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THE STUDENT'S MODERN EUROPE.

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A HISTORY
OF
MODERN EUROPE.

FROM THE CAPTURE OF CONSTANTINOPLE, 1453, TO THE TREATY OF BERLIN, 1878.

BY RICHARD LODGE, M.A.,
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HENRY MORSE STEPHENS

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

THE reception which has been accorded to the first edition of the 'Student's Modern Europe' encourages me to hope that it has been found to fill in some measure a gap in educational literature. The subject is so large, and the difficulty of compressing it into a single volume so great, that a smaller measure of success would have been a sufficient consolation for the labour which it has involved.

With regard to the plan of the work, I have only to repeat what was stated in the previous edition. No attempt has been made to go fully into the domestic history of each state, except where, as in the case of the French Revolution, it has been of European importance. The history of England (which has been admirably treated in Professor Brewer's edition of 'The Student's Hume' in that series) has been purposely omitted, except so far as it is directly concerned with the history of the continental states. No single work has been taken as a basis of the book, but the best authorities, whether contemporary or not, have been carefully consulted.

By far the greatest difficulty has been that of arrangement. An attempt has been made to avoid the baldness of a chronological summary, and to group the history of the separate states round the central current of European affairs. This method has necessitated frequent repetitions, but I still believe them to be lesser evil of the two. And the necessary corrective has been supplied in a full chronological table which is inserted at the beginning of the book.

The alterations in the new edition are not numerous. Several slips, some of which were pointed out by reviewers, while others escaped their notice, have been corrected. I have to acknowledge the courtesy of those private correspondents who have taken the trouble to send suggestions and lists of misprints. A few genealogical tables, to illustrate special points in the history, have been inserted for the first time, and it is hoped that they may prove useful to the student. They might have been more numerous and complete but for the fact that the original limits of space have already been far exceeded.

RICHARD LODGE.

OXFORD, *February*, 1887.

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MODERN EUROPE.

INTRODUCTION.

Without denying the essential unity of history, it is not only convenient but possible to draw a fairly well-marked line between certain periods. Such a line is that which is usually drawn between ancient and modern history at the fall of Rome. It was not true that Roman civilization ceased to affect the world, but a number of new influences came into working with the barbarian invasions, which were sufficient to mark a new epoch. Very similar is the line which can be drawn between the middle ages and later times. The two differ in innumerable points, in art, philosophy, language, literature, and commercial principles. But the historian is pre-eminently concerned with the radical difference in men's conceptions of politics and society.

In the middle ages there was nothing which corresponds to the modern conception of the state as a nation. The political unit was not fixed as it is now, nor was it so large as now. In some places it was the feudal lord and his vassals, who were bound together by reciprocal duties of service and defence. Elsewhere it was the commune, the association of citizens under a more or less independent municipal government. In other places it was still smaller, the guild or voluntary association of men for some common object, either mercantile or religious. These and other similar bodies were the practical units of mediæval politics.

But in theory they were not units at all. The political theorist regarded the whole of Christendom as forming one state, at once religious and political. This was the result of the influence of the Roman Empire, which fascinated the barbarians who broke it to pieces. This idea of unity lay at the root of the Holy Roman Empire, which in theory still represented the universal rule of Rome, long after it had lost all practical power and even influence. The theory was rendered more fanciful by the separation of Church and State, unknown before the introduction of Christianity. The papacy rose side by side with the empire, and the mediæval world regarded itself as one state with two heads. The quarrels of emperors and popes did much to weaken the system which both represented. Thus in its theoretical unity and its practical division the political condition of Europe in the middle ages differed completely from that of our own times.

Its social condition differed no less. The unit was not smaller, but larger than it is now. The modern unit of society is the individual. In the middle ages the individual was powerless. He could only obtain separate importance as the holder of some office, as emperor, king, or bishop. Otherwise he must efface himself in a corporation. The social units of mediæval times were the families, guilds, and corporations, which were in some cases also political units, but which, even when they had begun to form part of some larger whole, continued to exist as the bases of social life.

Though the two periods are thus distinctly divided, it is not possible to fix any absolute date of division. The fall of Constantinople in 1453, which brought the Eastern Empire to an end, which spread Greek literature and culture in western Europe, and which made the Turks a first-rate European power, serves as a convenient landmark. But the transition from the middle ages was going on throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The most notable points in the great change are: (1) the decline of the empire and the papacy; (2) the rise of the people, and their acquisition of a share in political power; (3) the formation of nations; (4) the rise of monarchy.

(1.) The practical power of the empire had been weakened by its long struggle with the papacy; it was almost destroyed by the great interregnum (1251–72) which followed the fall of the Hohenstaufen. The accession of Rudolf of Hapsburg restored order, but the empire had sunk to an ordinary territorial lordship, or something even less. But the papacy did not reap the expected advantage from the fall of its old rival. The championship of the temporal power fell to other and stronger hands. Philip IV. of France defeated and humbled Boniface VIII. Boniface's successor, Clement V., transferred his residence from Rome to Avignon, and during a Babylonish captivity of seventy years (1305–77), the papacy was subservient to France. The enemies of France became the enemies of the pope. This gave a great impulse to that national opposition to the papacy which did much to direct the course of the Reformation. The return to Rome in 1377 was followed by the outbreak of the great schism (1373–1417). Two popes, one in Rome, and one in Avignon, claimed the allegiance of Christians. In 1409 the Council of Pisa elected a third pope. The Council of Constance terminated the schism by the election of Martin V. But his successor Eugenius IV. embarked in a quarrel with the Council of Basel (1431–1449), in which the papacy was victorious, though it never really recovered its strength. From this time the popes sink more and more into temporal rulers of the States of the Church.

(2.) As the empire and papacy declined, a new power, that of the people, rose into prominence. In most European countries the towns had early established their right to form part of the political assemblies. But within the towns themselves democratic movements were going on in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, The artisans revolted against the arbitrary rule of the merchants or city nobles. And gradually the conflict extended beyond the town-walls. The fourteenth century is an age of great popular movements. In 1291 the cantons of Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden formed their famous league. In 1315 their peasants defeated Leopold of Austria at Morgarten. Thus strengthened, the league extended itself and took in Lucerne in 1330, Zurich in 1350, Glaris, Zug and Berne in 1352. Thus was formed the league of the eight old cantons which in 1386 secured its independence by the victory of Sempach. Flanders was another important scene of popular progress. In 1302 the Flemish burghers defeated Philip IV. at Courtrai. The people found leaders in Jacob van Artevelde, the ally of Edward III., and Philip van Artevelde, who was ultimately slain at Rosbecque in 1382. In France Etienne Marcel headed a movement of the third estate in 1355, which aimed at first at constitutional reforms, but which degenerated into a selfish insurrection of the Parisian mob. This was accompanied in 1358 by the fearful peasant outbreak, called the Jacquerie. In England we find the Lollards teaching doctrines of democratic equality, and in 1381 the insurrection of Wat Tyler necessitated the enfranchisement of the villeins. In the fifteenth century we come to the greatest of these popular movements, that of the Hussites in Bohemia, which for twenty years threatened to proselytise by force, first Germany and then Europe. But it failed because it was too destructive, and because it offered no satisfactory substitute for the system which it attacked. These movements were by no means uniformly successful, but even when they failed they were not without results, and they testify to a general ferment, which is a sign of the breaking-up of old political forms.

(3.) With the rise of the people is intimately connected the rise of nations. Hitherto Europe had been mainly divided into classes Chivalry was pre-eminently a class institution. Knighthood was a link between the upper classes of all countries. A French and a German knight had more in common with each other than either had with a citizen or peasant of his own country. But this came to an end as the lower classes forced their way upwards. Europe began to be divided vertically, instead of, as before, horizontally. The rise of nations was the result of the gradual growth of common interests which bound together the inhabitants of certain countries in opposition to the class-interests which had hitherto kept them divided. The most vivid form of common interest is common danger, and the chief creator of such danger has always been war. Thus the Hundred Years' War created the French, and consolidated the English nation. In Spain the ancient and well-marked divisions of Castile, Aragon and Navarre proved very difficult to unite. The first impulse to union was the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella, who held the crowns of Aragon and Castile. They conquered Granada and crushed the Moors. Ferdinand annexed Navarre, but provincial jealousies continued to exist, and it was not till local life and independence had been stifled by the inquisition and the policy of Charles V. and Philip II., that the Spanish nation was crushed and created at the same time. Two countries, Germany and Italy, were complete exceptions to the rest of Europe. Germany, nominally united, was really a loose federation. Italy was the battle-ground for foreign powers, and had no unity of its own.

(4.) In all the nations which arose in Europe at the close of the middle ages, the growth of unity was accompanied by the rise of a strong monarchical power. The same causes were at work in both cases. The rise of the people, and the consequent weakening of class distinctions, as they aided the gradual union, so also they strengthened the central power. This was specially the case in France. There the crown allied itself with the third estate against the nobles, and thus raised itself till it could tyrannise equally over all classes. Foreign war too was as serviceable to monarchy as to nationality. Victory over the English enabled Charles V. and Charles VII. to found a power, which was rendered despotic by Louis XI. In England the whole course of events was different from that in France. But the result was not dissimilar. Lollard schemes of confiscation drove the church, formerly the champion of liberty, to the side of the crown. The nobles destroyed themselves in the Wars of the Roses. The commons by themselves were for a time powerless, and the Tudors established despotism. In Spain it was the successful wars, first against the Moors and then in Italy, that founded the power of the monarchy. The accession of Charles V. gave the crown the assistance of foreign territories. This power was ruthlessly employed by Charles and his son to crush more ancient and more firmly established liberties than existed in any other country in the middle ages. Germany and Italy are again exceptions. As they had no unity so they could have no strong central power.

The period of transition is also marked by a great social change, viz., the rise to importance of the individual. This change is closely connected with the so-called Renaissance, which in its essence was the assertion of the rights of the individual against the mediæval chains which had hitherto bound him down. Literature and art opened up a new career, over which the old restrictions had no control. The change was completed in the 16th century by the Reformation, which broke through the most oppressive trammels of the mediæval system.

These then are the chief points of the great change which inaugurated modern history. The empire and papacy, the representatives of the old theoretical unity, lost their influence. That unity was replaced by large and united nations under powerful monarchies. Feudalism, chivalry, and the class interests which those institutions represented, were weakened by the rise of the people. And lastly, a vigorous attack was made on the repressive influence of the old system by the growth of freedom of thought and individual liberty. One may also mention without comment, the rise of national churches and of national literatures; the military change which substituted infantry for cavalry; the invention of gunpowder, which gave a death-blow to military feudalism; and the great scientific and geographical discoveries which opened up a new world of thought and action.

CHAPTER I.

EUROPE IN THE LATTER HALF OF THE 15TH CENTURY.

Italy from 1453 to 1494.—§ 1. Decline of the imperial power. § 2. Milan under the Sforzas. § 3. Naples and Sicily under the House of Aragon. § 4. The Papacy; growth of nepotism. § 5. Florence under the Medici. § 6. Venice; policy of territorial aggression. II. Germany from 1453 to 1519.—§ 7. Union of royal and imperial power; decline of central authority. § 8. Chief principalities of Germany; the knights; the free cities; fatal results of German disunion; attempted reforms under Frederick III. § 9. Hungary, Bohemia, and Poland; Ladislaus Postumus and the siege of Belgrad; Hungary and Bohemia separated from Austria; George Podiebrad and Matthias Corvinus. § 10. Maximilian I.; reforms in the empire; advance of the House of Hapsburg. III. France from 1453 to 1494.—§ 11. Growth of the French monarchy; the dukes of Burgundy; the War of the Public Weal. § 12. Rivalry of Louis XI. and Charles the Bold; importance of Louis' reign. § 13. Regency of Anne of Beaujeu; Charles VIII. prepares for his Italian expedition. IV. Spain from 1453 to 1521.—§ 14. Divisions of Spain; Navarre; Aragon; Castile. § 15. Ferdinand and Isabella; fall of Granada; the royal family; Ferdinand's rule after Isabella's death. § 16. Accession of Charles I.; revolt of the Communes. V. Ottoman Empire, 1453 to 1520.—§ 17. Causes of Turkish success; conquests of Mohammed II.; Bajazet II.; lull in Turkish aggression. § 19. Selim I.; conquest of Syria and Egypt.

I. ITALY FROM 1453 TO 1494.

§ 1. Italy and Germany, the two countries whose history stands out in complete contrast to the rest of Europe, were connected together by the fact that both were nominally subject to the same power, the Holy Roman Empire. This was the chief cause that neither of them attained to national unity. The Empire, by its nature, could not be hereditary. Elective princes held their power on very precarious terms; they had none of the ordinary motives for extending that power; and the electors were able to extort concessions which secured their own independence. Moreover, the attempt to rule two such distinct countries did much to destroy any real authority over either.

It was in Italy that the imperial power first became a practical nullity. The Hohenstaufen were the last emperors who made a serious effort to rule the southern kingdom. The invasions of Henry VII. and of Lewis the Bavarian, only proved the vanity of such an effort. Charles IV. (1346–1378), the founder of the greatness of the Luxemburg house, with a self-control rare in that age, purposely left Italy to its fate. The decline of the imperial power enabled independent despots to establish their power in most of the Italian states. Nearly every city had its own petty dynasty, as the Estensi in Ferrara, the Gonzagas in Mantua, the Bentivogli in Bologna, and the Baglioni in Perugia. But the most important of the States subject to despotism were Milan in the north, and Naples and Sicily in the south.

§ 2. Milan was ruled from the beginning of the 14th century by the Visconti. In 1395, the emperor Wenzel gave to Gian Galeazzo Visconti the title of duke. But in 1447 his son Filippo Maria died without legitimate issue. After a short-lived effort to restore republican government, which failed through the jealousy of the neighbouring states, a successful military leader, Francesco Sforza, conquered Milan and established a new dynasty. His first task was to defend himself against Venice, the rival of Milan for the supremacy in northern Italy. But the news of the fall of Constantinople terrified the combatants, and the war was terminated by the peace of Lodi in 1454. From this time Francesco Sforza gave up his military career and devoted himself to the peaceful government of his duchy. His chief supports were the friendship of Louis XI. of France, and of the Florentine Cosimo de Medici. He also maintained a close alliance with the kings of Naples. His connection with France enabled Sforza to annex Genoa in 1464. This was his last great success; and he died in 1466 leaving Milan to his eldest son Galeazzo Maria. Galeazzo Sforza represents the worst type of an Italian despot; he was selfish, debauched, suspicious, and cruel. Fortunately the continued influence of his father's ministers kept him for some time to a peaceful policy. The French alliance was cemented by his marriage with Bona of Savoy, whose sister was the wife of Louis XI. But Galeazzo was rash enough to alienate Louis by an alliance with Charles the Bold. The defeat of the latter at Granson (1476) compelled him to sue for pardon which was contemptuously granted. After ten years of tyranny and misgovernment, he was assassinated by three of the citizens whom he had grievously injured. He left an infant son, Gian Galeazzo, under the guardianship of Bona of Savoy. The guiding spirit of the regency was Francesco Simonetta, formerly secretary to Francesco Sforza and the devoted adherent of the policy of his former patron. The regency was attacked by the brothers of the late duke, who were indignant at their exclusion from power. They were foiled by Simonetta's vigilance and forced to leave Milan. But Simonetta's adherence to the Medici roused powerful enemies. Ferdinand of Naples and Sixtus IV., who were anxious to crush Florence, determined, as a preliminary, to overthrow the Milanese regency. They encouraged Lodovico Sforza, the ablest of the exiled princes, to renew his intrigues. In 1479, Simonetta was imprisoned and put to death, Bona of Savoy was removed from the regency, and Lodovico Sforza became supreme in Milan as the guardian of Gian Galeazzo. Lodovico was personally timid, but endowed with more than Italian cunning. His ambition was to supersede his nephew and to make himself duke. His unscrupulous pursuit of this object was destined to bring the greatest disasters upon Italy and ultimately upon himself.

§ 3. Naples and Sicily, in the 11th century, had been formed into one kingdom under Norman rule. Two centuries later they had been conquered by Charles of Anjou, brother of Louis IX. of France, who was called in by the popes to oppose the Hohenstaufen. But in 1282, a revolt, known as the Sicilian Vespers, drove the French from Sicily, and gave that island to the house of Aragon. From this time Naples and Sicily were divided until the extinction of the original house of Anjou by the death of Joanna II. in 1435. Alfonso V., already king of Aragon, Sicily, and Sardinia, now obtained the crown of Naples after a contest with Réné le Bon of Provence, the representative of a second Angevin line which was descended from Louis, brother of Charles V., and which rested its claims not on descent but on adoption. Alfonso V., by his patronage of literature and art, and by maintaining Naples in unwonted peace, has earned from historians the title of "the Magnanimous." On his death in 1458, he left Aragon, Sicily, and Sardinia to his brother, John II., while Naples, as a more personal possession, he bequeathed to his natural son Ferdinand I. This arrangement was contested in Naples where the Angevin claim was revived. Réné le Bon resigned his pretensions to his son John of Calabria, who was at this time governor of Genoa for Charles VII. of France. At first John gained important successes. But other Italian powers were opposed to the establishment of French influence in Italy. Especially, Francesco Sforza, though formerly the enemy of the house of Aragon, now gave consistent support to Ferdinand. And John's failure was assured when Charles VII. was succeeded in 1461 by Louis XI., who regarded with jealousy the house of Anjou. In 1464 John left Italy and showed his sense of Louis' hostility by joining the league of French nobles against him. Ferdinand I. was now firmly established in Naples.

His foreign policy will be best noticed in connection with the history of other states. At home his rule was in the highest degree oppressive and tyrannical, especially after the association in the government of his son, Alfonso of Calabria. The treacherous cruelty with which these princes treated the Neapolitan barons was one among the many circumstances which helped to bring the French into Italy.

§ 4. The papacy occupied a unique position among Italian powers. From a very early time the popes had endeavoured to supplement their universal spiritual authority by obtaining the secular rule of Rome and the neighbouring territory. Their claims were based on donations, real or pretended, of Roman emperors and Frankish kings. Their temporal dominions may be regarded as legally established by the cession of Rudolf of Hapsburg, and included Rome itself, the Patrimony of St. Peter, Romagna, and the March of Ancona. But the withdrawal of the popes to Avignon (1305–1377) enabled nobles and towns nominally subject to them, to throw off their allegiance, and the states of the church fell into the wildest anarchy. Cardinal Albornoz, as papal legate, restored the suzerainty of the popes, but only by confirming local independence. The Great Schism (1378–1417) again reduced the papal authority to a shadow. Martin V. (1417–1431) re-established his government in Rome, but only by identifying his interests with those of the Colonnas, his own family. Eugenius IV. (1431–1447), who endeavoured to abase the Colonnas, was driven by them from the city. But while he resided in Florence, his legates, Vitelleschi and Scarampo, reduced Rome to submission. Under Nicolas V. (1447–1458) a last attempt to revive republican independence in Rome was put down, and the ring-leader, Stephen Porcaro, was put to death. From this time the temporal sovereignty of the popes produced its natural result, nepotism. Men who had no chance of founding a dynasty, and who, elected in their old age, could expect but a short tenure of power, made their first object the aggrandisement of their relatives. Only one or two, more magnanimous than the rest, were roused by the Turkish advance to energetic labours on behalf of Christendom.

Calixtus III. (1455–1458) conferred the cardinal's hat on his nephew, Rodrigo Borgia, who was destined to carry nepotism to its extreme, and to bring lasting discredit on the papacy. Pius II. (1458–1464), the famous Æneas Sylvius Piccolomini, redeemed a worldly and careless youth by devoted efforts to rouse the temporal princes to a crusade against the Turks. But the age of crusades was past; international jealousy and the desire of territorial aggrandisement were too powerful to allow any combination of

European powers in a joint enterprise. The Congress of Mantua (1459) proved a complete failure, and Pius had to content himself with renewing the war between Venice and the Turks. The old pope died on the beach at Ancona, whither he had proceeded to superintend in person the embarkation of the crusading fleet. Paul II. (1464–1471), himself a Venetian, was expected to give great assistance to his countrymen. But he was absorbed in secular interests, and he even aided the Turks by impelling Matthias Corvinus, the ally of Venice, to make war on the Bohemian heretics. His successor, Sixtus IV. (1471–1484), was one of the worst popes even of the 15th century. He had five nephews: Girolamo and Pietro Riario, Lionardo, Giuliano and Giovanni della Rovere. All of them were raised to distinction either within or without the church. For Girolamo Riario he obtained Imola and Forli; and the endeavour to carve out a principality for this favoured nephew involved Italy in wars which still more divided the country and prepared the way for foreign invasion. Innocent VIII. (1484–1492), far less active than his predecessor, is notorious as the first pope who openly acknowledged his own children. But he was content to enrich his son, Franceschetto Cibo, with the spoils of the Roman curia, without attempting to alienate papal territories in his favour. On Innocent's death, the most prominent aspirants to the tiara were Giuliano della Rovere, nephew of Sixtus IV., and afterwards pope as Julius II., and Ascanio Sforza, the younger brother of Lodovico. As neither could obtain the requisite majority, the cardinals allowed their votes to be purchased by Rodrigo Borgia, the nephew of Calixtus III., who in 1492 became pope with the title of Alexander VI.

§ 5. There were only two important states in Italy whose government was professedly republican, Florence and Venice. The liberties of Florence had long been undermined, first by the Albizzi (1378–1434), and afterwards by the Medici. Cosimo de Medici, the founder of the greatness of his family, headed the opposition to the Albizzi as the champion of the lower classes. In 1433 Rinaldo Albizzi procured the banishment of his rival. But during his absence a revolution took place, the Albizzi were driven into exile, and Cosimo returned from Venice to become the ruler of Florence. He was careful to disguise his supremacy by the maintenance of constitutional forms and by retaining the habits of life of a private citizen. He found his chief supports in the favour of the lower classes and the wealth which he obtained by commerce. He was a distinguished patron of art and literature. By maintaining friendly relations with Milan on the one side and Naples on the other, he was able to act as a mediator in Italian politics. He died in 1464, and the title of *pater patriæ* was inscribed upon his tomb. His son Piero (1464–9), who succeeded him in middle age, had to confront a confederacy of powerful citizens, who were jealous of the Medici supremacy. But though the conspirators were supported by Venice, always jealous of the commercial prosperity of Florence, they were defeated; and Piero, in spite of the ill-health which crippled him, left his family more powerful at his death than it had been at his accession.

Piero left two sons, Lorenzo and Giuliano, the elder of whom now became the ruler of Florence, and has obtained a great name in history. For nine years he governed in peace and prosperity. He was careful to follow his grandfather's policy, and to maintain the alliance with Milan and Naples. But his power was shaken and almost destroyed by a quarrel with Sixtus IV. Lorenzo had gone in person to congratulate the pope on his accession, and the Medici had been appointed receivers of the papal revenues. This good understanding did not last long. Sixtus gave the archbishopric of Pisa to Francesco Salviati, but Pisa was subject to Florence, and Lorenzo refused to recognise the appointment. A far more important cause of quarrel was the opposition of the Medici to the pope's schemes on behalf of Girolamo Riario. The Florentines were hostile to the creation of a new dynasty in Romagna, and when Sixtus wished to borrow money for the purchase of Imola, the Medici refused the loan. Their post at Rome was taken from them and given to the Pazzi, another and hostile Florentine family. But the pope, not content with this, wished to destroy the Medici supremacy in Florence. With his sanction a conspiracy was formed by Girolamo Riario, Salviati, and the Pazzi. It is doubtful whether the pope was cognisant of the scheme for assassinating the two brothers. On Palm Sunday, 1478, the attempt was made in the cathedral of Florence. Giuliano de Medici was slain, but the priests who had been specially chosen to commit the sacrilege of murder in a church, failed in their attack on Lorenzo, and he escaped, though wounded, to the sacristy. The city rose in his defence, and prompt vengeance was taken on the conspirators. Salviati, in his archiepiscopal robes, was hanged with his colleagues from the windows of the Palazzo Vecchio. The news of these events infuriated Sixtus IV., who excommunicated the Florentines, and concluded an alliance against them with Ferdinand of Naples. Thus the balance of the Italian states, which had been so dear to Cosimo de Medici and Francesco Sforza, was suddenly overthrown. Hitherto Milan, Florence, and Naples had stood together, and had been strong enough to maintain the peace against Venice and the papacy. Now Italy was geographically divided into two hostile leagues; in the north, Milan, Venice, and Florence; in the south, Naples and the pope.

In the war which followed Florence was reduced to the greatest straits. Venice was a feeble and vacillating ally; Milan rendered what assistance it could, but, as has been seen, the friendly government of Simonetta was weakened and overthrown by the intrigues of Ferdinand of Naples. Lorenzo de Medici relied with confidence on the support of France. Louis XI. sent Philippe de Commines to Florence, but an envoy without troops could effect nothing. Thus Florence was left to its own defence. Alfonso of Calabria took Siena and a number of the Florentine fortresses. But fortunately a coolness sprang up between the pope and his ally, and Lorenzo took advantage of this to pay a personal visit to Ferdinand. With him he concluded a separate treaty, which was at last reluctantly accepted by Sixtus IV. Florence was not yet out of danger, as Alfonso of Calabria tried to obtain permanent possession of Siena. But the capture of Otranto by the Turks in 1480 compelled the Neapolitan troops to withdraw for the defence of their own country.

The failure of the conspiracy of the Pazzi and the extrication of Florence from pressing danger, strengthened the hands of Lorenzo. He was now able to make his government more despotic, and to get rid of many of the popular forms which had hitherto hampered him. The citizens began to address him with a servility hitherto unknown, and Florence witnessed the establishment of a splendid court, which resembled while it surpassed the courts of the northern despots. Lorenzo was himself a poet of no mean capacity, and his munificent patronage of art and literature, while it benefited Italy and the world, has helped to give him too lofty a reputation. His abilities, both as a ruler and a diplomatist, were unquestionable. But his honesty was not above the conventional Italian standard, and by destroying Florentine freedom he helped to degrade the political life of Italy. Lorenzo found it impossible to combine, as Cosimo had done, the functions of a statesman and a man of business. As the political power of the Medici increased, their mercantile profits diminished, and there can be no doubt that Lorenzo employed the public funds to support his own failing credit. But his name was gratefully remembered in Italy as the successful advocate of peace. When war was inevitable he laboured to maintain the balance of power. His death in 1492, at the early age of 41, was felt as a national disaster, and his best fame is the general belief that had he lived longer he might have averted many of the subsequent troubles from Italy.

Lorenzo left three sons; Piero, who succeeded him, Giovanni, afterwards famous as pope Leo X., and Giuliano. His brother Giuliano, the victim of the Pazzi conspiracy, had left a natural son, Giulio, who plays a prominent though ill-fated part in later history as Clement VII. The Florentines were soon made conscious of the loss they had sustained. Piero de Medici was as rash as his father had been prudent. He irritated the citizens by his contemptuously public assumption of despotic authority. And his foreign policy was still more ruinous. Deserting the traditional policy of his family, he identified his interests wholly with Naples, and thus alienated Milan just at a time when the unity of Italy was required to avert a foreign invasion.

§ 6. Perhaps the most prominent of Italian states in the eyes of Europe was Venice. The stability of its institutions, its commercial wealth, and the success of its cautious policy, combined to dazzle both philosophers and practical politicians. The Venetian government was a close and suspicious oligarchy. Power was confined to those families whose names were inscribed in the Golden Book. But among them a number of institutions had been devised which gradually restricted executive power to fewer and fewer hands, and thus secured that secresy which the Venetians regarded as the highest object of government. In the 15th century the famous Council of Ten was supreme in Venice.

Ever since the fourth crusade (1204), Venice had held important possessions in Eastern Europe, and had enriched itself with the commerce of the Levant. But the advance of the Turks had diminished their territories and crippled their commerce. To compensate themselves for these losses in the east, they aimed at increasing their power in Italy. Under the famous doge, Francesco Foscari (1425–1457), they acquired large possessions, and contested with Milan the supremacy in northern Italy. But the acquisition of empire diverted the Venetians from their true task, and in the end proved fatal to their greatness.

When Constantinople fell, the Venetians were most immediately concerned in resisting the Turks. But the party of peace, which had opposed the aggressive policy of Foscari, had now the upper hand, and the republic concluded a separate treaty with Mohammed II., by which it expected to secure its own interests while sacrificing those of Europe. Soon afterwards Foscari, who had been already attacked through his son, was compelled to resign, and died as the bells were ringing to announce the election of a new doge. But the selfish policy of his opponents proved a failure. The Turks annexed Greece and most of the adjacent islands, and the Venetians were at last compelled to take up arms. In the war they met with great and almost unmixed reverses, and in 1479 they concluded the ignominious treaty of Constantinople, by which they surrendered great part of their territories, and consented to hold the rest as tributaries of the Sultan. It was but a slight compensation that they were able soon afterwards to annex Cyprus. The last king, James of Lusignan, had married a Venetian lady, Catharine da Cornaro, whom the republic adopted as a daughter. On the king's death (1473), the Venetians stepped in as guardians of the widow, and before long compelled her to abdicate in their favour.

The Venetians now devoted themselves to a policy of selfish aggrandisement in Italy. Always hostile to Naples, they were suspected, not without reason, of encouraging the Turks to attack Otranto. And in 1482 they commenced a wholly unprovoked war against their neighbour, the duke of Ferrara. Sixtus IV., hoping to turn a disturbance in Romagna to the profit of Girolamo Riario, allied himself with them. The Venetians seized the Polesine of Rovigo, and the duke of Ferrara was brought to the verge of ruin. But Lorenzo de Medici considered that the war threatened the balance of power, and formed a league for the defence of Ferrara with Ferdinand of Naples and Lodovico Sforza. Thus the old balance of the Italian states, which had been overthrown after the Pazzi conspiracy, was restored, a great triumph for Lorenzo's diplomacy. Sixtus, finding that he was excluded from all share in the Venetian spoils, joined the league, and Venice was reduced to great straits. But Lodovico Sforza had become suspicious of the Neapolitan rulers, who were inclined to support his nephew against him. He opened relations with the Venetian commander, Robert of San Severino, and negotiated the treaty of Bagnolo which closed the war in 1484. By this the Venetians retained the Polesine, and the duke of Ferrara was the only sufferer. Sixtus IV. was extremely chagrined at the news of the treaty, and died soon afterwards—as the lampooners would have it—of peace. In this war the Venetians had displayed a selfish contempt for Italian interests which boded ill for the country in its coming trials.

II. Germany from 1453 to 1519.

§ 7. Germany, like most of the European states, was subject to a king. He was chosen by seven electors, the Archbishops of Mainz, Köln, and Trier, the count palatine of the Rhine, the duke of Saxony, the margrave of Brandenburg, and the king of Bohemia. By a series of events, which it is beyond our province to trace, the German king had come to be regarded as the head of the Holy Roman Empire, the apex of the political system, as the pope was of the hierarchy.

He assumed the title of King of the Romans on election, and the higher title of Emperor after coronation by the pope. This combination of two offices in themselves distinct, had important results. The monarchy remained elective, because the highest temporal dignity on earth could hardly be confined to a single family. And the vague nature of the more lofty authority tended to make the royal power equally vague and indistinct. The German monarchy, in the early middle ages the strongest in Europe, had sunk by the 15th century to be the weakest and most neglected. The princes who nominally acknowledged the imperial authority had made themselves practically independent.

This had not taken place without numerous efforts to prevent it. Charles IV. (1346–1378), whose policy has long been an unsolved puzzle, tried to get rid of the profitless burden of the empire and to found a territorial monarchy like that in France and England. But he died before this could be accomplished, and his sons had neither the will nor the ability to complete his schemes. Under his successor Wenzel, a schism broke out (1400–1411) which was almost as fatal to the empire as the contemporary schism in the church to the papacy.

From this time the main interest of German history centres round the efforts which were made to form a federal union in place of the monarchy, and thus to repress disorder. The Hussite war gave a great impulse to such attempts, and notable changes were proposed, especially in 1427, by Frederick I., the first Hohenzollern margrave of Brandenburg. His scheme was to found an imperial standing army and to inaugurate regular assemblies and a system of common taxation. But he was foiled by the party among the princes which regarded anarchy as the best security for their own independence. In 1438 this party secured the election of Albert of Austria. From this time to the fall of the empire in 1806 it remained practically hereditary in the house of Hapsburg. This family represented devotion to dynastic interests, and did nothing for the unity of Germany. During the long reign of Frederick III. (1440–1494) that unity seemed likely to disappear altogether.

The German diet was a purely feudal assembly, and contained only direct tenants in chief of the empire. This secured the power of the princes, as their subjects had no share in the assembly. The piet was divided into three chambers which sat separately. The first comprised the six electors, excluding the king of Bohemia who took no part in the diet. Next came the princes, both lay and ecclesiastical, and thirdly, the deputies of the free imperial cities who had obtained a place in the diet in the 14th century, but were looked down upon by the other chambers.

§ 8. The most prominent of the German states were Brandenburg, Saxony, the Palatinate, Bavaria, Austria and Würtemberg. Brandenburg had been given by Sigismund in 1415 to the house of Hohenzollern, previously burgraves of Nuremberg, and the ancestors of the later kings of Prussia. Saxony, on the extinction of the male Welf line in 1422, hadfallen to the house of Wettin. This was now represented by two brothers, Ernest and Albert, who agreed in 1484 to divide their territories by the treaty of Leipzig. Ernest kept Saxe-Wittenberg and Thuringia with the electoral title, while Albert took the remaining territories with the title of duke. The Palatinate was held by the elder branch of the house of Wittelsbach. The death of Lewis IX. in 1449 left the country to an infant son Philip under the guardianship of his uncle Frederick. This Frederick the Victorious, who obtained a great reputation, was allowed on the plea of the troubled times to supplant his nephew in the electorate on condition that he would never marry. The emperor Frederick III. refused to ratify this agreement, and found an implacable opponent in the able and energetic elector. On the death of Frederick the Victorious in 1476, the Palatinate passed again to his nephew Philip. Bavaria was held by a younger branch of the same house of Wittelsbach, and was weakened at this time by division into three duchies, Ingolstadt, Landshut and Munich, The two former lines became extinct, and in 1502 Bavaria was reunited under Albert II. of Munich.

Austria, the most powerful of the non-electoral territories, had been acquired in the 13th century by Rudolf, count of Hapsburg in Swabia, who was also king of the Romans. His descendants had since occasionally held the empire, and from 1438 obtained uninterrupted possession of that dignity. But the most striking point in their history hitherto was their steady acquisition of territories in the east. One after another, Styria, Carinthia and Tyrol had been annexed, and for a time Hungary and Bohemia were subject to them. Like other German families, the Hapsburgs had often been weakened by the practice of subdivision, but under Frederick III. and his son Maximilian, all the family territories were reunited. From this time the Hapsburgs became a prominent European power. Würtemberg, previously a small country, was raised to the rank of a duchy in 1495 for Eberhard the elder.

It is obvious that German unity had little chance amidst the jarring interests of so many independent princes. But this was not the worst evil under which the country suffered. Below the princes were an important body of lesser nobles, the knights or Ritters. They claimed to be independent of any power except the empire. but they were excluded from the diet. Thus they had no interest in the general welfare and fought for their own hand. Living in stray and isolated castles, they organised a regular system of highway-robbery which destroyed peaceful industry. At the same time by incessant feuds with the princes and among themselves they kept the country involved in civil strife.

The free cities were the most progressive and promising elements of German political life. Many of them had acquired great wealth, which with their fortifications made them important. But the opposition of their interests to those of the princes and knights compelled them to pursue a selfish policy, and thus they too were a hindrance rather than a help to the unity of Germany.

The evil results of German division were clearly visible in the gradual falling away of border-territories, and in the aggressions of foreign princes. Italy had already gone. When Frederick III. went to Rome in 1452 to receive the imperial crown, he was compelled to go without an armed retinue and to leave the country directly after the ceremony. The Swiss cantons, which had established their independence in opposition to the Hapsburgs, would pay no obedience to the empire while it was held by that house. In the north the Hanseatic League, which was strong enough to overcome both Scandinavian kings and German princes, stood practically outside the empire. The kings of Poland gained constant successes against the Teutonic knights, who in 1466 were compelled to cede great part of their territories and to hold the rest under Polish suzerainty. But the most considerable losses of Germany were in the west. The dukes of Burgundy, members of the royal family of France, had obtained, by marriage, conquest or cession, a number of imperial provinces, which they annexed to large French possessions. There was little doubt that Charles the Bold (1466–1477) intended to fuse these provinces into an independent kingdom, and was only prevented by a series of unforeseen accidents which terminated in his death.

In the face of these disasters and the still graver dangers which were threatened by the Turks, Frederick III. remained obstinately inactive. The princes, who had elected him mainly on account of his inactivity, began to repent when they discovered that they were left defenceless. A scheme was formed to depose him and to elect George Podiebrad, the Hussite king of Bohemia. But in face of this common danger, those old rivals, the empire and the papacy, formed a close alliance, and the scheme fell through. But the desire for reform had been roused and could not now be suppressed, though it was diverted to another direction. As the emperor would do nothing, the task of reform fell upon the estates. The first need was to put an end to private wars, and the measure known as the

Public Peace was passed by successive diets from 1466 to 1486. But it was found to be of little use to make laws while there was no machinery to enforce them. An attempt was therefore made in 1486 to extort from Frederick III. the establishment of a central judicial court, the Imperial Chamber. But Frederick clung obstinately to his traditional rights, and succeeded in postponing reform during his lifetime. Some success, however, was attained. In 1488 the Swabian League was formed of princes, knights and citizens to decide disputes by arbitration. In 1492 the league, supported by the empire, gained a great success in compelling Albert II. of Bavaria to cede territories which he held unlawfully.

The reign of Frederick III. is of primary importance in the history of the house of Hapsburg. By marrying his son Maximilian to Mary, the heiress of Burgundy (1477), he founded the European greatness of his family. But in spite of this and other successes, in his personal relations with his subjects and his neighbours he was hardly more fortunate than in the empire.

§ 9. In the fifteenth century the eastern kingdoms, Hungary, Bohemia, and Poland had an importance quite out of proportion to their present condition. This was due, in the case of Hungary, to its position as a barrier against the Turks, in the case of Bohemia and Poland, to the great conflict between the Germans and the Slavs. In the eleventh century the Slavs occupied northern Germany almost to the North Sea. From this territory they had been gradually driven eastwards, first by the dukes of Saxony, then by the Hanse towns, and lastly by the Teutonic knights, who occupied Prussia. Thus the southern coast of the Baltic became German. But in the fifteen century the tide of victory turned. The house of Jagellon obtained Poland in 1386, and undertook the championship of the Slavs. From this time they were engaged in constant war with the Teutonic Order. The Hussite movement in Bohemia was to a great extent a national revolt against German influences. The height of the Slavonic reaction was reached in 1466, when the peace of Thorn annexed great part of Prussia to Poland.

The Emperor Albert II. (1438–9) had been the first to unite Hungary and Bohemia to Austria. But he died within two years of making this acquisition, and his only son, Ladislaus Postumus, was not born till after his death in 1440. Austria and Bohemia acknowledged the infant prince, but the Hungarians, under the influence of John Huniades, chose Ladislaus VI. of Poland. The Polish king was killed in 1444 at the battle of Varna, and Hungary also acknowledged Ladislaus Postumus, who had been placed under the guardianship of Frederick III. It was not till 1453 that he became independent at the age of fourteen. Hungary and Bohemia remained under regents, John Huniades and George Podiebrad. Ladislaus himself fell under the influence of an Austrian noble, the Count of Cilly, who tried to make him jealous of the other governors, especially of Huniades. But the latter's presence in Hungary was now a European necessity. Mohammed II., who had paused after the capture of Constantinople in 1453, resumed his advance, and in 1456 laid siege to Belgrad. Belgrad stands at the junction of the Danube and the Save, and its capture would have opened to the Turks, not only Hungary but the whole of Germany to the Rhine. At this crisis Huniades, assisted by a friar Capistrano, but neglected by the European princes, raised an untrained and ill-equipped force. With this he first destroyed the Turkish fleet on the Danube, and having thus secured an entrance to the fortress, he repulsed the assault of the whole Turkish army. Mohammed II., completely defeated, fled to Sofia. Soon after this marvellous success, Huniades died, leaving two sons Ladislaus and Matthias. The elder son murdered Cilly, the king's favourite, at Belgrad, and for this was put to death in 1477. The younger, Matthias, was carried a prisoner to Prague. There, in the midst of preparations for his marriage with Madeleine, daughter of Charles VII. of France, Ladislaus Postumus died of the plague (Dec. 1457). His death severed the connection of Hungary and Bohemia with Austria for more than half a century.

Austria being a male fief, passed without question to the three surviving Hapsburg princes, and ultimately to Frederick III. But in Bohemia and Hungary the settlement of the succession was far more difficult. Ultimately it was decided to pass over all dynastic claims, whether based upon treaties or hereditary right. Hungary, to show its sense of the heroic and ill-requited services of Huniades, elected his surviving son Matthias Corvinus. Bohemia, in defiance of German claims and in still more open defiance of the papacy, gave the crown to the Utraquist leader, George Podiebrad.

Matthias Corvinus emulated the achievements of his father as the champion of Europe against the Turks. But unfortunately he became involved in quarrels with his neighbours. Ecclesiastical intolerance could not endure a Hussite on the Bohemian throne. Pope Paul II. issued a bull deposing Podiebrad, and entrusted its execution to Matthias. The war between Hungary and Bohemia was still going on when Podiebrad died in 1471. The Bohemians, to obtain the support of the other Slavs, now elected Wladislaus, the son of the king of Poland. Matthias himself claimed the crown and carried on the war with great vigour. Frederick III., who had been his ally, deserted him to go over to Wladislaus. In 1479, the treaty of Olmütz was concluded between Hungary and Bohemia, by which Lausitz, Moravia and Silesia were ceded to Matthias. He now turned his arms against Austria and, in 1485, captured Vienna. The lord of the world became an exile from his own capital. Under Matthias, Hungary reached the zenith of its power. He died in 1490, and his subjects elected as his successor his former rival, Wladislaus of Bohemia. Maximilian, Frederick III.'s son, now recovered Vienna, and even invaded Hungary, but without permanent result. In 1491 the treaty of Pressburg restored all Austrian territories to Frederick III., and the succession in Hungary and Bohemia was secured to the Hapsburgs on the extinction of the male descendants of Wladislaus.

§ 10. Soon afterwards Frederick III. died in August, 1493. Maximilian, who was already lord of the Netherlands by his marriage with Mary of Burgundy, and who had been elected King of the Romans in his father's lifetime, now obtained the empire and all the Austrian territories. The accession of a young and vigorous prince gave a new impulse to the schemes of reform which had been foiled by the obstinacy of Frederick III.

In 1495 Maximilian summoned the important diet of Worms. He himself wanted money to oppose the French in Italy, and the estates, under the guidance of the elector Berthold of Mainz, took advantage of his needs to demand constitutional concessions. A general tax, the "Common Penny," which had been one of the schemes of 1427, was now imposed in proportion to the population. Its collection and expenditure were entrusted, not to the emperor, but to nominees of the estates. The Public Peace was again enjoined, and to enforce it a great reform was made in the supreme court of justice. Hitherto it had always followed the emperor, and its members had been appointed by him. It was now fixed in a definite place, its members were appointed by the diet, and the president alone was nominated by the emperor. This reformed court, the Imperial Chamber, plays a great part in later German history.

But these reforms did not produce immediate results of importance. Maximilian had only accepted them to further his foreign policy. As that policy proved unsuccessful, he was by no means anxious to fulfil his engagements and to weaken his personal power. Constant struggles ensued between him and Berthold of Mainz, the leader of the constitutional party. In 1502 fresh concessions were extorted from the king. A Council of Regency (*Reichsregiment*) was entrusted with the chief executive power, and its composition was based on representation of the estates. Six circles were formed, each of which sent a count and a bishop to the Council. Austria and the Netherlands sent two representatives, and later two deputies from the cities were admitted. The president was chosen by the emperor. Maximilian was by no means sincere in this reform. He set himself to gain over a party among the princes, and before long the Council of Regency ceased to sit, though it was revived in the next reign. The only other important change effected under Maximilian was the extension of the division into circles, which had been primarily adopted to regulate representation in the council of regency. About 1512 Germany was divided into ten circles, viz., Franconia, Bavaria, Swabia, the Upper Rhine, and Lower Saxony, the six circles formed in 1502, with Brandenburg and Saxony, the Rhenish electorates, Austria and Burgundy. In each of these a captain was appointed to enforce the execution of the laws.

Maximilian's foreign politics, which play so great a part in his personal history, concern the history of Italy or of France rather than of Germany. His reign is remarkable for two things, the reforms in the empire, to which he was distinctly opposed, and the advance of the house of Hapsburg, to which he greatly contributed. By his own marriage he obtained Franche-Comté and the Netherlands, over which he retained his hold in spite of great difficulties. By marrying his son Philip to Joanna, the daughter of Ferdinand and Isabella, he not only secured an important alliance but prepared for his descendants the Spanish succession. He recovered the Austrian provinces from Hungary. He stipulated by treaties for the Hapsburg succession in Hungary and Bohemia, and facilitated it in 1516 by marrying his grandson Ferdinand to Anne, the daughter of Wladislaus.

For the empire Maximilian did little. He did not re-establish his authority in Italy; or enforce it in Switzerland. He could not even obtain from the pope that coronation which would give him the legal title of emperor. But in 1502 he assumed the title without the ceremony, and thus set an example which was followed by his successors. In 1519, Maximilian I. died, and Germany entered upon a new epoch.

III. FRANCE FROM 1453 TO 1494

§ 11. The French monarchy grew up from very humble beginnings. The early Capet kings had exercised direct power only over Paris and the surrounding country. The great territorial lords had hardly acknowledged a nominal allegiance. But gradually the crown had extended its judicial power and encroached on baronial independence. One after another the great provinces fell in or were conquered. The English wars, which seemed at one time to jeopardise the very existence of France, ultimately strengthened both the national unity and the royal power. Charles VII., with little ability of his own, was enabled by circumstances to do more for the monarchy than any of his predecessors. The gradual expulsion of the English, which was completed in 1453, gave him a firm hold on popular affection; while the necessity for peace and order generated a desire to increase the power of the crown. In 1439 the States-General of Orleans gave the king the right to form the *gens d'ordonnance*, the first germ of a standing army. To support this force he was allowed to levy and collect a perpetual tax, the *taille.* Thus the control of the purse, the essential basis of constitutional rights, was surrendered of their own accord by the national representatives. A revolt on the part of the nobles was put down, and Charles VII., dying in 1461, left the crown to his eldest son, Louis XI.

Of the old French territorial fiefs, Brittany alone retained its independence. But as the fiefs had fallen in, a dangerous custom prevailed of granting them out again to members of the royal family. Thus was founded the great house of Burgundy, which came to rival and almost to overshadow the power of the monarchy, John II. gave the duchy of Burgundy in 1363 to his fourth son Philip. By marriage Philip obtained Flanders, Artois, and the county of Burgundy. His grandson, Philip the Good, made further acquisitions. Brabant, Holland, Zealand, Hainault, Luxemburg and a number of other provinces which afterwards formed the Netherlands, were brought under his rule. By allying himself with England, Philip rendered possible Henry V.'s conquest of France. Charles VII. had to purchase his support at the Treaty of Arras (1435), by ceding to him Picardy and the border-towns on the Somme.

By a series of rash acts on his accession, Louis XI. alienated almost all the French nobles. But his most serious quarrel was with Burgundy. By gaining over the ministers of Philip the Good, he procured the restitution of the Somme towns on payment of 400,000 crowns. This roused the bitter hostility of Charles of Charolais, Philip's son and heir. In his wrath, Charles drove his father's ministers from court, and joined the League of the Public Weal, which was formed by the French nobles to restrict the royal power. The other chief members of the league were Charles of Berry, the king's brother, and the dukes of Brittany and Bourbon. Louis XI. at once attacked Bourbon, but meanwhile his other enemies surrounded Paris. Hurrying back, Louis fought an indecisive battle at Mont l'héry, and entered the capital. But he was compelled to yield the demands of the league at the peace of Conflans (1465). Charles of Berry was to receive the important duchy of Normandy, the loss of which would cripple the monarchy. Charles the Bold recovered the Somme towns.

§ 12. This great defeat taught Louis to employ diplomacy rather than force, and to divide his enemies instead of uniting them by aggression. A quarrel between the dukes of Berry and Brittany enabled him to recover Normandy. But from the first he recognised his great enemy in Charles the Bold, who in 1467 became duke of Burgundy by the death of his father. To weaken him Louis stirred up the town of Liège to frequent revolts. But in 1468 he incautiously placed himself in his rival's power at Perronne, and was again compelled to sign an ignominious treaty. He had to assist in person at the reduction of Liège, and to cede the provinces of Champagne and Brie to Charles of Berry. But seeing the danger of allowing his brother to fall under the influence of Burgundy, Louis induced him to accept instead the duchy of Guienne.

A new war between France and Burgundy was soon commenced by the intrigues of a French party which wished to force on a marriage of Charles the Bold's daughter with Charles of Guienne. The latter had lost the prospect of succession to the throne by the birth of a dauphin in 1471. The projected marriage would have placed Louis in a dangerous position, but he was saved by the opportune death of his brother in 1472. Guienne now reverted to the crown, and a truce was made with Charles the Bold, which events converted into a peace.

The year 1472 marks a complete change in the policy of Charles the Bold. Hitherto he had played the part of an independent French vassal, and his chief object had been the weakening of the royal power. Henceforth he devotes his attention to his German provinces, and seeks to consolidate his disjointed dominions into a powerful kingdom. From Sigismund of Tyrol, a member of the house of Hapsburg, he had obtained Elsass and the Breisgau in 1469, and soon afterwards he annexed the province of Gelderland. In 1473 he had an interview at Trier with Frederick III., by whom he hoped to be made a king, but the cautious emperor escaped by night down the Moselle. In the next year Charles laid siege to Neuss on the Rhine, of which river he hoped to make himself master. When at last he was compelled to raise the siege, he employed his troops in conquering Lorraine, the province which was required to unite the Netherlands with Burgundy.

All this time the hostility of Louis XI. was none the less active that it was not displayed in open war. He stirred up Frederick III. and the German princes to defend Neuss. He urged Sigismund of Tyrol to reclaim Elsass. But his greatest success lay in convincing the Swiss, partly by argument and partly by bribes, that Charles' progress was dangerous to their independence. To divert the attention of the French king, Charles induced Edward IV. to invade France, but the indolent English king was bought off by the treaty of Pecquigny (1475). The Swiss had attacked Burgundy during the siege of Neuss, and in the attempt to avenge this insult, Charles the Bold wrecked his power. He suffered crushing defeats at Granson and Morat, and the victorious Swiss aided René II. to recover Lorraine. In a desperate effort to retake Nancy, the capital of the duchy and the intended capital of the kingdom he dreamt of forming, Charles the Bold was killed on January 5th, 1477. His heir was his only daughter, Mary.

Louis, overjoyed at the death of his rival, set to work to reap advantage from the event. His most feasible plan would have been to marry Mary of Burgundy to the dauphin or to some prince of the royal house. But this would not satisfy the jubilant king, who determined to break up the Burgundian power altogether. His plan was to annex all the French territories to the crown, and to divide the German provinces among friendly German princes. He at once seized the Somme towns, the duchy of Burgundy, and great part of Artois. But this avowed hostility drove Mary into a marriage with Maximilian, Frederick III.'s son, who at once armed in defence of his wife's dominions. The war, distinguished only by the indecisive battle of Guinegate, was ended by the treaty of Arras (1482) after Mary's death. Maximilian's daughter, Margaret, was promised in marriage to the dauphin Charles, and Artois and the county of Burgundy were to form her dowry. Margaret was sent to be brought up in France.

Louis XI. was already worn out by disease, and he died in 1483. His reign marks an epoch in the history of France, and especially in the history of the monarchy. The last great revolt of the feudal barons was completely put down. By annexing Burgundy, and the county of Provence, Louis extended the territorial power of the crown. By the acquisition of Roussillon from John II. of Aragon, he gave France a strong frontier on the side of the Pyrenees. By his alliance with the Swiss, he procured for the monarchy the support of the first military power of the day. By instituting regular posts, he improved the communication between the different parts of the kingdom, and gave increased centralisation to the government. At the same time he systematically depressed the nobles by the elevation to office of members of the lower classes. His personal character presents a curious combination of great political ability with the weakest superstition. His reign terminated the middle ages in France, and gave that country a modern administrative system.

§ 13. Charles VIII. succeeded his father at the age of twelve. During his minority, the government was placed by the States-General in the hands of his sister, Anne of Beaujeu. She followed out with equal ability and success her father's policy. A revolt of the nobles, headed by the duke of Orleans, was suppressed, and the duke, although heir apparent to the crown was imprisoned. To prevent, the nobles from receiving aid from Richard III., Anne encouraged Henry Tudor in the invasion of England which ended in the battle of Bosworth (1485). The regent also prepared the way for the annexation of the last of the great French provinces. Francis II. of Brittany died in 1488, leaving the duchy to his daughter Anne. Her hand was sought and obtained by Maximilian, who was married to her by proxy. But Anne of Beaujeu saw the danger to France of such a union, and by a well-timed invasion of Brittany compelled the duchess to marry Charles VIII. Thus a double wrong was done to Maximilian; his wife was taken from him, and his daughter Margaret, who had been brought up in France as its destined queen, was ignominiously sent back. As soon as he had settled affairs in Austria, he armed for a war with France.

The regency now came to an end, and Charles assumed the government of his kingdom. The strength which France had attained under his father and sister, Charles determined to employ in the enforcement of dynastic claims in Italy. But first he had to settle the differences with his neighbours so as to avoid attack during his absence. Henry VII., alienated by the annexation of Brittany, was conciliated by the treaty of Etaples (1492). With Maximilian Charles concluded the peace of Senlis (1493), by which Margaret's dowry, Artois and Franche-Comté, were restored. To Ferdinand of Aragon Charles ceded the disputed province of Roussillon by the treaty of Barcelona (1493). Having thus, as he thought, secured France from danger, he crossed the Alps on his way to Naples in September, 1494.

IV. SPAIN FROM 1453 TO 1521.

§ 14. It was not till the end of the 15th century that Spain began to assume the position of a European power. Hitherto all its energies had been absorbed in the great contest with the Moors. The contest had not resulted in the union of the Christian inhabitants of the peninsula. On the contrary, the various provinces, Navarre, Aragon, Castile and Portugal, remained obstinately opposed to each other. And within each province there was equal disunion. Liberty had been developed earlier and more completely in Spain than elsewhere. In Castile and Aragon the Cortes possessed great power, and in the latter kingdom there existed an officer called the Justiza, whose authority almost overshadowed that of the Crown. But it was fatal to Spain that the interests of classes always clashed. Especially destructive were the quarrels between the nobles and the citizen class. It was certain that as soon as the monarchy was strong enough to take advantage of these divisions, it could crush constitutional liberty.

The little kingdom of Navarre, in the north-eastern corner of the peninsula, is important only as a link between France and Spain. At the opening of this period it had become connected with Aragon, through the marriage of Blanche, heiress of Navarre, with John, viceroy of Aragon for his brother Alfonso V. They had one son, Charles of Viana, who on his mother's death ought to have inherited the crown of Navarre. But he was kept out by his father, who was under the influence of a second wife, Joanna Henriquez. The result was a war between father and son, which was ended by the sudden death of Charles of Viana in 1461, not without suspicions of poison. The prince, whose early death was much lamented by his subjects, left two sisters, Blanche and Eleanor. The elder was imprisoned at Orthez, where she was poisoned in 1464. Eleanor, the reputed murderess, was married to Gaston de Foix, and brought Navarre to her husband's family. But the kingdom again passed into female hands, and through a granddaughter of Eleanor's, it came under the rule of the house of d'Albret, from whom it was conquered in 1512 by Ferdinand the Catholic.

Aragon, on the death of Alfonso V., passed to his brother John II. His reign was a period of incessant warfare. The province of Catalonia had been united to Aragon in 1137, but never thoroughly amalgamated. The Catalans had been warm partisans of Charles of Viana. They rebelled against John, and besieged his wife in Barcelona. To obtain assistance from France, John pledged the counties of Roussillon and Cerdagne to Louis XI. As the pledge was not redeemed, the provinces were annexed to France till their restitution in 1493 by the treaty of Barcelona. The Catalans offered the crown to Réné of Anjou, and he accepted it for his son John of Calabria, the knight-errant of the 15th century. He appeared in Catalonia and was crowned, but his adventurous career was closed by his death in 1469. In 1472 John II. suppressed the rebellion and re-entered Barcelona. He became involved in a war with France for the re-conquest of Roussillon, but was unsuccessful, and died at an advanced age in 1479. The crown of Aragon fell to Ferdinand, the son of the second wife.

In Castile the year 1454 witnessed the death of John II., patron of the famous but unfortunate minister, Alvaro de Luna. His son and successor Henry IV. received the nickname of the Impotent, and his reign is one scene of anarchy. He divorced his first wife Blanche of Navarre, and married Joanna, sister of Alfonso V. of Portugal. In 1462 the queen gave birth to a daughter Joanna, but there was a general conviction that she was illegitimate. So strong was this feeling that the nobles forced Henry to disinherit her in favour of his brother Alfonso. When the king tried to break this agreement, a party of the nobles deposed him with theatrical pomp at Avila, and declared Alfonso king in his place. A civil war ensued, in the midst of which Alfonso died (1468). Henry IV. was again acknowledged, but on condition that the crown should pass after his death to his sister Isabella. In 1469 Isabella married Ferdinand, son of John II. of Aragon. The marriage was displeasing to the king and to many of the Castilians; and a new effort was made to secure the crown to Joanna. But on Henry IV.'s death in 1474, Isabella was raised to the throne, and though Joanna's uncle, Alfonso V. of Portugal, armed in defence of his niece, he was completely unsuccessful.

§ 15. The marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella founded the unity of Spain. In 1479 the former succeeded his father in Aragon, and the most important kingdoms of the peninsula were brought under one government. To cement the newly-formed union, and to divert the attention of malcontent subjects, the new monarchs embarked in a grand crusade against the Moors, who still held the southern districts of Spain. In 1492 the war was brought to a triumphant end by the conquest of Granada, an event which did more than anything else to give strength to the central government. But the subject population was the reverse of homogeneous. The policy of the sovereigns was to base political upon religious unity. To this policy was due the establishment of the famous Inquisition, which was sanctioned by a bull of Sixtus IV. in 1482. The Inquisition, in spite of its religious duties, was a royal rather than a papal institution, and in later times it was employed as a formidable and efficient support of despotism. But it was fatal to the real greatness of Spain. The two most industrious and progressive elements of its population, the Jews and the Moors, were either expelled or crushed by religious persecution.

In spite of these blots on their policy, the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella is a great epoch in the history of Spain. Geographical discoveries gave them magnificent dominions in the new world. People began to speculate as to the probable heir of this magnificent inheritance. There were five children of the marriage, a son, John, and four daughters, Isabella, Joanna, Catharine, and Mary. The daughters were used as instruments of foreign policy. A natural object was the union of Portugal with the rest of Spain. To facilitate this, Isabella was married to Alfonso, prince of Portugal. On his death, the widow was married to his kinsman, Emmanuel, who became king of Portugal in 1495. Isabella herself died in giving birth to a child in 1498, but to keep up the connection with Spain, Emmanuel was induced to marry her younger sister, Mary. The second daughter, Joanna, became the wife of Philip, only son of Maximilian, and this important marriage brought to the Hapsburgs the crown of Spain. Catharine was married to Arthur, eldest son of Henry VII., and after his death to his brother, Henry VIII. To cement the alliance with the Hapsburgs, Ferdinand and Isabella brought about a marriage between their only son, John, and Margaret, Maximilian's daughter, formerly betrothed to Charles VIII. of France. But John died a few months afterwards (1497), and Margaret gave birth to a dead child. These events left the succession to the daughters, and, on the death of the eldest, to Joanna, the wife of the Archduke Philip.

In 1504 Ferdinand was brought into grave difficulties by Isabella's death. She had left to Ferdinand the regency of Castile for their daughter, Joanna; but it was doubtful whether this would be endured by Joanna's husband. Philip and Joanna came over from the Netherlands in 1505, and the former, supported by a large party among the nobles, compelled his father-in-law to resign the regency, and to withdraw to Aragon. But in the course of the next year Philip died, leaving two infant children, Charles and Ferdinand, both destined to play a great part in history. Joanna's intellect, never very powerful, was completely overclouded by her husband's death, and Ferdinand was enabled to resume the government of Castile. In his wrath at Philip's conduct, and his anxiety to keep him out of the succession to Aragon, he had concluded a second marriage in 1505 with Germaine de Foix. But there were no children by the marriage.

As king of Sicily, Ferdinand was closely connected with Italian politics. In 1504, his general, Gonsalvo de Cordova had conquered Naples. Cardinal Ximenes, the greatest of Spanish subjects, made extensive annexations on the coast of Africa, and in 1512 Ferdinand himself annexed Navarre. Thus the Spanish inheritance became more extensive and imposing than ever. In his later days Ferdinand began to feel jealous of his successor. He even cherished the idea of disinheriting his elder in favour of his younger grandson, but nothing came of it. In 1516 the Catholic king died, and Charles I. became king of Spain, while his mother, Joanna, though still living, was disregarded by her own son.

§ 16. In the next few years Spain passed through an important crisis. The energetic and centralised government of Ferdinand and Isabella had aroused grave discontent, especially among the nobles. The accession of a young and inexperienced prince seemed to offer a favourable opportunity of regaining the privileges and the independence that had been lost. Had they succeeded, the newly-formed unity of Spain must have perished. From this the country was saved by the zeal and energy of one man, Cardinal Ximenes, Archbishop of Toledo. He undertook the government, put down the malcontent nobles, and enabled Charles to receive the crown with its powers undiminished. For these invaluable services he was treated with more than royal ingratitude, and he died in 1517 without seeing the prince for whom he had saved a kingdom.

Charles I. of Spain, afterwards the emperor Charles V., had been born at Ghent in 1500. He had been brought up in the Netherlands, without any knowledge of other countries, and surrounded by flatterers. This education obscured, though it did not destroy, his natural talents for government. He soon undid all the work of Ximenes. By his reckless promotion of Flemish favourites he disgusted the nobles, by his despotism and his demands for money he alienated the citizens. The general discontent found expression in 1520 in a great rebellion of the Spanish communes. Fortunately for the king the old jealousies between nobles and citizens prevented any union between them, the rebellion was put down, and its heroic leader, Juan de Padilla, was executed in 1521. But before this date Charles had been elected to the empire, and Spain entered upon a wholly new position in Europe.

V. OTTOMAN EMPIRE, 1453–1520.

§ 17. The Ottoman Turks established an independent power in Asia Minor, on the ruins of the Seljukian empire. Internal disputes among the Greeks gave them their first footing in Europe in the middle of the fourteenth century. From this time their progress was incessant. Gradually the Greek emperors lost all their dominions except their capital, Constantinople, which was saved only by the strength of its position. In 1402 the city must have fallen but for the defeat of the Sultan Bajazet I. at Angora, by the Tartars under Timour. The Turks recovered their shaken power with marvellous rapidity. In 1453, Mohammed II., the seventh of the sultans, and the greatest conqueror of his age, took Constantinople, and the last of the Greek emperors, Constantine Palæologus, perished in a heroic defence of his capital. The cause of the Turkish successes in Europe is to be found, partly in the self-sacrificing heroism inspired by their religion, but still more in the superiority of their civil and military administration. This was based on their employment of slaves. Besides the captives taken in war, a regular tax of children was imposed on the conquered peoples. These children were subjected to a rigorous education, comparable only to that of the Jesuits. As they grew up they were divided into two classes. Those who showed intellectual vigour were drafted into the civil service, where they formed a body of perfectly trained and submissive administrators. Those who were distinguished by physical strength were added to the famous corps of Janissaries, long the backbone of the Turkish armies. It was this complete organisation, under the absolute control of a single will, which made the Turks so vastly superior to the imperfectly united nations of Europe.

The fall of Constantinople made a profound impression in Europe. The bolder and more sanguine spirits urged the union of the western princes in a new crusade. But it was soon evident that the age of crusades was long past. Special and national interests were too absorbing to allow the various nations to combine even for a common object. It soon became evident that resistance to the Turks would be left to those powers which were most immediately affected. And even they were in no hurry to provoke a conflict. The Venetians, afraid of interruption to their commerce, concluded a treaty with the Sultan in 1454.

Mohammed II. showed no immediate eagerness to extend his conquests. His first care was to settle the government of his new capital. He did all in his power to encourage the Greeks to reside. He promised his protection to the neighbouring princes who were willing to pay tribute. But even had he wished to stop short in the work of conquest, events were too strong to allow him to do so. From 1455 onwards his reign was one of ceaseless military activity, of which it is only possible to give a brief summary. He annexed the province of Servia, but his further progress westwards was arrested by the relief of Belgrad in 1456. In the south he was more successful. The duchy of Athens was taken from the Florentine family of Acciajuoli. George and Demetrius, two survivors of the house of Palæologus, were driven out of the Morea, and the whole of the peninsula was annexed except the few possessions of Venice. One after another Lesbos and other islands in the Ægean were conquered. Successful resistance was made only by the knights of Rhodes, the outpost of Christendom, and by Scanderbeg, the Albanian hero. All this time Mohammed II. was engaged in constant wars in Asia Minor, where he conquered the prince of Caramania, the old rival of the Ottomans. The Sultan was also occupied with the reduction of the Danubian principalities. In 1462 he annexed Wallachia. In the next year he overran Herzegovina and Montenegro, and in 1464 he completed the conquest of the kingdom of Bosnia. Further acquisitions in this direction were prevented by the military activity of Hungary under Matthias Corvinus. Matthias might have been able to drive the Turks backwards, had he not been diverted from the enterprise by his wars with Bohemia and Austria.

The progress of the Turks and the entreaties of Pope Pius II. at last drew Venice into the war which it had hitherto shunned. But the war was as unsuccessful as the former peace had been discreditable. Negropont and other Venetian possessions in Greece were conquered. The death of Scanderbeg in 1467 not only deprived the Republic of its most valuable ally, but hampered it with the defence of Albania. The fortresses of Kroja and Scutari were consequently besieged and in 1479 Venice had to conclude the peace of Constantinople, by which Albania and most of the Greek territories were surrendered, and the rest were held under Turkish suzerainty. Mohammed II. now organised an Italian expedition, which took Otranto in 1480, and caused a new feeling of alarm. But Otranto was restored in the next year on account of the death of Mohammed II. at the age of fifty-one.

§ 18. The Turkish throne was now contested by Mohammed's two sons Bajazet and Djem. Bajazet succeeded in defeating his younger but more capable brother, who fell into the hands of the knights of Rhodes. The Sultan, anxious to get rid of his formidable rival, paid the knights 45,000 ducats a year to keep him a prisoner. In 1489 the unfortunate Djem passed into the keeping of the pope, Innocent VIII., who received still larger sums from Bajazet. Alexander VI. was compelled to surrender his captive to Charles VIII., but was suspected of being bribed to poison him beforehand. At any rate Djem died in 1495, and Bajazet at last felt his throne to be secure.

Bajazet II. presents a curious contrast to his predecessors and successors. With some interest in literature, he was averse to war, and during his reign there was a lull in Turkish aggression. But the military activity of his subjects compelled him occasionally to divert his attention from peaceful pursuits. He reduced a revolt in Bosnia, and overran Croatia. He was also involved in a war with Venice which was ended by a peace in 1502. The Turks were disgusted with their indolent ruler. The Janissaries began to show that turbulence which was afterwards so fatal to the empire. Bajazet's son, Selim, was the favourite of the soldiers. Supported by them, he deposed his father, who died of poison (1512). Selim I. commenced his reign with the murder of all his brothers, a practice which became the invariable concomitant of each sultan's accession.

§ 19. Under Selim I., a ferocious and warlike prince, the Turks resumed that career of conquest, which had been interrupted since the death of Mohammed II. From 1514 to 1516 he was engaged in a war with the Persians, and conquered Mesopotamia. The Persians were Mohammedans, but of the sect of the *Shiites*, who showed especial reverence to Ali, Mohammed's son-in-law, and regarded him as the lawful successor of the prophet. The orthodox Mohammedans, or *Sonnites*, to whom the Turks belonged, acknowledged the intermediate Caliphs, Abou Bekir, Omar and Othman, who ruled before Ali. They regarded the Shiites with far greater abhorrence than they did the Christian heretics. In 1516 Selim attacked and conquered Syria. He then turned his arms against Egypt, where the ancient Caliphs still retained a shadow of their former power, at once ruled and protected by the Mamelukes. Egypt was speedily reduced, and the last of the Abasside Caliphs, Motawakkel, was removed to die in obscurity in Constantinople. From this time the Turkish sultans were regarded as the successors to the Caliphate, and thus became the spiritual as well as the temporal heads of Islam. Egypt was by far the most important Turkish conquest since that of Constantinople. It gave the last blow to the commerce of Venice by securing to the Turks the absolute control of the Levant. Soon after this great success, as he was planning an attack upon Rhodes, Selim I. died of the plague (1520). His son and successor, Solyman the Magnificent, became the able rival of the great European princes of the 16th century.

CHAPTER II.

WARS IN ITALY, 1494–1519.

§ 1. Possible claimants to the crown of Naples; Charles VIII.'s invasion solicited by revolted barons and by Lodovico Sforza. § 2. Rapid success of the French in Italy; league formed against them; Charles' return; battle of Fornovo. § 3. Loss of Naples by the French; death of Charles VIII. § 4. Louis XII. conquers Milan; partition of Naples with Spain; French expelled from Naples by Gonsalvo de Cordova. § 5. Alexander VI. and Cæsar Borgia: reduction of Romagna; death of the Pope and fall of Cæsar. § 6. Julius II.; the League of Cambray; the Holy League; the French lose Milan; death of Louis XII. and of Julius II. § 7. Florence under Savonarola; his fall; Soderini gonfalonier for life; restoration of the Medici. § 8. Francis I. invades Italy; battle of Marignano; conquest of Milan; treaty between Francis and Leo X.

§ 1. The tyranny of Ferdinand of Naples and his son Alfonso of Calabria provoked a rebellion among the Neapolitan barons (1485), which had important ultimate results. The claims advanced by the popes to the suzerainty of Naples gave them frequent causes of quarrel with the king, and Innocent VIII. supported the insurgents. It was decided to bring forward a claimant to the throne in opposition to Ferdinand. There were two families from which such a claimant might be chosen, those of Aragon and Anjou. Ferdinand of Aragon, the lawful son of John II., might claim Naples against his bastard cousin. In the house of Anjou, the old Réné of Provence had died in 1480, and his only descendant was Réné of Lorraine, the son of his daughter Yolande. But the elder Réné had disinherited his grandson, and had left his possessions and claims to his nephew, Charles of Maine. The latter had died in 1481 after making a will in favour of Louis XI. By the wills, therefore, of Réné le Bon and Charles of Maine, their rights, such as they were, to the crown of Naples might be claimed by Charles VIII. But the Neapolitans do not appear to have recognised these wills, and the crown was offered to Réné of Lorraine. He was at this time at the French court endeavouring to establish his claim to his grandfather's county of Provence. In this hopeless pursuit he wasted the time which might have given him the throne of

Naples. Vessels waited for him in vain at Genoa, and at last the barons surrendered on promise of a complete amnesty. In defiance of this promise, they were seized and shut up in prison, from which few of them came out alive. A small number of nobles, who had declined to put their faith in princes, remained in exile, and were impelled by the fate of their comrades to take vigorous measures of revenge. Their leaders were the princes of Salerno and Bisignan, the heads of the house of San Severino. They repaired to Venice, now as ever the enemy of Naples, and asked advice as to whom they should appeal to for aid. The choice lay between Réné of Lorraine, the hereditary Angevin claimant, Charles VIII., who claimed to represent the same family by the wills of Réné I. and his nephew, and Ferdinand the Catholic, the representative of the legitimate Aragonese line. Réné had shown his incapacity, the Venetians feared any increase of the maritime power of Spain, so by their advice it was determined to apply to France, whither the prince of Salerno proceeded in 1492.

Meanwhile events occurred elsewhere to facilitate the French invasion. Lodovico Sforza was still scheming to supplant his nephew in the duchy of Milan. But Gian Galeazzo had married Isabella, daughter of Alfonso of Calabria, who was likely to interfere on behalf of his son-in-law. Lodovico, therefore, looked round for allies who might assist him in a possible war against Naples. The Medici were the oldest allies of the Sforzas, but the rash conduct of Piero de Medici convinced Lodovico that he would probably find Florence hostile. This compelled him to look outside Italy. His immediate object was to hamper the Neapolitan rulers so as to prevent their interference in the affairs of Milan. This might be done by a French invasion, though he had no desire or expectation that Naples would be conquered. In 1493 he sent to the French court Galeazzo da San Severino, a relative of the prince of Salerno, to co-operate with him in urging on the invasion.

Charles VIII. was at this time under the influence of two low-born ministers, Etienne de Vers and Guillaume Briçonnet, both of whom were won over by the Italian envoys. The duke of Bourbon and the most prominent nobles of France endeavoured to dissuade the king, but in vain. In 1494 Charles advanced to Lyons, and thence crossed the Alps by Mont Genèvre. Milan was his ally and Venice was neutral, so that he met with no opposition in northern Italy. Lodovico Sforza obtained the object of his intrigues. Gian Galeazzo died suddenly at Piacenza, and his uncle was accepted as duke of Milan. The French troops in Romagna warded off danger from Naples. Gian Galeazzo left an infant son, Francesco, but he was passed over.

§ 2. There were three advantageous points for resistance to an army invading Italy, at the entrances into Tuscany, the Papal States, and the kingdom of Naples. The passes of the Apennines which divide Lombardy from Tuscany were commanded by Florentine fortresses, but no measures were taken for their defence. This was the result of a misunderstanding between Piero de Medici and his subjects. The Florentines were attached to the French alliance both by commercial connection and by old Guelf traditions. They were alienated, therefore, by Piero's close relations with the rulers of Naples. The party of opposition to the Medici rule was immensely strengthened by foreign politics. They had already opened a connection with the French king before he entered Italy. When Charles had advanced as far as Pisa, Piero made a sudden resolution to save himself from domestic sedition by a complete change of policy. He made his way to the French camp, and agreed to cede, not only Pisa, but Leghorn, Sarzana, Sarzanello and Pietrasanta. This complete abandonment of their interests was even more exasperating to the Florentines than his previous opposition to the French. On his return to the city, Piero found that a revolt had begun. He fled to Venice, his family was exiled, and a republic was proclaimed in Florence. Charles VIII. now entered the city as its pretended conqueror, and made the most extreme demands. But the republican leaders, and notably Piero Capponi, showed unexpected spirit, and ultimately a treaty was concluded which confirmed the cession of the fortresses, but only on condition that they should be restored when Charles entered Naples or returned to France.

In Naples, Ferdinand I. had died before the French invasion in January, 1494. His son and successor, Alfonso II., who had obtained unmerited repute as a commander through his boasted expulsion of the Turks from Otranto, displayed at the crisis equal incapacity and cowardice. He entrusted the command of the army to his son Ferdinand, and that of the fleet to his brother Frederick of Tarentum. The army was now encamped at Viterbo, at the entrance to the Papal States. The eyes of all Italy were fixed on this spot in the expectation of a decisive conflict. But the French were again favoured by their marvellous good fortune, Ferdinand withdrew with his troops to Rome, and Charles VIII. entered Viterbo unopposed. He marched thence upon Rome, and the enemy again withdrew. Alexander VI. shut himself up in the Castle of St. Angelo. Charles refused to listen to those who urged him to depose the pope, and was satisfied to extort a treaty, by which four papal towns were temporarily ceded to him. At the same time Djem, brother of Bajazet II., was handed over to the

French, as a possible instrument in the projected crusade against the Turks, and Cæsar Borgia, the pope's son, became a hostage for his father. But Cæsar soon escaped, and Djem died, probably of poison.

Alfonso of Naples, terrified at the near approach of the French, and conscious that his cruel rule had alienated his subjects, abdicated in favour of his son Ferdinand, who was too young to have incurred enmity. Ferdinand II., his father having retired to die in Sicily, advanced with his army to San Germano on the frontier, which a mountain-pass and the river Garigliano rendered easily defensible. But the news of a revolt in Naples compelled him to withdraw to the capital, and the French army again met with no opposition. The Neapolitan citizens compelled Ferdinand to fly to Ischia. Charles VIII. now realised his wildest desires; he entered Naples, and was crowned king.

But the marvellous success of the French arms, which the historian Commines calls "a true mystery," had effected a great change in the sentiments of the Italian powers. Lodovico Sforza had never anticipated the conquest of Naples, and had reason for alarm. Louis of Orleans, Charles' cousin, who had been left in command at Asti on the border of Lombardy, laid claim to Milan as the grandson of Valentina Visconti. The French invasion had given Milan to Lodovico, it might also deprive him of it. He was now as anxious to oppose Charles VIII. as he had previously been to befriend him. Venice was roused from its neutrality by the threatened establishment of a new and overwhelming power in Italy. Foreign princes, too, felt their interests to be at stake. Ferdinand of Aragon, as king of Sicily, was opposed to the possession of Naples by France. Maximilian was roused by the news that Charles VIII. had designs on the empire. The envoys of these powers met at Venice. The news that Charles had passed Viterbo hastened their deliberations. A league was concluded between Milan, Venice, the Pope, Ferdinand and Maximilian, which was really directed against France, though its avowed object was only mutual protection against attack.

Meanwhile in Naples Charles' conduct was unwise and imprudent. He took no pains to conciliate his new subjects, and the nobles, even the Angevin partisans, were especially ill-treated. All offices were conferred upon Frenchmen. The news of the conclusion of the league at Venice decided Charles to return to France. Leaving some of his troops under different commanders to uphold French interests, he set out on the land journey. He passed through Rome, whence Alexander VI., conscious of fraud, fled to Orvieto. Through Siena Charles came to Pisa. Hitherto he had taken no steps to fulfil his treaty with the Florentines. He had given liberty to the Pisans, who had been subject to Florence since 1406, and this was resented by the Florentines. Charles' evil genius on this journey was the count of Ligny, who induced him not to surrender the fortresses, but to leave them occupied by French garrisons. After thus weakening his army, the king proceeded through the Apennines towards Lombardy.

In northern Italy, the duke of Orleans had determined to prosecute his private plans upon the duchy of Milan. Sallying out of Asti, he captured Novara. This attack on one of their members gave the league their desired pretext for hostilities. A large army was collected at the entrance of Lombardy prepared to dispute the passage of the French. Charles VIII. was thus compelled to fight a battle at Fornovo, 6 July, 1495. The battle was merely a confused skirmish, in which neither side could claim a victory. But the French were enabled to continue their journey unmolested. The duke of Orleans was left to fight out his own quarrel. Charles might have done great injury to Lodovico Sforza by espousing the cause of Gian Galeazzo's infant son. But he refused either to assist his cousin or to prejudice his cause in any way.

§ 3. No sooner was the king's back turned than affairs in Naples began to go badly for the French. Their evil rule did much to obliterate from the minds of the natives the misdeeds of their former kings. Ferdinand II. took advantage of this reaction in men's opinions. He received assistance, both men and ships, from the king of Aragon, and the Venetian fleet under the marquis of Mantua was placed at his disposal. In return for this, he promised to cede to Venice five important ports on the Adriatic, including Otranto and Brindisi. Returning from exile Ferdinand commenced the reconquest of his lost kingdom. One place after another opened its gates. The city of Naples received him with enthusiasm, though the citadel was for some time held by the French under the marquis of Montpensier. At length, as no assistance came from France, the citadel was evacuated, and Montpensier with his army, after enduring a siege in Atella, surrendered to Ferdinand. Calabria held out longest under d'Aubigny, the ablest of the French commanders, but he too had to yield. Ferdinand did not live long to enjoy his triumph. After marrying his father's half-sister, Joanna, he died suddenly in 1496. He was succeeded by his uncle Frederick of Tarentum, the fifth king who had worn the crown of Naples within less than three years.

Meanwhile Charles VIII. was occupied with tournaments and other pleasures. In his intervals of leisure he had two Italian questions to consider; whether to assist the duke of Orleans, who was reduced to great straits in Novara, and secondly, how to preserve the vanishing French power in Naples. At court there were two contending parties. One wished to conclude a peace and to withdraw from Italian politics altogether; the other, headed by Briçonnet, saw its interest in the prolongation of the war. At last the peace party prevailed so far as to open negotiations with Lodovico Sforza, and to conclude the treaty of Vercelli. By this the duke of Orleans was allowed to quit Novara, and Sforza promised to equip two vessels for the relief of the castles of Naples. But the latter promise was constantly evaded, and Philippe de Commines, a member of the party of peace, failed to persuade Venice to accept the treaty.

Charles VIII. lived for three years after his return, during which he did nothing either for Italy or France. He died at Amboise in April, 1498. His understanding was as feeble as his person was deformed, and it was the irony of fate that made such a man the conqueror of Italy at a time when that country was in the zenith of its civilisation. Charles' three children had died before him, and the crown now fell for the second time in French history to a collateral line, in the person of Louis of Orleans. By Charles VIII.'s death, Brittany was again severed from the crown, as it passed to his widow Anne. Louis XII., anxious to recover so important a province, induced Alexander VI. to grant him a divorce from his wife Jeanne, daughter of Louis XI. This preliminary accomplished, Louis at once married Anne of Brittany.

§ 4. Louis XII.'s accession was an important event for Italy. Not only did he inherit his predecessor's claims to Naples, but he possessed a personal claim upon Milan, which he had already shown his intention to assert. He was urged on by his minister George of Amboise, who had designs on the papacy, which he hoped to attain by making his master powerful in Italy. And in Italy itself circumstances were favourable to the French. The Venetians, always rivals of Milan in northern Italy, were at this time on especially bad terms with Lodovico Sforza. Florence was occupied in the siege of Pisa, and though it owed its disasters to France, it still clung to the French alliance as the only means of recovering its losses. Pope Alexander VI. had schemes for the aggrandisement of his son Cæsar Borgia, which went far beyond the nepotism of his predecessors, and he hoped to accomplish them with the assistance of France. It was this hope which made him so compliant in granting Louis' divorce: he gave the cardinal's hat to George of Amboise, and encouraged his ambitious hopes. To Venice Louis promised Cremona and the Ghiara d'Adda, to Florence aid against Pisa, and to the pope French troops for the conquest of Romagna. Having thus purchased allies, he despatched an army across the Alps in 1499. Its success was immediate. Lodovico Sforza fled for refuge to the Swiss, and Milan opened its gates to the French. Louis now appeared in person to enjoy his triumph, and appointed Trivulcio governor of Milan. Trivulcio was himself a Milanese citizen, driven into the service of France by hostility to Lodovico Sforza. He ruled in the interests of his own party, and soon alienated his subjects. Lodovico took advantage of this to return to Lombardy, and recovered Milan as easily as he had lost it. But the French army strengthened by reinforcements renewed the war. The Swiss in Lodovico's service, being forbidden to fight against their fellow-countrymen, were compelled to desert him. He was given up to the French and imprisoned in the castle of Loches, where he died after ten years' captivity. Thus he expiated his own short-sighted policy in calling the French into Italy.

Having thus accomplished his first object, Louis turned his attention to the reduction of Naples. It was in vain that king Frederick offered to become the tributary of France. But Ferdinand the Catholic had claims upon Naples and Louis was unwilling to incur the hostility of Spain. Accordingly, a treaty of partition was arranged at Granada (1500). Louis was to have Abruzzi and Terra di Lavoro with the title of king, while Ferdinand was to receive Apulia and Calabria, the provinces which lay nearest to his own kingdom of Sicily. The unscrupulous character of this treaty was disguised by the flimsy pretext that the conquest of Naples was merely the preliminary of a crusade against the Turks. Frederick of Naples, who expected nothing but friendship from the king of Aragon, could make no resistance. He surrendered Naples to the French in 1501, and ended his life a prisoner in France.

Thus the first object of the treaty of Granada was attained; the partition proved more difficult. A quarrel between the French and Spaniards soon developed into open war. The military skill of the Spanish commander, Gonsalvo de Cordova, triumphed in every contest. Defeated in the battles of Seminara and Cerignola, the French were compelled to withdraw, and Naples was annexed to Spain (1503). In 1504 a large French army attempted the recovery of Naples, but it was completely routed by Gonsalvo on the Garigliano. Piero de Medici, who fought on the French side in the battle, was drowned in the river.

§ 5. Meanwhile the papal states had been the scene of momentous events. Alexander VI. reaped all the advantages he had hoped to gain from the French alliance. Cæsar Borgia was his second son, and had been destined for promotion in the church. But he soon wearied of this career, murdered his brother the duke of Gandia, and induced the pope to embark in schemes for his temporal aggrandisement. His object was to form a great secular power out of the states of the church. The assistance of French troops enabled him to conquer Romagna, which had long been divided among a number of practically independent princes. By a policy of unscrupulous cruelty, Cæsar succeeded in establishing a strong central government in the hitherto distracted province. With an unscrupulous ability, which extorted the admiration of Machiavelli, he extended his power over the duchy of Urbino, Perugia, and other important territories. When his adherents appeared untrustworthy, he entrapped them at Sinigaglia and murdered them. His power was supreme in central Italy, and he began to meditate the conquest of Tuscany. But he had always to face the danger that the two chief supports of his power might fail him. The French were not unlikely to become hostile, and his father might die. To make himself independent of France, he took advantage of the Neapolitan war to enter into relations with Spain. But his chief object was to secure his power against a probable reaction after his father's death. He secured a majority among the cardinals so as to dictate the choice of a new pope. All persons in Rome whose hostility was feared were removed by poison or the dagger. But his carefully devised policy proved a failure. The received account of Alexander VI.'s death is that he and his son accidentally drank the poison prepared for the Cardinal of Corneto. The pope died, and though Cæsar Borgia recovered, his life was for some time in danger. This unforeseen accident prevented his taking the necessary steps, and enabled his enemies to concert their measures without opposition. The choice of the cardinals fell first on Francesco Piccolomini, who took the name of Pius III. but died within a few days. The cardinals reassembled and elected Giuliano della Rovere, a nephew of Sixtus IV., who became pope with the title of Julius II. The great object of Julius' ambition was to extend the papal power, and he determined to take advantage of Cæsar Borgia's conquests for that purpose. Cæsar was imprisoned and compelled to surrender his territories to the papacy. On his release he escaped to Naples, where he was betrayed by Gonsalvo de Cordova and sent a prisoner to Spain. After three years' captivity he escaped to Navarre, where he perished in a civil war in 1510.

§ 6. The Borgias had within three years consolidated a power which they intended to make their own. In this they failed, and the fruits of their success were reaped by the papacy. Thanks to his predecessor, Julius II. was a stronger temporal prince than any of his predecessors had been. But he was too active and restless to remain contented with this. He wished to recover all the territory to which the papal see could lay claims. Venice was in possession of Faenza, Rimini and Ravenna, and Julius was determined to wrest them from her. For this purpose he made use of the jealousy with which the European princes regarded the republic. The Venetians had remained selfishly aloof from the contests in Italy, and had sought to aggrandise themselves by means of the disasters of other states. Louis XII. of France was anxious to recover Cremona and Ghiara d'Adda, with which he had purchased the Venetian alliance, and also Bergamo and Brescia, which had formerly belonged to the duchy of Milan. Ferdinand the Catholic resented the loss of the five Apulian ports which had been ceded to Venice in 1495 in return for assistance in the reconquest of Naples from the French. Maximilian had old grounds of quarrel with the republic, both as emperor and as duke of Austria. Julius II. took advantage of these various grievances to form a general league against Venice at Cambray in 1508. The campaign was begun by the French in 1509. The Venetian army was defeated at the battle of Agnadello or Vaila. Julius II. annexed Faenza, Rimini and Ravenna, while Otranto, Brindisi and the other ports were regained by Naples. The power of Venice seemed on the verge of complete annihilation, but it was saved by the quarrels which broke out among its enemies.

Julius II. had no sooner gained one object than with startling suddenness he set out in pursuit of another. He had himself been an active partisan of Charles VIII., but circumstances had changed, and he determined to free Italy from the foreigners. His first hostility was directed against the French, but to oppose them he had to make use of the power of Spain. In 1510 he absolved the Venetians from the interdict he had issued against them, and detached Ferdinand from the league of Cambray. Thus Italy was again convulsed by a new war. At first the pope was unsuccessful. A revolt in Bologna gave that city to the French, and Julius returned discomfited to Rome. But a hasty move on the part of the French king roused him to new vigour. Louis XII. summoned a general council at Pisa and threatened to try and depose the pope. This interference with ecclesiastical affairs alienated the European princes, and Julius II. was enabled to conclude the so-called Holy League in October, 1511. Its members were Maximilian, Ferdinand the Catholic, Henry VIII. of England and the Swiss. The war began in 1512 with the siege of Bologna, which was saved by the energy of the youthful French commander, Gaston de Foix. Bergamo and Brescia, which had been seized by Venice, were reconquered by the French. Gaston de Foix, raised to the summit of fame by these victories, marched towards Rome. On his way he had to fight with the army of the League at Ravenna. He won a glorious victory, but was himself slain at the age of 23. His death was more fatal to the French than his victory had been to their enemies. His successor, La Palisse, was compelled to retire to Lombardy. There he was attacked by the Swiss and driven out of Italy into France. The duchy of Milan was given to Maximilian Sforza, the eldest son of Lodovico, and thus the Swiss thought to repair the wrong they had done to the father. But Brescia and Bergamo were restored to Venice, and the pope seized upon Parma and Piacenza.

The loss of Milan was not the only disaster the French had to undergo. Ferdinand the Catholic drove John d'Albret from Navarre and annexed that kingdom. Henry VIII. and Maximilian invaded France, took several towns, and routed some French troops at Guinegate. To divert the attention of England James IV. of Scotland was induced to cross the border, but he was defeated and killed at Flodden. Louis XII. was compelled to make peace. In April, 1513, he concluded a truce at Orthez with Ferdinand, leaving Navarre in his hands. Peace was made with England in 1514, and Louis married Henry VIII.'s sister Mary. He did not long survive the failure of his Italian policy, and died 1 Jan., 1515. He had been a popular king of France, where his easy good nature and his economy had done much to reconcile the people to a government which had been built up by harsher measures. But he wasted the resources of the country in schemes of aggrandisement from which France had little or nothing to gain.

Before he could witness the final humiliation of France, Julius II. had died (21 February, 1513). He was guiltless of the nepotism which aroused such enmity against his predecessors. His nephew, Francesco della Rovere, obtained Urbino legally as the nephew of Guidobaldo Montefeltro. His comparative purity of motive has obtained for Julius a reputation which he hardly deserves. His restless activity involved Italy in wars which produced no result commensurate with the bloodshed. It is true that the French were expelled, but only by establishing the power of the Spaniards. The author of the League of Cambray could awaken no national spirit in Italy, which might preserve the country from foreign inroads in the future. And the spectacle of a pope clad in armour and leading troops to the siege or the battle-field, though it was preferable to that of a pontiff steeped in degrading sensuality, was not likely to reconcile to the papacy the awakening opinion of Europe.

§ 7. Julius II.'s successor, Leo X., was Giovanni de Medici, the second son of Lorenzo the Magnificent. He had been exiled from Florence on the downfall of his brother Piero. After that event the Florentines had established a republic under the guidance of the great reformer Savonarola. He induced them to form a great council on the model of the Venetian constitution. But the republican government depended too much for its hold on the people upon the continued influence of Savonarola. That influence was weakened by disasters in foreign politics, especially by the failure of the efforts to recover Pisa. A strong party was formed against the preacher, whose character was not robust enough to stand the trials of alternate triumph and failure. The Pope, whom he had attacked with vehemence, excommunicated him as a heretic, and in 1498 he was executed before the Palazzo Vecchio. Florence continued the siege of Pisa, which absorbed the attention and resources of the city, but without success. The head of the government was Piero Soderini, who had been elected gonfalonier for life. But intrigues outside the city and discontent within proved fatal to Florentine independence. After the expulsion of the French, Giovanni de Medici induced the Spaniards to attack Florence. The city was taken (30 August, 1512) and the Medici were restored to power. Piero's son Lorenzo became the ruler of the city under the patronage of his uncle Leo X.

§ 8. As Louis XII. left no sons, the French crown passed to Francis, count of Angoulême, a young and ambitious prince. He married his predecessor's daughter Claude, and thus prevented the separation of Brittany, of which she was the heiress. Francis I. was determined to wrest the duchy of Milan from Maximilian Sforza. Collecting an army he crossed the Alps with unexpected rapidity before the Swiss were prepared to oppose him. Like his predecessor, Francis I. was supported by the Venetians, and they diverted the attention of the Spaniards. Thus the burden of the war fell upon the Swiss, who were routed at the two days' battle of Marignano (13 and 14 September, 1515). Genoa had already been captured, and Maximilian Sforza now abdicated the duchy of Milan, and retired with a pension to France, where he died in obscurity in 1530.

This third conquest of Milan by the French concluded for a time the Italian wars, which had continued without intermission since 1494. Francis made peace with the Swiss at Freiburg, and resumed the old relations with them, which had been interrupted by the rashness of Louis XII. With Leo X. Francis had an interview at Bologna. Parma and Piacenza were restored to Milan, and the king promised to support Lorenzo de Medici in Florence. But the most important result of the interview was the Concordat of 1516. This abolished the Pragmatic Sanction of 1438, the foundation of the independence of the Gallican Church. The powers which had been assumed by the national synods under the Pragmatic Sanction were now shared between the pope and the king. The annates, or first year's revenue of a new benefice, were restored to the papacy, but the king obtained the right of appointing to ecclesiastical dignities. Thus, the central power of the monarchy was established as firmly in the Church as it had already been in the state.

Ferdinand the Catholic was alarmed at the re-establishment of the French power in Italy. Dreading an attack upon Naples, he tried to form a new European league against France. But his death in 1516 gave the Spanish crown to his grandson Charles, with whom Francis I. concluded the treaty of Noyon. Thus Italy enjoyed a brief interval of peace, to be followed in a few years by the outbreak of wars on a larger scale than ever.

CHAPTER III.

RIVALRY BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE HAPSBURGS—FIRST PERIOD.

§ 1. Contest between Charles V. and Francis I. for the Empire; success of Charles; grounds of quarrel between the two princes. § 2. Charles allies himself with Henry VIII. and Leo X.; outbreak of the war in 1520; Italian campaign of 1521; death of Leo X.; accession of Adrian VI. and Clement VII. § 3. Defection of the Constable of Bourbon; campaign of 1524; failure of Charles' invasion of France; Francis captured at Pavia. § 4. Reaction caused by Charles' success; treaty of Madrid; Francis breaks the treaty and forms a league against Charles. § 5. Campaign of 1527; sack of Rome; Lautrec in Italy, 1528; failure of French siege of Naples. § 6. Treaties of Cambray and Barcelona; second restoration of the Medici in Florence. § 7. Ferdinand of Austria acquires the crowns of Bohemia and Hungary.

§ 1. The election of an emperor, in 1519, to succeed Maximilian I. involved important consequences not only for Germany but for the whole of Europe. Maximilian, in his later years, had endeavoured to secure the crown for his grandson Charles. But the electors were by no means anxious to submit to a prince who was already ruler of Spain, the Netherlands, Naples, Sicily, and the New World, and who now succeeded his grandfather in the duchy of Austria. They were also unwilling to allow the imperial crown to become hereditary in the house of Hapsburg, which had already held it for three generations. These considerations encouraged Francis I. of France to come forward as a candidate for the empire. At first circumstances seemed to combine in his favour. He was still in the height of his military fame as the victor of Marignano, and no prince seemed so capable of leading the forces of Europe against the Turks. He was in close relations with the Rhenish electors whose territories bordered on his own; and since the treaty of Bologna he had been on the best terms with Pope Leo X. He spared no bribes and promises to purchase supporters, but before long his chances began to dwindle. Public opinion in Germany would be outraged by the election of a foreigner, and the electors, though irresponsible, could not wholly disregard this opinion. Charles was a German, at least on the paternal side, and as duke of Austria he was a German prince. The managers of his cause were no less lavish in money and promises than the French king. The elector Frederick of Saxony, whose character gave him important influence, and who might have obtained the vacant dignity for himself had he wished, declared for Charles. One by one the electors began to desert Francis for his rival. The archbishop of Trier was the last to go over, and on the 28th of June, 1519, Charles V. was unanimously elected. Thus the highest dignity in Christendom was conferred upon a youth of nineteen, whose dominions made him the most powerful prince that had ruled in Europe since Charles the Great. The German princes were not blind to the risk of their independence in the choice of such a ruler, and they extorted conditions from him for their own security. The object of the capitulation which Charles had to sign was the establishment of those constitutional reforms which had been attempted under Maximilian. He promised to renew the authority of the Imperial Chamber, and by creating a Council of Regency to give the estates a share in the executive government. These reforms were insisted upon at the Diet of Worms in 1521, after Charles' arrival in Germany.

It was obvious from the first that a war must break out between Charles V. and Francis I. Not only had the contest for the empire aroused a feeling of personal enmity between them, but at every point at which their territories touched there were causes of quarrel. In Italy, Charles held Naples as the successor of Ferdinand, but the claims of Charles VIII. to that kingdom had descended to Francis. The duchy of Milan had been conquered by Francis I., but Milan was an imperial fief and he had never received any investiture of it. Then Charles was pre-eminently a Burgundian prince, the descendant of Charles the Bold and the heir to his rivalry with France. The duchy of Burgundy had been annexed by Louis XI., but the representative of the old dukes was unlikely to acquiesce in its loss. In Flanders and Artois also there were conflicting claims. On the side of the Pyrenees, Charles retained Navarre, from which Ferdinand had expelled John d'Albret. The cause of the exiled family had been warmly espoused by the French Court. In addition to these isolated grounds of dispute, the rivalry had a wider aspect. Charles' power was dangerous to the independence of the lesser states of Europe. Francis obtained no inconsiderable increase of strength by acting as the champion of national rights against a claimant to universal rule. He plays somewhat the same part in the 16th century that England played in the Napoleonic wars.

§ 2. War being recognised as inevitable, the two princes set themselves to secure allies. They were especially anxious for the support of Henry VIII. and Pope Leo X. Francis invited the English king to that famous interview which is known as the Field of the Cloth of Gold. But Charles had already visited England and gained over both Henry and his all-powerful minister Wolsey. From the pomp and festivity of his interview with Francis, Henry VIII. proceeded to meet Charles at Gravelines, and there concluded a treaty with him. Francis relied complacently on the support of Leo X., but Charles could make offers which were irresistible to the pope. Leo was anxious to put an end to the spread of reforming doctrines in Germany; he was even more anxious to recover Parma and Piacenza, which had been annexed by his predecessor, but which he had been compelled to resign. Accordingly a treaty was concluded between pope and emperor, by which it was decided to expel the French from Milan, and to give that duchy to Francesco Sforza, the second son of Lodovico. Charles took the Medici family under his protection, and Parma and Piacenza were to be ceded to the pope.

The war was commenced in Navarre, whither a French army was despatched to espouse the cause of Henry d'Albret in 1520. The campaign is notable only for the fact that at the siege of Pampeluna, Ignatius Loyola, then a young Spanish knight, received a severe wound. On his sick-bed his attention was drawn to religion, and he rose from it to become the founder of the Jesuits. The French easily overran Navarre, but were as easily driven out again. A campaign on the border of the Netherlands was equally indecisive. In Italy alone was the war important. There the imperial troops, composed of Germans and Spaniards and assisted by the Swiss in the pay of the pope, drove the French from Milan. The French commander, Lautrec, who showed more vigour than ability, attempted to recover the province, but was defeated at Bicocca, and forced to retire from Lombardy. Thus the treaty between Charles and Leo was fulfilled. Parma and Piacenza were annexed to the papacy. Milan was given to Francesco Sforza, who swore fealty to the emperor.

The news of the success of his troops reached Leo X. at Rome just before his death, which is said to have been hastened by excessive joy. His successor was Adrian VI., who had been Charles' tutor and had acted as regent in Spain during the revolt of the communes. Adrian was a man of self-denying integrity, and projected reforms in the Church which, if carried out, might have changed the history of Europe. But his schemes made him unpopular in Rome, and he died before he could accomplish anything (1523). Imperial influence again prevailed with the cardinals, and secured the election of Cardinal Giulio de Medici, the nephew of

Lorenzo the Magnificent, and hitherto the devoted adherent of Spain. He took the name of Clement VII.

§ 3. Francis I. was deeply chagrined at the loss of Milan, and just when his affairs appeared most desperate he was threatened with new dangers by the treachery of the Constable of Bourbon. Louis XI. had married his daughter Anne to Peter of Beaujeu, heir to the duchy of Bourbon, on condition that, in default of male children, the duchy should pass to the crown. Thus the younger branch, of Montpensier, was to be disinherited. When duke Peter died, leaving an only daughter Susanna, the crown might have claimed the succession. But Louis XII., less anxious about the royal rights, married Susanna to Charles of Montpensier, who thus became duke of Bourbon, and was made by Francis I. Constable of France. But before long the power of the subject became an object of jealousy to the king; and the Constable also quarrelled with Francis' mother, Louise of Savoy. The death of Susanna gave Louise a claim to Bourbon as the niece of Peter of Beaujeu. The crown could base still more sweeping claims on the treaty extorted by Louis XI. Charles of Bourbon, seeing himself in danger of being stripped of his territories, determined to save himself by treason. He made overtures to Charles V. and Henry VIII., offering to co-operate with them in an invasion of France. Henry hoped to realise the designs of his predecessors on the French crown; while the ancient kingdom of Arles was to be revived for Bourbon. The news of the plot reached Francis I. as he was preparing to start with his army for Italy. He at once hurried back, and Bourbon, seeing his plans discovered, fled to join the imperial forces in Lombardy. Instead of the troops he had promised he brought to the emperor nothing but the services of a proscribed exile.

Francis allowed his army to cross the Alps without him under an incapable favourite, Bonnivet. Had the latter marched straight upon Milan he must have seized the defenceless city. But his delay gave strength and courage to the garrison, and winter soon put an end to the campaign. Early in 1524 the imperialists defeated the French on the Sesia, where the Chevalier Bayard met his death. Bonnivet was compelled to withdraw to France.

Emboldened by this success and by the representations of Bourbon, Charles V. now determined to invade France and to crush his rival. An army under Bourbon and Pescara entered Provence, and laid seige to Marseilles. It was in vain that Bourbon urged a march towards his own territories, the emperor was anxious to acquire a port which would give him an easy entrance into France. Pestilence decimated the besieging forces, and the advance of

Francis from Avignon forced them to a hasty and disorderly retreat. It was now Francis' turn to be carried away by success. Regardless of the advice of his mother and his wiser counsellors, he again crossed the Alps with a fine army. No preparations had been made for resistance, and, marching at once to Milan, he made himself master of the city without opposition. Instead of pursuing and crushing the imperial army he sat down to besiege Pavia. The obstinate defence of the garrison under Antonio da Leyva gave Bourbon and Pescara time to collect recruits. In 1525 they left their camp at Lodi and advanced to the relief of Pavia. With rash self-confidence, Francis not only weakened his army by sending 10,000 men to Naples, but also determined to await the enemy in his entrenchments. The battle which ensued was as fatal to the French as Poitiers or Agincourt. Ten thousand men fell on the field, and among the prisoners was the king himself.

§ 4. This overwhelming success produced a sudden reaction among the emperor's allies. In Italy there was a general fear lest the Spanish power should become supreme. The Pope, Clement VII., who owed his election to Charles, and whose only hope of restoring religious unity lay in the emperor's alliance, allowed himself to be influenced by his interests as a Medici, and became a bitter enemy of Spain. Francesco Sforza felt that he was only a puppet in Milan, and was eager to free himself from imperial tutelage. Henry VIII., who had no motive beyond his own aggrandisement, urged Charles to a joint invasion of France, hoping to place the crown on his own head. But neither Charles nor Bourbon were anxious to gratify English ambition. This disappointment opened Henry's eyes to the dangers with which Charles' success threatened Europe. Wolsey was already alienated by the successive elections of Adrian VI. and Clement VII. to the papacy. Louise of Savoy, who acted as regent in France during her son's captivity, was keen to take advantage of the change in political opinion. She concluded a truce with England and opened diplomatic relations with the pope. She even applied for assistance to the Turkish sultan Solyman.

Meanwhile, regardless or ignorant of these symptoms of hostility, Charles thought only of extorting extreme concessions from his captive rival. In this his policy was short-sighted. France was not conquered, though it had lost its king. Terms which injured the vital interests of France were certain not to be carried out, and must give rise to further hostilities. Francis, however, eager to gain freedom, accepted the treaty of Madrid in January, 1526. By this he promised to restore the duchy of Burgundy, to give up his claims upon Naples, Milan, Flanders and Artois, and to furnish no more assistance to Henry d'Albret. Two of his sons were to become hostages, and he himself was to marry Charles' sister, the dowager Queen of Portugal. On these terms, Francis was allowed to return to France in March, 1526.

Before signing the treaty, he had declared his acceptance to be compulsory and therefore not binding. The cession of Burgundy was impossible, and he at once determined to renew the war. The hostility to the emperor which prevailed in Italy offered him great advantages. Venice, Milan and the pope became members of a new Holy League at Cognac (May, 1526), with the object of compelling Charles to release the French princes and to give Francesco Sforza independent possession of Milan. Henry VIII. was acknowledged as protector of the league.

§ 5. Charles, while loudly declaiming against the faithlessness of the French king, took measures for an energetic prosecution of the war. Bourbon's army was far superior to that of the league, which was commanded by the duke of Urbino. Francesco Sforza was speedily forced to surrender, and his duchy fell into the hands of the imperialists. Bourbon now received large reinforcements of Protestant troops from Germany under George Frundsberg. But the emperor sent neither instructions nor money to pay the troops. They became mutinous, and it was only possible to pacify them by the plunder of some rich city. In Bourbon's circumstances the boldest policy seemed the safest, and he marched straight upon Rome. Frundsberg announced his intention to hang the pope. Clement VII., trusting to the sanctity of his position, made no preparations for defence. Bourbon was killed at the first onslaught, but his soldiers avenged his death by the capture and sack of the imperial city. The new commander, Philibert Prince of Orange, was powerless to restrain their excesses, and Rome suffered more than it had done at the hands of Goths and Vandals centuries before. Clement VII., beseiged in the fortress of St. Angelo, was compelled to surrender himself a prisoner. The Florentines were emboldened to throw off the despotism of the Medici and to restore the republic.

Charles' second great success and the outrage on the papal dignity produced a still deeper impression than the victory of Pavia. Francesco Sforza and the Venetians renewed their league, which was joined by Florence. Francis I., who had hitherto done nothing for his Italian allies, despatched a large army under Lautrec into Italy. Lautrec captured Genoa, where he restored the exiled Fregosi and Dorias, and might have conquered Lombardy with ease. But the French were more anxious to humiliate the emperor than to restore Francesco Sforza. Regardless of the entreaties of his allies, Lautrec marched southwards. The news of his approach necessitated the release of Clement VII., who fled to Orvieto. With great difficulty the Prince of Orange induced the imperial army to leave its comfortable quarters in Rome, and threw himself into Naples just before the arrival of the French. Lautrec at once blockaded the city, while Andrea Doria, the first admiral of the age, cut off all connection by sea. Naples must have fallen but for the imprudent conduct of the French king, who determined to humble Genoa by making a great port of its old rival Savona. Doria's patriotism was stronger than his attachment to France. He entered the service of Charles, expelled the French from Genoa, and restored the independence of his native city. Thus Naples was saved. Pestilence attacked the besieging army and carried off Lautrec. The remnant of the French forces was forced to surrender at Aversa. Francis made another effort in 1529 to retrieve his falling fortunes in Italy. An army under St. Pol invaded Lombardy, but was completely defeated by Antonio da Leyva.

§ 6. These French reverses produced a desire for peace, to which Charles, hampered by want of money, was not unwilling to accede. The negotiations were managed by Louise of Savoy and Margaret, the emperor's aunt. By their exertions the treaty of Cambray was concluded on the basis of the former treaty of Madrid. Charles withdrew his claim to the immediate cession of Burgundy, but the other articles were confirmed. Francis was to renounce all pretensions to Milan, Naples, Genoa, Flanders and Artois, and to complete his marriage with Eleanor of Portugal. On these conditions his sons were to be set at liberty.

Before the conclusion of this treaty, Charles had come to terms with the pope at Barcelona. Not only did the emperor agree to the complete restoration of the States of the Church, but he also took the Medici family under his protection. Florence was to be restored to them, and Charles' natural daughter, Margaret, was to marry Alessandro de Medici. Charles now left Spain to visit Italy in person. At Bologna he received the imperial crown from the pope, the last emperor who was so crowned. Francesco Sforza did homage and received again the duchy of Milan. Florence, after an obstinate defence, was reduced and compelled to submit to Alessandro de Medici. After thus settling Italian affairs with the high hand, Charles V. proceeded to Germany.

Thus the war, which had lasted with but slight intermission for nine years, ended in the humiliation of Francis I. The haughty victor of Marignano was driven altogether from Italy. The loss of Genoa cut off all direct connection between France and the peninsula, and Francis' heartless desertion of his allies completely alienated the Italians. But France itself had suffered less than its ruler. The strength and unity of the kingdom had been increased by the war, and had manifested itself in the easy repulse of hostile invasions. The interests of France lay in the maintenance or extension of its frontiers, not in the assertion of dynastic claims in Italy. The loss of Burgundy would have been a vital injury to France. But Burgundy was retained, and this in itself was more than compensation for the loss of Milan.

§ 7. The House of Hapsburg had advanced further during the war on its peculiar career. It had obtained that supremacy in Italy, which it retained with small profit to itself or its subjects for three centuries. Naples and Milan were under its direct rule; Florence and the papacy were dependent allies. Venice alone remained independent, but Venice was no longer what it had been. And while establishing their power over Italy, the Hapsburgs had also extended their dominions in eastern Europe. In 1526, Lewis, the Jagellon king of Hungary and Bohemia, had been killed in the battle of Mohacz with the Turks. His sister was married to Charles' brother Ferdinand, to whom the emperor had handed over the Austrian territories. Partly on his marriage and partly on treaty rights Ferdinand based a claim to the vacant crowns. In Bohemia the dukes of Bavaria were encouraged by Clement VII. to become his rivals. But in that country Hussite traditions were still a power, and Ferdinand's religious moderation secured him the crown against the harsh orthodoxy of a papal nominee. In Hungary a native noble, John Zapolya, came forward to claim the throne. Ferdinand defeated him, and received the crown at Stuhlweissenburg. But Zapolya's cause was espoused by the Turkish sultan, who utilised the opportunity to make new conquests. In the end Ferdinand had to content himself with the royal title and a long strip of western Hungary. Zapolya founded the principality of Transylvania or Siebenbürgen in the north-east, while the Turks annexed the south-eastern part of the kingdom. The necessity of making head against Turkish aggression was not the least of the motives which induced Charles V. to conclude the treaty of Cambray.

CHAPTER IV.

THE REFORMATION.

I. GERMANY.—§ 1. Martin Luther; his early life; protest against indulgences; Melancthon; Ulrich von Hutten; burning of the papal bull. § 2. Policy of Charles V.; Diet of Worms; Luther in the Wartburg. § 3. Disturbances in Wittenberg; Luther's reappearance; action of the German princes. § 4. Knights' war; reaction against the Reformation. § 5. Revolt of the peasants; Luther's attitude. § 6. Charles V. quarrels with the Pope; Diet of Speier; progress of the Reformation. § 7. Protest of Speier; confession of Augsburg; League of Schmalkalde; Turkish war; treaty of Nuremberg. II. SWITZERLAND.—§ 8. Career of Zwingli. § 9. Quarrels among the Swiss Cantons; death of Zwingli; differences between his teaching and that of Luther. III. SCANDINAVIA.—§ 10. Weakness of the Calmar Union; deposition of Christian II. of Denmark. § 11. Reign of Frederick I.; Reformation in Denmark under Christian III. § 12. Blood-bath of Stockholm; revolt of Sweden under Gustavus Vasa. § 13. Political motives for Swedish Reformation; Diet of Westerås; hereditary monarchy established. IV. JOHN CALVIN AND THE REFORMATION IN GENEVA.—§ 14. Political condition of Geneva; teaching of Farel. § 15. Calvin arrives in Geneva; harshness of his system; period of exile. § 16. Calvin returns to Geneva; peculiarities of his doctrine and institutions; persecution of his opponents; historical importance of Calvinism.

I. GERMANY.

§ 1. THE revolt against mediæval restraints upon freedom of thought had been commenced by the Italians in the so-called Renaissance; it was completed by the Germans in the Reformation. The Italian humanists had been inevitably compelled to question many of the received dogmas, and to ridicule established superstitions. But they were content with negative criticism; they had not sufficient earnestness to insist on any positive reform. That the renaissance spirit was compatible with acquiescence in existing abuses is obvious from the fact that Leo X., the representative patron of literature and art, was himself pope, that the refined sensualist, who devoted himself with equal zest to the pleasures of the intellect and of the table, was eager to suppress religious innovation with fire and sword. It was reserved for the more serious Germans to extend the humanist teaching to religion, and thus to further the emancipation of Europe.

Martin Luther, whose name stands for ever connected with the great movement of which he was the leader, was born at Eisleben on the 10th of November, 1483. His father was a poor miner, and his youth was one of hardship and suffering. His education began at the school of Mansfeld, and he always spoke with horror of the severity of his teachers. At the age of fifteen he was sent to another school at Eisenach, where he found a more comfortable home with relations of his mother. His father was by this time in easier circumstances, and he was able to support his son at the University of Erfurt, then the centre of the humanist teaching in Germany. But Luther's religious nature preserved him from the indifference so often the result of this teaching; he refused to comply with his father's desire that he should become a lawyer, and in 1505 he entered an Augustine monastery. This was an all-important step in his life. All real vigorous reform must proceed from within. A humanist reformation, imposed by the culture of the outside world, could have had none of that deep moral feeling which characterised the influence of Luther.

In his monastic retirement Luther devoted himself to study, especially of the Bible and the works of Augustine. Here he first arrived at the unconscious perception of the wide differences between the old Christianity and the secular church which had grown up from it. In 1508 he was transferred to Wittenberg, to become a professor in the new university, which had been founded there in 1502 by Frederick the Wise of Saxony. Luther's vigorous personality and eloquence soon made him a power in Wittenberg and a favourite at the elector's court. The duty of teaching compelled him to formulate his opinions, and to get rid of the mysticism which had hitherto blinded him. But he was not yet conscious of any opposition to the church of which he was a member. In 1512 he made a pilgrimage to Rome with feelings of the most profound reverence, though the contact with Italian corruption and immorality was not without influence. After his return he was employed in developing his doctrine of justification by faith, which was opposed not so much to the dogmas as to the practices of Roman Catholicism.

Just at this time he was brought face to face with the most flagrant abuse in the church, the sale of indulgences. The doctrine of indulgences was based on the theory that the merits of the whole church exceeded the sins of individual members, and that therefore there was a surplus stock of grace, which was at the disposal of the pope as head of the Church. In earlier times, such indulgences had only been granted on condition of confession and the performance of penance. A possible penance was the payment of money, and as the Church became more and more secular, this had become the most satisfactory to the Roman Curia. The prevailing sentiment of the hierarchy was expressed by a chamberlain of Innocent VIII., who said, "God desireth not the death of a sinner, but rather that he should pay and live." Leo X., reduced to great straits by his building projects and by his war with the duke of Urbino, sent three commissions into Germany to raise money by the sale of indulgences. The most shameless of the itinerant vendors of pardon, Tetzel, appeared in Saxony, and Luther was convulsed with indignation. On 31st of October, 1517, he nailed ninety-five theses on the door of the parish church of Wittenberg. In these he maintained that repentance was a necessary condition of pardon, and that without it the pope's indulgence was altogether impotent.

It was accident that made Luther's first quarrel with Rome turn on the question of indulgences; but it was a very fortunate accident, because it secured for him the support of the German princes. Their interests were naturally opposed to the papal exactions, and they bitterly resented the transit of their subjects' money across the Alps. At the time of the Council of Basel they had made vigorous efforts to put a stop to the abuse, but they had been foiled by the treachery of Frederick III. They were now eager to back up the intrepid monk whose convictions were so allied with their interests. At the diet of Augsburg (1518), attempts were made to induce the emperor to sanction the general opposition to the papacy. But Maximilian, anxious to conciliate the pope, that he might cease to oppose his grandson's election, refused to listen to the princes, and thus lost an excellent opportunity of putting the empire at the head of the great movement, and of restoring the unity of Germany.

The Church was by no means without defenders; both in Italy and in Germany theologians arose to confute Luther. The attention of the pope was called to a controversy which affected so closely the revenues of the hierarchy. Attempts were made to bring Luther to reason by remonstrance. The Cardinal-legate Cajetan summoned him to Augsburg, but the haughty ecclesiastic failed to overawe the intrepid monk. Another attempt was made by Carl von Miltitz, a man of the world rather than a churchman. He succeeded in inducing Luther to promise silence, on condition that his opponents should also abstain from controversy till the matter was conclusively settled. From this promise Luther was freed by the indiscreet conduct of Eck, a member of the orthodox university of Ingolstadt. He issued a treatise in which he attacked Luther's positions, and the latter came forward to answer him in a public discussion at Leipzig (June, 1519). No agreement could result from the discussion. Eck relied upon the authority of recent councils; Luther on the Bible and the early Fathers. The chief result of the controversy was Luther's avowal that several of the Hussite doctrines which had been condemned at Constance were fundamentally Christian. By thus denying the infallibility of a general council, Luther took the first step in a complete rupture with the Church.

Just before this Luther had been joined by an important ally, Melancthon, who became professor of Greek at Wittenberg. Melancthon was a relative and pupil of Reuchlin, and had already won reputation as a rising scholar. His zealous co-operation was of the utmost service to Luther. The settlement of the reformed doctrines was mainly the work of Melancthon, whose theology was more scholarly and accurate than that of his comrade. On the other hand, the practical tasks and the resistance to outside attack fell mostly to the more robust and independent Luther.

Hitherto it had been doubtful what attitude would be assumed by the German humanists towards the Reformation. This was settled by the conduct of the poet and satirist Ulrich von Hutten. At first he had regarded the dispute with contempt as a monkish quarrel: but as he became conscious of the magnitude of the question, and appreciated Luther's commanding attitude, he threw himself heart and soul into the cause. He desired to free Germany altogether from its thraldom to the papacy. He gave up writing Latin and employed his native tongue, whose power he had first learned from the works of Luther. A greater man than Hutten, Erasmus, was also at first inclined to favour the reformers. He advised the elector of Saxony not to withdraw his support from Luther, whose only fault was that "he had hit the pope on the crown and the monks on the belly."

Meanwhile Eck, finding that his rival had not been silenced by the Leipzig discussion, determined to resort to other measures. Collecting Luther's writings, he carried them to Rome, and there laid them before a commission appointed by the pope. There was no doubt of its decision, and Leo X. issued a bull excommunicating Luther and his adherents and ordering his books to be burnt. Eck himself was authorised to carry the bull to Germany, whither he returned in triumph. But his reception was not enthusiastic. The Germans were not inclined to respect a decision which had been come to in Italy, at the instigation of a rival, and without hearing the accused. Luther was prepared with his answer. He issued an appeal "to the nobility of the German nation," and he attacked the papal authority in "The Babylonish Captivity of the Church." Then on the 10th December, 1520, he went in procession to the market-place at Wittenberg, and there publicly burnt the pope's bull. The elector of Saxony, following the advice of Erasmus, had already resolved that the bull should not be executed in his territories.

§ 2. Thus, then, the schism had been completed, and, with a courage which captivated the people, Luther had broken down the bridge behind him. He was at war with the Church, and ecclesiastical weapons had failed against him. It was therefore necessary to appeal to the secular arm. At this conjuncture the newly elected emperor Charles V. made his first appearance in Germany. Everything seemed to depend upon the will of a youth not yet of age. The religious policy of Charles V. has been a matter of dispute: but the fact is that he had no religious policy at all. His religion was that of his ancestors, and he never gave sufficient thought to it to desire either to change or to defend it. His policy was dictated solely by political interests, and varied with those interests. The cause of his failure lay in the fact that, having no real religious convictions himself, he had no conception of the influence of such convictions on others.

The diet of Worms met on 28th of January, 1521. After settling political questions, its attention was directed to religious differences. Luther appeared before the diet to defend his views. Hutten wrote to the emperor urging him to make no concessions to Rome. But Charles V. was moved neither by the heroic firmness of the monk nor by the eloquence of the poet. He wished to secure the alliance of Leo X. against Francis I. This could only be done by yielding to the pope's desire to put down reform. Accordingly the edict of Worms was issued, which declared Luther a heretic and placed him under the imperial ban.

The imperial edict was not a whit more efficacious than the papal bull. Luther himself had left Worms before its issue, and on his return journey he had been seized by the emissaries of the friendly elector of Saxony and had been concealed in the castle of the Wartburg. There he employed himself in study and in the famous translation of the Bible, which not only created German prose, but also made religion the property of the people, instead of being, as before, the monopoly of the priests. His disappearance, which was at first kept a profound secret, produced a marvellous impression in Germany. It was feared that he had fallen a victim to the enmity of the Church, and indignation at his supposed martyrdom increased the number of sympathisers and adherents. As the news leaked out that he was alive and in safety, there was a general feeling of joyful relief. Partly through popular literature, partly through the devoted energy of preachers, the Lutheran doctrines were spread throughout the length and breadth of Germany. The most orthodox princes were unable to suppress the obnoxious but contagious heresy.

§ 3. In Wittenberg, which was now more than ever the centre of reform, and which offered a safe refuge to religious exiles, the absence of Luther gave rise to grave dangers. His place was taken by Carlstadt, a zealous reformer but a man of little strength of character. He allowed himself to be carried away by the desire for extreme and unnecessary changes. Among the numerous exiles who came to Wittenberg were the so-called "prophets" of Zwickau, Claus Storch and his followers, who urged the people to the wildest excesses. Carlstadt fell completely under their influence. Riots ensued, in which the images in the churches were destroyed. There was danger that the elector Frederick would feel himself compelled to oppose a movement which produced such anarchy.

The news of these events drew Luther from his retirement. At the risk of his life he returned to Wittenberg. In a series of six sermons he preached the necessity of moderation, and condemned the conduct of the popular leaders. His influence prevailed. The "prophets" departed from Wittenberg, and order was restored.

Charles V. had left Germany after the diet of Worms. During his absence the government was in the hands of a Council of Regency, which had been created by the diet. For the first time Germany was subject to a national and representative government. The princes who formed a majority in the council were by no means influenced by the same motives as the emperor. In spite of the entreaties of the orthodox duke George of Saxony, they allowed the edict of Worms to fall into oblivion. Their motive in this was not an inclination to Lutheranism. Most of them feared that in the excited condition of the people severe measures might produce an outbreak. And they were actuated by that jealousy of papal interference which had been more or less powerful among the German princes since the time of Lewis the Bavarian (1314–1347). The Imperial Chamber, which had been re-constituted in 1521, took no steps to enforce the edict, and disregarded the urgent appeals of pope Adrian VI. The diet of Nuremberg (1523) presented to the pope a hundred *gravamina* complaining of the abuses of the ecclesiastical system. Thus, while the emperor, for political reasons, condemned Luther, the German nation adopted his cause as their own. Before long Luther was able to leave the Wartburg and to again appear in public with perfect safety.

§ 4. But, in spite of these encouragements, his position was one of great difficulty. He had been able to resist the tendency to religious extravagance, but he was unable to check the political aspirations, which were in some respects the result of his teaching. Luther himself was a steadfast opponent of anything like armed resistance to authority; but his views on this point were by no means shared by all his followers. There were two great movements at this time, which directly grew out of the spirit of the Reformation, the knights' war, and the peasant revolt. With both of them Luther could not but partly sympathise, yet he was compelled to disapprove of them because they relied for success upon force.

The knights, or lesser German nobility, occupied an anomalous position. While they claimed to be independent of any power except the emperor, they were excluded from all share in the diets. They had thus no common political interests with any other order and constantly fought for their own hand. They were especially opposed to the increasing power of the princes, whom they regarded as their natural enemies. The spokesman of the knightly order at this time was Ulrich von Hutten. He had been bitterly disappointed by Charles V.'s conduct at Worms; and he now conceived the idea of placing the knights at the head of the national opposition to foreign and papal interference. With the strength thus obtained they would be able to overthrow the supremacy of the princes. He gained over to his views Franz von Sickingen, the owner of numerous castles on the Rhine and the commander of an independent army of personal followers. Had they made their movement immediately after the diet of Worms, it might have been successful. But Sickingen was then negotiating with the emperor about assuming the command of an army against Francis I., and the opportune moment was allowed to pass. But in 1522 the war was commenced with an attack on the elector of Trier. It was expected that he would be easily subdued. But Luther's resolute opposition to warlike measures withheld general support from the knights, and the keen-sighted princes armed at once in defence of the interests of their order. Sickingen was repulsed from Trier and besieged in his strong castle of Landstuhl. Its mediæval defences were battered down by artillery, and Sickingen died as his enemies entered the fortress (1523). Hutten escaped and fled to Switzerland, where he died soon afterwards. The princes, aided by the modern system of warfare, gained a great victory, and the knights, "an army of officers without soldiers," were deprived of all political importance.

The knights' war and its failure produced a reaction which was unfavourable to the progress of the Reformation. In spite of the moderation displayed by Luther, the disorder was attributed to his teaching. Hitherto Germany had been united in the demand for reform in the Church, but a party was now formed which was opposed to all reform. This was aided by the policy of the new pope, Clement VII., who sent cardinal Campeggio to Germany to take advantage of the growing dislike of revolutionary progress. The legate failed in his demand for the enforcement of the edict of Worms, but he succeeded in coming to terms with the dukes of Bavaria, the archduke of Austria, and most of the south German princes. At a convention at Ratisbon (1524) a few superficial reforms were made and the power of the princes in Church matters was extended. On these terms it was agreed to take measures for the suppression of the Lutheran heresy. Thus the pope suceeded in dividing Germany into two hostile camps. In Austria, Bavaria and other provinces the reformers were persecuted and driven into exile. At the same time the power of the Council of Regency and of the Imperial Chamber, which depended upon German unity, was lessened, and the constitution of these assemblies altered.

§ 5. Thus the central authority was weakened just at a time when it was most wanted to preserve order. For the Catholic reaction gave new strength to the radical party, and brought Luther's moderate policy into discredit. Carlstadt became again the preacher of extreme measures. Expelled through Luther's influence from Saxony, he wandered through southern Germany teaching revolutionary doctrines to the lower classes. He had an able assistant in this work in Thomas Münzer, the most violent of the anabaptist prophets of Zwickau. These men found a welcome reception among the down-trodden class of peasantry. Of all classes in Germany the most depressed and enslaved was the *Bauer* or peasant. Unlike the English villein, he had as yet made no step towards the acquisition of personal liberty. He was the chattel of his master, and he had no legal or constitutional remedy against oppression. Armed rebellion was his only resource. Already isolated movements had taken place in Kempten (1492), in Elsass (1490), and in the neighbourhood of the Black Forest (1513). These had all been put down with the strong hand, and the condition of the peasant was made even harder than before. But towards the end of 1524 a general rising of peasants commenced, on a far larger and more important scale than before. The *Bundschuhe*, the peasants' standard, was first raised in Swabia, and their demands were formulated in twelve articles. These are worth recording for their moderation, and because they give the best clue to the grievances complained of.

The influence of the Reformation is to be seen in the fact that each article is supported by reference to the Scriptures.

1. The congregation are to elect their minister.
2. The great tithe (of corn) is to be paid, but the small tithes (of animals) are to be abolished.
3. The peasants are to be free, and no longer bondsmen.
4. Game, fowls, and fish are to be free as God created them.
5. Fuel from the woods to be free to all.
6. Compulsory service to be no longer unlimited.
7. All service beyond the contract to be paid for in wages.
8. Rents to be regulated afresh in proportion to the value of the and.
9. Arbitrary punishments to be put an end to.
10. Common pastures and fields to be restored.
11. Heriots to be abolished.
12. These propositions to be tested by Scripture, and if found contrary to that they are not to stand.

These articles, moderate as they were, were promptly rejected by the ruling classes, and the revolt spread. The north of Germany was alone exempt from the general anarchy and bloodshed. The peasants' demands were not everywhere so reasonable as in Swabia. In Thuringia especially, where Münzer was supreme, the wildest ideas prevailed. There was no concerted action among the peasants, and they were no match for the united forces of the princes. If the knights had been an army of officers without soldiers, the peasants were an army of soldiers without officers. Everywhere the revolt was put down with merciless severity. By the end of 1525 the peasants' war was at an end.

This result was due in great measure to Luther's influence. Himself a peasant's son, he might have been expected to sympathise with the sufferings of the class from which he had sprung; and at the beginning of the revolt he wrote a guarded letter in which he expressed such sympathy, though he advised the most cautious measures. This encouraged the peasants to hope that, if not with them, he would at any rate not be against them. But after the war had commenced Luther wrote another and very violent letter, in which he urged the princes to cut down the misguided men who had ventured to take the redress of their grievances into their own hands. Thus he definitely threw in his lot with the ruling classes, a fact which influenced the whole course of the German Reformation. At this critical conjuncture, Frederick the Wise of Saxony, the enlightened patron and supporter of Luther, died (1525). He was succeeded in the electorate by his brother John, who was a still more zealous partizan of the reformers.

§ 6. The revolt of the peasants naturally strengthened the hands of the conservative German princes. George of Saxony endeavoured to form a league of north German princes on the basis of the convention of Ratisbon of 1523. It was at this time that Charles V. concluded the treaty of Madrid, in which it was arranged that he and Francis should co-operate in the suppression of heresy. Had Charles now appeared in Germany and definitely assumed the championship of the Catholic faith, the progress of reform might have been stayed. But the treaty of Madrid was never carried out, and at Cognac the pope joined Francis against the emperor. This quarrel between Charles and Clement VII. was of the highest importance for Germany. At the Diet of Speier in June, 1526, it was taken for granted that the emperor's opinions had changed; and a recess was issued which enacted that as regards the edict of Worms and religious disputes, "each state so live rule and conduct itself as it shall be ready to answer to God and his Imperial Majesty."

This recess may be regarded as completing the first stage of the Reformation. The Lutherans had failed in securing the united support of Germany; but there was henceforward no prospect of bringing them back to the old faith. Germany stood divided into two hostile camps; and the religion of each state was to be settled by the will of its ruler, a principle which was afterwards formulated in the words, *cujus regio ejus religio.* It has often been said that the Reformation completed the disunion of Germany, but this is hardly true without limitations. The disunion existed long before. The Reformation did at first, in 1521, offer a prospect of restoring unity. This might have been accomplished had the emperor been alive to the interests of Germany. But Charles V. was a Burgundian or a Spaniard rather than a German. He allowed the opportunity to pass, and German divisions were not only renewed but intensified by religious differences.

Though, after the diet of Speier, reform was confined within narrower limits, yet within those limits it continued to progress. Luther broke completely with the old church by throwing off his monastic vows and marrying a nun, Catharine Boria (1526). The reformed states set to work to form independent churches on the basis of the new doctrines. Services were conducted in German. Monasteries were suppressed and their revenues devoted to religion or education, though in some cases they were diverted to secular uses. Luther's Bible and hymns were everywhere adopted. The lead in these changes was taken by Saxony under the elector John, and by Hesse under the young and enthusiastic landgrave Philip. Other states were not slow to follow their example. The imperial cities, headed by Augsburg, Ulm, &c., eagerly adopted the new doctrines. In Brandenburg, margrave George became a convert. His brother Albert was grand-master of the Teutonic order; but in 1525 he transformed eastern Prussia into a secular duchy and acknowledged the suzerainty of the king of Poland. The Reformation was also introduced into Brunswick, Anhalt, Silesia, East Friesland, and Schleswig-Holstein.

§ 7. But the position of the reformed states was as yet far from secure. The orthodox princes, especially duke George of Saxony and the dukes of Bavaria, were eager to repress the progress of reform, and the emperor had yet to declare his will on the matter. As long as he was engaged in war with the pope there was no fear of his interference. But in 1529 he came to terms with Clement VII., and at this juncture another diet met at Speier (21 February). The imperial commissioners made no secret of their master's designs. Their proposal was to disregard the edict of 1526 and to return to the edict of Worms which had never been executed. The influence of the emperor, who had just been so successful in his Italian war, was sufficient to induce a majority to support this. But the minority issued a protest, signed by John of Saxony, George of Brandenburg, Ernest of Brunswick, Philip of Hesse, Wolfgang of Anhalt, and the representatives of fourteen cities. From this time the reforming party received the name of Protestants.

Charles V. now appeared in person in Germany, prepared to enforce obedience to his views, and to carry out his agreement with the pope. A diet met at Augsburg, and the emperor entered the city with mediæval pomp. His remonstrances with the protesting princes produced no effect, as they refused to sacrifice their convictions. The Protestant creed was drawn up by Melancthon in the Confession of Augsburg. All efforts to bring about a reconciliation between the rival beliefs failed. Ultimately an edict was drawn up which forbade the teaching of Protestant doctrines, and commanded all men to submit to the established church. Charles promised to induce the pope to summon a general council which should decide religious differences.

The Protestants could not accept this decree, and they felt certain that it would be enforced by arms. In the winter of 1530 they met together at Schmalkalde and there concluded a league for mutual defence. Germany seemed on the verge of civil war, but it was averted for a time by an invasion of the Turks, who besieged Vienna. Charles could not afford to forfeit the support of the Protestant princes, and this they were willing and anxious to give. The repulse of the Turks restored matters to their former condition, but Charles was again inclined to peace by the desire to secure the election of his brother Ferdinand as king of the Romans. And in 1532 the Turkish sultan renewed his invasion. This led to the conclusion of a peace at Nuremberg, which stipulated that until the meeting of a general council no one should be molested on account of his religion, and that all processes against Protestants begun in the Imperial Chamber should be stopped. In return for these concessions the Protestants furnished a large contingent to the imperial army. Charles himself assumed the command, his first experience as a military leader. The Turks refused to risk a battle, and after a brief campaign retired.

Thus the two parties in Germany remained unreconciled and both unsubdued. The Protestants had obtained some security for their belief, but this was avowedly only temporary. From this time their history depends mainly on the European complications in which Charles V. was again involved. The elector John of Saxony died in 1532, and was succeeded by his son, John Frederick, who rivalled his father in his devotion to the cause of reform.

II. Switzerland.

§ 8. The Swiss confederation had become practically free from all subjection to the empire in the time of Maximilian. The supreme authority was in the hands of the federal council, while each canton enjoyed a large amount of democratic freedom. This constitution made the Swiss as a body more enlightened than the population of any other European state. The humanist teaching found ready acceptance among them, and through it they were prepared to welcome proposals of reform.

What Luther was in Germany, Ulrich Zwingli was in Switzerland. He was born on the 1st of January, 1484, the son of the chief magistrate of the village of Wildhaus. He was educated at Berne, where the new classical learning was taught, and in 1499 he proceeded to the University of Vienna. After taking his degree he entered the church, and became curate of Glarus. From the first he established his reputation as an enlightened student and teacher of theology. Like Luther he made a careful study of the epistles of St. Paul, and learnt from them many of the same doctrines as the German reformer. As army chaplain he accompanied the Swiss troops in the Italian campaign of 1515, and there first learnt his abhorrence of the system which allowed his countrymen to be hired out to fight the battles of European princes. In 1519 he became curate of Zurich, where he entered upon his reforming career. The sale of indulgences roused his wrath, and he induced the canton of Zurich to refuse admission to the papal emissary, Bernhardin Samson. But his first real collision with the papacy arose in 1521, when Leo X. sent to Switzerland to raise forces for the war against the French. He was unable to prevent the levy of troops, but his patriotic feelings led him to make bitter complaints against the Roman pontiff. From this time his teaching became bolder. He attacked the church rules of fasting and the celibacy of the clergy. He urged the people to base their belief on the Scriptures alone and not on human institutions. His doctrines led to a quarrel with the bishop of Constance, in whose diocese Zurich lay. The canton supported Zwingli, and in 1525 definitely threw off the authority of the bishop. As there was no temporal prince, the settlement of ecclesiastical affairs devolved naturally upon the congregation. From Zurich the reform spread to Berne, Basel and other cantons.

§ 9. As political motives had from the first influenced Zwingli, so his reforms continued to have a political tendency. He wished to reorganise the federal constitution. At present the four forest cantons, Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden, and Lucerne, had as many votes in the federal diet as the other cantons, though the latter were larger and more numerous. Zwingli wished to put an end to this anomalous state of things and to establish equality of votes. But this produced a natural opposition among the cantons whose interests were threatened. They adhered obstinately to the orthodox religion, as the best security for their political power. The differences could only be settled by arms, and Zwingli had none of Luther's objections to their employment. In 1529 the war broke out and the four cantons were defeated. By the peace of Cappel they were compelled to pay the expenses of the war, and a rule was made that in each canton the religion should be that of the majority of the congregations. This treaty could not be lasting on account of the determination of the forest cantons to maintain their political predominance. A dispute between Zurich and Berne, both of whom claimed the dignity of metropolis, encouraged their opponents to renew the war. In October, 1531, the citizens of Zurich were completely defeated at Cappel, and Zwingli himself was slain. The second peace of Cappel (November, 1531) so far confirmed the previous treaty that it allowed each canton to settle its own religious affairs without external interference. Thus in Switzerland, as in Germany, the Reformation produced religious disunion.

The doctrines of Zwingli were not identical with those of Luther. They differed mainly on the subject of the communion. Luther adopted a mystical explanation of the real presence which was not easily intelligible, and which was an evident compromise. Zwingli, more logical and consistent, declared against transubstantiation altogether, and considered the words on which it was based to be merely symbolic. This gave rise to a quarrel between the two reformers, and Luther, ever prone to sacrifice courtesy to conviction, spoke of his Swiss fellow-worker in terms which did little credit to his heart or his understanding. There was also another important difference between the German and Swiss Reformations which arose out of the differing political constitution of the two countries. Lutheranism strengthened the hands of the territorial princes, Zwingli established the supremacy of the congregation.

III. SCANDINAVIA.

§ 10. In 1397 the three Scandinavian kingdoms, Denmark, Sweden and Norway, had been united at the Union of Calmar by Margaret, daughter of the Danish king Waldemar III. Such a union seemed natural and inevitable, but it was unsuccessful, because it was based merely upon dynastic interests and paid no regard to the feelings of the people. Though ruled by one sovereign, the three kingdoms remained isolated from each other; and the king of Denmark was practically powerless in Sweden and Norway. Besides this, within each kingdom the royal power was weakened by the independence of the church and the nobles. They possessed private jurisdiction, the right of taxation and coinage, and escheated property fell not to the crown, but to the community of nobles. The Scandinavian Reformation was essentially a political movement. It had its origin in these political conditions, and it prepared the way for the simultaneous development of the central power and of national unity.

In 1513 Christian II. of the house of Oldenburg obtained the three crowns. He was a man of considerable ability, but was endowed with a headstrong temper and little foresight. Under the influence of his mistress, or rather of her mother, a native of democratic Friesland, he set himself to break the overwhelming power of the nobles, and to make himself supreme. In Sweden he overthrew the aristocratic government of the Stures (1520), but his tyrannical and brutal conduct gave rise to a revolt which was attended with important consequences. In Denmark he set himself to raise the middle and lower classes as a counterpoise to the nobles. He encouraged commerce and manufactures, and endeavoured to break off the oppressive mercantile monopoly of the Hanse towns. At the same time he tried to ally himself with German Protestantism, and induced his uncle, the elector of Saxony, to send a Lutheran preacher to Denmark. But his arbitrary conduct produced a general indignation which blinded men's eyes to measures tending to real advancement. The death of his mistress, which he attributed to poison, aroused all the worst, passions of his nature. The nobles and clergy, who saw their independence threatened, took advantage of the king's unpopularity to excite a revolt. They obtained support from Lübeck, the head of the Hanseatic league. Christian II. was driven from Denmark in 1523, and the crown was conferred on his uncle, Frederick, duke of Schleswig-Holstein.

§ 11. Frederick I. was a Protestant, and had already introduced the reformed religion into his own duchies. But he was compelled to accept a capitulation in which he swore to do nothing to the prejudice of Roman Catholicism. While keeping the letter of his oath he did nothing to oppose the progress of the Reformation, which made rapid strides. In 1527 a diet at Odensee gave formal toleration to Lutheranism, at least until the meeting of a general council. But the progress of the new doctrines aroused the jealousy of the powerful clergy, and Christian II., who had returned to the orthodox faith, was encouraged in 1531 to attempt the recovery of the crown. But the undertaking failed, Christian was compelled to surrender, and remained a prisoner till his death in 1559.

On the death of Frederick I., in 1533, the two religious parties in Denmark measured their strength. The Catholics supported his second son John, while the Protestants rallied round the elder brother Christian. Ultimately, mainly by the assistance of Sweden, Christian III. obtained the crown. In his reign the Reformation was completely carried out. The nobles assisted the king to overthrow and despoil the church. The fall of one of the great independent powers in the state led to the foundation of a strong national monarchy in Denmark.

§ 12. Meanwhile in Sweden a great revolution had taken place. Christian II. had hoped to crush for ever Swedish independence. After the defeat of the aristocratic government, he had massacred all the nobles at Stockholm in cold blood. Thus he thought to deprive the people of their natural leaders: he even dreamt that the lower classes would be conciliated by the fall of their oppressors. In this he was completely mistaken. The news of the bloody massacre produced for the first time a real national spirit in Sweden. Hatred of the Danes and a desire to free themselves from the unnatural union overpowered all other considerations. The representative of this new spirit was Gustavus Erichsen, who received from his coat of arms the surname of Vasa. Himself of noble descent, he had been carried by Christian II. into Denmark as a hostage in 1518. From this imprisonment he escaped in 1520, only to hear the news of the massacre, in which his father and all his other relatives had fallen. From this time he consecrated his life to the work of vengeance.

A price was placed upon his head, and it was with great difficulty that he escaped from his enemies to find a refuge among the loyal peasants of Dalecarlia in the north of Sweden. There he lived for nearly a year, sharing the occupations of the rough people among whom he dwelt and gradually maturing his schemes. In 1521 he collected round him some hundreds of faithful peasants, and with this small force he commenced his great work—the emancipation of Sweden. National wrongs and aspirations brought to his standard crowds of inexperienced but determined soldiers as he marched southwards. He took Westeräs and Upsala, and advanced upon Stockholm. But the capital, garrisoned by Danish troops, resisted all his efforts, when suddenly in 1523 came the news of Christian II.'s expulsion from Denmark. The Stockholm garrison withdrew, Gustavus Vasa was crowned king of Sweden (June 7th), and entered his capital in state.

§ 13. But he was as yet only on the threshold of his difficulties. He had obtained a crown, but no real power with it. The nobles regarded him with jealousy as an equal who had been raised above them by the favour of the populace. The country was unaccustomed to the restraints of orderly government. During the long anarchy the church and the nobles had acquired all the power and nearly all the wealth of the country. Moreover Gustavus' relations with Denmark were doubtful. The support of Lübeck was necessary for him, but Lübeck was also the ally of Frederick I. If the latter insisted on the renewal of the Union of Calmar, how would Sweden be able to resist him? This difficulty was removed by the moderation of Frederick I., who allowed Lübeck to negotiate the treaty of Malmoe (1524). By this Sweden was declared independent, with the exception of the southern provinces, which remained united to Denmark. Thus the Union of Calmar came to an end.

Gustavus Vasa was now left free to complete his work of establishing a strong monarchy in Sweden. His first necessity was a sufficient revenue, because, besides the expenses of government, he was heavily in debt to Lübeck. He could not afford to quarrel with the nobles, who were already sufficiently hostile to him. He could wring no more from the peasants, who had given their all in his cause. In these straits he adopted a very simple policy. He determined to introduce the Reformation into Sweden, not from religious but from political motives. This would enable him to overthrow the church, and to obtain for the crown a large part of the clerical revenues. Out of these he would be able to improve the position of the lower classes, and if necessary to conciliate the nobles. But there were still great difficulties in the way. The nobles were sure to see in any attack on the church a scheme against themselves, as their property was held by no better title. And the uncultured peasants, loyal as they had proved themselves, were still devoted to their ancient religion. It was necessary to proceed with great caution. Lutheran preachers were allowed full liberty of teaching, though Gustavus was careful not to avow himself as their partisan. But his designs were seen through, and a revolt broke out in 1526, which was suppressed.

In 1527 Gustavus Vasa summoned a diet at Westeräs, at which not only nobles and clergy, but also representatives of the townsmen and peasants were present. Before this assembly the king laid his plans. They met with determined opposition. Prepared for this, Gustavus with theatrical promptness announced his determination to resign the crown. The diet, astounded by this sudden move, and conscious of the anarchy which must result from such a step, yielded to his demands. Four articles were issued, which are the foundation-stone of the new Swedish monarchy:—

1. All estates are jointly bound to oppose all rebellion and to defend the government from external and internal enemies.

2. The king is allowed the free disposal of clerical and monastic property.

3. The nobles have the right to take possession of all their property which has passed into the hands of the church since 1454.

4. Preachers shall have freedom to announce the pure word of God, and the Gospel shall be read in all Christian schools.

Thus the Reformation was accomplished in Sweden, and was based in the first place on political necessity. It was not, as in Germany and in Switzerland, first taught to the people and afterwards adopted by the government. On the contrary, it was introduced by the crown to further its own interests. The clergy lost most of their political power, and it was not till 1547 that they reappeared as an estate in the diet. The king had been compelled to purchase the support of the nobles by dangerous concessions, and thus to increase a power which he wished to lessen. In spite of this Gustavus gave a national existence to Sweden, and established on a firm basis the royal power, which (1544) was made hereditary for his descendants.

IV. JOHN CALVIN AND THE REFORMATION IN GENEVA.

§ 14. Geneva, situated on the border between the German and Romance nations, was subject in the sixteenth century to a triple authority. The sovereignty rested with the bishop: but the duke of Savoy had certain rights over the city, and the burghers claimed to exercise municipal self-government. Charles III. of Savoy (1504–1553) wished to annex Geneva to his duchy, and for this purpose he gained over the bishop. The independent burghers formed an opposition party which leaned for support on the neighbouring Swiss Confederation. Hence they received the name of "Eidgenossen" or "Huguenots," while the supporters of the duke were nicknamed "Mamelukes." The conflict lasted ten years, and ended in the victory of the liberal party, who received powerful support from Berne. The influence of Berne, which had adopted the doctrines of Zwingli, and the natural impulse of opposition to episcopal authority, encouraged the development of religious reform in Geneva. The new doctrines found an active and energetic teacher in Guillaume Farel, a native of Gap in Dauphiné. In 1535 the mass was abolished by order of the municipal council, and those who refused to accept the change went into exile. These events gave new ardour to the enemies of the city. The bishop laid Geneva under an interdict, and Charles III., supported by the Catholic exiles, made a last effort to restore his authority. But Geneva, again assisted by Berne, successfully defended itself, and the conquest of Savoy by the French relieved them from further danger on the side of the duke.

Thus in 1536 Geneva became an independent municipality, and had adopted Protestantism on account of its connection with the cause of liberty. But the work of reform was by no means completed. Constant party conflicts had accustomed the citizens to anarchy and disorder. The magistrates wished to take the government both of Church and State into their own hands, and to employ religion for political ends. Farel and his followers had been successful in destroying the old faith: they had not the requisite qualities for giving an orderly constitution to a new church. It was at this crisis that John Calvin appeared in Geneva.

§ 15. Calvin, the leader of the second generation of reformers, was born in 1509 at Noyon in Picardy. Destined by his father for the legal profession, he received an excellent education at Paris, Bourges, and Orleans. It was at Orleans that he turned his attention to theology, and became acquainted with the works of the German reformers. Of these he was no slavish disciple, but with their assistance he constructed an independent theological system. The persecutions of 1534 drove him from France, and he continued his studies in Italy and Germany. In 1536 he produced his greatest work, the *Institutio Christanæ Religionis*, which he wrote in Latin, and afterwards translated into French. In the same year he came to Geneva, where he was detained against his will by the urgency of Farel, who was eager to secure so able a colleague. In Geneva Calvin set to work to found a Christian church on the basis laid down in the "Institutes." But the harshness of his system, and the haughty supremacy which he assumed, provoked violent opposition. Men were not yet willing to sacrifice that freedom of life which was attainable under the new municipal government. They inveighed against the "new papacy," and received support from Berne, which wished to retain its influence over the liberated state. Calvin and Farel, who refused to make the slightest concessions, were in 1538 condemned to exile. Calvin now resumed his literary activity, and for the next three years resided chiefly in Strasburg.

§ 16. But it was soon discovered that his presence was indispensable to Geneva. The Roman Catholics were encouraged by these internal dissensions to attempt the recovery of the city. An address was issued by Cardinal Sadolet, to which Calvin wrote a conclusive answer from Strasburg. This achievement increased the number of his partisans, who strenuously urged his recall. And the growing influence of Berne was alarming to the patriotic supporters of independence. Thus political combined with religious motives to induce the magistrates to invite Calvin to return. It was with great reluctance, and only as he believed in obedience to a divine call, that he at last accepted the invitation. On the 13th September 1541, he returned to Geneva amidst general rejoicing. From this time he devoted himself with unequalled energy to the teaching of his doctrines and the foundation of a new church organisation.

The distinguishing feature of the Calvinistic doctrines was the development to its logical extreme of the Augustinian doctrine of predestination. Men were divided from their birth into two great classes, those who were destined to be saved and those who were doomed to destruction. But as it was impossible to divide these classes in this world, Calvin admitted to membership of the church all who were willing to conform to its rules. In his opposition to Roman Catholicism Calvin was far more irreconcilable than Luther. He rejected transubstantiation altogether, as well as all ritualistic forms and church festivals. Simplicity and seriousness were his highest ideal, and he made no provision for recreation of any kind. The whole hierarchical organisation of the old church, with its symbols and ceremonials, found in Calvin a most bitter and decided enemy.

Still more than in doctrine did Calvin differ from Luther in his conception of the constitution of the church. The German reformer had allowed religious supremacy to fall into the hands of the princes, who alone had power to wield it. The system of Calvin was far more democratic. He regarded the congregation, the community of believers, as the only source of authority upon earth. But he would tolerate none of the anarchy which might arise from a democratic constitution. The executive power was vested in an elected consistory, consisting of the clergy and twelve lay elders. To prevent the election of unfit persons, the clergy were compelled to pass a strict examination, and the elders could only be chosen from members of the two councils. The consistory was not only the chief ecclesiastical authority, it was also the supreme tribunal for the regulation of morals. Under Calvin's influence the strictest laws were enacted and enforced. Dancing and card-playing were forbidden under severe penalties, and adultery was punished by death. Calvin attached the greatest importance to the education of the young. Regular grades of schools were established, which taught in turn all the branches of knowledge known to those times. This made Geneva the educational centre of western Christendom, and extended the influence of Calvinism far beyond the city-walls.

Calvin was not able to complete his work without opposition. A party was formed which aimed at a relaxation of ecclesiastical strictness, and wished to bring the church under the control of the state. These men, who were known as the "Libertines," found numerous followers even among the municipal councils. But Calvin was able to maintain his supremacy, mainly by the support of the numerous French exiles who flocked to Geneva. He treated his opponents with merciless severity. Servetus, a Spaniard who came to Geneva in 1553, and who was opposed to Calvin only on doctrinal points, was publicly burnt as a heretic. It was unfortunate that the Protestants could not extend to others that toleration which they so convincingly demanded for themselves. In spite of his prodigious power, Calvin lived himself in poverty till his death in 1564, when his work was continued by his devoted disciple, Theodore Beza.

Calvin's doctrines were destined to exercise an influence quite out of proportion to the sphere of his personal activity. Their democratic and aggressive character, while it made them especially abhorrent to established governments, equally fitted them to be the religion of opponents of those governments. Lutheranism, both in Germany and in England, had strengthened the princely power; Calvinism, in Scotland and the Netherlands, was destined to attack and overthrow that power. Calvinism was the creed of rebels; it discarded altogether Luther's teaching as to the evils of employing force. Its influence is to be traced in the teaching of John Knox, in the heroic resistance of the northern Netherlands to Spain, in the prolonged struggle of the French Huguenots, and among the English Puritans, who organised the Great Rebellion and founded a mighty power beyond the Atlantic. Calvin was to the Romance and western nations what Luther and Melancthon were to the German.

CHAPTER V.

RIVALRY BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE HAPSBURGS.— SECOND PERIOD.

§ 1. Charles V.'s intervention in Tunis. § 2. Francis I. intrigues against Charles; allies himself with Clement VII., Henry VIII., James V., and Solyman. § 3. Outbreak of the war in 1536; French conquest of Savoy; Charles invades Provence; his failure. § 4. Campaign of 1537; truce of Nice; interview at Aigues-Mortes; death of Alessandro de Medici; accession of Cosimo, the first grand duke of Tuscany. § 5. Charles V. humbles the Castilian Cortes; suppression of the revolt of Ghent. § 6. Charles V.'s disaster off Algiers; Francis I. renews the war; campaigns of 1542 and 1543; treaty of Crespy. § 7. End of Francis I.'s reign; its importance in the history of France.

§ 1. After settling German affairs by the treaty of Nuremberg, Charles V. proceeded to Italy, where he renewed his alliance with the pope and the other states. Thence he went by sea to Barcelona, and his attention was soon drawn to affairs in Africa. There was considerable danger that the Turks might attain that supremacy on the Mediterranean coasts, which had belonged to the Mohammedans centuries before. Chaireddin or, as he was usually called, Barbarossa, the son of a potter in Lesbos, had taken up the trade of a corsair in conjunction with his brothers, and had made himself master of Algiers. Feeling unable to support this power by himself, he submitted to the sultan Solyman, who appointed him commander of the Turkish fleet. In his new capacity he interfered in a disputed succession to the throne of Tunis. Supporting the cause of Alraschid, he drove the rival claimant, Muley Hassan, from the kingdom. Then turning against Alraschid, he annexed Tunis to the dominions of the Sultan. Muley Hassan meanwhile had fled to Spain to implore the assistance of the emperor. Collecting a large fleet under the command of Andrea Doria, Charles V. sailed to the African coast in 1535, defeated Barbarossa, and restored the exiled prince to the throne of Tunis as a vassal of Spain.

§ 2. While the emperor was thus employed in upholding the cause of Christendom against the infidels, his power was threatened by the intrigues of his rival, the French king. It was impossible for Francis I. to accept with contentment the provisions of the treaty of Cambray. Above all, he was determined not to resign his pretensions to the duchy of Milan, but to take the earliest opportunity of re-asserting them. With this end in view, he tried to detach the pope from his alliance with the emperor. He offered to marry his second son, Henry of Orleans, to Catharine de Medici, daughter of Clement VII.'s cousin Lorenzo. In spite of Charles' efforts to prevent it, this marriage, fraught with important consequences to France, was concluded. But none of the anticipated advantages were reaped from it, because in 1534 Clement VII. died, and was succeeded by Paul III. In spite of this disappointment Francis continued his intrigues. He endeavoured to secure the alliance of Francesco Sforza, who, though duke of Milan and married to Charles' niece, was anxious to free himself from imperial tutelage. Maraviglia or, as the French call him, Merveille, was despatched from France to Milan as French envoy. But the intrigue was discovered by the imperialists, and Francesco Sforza was compelled to put Maraviglia to death. This breach of the law of nations gave Francis I. what he desired, a pretext for war. He formed a new standing army of 42,000 infantry, and looked round for alliances against the emperor. He entered into close relations with Henry VIII., and with James V. of Scotland. He was especially anxious to gain over the German Protestants; he invited Melancthon to Paris, and opened negotiations with the League of Schmalkalde. But within his own kingdom he was the persecutor of Protestants, and the German princes refused to trust him. To compensate himself for this he outraged the sentiments of Christian Europe by forming an alliance with the Turkish sultan Solyman.

§ 3. In the midst of these warlike preparations, Francis' position was completely altered by the death of Francesco Sforza (Oct. 1536). This of course deprived him of his pretext for war in the death of Maraviglia, but to make up for this he revived his claim to the duchy of Milan. At the beginning of 1536 a large French army was collected on the frontiers, but instead of invading Milan it attacked Charles III. of Savoy, whose only offence was that, having married the emperor's sister, he had deserted the French alliance for that of Charles. Savoy and Piedmont were speedily conquered, but the attack on Milan was still postponed. Charles V. proposed a compromise, and offered to give the vacant duchy to Francis' third son, the duke of Angoulême. Francis demanded it for his second son, the duke of Orleans; but as being nearer to the crown, and as the husband of Catharine de Medici, he was unacceptable to the emperor. By these negotiations Charles obtained time to raise money and troops. In June, 1536 he appeared in Rome, and there denounced Francis' conduct in the most violent terms, and challenged him to single combat. At the head of a large army he prepared to invade France. The treachery or incapacity of the Marquis of Saluces, the French commander in Piedmont, gave him an easy passage through that province. On the 25th of July, the anniversary of his defeat of Barbarossa, he crossed the frontier and entered Provence. His object was to bring the French king to a decisive engagement. But Francis I. pursued a more cautious policy than could have been expected of him. Occupying strong fortified positions at Avignon and Valence, he devastated the country before them, and stood strictly on the defensive. The conduct of these military operations was left to the Marshal de Montmorency, who had suggested them. Want of provisions and consequent disease soon produced their effect on the imperial army. With his officers and soldiers dying around him, and impregnable fortresses in front, Charles had nothing left but to retreat to Genoa. There he took ship for Barcelona, and hastened to hide his disgrace from the eyes of Europe. During the campaign the dauphin had died, and Henry of Orleans became heir to the French throne.

§ 4. At the beginning of 1537 Francis I., declaring the treaty of Cambray to be at an end, summoned "Charles of Austria" to appear before the parliament of Paris, as being a French vassal in Flanders and Artois. On his non-appearance, these provinces were declared to be forfeited to France. The campaign which followed this meaningless mediæval ceremony was unimportant. An invasion of Picardy was ended by the exertions of the regent in the Netherlands, Mary of Hungary, who obtained a truce for ten months extending to her territories only. On the side of Italy, the French re-conquered Piedmont, and Solyman, in accordance with his treaty, sent Barbarossa to ravage the coasts of Naples. But Francis' consciousness of the odium which the Turkish alliance brought upon him inclined him to peace, and he postponed the threatened invasion of Milan. Paul III. eagerly undertook the task of mediation. Charles V. was anxious to put a stop to the Turkish advance, and in 1538 a truce for ten years was arranged at Nice, by which each party kept his conquests. Thus the unfortunate duke of Savoy remained excluded from his territories, which he had done nothing to forfeit. Soon afterwards Charles, on his return journey to Spain, was driven by a storm to Aigues-Mortes. Francis hurried to meet him, and the two rivals, so lately engaged in open war and apparently imbued with deadly enmity for each other, passed three days together on terms of chivalrous cordiality.

Besides negotiating the truce of Nice, Paul III. advanced the interests of his family by securing for his grandson, Ottavio Farnese, the hand of the emperor's natural daughter, Margaret. She was the widow of Alessandro de Medici, the last male of the direct descendants of Cosimo, the founder of the house. Alessandro was murdered in 1437 by his kinsman Lorenzino, who hoped to supplant him, but who was driven by sudden terror to take refuge in Venice. The government of Florence now fell to Cosimo de Medici, the representative of a collateral line descended from Lorenzo, brother of the elder Cosimo. He subsequently annexed Siena and southern Tuscany to Florence, and thus founded the grand-duchy of Tuscany, which was held by his descendants till 1737.

§ 5. After the striking interview at Aigues-Mortes, Charles V. proceeded to Spain, where a dispute with the Castilian Cortes enabled him to humble that ancient assembly. Henceforth the nobles and clergy were excluded, as paying no taxes, and the Cortes consisted only of the deputies of eighteen cities, who could offer no determined resistance to the royal power (1538). About the same time Charles received news of a revolt in Ghent, the most flourishing city in Flanders. The Flemish cities had found their old independence sadly curtailed when they fell under the powerful dukes of Burgundy; but their lot was still worse under the house of Hapsburg. In 1536 the city of Ghent, relying on its ancient privileges, refused to contribute to a tax demanded by Mary of Hungary. The Regent at once ordered the arrest of all citizens of Ghent throughout the Netherlands. An appeal to the emperor being disregarded, the Gantois took up arms, established their independence, and wrote to Francis I. to offer him their aid in becoming sovereign of the Netherlands. This offer was refused by Francis, who, under the influence of Montmorency, was now as anxious to be on good terms with Charles as he had previously been to quarrel with him. Hoping to establish a claim on the emperor's gratitude, he divulged the whole negotiations, and gave him a free passage through France to Flanders. In France, Charles was treated with magnificent hospitality, and conciliated his host by a pretended intention to give Milan to the dauphin Henry, formerly duke of Orleans. Arrived in Flanders, Charles V. promptly put down the rebellion and deprived the Gantois of all their ancient privileges. Having thus gained his end, he refused to acknowledge his obligations to France, and denied having made any promise about Milan. Francis I. found himself duped; he had lost the support of Ghent, and was no nearer to the acquisition of Milan. Montmorency, on whom the blame of his short-sighted confidence fell, was degraded from office, and the king lay in wait for the first opportunity to renew his war against the emperor.

§ 6. Meanwhile Charles passed from Flanders to Germany, and thence to Italy, intent on a new expedition to Africa. The corsairs had resumed their incursions on the Mediterranean coast, and there was no prospect of peace and order until the pirate state of Algiers was reduced. With a magnificent fleet and army Charles set sail for Algiers in October, 1541. But he found more formidable opponents in winds and waves than in the infidels. A great storm shattered his fleet, and drove him with a small remnant of his forces to Spain.

This disaster, the greatest which Charles had yet experienced, gave fresh courage to Francis I. It also gave him an opportunity of renewing that alliance with the Sultan which had been broken off in 1538. A Spanish renegade, Rincon, was despatched to Constantinople, but on his passage through Lombardy, he was seized by the Marquis del Guasto, governor of Milan, and put to death This gave Francis his desired pretext for hostilities. An alliance with the duke of Cleve, to whom Charles V. refused the investiture of Guelders, offered the French great advantages in an attack on the Netherlands. James V. of Scotland was closely allied with France, having married first Francis' daughter Madeleine, and afterwards Mary of Guise. The Scandinavian countries now began to play a part in European history, and both Christian III. of Denmark and Gustavus I. of Sweden made treaties with France. Henry VIII., however, jealous of French influence in Scotland, refused to renew his alliance, but the Sultan, who was at this time. gaining great successes in Hungary, was more complaisant.

Francis declared war in 1542, raised five large armies, and made a simultaneous attack upon the Netherlands and Roussillon. Charles duke of Orleans, the commander of the former expedition, tired of a campaign of sieges, hurried off suddenly to the Pyrenees, where he heard that his brother, the dauphin, was going to fight a pitched battle. But the invasion of Roussillon was foiled by the resistance of Perpignan ; and the French retired into quarters without any success proportioned to their exertions. In 1543 Charles V. arrived in Germany determined to reduce the duke of Cleve. The latter applied for aid to the League of Schmalkalde, but Charles was lucky enough to gain over Philip of Hesse, and the application was refused. Cleve was conquered and the duke forced into humiliating submission, while Francis made no effort to assist him till too late. An attack upon Nice, the last possession of the duke of Savoy, by the combined French and Turkish fleets was unsuccessful. In 1544 Charles arranged with Henry VIII. a simultaneous invasion of France. The English king crossed over, but instead of advancing towards Paris he laid siege to Boulogne, which did not surrender till September. Charles, disregarding the fact that his army in Piedmont suffered a severe defeat at Cerisoles, invaded Champagne. He advanced within two days' march of Paris, which was thrown into the utmost consternation, when Charles evinced a sudden desire for peace. His motives are not easy to follow, but he probably was indignant that Henry VIII. failed to fulfil his engagement; and he also wished to end the dreaded alliance between French and Turks, and to have his own hands free to settle matters with the German Protestants. Francis was no less willing to come to terms, and the treaty of Crespy was concluded (10 September, 1544). By this all conquests made since the truce of Nice were restored. Francis renounced all claims to Naples, Flanders and Artois, and Charles consented to a formal renunciation of the Duchy of Burgundy. Besides this, the emperor promised the hand of his daughter or his niece to the duke of Orleans, who was to receive as his wife's dowry either the Netherlands and Franche-Comté, or the duchy of Milan. On the completion of this compact Francis was bound to restore Savoy and Piedmont to Charles III.

§ 7. This treaty which gave unexpectedly good terms to France, brings to an end the direct rivalry between Charles V. and Francis I. The latter's remaining years were mainly occupied with a war against Henry VIII., which was carried on partly in Scotland and partly round Boulogne. Boulogne was at last surrendered under Edward VI. and peace made between England and France. Francis was disappointed in the advantages which were held out by the treaty of Crespy. The duke of Orleans, his favourite son, died (September, 1545) before either of the proposed marriages had been completed. Francis attempted to revive his own pretensions to Milan, but the emperor disregarded them. He was compelled to content himself with retaining Savoy and Piedmont, which he was no longer bound to surrender. On the 31st of March, 1547, Francis I. died at the age of 53, after a stormy reign of 32 years.

Francis I. was too absorbed in foreign politics to pay much attention to domestic affairs, yet, in spite of this, his reign is a period of considerable importance in the development of France. The king failed to attain his dynastic objects. He never acquired Naples, and he was forced to relinquish Milan. But he was very successful in defending the French frontiers, and in creating a national spirit which aimed at their extension. Under Francis, too, the central power of the crown was vastly increased. The church was rendered subject by the Concordat of 1516. The estates were of little importance and were hardly ever summoned. Even local and municipal independence was restricted or carefully watched. Large revenues were derived, not only from the taille, but also from the sale of offices and from the clergy. A native infantry was formed on a larger scale than had previously existed. And the king was not unpopular, but was served with willing devotion. His magnificent court, his patronage of art and literature, and, above all, his martial spirit, made him the true reflex and representative of the national life. Maximilian I. once declared that the emperor was a king of kings, because no one felt bound to obey him; that the king of Spain was a king of men, because, though opposed, he was still obeyed; but the French king was a king of beasts, for no one dared to oppose him.

Francis I. was the originator of the traditional French policy, afterwards so successfully pursued by Richelieu, of being Protestant abroad and Catholic at home. His rivalry to the house of Hapsburg made him anxious to conciliate the League of Schmalkalde, but at the same time he was careful to repress every tendency to reform in his own kingdom. He aroused the anger of the pope by his alliance with the heretic Henry VIII., but he made amends by a furious persecution of French Protestants. In his later years his measures became more and more barbarous, and one of his last acts was the wholesale extermination of the Vaudois (April, 1545). Among the Frenchmen who were driven by his severity into exile was John Calvin, the apostle of Geneva.

CHAPTER VI.

CHARLES V. AND THE GERMAN REFORMATION. RENEWED WAR WITH FRANCE. 1532-1559.

§ 1. Progress of the Reformation in Germany after the treaty of Nuremberg; the Anabaptists in Münster. § 2. Attempted compromise; Diet of Ratisbon; its failure; the archbishop of Cologne. § 3. Charles prepares for a struggle against the Protestants; secures the adhesion of Maurice of Saxony; death of Luther; Schmalkaldic war; battle of Muhlberg. § 4. Council of Trent; the emperor quarrels with Paul III.; the Interim. § 5. Charles' attempt to establish despotism; reaction in Germany; conduct of Maurice of Saxony. § 6. The German princes obtain assistance from Henry II. of France; Charles narrowly escapes capture at Innspruck; treaty of Passau; French capture Metz, Toul, and Verdun. § 7. Charles fails in the siege of Metz; Albert of Brandenburg; death of Maurice of Saxony at Sievershausen; his character. § 8. Religious peace of Augsburg. § 9. Charles V. dispirited by his failures; his abdication. § 10. Pope Paul IV.; he provokes France to make war with Philip II.; Alva in Italy; success of the Spaniards. § 11. War on the French frontier; Spanish victories at St. Quentin and Gravelines; capture of Calais by Guise; treaty of Cateau-Cambresis; importance of the treaty.

§ 1. The treaty of Nuremberg (1532) secured toleration for the German Protestants, and imposed no restrictions upon the extension of their power. The emperor was unsuccessful in his efforts to induce the pope to summon a general council, and the renewal of the war with France kept him from any interference in the affairs of Germany. The Catholic princes were not united, and there was no armed power in the country which could hope to compete with the League of Schmalkalde. Circumstances were thus very favourable for the Protestants, and they soon gained an important victory in Würtemberg. Duke Ulrich of Würtemberg had been expelled in 1519, and his territories had since then been administered by the House of Hapsburg. But during his exile Ulrich had shown an inclination to adopt the reformed doctrines, and his son Christopher, who had none of his father's unpopularity, was a decided Protestant. On the motion of Philip of Hesse, and in spite of the opposition of the elector of Saxony, their cause was adopted by the League of

Schmalkalde. The dissolution of the Swabian League early in 1534 gave the desired opportunity. By a sudden invasion the Austrian troops were overpowered, Würtemberg was restored to Ulrich, and the Lutheran church established in the duchy. Ferdinand of Austria, taken completely by surprise, was compelled to sanction these events by the peace of Kadan (1534). This was a very great success. Protestantism was introduced in the midst of the south German states, and the House of Hapsburg suffered a severe defeat.

In this year the anabaptists established themselves at Münster under John of Leyden. They taught the most extreme doctrines, such as the community of property and of women, and the city became the scene of anarchy and the most insane excesses. The movement was put down by force in 1535 and the ringleaders executed. The reaction caused by these unfortunate events did little to stay the progress of reform. In the next two years Protestantism was accepted in Baden, Anhalt, Augsburg, and a number of towns both in northern and southern Germany. But in 1539 occurred the greatest extension of the new doctrines, owing to dynastic changes in Albertine Saxony and Brandenburg. George duke of Saxony had been as keen a supporter of orthodoxy as his relatives of the Ernestine branch were of Lutheranism. So averse was he to religious changes that he endeavoured by will to disinherit his brother Henry and to leave his dominions to the Hapsburgs. But all his efforts proved fruitless, and on his death (17 April, 1539) Henry obtained undisturbed possession of the duchy of Saxony, where he introduced the new faith to which he already belonged. Joachim I., margrave of Brandenburg, had endeavoured to preserve the Catholic religion, and had married his two sons, Joachim and John, to Catholic princesses. But after his death (1535) John, who obtained Brandenburg-Neumark, at once joined the League of Schmalkalde and established the reformed church. The elder brother, Joachim II., who succeeded to the electorate, proceeded more cautiously. While he himself remained a Catholic, he offered no impediment to the teaching of the reformers; and finally, in 1539, consented to the definite adoption of Protestantism. Thus the Reformation was successfully established in almost the whole of northern and central Germany. In the south, Austria, Bavaria, the Palatinate, and the Rhenish electorates, remained orthodox, while in the north Catholicism could reckon only one supporter, Henry duke of Brunswick.

§ 2. The progress of the Reformation was regarded with serious misgivings by Charles V. The political unity of Germany was one of his chief objects, but it could never be attained without religious unity. In the face of the danger threatened both by France and the Turks, it was impossible for him to alienate the Protestants by coercion. Measures of conciliation were therefore tried, but as yet they had been unsuccessful. The pope, Paul III., made tentative offers of a council in some Italian town, but the German princes were resolute in their refusal. The Vice-Chancellor Held, acting as Charles' agent, so far from being able to reconcile opposing parties, only formed a separate league of Catholic princes at Nuremberg in 1539. Thus Germany was divided into two hostile camps, and Held's conduct only lessened the chances of a reconciliation. But in 1541 Charles himself appeared in Germany to conduct his own affairs. At the diet of Ratisbon a serious effort was made to bring about a compromise. Circumstances never appeared so promising. The pope was represented by the most moderate of the cardinals, Contarini, the representative of a party at Rome which desired to reform the church. Luther was not present, and his place was taken by the more conciliatory Melancthon. The Catholics too put forward their more moderate theologians, Gropper and Pflug. But, in spite of this, religious differences proved too wide to be bridged over. Charles was convinced that nothing was to be gained by his present policy, and nothing was left for him but the employment of force. Henceforth this necessity was more and more impressed upon him; but as yet circumstances compelled him to temporise. The Turks were on the point of annexing Hungary, and the Protestants must be conciliated at all cost. The diet therefore ended by confirming the treaty of Nuremberg, putting an end to all processes against Protestants, and admitting members of both creeds to the Imperial Chamber.

The Protestant princes were completely blinded as to the emperor's real designs; they regarded the recess of the diet as a permanent security. Henry of Brunswick, who had obtained a decree against the town of Goslar, refused to obey the recess. The league of Schmalkalde took up arms against him and drove him from his territories, where Protestantism was at once established. This event caused great uneasiness to the emperor, which was increased by occurrences in Cologne. The aged archbishop, Hermann von der Wied, hitherto a moderate member of the Catholic party, gradually manifested his inclination to go over to the reformed faith. In spite of remonstrances from the chapter and the municipal authority, he sanctioned grave religious alterations and allowed full liberty to the Protestant preachers. This attitude on the part of a great prince of the church aroused the gravest misgivings. At present Charles' hands were tied by the war with France, but in 1544 the peace of Crespy set him free, and he set out for Germany determined to put down the League of Schmalkalde and to establish at the same time unity and submission to the central power.

§ 3. Although his mind was now fully made up, Charles proceeded with the utmost caution, and concealed his real designs as long as possible. The king of France was pledged by the peace of Crespy to assist in the putting down of heresy, and a secret treaty was easily concluded with the pope. On the support of the Catholic princes the emperor could rely, but he was also able to gain over some of the Protestants. To them he was careful to represent that his objects were political, not religious, that he had no desire to repress reform, but only to put down the haughty and independent League of Schmalkalde. John and Albert of Brandenburg, indignant at the treatment of Henry of Brunswick, readily joined the emperor. But a more important ally was Maurice duke of Saxony. He had succeeded his father in 1541, and, though an avowed Protestant, he soon adopted an independent attitude. In 1542 he withdrew from the League of Schmalkalde, though he still promised his aid if the interests of religion were threatened. But with him, as with Charles V., religion was altogether subordinate to politics; his guiding motive was personal ambition. Jealousy of the Ernestine branch of his family and desire of territorial aggrandisement combined to induce him to join the emperor, with whom he concluded a close alliance. Meanwhile the Protestant leaders were quite in the dark as to Charles' designs. While he was collecting an army, he continued to hold diets, where schemes of compromise were discussed, though on each occasion the Catholics adopted a bolder and more aggressive tone.

Before the final overthrow of the peace, which he had so consistently enjoined, Martin Luther died on 18th February, 1546. In July Charles declared war by issuing the imperial ban against the leaders of the League of Schmalkalde. They now collected their forces, and if they had attacked the emperor at once they must have been victorious. But they were weakened by the evil results of a divided command. Philip of Hesse, the most active and able of the Protestant princes, urged an immediate attack, but he was foiled by the opposition of his cautious and irresolute colleague, the elector of Saxony. This gave Charles time to receive reinforcements from Italy and the Netherlands, though he continued to avoid a battle. Meanwhile Maurice, in conjunction with Ferdinand of Austria, invaded the Saxon electorate, which was speedily overrun. This news at once dispersed the army of the League, and the elector John Frederick hurried to the defence of his own dominions. Charles V., taking advantage of the confusion among his enemies, reduced southern Germany to subjection. Meanwhile John Frederick had turned the tables on Maurice by attacking the duchy of Saxony, where Dresden and Leipzig alone held out. In April, 1547, Charles marched to the assistance of Maurice, and mainly through the latter's strategy won a complete victory at Mühlberg. The elector himself was taken prisoner. After suffering brutal treatment he was compelled to sign the capitulation of Wittenberg, by which he resigned his electoral title and his territories to the emperor. These were conferred by Charles upon Maurice as the reward of his services, and thus the Saxon electorate was transferred from the Ernestine to the Albertine line. A few weeks later Philip of Hesse was compelled to surrender, his personal safety being guaranteed by Maurice and the elector of Brandenburg. But Charles, disregarding this, threw him into prison. Henry of Brunswick was released from captivity and restored to his duchy.

§ 4. By these great successes Charles realised his grand object and became supreme in Germany. He could now insist upon that religious uniformity on which he intended to base political centralisation. But just at this moment, when everything seemed favourable, he forfeited the most necessary alliance, that of the pope. Paul III. was anxious to suppress Protestantism, but he was unwilling to see Charles powerful enough to dictate to the papacy. Every advantage gained by the emperor terrified the pope. The Council of Trent had been summoned in 1545, but against Charles' wishes questions of practical reform were postponed to doctrinal matters, and these were settled in the most uncompromising form. In March, 1547, in defiance of imperial remonstrances, the council was transferred from Trent to Bologna. Before the battle of Muhlberg the papal contingent was withdrawn from the imperial army. In his indignation, Charles despatched an embassy to Bologna in January, 1548, to declare that all proceedings of the council were null and void. Other circumstances occurred to inflame the quarrel. Paul III.'s son Piero Luigi Farnese had been invested with the cities of Parma and Piacenza. His tyranny made him detested, and he was assassinated. The governor of Milan at once took possession of Piacenza in the emperor's name. Paul III. accused Gonzaga of complicity in his son's murder, and called upon Charles to invest his grandson Ottavio Farnese with Parma and Piacenza. This being refused, the pope declared the two cities reunited to the holy see, thus making the emperor guilty of an attack upon the church.

This bitter quarrel with the pope, and the impossibility of obtaining a satisfactory council, compelled Charles V. to settle the religious affairs of Germany by himself. In May, 1548, he brought before the diet of Augsburg the system of faith to be observed in Germany, which, from its avowedly temporary character, was called the Interim. The doctrines contained in it were substantially Catholic, but to the Protestants were conceded, among other points, the communion in both kinds and the marriage of the clergy. This high-handed attempt on the part of a temporal prince to formulate a religious creed excited the greatest astonishment in Germany, while it further exasperated the pope. But by a dexterous manœuvre on the part of the archbishop of Mainz it was accepted by the astounded diet. The Interim shows clearly how Charles' head had been turned by his success, and how little conception he had of the real meaning and force of religious belief. It was almost equally distasteful to both Catholics and Protestants, and, though formally adopted by several princes, it was hardly anywhere really enforced. Maurice of Saxony was the first to protest against it, and in many parts of Germany it could only be introduced by force of arms.

§ 5. If Charles V.'s religious policy was unpopular, his other measures were far more so. His treatment of the imprisoned princes was an outrage not only on justice but on humanity. And the political changes which he introduced roused feelings of profound mistrust. The diet of Augsburg, meeting just after the emperor's great successes, was numerously attended by prelates and princes who had little courage to oppose his will. Almost all his proposals were accepted. The Imperial Chamber was reconstituted and the appointment of its members vested in the emperor. The Netherlands were united with the empire as a tenth circle, while they retained their old institutions. A new military treasury was formed under the complete control of the emperor. Thus Charles V. succeeded in establishing a central authority which none of his predecessors had possessed for centuries.

But princely independence was too firmly rooted in Germany to submit without a struggle. Charles' high-handed measures produced a reaction. Of this the representative was Maurice of Saxony. He found that he had purchased the electorate at the price of universal unpopularity. He had aided to subject Germany to a Spanish despot, whose troops conducted themselves as in a conquered country. And his compliance had secured him no influence with the emperor; he could not even obtain the release of his father-in-law, the landgrave of Hesse, whose continued imprisonment was a stain upon his honour. To regain his lost reputation he determined to become the champion of German independence, and to strengthen this cause by linking it with that of religious freedom. But he was careful to disguise his change of policy until circumstances were ripe for action.

Meanwhile Charles V., blind to the growing reaction, was determined to complete his schemes. The Interim was insisted upon. Even Maurice felt compelled to accept it, though it was modified for Saxony by Melancthon. The south-German cities which opposed its introduction were subdued by Spanish soldiers, and the municipal government altered to suit the emperor's wishes. But in northern Germany, where the lead was taken by Magdeburg, for a time the metropolis of Protestantism, the opposition was less easily suppressed. Charles was encouraged in his designs by the death of his enemy Paul III. (1549) and the election of his easy-going successor Julius III. The new pope was willing to resume the Council of Trent, to which Charles looked for a confirmation of his ideas of religious unity.

§ 6. The emperor now aimed at making his vast power perpetual by securing the succession of his son Philip to the empire. But here he was confronted by the steady opposition of his brother Ferdinand, who was already king of the Romans, and who refused to yield to the pretensions of his nephew. This dispute encouraged Maurice of Saxony to develop his schemes. He refused to appear at the diet of Augsburg, because the landgrave was not released. He had accepted the task of forcing the Interim on Magdeburg, and laid siege to the city. But this was intended only as a blind; he did not press the siege, while he used it as a pretext for collecting an independent army. He was joined by the margraves of Brandenburg, by William of Hesse, Philip's son, and by John Albert of Mecklenburg. These princes made overtures to Henry II. of France, and on 15th January, 1552, concluded with him the treaty of Friedewalde. By this the French-speaking cities of Metz, Toul, Verdun and Cambray were to be ruled by Henry as imperial vicar, and he undertook in return to assist the princes in their war against the emperor. In consequence of this treaty the French king assumed the title of Defender of the Liberties of Germany.

Just before this, Magdeburg had surrendered to Maurice on easy terms. In March, 1552, he was able to commence the war. He took Augsburg and restored the Lutheran Church. While engaged in a conference with Ferdinand at Linz, he heard that the emperor was collecting troops. Determined to strike a speedy blow, he marched towards Tyrol, took the fortress of Ehrenberg, which commanded the pass, and arrived at Innsprück only a few hours after Charles had fled in haste. But for a mutiny among the troops at Ehrenberg the emperor must have been captured. As it was the late tyrant of Germany became suddenly a powerless exile in Styria. Utterly humbled and dispirited, he left the necessary negotiations to Ferdinand, who concluded the treaty of Passau in July, 1552. The elector of Saxony and the landgrave of Hesse were to be released; the Lutherans were to be allowed undisturbed exercise of their religion, and to be admitted to the Imperial Chamber; a diet was to meet in six months to arrange, if possible, a permanent settlement. Albert of Brandenburg, who was still in arms as the ally of Maurice, was to be admitted to peace on these terms. Charles, not without great reluctance, consented to sign the treaty. The supremacy so lately established in Germany was shattered, and the schemes which seemed so near success were for ever foiled. The Council of Trent, which had met again in 1551, separated in fright at the news of the confederates' advance.

Maurice's marvellous success was sullied by his unpatriotic concessions to the French. In all probability he never contemplated a permanent annexation of the "three bishoprics" to France. His idea was that the interests of the French king and the German princes, as opponents of the House of Hapsburg, were identical, and that in humbling that house they could work harmoniously. But Henry II. was less disinterested than was announced in his manifesto. No sooner had Maurice taken the field than the constable Montmorency with a large force entered Lorraine, and speedily occupied Toul, Verdun and Nancy. The guardianship of the young duke of Lorraine was taken from his mother, Charles V.'s niece, and given to the count of Vaudemont, an adherent of France. Metz, the grand object of the campaign, was taken only by a deceitful stratagem, and Henry II. entered it in triumph (April, 1552). The fortress which had hitherto been the outpost of Germany was henceforward to be the great defence of France. The command was given to the ablest of French soldiers, Francis of Guise. There was no mention made of the imperial vicarship or of a reservation of the rights of the empire, which had been stipulated in the treaty of Friedewalde.

§ 7. The news of these events aroused Charles V. to indignation that the son of his old rival should gain successes where Francis I. had failed. Leaving affairs in Germany to take their course, he collected an army and advanced against Metz in October, 1552. On the way he was fortunate enough to gain over Albert of Brandenburg, who remained in arms in spite of the peace of Passau, and who had lately been in close alliance with France. The ability and energy of Francis of Guise defeated all Charles' efforts to take Metz. The bitter cold of winter proved very fatal to the Spanish and Italian soldiers. In January, 1553, it was found necessary to retire. Thus the grand border fortresses of Metz, Toul and Verdun passed from Germany to France, to become the basis of later acquisitions in the same direction. Their loss was the natural fruit of German disunion.

This great reverse, combined as it was with a Turkish invasion in the east and considerable losses in Italy, seems to have reduced Charles V. to reckless despair. He no longer cared to pursue a consistent policy, when success appeared so hopeless. He was not unwilling to avenge himself on Germany by sowing the seeds of civil war. Regardless of all his duties as a ruler, he encouraged the lawless actions of Albert of Brandenburg, who supported himself by constant warfare. Thus he alienated all the German princes, both Catholic and Protestant. His brother Ferdinand was determined to support order and to carry out the treaty of Passau. A league of princes was formed at Heidelberg with these objects in view. They were determined not to continue the connection with Spain by electing Philip, and to exclude Spanish influence from the government of Germany. But Charles V. was wholly uninfluenced by this, and continued his connection with the disturbers of the public peace.

It became necessary, if the peace of Passau were to have any effect, to oppose Albert of Brandenburg by force. Maurice of Saxony, who was more responsible for the treaty than any one else, and who regarded the margrave as a personal rival, undertook the task. He entered Brunswick, where Albert had allied himself with the enemies of duke Henry, and won a complete victory at Sievershausen (July, 1553). But in the battle he received a musket wound which proved fatal. Maurice was only in his thirty-second year, yet he had played a great part in a crisis of German history. He defeated and humbled the greatest potentate in Europe at a time when the world seemed to be at his feet. He freed Germany from the dreaded despotism of the foreigner. Had he lived longer much of the mystery which shrouded his character would have been cleared away. The Protestants, in spite of his services, always regarded him with suspicion, and this was well justified. He had no real sympathy for the religion to which he belonged. His motives were purely political, and his two main objects were his own aggrandisement and the independence of the princely class of which he was a member. It was fortunate for his reputation that with his last projects the interests of Germany were bound up; had he died just after the Schmalkaldic war he would have come down to history merely as a successful traitor. Maurice of Saxony must be regarded as the aptest German pupil of that school of politicians and diplomatists which had been founded in Italy and whose creed is formulated in the *Prince* of Machiavelli. Maurice was succeeded by his brother Augustus. John Frederick made a last effort to induce Charles V. to restore him to his electorate. Augustus, more moderate than his brother, made concessions of territory which satisfied his Ernestine relatives. But the electorate and duchy remained in the hands of the Albertine line, to develop ultimately into the kingdom of Saxony.

§ 8. Maurice's death did not terminate the war, but rather encouraged the aggressions of Albert of Brandenburg. The task of opposing him now devolved on the aged Henry of Brunswick, who became reconciled with his subjects, and at last granted toleration to the Lutheran religion. Albert, defeated in several engagements, was compelled in 1554 to retire to France, where he entered the service of Henry II. The diet, which had been stipulated in the treaty of Passau, but which had been delayed by the prolonged hostilities, met at last in February, 1555, at Augsburg, under the presidency of Ferdinand of Austria. Its task was to arrange a permanent religious peace. The toleration secured to the Lutherans at Passau was confirmed. The Public Peace was renewed, and the Imperial Chamber was to contain members of both creeds in equal proportion. But a great difficulty arose as to the disposal of Church property. In the Lutheran States this property had been secularised, and it was arranged that all secularisations which had taken place before 1552 should be confirmed. But the Catholics were resolute to prevent any similar alienations from their church in the future. They insisted on the so-called Ecclesiastical Reservation, by which if any prelate went over to the reformed church he should resign his office and all the patronage connected with it. The Protestants refused to accept this; and as no agreement could be arrived at, Ferdinand took the matter into his own hands. The Ecclesiastical Reservation was included in the treaty, but the protest of the Protestants was also included.

Thus the religious peace of Augsburg could not be, as intended, a permanent settlement of the questions at issue. The fixing of an arbitrary date, 1552, as the limit of the progress of reform was too artificial to be really binding. The treaty was the work of the princes, and paid no regard to the interests of the people. It did not concede individual freedom of conscience, but only the right of the prince to fix the religion of his subjects. The principle established was the *cujus regio ejus religio* which was laid down first at the diet of Speier in 1526. And the toleration which was the great gain from the treaty applied only to adherents of the confession of Augsburg, i.e. the Lutheran Protestants. There was no concession made to the followers of Zwingli or Calvin, who were now the most active and progressive of the Protestant sects. But in spite of these defects the treaty of Augsburg was the basis of religious and political life in Germany for more than half a century, and its omissions were hardly realised till they gave birth to the Thirty Years' War.

§ 9. Charles V. was at this time in Brussels, the capital of the Netherlands, where he had been born, and which he always preferred to his other dominions. His health was already broken, and the news of the treaty of Augsburg announced to him the failure of his dearest schemes. Not only were all hopes of reviving German unity and establishing a strong Hapsburg monarchy at an end, but the Netherlands, which he had united to the empire in 1548, were separated again by the Augsburg diet. The princes were resolutely opposed to all the dynastic designs of their Spanish ruler. Outside Germany, too, events occurred which added to Charles' despair. He had been forced to conclude the truce of Vaucelles with Henry II., and thus virtually to give his sanction to French aggressions. The marriage of his son Philip to Mary Tudor, by which it had been hoped to obtain for the Hapsburgs another crown, had turned out ill. Philip was unpopular in England, and all Mary's hopes of an heir proved disappointments. To propitiate the Deity the queen encouraged that persecution of the Protestants which assuredly did nothing to conciliate the people to Spanish rule; and in Rome pope Julius III. died in 1555, and was succeeded by Paul IV., the determined opponent of the Hapsburgs.

All these events combined to induce Charles to carry out a design already entertained of retiring from the cares of government. On 25th October he appeared in the grand hall at Brussels, leaning on the shoulder of William of Orange, and, amidst the tears of the spectators, formally resigned the Netherlands and the Italian provinces to his son Philip. In January, 1556, the crown of Spain was similarly transferred. An embassy was sent to Germany to announce his abdication of the empire, and to commend his brother Ferdinand to the electors. In September, 1556, Charles sailed to Spain and retired to San Juste, where a retreat had been already prepared for him. There he lived, still concentrating his attention on European politics, till his death on the 21st of September, 1558.

§ 10. Philip II. immediately on his accession found himself confronted by a great European war. This was brought on by the headstrong violence of pope Paul IV. The hereditary attachment of his family (Caraffa) to the Angevin cause, personal enmity to Charles V., and the desire to free Italy from the Spaniard, all combined to inspire the aged pope with the bitterest antipathy to the Hapsburgs. This was increased by the intelligence that Ferdinand, in the treaty of Augsburg, had consented to give toleration to the German Protestants. Paul IV. refused to confirm the treaty; in his blind rage he even refused to support Mary Tudor in her efforts to restore Roman Catholicism in England. He determined to reverse the policy of Julius II., and to call the French into Italy to expel the Spaniards. By holding out hopes of the conquest of Naples, and by gaining over the influential family of Guise, he induced Henry II. to break the truce of Vaucelles, and to conclude an alliance with the papacy. The duke of Guise was sent with an army into Italy. His opponent was the duke of Alva, whom Philip appointed governor of Naples.

It was the irony of fate which involved Philip II. and Alva in a war with the head of the church of which they were devoted adherents. Alva was completely successful, and might have taken Rome, but his reverence for the pope forbade him. This allowed Guise to raise new troops in France and Switzerland, with which he returned to Italy and attacked Naples. In his straits Philip had to secure allies by concessions. Ottavio Farnese of Parma was reconciled to Spain by the restoration of Piacenza. Cosimo de Medici was allowed to annex Siena and thus to complete the grand duchy of Tuscany. But the French were completely unsuccessful. The heroic defence of Civitella frustrated all Guise's attempts to take the town. Alva again entered the papal states and advanced to the walls of Rome. Paul IV. was at last compelled to treat, but the religious devotion of his enemies enabled the defeated pope to dictate his own terms. Alva appeared in Rome as a suppliant instead of a conqueror, and in his master's name entreated absolution for the offence of defending himself against an unprovoked attack. This was the last attempt to shake the Spanish supremacy in Italy.

§ 11. Meanwhile war had also broken out on the French frontier, and Philip II. had used his influence over Mary to involve England in the war against France. The Spanish army was placed under the command of Emmanuel Philibert of Savoy, who had a private quarrel with France for the recovery of his paternal duchy. He laid siege to St. Quentin, which was defended by the illustrious Admiral Coligny. The French commander, Montmorency, advanced to his relief, and the pitched battle which ensued ended in the complete defeat of the French. Philip himself, who took no part in the war, now appeared in the camp, where his caution prevented the victory from being followed up. Had the duke of Savoy marched at once upon Paris, the capital could hardly have made any resistance. But the delay gave the French time; the duke of Guise returned from Italy, and in 1558 he gained a brilliant success, no less than the conquest of Calais, the last of the great English possessions on French soil. It was to no purpose that the count of Egmont won a signal victory over a detachment of the French army at Gravelines (July, 1558). Philip was determined to make peace, and he was confirmed in this by the death of his wife, and the accession of her sister Elizabeth to the English throne. In 1559 the important treaty of Cateau-Cambresis was concluded. The chief difficulties which arose were connected with Calais and the duchy of Savoy. These were at last compromised; Savoy and Piedmont were restored to Emmanuel Philibert, the son and heir of the ejected duke Charles, with the exception of five fortified places which remained in the hands of the French; Calais was ceded to the French king for eight years, but at the end of that period it was to be restored to England under penalty of forfeiting 500,000 crowns. The other terms were easily settled. The French restored all places which they held in Italy and the Low Countries, while the Spaniards evacuated their conquests in Picardy. To confirm the peace between the two countries, Philip II. married Henry II.'s daughter Elizabeth, who had previously been destined for his son, Don Carlos. The advantage remained on the side of Philip, who regained nearly 200 fortresses, while he had to surrender only five or six. The treaty was very unpopular in France, and the Guises especially declaimed against it as the work of Montpensier.

The peace of Cateau-Cambresis closed the long series of wars which had commenced with the accession of Charles V. to the empire in 1519. It marks an epoch in the international relations of the European states. France had succeeded in its task of resisting the formation of a Hapsburg monarchy which threatened the independence of Europe. Germany and Spain are henceforward separated. For some time after this religious rather than political differences divide Europe; and when something like the old rivalry re-commences at the close of the century, it takes the form of a national duel between Spain and France.

For forty years the dominant personality in Europe had been Charles V. His disappearance necessarily effected a great change. European history loses its unity when it ceases to group itself round one central figure. With the great emperor vanished all prospect of a compromise between the two rival faiths. Henceforth Roman Catholicism hardens itself in its remaining strongholds, and prepares not only to repress all attempts at internal change, but also to carry on a determined war against the hostile Protestant separatists.

CHAPTER VII.

THE COUNTER-REFORMATION.

§ 1. Protestant doctrines in Italy; their failure to produce a schism; they help to reform the Roman Catholic Church. § 2. New religious orders; the Jesuits; causes of their success. § 3. The Inquisition and the Index. § 4. The Council of Trent; its three sessions; general result of the Council. § 5. Altered character of the Popes; Pius V.; Gregory XIII.; Sixtus V.; his domestic administration.

§ 1. The Reformation is usually regarded as a movement which was confined to the northern nations of Europe. But it also exercised a considerable influence in Italy, the stronghold of the papal power. The Italian Renaissance had produced among its pupils a negative and somewhat contemptuous attitude towards religion, and this was confirmed by continual contact with the most flagrant ecclesiastical abuses. But there were not wanting earnest-minded men who were anxious to remove rather than to satire these abuses, and who were actuated by the true spirit of the Reformation. It has been conclusively shown that Luther's special doctrine, that of justification by faith, found numerous adherents in Italy. It was held by Contarini, Sadolet, Bembo and other cardinals of the church. It was preached in Naples by Juan Valdez, a Spaniard, in Siena by Bernardino Ochino, and in Lucca by Peter Martyr. An anonymous work, "Of the Benefits of Christ's Death," which maintained this doctrine, was published in 1540 and obtained a very large circulation. As compared with this doctrinal agreement, practical reforms were far simpler and were urged with greater unanimity.

The natural impulse of these reforming tendencies was to bring about some compromise with Protestantism and so to preserve the unity of the church. This, as has been seen, was attempted at the diet of Ratisbon in 1541, where the pope was represented by cardinal Contarini. But several causes combined to frustrate the attempt. The desire for reform was confined to the cultivated classes in Italy, and found little adherence among the people. The traditional policy of the papacy was opposed to any concessions which might strengthen its old rival, the empire. And the influence of the French king was employed to prevent a reconciliation between Charles V. and the German Protestants. The prospect of a compromise thus proved hopeless, and the reforming tendencies took another direction. An attempt was made to purify, and so to strengthen the Roman Catholic Church, that it might be able to confront its Protestant enemies on an equal footing. It is this movement which has received the name of the Counter-Reformation.

§ 2. The spirit of the movement is manifested in the numerous orders which were formed in the 16th century to renew that purity and self-sacrifice which had once characterised the older orders, but had been lost in their degradation. Such were the Theatines, founded in Rome by Caraffa, and the Barnabites, a Lombard order in Milan. But by far the most active and important of these new associations was that of the Jesuits. Their founder was Ignatius Loyola, a Spanish knight, born in the year 1491. At the siege of Pampeluna in 1521 he was crippled by a cannon shot. During the forced inaction of his illness he read the legends of the saints, which exerted a marvellous influence on his excitable and visionary nature. He determined to emulate their achievements, and to resign his dreams of military glory for the more heroic service of the Virgin. After numerous pilgrimages he took up his abode in Paris, and there in middle age set to work to complete his neglected education. Among his fellow students he found and gained over the men who were to assist him in his great task. These were Francis Xavier, Iago Lainez, Salmeron and Bobadilla, all Spaniards, and Peter Faber, a Savoyard. In 1534 these enthusiasts bound themselves by an oath to sever themselves from the world and to devote their lives to the service of the church. Two years later they appeared in Rome, and after many rebuffs and difficulties they obtained from pope Paul III. the bull which constituted them "The Order of Jesus" (27th Sept. 1540). To their three vows of chastity, poverty and obedience they added an oath to carry out the commands of the pope without hesitation or delay. Thus the papacy, at a time when Europe seemed to be slipping from its grasp, received the voluntary assistance of a body of devoted men, who were destined to revive its power and influence. The order obtained the right to elect their own general, and their choice fell at once upon their founder. On Loyola's death in 1556, he was succeeded by Lainez, a man of far less mystical enthusiasm, but endowed with greater administrative ability. To him the order owes the constitution which has made it the wonder and the model of later associations.

The secret of the success of the Jesuits lay in their complete severance from all ordinary ties, from home, family and friendship, and their entire devotion to the interests of their order. Obedience was the cardinal duty which swallowed up all other motives. They renounced, on taking the vows, all right of private judgment, and blindly submitted themselves to the orders of their superiors. The order was divided into grades of varying authority, but the whole formed one vast machine which was wielded at will by the general. To enable the Jesuits to devote themselves to their special work, they were relieved from the ordinary duties of monastic orders. Thus they were not bound to the performance of the routine religious exercises of each day. Paul IV. wished to withdraw this privilege, but Lainez refused to submit, and the danger was removed by the pope's death. From the first the Jesuits occupied a unique position among religious associations. They aroused none of the prejudices which had now grown up against monks, and they could appeal to a wider circle of sympathies. To ordinary men and women they appeared as men of the world rather than ecclesiastics. Nothing was too high or too low for them. Politics occupied great part of their attention, and here they conspicuously displayed that subordination of the means to the end which has since been a ground of accusation against them. But for a time they were very successful, and became influential advisers of kings and ministers. They also exercised great influence through the confessional, that most potent instrument of the Roman Catholic priesthood. But their power was made durable not so much by their activity as preachers and confessors, nor even by the political doctrines which they skilfully varied to suit different countries and peoples, as by their devotion to education. The Jesuit schools became the best in Europe. The thoroughness of the system which they formulated, and the fact that they taught gratis, enabled them to supersede the humanist teachers, who had hitherto claimed a monopoly of learning and enlightenment. By gaining over the youth of Catholic countries, they secured their hold over future generations. The papacy owed a great debt to the order of Loyola, which carried on a crusade against Protestantism with the military devotion and enthusiasm that characterised its founder.

§ 3. The Counter-Reformation was compelled, by the instinct of self-preservation, to suppress the reforming tendencies in Italy to which it owed its origin. In 1542 Paul III., the very pope who had shown the greatest inclination to reform, established the Inquisition in Rome on the Spanish model. The bull appointed six cardinals, of whom Caraffa was the most prominent, and empowered them to try all matters of faith and to inflict the penalties of death and confiscation upon heretics. These powers were exercised with unflinching severity. The most conspicuous reformers, as Bernardino Ochino and Peter Martyr, left Italy. Not content with persecuting the professors of heretical doctrines, it was determined to suppress the books in which those doctrines were maintained. The first Index, or list of proscribed writings, was published in Rome by Paul IV., who, as cardinal Caraffa, had been the guiding spirit of the Inquisition. A regular book-police was instituted, and, supported by the secular authorities, its work was carried out with marvellous efficiency.

§ 4. There was one demand of the reforming party which could not be wholly refused, but which produced in the end very unexpected results. This was the summons of a general council. The pope hesitated for a long time to comply with this request, though it was advanced even by Catholic princes. At last, at the urgent instance of Charles V., Paul III. summoned a council to meet in Trent at the end of 1545. The first session was short, and was deprived of importance by a quarrel between the emperor and the pope. Charles V. wished the council to make such reforms in the church as would enable him to come to terms with the German Protestants. The pope's object, on the other hand, was to strengthen his own authority and to condemn all doctrinal heresy. Charles' successes in Germany terrified Paul III. for his own independence, and in 1547 he suddenly transferred the council to Bologna. The emperor, deeply indignant at this, protested that its decrees would now be null and void, and the council separated without having effected any important result. Paul III.'s successor, Julius III. (1550–1555), was an adherent of the emperor, and was induced to convene the council again at Trent in 1551. But the pope's views were still opposed to any of the concessions which were desired by Charles. The Protestants, who appeared at Trent, were treated as recusant heretics, with whom there could be no equal negotiation. All doctrinal points which came up for discussion, such as transubstantiation, were settled in accordance with the strictly orthodox views. But before any progress had been made in this direction, the advance of Maurice of Saxony led to the sudden breaking up of the council in 1552.

Paul IV. (1555–1559) was the representative pope of the counter-reformation. It was he who had organised the Inquisition, and who drew up the Index. At first his hatred of the Hapsburgs diverted his attention to political affairs, and led him to confer great powers on his nephews. But on the termination of the war he altered his policy, devoted himself to establish the strictest ecclesiastical discipline, and drove all his relatives from the court. From this time nepotism, in the sense of the advancement of relatives to political power, came to an end. This had been the most flagrant vice of the papacy, and had done much to bring it into discredit. Its removal was an important step towards the regeneration of the Romish church.

Under Paul IV. the demand for a general council had again been raised. His successor, Pius IV. (1559–1565), gave his consent, and the third, and far the most important, session of the Council of Trent was opened in January, 1562. This session differed from the others mainly in the fact that there was no longer any idea of a reconciliation with the Protestants, whose position in Germany had been secured by the treaty of Augsburg. The work of the council was therefore limited to the narrow circle of the Catholic nations. Within these limits it had important duties—to determine the relations between the head and the members of the church, to settle doctrinal points which were still disputed, and to complete those internal reforms which were needed to restore the old reverence for the church.

It was soon evident that even among the Catholics there were grave divergences of opinion, and in especial the papal authority was exposed to attack. The Germans, acting under instructions from Ferdinand I., demanded radical reforms, such as the marriage of the clergy, the communion in both kinds, and services in the German language. The French prelates, headed by the Cardinal of Lorraine, not only supported the German demands, but took up the doctrine advanced in the last century at Constance and Basel of the superiority of a general council over the pope. The Spaniards, while they were opposed to all doctrinal reforms, wished the episcopal authority to be recognised as of divine origin, and thus independent of the papacy. All were opposed to the claim advanced by the papal legates to have the sole right of bringing proposals before the council. It was fortunate for the papacy that votes were no longer taken by nations as at Constance. The Italians still outnumbered the representatives of all other nations, and their interests, which were more powerful than their consciences, were on the papal side. But Pius IV. felt that he was threatened by the dangers which his predecessors had always dreaded from a general council. From these he was saved partly by his own ingenuity, but still more by the dexterous diplomacy of Cardinal Morone, whom he appointed president of the council. The differences between the various nations were carefully fomented and points of concord obscured. Separate negotiations were opened with the temporal princes, and they were persuaded that the papal authority was needed to repress the growth of an independent hierarchy. At the same time it was hinted to the bishops that a strong papacy was their only security against complete subjection to the temporal power.

The triumph of the papacy being thus assured, the work of the council proceeded with marvellous rapidity. The pope was anxious to bring it to a close, and he met with little or no opposition. In the latter half of the year 1563 a decision was come to on all important dogmatic points, indulgences, purgatory, the ordination of the clergy, the sacrament of marriage, and the worship of saints. And almost all were decided in the old Roman Catholic sense. The foremost spokesman of the strictly orthodox party was Lainez, the general of the Jesuits. Differences were avoided by dexterous verbal compromises, which meant nothing, as the interpretation of the decrees was vested in the pope. Reforms were made in the direction of enforcing strict discipline over the inferior clergy, the establishment of schools, and a new regulation of parishes. But no further mention was made of reforming the central authority, the papacy, the cardinals, and the curia. So far from maintaining its supremacy over the pope, the council itself petitioned Pius IV. to confirm its decrees. On the 4th of December, 1563, the last sitting came to an end.

The Council of Trent was the last of the great ecclesiastical assemblies which are so prominent in mediæval history. It had no successor till the meeting of the Vatican Council in 1869. Its importance lies in the fact that it completed the counter-Reformation. In opposition to the Protestant revolt, it formulated the old doctrines with logical distinctness. The traditions which had hitherto been open to question were henceforth established dogmas. The Catholic church had to content itself with narrower limits, but within those limits it acquired new strength and consistency. While many of the worst abuses were removed or concealed, the old hierarchical constitution, and, above all, the despotic authority of the papacy, received a new confirmation. These were the advantages which the Roman Catholic church reaped from the Reformation, advantages which almost compensated it for the loss of territory.

§ 5. From this time a new spirit seems to take possession of the Romish church. It is manifest in the revival of saintly purity of life and missionary zeal, which we can trace in the lives of such men as Carlo Borromeo, archbishop of Milan, and St. Francis de Sales, the heroes of modern Catholicism. But it is even more manifest in the altered character of the popes. The age of Sixtus IV., Alexander VI., and even of Paul III., is past. Their place is filled by popes like Pius V. and Sixtus V., who within the church are active reformers, while outside they appear as the uncompromising opponents of Protestantism. When they are diverted from ecclesiastical interests and duties, it is not by dreams of secular aggrandisement for themselves or their families, but by the carrying out of long-needed reforms in the States of the Church.

Pius V. (1566–1572) was chosen as the representative of the rigid party in the church. Carlo Borromeo was active in supporting his election. Nor did he disappoint the expectations that had been formed of him. He put a final end to nepotism by a law which forbade the alienation of any property of the church, and threatened excommunication against any one who should propose it. He maintained church discipline with the greatest rigour. The expenses of the papal household were reduced by the strictest economy. In Europe the influence of so energetic and self-denying a pope became a power. Pius V. urged Philip II. to take the severest measures against the Netherlands, and approved the cruelties of Alva. He sent Italian troops to the aid of the Catholic party in France, and gave them special injunctions to grant no quarter to Huguenots. He issued the bull of excommunication against Elizabeth, which for ever alienated England from the papacy. More creditable to the pope was his activity against the Turks. He succeeded in concluding the league between Spain and Venice, which under the command of Don John of Austria gained the great victory of Lepanto in 1571.

The pontificate of Gregory XIII. (1572–1585) is notable mainly as showing that a pope who was personally inclined to laxity was unable to resist the prevailing tendency of the age. He was forced almost against his will to govern in the same spirit as his predecessor. He is remembered chiefly as the pope who reformed the calendar, and celebrated the massacre of St. Bartholomew. His domestic government of the papal states gave rise to disorders which it required all the ability of his successor to suppress.

Sixtus V. (1585–1590) is perhaps the most remarkable pope of the 16th century. He was endowed with signal administrative ability, and his short pontificate was a period of great and multifarious activity. He limited the number of cardinals to seventy, and gave them a new organisation. But his attention was mainly directed to the temporal interests of his subjects. He encouraged agriculture and manufactures, and conducted works of great public utility. The towns received from him important privileges. The city of Rome owed much to Sixtus V. He constructed a colossal aqueduct (*Acqua Felice*) to supply the city with water. The erection of the great obelisk in front of St. Peter's the triumph of the mechanical art of those days, was his work. His object was characteristic of the man and the age, the public humiliation of pagan monuments before the glory of the cross. The great blot upon his administration was his greed for money. To gratify this he resorted to the most ruinous financial expedients. He not only sold offices, but created new offices for sale. He raised loans recklessly, and secured the interest upon increased taxes, which obstructed the industries he was trying to foster. But he was so successful in his immediate object that he was able to collect nearly five millions of scudi in the castle of St. Angelo. To Europe generally Sixtus V. appeared as the promulgator of the most chimerical schemes. The annihilation of the Turkish empire, the conquest of Egypt, and the recovery of Jerusalem and the Holy Sepulchre, seemed to him quite feasible. But behind these dreams of a vivid imagination is manifest the spirit of revived Catholicism, of which the pope was at once the creature and the representative.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE REIGN OF PHILIP II., AND THE REVOLT OF THE NETHERLANDS.

§ 1. Policy of Philip II.; personal character. § 2. Suppression of the liberties of Aragon; use of the Inquisition as a political instrument. § 3. History of Don Carlos; his death. § 4. Annexation of Portugal to Spain. § 5. The Netherlands; causes of discontent; the new bishoprics. § 6. The leading nobles, Orange, Egmont and Horn; opposition to Granvella, who is recalled. § 7. Egmont's mission to Spain; the Compromise; the *Beggars;* iconoclastic riots. § 8. Margaret of Parma superseded by Alva; the *Council of Blood;* beginning of the revolt. § 9. Execution of Egmont and Horn; Alva's cruelty; his financial measures; revolt of the northern provinces; recall of Alva; § 10. Administration of Requesens; the Spanish Fury; Pacification of Ghent. § 11. Don John of Austria in the Netherlands; the Perpetual Edict; death of Don John. § 12. Alexander Farnese; Union of Utrecht; Francis of Anjou; assassination of William of Orange. § 13. The southern provinces return to their allegiance to Spain; the northern provinces extort the recognition of their independence. § 14. Maurice of Nassau and John of Barneveldt.

§ 1. THE Counter Reformation found among temporal princes one consistent and active supporter, Philip II., the son and successor of Charles V. Austria and the Empire passed to the younger branch of the Hapsburgs, but Philip was careful to maintain close relations with his German cousins. He himself inherited Spain, the Netherlands, Milan, Naples, the New World and a number of smaller dependencies. Both his territories, and the revenues derived from them, made him the most powerful of European princes. The Spanish army was at the height of its unrivalled reputation. After concluding the treaty of Cateau-Cambresis (1559) Philip returned to Spain, which he never again quitted. He transferred the capital from Saragossa to Madrid, near which he built a new royal residence, the Escorial. From this centre he directed the policy by which he hoped to realise his father's great scheme, the establishment of the Hapsburg supremacy in Europe. The means which he employed were of course different, as circumstances had changed. In one point, in his relations to the church, this difference is most conspicuous. Charles V, had subordinated religion to politics, he had no enthusiasm for orthodoxy either in doctrine or ceremonial; he was anxious to dictate his own terms to the pope, and to make himself supreme both in church and in state. Philip II., on the other hand, was the willing vassal of the papacy. The extension of his power implied the extension of Roman Catholic doctrines and organisation. He was the champion of the reaction. To Charles V. heresy was distasteful only as connected with political opposition; to Philip it was something hateful in itself. He expressed his inmost feelings when he declared that it was better not to rule at all than to rule over heretics. The two guiding motives of his policy were religious bigotry and dynastic ambition, and in his mind they were inseparable.

In personal character, Philip presents a complete contrast to his father. From his youth the latter had been brought into close contact with men and affairs. His ductile nature had been open to the varied influences of his eventful career. He had learnt to conciliate the different nations over which he ruled by conforming to their manners and customs. Thus among Flemings, Italians, and Spaniards he acquired a personal popularity which often stood him in good stead. Even among the Germans, with whom he had least sympathy, it was his policy rather than his person which aroused dislike. He took an interest in art and literature; shared in the tournaments and other entertainments of the time; and collected round him a splendid and imposing court. For such behaviour Philip had neither the talent nor the inclination. He always remained a Spaniard, and a foreigner to his other subjects. He could express himself with ease in no language except Spanish. Literature and art had no attractions for him. He carefully cultivated the haughty and reserved manner which has been always attributed to the grandees of Spain, and which he regarded as alone suited to a ruler of men. Even when he endeavoured in his own interests to obtain popularity, as in England, he could not succeed. Charles V. brought him to Germany to secure his succession to the empire, but his presence destroyed what prospect there was of such an event. When he became an independent king, Philip carefully secluded himself as much as possible from contact with mankind. Even his own ministers could rarely obtain an interview with him. The information which he required was furnished in writing. He was the most industrious of monarchs, but his industry was that of a clerk rather than of a statesman. In his cabinet he received and read all despatches, which he annotated and even answered with his own hand. He was acquainted with all the most trivial details of the administration. He collected round him ministers of opposite views, such as the duke of Alva and the prince of Eboli, so that he might decide on his own course of action without being biassed by one-sided advice. He himself declared that royalty was the most hard-worked of offices. His reserve was a source at once of weakness and of strength. He had none of the elasticity of purpose and variety of resource which a great statesman acquires from personal contact with other men. But at the same time his policy was saved from the danger of weak and inconsiderate change; it impressed people like a mighty engine which works with constant and resistless force, but whose springs of motion are concealed and mysterious.

§ 2. In his domestic policy, Philip II. aimed at the complete suppression of all constitutional privileges and freedom, at the entire subjection of Spain to one central power, the monarchy. In this he had only to follow the lines already laid down by his father and great-grandfather. The Cortes of Castile had been reduced to insignificance by Charles V. in 1538. In Aragon, liberties were more firmly founded and endured longer. The influence of the Cortes was supported by the independence of the Justiza, whose authority rivalled that of the crown. In 1590, Antonio Perez, a minister who had incurred Philip's displeasure, appealed for protection to the forms of the Aragonese constitution. The king took advantage of this to put an end to institutions which checked his power. The Cortes became a body of royal nominees with hardly any rights but that of presenting petitions. The appointment of judicial officers was vested in the crown, and a fortress was erected to overawe the old capital, Saragossa. In these and other changes Philip was aided by the provincial rivalry which still subsisted. Castile and Aragon, though united under one crown, had not forgotten the time when they were independent kingdoms; and only became conscious of their common interests when it was too late to defend them. It was easy for the king to employ the forces of one country to suppress the liberties of the other. And in carrying out his policy of centralisation, Philip found a useful weapon in that most terrible of ecclesiastical institutions, the Inquisition. It was here that the king found a reward for his devotion to the interests of the church. The judges of the Inquisition, who were mostly ecclesiastics, were appointed by the king, to whom fell the confiscated property. The dreaded tribunal was employed to punish political offenders as well as heretics. Its zeal for the crown was rewarded by the periodical autos-da-fè of Jews and Moriscoes. But Philip's policy, however successful, was fatal to Spain. He crushed the liberties, but with them the life of the country. The most important industrial elements of the population were destroyed or driven into exile by religious persecution.

§ 3. Philip II.'s merciless character was manifested even within the limits of his own family. The most tragic incident of his reign was the fate of Don Carlos, the son of his first wife, Maria of Portugal. The young prince, who was born in 1545, was brought up by his aunt Joanna, and saw little of his father. He was afterwards sent to the University of Alcala de Henares, where he was the fellow-pupil of Don John of Austria and Alexander Farnese. There he gave himself up to a life of dissipation, and this further alienated his father, who had never shown any affection for him. Philip refused all his son's demands to be admitted to some office suited to his rank. At last Don Carlos planned to escape from Spain, probably to the Netherlands, and may even have manifested some inclination to the Protestantism which was making great progress there. This suspicion is sufficient to explain the wrath of Philip, who seems also to have accused his son of a design upon his life. The prince was seized and placed in close confinement, from which he never emerged. It is quite possible that his death (July, 1566) was natural, but a suspicious age was not slow to accuse Philip of the murder of his son. Three months afterwards Philip's second wife, Elizabeth of France, also died. She had at one time been the destined bride of Don Carlos, but had been afterwards married to the father. This fact and the coincidence of their deaths gave rise to legends of love and jealousy which have supplied both Schiller and Alfieri with the subject of a tragedy.

§ 4. Philip II.'s greatest success was the annexation of Portugal, by which he completed the unity of the peninsula. This had been a favourite object both of Ferdinand and of Charles V., and numerous intermarriages had been concluded which might pave the way for such a junction. In 1557 the death of John III. gave the Portuguese crown to his infant grandson Sebastian. The regency fell into the hands of the young king's uncle, Henry, a cardinal of the church and a devoted adherent of the papacy. Under his rule the Jesuits became all-powerful in Portugal. When Sebastian came of age to govern, the effects of his ecclesiastical training became manifest. He refused to marry, and devoted himself to a crusade against the Mohammedans in Africa. By them he was slain in the battle of Alcacer (1578) and the crown passed to his uncle Henry, a weakly priest in his sixty-seventh year. With him it was certain that the Portuguese dynasty must expire. Philip II. at once commenced intrigues to establish his claim to the throne. His mother Isabella was the eldest sister of John III., and his first wife was John's eldest daughter. The other claimants were Antonio Prior of Crato, the natural son of John III.'s brother, and the duchess of Braganza, daughter of a younger brother. Antonio maintained that he was really legitimate, while the duchess opposed Philip's claim on the ground that no foreigner could ascend the throne. The succession question was still unsettled when King Henry died (Jan. 1580). Philip at once crossed the frontier with an army to support his claim. The clergy and chief nobles were gained over by his promise to respect the national liberties. The people, who hated Spain and the prospect of foreign rule, rallied round Antonio, who was crowned at Lisbon. But he had neither ability nor military force to maintain his position. Lisbon was taken at the first assault, and the pretender fled to France. There he was maintained by the European powers who wished to have a means of injuring Philip II. at their command, and died there in 1595. Philip entered the capital in triumph, and received the crown. His promise was not fulfilled, and the liberties of Portugal soon shared the fate of the similar institutions in Spain.

To secure the permanence of Spanish rule, the power of the nobles was diminished and the royal domains increased. But this policy defeated its own ends. The alienation of the nobles from Spain led to the restoration of Portuguese independence under the House of Braganza in the next century.

§ 5. In Philip's Italian provinces, Milan, Naples, and Sicily, his system of government was introduced with complete success, but in the Netherlands it provoked a storm of opposition which wrecked the power of Spain. The Netherlands consisted of seventeen provinces, each possessed of independent institutions and inhabited by populations of differing character. They had become united by falling under the rule of the dukes of Burgundy, from whom they had passed to the Hapsburgs. But the union under a common government had done little or nothing to put an end to provincial differences. Under Charles V., himself a Netherlander by birth, some advance had been made towards the formation of a central government. A supreme court of justice had been founded at Mechlin, and deputies from the various provinces were summoned to form the States-General. But Charles had been too cautious to make any determined attack upon local privileges, and the Netherlands remained a loose federation. In one point only had he shown uncompromising purpose, in his opposition to religious reform. An edict of 1550 threatened heretics with the severest penalties, and a board of inquisitors, or as they were euphemistically called, "ecclesiastical judges," was formed to enforce them. But in spite of this severity the Netherlands were quite submissive when they were transferred to Philip II. in 1555.

The new ruler soon made himself as hated as his predecessor had been loved. His first act was to renew the edict of 1550. When he departed for Spain in 1559, he showed his contempt for the feelings and prejudices of his subjects in the appointment of a governor. Passing over the claims of the native nobles, he gave the post to his half-sister, Margaret of Parma, the pupil of Ignatius Loyola and the devoted instrument of Philip's reactionary policy. Her chief minister was Cardinal Granvella, a Burgundian whose father had been an influential adviser of Charles V. With him were united Barlaymont, a noble, and Viglius, a lawyer. These three formed the *Consulta*, or secret council, and their influence rendered powerless the recognised Council of State, in which the great nobles had seats.

This establishment of an anti-national government provoked widespread discontent, which found immediate vent in complaints against the continued presence of Spanish troops after the king's departure. So threatening was the opposition, that Philip, much against his will, was compelled to withdraw the troops. But no sooner was this concession made than a new ground of complaint was furnished by proposed ecclesiastical changes. At this time there were only four bishoprics in the Netherlands, Arras, Cambray, Tournay, and Utrecht. Philip obtained a bull from Pius IV. in 1560, creating fourteen new bishoprics, with three archbishoprics at Mechlin, Cambray, and Utrecht. This extension of the hierarchy was felt to be a general grievance. The secular estates dreaded the great development of the Spanish and ecclesiastical power, while even the clergy were discontented by the proposal to confiscate church property for the endowment of the new sees. The doctrines of Luther and Calvin had already made considerable progress in spite of the edicts. They now became a political power.

§ 6. The lead of the opposition was taken by the great nobles, who felt themselves excluded from their due share of the government. At their head were three men, William of Orange, Count Egmont, and Admiral Horn. Egmont was a soldier who had won great distinction in the battles of St. Quentin and Gravelines. His bravery and his loyalty were equally conspicuous, but his devotion to the interests of the country and the feeling that his great services were unrequited combined to place him unwillingly in opposition to the crown. He was a sincere Catholic and had no sympathy with the reformed doctrines. William of Orange was a man of very different stamp and of far greater importance. He was the descendant of the German house of Nassau, which had acquired large possessions in the Netherlands. His grandfather, Engelbert II., had divided his territories between his two sons, Henry and William. Henry, the elder, who received the lands in the Netherlands, brought the principality of Orange into the family by his marriage with the sister of that Prince of Orange who commanded at the siege of Rome in 1527. On the death of his son Réné in 1544, both Orange and the territories in the Netherlands fell to the younger branch of Nassau, which was now represented by William, the grandson of Engelbert. The prince who thus obtained so magnificent an inheritance was at the time only eleven years old, having been born at Dillenburg in 1533. He was now taken into the service of Charles V., became a page in the imperial household, and there gave up the reformed faith in which he had been brought up. He became a favourite with Charles, who employed him on important embassies. He was still quite a young man, and little was known of his character, when the accession of Philip II. called him to play an important part in the history of Europe.

The opposition directed itself in the first place against Granvella, who was designed to be archbishop of Mechlin and Primate of the Netherlands. The nobles formed a league among themselves, and refused to take any share in the conduct of business until the minister was removed. At last even the regent herself, who had no love for the man whose advice was often preferred to her own, joined in the demand for Granvella's removal. In 1564 Philip felt himself reluctantly compelled to accede. The Cardinal was requested to withdraw of his own accord for the sake of peace. But his conduct had earned rather than forfeited the esteem of his master. After a brief residence on his estates at Besançon, he was summoned to Madrid, where he remained an influential crown-adviser till his death in 1586.

§ 7. The nobles soon found that they had no reason to regard Granvella's recall as a triumph. Philip was determined to make no change in his system of government; the enforced concession only increased his obstinacy. He ordered the decrees of the Council of Trent to be promulgated in the Netherlands, and enjoined on the regent a strict enforcement of the edicts against heresy. His commands were obeyed, but the persecution only strengthened the movement it was intended to suppress. The nobles despatched Egmont to Madrid in 1565, to represent to the king the evils of the policy which he was pursuing. Philip befooled the loyal but vain count by the pomp of his reception, and promised increased moderation. Egmont returned with the conviction that his mission had been altogether successful. But Philip was unmoved; new and more severe edicts were issued: the relentless severity of the persecution was increased. Thousands of skilled Flemish workmen were driven to take refuge in England, where the politic Elizabeth received them with open arms.

In the midst of the general excitement, a league was formed against the Inquisition, called the Compromise. Its founders were St. Aldegonde, Brederode, and Lewis of Nassau, William's brother. It was joined by 500 of the lesser nobles, and also by a number of burghers. It derived additional importance from the fact that many of the members were Catholics. The greater nobles, not yet prepared for extreme measures, held aloof. A petition to the regent was prepared and presented by Brederode at the head of 300 followers. Barlaymont contemptuously told Margaret not to be afraid of those beggars. The nickname was gleefully adopted, and the most determined of Philip's opponents were henceforth known as the "Beggars."

While the regent was making vain efforts to satisfy complaints and at the same time to obey her brother, the movement of opposition spread from the nobles to the lower classes. Everywhere the Calvinist preachers collected crowds of armed and enthusiastic hearers. Riots broke out, and the images and ornaments in the churches were destroyed by the iconoclastic fury of the mob. In the face of this general rebellion the edicts could not be carried out. The regent wished to escape from Brussels, but was prevented by Egmont and Orange, who promised to support her authority if she would consent to abolish the Inquisition. She was unable to refuse, and they at once set to work to restore order.

§ 8. But meanwhile the news of the disorders had infuriated Philip II. He refused to recognise the concessions which his sister had made. He ordered the renewal of the old edicts, and determined to send Alva to the Netherlands to carry them out by force of arms. William of Orange, who had endeavoured to conciliate Spain by the suppression of tumult, was so depressed at the news of this determination that he retired to his German territories. Alva was merely a brutal soldier, with no conception of the duties or methods of civil government. He found the provinces at peace, and by conciliatory measures might have secured them to Spain. But severity had been enjoined by his master, and was also congenial to his own nature. His violence excited the bitterest hatred of Spanish rule and gave rise to a revolt which developed into a struggle for life and death. Margaret of Parma, who found her measures reversed and her authority superseded, soon quitted the Netherlands.

Alva's first act was to arrest Egmont and Horn, though they had lately given conspicuous support to the government. His great regret was that the prince of Orange had escaped his clutches. He erected an extraordinary court of justice, the "Council of Disorders," which the people called the "Council of Blood." The persecution now commenced resembled a massacre rather than a judicial proceeding. The Protestant powers of Europe were profoundly moved. Philip II. received a strong remonstrance from his cousin Maximilian II., but disregarded it. In the Netherlands the feeling of dismay was even stronger for a time than the instinctive desire for resistance. But William of Orange, who heard of these events in his castle of Dillenburg, was convinced that now or never was the time for him to move. He formally announced his adhesion to Calvinism. An army was collected composed of German mercenaries, French Huguenots, and exiles from the Netherlands. One division of this force, under the command of Lewis of Nassau, defeated a detachment of Spaniards at Heiligerlee (24th May, 1568). The great revolt of the Netherlands had begun.

§ 9. The news of the defeat decided Alva to conduct the war in person. Before leaving Brussels, he had Egmont and Horn tried and executed, an event which sent a thrill of horror through Europe. He then marched to meet Lewis of Nassau and defeated him at the battle of Jemmingen. It was in vain that William of Orange advanced in person into Brabant to retrieve this loss. Alva refused to meet him in battle, and want of money and provisions compelled the prince to retreat. With his brother and the remnant of his forces William took part in the Huguenot campaign of 1569 in France. Alva boasted that the revolt was crushed. A perfect reign of terror ensued in the Netherlands, which were treated as a conquered country. Not only were the previous cruelties revived with still more reckless severity; Alva also developed a new system of taxation, which was to bring vast revenues to the Spanish crown. His ignorance of public economy was equal to his ferocity, and produced results quite as disastrous. He proposed in March, 1569, to impose a tax of a hundredth penny, or one per cent. on all property. All sales of real property were taxed at five per cent. and of movables at ten per cent. A commercial community like that of the Netherlands was threatened with complete ruin by such impositions. Even Alva's obstinacy was unable to carry his proposals against the opposition of the most devoted adherents to Spain. One commodity after another was excepted from the taxes, which brought in little or nothing. Alva's financial measures proved a failure, and they convinced even Philip II. of his representative's incompetence. The brief period of Spanish despotism brought ruin to the industry of the Netherlands. Manufactures and commerce began to pass over to England. The place of Bruges and Antwerp was taken by London.

Alva's recall had been decided upon, though he continued to hold office till the appointment of a successor. But he remained only to witness the fall of the edifice which he had reared on a foundation of violence and bloodshed. In 1572 the "sea beggars," exiles who had found refuge on the English coast and a means of a subsistence in piracy, attacked and captured the town of Brill. This was followed by a general revolt of the northern provinces. Lewis of Nassau, by a bold movement, made himself master of the fortress of Mons (Bergen) in Hainault, in the heart of the Spanish power. From this time all the efforts of Spain could never restore complete subjection. On July 18, 1572, the states of Holland, Zealand, Friesland, and Utrecht acknowledged the authority of William of Orange as stadtholder. Everything seemed to favour the cause of liberty: assistance was confidently expected from France, then under the influence of Coligny. But the massacre of St. Bartholomew and the change of French policy put an end to this hope, and restored the superiority of the Spanish arms. Mons was forced to surrender, and Alva's son Frederick undertook the conquest of the northern provinces. Zutphen, Naarden and Haarlem were besieged and taken; but at last the heroism of the inhabitants of Alkmaar forced the Spaniards to retreat. But meanwhile Alva, conscious of failure and weary of a war in which success could bring no honour had himself petitioned for a recall. In December, 1573, he left the Netherlands, where his name was long remembered with dismay and horror.

§ 10. Alva's successor, Don Luis de Requesens, was an able soldier and was personally inclined to moderate measures. But he was tied down by his instructions from Philip, who was determined not to give way. The three demands of William of Orange—the withdrawal of Spanish troops,. restoration of the old constitution, and religious freedom—were rejected, and the war went on. Lewis of Nassau, with his brother Henry, were defeated and slain at the battle of Mooker Heath (April, 1574). But this disaster was redeemed by the relief of Leyden. Besieged by the Spaniards for seven months and reduced to the direst necessities, the inhabitants still held out till the advance of Orange compelled the raising of the siege (October, 1574). The University of Leyden was founded, on William's suggestion, to commemorate this heroic incident in the history of the town. The next year was occupied with futile negotiations at Breda and military movements of slight importance. But the sudden death of Requesens in March, 1576, brought with it important changes.

During the interval that elapsed before the appointment of a new governor, the conduct of affairs devolved on the council of state in Brussels. The Spanish troops, whose pay was in hopeless arrears, had for some time been on the verge of mutiny. They now openly refused obedience to a civil government, and seized and plundered a number of the most wealthy cities. The sack of Antwerp, which lasted three days, during which the inhabitants were treated with the greatest barbarity, received the name of the Spanish Fury. These events enabled William of Orange to realise his great desire of combining the southern with the northern provinces in a common cause. The conduct of the soldiery brought into prominence the political interests which united the provinces, and obscured for a time their religious differences. The Pacification of Ghent was signed in November, 1576. By this all the provinces, while recognising the authority of Philip, agreed to expel the foreign soldiers, to establish religious toleration, and to convene a federal assembly. To conciliate the orthodox states of the south, Holland and Zealand, which were now wholly Protestant, were forbidden to take any measures against the Roman Catholic religion.

§ 11. At this critical moment Philip's half-brother, Don John of Austria, the hero of the victory of Lepanto, appeared in Luxemburg as successor to Requesens. In the face of the general union it was impossible any longer to refuse concessions, and the "Perpetual Edict" confirmed the Pacification of Ghent and promised the immediate removal of the Spanish troops (February, 1577). But the Prince of Orange distrusted the fair promises of Spain, and refused to accept the edict in Holland and Zealand. Don John, hampered by Philip's commands and impatient of constitutional checks, soon alienated the estates. William appeared in Brussels in September, 1577, and the governor was powerless. But though the prince was a favourite with the people, he was regarded with jealousy by the nobles of the southern provinces, who called in the Archduke Matthias of Austria. His authority was recognised by the States, but he had no real power. Don John took up arms to maintain his position, and defeated the hostile troops at Gemblours (January, 1578). But Philip II. was jealous of his brilliant half-brother, and refused to send supplies of men and money. After suffering a reverse near Mechlin, Don John died, disgusted with the world, at the early age of thirty-two (1 October, 1578). His brief career in the Netherlands had one important result. By his conciliatory measures, he aimed at the dissolution of the Pacification of Ghent, and paved the way for the return of the southern provinces to Spanish rule.

§ 12. Don John's successor was his nephew, Alexander Farnese, duke of Parma, son of the ex-regent Margaret, and the first general of his age. He pursued the policy of his predecessor with signal success. He made use of the antipathy which the Catholics in the south felt towards the intolerant Calvinists in the north. He was aided by disorders among William's foreign troops, who oppressed the people they had come to defend. The Prince of Orange discovered that it was hopeless to unite all the provinces, and that it was impossible to maintain the Pacification of Ghent. He was obliged to fall back on the devoted population of the north, which was opposed to Spain on religious as well as patriotic grounds. In 1579, the seven provinces of Holland, Zealand, Utrecht, Gelderland, Friesland, Groningen and Overyssel formed the Union of Utrecht, the foundation of the Dutch Republic. The authority of Philip was still nominally retained, but this was now a mere form. In 1581 the severance from Spain was publicly announced. But there was as yet no idea of complete independence. The sovereignty was offered to Francis of Anjou, who gladly accepted it. But his pride was hurt by the continued influence of William of Orange, and he determined to establish an independent power by a *coup d'état.* A number of towns were suddenly occupied by his troops. In Antwerp, where the duke himself was present, the resistance of the citizens led to a massacre which was called the "French Fury." These high-handed proceedings alienated the people, and the duke of Anjou was compelled to return to France, where he died the next year (1584). The northern provinces now formed an independent constitution under William of Orange, as count of Holland and Zealand. Soon afterwards the prince, the great Protestant hero of the century, was assassinated by Balthasar Gerard (10 July, 1584). This was the last of seven attempts on his life, all encouraged by the Spanish king, who had set a price on the head of his unconquerable enemy. William's authority descended to his son Maurice, who in military skill soon more than rivalled his father.

§ 13. From this time the war ceases to have any but a purely military interest. Alexander of Parma succeeded before his death in 1592 in reducing the southern provinces to complete obedience. They became the Spanish Netherlands, and in 1595 Philip gave them as a dowry to his daughter Isabella on her marriage with the archduke Albert of Austria. The northern states preserved their independence. This was due, partly to the skill and ability of Maurice of Nassau, partly to the assistance of Elizabeth of England and of Henry IV., but mainly to the fact that Philip II. found more than enough to do elsewhere. The war with England and the destruction of the Spanish Armada dealt a fearful blow to the power of Spain. Then Philip's connection with the League involved him in French politics. Twice was the duke of Parma compelled to leave the Netherlands at a critical moment and to lead his army into France. The accession of Henry IV. ruined the schemes of Philip II. Even after the latter's death in 1598, it was long before Spain would consent to resign its claim to any part of the Netherlands. At last, in 1609, Philip III. concluded a truce for twelve years which practically secured the independence of the seven provinces.

§ 14. The United Provinces had still many difficulties to contend with. The state was a confederation of provinces, but each province was a confederation of towns. Political power was practically monopolised by a burgher aristocracy. The town-councils, the ultimate source of power, were filled up, except in Overyssel and Groningen, either by co-optation or by the choice of a small body of electors. The disintegrating tendencies of such a constitution were counterbalanced by the federal institutions, the states-general and the state council, by the ascendancy which superior wealth gave to the province of Holland, and by the authority and prestige of the House of Orange. But there was always a risk that the princes of Orange might aspire to real sovereignty, and thus come into collision with the dominant burghers, whose main strength lay in the great trading cities of Holland.

Maurice of Nassau commanded all the forces of the Provinces as captain and admiral, and he was also stadtholder in Holland, Zealand, Utrecht, Gelderland and Overyssel. He had the enthusiastic support of the lower orders, who resented the exclusive pretensions of the wealthy burghers. The leader and representative of the latter class was John of Barneveldt, to whom, after the princes of Orange, the Provinces were most indebted for their independence. He and Maurice, allied during the war, now found themselves opposed to each other. Religious differences lent acrimony to the political quarrel. The rigid Calvinists wished to monopolise the advantages of a war that had been fought against intolerance. Arminius, a professor at Leyden, questioned some of the fundamental tenets of Calvinism. His followers, of whom the most prominent were Barneveldt and Hugo Grotius, sought to restrain the Calvinist clergy by upholding the supremacy of the state in ecclesiastical matters. A violent quarrel arose between the Remonstrants (Arminians) and the Contra-Remonstrants or Gomarists. The latter called for a national synod, and Maurice, who was no theologian, espoused their cause. The Synod of Dort or Dordrecht (1618) condemned the teaching of Arminius. Barneveldt and Grotius, who had thrown themselves on the support of Holland and had almost kindled a civil war, were imprisoned in 1618. The latter succeeded in escaping, but Barneveldt had to experience the ingratitude of princes and people, and perished on the scaffold (1619).

CHAPTER IX.

FRANCE AND THE WARS OF RELIGION, 1559-1610.

§ 1. Religious persecution in France under Francis I. and Henry II. § 2. Catharine de Medici; the Guises; the houses of Bourbon and Chatillon. § 3. Reign of Francis II.; power of the Guises; conspiracy of Amboise; Edict of Romorantin. § 4. Accession of Charles IX.; States-General at Orleans; Catharine de Medici in power; Edict of July, 1561; conference at Poissy; Edict of January, 1562. § 5. The triumvirate; Antony of Navarre gained over; massacre of Vassy; outbreak of war; battle of Dreux; assassination of Francis of Guise; Edict of Amboise. § 6. Conference of Bayonne; conspiracy of Meaux; second war; Montmorency killed; treaty of Longjumeau. § 7. Third war; battles of Jarnac and Moncontour; peace of St. Germain. § 8. Changed attitude of the French Court; influence of Coligny; his attempted assassination; massacre of St. Bartholomew; was it premeditated? § 9. Rise of the *Politiques;* Edict of July, 1573; death of Charles IX. § 10. Henry III. adopts a persecuting policy; the Huguenots obtain foreign assistance; States-General at Blois; Edict of Bergerac. § 11. Seven years of comparative peace; death of Francis of Anjou makes Henry of Navarre heir to the throne; formation of the Catholic League; war of the three Henries; battle of Coutras. § 12. Supremacy of Guise; his assassination; Henry III. also assassinated. § 13. Question of the succession; final victory of Henry IV.; termination of civil wars. § 14. Edict of Nantes; financial administration of Sully. § 15. General character of Henry IV.'s reign.

§ 1. It was impossible for France to remain isolated from the general movement of religious reform. Ecclesiastical abuses were as rife there as elsewhere, especially after the Concordat of 1515 gave the Crown the appointment to benefices. The renaissance movement, and the contact with other countries produced by the Italian wars, led men naturally to criticise the established faith. The writings of Luther and other reformers were circulated through France, and found earnest readers. Francis I., devoid of religious enthusiasm and a patron of literary culture, was personally inclined to tolerance. But his domestic government depended less on his own will than on foreign politics. His rivalry with Charles V. forbade him to quarrel with the pope, or to allow the French nation to become divided and so weakened. At the instigation of the Sorbonne, the theological faculty of the Paris University, he issued the most severe edicts against heresy. Many reformers were burnt, while others sought safety in exile. Henry II. pursued the same policy as his father, not so much from necessity as from inclination. Yet, in spite of persecution, the reformed doctrines continued to progress. The constant warfare in which France was engaged prevented any very complete execution of the religious edicts. But in 1559 Henry II. obtained peace by the treaty of Cateau-Cambresis, and prepared to devote himself to the suppression of heresy. At this crisis, as he was celebrating the marriage of his daughter with Philip II., he received a fatal wound in a tournament. With his death commences the period of religious conflict in France.

§ 2. To intelligently follow succeeding events it is necessary to have a clear conception of the chief personages who became the leaders of parties. Henry II. left behind him four sons, three of whom succeeded to the crown. But none of them possessed either ability or independence, and they are merely puppets in the hands of more prominent actors. Their mother, Catharine de Medici, who had been married in her early youth, had hitherto taken little or no part in politics. Her husband never cared for her, and paid far more attention to his mistresses. But Catharine's ambition was only strengthened by its enforced repression, and she eagerly grasped at the opportunity of ruling France through her sons. For many years she exercised a fatal influence over the kingdom. She encouraged her children in frivolity and vice to make them more dependent. She employed those stratagems and deceits which passed for policy in Italy, and her knowledge of the weaknesses of human nature gave her prodigious power. She stopped at no crime, however heinous, which might aid in the accomplishment of her schemes.

Even more important for a time than the queen-mother were the Guises. Claude of Guise, the second son of Réné of Lorraine, had come to seek his fortune at the French court, bringing with him six sons. Of these, two obtained great importance. The eldest, Francis of Guise, acquired a military reputation as the defender of Metz and the conqueror of Calais. His brother Charles entered the church and was known as the cardinal of Lorraine. He devoted his attention to politics, and became prominent among the ministers of Henry II. The Guises were firm supporters of the Catholic religion, and in close connection with Philip II. and the papacy. In opposition to the Guises stood the chief noble families of France, headed by the Bourbons. Antony of Bourbon was, after Henry's children, the nearest male heir to the crown. He had married Jeanne of Navarre, and under her influence became a convert to Calvinism. But Antony, though a popular and able soldier, was weak and irresolute. His younger brother, Louis prince of Condé, who was more firm and capable, soon superseded Antony as the leader of the Protestant party. With the Bourbons were closely allied the three Chatillons, the nephews of the constable Montmorency. The eldest, Odet de Chatillon, though a cardinal, was suspected of an inclination to reform. The second brother, Gaspar, was the celebrated Admiral de Coligny, the heroic and disinterested champion of the Huguenots. The third brother, Francis d'Andelot, was an able supporter of Coligny. Montmorency himself opposed the supremacy of the Guises, but remained devoted to the old faith.

§ 3. The accession of Francis II., who was legally of age though really a minor, gave none of the anticipated power to his mother. He fell altogether into the hands of the Guises, the uncles of his wife, Mary Stuart. The reins of government were assumed by the cardinal of Lorraine, while his brother, the duke of Guise, had control over the army. Their object was to establish Mary Stuart on the English throne in place of Elizabeth, who was held to be illegitimate. In this enterprise they relied on the support of the papacy, and were therefore anxious to suppress all tendencies to heresy in France. Numerous edicts were issued and enforced against the Huguenots, as the Calvinists were called in contempt.

But the Guises had to confront a powerful opposition. French finances were in a very serious condition, and the blame for this fell on the cardinal, who had managed them under Henry II. The heavy taxation and the ill-success of the war in Scotland alienated the people. But far more serious was the hostility of the nobles, who hated the Guises as foreigners, and who regarded the nobles of royal blood as the rightful holders of political power. Opposition to the Guises inclined the nobles to the reformed religion, and it was this which gave the Huguenot movement its political and aristocratic character. In the midst of the general discontent a certain La Renaudie concerted a plot to seize the person of the king at Amboise. The enterprise, though condemned by Calvin, is said to have been encouraged by the prince of Condé. It proved a complete failure. La Renaudie was slain and most of his followers executed.

The conspiracy of Amboise, though unsuccessful, terrified the cardinal into moderation. The chancellorship was given to Michel L'Hôpital, the representative of a small party which tried to hold the balance between the two extremes. The Edict of Romorantin, while forbidding public worship to the Huguenots, conceded liberty of conscience. The States-General were summoned to meet at

Orleans. But in spite of this apparent change the Guises held to their policy. They used every exertion to secure a majority in the States, and they imprisoned Condé on a charge of complicity in the recent conspiracy. He was even tried and condemned to death. But their schemes were all foiled by the sudden death of Francis II. (5 Dec., 1560).

§ 4. The accession of her second son, Charles IX., at the age of eleven, gave Catharine de Medici her desired opportunity. By prompt action she secured the regency, and bought off the undeniable claims of Antony of Bourbon. The Guises, disappointed of their own hopes, supported her government as preferable to that of the Bourbons. Montmorency returned to Paris. Catharine conceived the policy of balancing parties against each other, and thus securing her own power. In this she relied on the assistance of the Chancellor L'Hôpital. But all her efforts were unable to prevent an open conflict.

The States-General, summoned to Orleans under Francis II., met after his death. The nobles and the third estate complained bitterly of the condition of the church, and demanded radical reforms. The clergy, on the other hand, urged the persecution of heretics. Nothing was done immediately, but the Edict of July, 1561, relaxed the previous severity by substituting exile for death as the punishment of avowed heresy. A meeting of deputies of the estates was held in August at Poissy, where a religious conference took place. The demands of the laity went far beyond those made at Orleans. They included a complete constitutional reform of both church and state, and the confiscation of two-thirds of the clerical property for secular uses. But the clergy, by paying a large sum of ready money, were able to purchase the protection of the government and the conference on doctrinal points came to nothing. The Edict of January, 1562, gave a wide extension to the religious toleration which L'Hôpital desired. Huguenot worship was allowed in the families of nobles, in the open country and in unwalled towns. It was only with great difficulty that the orthodox Parliament of Paris was induced to register the edict.

§ 5. It gave the greatest offence to the Catholics. A league had already been formed for the protection of the established religion by Montmorency, the duke of Guise, and marshal St. André, which was designated by their enemies as the "triumvirate." They conceived the happy idea of gaining over Antony of Navarre. Hopes were held out to him by the pope that Philip II. would give him the island of Sardinia or a kingdom in Africa. The weak prince allowed himself to be duped, and he deserted the Huguenots to become a member of the league. Thus strengthened, the Catholics prepared for violent measures. The duke of Guise, on his way to Paris, found a Huguenot congregation worshipping in a barn at Vassy. His followers were sent to disperse them, and a riot ensued, in which sixty unarmed men, women, and children were slain, and more than two hundred were wounded. In Paris the duke was received by the mob as a conqueror. The regent and her son were compelled against their will to leave Fontainebleau for the capital.

Meanwhile the news of the massacre of Vassy had produced a profound impression in the Protestant world. The Huguenot nobles assembled at Orleans at the summons of Condé. They received assistance from the German princes, who regarded them as supporters of an imprisoned king, and from Elizabeth of England, who hated the Guises as the allies of Mary Stuart, and who received Havre in return for her support. The Catholics, on their side, obtained troops from Philip II. and from the unreformed Swiss Cantons, together with supplies of money from the pope. The Huguenot army marched to Normandy, where the war broke out. At the siege of Rouen, Antony of Navarre was slain. The headship of the house of Bourbon now devolved upon his son, afterwards Henry IV., who was at present only ten years old. The death of his elder brother gave increased influence to Condé. The two armies finally met in a pitched battle at Dreux. Both sides claimed the victory, but both had suffered great loss. St. André was slain, while Condé on the one side and Montmorency on the other were taken prisoners. The command of the Huguenots was assumed by Coligny, who conducted a skilful retreat to the Loire. The duke of Guise advanced to besiege Orleans, the headquarters of his enemies, but was assassinated by a fanatical Calvinist of the name of Poltrot (18th February, 1563). His death put an end to the war. The Peace of Amboise was arranged by the two prisoners, Condé and Montmorency. By this the reformed faith was tolerated in all those places where it was established before the war, though Catharine de Medici insisted that Paris should be excepted from this. Moreover in each official district a town was selected which was specially devoted to the celebration of the Huguenot worship. The nobles retained the privileges secured to them by the edict of January. The government now turned its arms against the English, who were compelled to surrender Havre.

§ 6. The death of the great party leaders and the exhaustion of the combatants gave new strength to Catharine's government, and this was increased by the recovery of Havre. She had Charles IX. formally proclaimed of age, though all authority was still left in her own hands. She now set herself to maintain peace and to strengthen the central power. At a conference at Bayonne with her daughter the queen of Spain, the duke of Alva in vain urged her to employ violent measures against the Huguenots. Catharine had all a woman's horror of war, and an Italian's preference for guileful diplomacy. While she enforced the treaty of Amboise, she lost none of her attachment to the Roman Catholic faith. On a journey through France the sight of the fallen crucifixes grieved her. She was quite willing to suppress heresy, but only if it could be done without disturbing the peace. She therefore continued to favour L'Hôpital, and refused to accept the decrees of the Council of Trent.

But in so disturbed a period as the sixteenth century, events were often too strong for the most cautious of politicians. Alva's violent policy in the Netherlands excited new hopes among the Catholics and new fears among the Huguenots. The latter dreaded lest the power of Spain should be re-established in the neighbouring provinces and then employed to restore Catholicism in France. They had no confidence in the moderation of the queen-mother and felt that their safety depended on their own exertions. A conspiracy was formed in 1567 with the greatest secrecy. Its object was to obtain possession of the king's person at Meaux, and to compel the dismissal of the Swiss troops and a change of government. Everything was carefully prepared, and success assured, when Condé allowed himself to be entrapped into futile negotiations. The delay gave time to collect the Swiss, and under their protection the court was removed to Paris. Condé now laid siege to the capital, and demanded not only toleration for the Huguenots but also free admission to public offices. But Catharine had been driven into the arms of the Catholics, and his demands were refused. The Parisians strained every nerve to support the government and the orthodox cause. A large army was collected under the command of the aged Montmorency. At St. Denis another indecisive battle took place, in which Montmorency received a mortal wound. The office of Constable was not revived, and the command of the troops was given to Charles IX.'s younger brother, Henry of Anjou. Philip II. offered assistance to Catharine, but she refused to subject France to the humiliation of foreign interference. In March, 1568, this war was closed by the treaty of Longjumeau, which confirmed the previous treaty of Amboise.

§ 7. There was never any intention of observing this treaty, which was concluded only to disarm the Huguenots. The conspiracy of Meaux convinced Catharine that continued toleration would be fatal to the royal power. She threw in her lot with the Catholic powers, who in 1568 were making vigorous efforts to suppress heresy. The cardinal of Lorraine regained his position in the council and

L'Hôpital was dismissed from the chancellorship. The fanatical pope Pius V. released the French government from its obligations. A royal edict forbade the celebration of the reformed service under penalty of death, and ordered the Huguenot preachers to leave the kingdom within fourteen days. An attempt was made to seize Condé and Coligny, and only with great difficulty could they escape to La Rochelle. This port became the head-quarters of the Huguenots, and enabled them to keep up their connection with England and the Netherlands. Hither came Condé's sister-in-law Jeanne, with her young son, Henry of Navarre.

Before the end of 1568 the third religious war had broken out in France. It is impossible here to follow the military movements. In the open field the Catholics under Henry of Anjou were constantly successful. In the battle of Jarnac (13 March, 1569) the Huguenots were routed and Condé slain. He was succeeded in the command by Coligny, who never displayed more conspicuous courage and conduct. But want of money to pay his troops compelled him to risk a battle against superior forces, and at Moncontour (3 October, 1569) he was again defeated. Had the Catholics promptly followed up the victory they might have crushed the Huguenots. But the government was beginning to vacillate. Catharine de Medici had no sympathy with the ambitious schemes of Philip II., who wished to use France as a tool. And Charles IX. was jealous of the military successes of his younger brother, the duke of Anjou, who was the favourite of his mother and the Catholic party. The influence of the Guises, who were hand and glove with Philip II., declined. In August, 1570, the treaty of St. Germain put an end to hostilities. Religious freedom and the right of public service were confirmed to the Huguenots, and they received four towns as places of refuge, La Rochelle, Montauban, Cognac and La Charité.

§ 8. This treaty was followed by a great change in the attitude of the French court. Charles IX. showed an unexpected determination to assume the reins of government. He wished to free France from foreign influence, and to emulate the achievements of his father and grandfather. The connection with Spain was broken off, and negotiations were opened with England and the Netherlands. It was proposed that Elizabeth should marry the duke of Anjou, and, after that was given up, the duke of Alençon. Lewis of Nassau, the brother of William the Silent, was well received at court. In domestic politics Charles broke with the Guises and allied himself with the moderate party. His youngest sister, Margaret, was betrothed to the young Henry of Navarre. Coligny was invited to court, and there soon obtained great influence over the weak and impulsive king. He urged an immediate war against Spain, and Charles IX. accepted the plan.

But before this could be carried out, Catharine de Medici hurried back to Paris, determined to employ any means in her power to prevent such a reversal of her previous policy and to restore her influence over her son. In alliance with the duke of Anjou she determined to get rid of Coligny. He was fired at from a window near the court and wounded, though not mortally. This attack made him more popular and more dangerous than ever. The Huguenots were assembled in great numbers to celebrate the wedding of Henry of Navarre. The population of Paris was fanatically hostile to them, and Catharine determined to free herself from all danger by a general massacre in which Coligny and his followers might share a common fate. The unfortunate Charles IX. was induced to give the necessary orders by the entreaties and threats of his mother and brother. At midnight on 24th August, 1572, the bell of St. Germain l'Auxerrois gave the appointed signal. The murder of Coligny was superintended by Henry of Guise, the son and successor of Francis. In Paris the mob rose and slaughtered the unsuspecting Huguenots. Other towns followed the example of the capital. Nearly 20,000 victims fell in this "Massacre of St. Bartholomew" or the "Paris Matins."

It has often been asserted that the massacre had long ago been decided upon, and that Catharine had only waited for the favourable moment to carry it out. It has been regarded as the direct outcome of Alva's advice at the Conference of Bayonne. But this is not only improbable but almost impossible. Catharine's guiding motive was not religious bigotry, but personal and dynastic ambition. She could never have reckoned on so favourable a circumstance as the presence of so many unarmed Huguenots in the midst of the bloodthirsty mob of Paris. Everything points clearly to the conclusion that, even if the idea lay already dormant in her mind, the impulse to its execution was sudden, and arose from the immediate position of affairs.

§ 9. The news of the massacre roused the remaining Huguenots to a new war of defence. But, weakened as they were by the loss of their leaders, there seemed little prospect of their success. The government issued orders proscribing the reformed religion, and prepared four armies to reduce those towns which refused obedience. The heroic resistance offered by two towns, Rochelle and Sancerre, rivals the most celebrated deeds of antiquity. And meanwhile the massacres had called into existence a new party called the *Politiques*, which adhered to neither of the rival creeds, but insisted on the necessity of toleration. At its head were the Montmorencies, the sons of the Constable, who, though Catholics, inherited their father's opposition to the Guises. The government found it impossible to carry out their policy. The edict of July 1573, secured liberty of conscience and permitted the Huguenot worship in Rochelle, Nismes, and Montauban. Through the mediation of the Polish envoy, Sancerre was admitted to the same privileges.

Thus the policy of massacre proved a failure. The Huguenots could not be crushed by such measures. Charles IX., who never recovered after the horrors of St. Bartholomew, and was ever haunted by imaginary visions of its victims, died without male issue on May 30, 1574. The crown passed to his brother, Henry III., who had just ascended the throne of Poland, but who promptly deserted his northern kingdom, and made his way through Italy to France. Till his arrival the administration fell once more into the hands of Catharine de Medici.

§ 10. The moderate party endeavoured to take advantage of the change of government. Damville de Montmorency met the new king on the frontier, and obtained from him promises of toleration. But when Henry III. reached Paris, he soon fell under the influence of his mother and the Catholics, and adopted the extreme policy to which his own nature inclined him. The contest was at once renewed. The *Politiques* were strengthened by the junction of Francis of Alençon, Henry of Navarre, and the young prince of Condé. John Casimir of the Palatinate advanced to their assistance with German troops. Against this powerful confederacy the Government could only proceed with weapons of deceit. Concessions were made to break up the hostile alliance without any intention of observing them. The Huguenots were allowed the free exercise of their religion everywhere except in Paris and the country round; they were to be admitted to offices, and the judicial authority was to be vested in mixed parliaments. Alençon was bought off with the duchy of Anjou, and Condé with the administration of Picardy. John Casimir received compensation and pay for his troops. The allies also demanded a meeting of the States-General, and these were convened at Blois in December, 1576; but with a very unexpected result. They adopted an attitude of uncompromising hostility to the reformed religion, and thus strengthened the hands of the Government. The Huguenots again took up arms; but, after an uneventful campaign, the king suddenly concluded peace by the edict of Poitiers or Bergerac, the most important of the numerous religious treaties. By this the extreme concessions of 1575 were revoked; but the reformed worship was allowed in all places where it was exercised on the day of the treaty. One town in each district and nine fortified places of refuge were ceded to the Huguenots, while the nobles retained the privilege of private service. In the parliaments of Bordeaux, Grenoble, Aix, and Toulouse, four judges out of twelve were to be Protestants.

§ 11. Thus at last the great question as to how the two religions could exist side by side seemed to have received a practical solution. For the next seven years France enjoyed an unwonted respite from warfare. The peace might have been permanent but for the disastrous influence of foreign states. Never was the spirit of religious bigotry so active as at this period. By rulers who had applauded the massacre of St. Bartholomew, and who favoured plots for the assassination of Elizabeth of England and William of Orange, the vacillating government of France was regarded with abhorrence. Philip II. was especially concerned. The Catholic reaction, for which he lived and worked, could not be completed without French co-operation. And he had personal motives for opposing a peaceful settlement of religious differences. A united France offered the greatest obstacles to Spanish ambition. Even in the court of Henry III. there were symptoms of opposition to his annexation of Portugal. And Henry's brother, Francis of Anjou, appeared in the Netherlands as the avowed opponent of Spain, and the aspirant for the hand of the English queen. Before long events occurred which enabled Philip to interfere decisively in French politics.

On June 10, 1584, Francis of Anjou-Alençon died unmarried. The house of Valois was evidently on the verge of extinction. Henry III., its last representative, had no children, nor was he likely to have any. By the law of succession hitherto observed in France, the heir to the throne was Henry of Bourbon, the Calvinist king of Navarre and Béarn. But the prospect of a heretic king roused the bitterest feelings among the French Catholics, and especially among the Guises. They were already alienated by the promotion of royal favourites, who excluded them from office. At the instigation of the Spanish envoy, the Catholic League was formed at Joinville. Its leaders were Henry of Guise and his two brothers, the duke of Mayenne and the cardinal of Guise. Their avowed objects were to extirpate Protestantism in France, to exclude Henry of Navarre from the throne, which was to be given to his uncle, the cardinal of Bourbon, and to cede Navarre and Béarn to Philip II. as the price of Spanish assistance.

Thus a Catholic king of France found himself superseded by subjects of his own religion, who presumed to arrange the succession to the crown, and to conduct independent negotiations with foreign powers. Had Henry III. been a man of foresight and energy, he would have allied himself with Henry of Navarre, with the still loyal Catholics, and with the Protestants both in France and the Netherlands. But under his mother's influence, he negotiated with the League, and placed himself altogether in their power. All the edicts of pacification were revoked, and the Protestant religion was proscribed. The result was the outbreak of a new war, known as that of the three Henries. Henry III., Henry of Guise, Henry of Navarre, were at the head of independent armies. An army of mixed Germans and Swiss, under the command of Count Dohna, entered France to assist the Huguenots. The king went to meet them, while he despatched the duke of Joyeux against Henry of Navarre. The latter won the first Huguenot victory at Coutras. Meanwhile Henry III. met the Germans, and induced Dohna and his troops to quit the kingdom. But the duke of Guise, disregarding this, attacked and inflicted great loss on the retreating army.

§ 12. The result of the war was an immense increase of popularity for the League. Guise was welcomed as the heroic conqueror of the foreign invaders, to whom the king had basely truckled. In Paris, still the stronghold of Catholic bigotry, these feelings were especially strong. Henry III. found himself powerless in his own capital. The arrival of Guise gave new energy to the fanatical mob; they erected barricades in the streets, disarmed the royal troops, and Henry III. only escaped captivity by a hasty flight from Paris, which he never saw again (1588).

In spite of this humiliation the king continued to treat with his enemies. He again summoned the States-General at Blois, and they insisted on the complete suppression of the Huguenots.

The king gave way to them on every point, but they proceeded to cut down the royal revenues, and to insist on the removal of the royal favourites. Guise, who had arrived at Blois, was evidently all-powerful. In these straits Henry came to one of those violent resolutions which so often commend themselves to weak minds. The duke of Guise was invited to a conference in the royal cabinet and there murdered (December 23, 1588). His brother the cardinal was seized and executed, and the cardinal of Bourbon imprisoned. In the midst of these fearful events, Catharine de Medici died at Blois on January 5, 1589.

The assassination of Guise produced open war between the king and the League. Under Mayenne's guidance, Paris threw off its allegiance and established a provisional government. The example was followed by most of the large towns. Henry III. found that he was a king without a kingdom. At last he was forced to take the step which might before have saved him. He united his forces with those of Henry of Navarre. Together they advanced to lay siege to Paris. Here Henry III. paid the penalty of his weakness and his crimes. A monk, Jacques Clement, made his way into the royal presence, and stabbed the king mortally with a dagger (August 1, 1589).

§ 13. The line of Valois, which had ruled France since 1328, was now extinct, and the legitimate claimant to the throne was Henry of Navarre, who could trace his descent back to a younger son of Louis IX. He at once assumed the royal title as Henry IV. But his position was one of extraordinary difficulty, and it was necessary for him to conquer a kingdom before he could reign. He could only secure the support of the Catholics in his own camp by changing his religion, and this would alienate the Huguenots He took a middle course. He declared himself still open to conviction on religious matters, and he promised complete toleration and the appointment of Catholic officers. But there was no prospect of a peaceful submission of his extreme enemies. In Paris, where the news of Henry III.'s death was welcomed with enthusiastic rejoicing, the cardinal of Bourbon was proclaimed king as Charles X. This was a mere form, as the cardinal was a prisoner in Henry's hands. The real leader of the League, and therefore the ruler of Catholic France, was the duke ot Mayenne.

Henry IV., who confronted his difficulties with unflinching courage, might have succeeded in conquering his enemies, but for the assistance they received from Spain. He defeated Mayenne at Ivry, and had already reduced Paris to great straits, when Alexander of Parma marched into France from the Netherlands, and compelled him to raise the siege (1590). In 1592 Parma again appeared in Normandy and saved Rouen from the royalist forces. Henry IV., with all his personal courage and activity, was out-generalled by the cautious Spanish commander. But, fortunately for him and for France, Parma died after his return to the Netherlands in 1592. While Henry was thus freed from his most formidable opponent, he also reaped great advantages from the divisions among the French Catholics. France, divided into hostile camps, without any central authority, was in a state of anarchy and confusion, which if continued must end in national ruin. Henry IV. offered one solution, his own accession and religious toleration. His enemies were bound to offer an alternative. The cardinal of Bourbon, who was only used as a puppet, had died, still in captivity, in 1590. Spanish influence was all-powerful among the leaguers, and was wielded by the envoy Mendoza. It was almost decided to put aside the Salic law, and to acknowledge Philip's daughter the

Infanta Isabella. But a difficulty arose about the choice of a husband for her. Philip himself wished her to marry her second cousin, Ernest of Austria. He hoped to compensate the Hapsburgs for their losses in the war with England and the Netherlands by gaining for them the crown of France. But the national spirit, weakened as it was by religious differences, was too strong to submit to a foreign king. Philip then proposed Charles of Guise, the son of the murdered duke. This was acceptable to most of the Catholics, but not to Mayenne, who aimed at the crown himself and refused to be put aside in favour of his nephew. These divisions ruined the Catholic cause. And in 1593 Henry IV. decided the fate of France by formally adopting the Catholic religion. The reaction against Spanish influence induced many of the leaguers to embrace this opportunity of going over to the legitimate king. Henry entered Paris in triumph in 1594. He at once declared war against Spain, which still supported the remnants of the League. All loyal Frenchmen rallied to his standard. In 1595 the pope, Clement VIII., withdrew the bull of excommunication and acknowledged him as king. In 1596 the duke of Mayenne submitted on very favourable terms. In 1598 Philip II., conscious that he was near the end of his life, and that his policy had proved a failure, concluded the Peace of Vervins, which confirmed the treaty of Cateau-Cambresis. All the conquests which had been made by Spain and Savoy were restored, and France regained its ancient boundaries. The most obstinate member of the league, the duke of Mercœur, at last submitted, and acknowledged Henry IV.

§ 14. Thus, after nearly forty years of anarchy, a national monarchy was re-established in France. But still Henry IV. had only crossed the threshold of his difficulty. It required years of cautious and enlightened government before the kingdom could recover from the confusion and losses of the civil wars. The first necessity was the settlement of a religious peace, which was accomplished by the famous Edict of Nantes (April 13, 1598). The Catholic church retained its supremacy and its revenues, and all dissenters from it were compelled to pay tithes and to observe the religious festivals. But the Huguenots obtained liberty of conscience and the right of public service in all places where it had been celebrated in 1577. Their ecclesiastical expenses were to be defrayed by themselves with the help of a yearly contribution from the king. The nobles retained the special religious privileges which had been given them by previous edicts. Offices were to be open to members of both creeds, and the parliaments were to be composed of mixed chambers. As a security for these concessions, a number of fortresses, including

Nismes, Montauban and La Rochelle, were ceded to the Huguenots for eight years. The king promised to defray part of the expense of the garrisons. The pope, Clement VIII., was induced, not without difficuity, to confirm the Edict of Nantes. He also divorced the king from his first wife, Margaret of Valois, and enabled him to marry Mary of Medici, daughter of Francis, grand duke of Tuscany (1599). In 1601 the birth of an heir ensured the continuance of the Bourbon dynasty.

Next in importance to the religious settlement came the question of finances. Ever since the death of Francis I. the financial condition of France had gone from bad to worse. Corruption prevailed among all the officials: the most reckless methods of raising money had been resorted to. Patents of nobility had been sold, and thus the number of taxpayers was reduced. Though the taxes were enormously heavy, so wasteful was the administration that they brought hardly anything into the treasury. The expenditure was ten times larger than the revenue. Every year the deficit increased, and at Henry IV.'s accession the public debt was estimated at £345,000,000, an enormous sum for those days. And the rate of interest varied from eight to ten per cent., so that it absorbed the whole of the annual revenue, which was not more than £30,000,000.

The task of evolving order in the midst of this confusion was entrusted to one of Henry's comrades in arms, the duke of Sully, the most conscientious, if not the most able of French administrators. Heedless of the interests of individuals when they were at variance with the welfare of the state, Sully instituted a series of sweeping reforms. A number of sinecure offices, which had been created merely to raise money by their sale, were swept away. Seats in the parliament, hitherto purchasable, were made hereditary on the payment of an annual tax (the *Paulette*) by their holders. Thus a lawyer-caste was created in France which occupied a unique position in the history of the country. Holders of royal domains were compelled to prove their title, and large territories were recovered. The system of collecting the taxes was reformed and made more orderly and economical. Patents of nobility were revised and in many cases revoked. While he thus increased the revenues, Sully also diminished the expenditure, and was thus enabled to pay off £147,000,000 of the debt. These and other reforms, which affected so closely the interests of powerful classes, could only have been carried out by a minister like Sully whose personal honesty was above suspicion.

§ 15. Nor was the king himself behindhand in the work of reform. Henry IV.'s devotion to the national welfare has been fondly recorded by his countrymen in the wish attributed to him that "every peasant might have a fowl in his pot on Sundays." While Sully was especially anxious to revive agriculture, Henry set himself to encourage manufactures and commerce. The silk-manufacture, which has become so important an industry in France, was introduced by him, and he planted the Tuileries gardens with mulberry-trees. Marseilles became a great mercantile and Toulon a great naval port. Discoverers were sent out under royal patronage to establish colonies in America. Port Royal (Annapolis) was founded in 1604, and Quebec in 1608. Henry even aimed at the formation of an Indian company which might rival the enterprise of the English and Dutch in the east.

By these and similar measures a foundation was laid for the revival of national prosperity in France. But for the government of Henry IV. there could have been no "age of Louis XIV." It is no wonder that the chivalrous, popular Henry of Navarre has lived long in the grateful memory of his people. Yet the permanent interests of France undoubtedly suffered from his rule. He made no effort to establish constitutional government under which the people might have been trained in the habits of self-rule. It was perhaps impossible for him to do so. It has been one of the misfortunes of France that it has been periodically brought to the verge of ruin either by foreign invasion or domestic divisions. It has been necessary to restore order with the strong hand, and despotism has been welcomed by the people as the only antidote for existing evils. Henry IV. and Sully unquestionably contributed to that over-centralisation which was completed by Richelieu, and of which the monarchy paid the penalty in the Revolution.

The foreign policy of Henry IV. was as simple and consistent as the objects of his domestic government. He wished to combine against the Austro-Spanish power all hostile elements in Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and the northern States. By destroying the Hapsburg supremacy, he hoped to establish a new system of European politics, of which France should be the centre. He did not live long enough to execute so grand a project, but he bequeathed it to his successors. Henry IV. was preparing a great force to interfere decisively on behalf of the Protestant claimants to Jülich and Cleve, when he was assassinated in the streets of Paris by the dagger of François Ravaillac (May 14, 1610).

CHAPTER X.

GERMANY AFTER CHARLES V., AND THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR.

§ 1. Germany and the Counter-Reformation. § 2. Progress of Protestantism under Ferdinand I. and Maximilian II. § 3. Protestant disunion and Catholic advance. § 4. Rudolf II. § 5. Disputes between Protestants and Catholics. § 6. The Union and the League. § 7. Succession question in Jülich and Cleve. § 8. Rudolf II. and Matthias. § 9. Ferdinand of Styria and the succession to the Hapsburg territories. § 10. Bohemian insurrection; crown accepted by the Elector Palatine. § 11. War in Bohemia; victory of the Catholic League. § 12. Attitude of France, Denmark and Sweden. § 13. Danish war; Wallenstein's successes and policy; siege of Stralsund. § 14. Mantuan succession; Edict of Restitution and dismissal of Wallenstein. § 15. Gustavus Adolphus in Germany; his successes. § 16. Wallenstein's second command; death of Gustavus Adolphus at Lützen. § 17 Assassination of Wallenstein; battle of Nordlingen; treaty of Prague § 18. Last period of the war. § 19. Negotiations; peace of Westphalia results of the war.

§ 1. The main interest of the history of all European countries during the last half of the sixteenth century centres round the success or failure of the Counter-Reformation. In Italy and Spain Catholicism succeeded not only in holding its ground but also in sternly repressing all opposing beliefs. In France the long wars of religion ended in a compromise, the Edict of Nantes, but, on the whole, victory rested with the Catholics. In the Netherlands the grand conflict with Spain produced a division between the provinces. The northern states formed a republic under the house of Orange. The Walloon provinces, more exposed to Romish influence, returned to the Spanish allegiance. In England the Catholic reaction failed altogether owing to the national spirit evoked by Spanish intervention. In Sweden the Jesuits almost accomplished the conversion of John III. (1568–92), the second son of Gustavus Vasa; but national interests proved in the end too strong for them. John's son, Sigismund, an avowed Catholic, was elected king of Poland, but forfeited the Swedish crown to his uncle, Charles IX. Germany, the starting-point of the Reformation, was affected no less than other countries by the reactionary movement. The Thirty Years'

War, to which this ultimately gave rise, proved a more desolating and extensive conflict than any of the other religious wars.

The Treaty of Augsburg (1555) was in itself too vague and too distasteful both to Protestants and Catholics, to furnish a satisfactory basis of peace. The so-called "ecclesiastical reservation" proved a fertile source of disputes. The spread of Calvinism produced a number of Protestants whose interests were not recognised by the treaty. But its cardinal defect was that it gave no security for freedom of conscience, but placed the settlement of religious questions in the hands of the territorial princes. This makes German history at this period more than usually difficult and complicated. Religion is no longer, as under Charles V., a question for the whole empire, but for each individual state.

§ 2. The Catholics had hoped by the ecclesiastical reservation to stay the further progress of Protestantism. In this they were disappointed. In almost every province the adherents of the reformed faith increased in numbers and importance. Protestant "administrators" obtained the bishoprics of Magdeburg, Bremen, Halberstadt, Lübeck and others. In the great archbishoprics of Trier and Cologne it was found impossible to exclude Protestant preachers. Even in Bavaria and the Austrian provinces the Lutheran doctrine spread rapidly. A Venetian envoy computed that in 1558 only a tenth part of the German population remained faithful to Catholicism. Charles V.'s successor, Ferdinand I., though he remained personally orthodox, took no measures to repress reform. It is worth remembering that this prince was the first who definitely gave up the old ceremony of a papal coronation. Henceforth the elected king of Germany assumes at once the title of emperor, and thus the popes are deprived of their chief means of interference in German affairs. Ferdinand was succeeded by his eldest son, Maximilian II., who was seriously inclined to Lutheranism, and it was only his connection with Spain and his regard for family interests that prevented his public conversion. But he pursued a policy of enlightened toleration, in which he was unfortunately far in advance of his age. Thus the policy of Charles V. was completely surrendered by his successors. The emperor no longer seeks to establish the religious unity of Germany, but stands as mediator between the two opposing beliefs.

§ 3. For a time Protestantism advanced so rapidly that it appeared possible that Germany might be altogether severed from the Church. But the greatness of the danger aroused corresponding energy in the declining faith and led to a strong Catholic reaction. This was facilitated by disunion among the Protestants themselves.

Their leaders were the duke of Saxony and the Elector Palatine, and they were unfortunately opposed to each other on doctrinal points. Saxony was fanatically Lutheran. When Christian I. (1586–1591), under the influence of his chancellor Crell, endeavoured to secure toleration for the Calvinists as the basis of a general Protestant alliance, he met with vehement opposition from his own subjects. The sudden death of the elector left the guardianship of his infant son to a Lutheran relative, Frederick William. Crell was imprisoned and put to death in 1601. Calvinism was suppressed in Saxony with a strong hand. Christian II. was succeeded in 1611 by his brother John George, who during a long reign was the head of the Lutheran party, and by his obstinate antipathy to Calvinism did incalculable harm to the Protestant cause in Germany.

In the Palatinate, owing to its geographical position, the influence of France and the Netherlands was strongly felt. This led to the establishment of Calvinism under Frederick III. (1557–1576), the first elector of the Simmern branch. His son and successor, Lewis VI. (1576–1580), was a Lutheran, and tried to effect a reconciliation between the two creeds. But the scheme ended with his life. His brother, John Casimir, became guardian of the young elector, Frederick IV. (1583–1610). Under the new rule Calvinism was thoroughly re-established in the Palatinate. Frederick was succeeded in 1610 by his son Frederick V., who married the English princess Elizabeth, and who figures very prominently in the first part of the Thirty Years' War.

This division of the Protestants into two hostile camps was fatal to their advance, and gave a great opportunity to the champions of the Catholic reaction. The Jesuits had been admitted into Germany by Ferdinand I., and before long their zeal and energy produced important results. Their schools surpassed those of the Protestant teachers, and enabled them to gain a firm hold over the rising generation. But their great object was to induce those princes who remained Catholic, to pursue a more active policy in their dominions. In Bavaria, Protestantism was put down by Albert III. (1550–1579), and this duchy became the centre of the Catholic movement. In Trier, Bamberg, Fulda, and other places a similar policy was successfully pursued. Protestants were first excluded from all offices, and finally forced into either recantation or exile.

§ 4. A great object of the Catholics was to make some impression on the hereditary domains of the house of Hapsburg, where, under Ferdinand I. and Maximilian II., Protestantism had made startling progress. Maximilian had five sons by his wife Mary, a daughter of

Charles V., but he wisely gave up the family custom of subdivision and left the administration of Hungary, Bohemia and Austria to the eldest, Rudolf II., who was also elected emperor. Rudolf, educated first by his mother and afterwards at the court of Phillip II., was imbued with Spanish ideas both in religion and politics. He had an exaggerated conception of his own dignity, and no respect for the religious beliefs or political interests of his subjects. His first act was to expel from Vienna Opitz and other Protestant preachers, and he thus gave the first impulse to a Catholic reaction in Austria. Unfortunately, however, for the Catholic party, Rudolf, though not without ability, was not of a character to interfere vigorously in the affairs of the empire. He held himself aloof from politics and devoted himself in his castle of Prague to alchemy and astrology. But it was a great thing that the policy of his two predecessors was given up by Rudolf, and that the imperial influence, however small, was henceforth assured to the Catholics. They were now determined to enforce throughout the empire their interpretation of the religious peace and especially of the ecclesiastical reservation. Thus they hoped to resist any further progress of Protestantism, and, if circumstances favoured them, to reduce it to the old limits of 1552.

§ 5. At the Diet of 1582 an important contest arose about the bishopric of Magdeburg, to which was attached the presidency in the College of Princes. Its present holder was a Protestant, Joachim Frederick of Brandenburg. The Catholics refused to his deputy not only the presidency, but even admission to the Diet, on the ground that he was not lawful bishop. This was a point of the highest importance, as the admission of the Catholic ruling would have excluded many of the Protestant princes from political influence. It was impossible to come to any compromise on the question, which remained a source of difficulty at each successive diet. A similar question arose in the third College of the Diet, that of the cities. Aachen, long a Catholic city, had fallen at last under the government of a Protestant majority. An attempt was made to exclude its deputies from the Diet, but the other towns regarded this as an attack on their liberties, and admitted the deputies, though they had received no regular summons. This also remained unsettled until 1598, when Catholicism was restored in Aachen by a military force.

Still more important were the events in Cologne at this time. The Protestant interpretation of the ecclesiastical reservation was that it did not apply to the case of a Protestant bishop lawfully elected by the chapter. But they had never yet held that a Catholic bishop might go over to Protestantism and yet hold his see in defiance of the chapter. A previous elector of Cologne, Hermann von der Wied, had married, and had at once resigned. But in 1581, the archbishop Gebhard Truchsess married Agnes of Mansfeld, and announced his conversion to the reformed faith and at the same time his determination to retain his see. This was of immense importance, because the defection of the archbishop of Cologne would give the Protestants a majority in the electoral College. The Catholics took the strongest measures. The pope issued a bull of deposition, and the temporal princes armed to support it. Truchsess, having adopted Calvinism, found no supporters among the Lutherans. He was driven from his see, and lived in exile till his death in 1601. This was a great victory for the Catholics, and encouraged them to take further measures. They had a majority in the Imperial Chamber, the supreme court of the empire. All legal disputes were decided against the Protestants. Besides this, an attempt was made to increase the authority of the Aulic Council, an institution which had no imperial sanction, but was merely a private court of the emperor, whose wishes it unhesitatingly carried out.

§ 6. Thus the imperial constitution failed to supply an efficient administrative machinery. The Diet could come to no decisions, and even if it did, they were rejected by the minority. The judicial courts were on the side of one party, and the other refused to recognise their authority. It was evident that the Protestants could only rely for security on their own exertions. Their obvious policy was to form a defensive union among themselves. This object was steadily pursued by the court of the elector palatine under the guidance of an able minister, Christian of Anhalt. But for some time all attempts failed through the want of union between Calvinists and Lutherans, and the invincible sluggishness of Saxony. But at last events happened which compelled immediate action.

Donauwörth, a free imperial city, was so completely Protestant that the attempt of an abbot to conduct a religious procession through the streets produced a violent tumult. The matter was brought, with doubtful legality, before the Aulic Council, and that body, without a formal trial, issued the imperial ban against the town and entrusted its execution to Maximilian of Bavaria. That prince was one of the ablest of German princes and the recognised leader of the Catholic party. His devotion to his religion did not, however, prevent an enlightened regard for his own interests. He had long foreseen the possibility of war and was prepared for the emergency. His troops marched against Donauwörth, and not only forcibly suppressed the Protestant religion, but practically annexed the town to Bavaria. This high-handed act on the part of the Aulic Council and of Maximilian convinced the Protestants of the danger in which they stood. At the diet of Ratisbon (1608) they made vehement protests, and these being disregarded, they left the assembly. Almost directly afterwards, Christian of Anhalt succeeded in inducing the Protestant princes and towns of southern Germany to form a league at Ahausen. It was impossible as yet to persuade the Lutherans of Germany to join them. The Catholics on their side were equally prompt. Under the leadership of Maximilian, a Catholic league was formed at Munich in July 1609.

§ 7. Thus the imperial constitution was broken down by religious differences, and the two parties stood face to face, both prepared for war, but neither willing to strike the first blow. A disputed succession in Jülich and Cleve almost precipitated the struggle. On the death of the childless duke, John William, in 1609, a number of claimants to his territories arose. Of these the most prominent were John Sigismund of Brandenburg and Wolfgang William, son of the duke of Neuburg. But both were Lutherans, and the presence of heretics so near to the Netherlands aroused the fears of Spain. The emperor Rudolf was induced to claim the vacant provinces as imperial fiefs. In face of this danger the two claimants formed an alliance and took joint possession. A general war seemed inevitable. As the Catholics relied on Spain, so the Protestants turned to France, and in 1610 a treaty was made between Henry IV. and the Union. Henry was determined to seize the opportunity of humbling his old enemies the Hapsburgs. He was preparing to lead a large army from France, when his life was taken by Ravaillac. France fell under the miserable regency of Marie de Medici, and the danger of a European war was for the time over. Jülich and Cleve remained in the hands of the two joint possessors. But the difficulty of finding a permanent settlement again endangered peace. Wolfgang William proposed to his rival to marry his daughter and to take the whole territories. The elector of Brandenburg, enraged at the impudent proposal, boxed the youthful speaker's ears. Wolfgang William went over to Catholicism, married a daughter of Maximilian, and threw himself on the protection of the League. Spanish and Dutch troops were called in by either side. But there was still a general abhorrence of war. At Xanten a truce was concluded by which Jülich and Cleve were divided between Brandenburg and Neuburg. Thus the outbreak of war was again postponed. For its immediate causes we must turn to the history of the house of Hapsburg.

§ 8. Ferdinand I. had divided his territories between his three sons. Maximilian II. received Austria, Hungary, and Bohemia; Ferdinand, Tyrol; and Charles, Styria and Carinthia. Ferdinand died without legitimate issue and Tyrol reverted to the elder line. Charles of Styria was succeeded in 1596 by his son, afterwards the emperor Ferdinand II. Maximilian's territories passed, as has been seen, to Rudolf II., while the younger sons received compensation elsewhere. Ernest was intrusted with the administration of Austria, which fell after his death to Matthias; Maximilian was made governor of Tyrol; and Albert was married to Philip II.'s daughter and became regent of the Spanish Netherlands.

Rudolf II.'s government in his hereditary dominions was more active but quite as unsuccessful as in the empire. His attempts to put down the Protestant doctrines, and with them the political privileges of his subjects, led to open revolts. In Hungary the rebels gained the support of the Turks, and established virtual independence. So serious did matters appear, that the other members of the family determined to combine against their incapable head and to entrust the administration to the archduke Matthias. But Rudolf resisted all attempts to diminish his power with an obstinacy akin to madness. Compelled to entrust affairs in Hungary to his brother, he refused to ratify his acts, and especially his treaty with the Turks. At last, in 1608, the archdukes took up arms and compelled Rudolf, by the treaty of Lieben, to cede Hungary, Austria, and Moravia to Matthias, and to promise him the succession in Bohemia. These events were unfavourable to the Catholics. Matthias was forced to make concessions in Hungary and Austria, while the Bohemians took advantage of Rudolf's difficulties to extort from him the famous "Letter of Majesty" (1609). This secured freedom of conscience to all Bohemians, but freedom of worship only to members of the assembly of estates. On the royal domains complete toleration was to be assured. Rudolf tried hard to evade these conditions, which placed him in an inferior position to other landholders. But he only provoked a new revolt, which in 1611 deposed him and transferred the Bohemian crown to Matthias. In January, 1612, while still struggling to regain his lost power, Rudolf died. The imperial crown followed the others and was conferred by the electors upon Matthias.

§ 9. Matthias had now stepped altogether into Rudolf's place, and found himself face to face with the difficulties which had crushed his brother. In Bohemia and Austria religious differences were by no means ended by the concessions made to the Protestants, and the attempt to evade these concessions produced serious disaffection. In Hungary the royal power was almost null. Transylvania had been made practically independent by Bethlen Gabor, who was supported by the Turks. The empire would render no assistance. At a diet at Ratisbon in 1613 Matthias demanded aid against the

Turks; but the assembly would consider nothing but the old religious questions and had to be dissolved. This was the last diet held before the war, and marks the final collapse of orderly constitutional arrangements. Matthias being old and childless, the Austrian princes saw that family interests required some settlement of the succession. The elder archdukes agreed to renounce their claims in favour of Ferdinand of Styria, the emperor's cousin. He had been educated with Maximilian of Bavaria at the Jesuit university of Ingolstadt, and was imbued with the most extreme ideas of the Catholic reaction. He had earned the papal gratitude by the forcible restoration of Catholicism in Styria and Carinthia. A prince of equal bigotry and ability was now to become head of the Hapsburgs and to resume the policy which had been abandoned since Charles V.'s defeat by Maurice of Saxony.

§ 10. The only province where serious opposition to Ferdinand was anticipated was Bohemia, where the anti-Catholic party was very strong and inherited some of the spirit of the old Hussites, and where the crown was considered elective. Ferdinand I. had declared the succession to be hereditary, but Matthias himself had in 1608 acknowledged the right of election. This difficulty, however, was overcome. The estates were suddenly summoned in 1617 and induced by promises and threats to recognise Ferdinand as heir to the throne. It was soon evident that the Bohemians had lost the most favourable opportunity of maintaining their liberties. The government became more and more Catholic and tyrannical. The Letter of Majesty, which Ferdinand had sworn to observe, was disregarded. Protestant churches were demolished and the government was entrusted to two men, Martinitz and Slawata, who were fanatical Catholics. In these circumstances the Bohemian nobles, headed by count Thurn, determined to take up arms. The revolt commenced in Prague, where the two unpopular ministers were thrown from a window of the town-hall. This act proved the commencement of an European war. Want of space forbids any detailed account of military movements, and a general sketch of the main events must suffice.

Ferdinand II. at once determined to enforce his authority in Bohemia. An army of mercenaries was despatched thither under Bucquoi, which was opposed by a native force under Thurn and by count Ernest of Mansfeld, who commanded troops in the pay of the duke of Savoy. Nothing decisive was done in 1618. The next year Thurn made a bold march upon Vienna, and Ferdinand was, for a moment, in extreme danger. But he was saved by a defeat inflicted on Mansfeld by Bucquoi which compelled the Bohemians to retire. Ferdinand at once hurried to Germany, where Matthias' death had necessitated a new imperial election. The division between Saxony and the Palatinate, and the moderation of Maximilian of Bavaria secured to him the crown (28 August, 1619). Two days beforehand an election of equal importance took place in Bohemia. The rebels were anxious to fortify themselves with foreign alliances. They had gained over Bethlen Gabor, the adventurous prince of Transylvania, and they received support from Savoy. But their great object was to enlist on their side the Protestant Union of Germany. It was decided to offer the Bohemian crown to Frederick V., elector Palatine and head of the Union. Dazzled by ambition, and urged on by Christian of Anhalt, he accepted the offer, though his allies were hesitating and his father-in-law, James I., refused any active support. On the 26th of August, Ferdinand was deposed and Frederick elected in his place. With great pomp he left Heidelberg and was crowned at Prague.

§ 11. This act of aggression, which threatened to give a second electorate to a Protestant prince, stirred the Catholic world to its depths. Maximilian of Bavaria and the League at once espoused the Hapsburg cause, from which they had hitherto held aloof. Ferdinand promised the Upper Palatinate to Maximilian, and in the meantime offered to cede Upper Austria as a security for his military expenses. The northern Protestants, who were unwilling to support a Calvinist usurper, pledged themselves to neutrality at Mühlhausen. In return for this, Ferdinand promised to respect the secularised bishoprics, and ceded Lausitz to the Lutheran leader, John George of Saxony. By these sacrifices Ferdinand insured his success. Frederick's cause was hopeless. His new subjects were alienated by his bigoted Calvinism. The army of the League under Tilly, a Walloon leader of capacity and experience, entered Bohemia, defeated Frederick at the White Hill (8 Nov. 1620), and drove him from the kingdom. Spanish troops under Spinola invaded the Palatinate. The allies of the unfortunate "winter-king" did nothing to help him. James I. trusted to futile negotiations with Spain. The Union gave no support to its nominal head, and soon afterwards was formally dissolved.

Thus the Catholic League obtained immediate and complete victory. The only troops which held the field against them were commanded by adventurers like Christian of Brunswick and Mansfeld. As they had no regular pay, the soldiers lived by pillaging the countries where they were quartered. Such troops might do infinite damage, but could hardly gain any lasting success. Tilly was more than a match for them even when united. Had the Catholics been content to make a moderate use of their triumph, they might have speedily ended the war. But they were encouraged to adopt an extreme and aggressive policy. In Bohemia, Protestantism was suppressed with such rigour that it never afterwards raised its head. Upper Austria was purged of heresy by similar measures. Still more unpopular was the rigorous vengeance taken on the elector palatine. His hereditary dominions were conquered, the Lower Palatinate by the Spaniards, the Upper by Bavaria. Frederick was forced to live in exile at the Hague, ever busied with futile schemes for the recovery of his territory. Even his electoral dignity was declared forfeited, and in 1623 was transferred to Maximilian. This was of the greatest importance, because the Bavarian vote added to those of the three clerical electors, gave the Catholics a definite majority in the electoral college, hitherto equally divided.

§ 12. These high-handed measures produced an inevitable reaction. It was feared that Ferdinand, with the support of Spain, might now revive Charles V.'s schemes, and restore religious unity in Germany under the absolute rule of the house of Hapsburg. Those princes who had refused to strike a blow for Protestantism were alarmed by the danger to their independence. The Lower Saxon circle showed the greatest uneasiness, but they dared take no decisive steps without external assistance. Germany seemed prostrate at the feet of emperor and League. But this sudden revival of the Austrian power aroused misgivings not only in Germany but also among the neighbouring states. France, the old antagonist of the Hapsburgs, was naturally the first to take alarm. Ever since Henry IV.'s death, the French government, absorbed in petty court intrigues, had done nothing of importance in foreign politics. But pressing danger at last put an end to this inactivity. For the rise of Austria was not only alarming in itself, it also gave new strength and courage to Spain. The two Hapsburg powers had lately obtained a definite geographical connexion by the Spanish occupation of the Valtelline, a pass which gave easy communication between Italy and the Austrian province of Tyrol. Here was a serious danger for France. It was at this moment that Richelieu (1624) became chief minister of Louis XIII. His great object was to depress the Austro-Spanish power, and to raise the French monarchy to its place. He succeeded in breaking off the proposed alliance between England and Spain, and prince Charles was married to the French princess Henrietta Maria instead of the Infanta. Although a Catholic and a cardinal, Richelieu had no hesitation in supporting the Protestant cause in Germany. In this he was only following the lines of policy laid down by Francis I. and Henry II. His first direct interference was in Italy, where

French troops drove the Spaniards from the Valtelline. But this active policy was suddenly checked by the outbreak of a Huguenot revolt in France. Richelieu was compelled to conclude the treaty of Monzon with Spain and to concentrate his attention on the reduction of the Huguenot fortress of La Rochelle. The Valtelline was declared independent, but had to pay an annual tribute to the Grison league, from which it had been conquered by Spain.

Though the allies of France were disconcerted by this sudden desertion, the Protestant cause had undoubtedly received a great impulse. The war had begun to absorb the interest of Europe. It was no longer possible to regard it as an internal affair of Germany. Political as well as religious interests were involved and both of the highest importance. Two princes deeply interested in the course of German events were Christian IV. of Denmark and Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden. Christian, as duke of Holstein, was a member of the Lower Saxon circle, and a prince of the empire. He had obtained for his son the bishopric of Verden and the coadjutorship of Bremen. He was thus directly interested in maintaining the Protestant bishoprics, which were threatened by the Catholic victory. The Swedish king was more ardently Protestant than Christian, and had also secular interests at stake. His chief enemy was Sigismund III. of Poland, who by strict hereditary right could claim the Swedish crown, and who relied for assistance on his brother-in-law Ferdinand II. The independence of Sweden, too, would be jeopardised by the establishment of a strong imperial power in northern Germany. Thus both these kings were anxious to head the Protestant opposition to the Hapsburgs, but internal jealousies prevented their acting together. The decision as to which should undertake the task rested with the English king. He decided in favour of Christian, whose plans were the more sanguine and demanded less money. In 1626 the Danish king was acknowledged head of the Lower Saxon circle, and prepared with the aid of English men and money to interfere in Germany. Gustavus had to content himself with the war in Poland, which was indirectly of assistance to the Protestant cause.

§ 13. Besides the Danish king, the emperor had to make head against Mansfeld and Christian of Brunswick, who still held the field, and also Bethlen Gabor, who threatened an attack from the east. To these numerous enemies he could only oppose one army, that of the League commanded by Tilly. The imperial treasury was empty. At this juncture one of Ferdinand's own subjects came forward with a noteworthy scheme. Albert of Waldstein, or Wallenstein, was the descendant of an old Bohemian noble family. By espousing the royal cause in the Bohemian wars he had obtained distinction and wealth and had been created prince of Friedland. He now offered to raise an army for the emperor's service which was to cost him nothing. It was to be supported, not by disorderly pillage like the soldiers of Mansfeld, but by forced contributions. Regardless of the fact that such measures were of doubtful legality, Ferdinand accepted the offer. The new army was speedily formed, and advanced to support Tilly. Mansfeld was defeated at the bridge of Dessau, and retreated into Hungary to join Bethlen Gabor. While Wallenstein pursued him, Tilly routed the forces of Christian IV. at Lutter (August, 1626). In the east Wallenstein was completely successful. Mansfeld had to retire to Venetian territory, where he died. Christian of Brunswick was already dead. A treaty with the Turks (1627), who were occupied with a Persian war, put an end to further danger from Bethlen Gabor. Wallenstein was now free to turn his attention to German affairs. He defeated the Danes at Cosel, and drove them from Silesia. Following the enemy northwards, he occupied Mecklenburg, and then attacked the Danish territories. Holstein, Schleswig, and Jutland were overrun, and it was only the want of a fleet that prevented the complete conquest of Denmark. Foreign relations at the same time were favourable to the emperor. France and England had quarrelled, and Buckingham led a fleet to the assistance of La Rochelle (1627). And Charles I.'s disputes with his parliament rendered him unable to send the stipulated supplies to Christian, without which his army could not be paid.

The victory of the Catholic cause was as complete in northern Germany in 1627 as it had been in Bohemia and the Palatinate in 1623. But circumstances had completely changed between the two years. The earlier victory had been won by the Catholic League, and the emperor had to carry out their wishes. But in the second, or Danish period of the war, the emperor had an army of his own which had gained the greatest successes. It was not Tilly but Wallenstein who had saved the eastern provinces and had driven the Danes from the north. And with Wallenstein politics rather than religion were the guiding motive. Protestants were admitted to his army and even to high command. Under his influence the most magnificent schemes were entertained at Vienna for the revival of the imperial supremacy over all hostile interests. But these were to the full as distasteful to the Catholics as to the Protestants. The ideas of princely independence, always strong in Germany, and never more so than at the present moment, set themselves in direct opposition to Ferdinand and his general. The ill-feeling against Wallenstein was increased by the fact that he sought his own aggrandisement as well as that of the imperial authority

After the conquest of Silesia, he had received the principality of Sagan, and afterwards he obtained from Ferdinand the investiture of Mecklenburg. This arbitrary interference with German territory, and the rise to equal rank with themselves of a Bohemian adventurer, aroused the greatest disaffection among the princes. The forced contributions for the imperial troops, and their oppressive conduct, were another great grievance. The Catholic electors combined to demand Wallenstein's dismissal. But Ferdinand and his minister Eggenberg were in complete accord with the schemes of their general, and the attack on him failed. This set him free to continue his policy in Germany.

His great object now was to revive the German maritime power in the northern seas, and thus to complete the humiliation of the Scandinavian kingdoms. In this he relied on the Hanseatic League, which still existed, though the new commercial routes had cut off most of its trade. Already the Spaniards, anxious to deprive the Dutch of their commerce, had sent envoys to the Hansa proposing a commercial alliance on very advantageous terms. But the merchants refused to advance their interests at the expense of Protestantism. Wallenstein relied upon force instead of diplomacy, and determined to make himself master of the southern Baltic coast. His troops occupied Wismar and laid siege to Stralsund (1628), where the inhabitants offered a heroic resistance. The siege was of vast importance. Had the town fallen, Germany would have been completely at the emperor's feet. Sweden and Denmark would have been excluded from further interference. Wallenstein strained every nerve to take Stralsund, but was foiled by the want of a fleet, which left the sea open to his enemies. In the face of the danger of imperial supremacy on the Baltic, Gustavus Adolphus gave up his old rivalry with Denmark and sent assistance to the besieged. Wallenstein sent to beg troops from Tilly, who referred the matter to his employers, the princes of the Catholic League. They were unwilling even to ensure the fall of Protestantism if they thereby endangered their own liberties, and the request was refused. After six months Wallenstein was compelled to raise the siege and thus experienced his first reverse. This encouraged Christian IV. to attempt another landing in Germany. But Wallenstein was still too strong in the open field, and forced him to conclude the treaty of Lübeck (1629). By this he received back his conquered territories, but in return gave up all claims to his son's bishoprics and promised to abstain from further interference in German affairs.

§ 14. During the years 1627–9 the House of Hapsburg seemed to be as powerful in Europe as it had been even under Charles V. The division into two branches had weakened it for a time, but now the Austrian and Spanish lines were in the closest union. Philip IV. and his minister, Olivares, were Ferdinand II.'s most ardent supporters. In Germany the emperor seemed supreme, and an opportunity now occurred of reviving his rule in Italy. The death of Vincenzo Gonzaga, the duke of Mantua, in 1627, left as the next heir a Frenchman, the duke of Nevers. But both Spain and Austria dreaded the establishment of French influence in Italy. Mantua was declared to be an escheated imperial fief, and was occupied by Spanish troops. But again, as in 1623, the rise of the Hapsburg power excited the greatest opposition in Europe. The lesser Italian states appealed to France; and Richelieu, as soon as he had crushed the Huguenots by the capture of La Rochelle (1628), led troops into Italy which forced the Spaniards to raise the siege of Casale (1629). In the next year, 1630, imperialist troops joined the Spaniards in Mantua. But Richelieu again crossed the Alps, made himself master of Piedmont, and again raised the siege of Casale, though he was not strong enough to take Mantua. He now determined to make a diversion on the side of Germany by calling in Gustavus Adolphus. He negotiated a peace between Sweden and Poland, and thus set the king's hands free.

At the same time hostility to the emperor appeared in Germany itself. The imperial supremacy was based on the army raised by Wallenstein, and this army and its leader were the objects of bitter hatred to all German princes. The four Catholic electors, with Maximilian of Bavaria at their head, renewed their demand for Wallenstein's dismissal. At the same time they wished to utilise the victory which he had won for the advantage of their religion. They induced Ferdinand to issue the Edict of Restitution (March 6, 1629), by which all ecclesiastical property that had been secularised since the peace of Passau was to be restored to the Catholic church. The measure was entirely opposed to the policy of Wallenstein, who wished to subordinate all religious questions to his grand object, the establishment of imperial supremacy. It roused the bitterest discontent among the Protestants, even those who had hitherto been neutral, and thus gave great advantages to the Swedish king.

It was obvious that for once the interests of the Austro-Spanish house and those of Catholicism were at variance. The electors were ready to throw themselves on the side of France rather than submit to any diminution of their territorial independence. This offered a great opening for Richelieu's intrigues. While on the one hand he was urging Gustavus Adolphus to espouse the Protestant cause, on the other he was encouraging the extreme Catholics in their opposition to the emperor. His right-hand man, the Capuchin Father Joseph, played an important part in the meeting at Ratisbon in 1630, where the attack on Wallenstein was vigorously renewed.

Ferdinand, who hoped by conciliating the princes to procure his son's election as King of the Romans, at last gave way, and the great general went into temporary retirement. The command of his army was transferred to Tilly. Thus at the very moment of its greatest triumph, the imperial authority was once more overshadowed by the power of the League, from which it had attempted to free itself.

§ 15. At this all-important conjuncture Gustavus Adolphus landed at Usedom without opposition. He forced the aged duke of Pomerania to make an alliance with him, and made himself master of the southern Baltic coast. Tilly failed in an attempt to oppose his progress and was compelled to retire to the Elbe. The only great obstacle in Gustavus' way was the extreme unwillingness of the German princes to join him. A few of the lesser princes, who had more to gain than to lose appeared in his camp, prominent among whom was Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar, a representative of the Ernestine line of Saxony. But the great Lutheran leaders, John George of Saxony and George William of Brandenburg, the latter of whom was the Swedish king's brother-in-law, adhered obstinately to their feeble and ruinous neutrality. They summoned a Protestant conference at Leipzig, where they demanded once more the withdrawal of the Edict of Restitution. But they took no steps to enforce their demand, which was unhesitatingly refused. The persecution of the Protestants was continued. Magdeburg, which had refused to accept the edict, was vigorously besieged. To strengthen his forces Ferdinand concluded the treaty of Cherasco (1631) with France, by which the duke of Nevers obtained Mantua, and the imperial troops were enabled to quit Italy. Gustavus Adolphus was above all things anxious to advance to the relief of Magdeburg. But he dared not stir southwards till he had gained over Saxony and Brandenburg, and they rejected all his offers. Tilly stormed the devoted town, and it was sacked with a cruelty which stands out even among the atrocities of the Thirty Years' War. Thus the Catholics gained a new victory, but it was their last. Gustavus advanced to Berlin, and the Swedish troops and cannon forced his vacillating brother-in-law into an alliance, as security for which two important fortresses were ceded. But John George of Saxony was harder to deal with, and Gustavus might have been foiled but for the imprudent conduct of the emperor himself. Tilly received orders to invade Saxony and to force the elector to disarm his troops. This ungrateful treatment was too much for the most peace-loving prince. John George threw himself into the arms of the Swedes and concluded an offensive and defensive alliance with them. A combined army marched to attack Tilly and met him in the great battle of Breitenfeld. The untrained Saxons were put to flight, but the Swedes held their ground and completely routed the imperial troops.

The defeat undid at one blow all that the Catholics had hitherto gained. The enforcement of the Edict of Restitution in northern Germany became impossible. And Gustavus did not remain content with this success. The Saxon army was sent into Bohemia, where it occupied Prague without opposition, but did nothing further. The king himself undertook a marvellous march against the ecclesiastical principalities of south-western Germany. Passing through Thuringia he reached the Main and the Rhine. One after another Würzburg, Bamberg, even Mainz fell into his hands. Everywhere the Catholics fled before him, and the work of the Counter-Reformation was undone. The exiled elector Palatine joined him and might have recovered his territories, but that his bigotry forbade him to promise the least toleration to the Catholics. It was in vain that French diplomacy, astounded and dismayed at the Swedish successes, sought to make peace between them and the League, so as to direct all hostility against the house of Hapsburg. Gustavus Adolphus refused to become the tool of Richelieu. Early in 1632 he turned eastwards to attack Bavaria, the head-quarters of Catholicism. Nuremberg welcomed him with effusive demonstrations. Tilly, who had re-formed his army, tried to dispute the passage of the Lech, but was again defeated and himself slain. Gustavus entered Munich, and the whole of Bavaria, except Ingolstadt, lay at his feet.

§ 16. Thus was Ferdinand II. rewarded for his concessions to the Catholics in 1630. For their sake he had sacrificed Wallenstein, and resigned the prospect of imperial absolutism both in Italy and Germany. And now his allies had proved unable to protect either their religion or themselves. Protestantism was triumphant, and the emperor's hereditary territories were only spared by the invincible moderation of the elector of Saxony. In these circumstances it was natural that he should turn again to his old general who had before rendered him such important service. During his enforced retirement Wallenstein had by no means lost sight of politics, though he regarded them with altered views. Stung with the ingratitude shown to him, he had made overtures to the Swedes, and had offered to drive the Hapsburgs into Italy. The news of Breitenfeld filled him with joy. When these schemes failed, he still kept up a close connection with the Saxons, whose commander, Arnim, was his old companion in arms. Now came the imperial offer to restore him to his old command. He accepted on conditions which were to give him both military and political independence, and to secure him from the possibility of another abrupt dismissal. His name alone was sufficient to create an army. But Wallenstein entered upon his second command with a very different policy to that which had guided him before. He was no longer the devoted champion of imperial supremacy. He was determined not to become the tool of the League or of the Catholic party at Vienna. He would have nothing to do with the Catholic reaction. Through his connexion with Saxony he hoped to establish a religious compromise, if necessary by force; he would exclude all foreigners, Swedes, Frenchmen, even Spaniards, from interference in Germany: and lastly, he would found a great principality for himself. Wallenstein is no longer an Austrian general but an independent potentate. His first act was to drive the Saxons from Bohemia, and he endeavoured to force a peace on the elector. But John George had some honourable feeling, and refused to break his promise to the Swedes.

The news of Wallenstein's movements reached Gustavus Adolphus as he was trying by organisation to secure some permanent result of his successes. For himself he wished to obtain Pomerania, which would give him absolute control of the Baltic, and a position of a prince of the empire. In this latter capacity he wished to place himself at the head of a new Protestant union, a *corpus evangelicorum*, which was to have an internal constitution, and which might defend itself against all attacks. It is possible that he looked forward to a time when a Protestant majority of the electors might place the imperial crown on his own head. But in all his schemes he had to contend with the political incapacity of the Germans, and their incurable jealousy of himself as a foreigner. Saxony was especially reluctant to submit to Swedish headship. And now Gustavus had to stand on the defensive, for Wallenstein had marched from Bohemia against Nuremberg. The king threw himself into the town, and held out till the arrival of reinforcements made him strong enough to meet the enemy. But Wallenstein refused a battle, and an attack on his strong intrenchments was repulsed with loss. For once Gustavus had to retreat unsuccessful. Instead of pursuing him, Wallenstein broke up his camp and invaded Saxony, hoping to compel the elector to desert the Swedes. Gustavus had to give up the plan of a direct march on Vienna, and advanced to assist his ally. At Lützen the two great generals were again face to face. An obstinate battle ended in favour of the Swedes, but Gustavus fell a victim to his personal rashness, and his loss was far more disastrous than a defeat could have been.

The death of Gustavus Adolphus was fatal to the last chance of forming a Protestant union in Germany. If Saxony had objected to the Swedish king, it was not likely to submit to the influence of the chancellor Oxenstiern, who undertook the management of affairs during the minority of queen Christina. All he could do was to form the League of Heilbronn among the south German states, the nearest approach that was ever made to the projected *corpus evangelicorum.* The great object of Swedish diplomacy was to induce the north-German states to join the League, but it proved impossible. And the death of the king was a terrible disaster from a military, as well as from a political point of view. Numerous able leaders had been trained under his eye, notably, Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar, Horn, Baner, Torstenson, and others. But the requisite unity was gone; and what was worse, the old discipline could no longer be maintained. The Swedes, hitherto remarkable for their temperate conduct, were henceforth as great a scourge to Germany as had been the troops of Mansfeld or Tilly.

In spite of all this, the imperialist cause did not reap any immediate advantage from Gustavus' death. The alliance between France and Sweden was renewed, and French influence was gradually extending itself, though Richelieu had not yet declared war against either Austria or Spain. The elector of Trier had admitted a French garrison into Ehrenbreitstein, which commanded the Rhine and Moselle. The duke of Lorraine, a partisan of Spain, had been driven from his territories, whence the French obviously threatened Alsace. Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar maintained the Swedish preponderance in Franconia and Bavaria, and before end of 1633 took Ratisbon. His object was to restore the Ernestine line to its old dignity, and he demanded and obtained from Oxenstiern the grant of the bishoprics of Bamberg and Würzburg, which were to be made into the duchy of Franconia. The assumption by a Swedish noble of the right to dispose of German territories, increased the alienation of Saxony, Brandenburg, and other states.

§ 17. Meanwhile all eyes were fixed on Wallenstein; who, after Lützen, had retired to Bohemia, where he occupied a strong defensive position, and could advance at will either to the north or south. He was still pursuing his favourite scheme, to come to terms with Saxony as the basis of a general peace. He was prepared to revoke the Edict of Restitution altogether. At one time a treaty was on the verge of conclusion, but it was doubtful how far Wallenstein could insist on his policy at Vienna. Thus disappointed, he took the offensive, drove the Swedes from Silesia, and threatened Saxony and Brandenburg. But the fall of Ratisbon checked his advance, and he returned to Bohemia, refusing to assist the elector of Bavaria, towards whom he felt no good will. His conduct, and especially his policy of peace and religious compromise, had aroused the greatest antipathy among the Catholic powers. A strong party was formed against at him at Vienna, headed by the emperor's confessor. The Spanish influence, which had once supported him, was now hostile. He had proposed to obtain the Palatinate for himself, but the Spaniards were afraid of a strong power in that neighbourhood. And he had shown himself resolutely hostile to all attempts of Spain to secure a territorial connexion between Italy and the Netherlands. All the hostile influences combined to sow discord between the emperor and his general. Ferdinand was naturally jealous of the independent attitude of Wallenstein, and was induced to believe that he aimed at the Bohemian crown. It was determined to get rid of so inconvenient a servant. Many of Wallenstein's chief officers were induced to desert him. It was in vain that he did all in his power to secure the allegiance of his army. The officers signed all kinds of promises, but reserved their fealty to the emperor. In an unlucky moment Wallenstein moved from Pilsen, where the garrison were devoted to him, to Eger. There his two chief supporters were killed at a banquet by Scotch and Irish mercenaries, and the murderers completed their work by assassinating Wallenstein in his bedroom. Thus perished a leader whose character will always be variously interpreted, but who ranks with Richelieu and Gustavus Adolphus as one of the great men of the age.

The House of Hapsburg reaped undeserved advantages from Wallenstein's death. His army passed under the command of the emperor's son, Ferdinand, king of Hungary. It was joined by the Spanish troops from Italy, which Wallenstein had tried to exclude. Thus strengthened it advanced to the relief of Bavaria, where the troops of the Heilbronn League were wholly inferior. At Nordlingen, Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar induced his cautious colleague Horn to risk a battle, in which they were wholly routed and Horn taken prisoner (September, 1634). Nordlingen did for the Catholics of the south what Breitenfeld had done for the Protestants of the north. The work of Gustavus was undone, and almost the whole of Southern Germany fell into the hands of the imperialists.

The first great result of the battle of Nordlingen was to throw the defeated Protestants into the arms of France. Richelieu's object was at last obtained, and French influence tends to supplant that of Sweden. Oxenstiern was forced to cede the fortresses of Elsass to France, and thus to commence that dismemberment of the empire, which Gustavus had hoped to avoid. War between France and Spain was declared in 1635. Another great result of the battle was the treaty of Prague. John George of Saxony was more than ever averse to the war. If he had been jealous of the Swedes, he was far more so of the French. The negotiations which Wallenstein's death had interrupted, were resumed. Ferdinand had learnt some wisdom from adversity, and was willing to give up in fact, though not in word, the Edict of Restitution. The year 1627 was to replace 1552. All bishoprics held by Protestants at that date were to remain in their hands. The Calvinists were excluded from the treaty, which could not therefore be permanently satisfactory. Such as it was, however, it was accepted by most of the Protestant states, and the great conflict might have ended in 1635, but for the foreign interests that had become involved in it.

§ 18. Henceforth the war ceases to be German; and becomes a mere struggle of French and Swedes against Austria and Spain which is fought out on German soil. No regard for German interests is displayed by any of the combatants after the death of Gustavus Adolphus. The Swedes fight for compensation in the shape of Pomerania, the French for the Rhine frontier. As soon as the empire can be forced to gratify these claims, the war may come to an end. There is henceforth a double military centre; in the north the Swedes fight against Saxony and occasionally invade the Austrian territories under the successive command of Baner, Torstenson and Wrangel, all leaders of eminent ability. In the south-west Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar enters into the service of France, and carries on a stubborn contest with Austrians and Spaniards for Elsass and the Rhine country. At first the imperialists had the upper hand, and the expulsion of the foreigners from Germany seemed imminent. The Swedes were gradually driven back towards the Baltic and in 1636 Oxenstiern retired to Sweden. In the south the French were equally unsuccessful. Not only were they driven back from the Rhine, and their ally the elector of Trier taken prisoner, but the enemy even entered France and threatened Paris. But now, as under Francis I., the defensive strength of France showed itself invincible, and the invaders retired. In October, 1636, Baner recovered some of the lost ground for Sweden by a victory at Wittstock.

At the beginning of the next year, Ferdinand II. died. On him more than on any other individual, rests the responsibility for a war which was perhaps in some form or other inevitable. He was succeeded both in the empire and in his hereditary territories by his son Ferdinand III., a prince of far less capacity than his father. In the campaign of this year all parties seemed exhausted by their previous efforts. But in 1638 Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar by a sudden attack seized the chief fortresses of Elsass, and thus obtained a firm stronghold for the enemies of the house of Hapsburg. Richelieu wished to treat the conquered land as a French province, but Bernhard, with some lingering regard for the unity of the empire, refused to consent to its dismemberment. His plan was to make Elsass into a duchy for himself, and having thus established an independent position, to resume the policy of Wallenstein, and force a peace on the combatants. But his sudden death in 1639 put an end to his schemes and gave the greatest advantages to France. Bernhard's army and with it Elsass passed into French hands.

Meanwhile Baner in the north had invaded Bohemia without any permanent success. In 1640, his forces, combined with the French, made a bold attack in winter on Ratisbon, where the emperor was holding a diet. The town was saved by the flood caused by a sudden thaw, and Baner was forced to retreat to Saxony. In 1641 he died, and the command passed to Torstenson. He concluded a truce with Brandenburg, where the new elector Frederick William gave up that policy of dependence on the Hapsburgs which his father had pursued in conjunction with Saxony, This treaty secured the position of the Swedes in northern Germany.

The death of Richelieu in December, 1642, followed by that of his master Louis XIII., made no change in the policy of France, which was now directed by the cardinal's pupil, Mazarin. Hitherto the French troops had done nothing but hold their own, but they had gradually become inured to war and were now to acquire fame under worthy commanders. The brilliant Condé, devoid of the higher qualities of a general and prodigal of his soldiers' lives, had a genius for fighting battles. Turenne, a far greater strategist, was able to supply the defects of his more dashing rival. In 1643 Condé won the first of a series of victories over the Spaniards at Rocroy, and took Thionville. In the next year a three days' battle at Freiburg ended in the retreat of the imperialists. A second battle of Nordlingen in 1645 cost an enormous number of lives, and was only converted into a French victory by the death of the hostile commander, Mercy. In the same year Torstenson had invaded Bohemia and had won a great victory at Jankow. Thence he advanced against Vienna, but was compelled to retreat, and soon after resigned the command to Wrangel.

§ 19. It was evident that no great advantage was to be gained from the continuance of a war of which all parties were weary. Already in

1643 the diplomatists had met in Westphalia to negotiate a peace. At Osnabrück the emperor treated with Sweden and the Protestant states, at Münster with France and the Catholics. The great difficulty was the emperor's disinclination to dismember the Hapsburg territories by the cession of Alsace. Maximilian of Bavaria, who cared little for Hapsburg interests, was more desirous of inducing France to consent to his retention of the Upper Palatinate. In these circumstances it was determined by a vigorous movement to detach Bavaria from the imperial allliance. Saxony had already made a truce with the Swedes, and in 1646 Turenne, by a brilliant manœuvre, passed the hostile army, joined Wrangel, and deliberately laid waste the Bavarian territory. Maximilian had to conclude a truce, which was no sooner made than broken. But the enemy was upon him again, and he was completeiy defeated at Zusmarshausen (May, 1648). Ferdinand III., unable to carry on the war by himself, was compelled at last to come to terms. The various treaties were arranged at Osnabrück and Münster, but are usually and conveniently classed together as the peace of Westphalia.

The religious settlement effected by the treaty followed the lines laid down at Passau and Augsburg. The one important difference was that Calvinism at last obtained formal recognition. The great question as to church property was arranged by the selection of a fresh date, 1624. Benefices were to remain in the hands of members of that creed to which they belonged in that year. This secured to the Protestants greater advantages than the treaty of Prague had done. To secure an impartial administration of justice the Imperial Chamber was to be composed of Protestants and Catholics in equal numbers. The territorial changes sanctioned by the treaty were of considerable importance. Sweden obtained the bishoprics of Bremen and Verden and the greater part of Pomerania, and thus secured that command of the Baltic which had been so great an object of Gustavus Adolphus. The rest of Pomerania went to Brandenburg, which had legal claims on the whole. In compensation for these claims the elector received the bishoprics of Magdeburg, Halberstadt and Minden. Maximilian of Bavaria retained the Upper Palatinate and his electoral dignity. The Lower Palatinate was restored to Charles Lewis, son of the deposed Frederick V., for whom an eighth electorate was created. France obtained the legal cession of Metz, Toul and Verdun, which had been seized in 1552 by Henry II., and also retained Austrian Elsass, with the exception of Strasburg and the immediate vassals of the empire. Switzerland was declared formally separated from the empire. Between France and Spain it was found impossible to arrange terms, and the war was continued till 1658.

The war between Spain and the United Provinces, which had been going on since the expiration of the twelve years' truce, was also concluded by the treaty of Westphalia. On the death of the Archduke Albert in 1621, the southern provinces had returned to direct subjection to Spain. The command of the Spanish troops was entrusted to Spinola, but he found himself confronted by equal antagonists in Maurice and Frederick Henry, the latter of whom succeeded his half-brother as stadtholder in 1625. After the recall of Spinola in 1629, the Dutch had matters all their own way. While their army carried the war into the southern provinces, their fleet inflicted the most damaging blows to Spanish trade, and among other achievements, reduced the Portuguese colony of Brazil. When it became apparent that Austria could no longer support the war, Spain recognised the necessity of making peace with Holland. The seven provinces were formally recognised as an independent state; their territory was increased by the cession of North Brabant and part of Limburg; they were allowed to retain all their colonial conquests; and their trade was secured against the rivalry of Antwerp by the closing of the Scheldt. Frederick Henry had died in 1647. His son and successor, William II., who had married a daughter of Charles I., revived the old scheme of obtaining sovereign power, in the hope of assisting the Stuarts in England. But his ambition involved him in a quarrel with the burgher aristocracy, and especially with the powerful city of Amsterdam, which was only ended by his sudden death in 1650. His only son, the future William III., was born a week afterwards. The office of captain-general and admiral was suspended, and the stadtholdership was left vacant in most of the provinces. The Orange party, without a head and hopelessly divided, was powerless to resist the establishment of a purely republican government, which lasted till 1672.

The great result of the Thirty Years' War, and of the religious differences from which it had arisen, was the complete annihilation of German unity. The name of the Empire was retained, but it had no longer any practical reality. Ferdinand II. had identified the imperial authority with the suppression of Protestantism. Protestantism survived the danger, and the result was the destruction of the authority which had menaced it. Germany became a loose federation in which the territorial princes were all-powerful. The right to determine the religion of their subjects, which had been admitted in the peace of Augsburg, was confirmed in that of Westphalia. The imperial diet continued its meetings, but it became a congress of plenipotentiaries. One great blessing the peace brought with it, the absolute termination of those religious quarrels which had produced such havoc and misery, and which were ended less by agreement than by exhaustion.

CHAPTER XI.

FRANCE UNDER RICHELIEU AND MAZARIN.

§ 1. Regency of Mary de Medici; change of foreign policy; Concini; revolts of the nobles; States-General of 1614; fall of Concini and end of the regency. § 2. Huguenot revolts; death of Luynes; peace of Montpellier. § 3. Richelieu becomes minister; second revolt of the Huguenots; its suppression; conspiracy against Richelieu; domestic reforms. § 4. Huguenots again revolt; siege of La Rochelle. § 5. Opposition to Richelieu; the day of Dupes; exile of Mary de Medici and Gaston of Orleans. § 6. Rising in Languedoc; execution of Montmorency; Richelieu triumphs over his domestic enemies. § 7. Conspiracy of Cinq-Mars; death of Richelieu; character of his administration; his foreign policy. § 8. Mazarin becomes minister; death of Louis XIII.; regency of Anne of Austria; the *Importants.* § 9. Financial distress; the Parliament of Paris; opposition to the government. § 10. Arrest of Broussel; outbreak of the Fronde; attitude of the nobles; peace of Rueil. § 11. The second Fronde; victory of Mazarin; junction of the old and new Frondes; Condé's triumph; Turenne gained over by the Regent; civil war; collapse of the Fronde. § 12. War with Spain; France gains the alliance of Cromwell; treaty of the Pyrenees. § 13. Death of Mazarin; his will.

§ 1. On the death of Henry IV. (1610), France fell for fourteen years under the most worthless government that even that country had ever endured. As Louis XIII. was a minor, the regency was claimed by his mother, Mary de Medici, and her claim was sanctioned by the Parliament of Paris. She at once reversed her husband's policy, deserted the Protestant allies of France, and concluded a close alliance with Spain. Louis XIII. was betrothed to Philip III.'s daughter, Anne of Austria. The favour of the queen raised to power a native of her own Tuscany, Concini, who became marquis d'Ancre, and a marshal of France. Sully was driven into retirement. Concini's rule excited the natural enmity of the great nobles, who had been kept down by the strong hand of Henry IV., but who hoped on his death to recover their independent power. They found a leader in the Prince of Condé, the king's cousin, who, as the nearest prince of the blood royal, considered that he had a just claim to the regency. A series of revolts ensued, all equally unimportant, because they involved no political principle. The objects of the nobles were purely selfish, and they could always be bought off with pensions, places and titles. As in the old war of the Public Weal, they put forth a flimsy claim to be the champions of popular privileges, and demanded the summons of the States-General. They met at Paris in 1614 only to display once more the weakness arising from the jealousies among the three orders. They were dissolved without any result, and no other meeting of the States-General was held till 1789. The factious turbulence of the nobles continued to harass and weaken the government till, in 1617, the king determined to take the reins into his own hands. He ordered Concini's arrest, but the soldiers who executed the order shot him. His wife, the queen-mother's attendant, was accused of sorcery, condemned and executed. This event only transferred the government to the king's favourite, Luynes, who had suggested the attack on the late minister. Disorder was increased by the accession of Mary de Medici to the party of opposition.

§ 2. The one notable point in the selfish policy of the nobles had been their efforts, more successful than they deserved, to arouse the discontent of the Huguenots. The Edict of Nantes had secured to them not only religious toleration but also a large amount of political independence. They formed an inner state within the state. This was a real danger to the unity of France, and was certain to give rise to future evils. In 1620 the re-establishment of Catholicism in Béarn by the royal authority, together with the contemporary events in Germany, aroused the greatest apprehension among the Huguenots, and led France into a new religious war. A great assembly at La Rochelle determined to resort to arms. A central organisation was formed and the Protestant districts were divided into circles under regular officers. The example of the Dutch had evidently great influence over their fellow Calvinists in France. The king confirmed the Edict of Nantes in order to reassure the moderate Huguenots, and then prepared to put down the revolt. Luynes undertook the reduction of Montauban, but was repulsed, and died soon afterwards of fever (December, 1621). But the central government was too strong for the rebels, and in 1623 they were compelled to accept the treaty of Montpellier. By this the Edict of Nantes was confirmed, but all political meetings were prohibited, and only two towns of security were left, La Rochelle and Montauban.

§ 3. The death of Luynes restored some of her former power to the queen-mother, and her influence brought into the ministry a man who was destined to alter the whole character of the reign. Armand

Duplessis de Richelieu, a member of an old family of Poitou, was born at Paris in 1585, he was made bishop of Luçon at an early age, and in the States-General of 1614 he appeared as an orator of the clergy; in 1623 he received the cardinal's hat. Formerly a supporter of Concini, he now assumed an independent position, and from 1624 he may be regarded as the real ruler of France. During a ministry of eighteen years he had to contend with great difficulties, the open opposition of the great nobles, his own ill-health, and the feeble vacillation of the king. But he triumphed over all, and must be regarded as the greatest, though not the noblest, statesman France has ever produced. The objects of his policy were simple and comprehensive; within France, the establishment of national union by the suppression of the factious nobles and of the political independence of the Huguenots; without France, the annihilation of the supremacy claimed by the Austro-Spanish power. His foreign policy, which was eminently successful, has been sufficiently considered in connexion with the Thirty Years' War. It remains only to speak of his internal administration, which was of no less importance and success, but the merits of which are more open to question.

While Richelieu's attention was absorbed in Italian affairs and the question of the Valtelline, a second revolt of the Huguenots broke out in 1625 under Soubise and Rohan. Its cause was the alarm aroused in La Rochelle by the erection of a royal fort in the neighbourhood. The war was mainly a naval one, and the defeat of the Huguenot fleet was followed by a treaty which renewed that of Montpellier. But the revolt convinced the cardinal of the necessity of establishing perfect unity at home before embarking in extensive foreign projects. Deserting his allies, therefore, he concluded the treaty of Monzon and threw himself at once into domestic affairs. A series of edicts in 1626 prohibited duelling, ordered the demolition of all fortresses which were not on the frontiers, and attacked the worst abuses that had sprung up under the government of grasping courtiers. These measures excited great discontent and gave rise to the first of a series of court intrigues against Richelieu. The intriguers found a useful instrument in the king's brother, Gaston of Anjou, a weak and dissolute prince. He was induced by the count of Chalais, a young royal favourite, to refuse a marriage with Mademoiselle de Montpensier, which the cardinal proposed. The duke of Vendome and his brother, two natural sons of Henry IV., a number of lords and ladies, and even the queen Anne of Austria, were concerned in a plot to depose Louis XIII., to give the crown to his brother and to assassinate Richelieu. But the cardinal's vigilance detected the plot, and his vengeance was unsparing. Chalais was arrested, tried and executed.

The duke of Vendome with a crowd of nobles was sent into exile. Gaston, who made a full confession, was left unpunished, but had to marry Mademoiselle de Montpensier and was made duke of Orleans. Even the young queen was severely reprimanded, and was henceforth regarded by her husband with jealousy and suspicion. Having thus crushed sedition for a time, Richelieu summoned an assembly of notables, before which he developed his plans for administrative reform. The expenditure amounted to thirty-six millions, and the revenue only to sixteen. This was to be remedied by the recovery of domain-right, the reduction of the royal household, and the abolition of the old offices of constable and admiral. Steps were to be taken for the raising of a navy, and protective measures adopted for the development of French commerce. This assembly is important as showing that Richelieu had really some consideration for the popular welfare, and that in more fortunate times he might have obtained fame as a reformer. But the constant succession of wars and conspiracies absorbed his attention, and increased the expenditure. Most of his schemes were left to be carried out by his successors.

§ 4. In 1627 the alliance between England and France was broken off by a dispute about Henrietta Maria's marriage treaty, and, as rumour declared, by Buckingham's passion for Anne of Austria. The prospect of English assistance aroused a new revolt in La Rochelle, and the restless Rohan again took up arms in Languedoc. This danger called forth all the cardinal's energies. The English fleet, which had been led by Buckingham against the island of Rhé, was repulsed, and Richelieu determined to crush Huguenot disaffection once for all by the reduction of La Rochelle. The great difficulty in the way of a blockade was that the besieged commanded the approach by sea. To put an end to this Richelieu determined to build a huge mole across the mouth of the harbour. All attempts to interrupt or destroy the work were foiled. At last the town, after a heroic resistance, was starved into submission (28 October, 1628), and received fairly favourable terms, though its walls and fortifications were demolished. Thus a great step was made towards centralisation. No other French city ventured to oppose the monarchy until the Revolution. The assassination of Buckingham by Felton removed the chief obstacle to peace with England, which was concluded in 1629. Richelieu was now free to turn to Languedoc, where the rising was put down and a treaty concluded at Alais. The Huguenots retained their religious liberty and their rights as citizens, but they lost that political independence which was dangerous to the unity of the kingdom. Their towns of security were taken away, and they became ordinary subjects of the crown. It is evident that Richelieu, though a cardinal, was imbued with none of the fanaticism of the Catholic reaction. He was anxious to conciliate the Huguenots after rendering them harmless, and he had no desire to drive them to despair.

§ 5. The anti-Spanish policy which Richelieu so conspicuously manifested in 1629 in the affair of the Mantuan succession, aroused against him a more formidable enemy than he had yet encountered. This was the queen-mother, Mary de Medici. She regarded the cardinal as her own creature, and was astounded and enraged when he acquired an independent influence over the king which threatened to exclude her from all control over the government. She therefore allied herself with the opposition party and determined to overthrow the minister. His place was to be taken by the two Marillacs, one of whom held the seals and the other was a marshal with the army now in Italy. By coarse violence she triumphed over her son's weakness and induced him to sign an order entrusting supreme authority to Marshal Marillac and removing the other commanders who were Richelieu's friends. All Paris exulted in the minister's fall, and the political world crowded to Mary's reception at the Luxemburg, Even Richelieu himself believed for a moment that all was lost. But the queen-mother, with fatal confidence, had allowed Louis XIII. to escape from her presence to Versailles. There Richelieu visited him and at once recovered his old influence. The next day a new order was sent to Italy for Marillac's arrest. The Parisians, astonished at this sudden reversal of anticipations, called it "the day of Dupes." Mary de Medici saw all her schemes ruined and became more and more embittered against the author of her humiliation. The cardinal spared no pains to gain over Gaston of Orleans, the worthless heir to the throne. But the mother's influence prevailed over her younger and favourite son. He renounced all friendship towards the cardinal and retired to Orleans. Richelieu now determined by a skilful manœuvre to rid himself of so constant a source of danger as the queen-mother's presence in Paris. The court was suddenly removed to Compiègne. Mary, mindful of her recent error, at once followed her son. But Louis and Richelieu rode back to Paris, whence the former wrote to his mother forbidding her return and offering her the government of Anjou. This great success being gained, steps were taken to reduce Orleans. Gaston had no means of resistance, and fled to Charles III. of Lorraine, who was the ally of Spain against France, and whose sister he secretly married. Soon afterwards Mary de Medici, who had refused the proffered governorship, escaped across the frontier to Brussels, where she was welcomed by the Spaniards. At the same time the duke of Guise, governor of Provence, who had been involved in the opposition to Richelieu, found it prudent to retire from France, and ultimately died in exile in 1640.

§ 6. Although the flight of his enemies was a great triumph for Richelieu he was still by no means secure. The House of Hapsburg was profoundly interested in the plots for his destruction. Spanish influence had been at the bottom of the recent intrigues, and now the exiles relied upon Spanish money and troops to effect their return. There was no patriotism in either Mary de Medici or Gaston. But for the bold march of Gustavus Adolphus upon the Rhine it is possible that France might have been exposed to a foreign invasion. The Swedish successes were fatal to the hopes of the exiles, but they determined to do what they could with the help of internal discontent. The provinces, and especially the provincial governors, were alienated by Richelieu's policy of centralisation, which threatened their ancient privileges. Of all the provinces Languedoc had enjoyed the greatest independence, and moreover, some of the Huguenot disaffection still survived in its old stronghold. Montmorency, who was now governor of Languedoc, had formerly been a supporter of the cardinal's, but was induced to join in a scheme for his overthrow. He received Gaston of Orleans into the province and headed a rebellion. Richelieu at once despatched a force against him under Schomberg. At the battle of Castelnaudari, Montmorency was wounded by a musket-bullet and taken prisoner. Gaston had to submit, and as usual received favourable terms. The rebellious province was also treated with politic leniency. But Richelieu felt it necessary to make some example of the danger of revolt. At the beginning of the troubles Marshal Marillac had been brought before a special commission on a charge of peculation, condemned and executed. A similar fate befell Montmorency, who was tried by the Parliament of Toulouse and sentenced to death. Strenuous efforts were made to secure a royal pardon, but Richelieu kept the king firm, and the sentence was carried out. The last of a family famous in the history of France perished on the scaffold (October, 1632). Thus Richelieu advanced the French monarchy by a policy at once consistent and ruthless.

Gaston of Orleans, enraged at the death of Montmorency, again retired to Brussels and resumed his connection with Spain. Richelieu, who after the death of Gustavus Adolphus became more deeply involved in European politics, was extremely anxious to deprive the Spaniards of the advantage which they had derived from their hold over the heir of the French throne. The great difficulty was to induce Gaston to return without his mother, whom Richelieu wished to keep as far as possible from court. At last this was accomplished, and the duke of Orleans was reconciled to his brother and the cardinal. His marriage with Margaret of Lorraine was declared null by the Parliament of Paris, and as the pope refused to confirm this, the requisite ecclesiastical authority was obtained from an assembly of Gallican clergy. Richelieu's triumph over his domestic enemies was completed by the birth of a son to Anne of Austria, after twenty-two years of married life. This at once deprived the untrustworthy Gaston of his political importance. About the same time Mary de Medici was forced to leave Flanders, and found refuge with her daughter in England. Richelieu was now all-powerful in France. The great European war in which he was engaged strengthened his control over the feeble mind of Louis XIII. and did much to create a national spirit in the French people. A marvellous system of espionage enabled Richelieu to detect and crush all hostile intrigues.

§ 7. It was not till towards the close of his life that Richelieu's authority was again seriously threatened. In 1641 the count of Soissons, imbued with the old jealousy of the nobles against the minister, collected a number of exiles at the frontier-fortress of Sedan. The royal troops which were despatched against them were routed, but Soissons was killed by a pistol-bullet while heading the pursuit. His followers came to terms and laid down their arms. More formidable was a conspiracy at court. Louis XIII., weaker than ever in his old age, had fallen under the influence of a favourite, Cinq-Mars, whom Richelieu himself had introduced. The empty-headed but ambitious youth conceived the project of supplanting the great minister. He had opened relations with Soissons and was undismayed by the death of his ally. Louis XIII. had never loved the cardinal, whose intellect had so long dominated his own, and who had learnt to lecture his royal pupil with scanty respect. The king lent an ear to the accusations which the favourite showered freely against the presumption and arrogance of the minister. Richelieu was already suffering from the illness which proved mortal, and was unable to follow his master. His overthrow seemed assured, when he fortunately discovered a treasonable intercourse of Cinq-Mars with Spain. Louis had already learnt that he could not do without the servant on whom he had so long relied. He was convinced of the treachery of his favourite, who was arrested with his confidant, de Thou, the son of the historian. Gaston of Orleans, who had been involved in the conspiracy against his old enemy, was induced to betray his comrades when their cause was seen to be hopeless. Richelieu was as implacable as ever in his old age, Cinq-Mars and de Thou were tried and executed. This was the cardinal's last triumph. On 4th December, 1642, he died, at the age of fifty-eight.

Richelieu will live for ever in French history as the creator of absolute power in France, as the founder of that system of government which became an abuse in the hands of his successors and was overthrown by the Revolution. It is not true that he was entirely regardless of the interests of the subject people. It was only the constant pressure of foreign wars and of internal dissensions that prevented his carrying through reforms which would have been of the utmost benefit to France. But it is true that he refused to admit the people to any share in their own government. The States-General he never summoned at all. Provincial liberties were crushed by the appointment of Intendants, the agents of the central power. Judicial institutions were made subservient to the monarchy. The most ancient and powerful of them, the Parliament of Paris, was constantly humiliated by the minister. Constitutional pedants have made these facts the foundation of their gravest charge against Richelieu. But it must be remembered that no statesman, however great, can free himself from the influences of past history. Richelieu worked, as he could hardly have helped doing, on the lines laid down by the greatest of preceding rulers, by Louis XI., Francis I. and Henry IV. The French people in the seventeenth century were incapable of constitutional government, they did not even desire it. A strong central power was needed to create the nation. But for Richelieu neither the glories of Louis XIV. nor the reforms of Colbert would have been possible. One great service he undoubtedly rendered, the reduction to political nullity of a greedy and degenerate noble class, and this has won for him the praise even of revolutionists whom he would have abhorred. The means which he adopted for this end were creditable to his courage if not to his heart. His vengeance was ever directed against the great and powerful; he never condescended to punish their ignorant accomplices. But in pursuit of vengeance he too often transgressed the spirit if not the letter of the law, and he showed a personal animosity which excited natural unpopularity. The execution of Marillac for an offence of which hardly any official was guiltless, remains a stain on his administration. Richelieu himself maintained even on his death-bed that he had no enemies save those of the state. Contemporaries did not believe this, nor will posterity.

Richelieu's services to literature have often been enumerated. He was the founder of the Academy, which has exercised so great an influence over style and thought in France. He may be credited also with the establishment of the Gazette, the first of

French newspapers. In the words of Martin, he "gave birth at once to the two great enemies, whose contest was to fill the modern world, absolutism and the press." But government patronage has never been an unmixed benefit to literature. Corneille, the greatest poet of the age, was no favourite of the cardinal, who set himself to ensure the failure of the "Cid." Descartes, the greatest of French philosophers, found Holland a more favourable soil for independent thought than his native country, and published most of his works at Amsterdam.

It was in foreign politics that Richelieu was most completely successful. He broke the force of the Catholic reaction, and by his alliance with Sweden saved Protestantism in northern Europe. He shattered the power of the Austro-Spanish empire, and paved the way for the aggrandisement of France under Louis XIV. Under different circumstances, and by different means, he did for France what Chatham did for England, and made his country the foremost of European powers. It has been well remarked that Richelieu invariably selected the rising cause in every country with which he was concerned and made it the instrument of his designs. "In England he was on the side of Parliamentary opposition to the crown. In Germany he was on the side of the opposition of the princes against the emperor. In Italy he was on the side of the independence of the states against Spain. In the Peninsula he was on the side of the provinces against the monarchy. There is not the slightest reason to suppose that he cared one atom for these causes except so far as they might promote his own ends. Yet in every case he selected those causes by which the real wants of the several countries were best expressed."[1]

§ 8. Louis XIII. received the news of Richelieu's death without emotion and without regret. But he was nevertheless determined to carry out his policy. He at once called into his council the man who more than any other represented the views of the departed minister, cardinal Mazarin. Mazarin was in personal character a complete contrast to his predecessor. He could boast none of his commanding qualities. Adroit, supple, and without pride, he would fawn and cringe where Richelieu had dictated. His success was due to his great diplomatic talents, and he remained a diplomatist all his life. For domestic government he was unfitted, but in foreign politics and intrigues he was quite at home. In spite of his defects, his unquestionable ability enabled him to retain the reins of power until his death.

The first symptom of a change of government was seen in a relaxation of the recent severity. Most of the political prisoners were set at liberty, and a large number of exiles returned to France. In foreign politics the old system was unhesitatingly continued. But it was doubtful how long it could survive the king, who was already dying. The heir to the throne was not yet five years old, and the only possible claimants to the regency were the queen, Anne of Austria, and the king's brother, Gaston of Orleans. Both had been the life-long enemies of Richelieu, and both had been in constant connexion with Spain. The king determined if possible to tie their hands by an ordinance, which gave the regency to Anne and the lieutenant-generalship to Gaston, but made their authority dependent on a standing council of which Mazarin was the chief member. On 14th May, 1643, Louis XIII. died. He had enjoyed little real power during his life-time, and had naturally less after his death. His ordinance found no defenders, and was promptly cancelled by the Parliament of Paris, which entrusted absolute power to Anne of Austria. Everybody expected from the regent a complete reversal of French policy in favour of her native Spain. Intense was the astonishment when it was announced that Mazarin was to remain chief minister. The subtle Italian had obtained a marvellous influence over the queen, who afterwards was secretly married to him. Still more intense was the disappointment of the young courtiers who formed the queen's court. They had so confidently anticipated a new era, in which they were to govern France, that they received the nickname of the "Importants." In their despair they resorted to conspiracies under the duke of Beaufort, the son of the duke of Vendome. But their plots were soon discovered, and were suppressed with an energy and firmness which showed that the influence of Richelieu's example had survived him. Beaufort was suddenly seized and imprisoned. Vendome and a number of lords and ladies, including the veteran intriguer Madame de Chevreuse, were driven into exile. For the next five years Mazarin and the regent ruled without opposition. They were in close alliance with the prince of Condé, whose son Enghien gave increased strength to the government by his brilliant victories. In 1648 the treaty of Westphalia was concluded, and may be regarded as the triumph of the policy of Richelieu and his successor. France obtained important territories in the direction of the Rhine, and succeeded in severing Austria from its alliance with Spain. With the latter power war still continued.

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[1] Gardiner, 'Thirty Years' War,' p. 199.

§ 9. While success attended French arms and diplomacy abroad, the home government was threatened by formidable disaffection. The chief source of difficulty lay in the wretched financial administration which had prevailed ever since Henry IV.'s death. Sully's reforms had perished with him; Richelieu's short-lived attempt to follow his example had been a failure. Not only had the great European war immensely increased the expenditure, but Mazarin found it necessary to employ large sums of money in bribing possible opponents of his power. Extraordinary measures were resorted to to obtain supplies. But the worst grievance was, that of the money paid by the people a large portion of it never found its way into the coffers of the state. To the bankers who advanced loans were assigned the proceeds of certain taxes as security for principal and interest. These "partisans" as they were called, grew enormously wealthy, while the people were ground down by intolerable exactions.

The task of representing the popular grievances was undertaken by the Parliament of Paris. This institution had its origin in the court of peers created in the 12th century by Philip Augustus. St. Louis was the first to admit lawyers into the court, which he employed to restrict the judicial independence of feudalism. Under Philip the Fair, the lawyers rendered the greatest services to the monarchy, and from this time the nobles tended to disappear from the parliament altogether, which becomes purely an assembly of lawyers. It was not the only parliament in France, because a number of similar courts were created by successive kings in the provinces; but it was the most important, partly on account of its origin and partly because it was established in the capital. A seat in the parliament was to be purchased like any other office in France. Under Henry IV., as we have seen, the right to a seat became hereditary, as long as the holder paid the *paulette* to the royal treasury. As the position of the lawyers became thus permanent and honourable, the assembly, which had once been the servile instrument of the crown, began to make itself heard in opposition. By old usage royal edicts and ordinances had to be registered in the parliament before being carried out. This gave the members their only pretension to interfere with legislation or administration. They claimed the right to refuse to register an edict, and that this refusal made it invalid. This would have given them a right of veto, which must have produced a dead-lock. To overcome their opposition there was only one available method, the anomalous transaction known as a "bed of justice." This was an occasion when the king appeared in person in the grand chamber and ordered the registration of an edict by his own authority. It was held that the king's personal presence superseded the ordinary powers of the magistrates. Under Richelieu the attempts of the parliament to control the administration had met with persistent and contemptuous refusal. But they had now a better ground for their pretensions in the part they had played in undoing the will of the late king. It was they who had conferred the absolute regency upon Anne of Austria, and they naturally deemed themselves in some sense superior to a regent of their own creation.

The Parliament of Paris, therefore, was, strictly speaking, only a central law court; it had no share in the executive or legislative powers. Nothing but the name was common between it and the English Parliament; it was more like our court of King's Bench. Still, such as it was, it was the only institution in France which had sufficient strength and consistency to oppose the government. It did not in any sense represent the people, it had not even a very deep interest in the popular welfare, but it found that a popular cause was a very useful instrument for advancing its own importance. Great influence was exercised in France by contemporary events in England, where the parliament had headed a successful revolt against the monarchy and was about to give a signal illustration of its power by the execution of the king himself.

Under Mazarin the chief control of finances was entrusted to d'Emeri, who was also an Italian, and who on that ground shared the unpopularity of the chief minister. One of his measures for raising supplies was the imposition of a duty on all food brought into Paris. The measure was not unjust, but was very unpopular, and the parliament refused its consent. Mazarin had none of the unswerving firmness of Richelieu, and gave way. But money had to be obtained, and new taxes were imposed, which were registered by the authority of the young king in a bed of justice (Jan. 1648). The next day the parliament maintained that such an exercise of royal power by a minor was invalid, and revoked the registration. Just at this time the period for which the *paulette* was granted had expired, and the government determined to use the opportunity for enriching itself and for teaching a lesson to the too independent magistrates. The *paulette* was not renewed, and thus the hereditary character of their offices was destroyed. At the same time four years' wages of the chief courts were declared to be confiscated. This attack on their common privileges exasperated the whole official class. The four superior courts, or *cours souveraines*, agreed to issue an "edict of union," and to send delegates to a joint assembly held in the chamber of St. Louis. There they agreed upon a number of demands which were of great constitutional importance. The recently appointed intendants were to be withdrawn; the taille was to be diminished by a quarter; no impost was to be levied without the consent of the sovereign courts; and, to prevent the arbitrary imprisonments so common in France, every person arrested was to be brought before a judicial tribunal within twenty-four hours. It is obvious that the magistrates were aiming at powers far beyond any they had hitherto exercised. The younger members of the parliament compared themselves with the senators of Rome.

§ 10. Anne of Austria, who was imbued with Spanish conceptions of royal power, was enraged beyond measure at the insolent opposition of the parliament. But Mazarin, less haughty and less courageous, persuaded her to concede most of the demands made in the chamber of St. Louis. But similar assemblies were to be strictly forbidden for the future. The parliament regarded the concessions thus limited as unsatisfactory, and refused to accept them. They were supported by the sympathy of the Parisian populace, which was filled with a democratic spirit, and was under the influence of the most accomplished of agitators, Paul de Gondi, coadjutor of the archbishop of Paris, and known to fame as the cardinal de Retz. It was apparent that the quarrel between court and parliament was tending towards civil war, and this was precipitated by the action of the government. Encouraged by the news of a great victory gained by Condé at Lens, the regent ordered the arrest of three prominent members of the parliament, one of whom, Broussel, was the idol of the populace. His arrest roused the passions of the mob barricades were raised in the streets, and the troops which attempted to restore order were repulsed. Thus began the war of the Fronde, so called from a derisive comparison of the rebels to the Parisian gamins, who were accustomed to fight with slings (*frondes*).

Anne of Austria, despite her haughty utterances, was compelled to release Broussel. The aged citizen, in himself of no ability or importance, was received with extravagant demonstrations by the populace. The weakness of the government encouraged its opponents. The most insulting language was openly used towards both regent and minister, and there was no power to punish it. Orderly government being impossible, the court suddenly quitted Paris for Rueil (September, 1648). It was thought that a siege of the capital was imminent, and the parliament ordered the citizens to arm. But the government soon found that war was out of the question. Money necessities were pressing; the peace of Westphalia was not yet signed, and the enemies of France triumphed in her internal dissensions. The regent again promised to grant the demands made by the chamber of St. Louis, and returned to Paris. The great peace was now concluded, and Mazarin was free to devote himself to domestic affairs. But the first financial measures aroused all the old dissensions. A permanent settlement was as far off as ever. De Retz was the most powerful man in Paris. Once more the court determined to retire, this time to St. Germain, with the definite intention of reducing the rebellious capital by force of arms. The great Condé, who had shown some inclination to support the Fronde, was won over to the cause of monarchy. A speedy military success was anticipated. The parliament, however showed no fear. It undertook the vacant government, levied taxes, and raised troops for defence. Mazarin was declared a traitor, and condemned to exile. And the city and parliament were now joined by important allies. The French nobles gleefully regarded the outbreak of civil war as an opportunity for regaining that position from which Richelieu had ousted them. Condé's brother, the prince of Conti, the dukes of Longueville, Rochefoucauld and Bouillon appeared in Paris to support the popular movement. The duke of Beaufort, the leader of the "*importants*" five years ago, escaped from his prison at Vincennes, and at once acquired the greatest popularity as the "*roi des halles.*" Still more important than the nobles were the noble ladies who crowded to Paris, headed by the brilliant and beautiful duchess of Longueville. They threw themselves with all the energy of their pleasure-loving natures into the game of political intrigue. From this time the Fronde degenerates. It is no longer the attempt of the magistrature to impose constitutional checks on the monarchy, and becomes a selfish struggle of the aristocracy to regain their lost privileges. The welfare of the people, once so prominent a pretext is more and more thrust into the background.

The civil war was as devoid of importance as of principle. Condé took place after place in the neighbourhood of Paris. The rebel troops were defeated in every engagement. But the light-hearted nobles were wholly indifferent, and regarded these reverses as a subject for merriment and epigrams. The more serious leaders of the parliament were soon convinced that they had little to hope from their new allies, and were disposed to come to terms with the court. This disposition was increased by the intrigues of the nobles with the archduke Leopold, governor of the Spanish Netherlands, which alienated all patriotic citizens. Mazarin, on his side, was inclined to treat, on account of the threatening attitude assumed by Spain. Throughout domestic difficulties he never lost sight of foreign politics. The President Molé, the leader of the moderate party, headed an embassy to the court, and concluded a treaty at Rueil. But the nobles, who had already concluded an alliance with Spain, refused to accept the treaty, and induced the parliament to reject it. Turenne had been seduced by the duchess of Longueville to bring his army to the side of the Fronde. The Spaniards entered Champagne. For a moment the military advantage seemed to be on the side of the rebels. But Mazarin bribed the troops of Turenne to desert their leader, and the citizens showed themselves more and more averse to Spanish intervention. The regent on her side consented to give more favourable terms to the parliament, and bought off the nobles with pensions and provincial governorships. The treaty thus modified was at last accepted, and the court returned to Paris.

This closes the first period of the Fronde.

§ 11. The difficulties of the government were by no means at an end. The Fronde retained its organisation and its pretensions. Still more formidable was the prince of Condé, who regarded the return of the court as his work, and was determined to exercise supreme authority. He had not the slightest sympathy with the popular interests or wishes, and he regarded the parliament with undisguised contempt. His intention was to rely only on the noblesse, who were to resume their old position under his leadership. The members of the new aristocratic Fronde were nicknamed, from their haughty affectation, the "*petits-maîtres.*" Condé's insolent disregard of parliament and people gave Mazarin an opportunity for getting rid of the prince. He formed an alliance with the leaders of the old Fronde, so recently his bitter enemies. De Retz was won over by the prospect of a cardinal's hat. Suddenly, in January, 1650, Condé was arrested, with his brother Conti and his brother-in-law Longueville, and sent to Vincennes. The populace rejoiced in the event.

But the imprisonment of the princes, so far from ending existing troubles, only gave rise to new ones. Discontent had spread from the capital to the provinces, and two of the great ladies of France set themselves to effect the release of the prisoners. Condé's sister, the duchess of Longueville, escaped to Normandy, and thence to Holland, where she once more secured the support of Turenne, and concluded a treaty with Spain. At the same time Condé's wife raised a revolt in Guienne. In face of these dangers Mazarin took energetic measures. Guienne was pacified by concessions which undid the centralising policy of Richelieu. Thence, at the head of an army, the cardinal marched to Champagne, which had been invaded by Turenne and the Spaniards. The former was completely defeated at Rethel, and his army dispersed.

But Mazarin's triumph over the party of the nobles only aroused fresh enemies against him. The old Fronde had sacrificed Condé merely because he treated their claims with contempt. They had never ceased to hate Mazarin, and they were not prepared to acquiesce in a new period of ministerial absolutism. Once more an alliance was arranged between the nobles and the party of the parliament. The two Frondes combined to attack Mazarin, and to demand Condé's release. The duke of Orleans, hitherto under the influence of Anne of Austria, was gained over by de Retz, and refused to sit in the royal council as long as the cardinal was admitted to it. The regent was anxious to resist to the uttermost. She regarded Charles I.'s sacrifice of Strafford as the source of his misfortunes, and was determined to avoid a similar error. But Mazarin decided to yield. He went in person to release the princes in the vain hope of earning their gratitude, and then retired to Brühl in the electorate of Cologne, whence he continued to correspond with the queen and to direct her actions.

Condé returned in triumph to Paris (February, 1651), and soon showed that he had learnt no wisdom from adversity. He refused to acknowledge the services rendered by the old Fronde, and treated the magistrates with his former haughtiness. The duke of Orleans he regarded as a possible rival in power, and he hated de Retz for the part he had played at the time of his imprisonment. All his efforts were directed towards the aggrandisement of the nobles, and especially of his own family. He demanded for himself the government of Languedoc and Guienne, for his brother that of Provence. He treated with Spain as an independent power. He compelled the regent to dismiss the ministers who had been appointed under Mazarin. But Condé's violence, and his contemptuous disregard of all allies, were again fatal to his supremacy. Anne of Austria, acting always under Mazarin's advice, succeeded once more in gaining over de Retz and the party of the old Fronde. Condé soon found himself powerless in the capital, and retired to the south, determined to restore his power by force of arms. Anne of Austria, in order to weaken the influence of Orleans and Condé, had the young king Louis XIV. formally declared of age. Opposition to the government became now rebellion against the king's person. The parliament was induced to declare Condé and his followers guilty of treason.

France was again involved in civil war. Condé was joined by the nobles of southern France and speedily raised a considerable force. The Spaniards, ever eager to profit by French dissensions, agreed to assist him by an invasion of Champagne. Turenne was expected to support them. The court on its side prepared two armies, one under d'Harcourt to prevent Condé's advance from Guienne, the other to oppose the Spaniards. The king with his mother left Paris for Poitiers. There Anne of Austria felt herself strong enough to recall Mazarin from his retirement. Louis XIV. went out in person to greet the cardinal, who brought a third army at his own expense, and who at once resumed his position as chief minister. One important success Mazarin had already gained. He had induced Turenne to desert Condé, and to come over to the king's side. The two greatest generals of France were now to be opposed to each other. Condé saw at once that the struggle was not to be decided in the south. Leaving his brother Conti to oppose d'Harcourt, he made his way with a handful of men through central France, and after a number of hairbreadth escapes he reached the northern army under the dukes of Nemours and Beaufort. At once assuming the command, he defeated a portion of the royalist army under d'Hocquincourt, and it was only the superior strategy of Turenne that saved the court from the danger of capture. Condé now determined to secure his position by gaining over the capital. He marched towards Paris and Turenne followed him.

In Paris Mazarin's return had produced a profound impression. All the enmity of the old Fronde revived against the hated minister. The parliament considered his recall a direct attack on its own authority. Not only were new edicts of banishment issued against the cardinal, but a price was put upon his head as a public enemy. The alliance so recently concluded with the court was thus broken off. But there was as yet no general desire to go over to Condé. De Retz and the other leaders wished to form a third party, with the duke of Orleans as its nominal head, and to utilise for their own advantage the contest between Condé and the court. When, therefore, the prince, hurrying on in advance of his army, entered Paris, he found no general inclination to receive him. He was compelled to rejoin his troops in order to check the advance of Turenne, who had brought the court back to St. Germain. After a number of skirmishes, in which the royalists had the better, Turenne forced a general engagement on his opponent near the Faubourg St. Antoine. Condé was out-numbered and out-manœuvred. The gates of the city were closed against him, and his army must have been cut to pieces but for the energy of Mademoiselle, daughter of Gaston of Orleans. Parading the streets, she roused the mob, and compelled the council to order the opening of the gate of St. Antoine. While Condé's defeated troops poured into the city, she entered the Bastille and compelled the gunners to fire on the royalist troops. Turenne was forced to retire, and Condé was master of Paris. A large number of magistrates and the bourgeois class were still hostile to him. But he had gained over the mob, which attacked and pillaged the Hôtel de Ville. Condé took no steps to restrain a lawlessness which served his own ends. The parliament, which had refused to espouse his cause, was now compelled by terror to join him. A revolutionary government was set on foot. Gaston of Orleans was named lieutenant-general of the kingdom, Condé commander-in-chief, Beaufort, "the king of the markets," governor of Paris, and Broussel, the hero of the barricades, provost of the merchants. But it was obvious that such a government, founded on violence, could not last long. All business was at an end, and the peaceful burghers saw themselves ruined unless order could be restored. This could only be done by the return of the king and court, to which all inclinations gradually tended. The great obstacle to peace was the old enmity against Mazarin, and this was removed by the action of the minister himself. Again of his own accord he determined to leave the court. But this time he had no fear of an overpowering combination of his enemies. His departure was only to assure his ultimate success; it would detach the citizens from their alliance with the nobles, and bring about a speedy peace.

Mazarin's anticipations were fully verified. Condé's government found it impossible to maintain itself against the general desire for peace. The Spanish troops withdrew to defend the Netherlands, and the duke of Lorraine was bribed by Mazarin. Condé, finding himself no longer master of the situation, quitted Paris, October 14, 1652, and sought a refuge with his Spanish allies. Within a week the court returned to the capital, and the royal power was completely re-established. Condé was sentenced to death, Beaufort and a number of other nobles to exile. Gaston of Orleans was ordered to reside at Blois, where he died in 1660; his daughter the spirited Mademoiselle, who had at one time looked forward to a marriage with the king, was banished to her domains. De Retz was imprisoned. In February, 1653, Mazarin returned, to be received with triumph by the king and courtiers, and with complacency by the fickle citizens. The Fronde was at an end. The last obstacle in the way of a centralised despotism was swept away. The nobles had made their final effort to regain political importance and had failed. The citizens and magistrates had shown themselves too weak to control the monarchy. One prominent result the war had; it made a profound impression on the mind of the young king, and rendered him resolutely hostile throughout his life to all ideas of constitutional government.

§ 12. The conclusion of domestic disturbances left the French monarchy at liberty to continue the war with Spain. During the last four years the Spaniards had regained many of the advantages they had lost. They had retaken Barcelona and Casale, and several strong places in Flanders, including Gravelines, Ypres, and Dunkirk. They were now reinforced by the presence of the great Condé, who received the chief military command in the Netherlands. But neither power was in a condition to carry on the war with vigour. France was exhausted by civil war and financial maladministration, while the internal condition of Spain was still worse. The only military operations of any importance were carried on on the frontier between France and the Spanish Netherlands, and they derive their chief interest from the fame of the rival commanders, Condé and Turenne. In 1653 Condé, anxious to utilise what relics of power and influence still remained to him, invaded France and advanced far enough to threaten the capital. The royal army was very small and incapable of meeting the enemy in the field. But Turenne's tactics of harassing the invaders without risking a battle, were admirably suited to a small force and were completely successful. Condé had to retreat. In 1654, Louis XIV. tasted his first experience of war at the siege of Stenay, the fall of which was ensured by Turenne's masterly tactics. Slowly but surely the French were gaining ground. The two generals were fairly matched, but the old Spanish tactics were now out of date, and the once invincible infantry was almost useless in the face of the quick movements of light-armed troops which had been introduced by Gustavus Adolphus. It was only the genius and resolution of Condé that preserved the Spaniards from complete and crushing defeat. In 1656 they even gained a considerable success, and routed a detachment of the French army under the walls of Valenciennes. But this was completely overbalanced by the conclusion of an alliance between France and England. Both the contending powers had earnestly sued for the support of Cromwell. The negotiations with Spain came to nothing owing to the religious bigotry that still prevailed at the court of Philip IV. At last Mazarin gained over the Protector by promising to banish Charles I.'s family from French soil, and to cede Dunkirk to England. Reinforced by 6000 Ironsides, probably the best soldiers in Europe at the time, Turenne was irresistible. After the fall of several smaller places, Dunkirk was besieged. The Spaniards under Condé and Don John of Austria, a natural son of Philip IV., hastened to its relief, but were completely routed. Dunkirk surrendered, and was handed over to the English in spite of the indignant complaints of the Catholic world. One after another the fortresses of Flanders were taken, and even Brussels was felt to be in imminent danger.

Spain, thus hardly pressed, was anxious to obtain peace. Events elsewhere tended in favour of France. In 1657 the emperor Ferdinand III. died, and a new election took place. Mazarin despatched an envoy to Germany to canvass the electors in favour of Louis XIV. This ambitious project came to nothing, and another Hapsburg, Leopold I., ascended the imperial throne. But the French embassy was not without important results. The electors forced the new emperor to confirm the article in the peace of Westphalia by which Austria was bound to send no assistance to Spain and to engage in no war against France. At the same time the League of the Rhine was formed by the chief German princes, both Catholic and Protestant, for the maintenance of the treaty of 1648. Thus France re-asserted its position in Germany, and isolated Spain completely from the Austrian Hapsburgs. Another great advantage for Mazarin was the death of Cromwell. He had reaped the full benefit of the English alliance, and the Protector's death enabled him to negotiate without any inconvenient regard for the interests of England.

The negotiations between France and Spain were undertaken by the chief ministers of the two countries. Mazarin and Don Luis de Haro met on a small island in the Bidassoa, the frontier-line. There in 1659 they arranged the important treaty of the Pyrenees. It was evident that recent military successes had enabled France almost to dictate the terms. On the northern frontier Spain ceded Artois and a number of fortresses in Flanders, Hainault and Luxemburg. Lorraine was to be restored to Charles III., who had been expelled from his duchy on account of his alliance with Spain. But the fortifications of Nancy were to be rased, the duke was to make no war against France, and was to allow a free passage to French troops through his territories. Spain resigned all pretensions to Alsace, and confirmed the cession of that province which had been made in the peace of Westphalia. In the south France retained possession of Roussillon and Cerdagne, and thus the Pyrenees were fixed by law as well as by nature, as the boundary between the two countries. In return for all these gains France made comparatively slight concessions. It renounced all pretensions to sovereignty in Italy, as it had done in all the great treaties of the sixteenth century. It promised to give no further support to the house of Braganza, under whose leadership Portugal had reclaimed its independence in 1640. And lastly, Condé was restored, not only to his private property, but also to his official dignities and to the governorship of Burgundy.

The basis of all these provisions was the conclusion of a marriage between Louis XIV. and the infanta Maria Theresa. This was a favourite design of Mazarin, but he was on the verge of being thwarted by the personal wishes of the king. Louis had conceived a passionate attachment for Maria Mancini, one of the cardinal's nieces, and refused to hear of any other marriage. It required all the cardinal's influence to overcome an inclination which was at once so flattering and so dangerous to his own family. At last he succeeded, and the treaty was finally signed (7 November, 1659). The next year Louis was married to Maria Theresa, who renounced all claims to the Spanish succession on condition of receiving a dowry of 500,000 crowns. This renunciation was insisted upon by the Spanish court, though no one seems to have regarded it as important or even valid. On the extinction of the male line ot Philip IV., the infanta's claims could hardly be disregarded, especially as the dowry, on which the renunciation was conditional, was never paid. This question was destined to give rise to important complications in the future.

§ 13. Mazarin returned from his diplomatic triumph on the Bidassoa broken in health but more powerful than ever. Louis XIV. regarded him rather as a master than as a minister; he refused to listen to those who suggested that he was too powerful; and was content to learn the principles of government from him. One of Mazarin's most notable precepts was that the king should have no chief minister. He and Richelieu had been the greatest of ministers, the real rulers of France. But henceforth the king himself begins to govern, his officials are really servants, heads of departments, who have to apply to the king for instructions. Mazarin's last days were mainly occupied in establishing the position of his family. His seven nieces all made distinguished marriages, and thus the nobles were bound more closely to the cardinal's cause. On 9th March, 1661, Mazarin died. He left behind him an enormous fortune, collected by means that do little honour to his honesty or his patriotism. Part of this wealth he left to found the "Collège des quatre nations," to which he also bequeathed his magnificent library. This college was intended to educate natives of those provinces which had been added to France by himself or by Richelieu—Roussillon, Alsace, Artois and Pinerolo. Thus the work of union would be completed. The younger generation would be brought up in Paris, and would return to spread French culture and French interests in their native land. It was a bequest worthy of the statesman whose diplomacy had been so successful in extending the frontier of France.

CHAPTER XII.

THE LESSER STATES OF EUROPE IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY.

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I. Spain and Italy.

§ 1. Philip II. left a sadly exhausted but still enormous empire to his son, Philip III. (1598-1621). In the first place, there was the whole united peninsula, with the addition of Roussillon and Cerdagne north of the Pyrenees. Naples, Sicily, Sardinia and Milan were provinces of Spain, and Spanish influence was almost supreme in Italy. Further north, came Franche-Comté, and then the Netherlands. Seven provinces of the Netherlands were in open rebellion, but their practical separation had not been recognised. Beyond the seas, lay the immense colonies of Mexico and Peru, with their fabled treasures of gold and silver. The great Hapsburg monarchy had as yet escaped dismemberment. But during the next three reigns, which occupy the whole 17th century, all this was changed. Spain suddenly fell from its greatness to be scarcely a second-rate power. Internal exhaustion reacted on the external power; from every war in which it engaged Spain emerged the loser, and gradually the magnificent empire was torn to pieces. France seized upon Roussillon and Cerdagne, Franche-Comté, and great part of the Southern Netherlands. Richelieu established French influence in Italy as a counterpoise to that of Spain. Holland enforced a tardy recognition of its hard-won independence. Portugal became once more a separate kingdom, and Catalonia was reduced only to very doubtful submission. The English and Dutch aggrandised themselves at the expense of Spanish colonies and commerce. This decline was due, partly to causes that were in working under Charles V. and Philip II., partly to the feeble character and government of the succeeding kings.

§ 2. Philip III., educated wholly by women and priests, had none ot his father's ability or taste for business. From the first he entrusted the cares of state to his favourite, the duke of Lerma, and contented himself with the performance of religious duties and the ceremonies of a stately court. Spanish etiquette was a model for the rest of Europe. The churchmen reaped a rich harvest from the devotion of king and minister. Lavish grants of money and land increased the already enormous wealth of the clergy. New monasteries and religious foundations were established and endowed. Almost every other country had found itself compelled to institute some kind of mortmain law: in Spain alone was ecclesiastical property allowed to increase far out of proportion to the riches of the country. At the same time this property was more free than elsewhere from the burden of public contributions. The king's religious zeal displayed itself even more disastrously in his persecution of the Moriscoes. Ever since the fall of Granada the conquered Moors had lived under cruel oppression. But like the Jews in a similar case, they had thriven in spite of it. They were the most industrious and the most skilful of the population. The Spaniards, partly from idleness and partly from pride, disliked trade and manufactures, and gladly left them in the hands of their more industrious inferiors. Thus the Moriscoes had obtained considerable wealth, and contributed largely to the welfare of the whole nation. But their religion, even when carefully concealed, was a terrible stumbling-block to kings who preferred to have no subjects at all rather than rule over heretics. Philip II. had issued a series of heartless edicts against them. They were forbidden to speak or write in Arabic, to sing a national air or to play on a Moorish instrument. They were compelled to attend mass, and to have their children baptised. Still they clung obstinately to the rites and customs which they could only practise in secret. Philip III. determined by a signal act to prove his zeal for orthodoxy and the cause of the church. In 1609 an edict appeared which ordered the forcible expulsion of all Moriscoes from Spain, and their transference to the shores of Africa. This edict was carried out with the utmost barbarity, and within two years, more than half a million people were driven from the country of their birth into exile and poverty. It was a blow to the industrial resources of Spain from which that country never recovered.

§ 3. It was perhaps fortunate that Lerma pursued that policy of peace which the Prince of Eboli had vainly urged against Alva under Philip II. The old aggressive attitude was given up. Peace was concluded with James I. of England, and in 1609 a truce with the Dutch ended the long and costly war of independence. The death of Henry IV. and the regency of Mary de Medici gave an opportunity for renewing and strengthening the alliance with France. Louis XIII. married the Spanish infanta, while a French princess was given to Philip III.'s son and heir. But this policy of peace alienated the Austrian branch of the Hapsburgs, who had been accustomed to rely on Spanish hostility to France and devotion to the Catholic cause. It was at this moment that the Thirty Years' War was about to break out. The Jesuits at the court of Vienna were occupied with magnificent schemes for the restoration of Catholicism. For their execution the support of Spain was absolutely necessary, and the minister who opposed it must be got rid of. In 1618 the clerical party induced Philip to sacrifice Lerma, who carried the immense wealth which he had collected into retirement. His place was taken by his own son, the duke of Uzeda, who governed Spain during the remainder of the reign. Spanish forces under Spinola co-operated with the imperialists on the Rhine and wasted the Palatinate. But Philip III. died in 1621, before he could witness the temporary success of the cause to which he had attached himself. His government had brought no happiness either to his subjects or to himself. It is a noteworthy fact, and not easy of explanation, that this period of political decline was the golden age of Spanish literature. Three writers have obtained European fame: Cervantes, who produced the immortal *Don Quixote* between 1605 and 1613, and two of the most fertile and distinguished of romantic dramatists, Lope de Vega and Calderon. In the domain of art Spain produced two of the greatest masters of the 17th century, Velasquez and Murillo.

§ 4. Under Philip III. Spain had escaped any very great humiliation, except the recognition of the United Provinces, which was inevitable. Philip IV.'s reign (1621-1665), on the other hand, was one long series of misfortunes and losses. This difference was due, not so much to the inferiority of the younger king's character, though this existed, as to the fact that the weak and vacillating regency of Mary de Medici gave way, in 1624, to the vigorous government of Richelieu. Philip IV. was only seventeen years old at his accession, and like his predecessor, he refused to be burdened with the control of the government. This was entrusted to another favourite, Olivares, a man of considerable ability and energy, but no match for his great contemporary in France. In foreign politics, Olivares set himself to support the religious and dynastic schemes of the Austrian Hapsburgs, while at home he aimed at the further aggrandisement of the monarchy. He began by an attempt to introduce some reform into the finances, but his object was rather to increase the revenue than to remove or redress grievances, and no lasting good was effected. The alliance with Austria provoked the hostility of Richelieu, who expelled the Spaniards from the Valtelline and thwarted them in the Mantuan succession. At last, in 1635, open war commenced between France and Spain, which after the first two years went wholly in favour of the former power. Meanwhile Olivares' despotic government provoked domestic rebellion, of which his opponent was not slow to take advantage. It was only in Castile that absolute despotism had been established by preceding kings. The northern and eastern provinces, especially Catalonia, still retained many of their ancient liberties. Olivares, anxious to emulate the successes of Richelieu, determined to destroy these liberties, and to crush every element of opposition to the crown. But this attempt drove the Catalans, in 1640, into open revolt, and they found ready support from France. For the next sixteen years Catalonia was a French rather than a Spanish province. And the rebellion had further results, in encouraging disaffection in Portugal, The Portuguese had never forgotten their former independence, and endured the Spanish yoke with ill-concealed repugnance. In December, 1640, a revolution was successfully accomplished, and John duke of Braganza, in whose veins ran the blood of the old dynasty, was raised to the throne as John IV. Here, again, Richelieu saw his advantage in fostering internal disunion, and mainly through French assistance, the independence of Portugal was assured after a struggle of twenty-eight years. These disasters were fatal to the influence of Olivares, who in 1643 was overthrown by a court intrigue. His place was taken by Don Luis de Haro, who succeeded to all the difficulties caused by his predecessor, and was possessed of still less ability to confront them.

§ 5. While disaffection was thus rife within the limits of the peninsula, it was impossible to retain the obedience of the Italian provinces, which the king never visited, and which were regarded merely as a source of revenue. The first duty of each viceroy was to supply the necessities of the court at Madrid, and these necessities were at their height in this period of foreign war and domestic revolt. And not only were the taxes heavy, but their incidence was unjust and oppressive. The nobles, clergy and official classes claimed exemption from the public burdens, which fell with all the greater weight on the middle and lower classes. These grievances led to a rising in 1647 in Palermo, the seat of government in Sicily. The viceroy endeavoured in vain to put down the movement by concessions, and he was forced to fly from the city But the noble and wealthy classes felt their interests threatened by the excited populace; with their assistance, the government put down the rising, and restored order in Sicily. Meanwhile these events had exercised an important influence in Naples. In that province, the duke of Arcos, the Spanish governor, had imposed heavy duties on all the necessaries of life. A tax on fruit, so important in that southern climate, at last provoked a rising among the excitable lower classes. They found a leader of energy and ability in a fisherman of Amalfi, Tommaso Aniello, or, as the people loved to call him, Masaniello. The duke of Arcos, who resolved to make no concessions, had not sufficient military force to support his resolution, and had to withdraw the obnoxious taxes. He then shut himself up in the Castello Nuovo, and the city was left to anarchy. Masaniello now became supreme. He received the title of "Captain-General of the people," and exercised his power with a wisdom and moderation that could hardly have been expected. But this alienated his more extreme followers, and when he entered into negotiations with the viceroy, he lost all hold upon the people. Arcos thought this a good opportunity to get rid of the demagogue, and Masaniello was shot by bravos in the pay of Spain. But the rebellion survived his death. The people soon recognised their error, and buried their leader with great pomp. As his successor they chose a Spanish noble, the Prince of Massa, and fresh disturbances commenced. Arcos was besieged in the castle and forced to make new concessions. At this conjuncture a Spanish fleet arrived under the command of Don John of Austria, a natural son of Philip IV. An attempt was made to suppress the revolt by a treacherous stratagem. A general amnesty was proclaimed, with a confirmation of all concessions. While the populace was thus satisfied and quiet, the soldiers were landed to occupy the city. But the treachery was soon discovered, and the enraged people drove the troops back to the ships. The Prince of Massa, who had throughout been in connexion with the government, was beheaded, and in his place was elected an armourer, Gennaro Annese. From this time the rebels went to extremes, and determined upon separation from Spain. As was natural, they turned for assistance to France. Negotiations were opened with the Spanish envoy at Rome, and these came to the ears of the duke of Guise, who happened to be at the papal court. He was descended from the Angevin family which had so long and so unsuccessfully claimed the crown of Naples. The opportunity of reviving this claim was too attractive to his adventurous and romantic nature to be neglected. He was received with the greatest enthusiasm in Naples, where his presence was regarded as an earnest of French support. It was determined to exchange the suzerainty of Spain for that of France. But Guise's real object was to gain the crown for himself, and this was not likely to be approved by the French court. Mazarin was very eager to sever Naples from Spain, but not in the interests of Guise, nor in alliance with the lower classes. He wished to gain over the nobles, who had perforce been driven on to the Spanish side by the popular excesses. Still he was unwilling to lose the chance of striking a blow at the enemy, and a fleet was sent to Naples. But it arrived late, and as the commander refused to recognise Guise, it returned without doing anything. And meanwhile Guise had quarrelled with the popular leader, Gennaro Annese, who became disgusted with the prospect of French rule, and opened negotiations with Spain. At this opportune moment, the hated duke of Arcos was recalled, and his authority fell to Don John of Austria, who was inclined to a more moderate policy. Annese opened the gates during the absence of Guise, and the Spanish troops speedily rendered themselves masters of the city. The traitor Annese met a well-merited death with the other leaders of the populace, and the rebellion was at an end (April, 1648).

The peace of Westphalia brought no cessation of hostilities between Spain and France, but the civil disturbances of the Fronde gave a temporary advantage to the former. In 1652 Don John of Austria, who rivalled the achievements though not the fame of his great namesake in the previous century, succeeded in taking Barcelona, and in driving the French from Catalonia. But the policy of Olivares was given up, and the province was confirmed in its rights and privileges. From this time the energies of Spain were absorbed in the war in Flanders, which was decided by the interference of Cromwell, and was closed by the treaty of the Pyrenees (1659). The peace, which was purchased with great territorial concessions, enabled Spain to devote its energies to the recovery of Portugal. But the marriage of Catherine of Braganza with Charles II. gave that country the support of England, and Louis XIV., after failing to obtain a recognition of his eventual claims to the Spanish succession, continued to send assistance to the rebels. In 1665 the long conflict was pracallcity decided by the battle of Villa Viciosa, where the victory was won by the French contingent under Schomberg. In the same year Philip IV.'s disastrous reign closed, and he left a sadly diminished empire to his only son, Charles II.

§ 6. The new king was only in his fourth year, and already displayed that weakness of body and mind which incapacitated him for any real share in the Government even after he grew up. The regency was entrusted to his mother, Maria Anna of Austria, who was wholly under the influence of her confessor, Father Nithard, whom she had brought with her on her marriage. The new government was ill-fitted to recover any of the ground lost during the late reign. In 1668 the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle gave great part of Flanders to France, and the treaty of Lisbon recognised the independence of Portugal. These disasters increased the natural hostility of the grandees to the rule of a woman and a Jesuit. An opposition party was formed under the leadership of the king's half-brother, Don John of Austria. Father Nithard was compelled to retire to Rome, whence he still directed the actions of the queen-mother. At length, as Charles II. grew older, Don John succeeded in alienating him from his mother, who retired to a convent. But the prince who now obtained the government showed far less ability as a statesman than as a soldier. One disaster followed another in the French wars, and Don John only lived to conclude the treaty of Nymegen.

Maria Anna returned from her convent to resume the control of the state. From this time the history of Spain becomes unimportant. The decline of internal and external resources continued with frightful rapidity. Charles II., contrary to general expectation, survived the century, and his death in 1700 ended the male line of the Spanish Hapsburgs. In the great contest for the succession which now ensued, the dismemberment of the Spanish Empire was continued and completed.

§ 7. That Spain during this century of decline and disaster kept a firm hold on its distant territories in Italy was due, not to any merits of the government, but to the complete lack of national feelings and political capacity shown by the Italians, and to the mutual antipathy existing between the various classes of society. As has been seen, the revolts in Sicily and Naples failed mainly through the want of sympathy between the nobles and the people. The only independent powers whose attitude was of the least importance, were the grand dukes of Tuscany, the Venetians, the popes and the dukes of Savoy. The Medicean grand dukes at this time threw themselves unreservedly into the hands of Spain, and by sacrificing their independence, secured uninterrupted tenure of power. But they showed none of the ability, nor even the taste for literature and art, which had given such fame to the founders of the family. They became the abject servants of the priesthood, and under their rule Florence sank entirely from its former grandeur. The line became extinct in 1737 with Giovanni Gaston, the last of the Medici. Venice during this century was almost entirely absorbed in its long war against the Turks. The republic leaned to the side of France against Spain, and was the first power to recognise Henry IV., but eastern complications prevented its taking a prominent part in western politics. Cyprus had been already lost, and the first half of the century was mainly occupied with the struggle for the possession of Crete. In 1669 Candia fell, and the island was annexed by the Turks. The war was now transferred to Greece, where the famous Venetian commander, Morosini, conquered the Peloponnese (1684–9). This was formally ceded to them by the peace of Carlowitz in 1699, but was reconquered by the Turks in 1715, and the long and wearisome warfare, as creditable as it was exhausting to the maritime republic, was not ended till the treaty of Passarowitz in 1718.

§ 8. The papacy continued to direct the progress of the Catholic reaction, until that movement was stayed by the failure of Austria in the Thirty Years' War. From that time it had to content itself with lesser interests, the government and extension of the papal states, and the settlement of internal disputes within the church. It became evident that not only had the popes failed to restore their rule over European Christendom, but their authority over the Catholic states was weakened by these disputes and by the independence of the secular powers. Sixtus V. was succeeded by three short-lived popes (1590–1), each of whom ruled only long enough to reverse the policy of his predecessor. Clement VIII. (1592–1605) was the first pope to break off the subservience to Spain which had prevailed ever since Pius IV. He gave absolution to Henry IV., and was enabled by French support to annex Ferrara to the papal states on the death of Alfonso II. of Este (1597). To his mediation was due the treaty of Vervins in 1598. During this pontificate a great contest broke out between the Jesuits and Dominicans. The doctrines of free-will, which were expounded by the Jesuit Molina, were regarded as an attack on the teaching of the great Dominican, Thomas Aquinas. Spain espoused the cause of the latter order, because the Jesuits, founded by a Spaniard, and at first working wholly in the interests of Spain, had now become more independent. The first generals of the order had all been Spaniards, but the office was now held by an Italian, Aquaviva. France naturally sided with the Jesuits, and Clement VIII., unwilling to offend his chief ally, died in 1605 without coming to a decision. Paul V. (1605–1621) was imbued with mediæval ideas as to the papal authority and the validity of the canon-law. These speedily brought him into collision with the secular power, especially in Venice, which had always maintained an attitude of independence towards the papacy. Ecclesiastical disputes were aggravated by the fact that the acquisition of Ferrara had extended the papal states to the frontiers of Venice, and that frequent differences arose as to the boundary line between them. The defence of the republic and of the secular authority in church affairs was undertaken with great zeal and ability by Fra Paolo Sarpi, the famous historian of the Council of Trent. Paul V. did not hesitate to excommunicate the Venetians, but the government compelled the clergy to disregard the pope's edict. The Jesuits, Theatines, and Capuchins were the only orders that adhered to the papacy, and they had to leave the city. If Spain had not been under the rule of the pacific Lerma, it would probably have seized the opportunity to punish Venice for its French alliance. But France and Spain were both averse to war, and Paul V. had to learn that the papacy was powerless without secular support. By the mediation of the two great powers, a compromise was arranged in 1607. The Jesuits, however, remained excluded from Venetian territory for another half-century. This was the first serious reverse encountered by the Catholic reaction. The Jesuits had earned the pope's gratitude, and in return they obtained a decision which pacified the Dominicans, without condemning the doctrines of either party. The attention of the Catholic world was now absorbed in the Austrian schemes for the repression of Protestantism in Germany, which received the unhesitating support both of Paul and of his successor, Gregory XV. The latter was a great patron of the Jesuits. Under him the Propaganda was first set on foot, and the two greatest members of the order, Ignatius Loyola and Francis Xavier, received the honour of canonisation.

The pontificate of Urban VIII. (1623–1644) was a period of great importance. He regarded himself rather as a temporal prince than as head of the Church. He fortified Rome and filled his states with troops. The example of Julius II. seemed to find an imitator. Urban was imbued with the old Italian jealousy of the imperial power, and allied himself closely with France. Papal support encouraged Richelieu to take decisive measures in the Valtelline, Casale, and the Mantuan succession. And at the moment when Ferdinand II. had gained his greatest success in Germany he was confronted with the hostility of the pope. Gustavus Adolphus landed in Germany, and by a strange coincidence Protestantism found support in the temporal interests of the papacy. The Catholics were astounded and dismayed by Urban's attitude. The Spanish envoy presented a formal protest, which was disregarded. The failure of the Catholic reaction was thus due in no small measure to the action of the pope himself.

Urban VIII. succeeded in making an important addition to the papal states by the annexation of Urbino, in 1631, on the death of Francesco Maria, the last duke of the Della Rovere family. But in the government of the states he met with great difficulties. Nepotism had been revived in a new form since Sixtus V. The relatives of the pope no longer aimed at political independence, but were entrusted with the control of the administration. Thus each papacy witnessed the foundation of a new family which acquired sufficient wealth to maintain its position after its patron's death. The aristocracy thus formed proved a great obstacle to the papal government. Urban VIII.'s relatives, the Barberini, quarrelled with the Farnesi, who had held Parma and Piacenza since the pontificate of Paul III. The pope was induced to claim the district of Castro, and this claim aroused a civil war (1641–1644) in which the papacy was completely worsted. Urban was forced to conclude a humiliating treaty and directly afterwards died. His successors are of very slight importance to the history of Europe. The great schemes of a counter-reformation had perished. Even within their own states the personal authority of the popes was curtailed by the rise of the Congregation, which had been founded by Urban VIII., and after his death obtained the chief control of the administration. The only important questions in which the papacy was involved in the latter half of the century were the schism of the Jansenists and the relations with Louis XIV., and these concern the history of France rather than that of Italy.

§ 9. Savoy owes its importance at this period not to its internal strength but to its geographical position between the territories of France and Spain. The duchy, after several years' occupation by the French, was restored by the peace of Cateau-Cambresis (1559) to Emanuel Philibert, the general of Philip II. He was anxious to recover the territories on both sides of the Lake of Geneva, which the Swiss had acquired at the expense of Savoy during the disturbances of the reformation. But in 1564 he had to accept the treaty of Lausanne, by which he gave up all territories to the north of the lake. From this time Savoy tends to lose ground in the north and to extend itself southwards; to become an Italian rather than a transalpine power. Emanuel Philibert devoted himself mainly to domestic government, and to repair the evils that the foreign occupation had left behind. He remained true to his attachment to the House of Hapsburg, but he was careful at the same time not to provoke the hostility of France. By this well-timed policy of peace, he was enabled to leave his duchy immensely strengthened to his son Charles Emanuel (1580–1630). The new duke was much more active in his policy. His marriage with a daughter of Philip II. bound him to the side of Spain and he supported the cause of the League in France. With the help of the Catholic party he seized the vacant marquisate of Saluzzo, and thus involved himself in a long quarrel with Henry IV. In 1601 the peace of Lyons confirmed the duke in the possession of Saluzzo, in exchange for which he ceded Bresse on the Rhone frontier to Henry. All attempts made to recover Geneva for Savoy proved unsuccessful. Before his death the restless Charles Emanuel brought forward another claim to the marquisate of Montferrat. This had been held since 1533 by the dukes of Mantua, whose male line became extinct in 1627. The duke did not live to see the settlement of the Mantuan succession, but his son, Victor Amadeus I., obtained great part of Montferrat by the treaty of Cherasco (1631). By a secret clause Richelieu acquired the fortress of Pinerolo for France, and this effected a complete change in the policy of Savoy. Victor Amadeus was married to Christine, a daughter of Henry IV., and he and his successor remained till nearly the end of the century as faithful to France as his predecessors had been to Spain. Charles Emanuel II., who succeeded as a minor on the early death of his father, was at first under the guardianship of his mother, and when he came of age remained in the closest alliance with Louis XIV. His great object was to secure the Italian position which Savoy had assumed, by the acquisition of Genoa. But the maritime republic made a successful resistance both to open attack and to treacherous plots. Victor Amadeus II., who became duke in 1675, was married to a daughter of Philip of Orleans. But Louis XIV. had begun to treat Savoy less as an ally than as a dependency, and the duke, weary of French domination, broke off the old connexion, and in 1690 joined the League of Augsburg against Louis. His defection was well-timed and successful, for the treaty of Ryswick (1697) gave him the fortresses of Pinerolo and Casale, the former of which had so long dominated his duchy. In the war of the Spanish succession he first supported Louis and afterwards turned against him. His faithlessness was rewarded in the peace of Utrecht with the island of Sicily and the title of king. Within a few years, however, he was compelled to exchange Sicily for Sardinia. The gradual transformation of Savoy into an Italian state has had important consequences for the history of Italy.

II. The Kingdoms of the North.

§ 10. No portion of European history is more intricate and confusing than that which describes the relations of the northern and eastern states in the 16th and 17th centuries. It would require a volume to follow the details of the continual and complicated wars between Sweden, Denmark, Poland, and Russia. But the period is one of considerable importance, and it is necessary to grasp its leading features. Sweden emerged from its subjection to Denmark, became Protestant, and in the 17th century took rank among the great continental powers. Poland was weakened by its oligarchical constitution, its elective monarchy, and the reactionary religious policy of its rulers, and speedily sank from the great position it had assumed under the House of Jagellon. But by far the greatest event of the period was the rise to European importance of the great monarchy of the Czars.

In a preceding chapter we have noticed the dissolution of the Union of Calmar between the Scandinavian kingdoms. Sweden gained its independence under Gustavus Vasa, who founded a strong monarchy, which passed on his death to his son Eric. This prince had none of his father's qualities, and early showed symptoms of an insanity which rapidly developed. He was engaged in constant quarrels with his brothers, John of Finland and Charles of Sœdermanland, and in 1568 was deposed by the former. John was married to a princess of the house of Jagellon and was able through this to secure the vacant crown of Poland for his son Sigismund in 1587. But Sigismund became a bigoted Roman Catholic, and his religious policy speedily alienated his Protestant subjects when he became king of Sweden in 1592 by his father's death. His uncle Charles, the ablest of Gustavus Vasa's sons, took advantage of this to assume first the government and afterwards the crown of Sweden as Charles IX. He was the father of the great Gustavus Adolphus.

§ 11. In Denmark, Christian II., the last king of the three Scandinavian countries, whose brutality provoked the revolt of Sweden, was deposed in 1523 in favour of his uncle Frederick, duke of Holstein. Frederick I.'s eldest son, Christian III., had to fight for three years against Christopher of Oldenburg and the Hanse Towns before he could obtain the crown, which he did ultimately through the assistance of Gustavus Vasa. He made Protestantism the established religion of Denmark in 1536, and he recognised the independence of Sweden by the treaty of Brömsebro in 1541. His son Frederick II. (1559–1588) continued to bear the arms of the three kingdoms, and this provoked Eric of Sweden into war against Denmark. The treaty of Stettin in 1570 closed the war just after the accession of John to the Swedish throne. Denmark resigned all claims to Sweden, but retained possession of all its territories in the northern peninsula, Norway, Skaania, Halland, Blekingen and Jamteland. Frederick II. is famous as the patron of the great astronomer Tycho Brahe. He was succeeded by his son Christian IV. (1588–1648) who earned a good reputation by his domestic government, but who played but a sorry part in the Thirty Years' War.

§ 12. Poland was ruled at this time by Sigismund Augustus (1548–72), the last male of the great family of Jagellon, which had held the crown since 1386. By their accession Lithuania and Poland had been brought under a common ruler, but the two countries had never been really united. This was at last accomplished by Sigismund Augustus in 1569 under the pressure of Russian invasion. During his reign Protestantism obtained a great position and almost a preponderance in Poland, and the king, though himself a Catholic, did nothing to stay its progress. To some extent his hands were tied in religious matters by his position as suzerain of the secularised states of Livonia and Prussia. On his death in 1572 without children, the Polish estates decreed that thenceforth the crown should be purely elective, without restriction to any family, and that Protestants and Catholics should have equal political rights. They also drew up a constitution which limited political power to the nobles, and made Poland an oligarchical republic with a nominal head. The first elected king was Henry of Anjou, brother of Charles IX. of France, and the guilty author of the massacre of St. Bartholomew. He was compelled to accept the decrees of the diet, a promise which he would hardly have kept, but on the news of his brother's death he escaped secretly from Poland, four months after his coronation, to ascend the French throne. The Poles now chose Stephen Bathori of Transylvania, who was married to Anne, a sister of the last Jagellon. In his reign, though he was personally inclined to moderation in religious matters, the Catholic reaction was commenced in Poland. This was due mainly to the exertions of the Jesuits, who obtained admission into the kingdom in 1570 and gained over the most powerful nobles. On Bathori's death in 1586 the Catholic party secured the election of Sigismund III., son of John of Sweden, who took vigorous measures for the restoration of Catholicism, and by his religious policy sacrificed the Swedish crown.

§ 13. The Russian monarchy had been founded in the 9th century by Ruric, a prince of Scandinavian origin. The capital was first fixed at Novgorod and afterwards at Kief. But Ruric and his descendants possessed none of that absolute authority which we are accustomed to associate with Russian rule. Their power was limited by the existence of strong municipalities, and by the practice of granting large appanages to younger members of the royal house. The disunion thus caused facilitated the conquest of Russia by the Tartars or Moguls in the middle of the 13th century. For two hundred years the country groaned under their barbarous despotism, which ground the people in slavery and abject poverty. Gradually, however, the princes of Moscow, descendants of Ruric, rose to eminence, not by military prowess, but by a policy of wiles and treachery. They ingratiated themselves with the Tartar rulers, and artfully employed them to crush the princes who might be their rivals. At length they were strong enough to shake off the galling yoke. Iwan III. (1462–1505) allied himself with the Tartars of the Crimea, and with their help defeated the rulers of Russia, the Tartars of the Golden Horde. Iwan and his son Vassily Iwanovitch put an end to the independence of the great municipalities, and also crushed the great princes who had arisen under the system of appanages. These princes, on losing their independence, became the *boyars* of the court at Moscow. From this time Russia, independent and centralised, was enabled to play a more and more prominent part in European politics. Iwan IV. (1533–1584), known by the well-merited name of the Terrible, was the first who assumed the famous title of Czar. He reduced to submission the Tartars of Kazan, the third of the great Tartar tribes, and by the conquest of Astrakhan extended the Russian boundaries to the Caspian. But his great ambition was to obtain a hold on the Baltic, and it was this which brought him into collision with the Western powers.

We have seen how the Teutonic Order was forced into subjection to Poland, and how its territories were finally secularised by Albert of Brandenburg, and became a duchy under Polish suzerainty. A similar order, the Knights of the Sword, ruled in Livonia. They had been for a long time amalgamated with the Teutonic Order, but obtained independence under Walter of Plattenberg. The progress of Protestantism among the knights gave rise to great disorder, and Iwan IV. sought to take advantage of these to conquer their territories, which would give him the coveted access to the Baltic. Pressed by this danger, the grand master, Gothard Kettler, determined to imitate Albert of Brandenburg. He adopted the Lutheran doctrines, offered the greater part of his territories to Poland, on condition that the remainder should be formed into the hereditary duchy of Courland for himself and his descendants. The offer was accepted by Sigismund Augustus, but the treaty could not be executed without a long war. Sweden claimed Esthonia and the northern territories of the order, and the Czar refused to give up his schemes of conquest. A long war ensued, in which Russia, Poland and Sweden contended for the possession of Livonia. The vigorous measures of Stephen Bathori forced Iwan IV. to conclude a truce in 1582, by which Poland gave up its conquests but kept Livonia. The claims of Sweden remained unsatisfied till 1593, when a truce with Iwan's successor, Feodor, gave the Swedes Esthonia, Narva and Revel. These arrangements were confirmed in 1595 by the peace of Teusin between the three powers. Russia, so successful in the south, was compelled to give way in the north-west, and to postpone the scheme of obtaining a frontier on the Baltic coast.

§ 14. The key to the political relations of the four northern states is to be found in the eager desire of each to obtain supremacy over the Baltic. It had not yet been realised how completely the great geographical discoveries had deprived that sea of its mediæval importance. It was this which had caused the decline of the Hanse Towns, but the position which they had occupied seemed as desirable as ever to the powers which wished to take their place. There were also special grounds of quarrel between Sweden and Denmark and between Sweden and Poland. The Danish kings had by no means accepted as final the dissolution of the Union of Calmar, and their command of the Sound and Belts enabled them to cripple the rising Swedish commerce. Between Sweden and Poland there was the disputed claim to Esthonia, and still more serious dynastic and religious differences. The northern states were at this time brought into close and novel connexion with the main current of European politics. The Catholic reaction, supported by the arms of Phillip II. had suffered great reverses in the successful revolt of Holland, in the destruction of the Great Armada, and in the establishment of Henry IV. on the throne of France. The last chance of recovering these losses was bound up with the election of the Catholic Sigismund III. in Poland, and his succession to Sweden on the death of his father John. He had the enthusiastic support of the pope and of the Hapsburgs of Spain and Austria. Philip II. hoped, with the aid of Sweden, to revive Spanish commerce in the Baltic, and to strike a fresh blow from the north against England and the revolted Netherlands. Against these Spanish-Catholic schemes all the hostile interests centred round the champion of Swedish Protestantism, Charles of Sœdermanland. The decision of the great European question depended upon the struggle between Charles and Sigismund, which was decided by the battle of Stangebro in 1598. Charles obtained the supreme government of Sweden, and in 1604 received the crown, which was declared hereditary in his descendants both male and female. Charles IX. is the second founder of the Swedish monarchy on a Protestant basis. The work of Gustavus Vasa had been undone during the troubled reigns of Eric, John and Sigismund. The nobles had regained the independence which they had enjoyed in the time of the Union. The military, naval and commercial organisation of the first Vasa had fallen to pieces. All this was now altered. The nobles were reduced into subjection to the crown, and those who had supported Sigismund were punished with relentless severity. Measures were taken to revive the internal welfare of Sweden. But Charles IX. was interrupted in his beneficent work by a renewed Danish War. Christian IV. of Denmark considered the opportunity favourable for the renewal of claims which had been temporarily renounced in the treaty of Stettin. In 1611 he besieged and took Calmar. Charles IX. died at the commencement of hostilities and left the crown to his famous son, Gustavus Adolphus. The young king was eager for military glory, but his first war was not successful. The Danes took one town after another, and when peace was made in 1613, Sweden had to purchase the restoration of these conquests with a large bribe. Elfsborg, the only point of importance which the Swedes held on the north sea, was left in Danish hands as a security.

§ 15. The Danish war was of comparatively slight importance by the side of contemporary events in Russia, whither the main interest of northern politics had transferred itself. Iwan the Terrible had been succeeded in 1584 by his eldest son Feodor, who was devoid both of his father's energy and his vices. The government fell entirely into the hands of his brother-in-law, Boris Godunof, who aimed at securing the succession to himself. Demetrius, the Czar's brother, and his sister, were got rid of by poison. With Feodor's death in 1598, the male line of the house of Ruric came to an end. Boris Godunof now reaped the fruit of his ambition and his crimes, and became Czar. But he was not allowed to enjoy his ill-gotten power in peace. A pretender appeared, who claimed to be the brother of the late Czar, and who is known to fame as the False Demetrius. He applied for aid to Poland, married a Polish wife, and offered to become a Roman Catholic. Sigismund III. eagerly grasped at this opportunity of obtaining in Russia some compensation for his loss of Sweden. Demetrius marched into Russia, where he was welcomed by the people and placed upon the throne Boris Godunof, overwhelmed with remorse for his fruitless crime, died in the moment of defeat (1605). But the establishment of Polish influence in Russia was a serious danger to Sweden. Charles IX. allied himself with the leader of the party opposed to Demetrius, Vassily Shouisky, a distant relative of the main line of Ruric. A revolution was successfully conducted in Moscow, in which the pretender perished and Shouisky became Czar (1606). He at once made important cessions of territory to Charles IX., in return for which he obtained the support of a Swedish army. But the Poles were not inclined to submit to this reverse. A new pretender the second False Demetrius, was brought forward and supported by a large Polish force. The quarrel between Sweden and Poland was thus transferred altogether to Russian soil. In 1610 the Poles took Moscow, drove Vassily Shouisky from the throne to a cloister, and compelled the election of Ladislaus, Sigismund's son. The danger of the union of Poland and Russia roused the Swedish king to make great efforts. His troops took Novgorod, and it was proposed to confer the crown of the Czars upon Charles Philip, the younger brother of Gustavus Adolphus. Thus the contest between Charles and Sigismund took a new phase: it was no longer a question as to which should rule in Sweden, but whether Russia should be annexed to Sweden or to Poland. The Poles had the capital and the best of the position, and might have proved successful but for Sigismund's ambition to become Czar himself instead of his son. As it was, the pretensions of the rival dynasties were foiled by the rise of a patriotic party in Russia, which determined to submit to no foreign rule, and in 1613 elected Michael Romanof, the ancestor of the later Russian Czars. But the war was by no means ended by this election. Russia had to purchase its independence by large cessions of territory to the two powers whom internal dissensions had introduced. In 1617 peace was made with Sweden, and a truce for fourteen years with Poland. Before the expiration of the truce, Sigismund III., whose religious policy had caused such disturbances in northern Europe, died in 1632, leaving the Polish crown to his son Ladislaus. The Russians seized the opportunity to renew the war against Poland, but they were defeated, and in 1634 peace was made on the same terms as the truce of 1617.

§ 16. Gustavus Adolphus triumphantly announced to his estates the terms of his treaty with Russia, and declared that that enemy could not launch a single boat on the Baltic without the leave of Sweden. He now devoted himself for a time to domestic government. The nobles were compelled to fulfil their military duties, the neglect of which had caused the disasters of the Danish war. Constitutional institutions were established and regulated, but at the same time the power of the crown was secured. The financial system was reorganised. All the time Gustavus was watching closely the course of affairs in Germany, where the Thirty Years' War broke out in 1618. He was enthusiastic for the success of the Protestant cause, and he married the sister of the elector of Brandenburg, one of the chief Lutheran princes of Germany. In 1620 the war against Poland began afresh. Sigismund III. was anxious to obtain Esthonia, even if he could not get the Swedish crown. But Gustavus speedily took the aggressive and carried the war into the Polish territory of Livonia. It was in these campaigns that he developed the military ability which was afterwards to be displayed on a wider stage. In 1624 he was anxious to interfere in Germany, but had to give way to the more sanguine schemes of Christian IV. of Denmark. He continued the Polish war, which served as a diversion in favour of the Protestants, because Sigismund III. received support from his ally the emperor. At last the failure of the Danish king and the peace of Lübeck opened the way for Swedish intervention in the European war. Wallenstein's schemes for establishing the imperial power on the Baltic threatened the most vital interests of Sweden. French mediation enabled Gustavus to conclude the truce of Altmark with Poland, by which he obtained almost the whole of Livonia and great part of Polish Prussia. In 1629 he landed in Pomerania and commenced those brilliant campaigns which completely changed the aspect of European politics and secured him everlasting fame, and which were closed by his premature but glorious death on the field of Lützen (1632).

§ 17. The Swedish crown now passed to Gustavus' infant daughter, Christina. During her minority an oligarchical government was established, with the chancellor Oxenstiern as its head. The domestic policy of Gustavus was continued, but the government was mainly occupied with the European war. The alliances with France and the German princes were renewed, and in 1635 the prolongation of the truce with Poland was purchased by the cession of that part of Polish Prussia which Gustavus had obtained in 1629. Livonia was left in the hands of Sweden. While the Swedes were busied with military operations in Germany and Bohemia, they were interrupted by the manifest hostility of Christian IV. of Denmark. It was determined to anticipate an invasion of Sweden by attacking Denmark, and Torstenson was recalled to conduct the campaign. So unprepared were the Danes for defence, and so weakened was their kingdom by the independence of the nobles, that no resistance could be made. Christian was compelled to accept the humiliating treaty of Brömsebro in 1645. By this, Swedish vessels were freed from the tolls which the Danes levied in the Sound, and Denmark ceded Oesel, Halland, Jamteland and the island of Gothland. Three years later the Thirty Years' War was concluded by the peace of Westphalia, and the scheme of Gustavus Adolphus to establish Swedish supremacy over the Baltic was realised by the acquisition of the greater part of Pomerania.

Christina had personally undertaken the government in 1644 at the age of eighteen. She had received an education which fitted her for the performance of a man's duties, and she displayed great talent and inclination for business. She possessed a considerable knowledge of languages and literature, and took great interest in philosophical and theological questions. Grotius, Vossius, and Descartes were among the distinguished men who were attracted to her court at Stockholm. It was of great importance that she should have an heir, and the Swedes urged her to marry her cousin, Charles Gustavus of Zweibrücken, son of a sister of Gustavus Adolphus. But Christina refused to take a husband, and compelled the states, against their will, to recognise her cousin as her heir. Soon afterwards her religious belief was shaken by her philosophical researches, and at last she determined to escape from doubts by adopting Roman Catholicism. But the constitution of Sweden under the Vasas was based upon Protestantism, and the country could never submit to a Catholic queen. Christina made up her mind to abdicate, and carried out her resolution with characteristic obstinacy. The extravagance of her government had proved almost as expensive as the recent war, and this may have made her subjects less unwilling to part with her. After making arrangements for receiving a liberal pension and freeing herself from the crown debts, she left Sweden in 1654, and soon afterwards publicly declared herself a convert to Roman Catholicism. After spending several years in travelling about Europe, she ultimately settled in Rome, where she surrounded herself with literary society, and where she died in 1689. Her eccentric character, her abdication while in the prime of life, her subsequent adventures and literary tastes have combined to give her a reputation which her actions hardly deserved.

§ 18. The crown which Christina had so lightly parted with passed to her cousin Charles X., "the Pyrrhus of the North." His reign lasted barely six years, but during that period his ambition gave rise to a turmoil in which all the northern states were involved, and which was watched with interest by the whole of Europe. In the general confusion, it is a relief to find one power which was consistent in aim though not in conduct. This was Brandenburg, where Frederick William, the Great Elector, had begun to rule in 1640. He found his territories in the most deplorable condition, caused mainly by the vacillating policy of his father in the Thirty Years' War. The various provinces were under no common government, and the duchy of Prussia, which had fallen into the hands of the electoral line in 1611, was still subject to the suzerainty of Poland. To rid himself of this suzerainty was one of the elector's chief objects. He was naturally opposed to Sweden, because he had a valid claim to Pomerania, of which only part had been given him by the peace of Westphalia. Though he had received ample compensation for the part which had been ceded to Sweden, he never relinquished the hope of obtaining the whole province. He, too, was ambitious to secure that dominant position on the Baltic which was the common aim of all the northern states. But the independence of Prussia was a more immediate and feasible object, and it was this that regulated his policy in these years. At first he remained neutral, then he joined Poland against Sweden, then he made a close alliance with the latter power, and finally deserted it. These abrupt but well-timed variations of policy were attended with complete success.

Charles X. had served under Torstenson in the later years of the great war, and was anxious to find a field on which to display the military ability which he had thus acquired. He determined to complete the Swedish ascendancy on the Baltic, towards which great strides had been already made. There were three states which he might attack; Poland, the old rival of Sweden, which was now ruled by John Casimir, the second son of Sigismund III.; Denmark, which held the entrances into the Baltic; and Brandenburg, whose territories separated the Swedish possessions in Pomerania and Livonia. The question as to which should be invaded depended on the first pretext for war, and this was afforded by Poland. John Casimir, who maintained the right to the Swedish crown of the elder branch of the house Vasa, refused to recognise Charles. Poland was already hampered by a war with Russia and offered an easy prey. In 1651 Alexis, the second Czar of the Romanof line, had taken advantage of a quarrel between Poland and the Cossacks of the Ukraine to recover the territories extorted from Russia in 1617 and to invade Lithuania. In 1656 three Swedish armies invaded Poland and carried all before them. John Casimir fled to Silesia. After a campaign that resembled a triumphal progress, Charles X. found himself complete master of Poland. This sudden success roused the misgivings of the elector of Brandenburg, who had refused to ally himself with Sweden, and hoped to see the two powers destroy each other. He now prepared for war in the interests of Poland, but Charles, with marvellous rapidity, was upon him before he could move. The Swedish invasion forced Frederick William to conclude the treaty of Königsberg (Jan. 1656), by which he agreed to hold Prussia of Sweden, as formerly of Poland, and to send auxiliaries to Charles's army.

Charles X. was now at the height of his power. But his success was too rapid to be lasting. He had no real hold on the kingdom which he had conquered. Brandenburg was only his ally by compulsion, and could not be trusted. The Russians regarded the Swedish victories as an obstacle to their own advance, and were as ready to fight the Swedes as the Poles. The Dutch were afraid of the Swedish power on the Baltic, as dangerous to their commerce. The emperor had good cause to hate and fear the Swedish king, and prepared to resist this new Gustavus Adolphus. Charles X.'s only ally was England, and Cromwell, though he favoured Sweden out of hostility to Holland, was unwilling to render any active assistance. While the aspect of affairs in Europe was so unfavourable, the Poles rose against their conquerors and recalled John Casimir. Charles X. hurried to confront the danger, but found himself opposed by overwhelming numbers, and was forced to retreat. To recover the lost ground the assistance of Brandenburg was essential, and Charles now offered to cede a great part of Poland to the elector. This was settled by the treaty of Marienburg (June, 1656). The combined armies of

Sweden and Brandenburg marched to Warsaw, where they completely defeated John Casimir, who again fled from the kingdom. But this great victory produced no commensurate results. The elector was still cool in his alliance with Sweden, and was evidently anxious to prevent rather than to further the success of Charles' schemes. The king determined by new sacrifices to bind his ally closer to his interests, and in November, 1656, a new treaty with Brandenburg was concluded at Labiau, the third that had been made within the year. By this the duchy of Prussia was ceded to Frederick William in entire independence, and the succession secured to his descendants. But this was too late to decide the fortunes of the war. Sweden had embarked in an enterprise which proved beyond its strength, and had aroused enemies on every side. The Russians had declared open war, and concluded a treaty at Wilna (Nov. 1656) with the Poles. The emperor Ferdinand III. had espoused the cause of John Casimir. The Danish king, Frederick III., was preparing for war against Sweden. To meet these powerful enemies Charles X. enlisted the support of George Ragocsky, Prince of Transylvania, in conjunction with whom he proceeded to attack the Russians in Lithuania. At this juncture the news reached him that the Danes, in alliance with the emperor and the Dutch, had commenced the long-threatened war against Sweden by a naval attack on Gothenburg. He at once determined to give up the prospect of distant conquests to meet this danger so near home. His departure disgusted Ragocsky, who returned at once to Transylvania. At the same time Sweden lost a far more important ally. The elector of Brandenburg, whose guiding motive was an enlightened self-interest, saw that nothing was to be gained from Charles X. when he ceased to be victorious. He now turned to John Casimir, who was only too glad to purchase so powerful a friend. In February, 1657, the treaty of Wehlau was arranged, by which Poland and Brandenburg concluded an offensive and defensive alliance against Sweden. Frederick William engaged to restore all conquests, and in return he was to receive Prussia free from all claims of Polish suzerainty. In default of male heirs the province was to return to Poland. Thus a great step was taken towards the formation of the Prussian monarchy.

§ 19. Undismayed by these disasters, Charles X. displayed an activity that roused the astonished admiration of Europe, and in June appeared on the frontiers of Holstein. The Danish monarchy was no stronger than in 1644, and no preparations had been made for defence. The mainland provinces, Holstein, Schleswig and Jutland, were speedily overrun. But the main strength of the Danes lay in their islands, and the winter was now far advanced. Charles decided on a daring movement which still extorts wonder. He crossed the little Belt on the ice into Fünen, defeated the Danish troops, and took the capital, Odensee. Without delay he effected the more dangerous passage of the Great Belt into Zealand, and threatened Copenhagen. Frederick III. could make no resistance. The ice which gave admission to his enemies prevented the arrival of the Dutch fleet to his aid. By the mediation of France and England a treaty was concluded at Roeskilde (Feb. 1658). Denmark ceded all her possessions on the northern peninsula, Skaania, Halland, etc., and agreed to close the Baltic against all enemies of Sweden. Thus Sweden obtained a geographical unity which it had never yet possessed. But the treaty was not destined to be observed by either party. The Danes accepted the humiliating terms only to escape from the immediate danger, and Charles X. was resolved on the complete subjection of a neighbour that must always be dangerous. His successes in the recent campaign had enabled him to conclude a three years' truce with Russia, and before the end of the year he renewed the war against Denmark. But Frederick III. had now the assistance of his continental allies. The Dutch fleet brought provisions to Copenhagen, which was besieged by the Swedes. At the same time Frederick William of Brandenburg led an army which contained imperial troops into Jutland. It was only the inability of the Germans to cross the Belt that saved Charles X. from being crushed between two hostile forces before Copenhagen. From Jutland the elector marched to Pomerania and Prussia, and in 1659 the Swedes were driven from all their conquests on the continent. In spite of Charles' obstinate determination to hold out to the last, it was obvious that peace could not be long deferred. In February, 1660, the last obstacle was removed by the death of the warlike king as Gothenburg. The mediation of England, France and Holland was successfully employed. In May a treaty was concluded at Oliva between Sweden and Poland and Brandenburg. John Casimir renounced all claims to the crown of Sweden, and renewed the cession of Livonia. All conquests were restored, and the independent possession of Prussia was confirmed to the Great Elector. In June the Danish war was closed by the treaty of Copenhagen. Its terms were essentially the same as those of Roeskilde, with the exception that the clause about the exclusion of hostile vessels from the Baltic was omitted, and that one or two small pieces of territory were restored to Denmark. The general pacification of the north was completed in 1661 by the peace of Kardis between Sweden and Russia, which made no territorial changes, but merely secured the mutual restitution of conquests.

§ 20. Denmark was left in a most deplorable condition by the treaty of Copenhagen. The territorial losses were not so serious as the internal disunion that had made them inevitable. The crown was strictly elective, and the nobles had been able to extort such privileges from each successive king on his accession that their power completely overshadowed the monarchy. Though they possessed two thirds of the wealth of the country, they were exempt from all taxes, and selfishly refused to contribute even in the time of invasion. But by this they aroused the hostility of the other classes, which combined with the crown against them. In 1660 a diet met at Copenhagen, where a great revolution was effected by the action of the clergy and the burghers. The nobles were forced to pay their share of the expenses of the Government. The crown was made hereditary for females as well as males, and the capitulation which the king had signed was abrogated. The opposition of the nobles to these measures was overcome by intimidation. Thus the extremity of the evil produced a cure. Frederick III., from being one of the most powerless sovereigns in Europe, became suddenly the most despotic. The whole administrative system was reorganised, and brought wholly under royal control.

§ 21. Very different was the state of things in Sweden. Charles X.'s death left the crown to his son Charles XI. an infant of four years. During the minority a council of regency was formed with the queen-mother as its head. The nobles took advantage of the opportunity to rule in their own interests. The domain-lands were squandered in reckless grants. All the financial reforms of the late king were given up. Sweden seemed likely to fall into the very condition from which Denmark had just emerged. To fill the empty treasury, the regency fell into the fatal practice of receiving subsidies from foreign powers. It was the hope of English gold that induced Sweden to become a party to the Triple Alliance against France in 1668. But the great master of the art of purchasing allies was Louis XIV., and he was as ready to take advantage of the mercenary character of the Swedish government as he was of England. Just as he was commencing his unjust war against the Dutch in 1672, he concluded an alliance with Sweden. In this year Charles XI. assumed the government in person, but found himself hampered by the actions of the regency. The elector of Brandenburg had undertaken to support the Dutch, and was leading armies against the French in Alsace. Louis now called on the king of Sweden to fulfil his engagements and to effect a diversion in Germany. A Swedish army under Wrangel marched from Pomerania into Brandenburg and occupied several strong places. The Great Elector heard of the invasion not without pleasure, as he hoped with this pretext to drive the Swedes from Pomerania. Leaving the Rhine, he reached his own territories by a series of forced marches, fell upon the surprised enemy at Fehrbellin and inflicted a crushing defeat upon them. Following up his success, he drove the Swedes from the electorate, and proceeded to effect his great object in the war, the conquest of Pomerania. His success gained him allies. Holland and the emperor were on his side as common enemies of France. And now Denmark, where Christian V. had succeeded Frederic III. in 1670, determined to make war on Sweden in order to recover the territories lost by the treaty of Copenhagen. Charles XI. whose qualities were as yet little known, displayed all the firmness and energy that characterised his family. The Danes landed in Skaania, hoping to revive the ancient loyalty of that province to its former rulers. But they were defeated by Charles in the battles of Lund (1676) and Landskrona (1677), while an invasion from the side of Norway was repulsed. But by sea the Danish fleet, assisted by the Dutch under Tromp, was completely successful, and drove the Swedes from the Baltic. At the same time the Great Elector completed the subjection of Pomerania. In 1677 he took Stettin, and in the next year Stralsund and Greifswald. But these successes proved ultimately useless. The European war, out of which this northern conflict had arisen, was concluded by the peace of Nimwegen, and in 1679 the treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye was forced upon Sweden and Brandenburg by French intervention. Louis XIV. insisted that his allies the Swedes should lose nothing by supporting him, and treated with lofty scorn the remonstrances of the elector. The whole of Pomerania, with the exception of a small district, had to be restored. A few months later peace between Sweden and Denmark was concluded at Lund on the basis of the treaty of Copenhagen. Thus Sweden emerged out of an unsuccessful war without any loss of territory. But the military prestige which it had enjoyed under Gustavus Adolphus and Charles X. was weakened if not destroyed. These reverses, however, led in Sweden, as in Denmark, to a reform of the constitution. Clergy and commons combined with the king against the nobles. The domain lands which had been so recklessly distributed under the regency, had to be restored. The royal power was made absolute, and the council, which had so long been a check, now became the mere creature of the king's will. Charles XI. carried out these changes with resolution and severity, but he could plead the interests of the people. Under the new government manufactures and commerce revived and the army and navy were reorganised.

The aggressive policy of his predecessors was given up by Charles XI. No more subsidies were received, and France was unable to entangle Sweden in its European wars. This beneficent, though scarcely popular government, continued till Charles' death in 1697, when a new era commenced for Sweden with the accession of Charles XII. Denmark during this time had also an uneventful history. Christian V. ruled till 1699, and endeavoured to model his court on that of Versailles. This ambition involved great expense, and the king sought to obtain supplies by hiring out Danish troops to foreign powers. His kingdom had to suffer for his extravagance, but less than they would have done from a renewal of war. Even the hereditary hostility towards Sweden was allowed to cool during this period of tranquillity.

§ 22. The war between Poland and Russia, which had been commenced by troubles in the Ukraine, was continued after the Swedes had withdrawn from it by the treaty of Kardis (1661). In 1667 a truce was concluded at Andrussov, by which the Ukraine was divided. Russia received the whole territory to the left of the Dnieper, and Smolensk and Kiev on the right bank. John Casimir had alienated his subjects by his ill-success in war, and by his partiality for France. In 1669 he abdicated, and thus closed the long and famous rule of the Jagellon line. The Polish nobles were divided into a French and German party, but ultimately their choice fell on one of themselves, Michael Wisnowiecky. Under him Poland became involved in a war with the Turks, and in 1673 the king's death produced new disputes as to his successor. Ultimately the foreign candidates were rejected, and the famous general, John Sobieski, was raised to the throne. He closed the Turkish war in 1677 by the cession of part of the Ukraine, which three years later the Porte had to resign to Russia. Soon afterwards a second war broke out with Turkey, in which Sobieski gained eternal fame by the relief of Vienna in 1683. But this was his greatest success. He enlisted the Russians against the Turks by a treaty in 1686, which confirmed the terms of the truce of Andrussov. But the allies reaped more advantage than the Poles from the war, of which Sobieski did not live to see the conclusion. His death in 1697 renewed the old quarrels among the Polish nobles. The two candidates were the Prince of Conti and the elector of Saxony, Augustus the Strong. Louis XIV. had always been jealous of the House of Condé, and though anxious for the success of the French claimant, failed to use all his influence on his behalf. The result was that the German faction carried the day, and Augustus was elected king of Poland. To obtain the crown he deserted the faith of his ancestors and became a Roman Catholic.

Meanwhile Peter the Great had ascended the throne of the Czars in 1682. For seven years the government was exercised by his sister Sophia, but in 1689 Peter began to rule independently. His reign marks an epoch in the history, not only of Russia, but of Europe. But before considering it, it is necessary to turn to the history of the Turks, who now became involved in the disputes of the northern states.

III. THE OTTOMAN TURKS.

§ 23. The Ottoman empire attained the zenith of its greatness under Solyman the Magnificent (1513–1566), the contemporary and rival of Charles V. and Francis I. One of his first acts was the capture of Rhodes, the outpost of Roman Catholicism in the Levant, from which the Knights of St. John retired to Malta. In 1521 he took Belgrad, before the walls of which John Huniades had checked the victorious career of Mohammed the Conqueror. Five years later he defeated and slew the last Jagellon king of Hungary in the battle of Mohacz. The Hungarian crown passed to Ferdinand of Austria, to be contested with John Zapolya, but the Sultan obtained more territory in the kingdom than either of the rival claimants. In 1529 Turkish troops advanced to the walls of Vienna, but failed, as they did a century and a half later, to reduce the Austrian capital. The naval empire of the Turks was extended over the Mediterranean and the northern coasts of Africa by the enterprise of admirals like Barbarossa and Dragut. In 1540 Solyman forced the Venetians to cede to him their last fortresses in the Morea, and Greece was completely subjected to Ottoman rule. In alliance with Francis I., the Turkish fleet laid siege to Nice, and spread consternation throughout Christendom. The greatness of the Ottoman power under Solyman was not merely territorial. Several provinces, such as Cyprus and Crete, were annexed in later times. But the moral energies of the empire were never so conspicuous afterwards. Solyman himself, spite of the cruelties characteristic of his race and age, was a ruler who may compare favourably with any of his contemporaries. And the Turkish rule, with its disregard of doctrinal differences, had positive merits in a period of religious strife and persecution. We know that conquest by the heathens was absolutely preferred by many of the subjects of Christian powers like Austria and Venice. "The Turkish dominion, at the period of its greatest extension, stretched from Buda on the Danube to Bussora on the Euphrates. On the north their frontiers were guarded against the Poles by the fortress of Kamenietz, and against the Russians by the walls of Azof; while to the south the rock of Aden secured their authority over the southern coast of Arabia, invested them with power in the Indian Ocean, and gave them the complete command of the Red Sea. To the east, the Sultan ruled the shores of the Caspian, from the Kour to the Tenek; and his dominions stretched westward along the southern coast of the Mediterranean, where the farthest limits of the regency of Algiers, beyond Oran, meets the frontiers of the empire of Morocco. By rapid steps the Ottomans completed the conquest of the Seljouk sultans in Asia Minor, of the Mamlouk sultans of Syria and Egypt, of the fierce corsairs of Northern Africa, expelled the Venetians from Cyprus, Crete, and the Archipelago, and drove the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem from the Levant, to find a shelter at Malta. It was no vain boast of the Ottoman sultan, that he was the master of many kingdoms, the ruler of three continents, and the lord of two seas."[1]

§ 24. The decline of the Turkish power commenced even during Solyman's lifetime. In 1565 a determined attack on Malta was repulsed by the heroic resistance of the knights, and it was a poor compensation that Chios was taken in the next year from the powerless hands of its Genoese rulers. The Sultan determined to retrieve the credit of his arms by a great effort in Hungary. But the small fortress of Szigeth checked his advance, and under its walls the last of the great Ottoman rulers died (1566). From this time the Turkish decline becomes more and more rapid, and its causes are not far to seek. Hitherto the Sultans, with the single exception of Bajazet II., had all been men of marked energy and ability. Their successors degenerate with marvellous rapidity. The Sultans no longer appear at the head of their armies. Absorbed in brutal sensuality, they resign the cares and duties of government to viziers and other officials, who rule for the most part for their own interest and avarice. Venality, the curse of Ottoman public life, spreads into every department of government, and especially into the administration of justice. The rule which had once been welcomed by the subject races as preferable to that of their fellow Christians becomes a barbarous and hideous despotism. And this internal decay was accompanied by the decline of those military institutions on which the Ottoman empire had been built up. The rigid discipline, once so conspicuous in the Turkish army, was a thing of the past. The Janissaries became the oppressors instead of the defenders of the empire. They obtained the privilege to marry previously withheld from them, and under Selim II. admission to their ranks became hereditary for their children.

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[1] Finlay, 'History of Greece,' vol. v. p. 6.

Thus their numbers increased from twelve thousand at the fall of Constantinople to more than a hundred thousand by the end of the 16th century. The tribute of children, the horrible expedient which had been so efficacious in enforcing submission and in training servants for the monarchy, now ceased to be exacted. This was a great advantage for the conquered populations, but a very serious blow to the power of their rulers.

Under Selim II. (1566–1574) the Ottoman power was still maintained, not by the Sultan himself but by the Grand Vizier, Sokolli, the last of the great officials who survived the period of Turkish success. Selim, who is known to history as "the Sot," illustrates the decline of personal character and ability which makes the sultans of this period little more than names. His first act was to conclude a truce with Maximilian II., leaving matters in Hungary and Transylvania as they stood. For a long time after this north-eastern Europe remained undisturbed by Turkish wars. The great event of Selim's reign was the attack on the Venetian island of Cyprus, an enterprise which was carried out against the advice of Sokolli by the influence of the favourite Lala Mustafa. The small force that was left to guard the island retired into the two fortresses of Nicosia and Famagosta. In 1570 the former was taken, and in the next year Famagosta had to yield after a heroic resistance. This new advance, and the cruelties with which the Turkish success was accompanied, roused for a moment something like the old crusading spirit in Western Europe. Pius V. concluded a Holy League with Spain and Venice. At the head of the allied forces, Don John of Austria won a great naval victory at Lepanto (October, 1571), the most famous and the most useless of all battles between the Cross and the Crescent. Selim II. displayed unexpected energy in repairing the losses of the Turkish fleet. In 1573 Venice concluded a humiliating treaty, by which Cyprus was surrendered and 30,000 ducats were paid as compensation by the defeated power. In 1574 Tunis, which had been taken by Don John, was recovered, and the Turkish power re-established in Africa. Soon afterwards Selim died.

§ 25. Under his son and successor, Amurath III. (1574–1595), the energies of the Turks were absorbed in a fourteen years' war with Persia (1576–1590), in which territories were gained only to be lost again even more speedily to the famous Shah Abbas. Sokolli had been assassinated in 1579, and the office of vizier fell into incompetent hands. The reigns of Mohammed III. (1596–1603), and of Achmet I. (1603–1617), are noteworthy only for the commencement of that female influence at the Porte which brought great disasters upon the empire, and for the growing insubordination of the

Janissaries, who aspire to imitate the Prætorian bands at Rome and to direct the succession by their own will. A period of anarchy and confusion followed, until Amurath IV. (1623–1640), the Nero of the Turkish Sultans, restored some external order by a reign of terror.

Ibrahim (1640-1648), who survived in spite of the politic rule which doomed the brothers of a Sultan to the bowstring, spent his life in brutal sensuality, and allowed all the worst abuses to revive after their momentary check. His reign, otherwise unimportant, is noteworthy for the commencement of the famous war of Candia between Venice and the Turks. A Turkish squadron on its way from Constantinople to Egypt was attacked and captured by a fleet from Malta. Ibrahim determined to revenge the insult, but was afraid to renew the war with the Knights of St. John which had ended so disastrously in 1565. He contented himself therefore with an attack on the Venetian island of Crete, on the ground that the plunderers had found refuge in one of its harbours. In 1645 the war began which lasted twenty-five years, and in which the Venetians, though ultimately unsuccessful, displayed some of their old capacity for maritime warfare. But the republic was no real match for the Turkish power, and the war would have been terminated much sooner but for the internal dissensions at Constantinople. In 1648 Ibrahim was deposed, and succeeded by his son Mohammed IV., who was only seven years old at the time, and during whose minority the government was contested for by his mother and his grandmother. During these years the Ottoman power sank to the lowest depths of anarchy and misrule. In 1656 the Venetians under Mocenigo won a naval victory in the Dardanelles and followed it up by the capture of Lemnos and Tenedos.

§ 26. But in this very year a new era of Turkish history begins. The younger Sultana had been successful in the contest for supreme influence, and at her instance the office of Grand Vizier was conferred upon an Albanian, Mohammed Kiuprili. Though already seventy years old, he set himself with determined energy to the task of reform. Everywhere disorder was put down with unsparing severity. Discipline was restored among the Janissaries, and their military spirit was revived. The old Ottoman institutions were once more set in working, and under the Kiuprili family the Turkish empire obtained a new lease of life. Not content with internal reform, the Grand Vizier determined to embark once more on a career of foreign conquest. The war of Candia was prosecuted with renewed vigour, and in 1657 the Venetians were driven from their recent conquests. At the same time the Turks prepared to make their power again felt in the Danubian territories, which had enjoyed unaccustomed security for the last seventy years. The occasion for this enterprise was given by events in Transylvania, the principality which had been formed by the Zapolyas under Turkish patronage, but which had now passed into other hands. The reigning prince, George Ragocsky II., in his greed for territorial aggrandisement, had in 1656 joined Charles X. of Sweden against Poland. His campaign was utterly unsuccessful, but Kiuprili chose to treat it as an act of insubordination in a vassal of the Porte. He declared Ragocsky deposed, and ordered the estates to elect a successor. Resistance being deemed impossible, the estates had to choose Barczai, a nominee of the vizier. Ragocsky, however, refused to submit, and applied for assistance to the emperor. Although the princes of Transylvania had always been thorns in the side of the Hapsburgs, Leopold I. (1657–1705) was unwilling to see the province definitely annexed by the Turks, as his own subjects in Hungary were extremely discontented, and might easily be induced to prefer Turkish to Austrian rule. On the other hand, Ragocsky was distrusted as a recent enemy, and after some hesitation, Leopold contented himself with diplomatic intervention, which the Porte disregarded. Ragocsky now made a stand with the help of his own followers, but the vizier sent an army to enforce submission, and in 1660 the last Ragocsky who ruled Transylvania was slain in battle. His party still held out, and elected as prince John Kemenyi, who succeeded in capturing Barczai and putting him to death. With Kemenyi Leopold concluded a close alliance, and sent Montecuculi to defend Transylvania. Thus, after a century of peace, the empire was once more at war with the Turks. Montecuculi, hampered by orders from home, was unable to conduct a successful campaign. The Porte put forward another nominee for the principality, Apasi, and in 1662 Kemenyi was killed. But Apasi himself was dissatisfied with his position. He saw that the real object of the Turks was to annex Transylvania, and opened secret negotiations with the emperor. Thus secure of internal support, Leopold made great efforts to continue the war. Louis XIV., with that magnanimity which sat so easily upon him, sent 4000 infantry and 2000 cavalry to aid against the infidel. In 1664 Montecuculi found himself at the head of a commanding force. He was opposed by Achmet Kiuprili, who had succeeded his father as Grand Vizier in 1661, and who was eager to lead the Turks to the conquest of Vienna. At St. Gothard, on the right bank of the Raab, the two armies met on the 1st of August, 1664. Montecuculi won his greatest victory, and the Christian arms recovered the glory that had been lost in previous wars against the Ottomans. But the victory had no commensurate results. Leopold was anxious to terminate the war, and ten days after the battle a truce for twenty years was arranged at Vasvar. The imperial and Turkish armies were to evacuate Transylvania, where Apasi was recognised as Prince and pledged himself to pay the accustomed tribute to the Sultan. The treaty excited the greatest discontent in Hungary, and certainly the victory of St. Gothard entitled Leopold to demand better terms. All that he secured was the continued independence of Transylvania, while the Turks, in spite of their defeat, obtained accessions of territory.

§ 27. This fortunate conclusion of the war enabled Achmet Kiuprili to devote undivided attention to the contest with Venice, which had dragged on for twenty years. At the end of 1666 he assumed the command of the army which was besieging Candia. The garrison was commanded by Morosini, one of the few heroes whom Venice produced after the 15th century. For two years the obstinate defence was conducted with success. But the superior numbers of the Turks and the stern determination of the vizier were not to be denied, and in 1669 the fortress became untenable. Morosini took the opportunity to negotiate a peace which the republic unwillingly accepted. Candia was surrendered on the 17th of September, and Venice ceded the whole island to the Turks, with the exception of three fortresses, Karabusa, Suda, and Spinalonga.

These successive pacifications only impelled Kiuprili to seek a new outlet for the military energies of the Turks, and this he found in a war with Poland. The territory of the Ukraine, inhabited by the warlike tribes of the Cossacks, had long been contested for by Russia and Poland. By the truce of Andrussov in 1667, it had been divided between the two powers. This arrangement was very distasteful to the Cossacks, who were eager to regain their unity and independence. In 1670, a movement of the Zaporogues, a tribe which dwelt by the mouths of the Boug and Dnieper, led to the despatch of a Polish army under Sobieski as general. The Hetman Doroschenko, made a vigorous resistance, and appealed for aid to the Porte He hoped to become ruler of the united Cossacks under Turkish suzerainty. Kiuprili readily responded to the appeal, and in 1672 collected an army, which was accompained by Mohammed IV. in person. Siege was laid to Kaminietz on the Dniester, which had to surrender, and the Polish province of Podolia was speedily overrun. The feeble king, Michael Wisniowiecky (1669-1673), hastened to conclude a treaty at Budziak, by which Podolia was ceded to the Porte and the Ukraine to the rebellious Hetman under Turkish suzerainty, and Poland promised an annual tribute of 200,000 ducats. But the influence of Sobieski induced the Polish nobles to reject the treaty, and in 1673 he won a great victory over Kiuprili at Khoczim. In 1674 his heroism was rewarded by his election to the Polish crown. But the Turks had the advantage of superior numbers, and in spite of another defeat at the hands of Sobieski at Lemberg (1675), they succeeded in regaining the mastery in Podolia. It was only the fear of a Russian war that induced the Turks to grant rather more lenient terms than those of 1672 in the treaty of Zurawna (Oct. 1676). By this the greater part of Podolia with Kamenietz was handed over to the Sultan, but on the other hand, he gave up the tribute and also restored two-thirds of the Ukraine to Poland.

§ 28. Meanwhile events had been taking place in Hungary which were destined to involve the Porte in its most important and ultimately its most disastrous war of the century. The modern kingdom of Hungary was at that time divided into three parts. In the west was the narrow strip of territory which was held by the Hapsburgs, and which was ruled by a Palatine, usually a native noble, with his seat of government at Pressburg on the Danube. In the south-east was the district which had been annexed by the Turks, and was directly subject to a pasha at Ofen, and in the north-east was Transylvania with its own elective princes, who owed allegiance to the Porte. It will be convenient to call the Austrian province Hungary, and the others respectively Turkish Hungary and Transylvania.

Hungary in the latter half of the 17th century was in a state of perpetual revolt. There were two main causes of discontent; religious persecution, and the arbitrary interference with the national rights and liberties as guaranteed by the coronation oath of each king. In most of the German principalities the treaty of Westphalia was followed by increased centralisation and despotism. The same thing is to be observed in the Austrian dominions. The Hapsburgs, as heads of the Empire, had suffered a serious diminution of dignity and influence. For this they thought to compensate themselves by increasing their domestic power. Thus one of the results of the decline of the old Empire, was the rise of the modern state of Austria. But the measures adopted to bring this about were bitterly resented in Hungary. The office of Palatine was often left unfilled, and the government brought more and more directly under officials at Vienna. The Magyar language was discouraged, and the people felt that they were being deprived of their separate nationality. Still more serious were the religious motives for discontent. Protestantism had made great strides in Hungary, as in the other Hapsburg territories, in the later part of the 16th century. To repress this heresy Ferdinand II. had introduced the Jesuits, founded a University for them, and strove to give them complete control of the national education. Ferdinand III., when the peace set his hands free, commenced a systematic persecution, which threatened Hungary with the same fate as had befallen Bohemia after its reduction in 1622. Leopold, in his coronation-oath, promised liberty of conscience, but the promise was never fulfilled. Like his predecessors he had been brought up by the Jesuits, and moreover had been destined for the church. The death of his elder brother gave him the throne, but he brought to it all the prepossessions of the priesthood. The suppression of heresy he regarded as his first duty, and his reign is the golden age of the Jesuits in Austria.

The prevailing discontent was increased by the treaty of Vasvar, which was concluded without the consent of the diet, and which bought off the Turks from Transylvania at the expense of Hungary. The troops which had been employed in the war were still quartered in the province, and it was evident that they were left, not as a garrison, but as armed missionaries to assist the Jesuits in the work of conversion. A conspiracy was formed in 1666 by a number of the chief nobles, who employed as their tool Francis Ragocsky, a son of the late prince of Transylvania, George II. But the conspiracy came to nothing through the failure to obtain foreign assistance. Achmet Kiuprili was absorbed in the siege of Candia. Louis XIV. was at this time on good terms with the government at Vienna. The emperor had early information of the plans of the rebels, but waited till they were fully involved, and in 1670 put all the leaders to death with the exception of Ragocsky, who was allowed to retire into insignificance.

§ 29. The suppression of the conspiracy was followed by a reign of terror in Hungary, of which Lobkowitz, Leopold's minister, was the presiding genius. A special tribunal at Pressburg proceeded against the nobles with the illegal severity of martial law. To support the military expenses, new taxes were imposed without any pretence of consulting the estates. The office of Palatine was abolished, and the executive power entrusted to a German official as governor-general. All the chief places were transferred from natives to foreigners. At the same time the opportunity was seized to complete the religious persecution. Protestant preachers were driven into exile or sent to the galleys. The only result of this severity must be a new and more formidable revolt. Many nobles and others escaped death by flying to Transylvania, where they concerted schemes for revenge. In 1674 the persecutor Lobkowitz was deprived of office on account of his subservience to France. But his fall brought with it no change in the system of government in Hungary and the projects of rebellion rapidly acquired consistency. An able and devoted leader was found in Emerich

Tököli, whose father had been a friend of the nobles executed in 1670. European affairs were more favourable to the second rebellion than to the first. Louis XIV. was now at open war with Leopold and had no scruples about supporting rebellion in the east. In 1674 John Sobieski had been elected king of Poland by the French and anti-Austrian party. Besides France and Poland, the Porte also favoured the movement. Achmet Kiuprili had died and had been succeeded by his son-in-law, Kara Mustafa, who was eager to win new laurels for the Ottoman arms. Apasi, prince of Transylvania, followed the lead of his suzerain, and had also personal interests on the same side. It was certain that if the Hapsburgs made themselves absolute in Hungary, their next object would be the annexation of Transylvania.

Encouraged by the prospect of such powerful support, Tököli and his followers took up arms. Four years of civil war ensued, in which the insurgents had on the whole the advantage. At one time Tököli even threatened Pressburg. But the treaty of Nimwegen restored the balance by releasing the imperial troops from the western war. In 1679 a truce was concluded, leaving matters as they stood, and the interval was occupied in negotiations. All the Hungarian advisers of Leopold urged a policy of conciliation, but his German ministers branded them as traitors. At last, however, the attitude of Louis XIV., who was commencing his famous *réunions* at the expense of Germany, forced concessions from the Austrian government. At the diet of Œdensburg in 1681 the system of Lobkowitz was definitely abandoned. The office of Palatine was revived and given to Paul Esterhazy. The general-governorship was to be abolished for ever; the arbitrary taxes were withdrawn; and offices were henceforth to be held by natives. Still more important were the religious articles, which remained in force till the death of Charles VI. Both Calvinists and Lutherans were restored to their rights as citizens, and received liberty of conscience. In the free towns Protestants might build a church on some spot to be selected by the emperor.

§ 30. These were ample concessions, but Tököli and his associates refused to accept them. They maintained that as soon as the fear of French and Turkish intervention was past the old oppressions would be resumed. Tököli now married the widow of Francis Ragocsky, who had died in 1676. By this marriage not only did he obtain great wealth, but he became the guardian of a second Francis Ragocsky, his stepson, and succeeded to the popularity and influence which this family still enjoyed in Transylvania. At the same time he drew closer his alliance with the Turks, and the Sultan nominated him Prince of Hungary. The emperor made a last effort to maintain the treaty of Vasvar. But the Porte purposely made demands too insulting to be accepted, and a new war broke out between Austria and the Turks.

In March, 1683, Mohammed IV. assembled an enormous army at Adrianople. He himself advanced with it as far as Belgrad, where he handed over the command to Kara Mustafa. At Essek, Tököli joined the Turks and was received with royal honours. There could be no doubt that the destination of the army was Vienna. Charles IV. of Lorraine, with the imperial forces, was covering Hungary, but as soon as he heard of the Turkish intentions, he hastened to throw reinforcements into the capital. The command of the garrison was undertaken by Count Gundaker Stahremberg, a member of a family that has rendered conspicuous military services to Austria. Under his directions the suburbs were burnt to the ground, and the efforts of the defenders were concentrated on the city walls. Leopold himself had fled with his family and treasure up the Danube to Linz.

The second siege of Vienna is a memorable event in the history of Europe. The Ottoman power, after a long decline, had been revived by the family of Kiuprili. The year 1683 was decisive as to the permanence of the revival. If Vienna had fallen it is not easy to imagine what would have been the future of Europe. One of two events appears the more probable. Either the Turkish empire would have been permanently extended to the Rhine with fatal results to European civilisation. Or Louis XIV. would have waited for the collapse of Austria to pose as the champion of Christendom. If he had succeeded in driving back the Turks, his dream of a Bourbon monarchy over Europe would have been realised.

It is worth while to review quickly the state of Europe at this crisis. Spain was the emperor's natural ally. But the Spanish monarchy had suffered so terribly, both from internal decay, and from external attack, that it was unable to give any effective assistance. In Italy, Venice was the only independent state of any importance, and the republic had sunk into impotent inactivity after the close of the Candian war. The Pope, Innocent XI., the enemy of Louis XIV., was devoted to the imperial cause, but the temporal power of the papacy did not count for much, and its ecclesiastical authority was narrowly restricted. Portugal was only too glad to enjoy its independence to risk it by intervention in a European war. England under Charles II. had sunk altogether from the position to which Cromwell had raised it. Holland was absorbed in watchful hostility to France. Sweden was too Protestant to assist such an emperor as Leopold, and moreover a false step would enable Brandenburg to seize Pomerania. Germany was as usual divided, and the western princes were occupied in watching Louis XIV., who had just seized Strasburg (1681), and was planning further acquisitions eastwards. There was only one power left, Poland, ruled by John Sobieski, who had already earned a great reputation by the victories of Khoczim and Lemberg. But then Sobieski was avowedly a partisan of France, and France was more or less openly encouraging the Turks. Moreover, the Polish constitution, with its unlimited opportunities for obstruction, made it difficult for the king to take part in a war which did not immediately concern the national interests. Sobieski had also a personal grievance against Leopold, who had refused him the title of Majesty on the ground that he was an elected and not an hereditary king. In spite of these considerations, Leopold applied to Poland for aid and obtained it. Sobieski's wife, a Frenchwoman, had recently been alienated by Louis, and the discovery of some letters of the French envoy, which spoke contemptuously of Polish venality, and disclosed a plot for the king's deposition, removed all difficulty with the diet. Poland promised to furnish 40,000 troops against the Turks which Sobieski was to command in person.

Meanwhile Vienna was besieged. It might have been taken with ease but for the delay of the Vizier, who wasted fourteen days over a march that might have been completed in two. This enabled Stahremberg to complete his plans for the defence. It was not till the 24th of July that Kara Mustafa appeared before the city with his whole army, over 200,000 men. The great siege lasted till the 12th of September. Several times the Turkish mines made great breaches in the walls, and the city was on the verge of being taken by assault. But each time the invaders were repulsed and the damage repaired. At last on the 10th of September the relieving army appeared on the neighbouring hill, the Kahlenberg. Sobieski and his Poles had effected a junction with Charles of Lorraine, and had also been reinforced by troops from Bavaria and Saxony. Kara Mustafa, confident in his overwhelming numbers, decided to risk a battle and to continue the siege at the same time. On the 12th the decisive conflict took place. The Turks were completely defeated, and fled in confusion, leaving enormous booty behind them. On the 14th the emperor arrived and held his famous interview with Sobieski.

A few days after the great victory of Vienna, Sobieski and the duke of Lorraine advanced to attack the Turks in Hungary. At Parkani, on the 7th October, the Poles, who were in the van, suffered defeat. But the arrival of the imperialists stopped their retreat, and two days later they won a complete victory. This was followed by the capture of Gran, which the Turks had held for seventy-four years. After these great successes, which have given him imperishable fame, Sobieski returned to Poland. The Grand Vizier, Kara Mustafa, who was responsible for the campaign of 1683, paid the penalty of his unsuccessful ambition. At Belgrad the envoy of the Sultan met him with the fatal bowstring, and he was put to death. With his fall ended the great impulse which the Kiuprili family had given to the Turkish power.

§ 31. The war between Austria and the Turks lasted for fourteen years. The imperialists found able and successful leaders in Charles of Lorraine, Lewis of Baden, and Eugene of Savoy. It is noteworthy that all of them, like Montecuculi, were foreigners. The great success of 1683 had aroused the enthusiasm of Europe, and the war has some of the characteristics of the mediæval crusades. The empire sent assistance to its head, and Venice once more came forward in the cause of Christendom. Early in 1684 the "holy league" was concluded by papal mediation between the emperor and the republic. It was the first time in its history that Venice had taken the initiative against the Turks. Under Morosini their armies invaded the Morea, and reduced the greater part of it. Besides the formal allies of the empire, volunteers flocked to join the Christian army from all parts of Europe. The only exception to the general crusading impulse was France. The Most Christian King was eager to have his hands free on the Rhine, and was rejoiced to see the imperial armies occupied in the east. Without going so far as to conclude a formal alliance with the Turks, the French envoy at Constantinople was active in urging on the war, and French gold was employed to support the armies of the infidel.

In 1684 the duke of Lorraine, deprived of the assistance of the Poles, undertook the sole command of the imperial and German troops. He laid siege to Ofen, the former capital of Hungary, which for 145 years had been held by the Turks, and was reckoned among the ten great cities of their empire. He succeeded in defeating an army which was sent to its relief, but the heroic obstinacy of the garrison foiled all attempts to take the city, and compelled the raising of the siege after it had lasted 109 days. In 1685 this failure was redeemed, Charles of Lorraine won another great victory, stormed the fortress of Neuhäusel, and drove the Hungarian rebels under Tököli back to Transylvania. In the next year the siege of Ofen was resumed by the duke of Lorraine and the elector of Bavaria. This time the imperialists were determined to succeed, and in September the town was taken by storm.

These imperalist successes were fatal to the rebellion in Hungary which had given rise to the war. Tököli had experienced the ingratitude of his allies. The Turks, treating him as the cause of their misfortunes, had sent him in chains to Adrianople. Before long, however, the want of his services was felt, he was released and sent back to Transylvania. But his influence had suffered fatally. Hungary lay at the feet of the victorious emperor, and Leopold was not long in making his power felt. A special court of justice was erected to act against the rebels, and the severity of its proceedings recalls the acts of Alva's council of blood. The Hungarian estates were summoned to Pressburg, and intimidated into sanctioning important changes in the constitution. The crown ceased to be elective, and was made hereditary in the House of Hapsburg. The nobles had to renounce their right of armed resistance. The coronation-oath, on which the liberties of Hungary were based, was abolished. At the same time, though no formal change was made in the relations of religious parties, the Jesuits were able to continue their persecutions in spite of the law. It was computed that more than half of the Hungarian Protestants suffered death or exile in these years.

Meanwhile the Austrian successes continued. In 1687 the new Grand Vizier, Suleiman Pacha, advanced with a large force to attempt the recovery of Ofen. But he was confronted by the German troops at Mohacz, the scene of a great Turkish victory in 1526, when the last non-Hapsburg king of Hungary fell in battle. After the lapse of a century and a half the Christian defeat was avenged. The duke of Lorraine and Lewis of Baden won a complete victory, which was followed by the reduction of Slavonia and Croatia. These unwonted defeats, coupled with losses in Greece, aroused a mutiny among the Turkish troops. The Janissaries took the lead in demanding the punishment of their generals. The Sultan attempted to pacify them by sending them the head of the grand vizier. But concessions only encouraged further demands, and the spirit of revolt spread from the army to the capital. In Nov. 1687, Mohammed IV. was deposed and replaced by his brother Solyman II. The new Sultan, who had lived for fifty-two years in compulsory retirement, showed unexpected capacity and energy. But he ascended the throne under unfavourable circumstances, which made it difficult to arrest the progress of decline. He was occupied for some months in suppressing the disorder and anarchy which accompanied the change of rulers.

These events in Constantinople gave new advantages to the imperialists. Early in 1688 they advanced against Transylvania, where the vassal princes of the Porte had so long been a thorn in the side of the Austrian monarchy. The ruling prince, Apasi, was occupied in gluttony and self-indulgence, and was easily induced to desert the sinking cause of the Turks and to ally himself with Austria. A treaty was arranged at Hermanstadt in May, 1688, in which the Turkish suzerainty was formally renounced, and Transylvania became a vassal province of the king of Hungary. Imperial garrisons were to be admitted into the chief fortresses. The emperor, on his side, promised protection and the security of political and religious freedom.

Later in the year the war against the Turks was resumed, and in September, Belgrad, the great Danube fortress, and the bulwark of the Turkish power in Hungary, was taken by storm. The imperialists now became the aggressors. In 1689 Lewis of Baden crossed the Danube and invaded Servia. Twice he defeated the Turkish armies, and closed the campaign by the capture of Nizza and Widdin. It was in vain that Solyman made overtures of peace. The emperor's demands were too excessive to be accepted without disgrace. To make matters worse, a new enemy, the Czar of Russia, took the field against the Turks. They had been driven from Hungary, and the old idea of expelling them altogether from the soil of Europe was revived with great prospects of success.

§ 32. At this critical moment two events combined to save the Ottoman empire from dissolution, and to reverse for a moment the fortunes of war. In the first place, war broke out with Louis XIV., which compelled the emperor to divert his attention from eastern affairs and to send his best troops and generals to the Rhine. Secondly, the Sultan conferred the office of Grand Vizier upon Mustafa Kiuprili, the brother of Achmet, whose death in 1676 had been so fatal to the Porte. This third member of the Kiuprili family emulated and even surpassed the reforming energy of his predecessors. Though he held office only for two years, yet in that period he made his influence felt in every part of the administration. The finances were reformed, the Christian subjects were conciliated by a policy of religious toleration, and a new army was created with improved discipline and a revived thirst for military glory. The change which could be produced by the ability and energy of a single man is conspicuous in the events of 1690.

In April, Apasi, prince of Transylvania, died, and the imperial party strained every nerve to secure the election of the emperor himself as his successor. But the grand vizier took the bold step of nominating the Hungarian rebel Tököli as prince of Transylvania, and sent forces which enabled him for a time to maintain his position in the province. While Lewis of Baden was engaged in war with Tököli, the grand vizier himself led a Turkish army into

Servia. Nizza and Widdin were recovered, and the Turks advanced to the siege of Belgrad. The garrison made a gallant defence in spite of the smallness of their numbers. But an accidental explosion, which blew up great part of the wall, enabled the besiegers to recover the greatest of the imperial conquests. The government at Vienna was thrown into consternation by the sudden change of circumstances. Early in 1691, Mustafa Kiuprili strengthened his army with reinforcements and prepared for a new invasion of Hungary. The death of the Sultan in June brought no advantage to the enemies of the Porte. His successor, Achmet II., confirmed the appointment of Mustafa, who was now advancing against Peterwardein. The margrave of Baden hastened from Transylvania to block his way. The two armies met at Szalankemen, where the imperial general won the greatest of his victories. The grand vizier was killed by a bullet, and with him perished the last hope of the restoration of the Turkish empire to its old greatness. The victors followed up their success by capturing Grosswardein and by the complete conquest of Transylvania. Tököli had been driven into Moravia, the young Apasi was a nonentity, and in December 1691, the estates accepted a treaty, by which the Hapsburgs were to hold the princely title, on condition of recognising all ancient rights and privileges. The emperor was to receive a yearly tribute of 50,000 ducats. This treaty destroyed all the ambitious dreams of Tököli. Still he remained true to his allies and fought during the rest of the war on the Turkish side.

The Turkish power was not destroyed by the battle of Szalankemen. Lewis of Baden was despatched to the Rhine to take the place of Charles of Lorraine who had died in 1690. Eugene of Savoy was employed in Italy. In their absence the command of the imperial troops in Hungary fell into comparatively inferior hands and the Turks were enabled to retain Belgrad, though they failed to regain any more of their lost ground. In 1695 Achmet II. died, and was succeeded by his nephew Mustafa II., the son of Mohammed IV. He declared his intention of following the example of his ancestors, and commanding the Turkish armies in person. For the moment he succeeded in inspiring new life into the effete monarchy. At sea the Ottoman fleet gained several advantages over the Venetians. In September, 1695, the Sultan crossed the Danube with an army, captured a number of fortresses, and completely destroyed a detachment of the imperial army. In the next year he again entered Hungary, and at Olasch near Temesvar came into collision with the imperialists under Caprara and the elector of Saxony. A long and obstinate battle ensued, in which both sides suffered heavily and neither could claim a decided advantage. Directly afterwards the elector departed to canvass for the throne of Poland, which was vacant by the death of Sobieski. The command of the imperialists was now undertaken by Eugene of Savoy, who was set at liberty by the recently arranged neutrality of Italy. Under his able leadership the supremacy of the Christian arms was completely restored. In 1697 the Sultan once more advanced from Belgrad to the Theiss. At Zenta on that river was fought one of the great battles of the century, in which Eugene won a decisive victory. The Turkish army, numbering over 100,000 men, was almost annihilated. Want of provisions and floods prevented the prince from reaping the full fruits of his victory, and allowed the Turks still to retain Temesvar and Belgrad.

The western war had been terminated by the peace of Ryswick, and the emperor was now able to concentrate his forces in the east. The Turkish power was once more in imminent danger. The Russians, under Peter the Great, conducted a victorious campaign which ended in the capture of Azof. Venice had reduced the Morea, and was beginning to advance beyond the isthmus of Corinth. But several circumstances combined to make the emperor desirous to end the war. Charles II. of Spain was childless and evidently dying. The great question of the Spanish succession required settlement, and it was necessary for the emperor to have his hands free. England and Holland used their influence to bring about an agreement. In October, 1698, a truce was concluded, which ripened into the important treaty of Carlowitz (January 1699). By this treaty Austria obtained the whole of Transylvania, Hungary with the exception of the Banat of Temesvar, and the greater part of Slavonia and Croatia. Venice retained the Morea, but restored all conquests north of the isthmus of Corinth. To Poland the sultan restored the territories in Podolia which had been conquered under Mohammed IV. Russia kept Azof, and thus secured a position on the Black Sea. The Ottoman power was seriously diminished by the treaty. The decline which began with the victory of Sobieski at Vienna was completed. From this time it ceased to be a danger to the Christian powers of Europe.

It only remains now to notice the end of the Hungarian leader Tököli. The emperor had demanded his surrender at Carlowitz, but the Sultan honourably refused compliance. The luckless rebel received from the gratitude of the Porte some property in Asia Minor near Nicomedia. There he was joined by his wife, who had been a prisoner in the hands of the imperialists, but was released after the peace. In 1703 Tököli died, his wife having died the year before.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE AGE OF LOUIS XIV.

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I. LOUIS' EARLY YEARS.—COLBERT'S ADMINISTRATION.

§ 1. ON the death of Mazarin, Louis XIV. at once undertook in person the government of the state. The place hitherto occupied by Richelieu and Mazarin was henceforth filled by the king himself. The courtiers were astonished at this sudden resolution of the young and pleasure-loving prince, they were still more astonished that he really carried it out. He had to work several hours a day, but he had a real love of details, and soon grew accustomed to and interested in his new occupations. He continued to employ the same ministers who had acted under Mazarin. The chancellor was Séguier, a devoted adherent of the monarchy. Lionne, a diplomatist scarcely inferior to Mazarin himself, had charge of foreign affairs. The military administration was in the hands of Le Tellier, famous chiefly as the father of Louvois, who was already assisting his father and was destined to succeed him. All these ministers were contented to stand in the same relations to Louis as they had previously to Mazarin. But the most ambitious if not the most able of the ministers, was Fouquet, the superintendent of finance. He had amassed a large fortune, which he spent partly on a magnificent establishment, partly on the patronage of literature and art. He aspired to the vacant position of chief minister. Louis, who had been warned against Fouquet by Mazarin, was determined to get rid of him. He had a successor already prepared in the person of Colbert, a humble and industrious servant of Mazarin, whom the latter on his death-bed had recommended to the king. The secrecy and almost treachery of the measures which Louis took for the arrest of Fouquet, show that he was as yet hardly conscious of the extent of the royal power. After everything had been done to inspire confidence, the minister was suddenly imprisoned, and a commission appointed to try him. The trial lasted three years, and in spite of the bitter hostility of the court he was condemned only to exile. The king, assuming the converse of his right of pardon, altered the sentence to perpetual imprisonment in Pinerolo. There Fouquet died in 1680, though many suspected that his reported death was a fiction, and that he was in reality that most famous of state prisoners, the Man in the Iron Mask. Louis now abolished the office of superintendent and entrusted the finances to a commission of five with Colbert at their head. The inner council of the king was now composed of Lionne, Le Tellier and Colbert. With their assistance Louis set himself to the task of internal reform, so necessary after the recent disturbances and maladministration.

§ 2. The chief burden of these reforms fell upon Colbert, who worked with inflinching assiduity. The first and most essential reform was that of the finances, which had fallen into the same condition as they were before the administration of Sully. The "partisans" were again in full activity: of the taxes levied less than half found their way to the treasury; the annual expenditure exceeded the revenue by 22 millions. The measures taken to remedy these abuses were in the highest degree arbitrary but effective. Interest on loans was reduced to five per cent. by a reckless breach of public faith. Individuals were suddenly reduced to poverty, but their interests were disregarded in comparison with the common welfare. A large number of useless offices were swept away, and the system of farming the taxes was abolished. Richelieu's Intendants were revived to superintend the financial administration in the provinces. The taille, the most obnoxious of taxes because it fell only on the middle and lower classes, was reduced, and the treasury compensated by duties on articles of consumption which fell upon all classes. The result of these and other changes was that the revenue was immensely increased, while the pressure of taxation was no heavier than before. This happy result was attained by the measures which Colbert took to increase the national wealth. Native manufactures were encouraged in every possible way. Foreign manufacturers were bribed to take up their abode in France. Heavy duties were levied on imported goods, while bounties were lavishly granted to domestic producers. Colbert's whole system was one of protection, and was attended with evil as well as advantage. The interests of the consumer were sacrificed to those of the producer, and the latter was taught to rely rather on state aid than on his own exertions. Commerce was patronised as well as manufactures. A great canal was projected which was to join the Mediterranean with the German Ocean, and thus to carry the commerce between north and south through the heart of France. Marseilles and Dunkirk were made free ports. Four great companies were formed to trade with the East and West Indies, with Africa and the north. Great part of the capital was furnished by the government, and the royal influence was exerted to obtain subscriptions from individual capitalists. The French navy, which had disappeared under Mazarin, was revived under Colbert. The great ports of Toulon and Brest were strengthened, and the naval power of France was before long inferior only to that of England and Holland. The only element of national industry which the government entirely neglected was agriculture, but even that felt the impulse of the new activity in other departments. Although Colbert's measures were not in accordance with the principles of modern political economy, they were not ill-suited to existing circumstances, and they mark an era in the history of France.

All departments felt the same reforming influence. The judicial administration was centralised, and obsolete differences of custom and procedure modified or abolished. Codes of civil, criminal, and commercial law were drawn up and issued in rapid succession. A regular police system was instituted, and became a new and powerful weapon for the extension of the royal power. The army was reorganised by Le Tellier and Louvois. Discipline was rigorously enforced, uniforms were introduced to distinguish the soldier from the civilian, magazines and hospitals were organised. One of the chief promoters of the new system was an officer called Martinet, whose name has become a proverbial expression for rigorous severity. The bayonet was brought into general use, artillery and fortifications were improved. The king found a new means of occupying the still restless nobility by the gift of military commissions which they could hardly refuse. The patronage of literature and art was undertaken by the government as part of its duties, and in the same spirit as the others. A regular list of pensioners was kept, and among the recipients of the royal bounty were included distinguished men from most European countries. The Academy of Sciences was founded in 1664 on the model of the English Royal Society. In 1669 the Academy of Music was formed for the encouragement of the opera, which had been introduced by Mazarin. In every department of life the influence of the central government was felt. The result was a forced and hasty development, which could not be lasting because it had no firm root in individual energy and independence.

§ 3. Whatever were the defects of the royal policy, these early years of Louis XIV. are among the most prosperous in the history of France. The country was at peace both within and without. But with his other magnificent tastes Louis XIV. unfortunately combined a love of military glory and of national aggrandisement. Determined to maintain his own supremacy in France, he was equally determined to assert and maintain French supremacy in Europe. This is visible in all his acts even during the period of peace. The French and Spanish ambassadors in London disputed for precedence. With the help of armed retainers and English sympathy the Spaniard gained a victory over his rival. Louis was willing to treat this as a *casus belli*, but the feeble government of Spain hastened to apologise and to withdraw its pretensions. In a similar spirit, Louis refused to acknowledge the naval supremacy of England by lowering his flag. Charles II., anxious to be independent of his subjects and to have plenty of money, not only compromised the obnoxious demand, but consented to sell Dunkirk, Cromwell's great conquest, for four million francs. And it was not only temporal powers that Louis treated with such haughtiness, even the pope had to bow before the superior power of France. The French ambassador at Rome, Créqui, had been insulted, and his followers maltreated by the papal guards. Créqui accused the pope's own family. Louis at once demanded satisfaction, and enforced his demand by seizing Avignon, and supporting the dukes of Modena and Parma in their war against the pope. Alexander VII. was forced to make a most humble submission, to banish his brother from Rome, and to send his nephew, Cardinal Chigi, on a special mission to France. He was, says Voltaire, the first papal legate ever sent to demand pardon.

On all sides Louis was successful. In Holland, the burgher party was in power under John de Witt, and always leaned to the French alliance, which was renewed in 1662. In Germany, the league of the Rhine gave the French king more real power than the emperor. The unfortunate duke of Lorraine signed a treaty promising the succession to Louis on his death, but though he afterwards retracted this, he was compelled to cede his last fortress, Marsal. It was quite in accordance with Louis's magnificent ideas that he broke off the old alliance of France with the Turks, and posed for a moment as the champion of Christendom. Neither emperor nor pope desired the help of so powerful an ally, nevertheless, 6000 French troops were despatched to Hungary and contributed to the victory of St Gothard on the Raab (1664). When war broke out in 1664 between England and Holland, Louis at first remained neutral, in the hope that the two great naval rivals would weaken or destroy each other. But as England had at first the upper hand, he espoused the Dutch cause, contributed to their successes in 1666 and 1667, and forced Charles II. to accede to the peace of Breda.

Special importance attaches to Louis XIV.'s relations with Spain, because with them are connected the great political objects of his reign. Mazarin had concluded the Spanish marriage with the definite intention of securing to the French king the succession to the crown of Spain. Louis XIV. inherited this intention from his minister; but he was willing, if he could not get the whole succession, to content himself with the Spanish Netherlands and Franche-Comté. The extension of the frontier towards the north-east was desirable for military reasons, as giving increased security to Paris. It was possible to bring great pressure to bear upon Spain by means of Portugal, which had gained and kept its independence mainly through French assistance. Louis offered to withdraw this assistance, which was continued secretly after the treaty of the Pyrenees, and to combine with Spain to crush Portugal, on condition either that the Infanta's renunciation of her claims to the throne should be declared invalid, or that Franche-Comté and great part of the Netherlands should be handed over to France. The offer was refused by Philip IV., and therefore Louis continued to support the Portuguese. In 1665, 4000 French troops under Marshal Schomberg gained the battle of Villa-Viciosa, which secured the House of Braganza on their throne.

§ 4. On the 17th of September, 1665, Philip IV. of Spain died. By his first wife, the daughter of Henry IV., he had one child, Maria Theresa, married to Louis XIV. By his second marriage with Maria Anna of Austria, Philip left two children, Charles II. who succeeded him, and Margaret Theresa who married the emperor Leopold I. The young king, Charles II., was from the first weakly and ailing: his death was always expected, but he managed to survive the century. Louis XIV. brought forward an immediate claim to several provinces of the Netherlands, based on the "law of devolution." This was an old feudal custom by which the children of a first marriage succeeded to the exclusion of all later descendants. At first Louis hoped to get his claim recognised without resort to arms. But sixteen months of diplomatic activity failed to induce the Spanish regent to dismember the empire. In 1667 the war commenced with an invasion of Flanders. Louis in person accompanied Turenne, and his presence gave to the campaign an appearance of luxury and pomp to which Europe was unaccustomed. No battles were fought, nothing was undertaken but sieges, in which the king delighted. The Spaniards were unprepared for resistance, and one fortress after another fell into the hands of the French. The campaign of 1668 was still more speedy and successful. An army under Condé was collected in Burgundy and suddenly entered Franche-Comté. Within a fortnight the whole province was reduced, and Louis hurried thither to receive its formal submission. But these great successes had aroused the jealousy and alarm of the other European powers. Spain made peace with Portugal, and England, Holland and Sweden concluded the famous Triple Alliance. The powers which had hitherto combined together to resist Spain, now found it necessary to support their old enemy against France. Louis XIV. yielded with surprising readiness, and accepted the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (May, 1668), by which he restored Franche-Comté, but retained his conquests in the Netherlands. Thus France secured an important accession of strength on the weakest point of her frontier. It is usual for English historians to attribute Louis' moderation to the dread of the Triple Alliance. His motive is perhaps rather to be found in a secret treaty which he had made with the emperor Leopold. By this, Spain itself was to go to the Austrian Hapsburgs, but France was to have the outlying Spanish provinces. Charles II.'s death appeared so likely that Louis preferred to wait for peaceful acquisitions rather than to draw on himself the hostility of Europe by further conquests.

II. FRANCE AT THE ZENITH OF ITS POWER.—ASCENDANCY OF LOUVOIS.

§ 5. From the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle must be dated an important change in the attitude of Louis XIV. Hitherto he had followed the lines laid down by Richelieu and Mazarin, who had paid little attention to religious differences, and had aimed solely at the political advancement of France. Henceforth he became more and more reactionary and bigoted, and resumed that policy of enforcing religious unity which had given rise to such evils in the last century. He was anxious to crush the Huguenots at home at first rather by peaceful pressure than by force. But a natural and obvious preliminary was to weaken the Calvinists abroad, in whom the Huguenots found their chief allies. The most important of these were the Dutch. Holland offered an asylum to refugees of all countries. It was there that the French exiles printed books and pamphlets which attacked the established government and religion of France. Louis had also political reasons for his hostility. He was indignant that the Dutch, a nation of merchants, should presume to interfere with the affairs of princes, and especially with his designs on the Spanish succession. The Triple Alliance, though less important than has been thought, was yet a menace to France, and Louis regarded John de Witt as its chief author. The existing government of Holland was based on the exclusion from power of the House of Orange, which had been accomplished on the death of William II. in 1650. Louis thought to render a service to the cause of monarchy by overthrowing the republic and restoring authority to William III. of Orange, who was just arriving at manly age.

It was not difficult to detach England from the Triple Alliance. The bombardment of Chatham still rankled in people's minds, and commercial jealousy was a fertile source of quarrel. Charles II. hated his pecuniary dependence upon Parliament, and his enforced adhesion to the English church. Negotiations were undertaken by Charles' sister, Henrietta of Orleans, the favourite of the French king and court. She concluded the treaty of Dover (1670), by which Charles II. undertook to restore Catholicism in England, to combine with France against Holland, and to offer no obstacle to Louis' designs on Spain. In return for these concessions, he was to receive a large sum of money and the assistance of French troops to crush a possible revolt of his subjects. This disgraceful treaty was kept a secret even from the majority of the ministers. They were duped by a false treaty which was only concerned with the alliance against Holland, and this was not made public for more than a year. Directly after her return from Dover, the duchess of Orleans died suddenly, not without suspicion of having been poisoned by her husband.

With Sweden, the other member of the alliance, French diplomacy was equally successful. The old alliance with France was renewed, and the Swedes engaged to invade Germany in case that power undertook the defence of Holland. The emperor Leopold was bound by the League of the Rhine and by his secret treaty with Louis. Most of the German princes agreed to remain neutral, and the archbishop of Cologne and the bishop of Münster openly took up arms against Holland. Frederick William of Brandenburg, the Great Elector, alone remained obstinate in his adherence to the Protestant cause. He hoped to obtain from the Dutch the territory in Cleve which they still held. Thus the success of France seemed assured. Spain was the only power that was likely to assist the Dutch, and the helplessness of Spain had been manifested in the recent wars. Charles III. of Lorraine, who hoped to take advantage of a new war to regain his lost independence, had been expelled from his duchy in 1670 and driven into exile from which he never returned. In 1671, Lyonne, the foreign minister, died, and his death was fatal to the continuance of peace. Colbert had no longer a supporter in the royal council, where the ascendancy fell to Louvois, brutal and harsh in domestic affairs, and the ardent supporter of an aggressive foreign policy. He becomes the evil genius of Louis XIV.

In 1672 the unjust and unprovoked war commenced. On sea the Dutch contended on equal terms with the combined fleets of England and France, and fought a desperate but indecisive battle in Southwold bay. But on land matters were altogether different. The army had been persistently sacrificed to the navy by De Witt, on account of its military loyalty to the House of Orange. There was no force capable of resisting the French attack. Louis had collected two great armies under Turenne and Condé, while a third force under the duke of Luxemburg was to co-operate with the bishops of Münster and Cologne. To avoid arousing the open hostility of Spain, it was determined not to march through the Netherlands, but to take a circuitous route. A detachment was sent to make a feigned attack on Maestricht, where the Dutch were best prepared, while the main force advanced to Neuss and Kaiserwerth, which the elector of Cologne had ceded as military depôts. The passage of the Rhine, which gave such undeserved fame to Louis' armies, was easily effected. The Dutch could make no resistance to attack from an unexpected quarter. One fortress after another fell into the hands of the king, who delighted in successful sieges. De Witt, conscious of defeat, attempted to negotiate, but the French terms were too humiliating to be accepted. Meanwhile party feeling in Holland had been stimulated rather than allayed by the national disasters. The partisans of the House of Orange rose against the unfortunate rather than guilty government, and compelled the appointment of William of Orange as stadtholder. Not content with this, the mob at the Hague rose in armed revolt and brutally murdered John de Witt and his brother Cornelius. William was accused of complicity with the crime, probably on no other ground than that it was to his advantage. Although the nephew of Charles II., he was determined to defend to the last the national independence, and he infused his own dauntless spirit into the people whom he ruled. The dykes were cut, and floods offered a more effectual barrier than troops to the invaders' progress. Already the first tide of French success had spent itself. Louis, under the influence of the self-confident Louvois, had rejected the advice of his abler generals. Instead of making a rapid and decisive advance, he set himself to capture unimportant towns, and weakened his army by detaching garrisons from it. When he found his career of conquest checked, he quitted the army, and returned with the court to St. Germain.

§ 6. The rapidity of the early successes had aroused all the enemies of France; the first check encouraged them to declare themselves. The emperor Leopold, disregarding all conventions with Louis, concluded an alliance with the elector of Brandenburg for the defence of Holland. A combined army, under Frederick William and the imperial general Montecuculi, advanced to the support of William of Orange. Spain, conscious of its own weakness, was unwilling to declare openly against France, but Monterey, the governor of the Netherlands, sent secret assistance to the Dutch. These events necessitated a complete change in the military plans of the French. Instead of continuing their conquests, they had to stand on the defensive. While Luxemburg remained in Holland to make head against William, Condé undertook the defence of Alsace, and Turenne advanced to the Rhine to check the German troops. Never were Turenne's abilities more conspicuously manifested than in this campaign. Though he had only 15,000 men, he handled them with marvellous dexterity. The elector and Montecuculi marched up the Rhine to find a safe crossing. Everywhere they found the French in front of them, while they were unable to force an engagement with their superior numbers. At length, wearied and exhausted, they gave up all hope of entering Holland, and retreated to attack the French allies in Cologne and Münster. Louis and Louvois, overjoyed at the withdrawal of this formidable enemy from the Rhine, sent strict orders to Turenne not to risk a pursuit. But conscious of his strength, he boldly disregarded the orders and advanced to attack the allies. The worn out German army could make no effective resistance, and were driven from one defensive line to another, till the whole of Westphalia was in French hands. The elector of Brandenburg retired in disgust to Berlin and offered terms which were readily accepted. He promised to remain neutral, and the French undertook to restore the Cleve territories which were held by the Dutch. Meanwhile, in Holland, William of Orange was bitterly disappointed at the failure of his German allies. Nevertheless, with a reinforcement of 10,000 Spaniards, he attacked Charleroi, though without success. During his absence, Luxemburg made a bold march over the ice against the Hague, and the capital was only saved by a sudden thaw. The brutal spirit of Louvois had infected the French army, and during their retreat they were guilty of atrocities which left an abiding hatred of France in the minds of the Dutch. Louis XIV. now reappeared in person at the head of an army. The brilliant but rash operations of 1672 were now out of the question, and it was determined to reduce Maestricht and to make it a military basis. The siege was successfully conducted by Vauban, the greatest engineer of the age, and the fortress, which commanded the whole line of the Maas, was forced to surrender (June 29, 1673).

Thus in the summer of 1673 France had more than held its own against numerous enemies. But it was evident that the war had completely lost its original character. In August a league was concluded at the Hague between the emperor, Spain, and Holland. It was joined by the king of Denmark, the elector of Saxony, and the duke of Lorraine. The imperial army had been reformed in Bohemia after its recent defeat. Montecuculi was not again outmanœuvred by Turenne. A junction was effected with William of Orange, and the combined armies laid siege to Bonn. All the French efforts to relieve the town proved fruitless. The Rhine was completely lost to France, and Turenne had to fall back on the Sarre. This decided the attitude of Germany. The bishops of Münster and Cologne had to make peace. The elector of Brandenburg showed signs of breaking his neutrality. The connexion of France with the German princes, established so firmly by the treaties of Westphalia, the Rhine, and the Pyrenees, was in a moment annihilated. Soon afterwards the English parliament, bitterly exasperated by the religious policy of Charles II., forced him to make peace with the Dutch (February, 1674). Sweden was the only ally left to France, and Sweden, isolated in the north, could do nothing of importance. Thus Louis XIV.'s aggressions had completely altered the whole balance of European politics. The invasion of Holland had served only to revive the old duel between France and the House of Hapsburg, with this all-important difference, that the powers which had previously supported the former were now united in opposition to her.

§ 7. Fortunately for France, Louis XIV. showed himself fully conscious of the changed aspect of affairs, and altered his plans to meet it. He ordered the evacuation of all the recent conquests in Holland except Maestricht and Grave. He was even anxious to make peace with the enemy whom he had so wantonly provoked, but William of Orange would listen to no terms. The war was brought back to the French frontiers. Condé was to make head against the Dutch and Spaniards on the Meuse. Turenne undertook the defence of Alsace and Lorraine against the Germans. Schomberg was sent to protect Roussillon from a threatened Spanish invasion. But while taking these measures to defend his newly acquired borders, Louis did not altogether abandon his schemes of conquest. He himself led an army into Franche-Comté. The duke of Lorraine attempted to defend the province but was prevented by Turenne. The second conquest of Franche-Comté took six weeks to accomplish, but was complete and final. Henceforth the Jura was to be the eastern frontier of France. While the king was occupied with this easy conquest, Condé was attacked by the prince of Orange. The French position was too strong for an assault, and the Dutch and Spanish troops retreated. Condé followed them and forced an engagement at Senef. A fiercely contested battle ended in the victory of neither, but the exhaustion of both armies. William succeeded in taking Grave, but this was the only success gained by the allies in 1674. Meanwhile, Turenne was conducting a campaign which put the seal on his military fame. Instead of waiting to be attacked, he took the aggressive, crossed the Rhine at Philipsburg, and crushed the imperial forces at Sinzheim. He followed up his success by devastating the

Palatinate, so as to deprive the enemy of sustenance. The cruelty with which this was done is a lasting stain on Turenne's reputation. The Germans now received reinforcements, and resumed their advance with numbers far superior to the troops of Turenne. The French government, fearing an invasion, ordered Turenne to fall back for the defence of France. But he again refused to obey the orders of the court. For a fortnight he held the enemy in check, until want of provisions compelled them to march along the Rhine to Strasburg. Turenne followed them, but too late to save the city, which surrendered, and opened to the imperialists the entrance into Alsace. Instead of retreating, as everybody expected, the French general again attacked the enemy, and won a complete victory at Enzheim, a battle in which Churchill, afterwards duke of Marlborough, took part. But immediately afterwards the arrival of the elector of Brandenburg with more than 20,000 men, restored their superiority to the German forces, and Turenne fell slowly back to Lorraine. The Germans occupied Upper Alsace, and promised themselves complete success in the ensuing campaign. But their active enemy would allow them no rest. In the middle of winter, in spite of frost and snow, Turenne marched his troops through difficult mountain-passes to Belfort. The Germans, completely taken by surprise, were forced to retreat in confusion. A part of the army, rallied by the elector of Brandenburg, was routed at Turkheim by Turenne, who followed in swift pursuit. Alsace was completely recovered, and the victorious general returned in triumph to Paris. Altogether few years are so famous in the military annals of France as 1674. The Spanish attack on Roussillon was unimportant, and was easily repulsed by Schomberg.

§ 8. The campaign of 1675 was comparatively unimportant as regards great achievements. Sweden was at last induced to keep the promise made in 1671, and to attack Brandenburg. This forced the elector to withdraw his troops for the defence of his own country, and thus the imperial forces were greatly reduced. But in compensation for this Montecuculi reassumed the command. Turenne found his task much harder than in the preceding year. His first success was in defending Strasburg, and thus making Swabia instead of Alsace the seat of war. In the Black Forest six weeks of patient manœuvring ensued, in which the two generals displayed all their skill in the space of a few square leagues. At last Turenne caught the enemy at a disadvantage, and was prepared to crush them, when he was killed by a stray bullet just as he made the final reconnaissance before the battle. The death of their greatest general was a far more serious loss to the French than any defeat could have been. The army at once withdrew across the

Rhine, and Montecuculi, obtaining a passage through Strasburg was enabled to threaten Hagenau in Lower Alsace. At the same time the French suffered another disaster. The duke of Lorraine had attacked the electorate of Trier, where he was opposed by an army under Marshal Créqui. At Saarbrück the French were completely defeated, and soon afterwards Trier was taken. This was the last act of the old duke Charles III., who died in September, having never been able to regain his lost duchy. Condé was now despatched to replace Turenne. With a skill and prudence worthy of his deceased rival, he forced Montecuculi to raise the siege of Hagenau, and ultimately drove him from Alsace. This was the last campaign of both these great generals. Montecuculi, broken down in health, resigned his command. Condé retired into private life at Chantilly, where he solaced his remaining years with the most brilliant literary society of France.

§ 9. In 1676 the loss of the great commanders is plainly visible in the comparative insignificance of the campaign. Louis commanded in person the army in Flanders, with the usual result. Condé and Bouchain were taken, but an excellent opportunity of defeating the prince of Orange was neglected. The fault was so obvious that Louis was accused of personal cowardice. The true explanation seems to lie in his extravagant conception of his own dignity. He could not endure even to run the risk of a defeat in a pitched battle. Sieges, on the other hand, were comparatively secure. Louvois, though wanting in military genius, excelled in the management of the transit and supplies of troops. The engineering operations were safely entrusted to Vauban. Thus Louis' successes, though not brilliant, were usually substantial. William of Orange made an effort to retake Maestricht, but was repulsed. On the Rhine the young Charles IV. of Lorraine succeeded his uncle in the command of the imperial army. He gained one great success in this year, the reduction of Philipsburg. But Luxemburg succeeded in excluding him from Alsace. It was on a wholly novel element, the sea, that France gained its most distinguished successes in 1676. With the support of France, Messina had revolted against Spain and maintained its independence. The Spaniards called in the aid of the Dutch fleet under Ruyter. The French vessels were commanded by Duquesne, a really great admiral, who fought three brilliant actions against the combined fleet, in one of which Ruyter was killed. These maritime successes were due in the first place to the reforms of Colbert, and made a profound impression in Europe. Hitherto the French had been powerless on the sea, but if they once gained the supremacy there, as well as on land, they would become invincible.

France had made great exertions during these years, and was beginning to show signs of exhaustion. Colbert had always been opposed to the war, partly because it gave Louvois an influence superior to his own, partly because it ruined his financial policy. All his reforms had to be given up one by one; new offices were created and sold; the taille had to be raised; even the old system of loans was revived. France was again suffering from exactions like those of Richelieu and Mazarin. Discontent produced revolts in Normandy, Brittany and Guienne. It was obvious that the glory of resisting all Europe was not without its drawbacks. Louis seriously desired peace. This he still hoped to gain by a separate negotiation with the Dutch. But William of Orange and the emperor were determined to prolong the war until some adequate security was obtained against French ambition. Louis determined to force on a peace by an energetic prosecution of the war. In 1677 he appeared in Flanders, and took Valenciennes and Cambray. His brother, the duke of Orleans, laid siege to St. Omer, and when William of Orange advanced to its relief, inflicted a severe defeat on him at Cassel. By this victory he secured the French hold on Flanders, but earned his brother's jealousy. Louis could not pardon a success more brilliant than he had ever gained, and Orleans was never again entrusted with a command. On the Rhine Créqui commanded instead of Luxemburg. He had learnt wisdom from his defeat at Saarbrück, and henceforth sought to emulate the prudent strategy of Turenne rather than the brilliant rashness of Condé. The result was a most successful campaign against the duke of Lorraine. The latter tried to effect a junction with Orange, but found the way barred: then he turned to meet the army of the circles which was advancing from Germany to assist him, but Créqui out-marched him, and completely routed the Germans. After inflicting a defeat on the duke of Lorraine in Alsace, Créqui concluded the year by taking Freiburg (Nov. 1677).

These brilliant successes increased the desire for peace, especially among the Dutch, who, having secured their independence, had everything to lose by the continuance of the war. But William of Orange was conscious that his life's task was to oppose Louis XIV. His point of view was European rather than national. The result was division and disaffection in Holland. The old republican party, apparently crushed by De Witt's death, once more raised its head. In opposition to the stadtholder, the states sent envoys to negotiate with the French at Nymegen. William, thus deserted by his subjects, sought to strengthen himself by an English alliance. He induced Charles II. to consent to his marriage with Mary, daughter of the duke of York. By allying himself with the opposition party in Parliament, he even forced the English king to declare war against France. Louis was compelled to make new efforts, and to concentrate his forces. Messina was evacuated, and left to the tender mercies of Spain. Créqui again defeated the duke of Lorraine, and drove him from Alsace into the Palatinate. Louis himself again entered Flanders and captured Ghent.

§ 10. These events gave a final impulse to the negotiations at Nymegen. On August 11, 1678, the first treaty was signed between France and Holland. Four days afterwards, William of Orange, still anxious to make peace impossible, made a desperate attack on the army of Luxemburg before Mons, but was repulsed. It has never been definitely known whether William was or was not cognisant at the time that peace had been made. Spain accepted a treaty in September. The emperor continued to hold out, but at last, hampered by a revolt in Hungary, he came to terms in February, 1679. France was the only gainer by a war which she had wantonly provoked. Holland lost nothing, as Maestricht, the last remnant of the French conquests, was restored, and an advantageous treaty of commerce was arranged. Spain, as the weakest of the allies, had to make the greatest sacrifices. Franche-Comté was irrevocably renounced, and all the important frontier towns of the Netherlands were handed over to France. The treaty with the emperor restored the arrangements of Westphalia, with the exception that Freiburg was given to France in exchange for Philipsburg. The duke of Lorraine was to be restored on the same terms as had been laid down in the peace of the Pyrenees, but these were rejected by Charles IV., and his duchy remained in French hands. The Great Elector of Brandenburg refused to consent to the French demands that all conquests made from Sweden during the war should be restored. But the appearance of Créqui on the Elbe forced him into acquiescence, and a treaty was signed in June, 1679. Two months afterwards Denmark also came to terms, and thus the war ended in the general pacification of Europe.

§ 11. Louis XIV. was now at the height of his glory. Single-handed he had confronted the allied powers of Europe, and had emerged from the contest victorious. In the invasion of Holland he had broken through the oldest and wisest traditions of French policy, but the vast resources of his country and the concentration of national forces under his predecessors enabled him to escape the consequences of his error. From this time, however, the period of decadence sets in. The brilliant successes of his early years are soon forgotten amidst the disasters that attend the close of his reign. The magnanimous and popular prince who so boldly grasped the reins of government as they fell from the hands of Mazarin, sinks gradually into the gloomy and bigoted tyrant, dreaded by all Europe and by his own subjects. The servility and adulation which surrounded Louis in the years following the peace of Nymegen would have turned the head of any mortal. Flattery almost gave place to worship. Louis fell an easy victim to temptation, and became intoxicated with the idea of his own greatness and invincible power. Opposition was unbearable from an equal, still more from a subject. He refused to live any longer at the Louvre in the midst of the citizens, and built for himself the enormous and wearisome palace at Versailles, which remains an apt memorial of his character and his reign. To defray the immense expenses, Colbert had to continue those financial expedients which had been forced on him by the war, but which ruined all his previous schemes. If he ventured the slightest remonstrance, Louis crushed him by a reference to the superior devotion of his rival Louvois. While the people groaned under the taxes levied to support the royal luxury, the nobles were degraded from all political importance to become the valets of their sovereign. Representatives of the great houses of France were content to hold the towel at the king's toilet instead of wielding the marshal's baton. Military and official posts were conferred on members of the middle class whose servility was assured. The patronage of literature, for which Louis has been so undeservedly praised, was regulated not so much by the merits of a writer as by his talents as a courtier and a sycophant. Everything was made to centre round the king and court. All that was healthy and independent either in thought or action, was sedulously stifled. In 1683 one of the last securities for a moderate government was removed by the death of Colbert, who had striven against much that he had been unable to prevent, and had acted as some counterpoise to the baneful influence of Louvois. That minister now became supreme in the royal council. At the same time a new actor appeared prominently on the scene, who shares with Louvois the control of the king in the ensuing period. Louis XIV.'s first mistress was Louise de la Vallière, who had really loved him and who retired to a convent. She was succeeded by the bold and brilliant Madame de Montespan, who for many years was supreme at court, but who was never allowed to exert any political influence. It was she who introduced to the king's notice the lady who was destined to be her rival and successor. Françoise d'Aubigny, noted for her beauty and ability, was the widow of the burlesque writer of the Fronde, Scarron. After his death she was reduced to great poverty until she was induced by Madame de Montespan to undertake the charge of the king's natural children. Louis himself for a long time disliked her, though he gave her the territory of Maintenon from which she took her historical name. Gradually he became accustomed to her society till he could no longer dispense with it. The new favourite was a prude. She got rid of Madame de Montespan by effecting a reconciliation between Louis and his wife Maria Theresa. When the latter died in 1683, the king was privately married to Madame de Maintenon. Her character has been the subject of endless dispute, but there can be no doubt of her immense influence on the history of France.

II. The Reunions. Religious Persecution. The League of Augsburg.

§ 12. Advantageous as the treaty of Nymegen was to France, it was regarded by Louis only as the basis of new acquisitions. He was determined to make France impregnable to external invasion. Vauban was employed to erect fortresses on every side of the French border. But there were still some points on the frontier which were not strong enough in a military point of view. Especially the Three Bishoprics and Alsace were exposed to attack. This Louis was determined to remedy without any regard to law or equity. He found his opportunity in the indefinite wording of the treaties of Westphalia and the Pyrenees. For instance, Metz, Toul, and Verdun had been ceded to France "with their dependencies," and this phrase was capable of various interpretations. Again, in Alsace the immediate vassals of the Empire had retained their independence, but the question arose as to who was really such an immediate vassal. And, moreover, subjection to the Empire was altogether a different thing to subjection to France. The Empire was a very loosely connected body in which the various units did much as they pleased. In France, on the other hand, there was a highly centralised government, which allowed no independent action whatever. Hitherto France, occupied with the Fronde and with foreign wars, had allowed these important questions to remain unsettled. But now that Europe desired peace, Louis determined to settle all these disputes for his own advantage. The parliament of Metz was ordered to find out all the dependencies of the Three Bishoprics, and they were speedily compelled to acknowledge French suzerainty. At Breisach a provincial court was erected to decide on the limits of Louis' rights in Alsace. A similar assembly in Besançon was to act in Franche-Comté. These are the famous "Chambers of Reunion," which claimed the powers of an international tribunal. The treaties which France had made with foreign powers were to be interpreted at the pleasure of France alone. These assumptions, bold and unparalleled as they were, aroused the mistrust but not the opposition of Europe. Louis had kept his army on a war footing, while his rivals had disbanded theirs. The chamber of Breisach awarded to France the complete suzerainty of Alsace. The lesser imperial vassals had to submit at once, and the free city of Strasburg, suddenly attacked by an army under Louvois, was compelled to surrender (Sept. 1681). On the very same day the fortress of Casale in Italy, which had been of such importance in the time of Richelieu, was ceded to France by Charles of Mantua. Not content with these acquisitions, Louis demanded Alost from Spain, and to enforce the demand laid siege to Luxemburg, a fortress which he ardently coveted.

Louis was very fortunate in the moment which he chose for these unheard-of aggressions. Spain was powerless without allies. William of Orange, eager for war, was hampered by the republican party, which insisted on peace. In Germany, the elector of Brandenburg, who had raised himself to the rank of a great power, was so disgusted with his treatment by the emperor in the recent negotiations that he had formed an alliance with France. The emperor himself, on whom devolved the duty of defending his outlying frontiers, was occupied with a revolt in Hungary, which was now complicated by a Turkish war. In 1683, for the second time in history, the Turks advanced to the siege of Vienna. No event could have been more advantageous for Louis, though he had probably done nothing to encourage the invasion. With a show of magnanimity he raised the siege of Luxemburg to allow the Spaniards to assist Austria against the infidel. But Vienna was saved by the heroism of John Sobieski, king of Poland, and France alone refused to share the transports of Europe. Louis at once resumed his hostilities against Spain. Courtrai, Dixmude, and lastly Luxemburg were taken. Still Europe refused to check the French advance. In August, 1684, a twenty years' truce was concluded with Holland, Spain and the Empire. Louis kept possession of Luxemburg, and the legality of the "reunions" was virtually recognised. About the same time Louis sought to establish his naval supremacy in the Mediterranean. Merely because Genoa had preferred a Spanish to a French alliance, the unfortunate city was bombarded and forced to make a humiliating submission.

§ 13. Louis' absolutist tendencies were to the full as conspicuous in his domestic as in his foreign policy. After the lapse of more than half a century, France was again agitated by religious disputes. The great questions of the day were, the schism of the Jansenists, the relations of the Gallican church to Rome, and the position of the Huguenots as an independent sect. The French church was at this time dominated by the Jesuits, who supplied the royal confessor, Père la Chaise. The famous order had sadly degenerated from the principles of Loyola. They had become more secular and more greedy of power and riches. The old unhesitating obedience to authority had disappeared, and in 1651 we hear of a general of the order being deposed. Always anxious to be on the winning side, the Jesuits had given up their close alliance with Spain and attached themselves to the House of Bourbon. Louis could rely upon them for support even against the papacy, which they had been founded to defend. And this worldly ambition had brought with it graver moral defects. Their system of casuistry taught them to find excuses for the worst vices so long as the end was laudable. Their influence and teaching tended to lower the whole moral and religious tone of the people. Against this influence a natural reaction set in, of which the Jansenists were the foremost representatives. Cornelius Jansen and Jean du Vergier, two fellow-students at Louvain, were the founders of the new sect. Jansen became bishop of Ypres, and in 1635 produced his *Augustinus*, in which he laid down his theological principles. Du Vergier was made abbot of St. Cyran and inculcated the same principles by his life and personal influence. The centre of the Jansenists was the monastery of Port Royal and a neighbouring retreat, where there were soon collected a number of the most eminent men in France, including Pascal, Arnauld, Nicole, Tillemont and Racine. The Jesuit casuistry was based upon the doctrine of free-will, and the Jansenists developed the counter-theory of predestination, which they found in the writings of Augustine. In their strictness of life and in many of their dogmas they resembled the Calvinists, and they have been called the "Puritans of Catholicism." But they differed from the Protestants in the weight which they attached to tradition and the fathers, and they clung steadfastly to the idea of the universal church. From the first the sect had to make its way against opposition. Richelieu, who dreaded the appearance of new Huguenots, persecuted them and even imprisoned St. Cyran. But after his death their influence revived and spread itself. During the Fronde they supported De Retz, and thus drew on themselves the enmity of Mazarin. In 1653 the pope, Innocent X., was induced to issue a bull condemning five propositions which were supposed to be found in the *Augustinus* of Jansen. A form of declaration was drawn up, and approved by the French government and a clerical assembly. This the Jansenists were called upon to accept. But they denied that the propositions were to be found in Jansen's book, and they maintained that the papal infallibility did not extend to matters of fact. Threats and persecutions were unable to make them yield. In 1654 Pascal published the famous 'Provincial Letters,' a satire on the principles of the Jesuits so vigorous and incisive that the order never really recovered its hold on the popular confidence. Their enmity against the Jansenists became more bitter than ever, but they failed to crush them. The question of the papal bull remained unsettled till 1669, when a compromise was accepted by Clement IX. The Jansenists agreed to condemn the five propositions as heretical, but reserved the question as to whether they were really taken from their teacher's book. From this time they again revived; some of them gained preferment in the church, and their doctrines spread into other countries. Louis XIV. hated them, partly as a remnant of the old Fronde, partly because they held the ecclesiastical power to be independent of the state, and partly because he personally favoured the Jesuits. They were thus opposed both by the king and by the pope, and were only saved from destruction by the want of unity between their opponents.

§ 14. Louis XIV. wished to be supreme in the church as well as in the state, and this necessarily brought him into collision with the rival authority of the papacy. Moreover the popes at this time were afraid of the rising French power, and usually sided with the House of Hapsburg, and for this Louis revenged himself by encroaching on their spiritual power. The basis of the royal power in church affairs was the so-called *regale*, the king's right to receive the revenues of a vacant bishopric, and to appoint to all the livings that belonged to it. This right had always been exercised by the French kings except in Guienne, Languedoc, Provence and Dauphiné. Louis, conscious of his power, wished to extend it to these four provinces. The two bishops of Pamier and Alais, who were Jansenists and wished to restrict secular interference, protested against this extension of the royal power, and appealed to the pope. Innocent XI. at once took up their cause, and forbade the king to proceed with his design. But Louis, religious and orthodox as he was, would not yield to papal authority. The clergy, and especially the Jesuits, had always been on his side, and he summoned a national synod in 1682. They approved of the extension of the *regale*, and drew up four general propositions, viz., that the temporal power is independent of the spiritual: that a general council is superior to the pope: that the papal authority cannot alter the usages of the Gallican church: and that papal decisions, even in matters of faith, are not valid till they have received the consent of the church. This was a great victory for Louis. The clergy combined with the king to exclude the domination of the papacy as a foreign power. This was a great advance both for the unity of the nation and for the royal supremacy. But the opposition to the papacy involved not the slightest tendency to a change in doctrine. Louis, under the influence of Madame de Maintenon, was more rigidly orthodox than ever. At the very time that he was quarrelling with the head of his church, he was preparing to render an acceptable service to that church by the suppression of heresy in France.

§ 15. Ever since the fall of La Rochelle and the treaty of Alais, the Huguenots had lived peaceably in the enjoyment of the religious liberty that had been left to them. During the Fronde they had remained perfectly quiet, and had thus earned the gratitude of the king. One of Louis' first acts was a promise to observe the Edict of Nantes. During the early part of his reign the Huguenots were unmolested. Excluded from direct military or political employment, they devoted themselves with the more ardour to industry, and especially to financial administration. Colbert found in them his ablest and most trustworthy instruments. So peaceful and prosperous was the Calvinist population, that Louis conceived the idea of effecting their reunion with the church. The rejection of this scheme by a synod in 1673 hurt the king's self-love, and produced the first ill-will against the Huguenots. It was at this time that he was at war with Holland, and though there was no trace of an alliance, he was irritated to think that a portion of his subjects had common religious interests and sympathy with his enemies. The devotion of the French clergy, who in 1675 made him an extraordinary grant for the war, seemed to merit some grateful return. From this time the court began to aim at the conversion of the Huguenots, at first by rewards and favours showered on those who came over, afterwards by more violent measures. Every possible form of oppression was resorted to that did not run directly counter to the letter of the Edict of Nantes. The conversion of a Catholic to the reformed faith was forbidden under the severest penalties. Mixed marriages were prohibited. Huguenots were excluded from all financial employment, from municipal offices, and from the legal and medical professions. The taille was doubly assessed upon them, and on the slightest pretext their churches were demolished by the orthodox parliaments. Many of the oppressed sect sought a refuge from persecution in voluntary exile. But emigration was forbidden by a royal edict. Risings broke out in the Cevennes and other provinces, but were speedily put down by force. Louvois now hit on a characteristic scheme for procuring conversions. Troops were quartered on Huguenot households till they abjured their faith. Military brutality proved a most effective missionary instrument. Every day came the news of numerous conversions. Louis was persuaded by his ministers that the one thing necessary to complete the work was that the royal will should be finally and unhesitatingly expressed. This could be most effectively done by the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. The king at first hesitated to take such an extreme step. France had obtained its greatness by alliance with the Protestants. To undo the great work of Henry IV. would be to break with the most serviceable of French allies. Had war with the Hapsburgs been going on, the act would have been impossible. But Europe was at peace, and had conclusively shown its desire to remain so. England, once the champion of Protestantism, was now under James II., from whom applause rather than opposition was expected. At last Louis determined on the most fatal measure of his reign. On Oct. 22, 1685, appeared an edict by which the Huguenots were deprived of all the privileges conferred on them by the Edict of Nantes or the treaty of Alais; the reformed worship was prohibited; the ministers were to be exiled, and the churches destroyed; emigration was forbidden under penalty of the galleys. The only concession made was a promise of liberty of conscience, so long as no public worship took place. The edict was welcomed with extravagant applause by the Catholic world. Innocent XI. alone, jealous of Louis' power, and personally inclined to mild measures, looked on in gloomy disapproval. But the measure was fatal to the real interests of France, both external and internal. The prohibition of emigration could not be enforced. More than half a million of the most intelligent and industrious population of France crossed the borders and carried their skill to more tolerant countries—to England, Holland, and Prussia. By the gain of those countries may be measured the loss of France. The industrial life which Colbert had hoped to create and stimulate, seemed to be irretrievably ruined. And the moral and intellectual energies of the people were no less seriously injured. Louis XIV. may have been misled and misinformed by Louvois, he may have been influenced by the milder bigotry of Madame de Maintenon, but on his head must rest the ultimate responsibility of the measure which did such infinite damage to France, and which far outweighs any benefits that his earlier government may have conferred on his subjects.

§ 16. In foreign politics the effect of the revocation of the Edict of Nantes was equally disastrous, and was more immediately felt. All the Protestant allies of France were completely alienated. In Holland William of Orange was enabled to triumph over the republican party, which had hitherto tied his hands. The elector of Brandenburg, who had closely allied himself with Louis in opposition to the emperor, changed his attitude, and made up all his differences with Austria. The influence which France had obtained over the German princes by the League of the Rhine was overthrown. Louis had schemed for the transference of the Empire to himself, that was henceforth hopeless. The aggressions of Louis on the frontiers of Germany, hitherto unopposed and condoned by the truce of 1684, would no longer be tolerated. In 1685 the elector palatine Charles died, the last male of the House of Simmern. The electorate passed to Philip William of the line of Neuburg. But Louis at once claimed great part of the Lower Palatinate, in right of Charles' sister, the wife of his brother Philip of Orleans. Germany raised itself to oppose the claim. In July, 1686, a defensive league was concluded at Augsburg between the emperor, Spain, Sweden, Holland and almost all the German princes and circles. In the next year it was joined by the elector of Bavaria, the duke of Saxony, and the chief independent states of Italy. The pope, Innocent XI., gave it his secret support. We can see how completely Louis XIV.'s ambition and bigotry had reversed the attitude of the European powers. Formerly France had supported Protestantism in its resistance to the great Catholic power of the House of Hapsburg. Now Spain and Austria—even the Pope himself—were leagued with the Protestant powers to check the aggressions of France in the sphere both of politics and of religion

There was still one important power whose adhesion to the league against Louis seemed necessary to ensure its success. England which, under Elizabeth and Cromwell, had been the champion of Protestantism, was now ruled by the bigoted and impracticable James II. So far from disapproving of Louis' actions, he showed a desire to imitate them in his own country. Like his predecessor, Charles II., he relied upon French subsidies and French troops to crush any discontent among his subjects. This discontent he speedily aroused. In a reign of only three years (1685–1688), he succeeded in completely alienating every class. His attack on the established church evoked the opposition of the most orderly and submissive of his subjects. The malcontents turned naturally to William of Orange, whose wife was James' daughter and presumptive heiress. The unexpected birth of a son to the king suddenly removed all prospect of a Protestant succession, and rendered prompt measures necessary for the protection of civil and religious liberty. It was determined to invite the Prince of Orange to England to effect a settlement. But in existing circumstances such an act was of European, as well as insular, importance. William was the bitter and avowed opponent of the French king, his success was certain to involve England in the great conflict impending on the continent.

So intense was the hostility which Louis had excited, that the Catholic powers of Europe, the pope at their head, were inclined to support a scheme which must result in the triumph of English Protestantism, and which might involve the deposition of a legitimate and Catholic sovereign. Every risk must be ran in order to deprive France of so important an ally.

§ 17. It was manifest that Louis' position was a very critical one, and required the most cautious action. He had no ally of importance except the Turks, and they were now being decidedly worsted in the war with Austria. In 1688, the great fortress of Belgrade was taken by the imperial army, and the Porte was forced to sue for terms. But Louis obstinately refused to yield in the face of any difficulties. Not only did he continue to prefer his claims in the Palatinate, he prepared for a new and more offensive intervention in German affairs. For a long time he had been in the closest alliance with the electors of Cologne, and this alliance was of great moment as securing the French on the Rhine. In 1688 the archbishop Maximilian Henry died, and the eyes of Europe were turned on the election of his successor. The French party, which included the majority of the chapter, put forward William of Fürstenberg, a vassal of Louis, who had been coadjutor under the late elector. But the emperor was determined not to allow so great a principality to remain practically subject to France. He put forward an opposition candidate, Joseph Clement, brother of the elector of Bavaria. The imperial intervention had some weight with the chapter, and Fürstenberg only obtained thirteen votes out of twenty-four, while his rival received nine. But for a legitimate election two thirds of the votes were required, and the dispute had to be referred to the pope. Innocent XI. had many grounds for quarrel with Louis XIV., and to these had been added a recent grievance. A frequent source of abuse in Rome had been the franchises claimed by foreign ambassadors, which enabled them to shelter any persons, however criminal, who sought refuge in the neighbourhood of their residence. Innocent had issued a decree abolishing these franchises. Louis XIV., with characteristic haughtiness, refused to give up the privileges of his embassy at the command of the pope. An envoy was sent to Rome with a military escort to enforce his pretensions. The pope excommunicated the ambassador, and France and Rome were again at open war with each other. It was obviously the interest of Innocent to check Louis' power in every way. He at once declared Joseph Clement to be the lawful archbishop of Cologne. The French king, afraid of losing his hold on Cologne, replied by acknowledging Fürstenberg and announcing his intention to uphold him.

But meanwhile the interests of France were still more directly threatened by William of Orange's projected expedition to England. Louis sent urgent warnings to James II. and threatened to attack Holland. But James, with his usual stupid arrogance, refused to listen to the warnings, and declared that his position was weakened by the open avowal of the French alliance. Louis had to act for himself. His council was divided as to the measures to be taken, Seignelay, Colbert's son, who was minister of the revenue, urged war against Holland both by land and sea. But Louvois, always jealous of the Colbert family, and fearing that a naval war might increase his rival's influence, advised an immediate attack upon Germany. His opinion was adopted by the king. An army under the dauphin laid siege to Philipsburg, and the skill of Vauban compelled its speedy surrender. The League of Augsburg was entirely unprepared for war, and in an incredibly short space of time the four Rhenish electorates were at the feet of France. The Palatinate was devastated for the second time. Louis' attack upon Germany decided the fate of England. William of Orange, freed from the danger of French invasion, hastened his preparations, and on Nov. 11, 1688, sailed for England. James II. showed as much abject cowardice in danger as foolish confidence beforehand. Desertions from his army and his own family convinced him of the utter hopelessness of resistance, and he fled from the capital. Captured and brought back again he availed himself of the opportunity offered by his crafty opponent, and escaped to France. There Louis received him with great pomp, and magnanimously allowed him to maintain an expensive court at St. Germains. William, with his wife Mary, received the English crown, and one of his first acts was to secure the admission of England into the League of Augsburg. Thus the circle of Louis' enemies was completed. The Revolution of 1688, to which his own errors essentially contributed, marks the triumph of those principles to which the French king was most diametrically opposed.

§ 18. In 1689 the war became general. The object of the allies was to enforce a return to the state of things recognised by the treaty of the Pyrenees. Louis fought to retain, and, if possible, to extend his acquisitions. France had to face attack on every side, on the Pyrenees from Spain, on the east from the combined forces of Holland, Germany, and the Spanish Netherlands, on the Italian frontier from Savoy. At the same time the coast had to be defended against the two great maritime powers, England and Holland. So immense were the resources of France, and so admirable the machinery for employing them, that all these tasks were performed at once. Louis had never less than four armies in the field, and sometimes as many as six. Nor were the allies on their side wanting in energy. Germany alone furnished three armies. One under the prince of Waldeck advanced to co-operate with the Dutch, English and Spaniards in the Netherlands, and defeated the French under d'Humières at Valcourt. Two others, commanded respectively by the elector of Brandenburg and the duke of Lorraine, undertook to drive the French from their recent conquests on the Rhine. Kaiserwerth, Bonn, and Mainz were captured. But these early reverses only roused Louis to greater efforts. The ablest of surviving French generals, Luxemburg, was sent to the Netherlands, the most important scene of war. Marshal Boufflers was to act on the Moselle, and the dauphin, under the supervision of de Lorges, on the Rhine. Catinat, hardly inferior to Luxemburg in ability, was sent against Savoy, while the duke de Noailles led a fifth army across the Pyrenees into Catalonia. It is impossible to follow the details of these various campaigns. Everywhere the French held their own, and even won battles, but the numerical superiority of the allies always neutralised the importance of these successes. Luxemburg defeated Waldeck at the battle of Fleurus (1690), but the enemy was immediately reinforced by the elector of Brandenburg, and the French could make no advance. More brilliant, though not more lasting, were the achievements of Catinat on the Italian frontier. Victor Amadeus of Savoy had joined the League of Augsburg in the hope of restoring to his duchy the great fortresses of Pinerolo and Casale, which were the basis of French influence in Italy. At first there seemed little prospect of his hopes being realised. Catinat crushed his forces at Staffarda (1690), and in a short time conquered almost the whole of Savoy. In the next year he reduced Nice and Montmélian. And while the French retained their supremacy on land, they almost succeeded in establishing a similar supremacy on the sea. In the same year (1690), their admiral, Tourville, succeeded in defeating the combined English and Dutch fleets off Beachy Head.

While France was making these marvellous but exhausting exertions by land and sea, Louis was by no means forgetful of the interests of James II. A French force escorted him to Ireland, where he soon obtained almost universal recognition. It was only in the Protestant north that opposition was to be dreaded. It would have been the most complete triumph for Louis XIV.'s policy if England could have been conquered from the side of Ireland. But William III. did not wait for an invasion. He hurried to meet the enemy, and the battle of the Boyne (July 1, 1690) decided the contest. James again fled to France, and William's generals were left to continue the reduction of Ireland. It was completed in

1691 by the pacification of Limerick. The success of William of Orange was a terrible blow to Louis. The combined English and Dutch forces were now free to act directly against France, and William was able to bring his abilities and his dauntless resolution to the assistance of the allies.

§ 19. Louis XIV., as if conscious that the war in the Netherlands was dignified by the presence of his great rival, appeared to take the command in person. But as usual when he was there none but the safest enterprises were undertaken. Mons was besieged in form, and taken by the skill of Vauban. William advanced to relieve it, but found the covering army too strong and had to retire. The capture of Mons, and Catinat's successes in Savoy, were the only military events of importance in 1691. More memorable than anything else was the death of Louvois, the suggester of Louis' unscrupulous policy and therefore the real originator of the war. His royal master had for some time been weary of him, and his death was so sudden that reports were circulated and believed of poison administered by order either of the king or of Madame de Maintenon. Louvois was the last able minister of Louis XIV. The military administration was entrusted to his son, Barbesieux, but he was young and incapable. The king had become so feebly jealous of power that he could not bear the presence of able men. Henceforth he surrounded himself with second-rate officials, and trusted more and more to his own impulses or the suggestions of Madame de Maintenon.

Great preparations were made for the campaign of 1692. Louis was determined on a fresh undertaking in favour of James II. Tourville, the admiral who had been so successful two years before, was ordered to convey the deposed king to Ireland. Great expectations were based upon the popularity of James with the English fleet; he had even a secret correspondence with the admiral, Russell. But Russell refused to recognise even his legitimate king on the deck of a French vessel. In the battle of La Hogue, the French showed conspicuous bravery, but Tourville was forced by superior numbers to a disastrous retreat. The expedition was now impossible, and England regained her naval superiority. Henceforth the maritime successes of the French were limited to the raids on Dutch and English commerce of adventurous privateers such as Jean Bart. Colbert's son, Seignelay, who had done so much for the French navy, had died soon after the victory of 1690. His successor, Pontchartrain, was, like all Louis' later ministers, incapable. By land the French had still the upper hand. Louis again commanded the army and attacked Namur. The siege is reckoned as Vauban's masterpiece, and the fortress was defended by the second engineer of the age, Cohorn. William's attempt at relief was frustrated by Luxemburg, and Namur surrendered. Louis had now a great opportunity of crushing his enemy, but as usual he refused to risk a battle, and soon afterwards returned to France. Luxemburg, who was left behind with diminished forces, was drawn by William into a trap at Steinkirk, but he extricated himself with masterly energy and skill, and the allied forces were compelled to retreat. Neither side seemed able to gain any decisive success. France was exhausted by its unparalleled exertions, and disaffection began to make itself heard. Louis had great difficulty in obtaining the necessary supplies. It was not till June, 1693, that he was able to take the field, and this delay gave the allies time to prepare their defence. On arriving in the Netherlands, Louis refused to venture an assault on William's position, and quitted the army without having achieved anything. It was his most conspicuous military failure, and he never again assumed the command. It was to no purpose that Luxemburg defeated the allies at Neerwinden. The only result was the capture of Charleroi. In the next year the French were forced to stand altogether on the defensive, and in January, 1695, Luxemburg died. Meanwhile Catinat was holding his ground in Savoy, even against the rising Austrian commander, prince Eugene. Eugene was French on his father's side, and Italian by his mother, who was one of Mazarin's nieces. But, slighted by Louis, he had thrown himself altogether on to the side of the emperor. In 1692 the forces of Savoy had the better of the conflict, and even attempted an invasion of Dauphiné. But the next year Catinat defeated them at Marsaglia and reconquered Piedmont. In Catalonia Noailles gained still more conspicuous successes.

§ 20. But all these heroic efforts served only to prolong a conflict which was already decided by the exhaustion of France. In response to the royal demands, all classes, and especially the clergy, had made great voluntary sacrifices, but this could not go on for ever. The financial administration had fallen into very incompetent hands since Colbert's death, but even Colbert could hardly have coped with existing difficulties. Not only had the annual expenditure risen to an unexampled amount, but the sources of revenue were proportionately diminished. The Huguenots had carried with them much of the wealth of France, and their departure had inflicted irreparable damage on French industries. Commerce and the colonies suffered from the attacks of English and Dutch. Even the coasts were no longer secure. The English fleet bombarded Havre and Dunkirk, and it was feared that they might effect a landing. To these internal misfortunes were now added military reverses. In 1695 William of Orange with the assistance of Cohorn retook Namur. The energetic defence of the commander, Boufflers, and the attempted relief by Villeroy, Luxemburg's successor, proved fruitless. It was evidently necessary for France to obtain peace. Louis had already withdrawn many of the obnoxious demands which he had put forward at the commencement of the war, but without satisfying the allies. He now determined to break up the hostile league by separate negotiations. The duke of Savoy, whose interest in the war was purely selfish, was easily induced to come over to the side of France by the restitution of all his territories, with the addition of Pinerolo and Casale. His daughter was married to Louis' grandson, the duke of Burgundy. It was an enormous sacrifice both of power and dignity for Louis to make, but it produced the desired result. The neutrality of Italy being secured, he was able to strengthen his forces at other points. The allies, weakened by the defection of Savoy, consented to accept the mediation of Charles XI. of Sweden, and a diplomatic conference was opened in May, 1697, at Ryswick, half way between the Hague and Delft.

The difficulties in the way of peace were great and numerous. Many of the demands were regarded by Louis as inconsistent with his honour and dignity as well as with his interests. Spain wished to restore the treaty of the Pyrenees, Germany that of Westphalia. And above all there was the bitter but inevitable necessity of acknowledging the legality of the English revolution. Fortunately for France the interests of the allies were not identical, and it was possible by satisfying one to limit the concessions to the other. Louis determined to expedite matters by an accommodation with William III. The treaty between England and France was not settled by the diplomatists at Ryswick, but by a private conference between Bentinck, William's friend and confidant, and the French marshal, Boufflers. Louis agreed to acknowledge William III. as king of England, and to withhold all assistance from his enemies. But with a magnanimity becoming a great king, he refused to listen to the demand for the expulsion of James II. from French soil. On these terms William undertook to manage Austria and Spain, who were anxious to continue the war. Spain was forced to a decision by the news that Barcelona had surrendered to the duke of Vendome, who had taken Noailles' command in Catalonia. On Sept. 20, 1697, the first treaty was signed at Ryswick between France, England, Spain, and Holland. Besides the concessions to William III., Louis withdrew from all conquests made since the peace of Nymegen, and agreed that the Dutch should garrison the frontier towns of the Spanish Netherlands as a security against a

French invasion. The emperor still held out, and demanded the cession of Strasburg. William was so convinced of the importance of this, that he was personally willing to resume the war. But England and Holland were almost unanimous in their desire for peace, and Louis was enabled to carry his point. On October 30, the second treaty between France and the empire was concluded. Louis surrendered the great fortresses of Freiburg, Breisach, and Philipsburg, and restored all the places acquired since the peace of Nymegen except Strasburg. That town with the whole of Alsace remained subject to France until our own day. Lorraine, with the sole exception of Saarlouis, was restored to its lawful duke, Leopold, son of Charles IV. Joseph Clement of Bavaria was recognised as elector of Cologne, and the pretensions of Fürstenberg abandoned. The claims of the duchess of Orleans on the Palatinate were surrendered for a sum of ready money.

The treaty of Ryswick was a great blow to the pretensions of Louis XIV. He had failed to enforce the legality of his famous ‘reunions," and had been compelled to withdraw from the Rhine frontier. The Stuarts, whose alliance had been of such service to him, remained excluded from the English throne. Holland, which he had wished to humiliate, was by its union with England more powerful than ever. The French had retired from their commanding position on the side of Italy. Louis had posed as the champion of Catholicism, but the Protestant interests had prevailed in Europe. And the king had also found it advisable to yield in his struggle with the papacy. Directly after Innocent XI.'s death, the French ambassador gave up the right of franchise. Avignon, which the French had occupied, was restored, the French clergy humbly implored forgiveness for their opposition to the Holy See, and finally the four articles of 1682 were abrogated. But these concessions were not regarded by Louis as a final check to his ambition. they were only made with a definite object in view. The question of the Spanish succession, which had absorbed so much attention at the beginning of his reign, was now coming to a crisis, Louis wished to have his hands completely free. It is necessary to have a clear conception of the various claims that were involved.

IV. WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION.

§ 21. Charles II., the reigning king of Spain, had never enjoyed sound health either in body or mind, and he was now rapidly sinking into the grave. He was the last male of the Spanish branch of the Hapsburgs, the descendants of Charles V. He had been married twice, first to Marie Louise, a niece of Louis XIV., and afterwards to Maria Anna of Neuburg, a sister-in-law of the emperor Leopold, but there was no prospect of his having children, and the succession to his throne must go to claimants by the female side. The eldest daughters both of Philip III. and of Philip IV. had been married into the house of Bourbon, Anne to Louis XIII., and Maria Theresa to Louis XIV. But both had on their marriage renounced all claims to the succession. Mazarin and Louis XIV. had endeavoured to obtain some declaration of the invalidity of these renunciations, but hitherto without result. By a curious coincidence the younger sisters of the two French queens had been married into the Austrian branch of the Hapsburgs, Philip III.'s daughter to Ferdinand III., and Philip IV.'s to Leopold. Neither of them had made any renunciation, and Philip IV.'s will had expressly favoured the succession of his younger in preference to his elder daughter. The French claims therefore being excluded by the renunciations of Anne of Austria and Maria Theresa, the hereditary right seemed to belong incontestably to the issue of Leopold's marriage with Margaret Theresa. This was a daughter Maria, who was married to the elector of Bavaria, and who had already given birth to a son, Joseph Ferdinand. But Leopold was unwilling to allow Spain to fall altogether from Hapsburg hands. He had compelled his daughter to renounce her claims on Spain, and demanded the succession for himself as grandson of Philip III., or, as a substitute, for the archduke Charles, his younger son by a second marriage. There were, therefore, three claimants of importance, the electoral prince of Bavaria, the archduke Charles, and either the son or one of the grandchildren of Louis XIV.

The Spanish monarchy had declined immensely from its old importance, but it was still a prize well worth the winning. One king after another had been compelled to sacrifice provinces and strongholds either to successful rebellion or to French ambition. Holland and Portugal were independent. France had annexed Artois, Roussillon, Franche-Comté, and great part of Flanders and Hainault. But besides Castile, Aragon, and Navarre, there still remained the bulk of the Netherlands, Milan, Naples and Sicily, and the great dominions in the New World. The succession to so enormous an empire was of European importance, and Europe was prepared to have a voice in the matter. These were the days when the "balance of power" was the watchword of diplomacy, and it was natural that the idea of subdivision should commend itself. A secret treaty of partition had been concluded long ago between Louis and the emperor, but that was now out of date. The circumstances of the two princes had completely changed, and, moreover, William III. had arisen since then, and was prepared to defend the interests of Europe. All the lesser powers were unwilling to allow the aggrandisement of either France or Austria by the acquisition of the Spanish territories. It was their obvious interest to support the claims of Bavaria, which were also the best from a legal point of view, because the renunciation of Leopold's daughter, made without any reference to Spain and without Spanish sanction, was a purely Austrian transaction and could not be regarded as valid. Louis, who dreaded the natural tendency of the Spanish king to favour the collateral branch of his own family, and who was anxious to exclude Austria at all costs, thought it advisable to fall in with the wishes of Europe. The first treaty of partition was concluded between France, England, and Holland on October 11, 1698. The archduke Charles was to receive the Milanese, the Bourbon claimant was to have Naples, Sicily, the Tuscan ports and Guipuscoa. All the rest of the monarchy was to go to the electoral prince of Bavaria, Joseph Ferdinand.

This treaty might secure the interests of Europe, but it had one fatal defect, that it took no account whatever of Spanish interests or feelings. There both court and people were unanimous in their opposition to any scheme of partition whatever as likely to be fatal to the greatness of Spain. Charles determined, if possible, to avert such a misfortune, and in November made a formal will, in which the Bavarian prince was acknowledged as heir to all his dominions. But in January, 1699, the infant prince suddenly died, either of small-pox or of poison. Both the partition-treaty and the royal will were thus nullified, and the old question appeared again under altered conditions. The elector of Bavaria claimed to stand in his son's place by the letter of the treaty, but the claim was rejected both by Louis and by William III. A second treaty of partition was agreed upon in May, 1700, which was much more advantageous to Austria. The archduke Charles was to have the bulk of the Spanish inheritance, viz., Spain, the Netherlands, Sardinia, and the colonies. The dauphin was to have the share stipulated in the previous treaty, with the material addition of Lorraine; and the duke of Lorraine was to be compensated with the Milanese.

§ 22. The obstinate determination of the European powers to effect a partition excited great indignation in Spain. A strong party formed itself to maintain at all costs the unity of the empire. Now the only claimant who could really enforce this unity was Louis XIV., who was himself a party to the treaties of partition. But it was probable that the prospect of undivided succession would induce him to throw over his allies. It was certain, at any rate, that the Bourbons were stronger than the Hapsburgs, and that the accession of the latter must inevitably result in the weakening and dismemberment of Spain.

These opinions were sedulously encouraged by Louis' envoy, count Harcourt, the ablest diplomatist in the French service. The charm of his manner had already gained popular feeling to the side of France, even when the court, under the influence of the queen, was wholly German in its sympathies. And now the attitude of the court was beginning to change. The queen's power decreased, and cardinal Porto-Carrero, the leader of the new French party, obtained supreme influence over the weak king. Charles sent to Rome to implore the pope's advice, and Louis now reaped the benefit of his reconciliation with the papacy. Innocent XII. declared in favour of the French claims. The contention was that the renunciation of the two infantas had been made only to prevent the union of the two crowns on one head. This could be avoided by giving Spain to Philip of Anjou, the dauphin's second son, who was not the heir to the French throne. On Oct. 2, 1700, Charles II. made a new will declaring the duke of Anjou heir to the whole Spanish territories, on condition that he should renounce for himself and his heirs all claims to the French crown. Before another month had elapsed the king, who had been forced to disinherit his own family in favour of his old enemies, closed his unfortunate life.

Everything now depended on Louis XIV.'s decision, whether he would stand fast by the treaty of partition, or whether he would accept the dazzling prospect offered by Charles' will and risk a European war. It is still a debated question whether the indecision manifested by the French court at this juncture was real or feigned. Some writers have maintained that Louis had all along been intriguing for the undivided succession, and that the treaties of partition, especially the second, were only intended as a blind to conceal his real designs. Whatever be the truth on this point, it is certain that the true interests of France would have been best served by the peaceful acceptance of the advantages secured by the partition. But this would have alienated Spain, and moreover Louis had learnt to disregard all national interests in comparison with those of his own dynasty. The will was finally accepted, and the duke of Anjou was formally proclaimed as Philip V. of Spain.

§ 23. Europe was astounded at the news of this unexpected event, but it was not prepared for organised opposition. It seemed at first as if Louis would carry through his great project unhindered.

Maximilian of Bavaria, who had been appointed governor of the Netherlands by Charles II., was gained over entirely to the side of France. Philip V. was proclaimed in Brussels, and the barrier fortresses which, in accordance with the treaty of Ryswick, were garrisoned by Dutch troops, were now handed over to French garrisons. Moreover the Bavarian elector and his brother, the archbishop of Cologne, promised their support to France in the event of war against Austria. On the side of Italy, Louis was equally fortunate. The dukes of Savoy and Mantua were won over, and Philip was proclaimed without opposition both in Milan and Naples. The emperor was the most determined opponent whom the French had to fear. The establishment of French power in Milan was a constant and pressing source of danger to Austria. Moreover, the claims of the archduke Charles were not to be relinquished without a struggle. Fortunately the Turkish war had been ended by the peace of Carlowitz in 1698. In Germany, Leopold could rely upon the newly created elector of Hanover, and on Frederick of Brandenburg, whom he bribed with a promise to transform his electorate into a kingdom. But even with these allies the Austrian power was not sufficient to do more than hold its own in Germany and to attack Milan. There could be no chance of obtaining the Spanish crown without the support of the maritime powers.

England and Holland had both acknowledged Philip V. as king of Spain. William III. protested bitterly against Louis' breach of faith, but he could do nothing against the obstinate desire for peace which was shown by his subjects. In England he had become very unpopular. The Tory majority in parliament was not only opposed to the war, but made a direct attack on the king's whole system of government. William went so far as to meditate abdication and a return to Holland. From these difficulties he was freed by the action of Louis himself. Shortly after Philip's departure for Spain, his right to an eventual succession in France was formally recognized. This was a distinct threat to Europe, which was determined to prevent the union of the two crowns. The exclusion of the Dutch garrisons, which destroyed all barrier against French aggression, opened the eyes of the states to the impending danger. It was evident that Louis treated his son's dominions as his own. Finally, the measures taken to extend French and Spanish commerce at the expense of England and Holland, touched the most vital interests of both countries. William III. was at last enabled to arrange the Grand Alliance at the Hague (Sept. 7, 1701), between the emperor and his German allies, Holland, and England. These powers agreed to restore the barrier in the Netherlands between France and Holland, to compel the cession of the Milanese to Austria, to protect the threatened Dutch and English commerce, and exclude France from the Spanish treaties. It is evident that the allies did not undertake to fight the succession quarrel on behalf of the emperor, but only to assist him as far as coincided with their own interests, and to extort reasonable securities from France. A few days after the conclusion of this alliance James II. died at St. Germains. Under the impulse of the moment, and forgetful of the stipulations made at Ryswick, Louis acknowledged the young prince as king of England. The act does honour to his heart, but it was a false political move. Public opinion in England was profoundly stirred by the claim of a foreign prince to determine who should be their king. The Tory parliament was dissolved, and the new elections were overwhelmingly in favour of the king's partisans. William was now freed from the last obstacle in the way of that great war against France which was the object of his life. But before he could see the fruit of his policy, he died, without children, on March 19, 1702. England and Holland were now separated. The crown of the former fell to William's feeble sister-in-law, Anne. But the great statesman's policy survived his death. It was ably continued in Holland by the grand pensionary Heinsius, and in England by the duke of Marlborough. These two men, with the Austrian commander, prince Eugene, were the real leaders of the alliance against Louis XIV.

The Grand Alliance was in no way more formidable than the previous leagues, which had failed to conquer France even when Spain was separate and hostile. But France was no longer what it had been. The three short years of peace had been insufficient to restore order in the financial administration. The king continued his enormous personal expenditure, and considered that he was benefiting the people by squandering millions on useless luxury. Louis himself was growing old ; he lived more in retirement, and had less knowledge of men and measures. The great ministers and generals who had shed such lustre on his earlier years had disappeared. Villars and Vendome were able commanders, but far inferior to Condé, Turenne, or Luxemburg. And in civil administration there was no one to be compared with Colbert, or even with Louvois. When Pontchartrain was made chancellor, the charge of the finances was entrusted to Chamillart, a young man who had no other merit than his ignorance and docility. So easy did Louis find it to work with a minister inferior to himself, that in 1701, on the death of Barbesieux, Chamillart received the war department in addition. He was thus practically sole minister, and had to bear the burdens that had taxed to the uttermost the joint energies of Louvois and Colbert. The inevitable result was confusion and maladministration. In the army especially, the old discipline disappeared, venality and other disorders flourished. The troops were ill-paid and ill-fed: the organisation which Louvois had raised to such excellence, fell to pieces. The king, with fatal self-confidence, assumed the task of directing from the cabinet the campaigns of his generals. They were often compelled to send for instructions, and were not infrequently defeated before the courier returned.

§ 24. The war broke out in Italy in 1701, before the conclusion of the Grand Alliance. Prince Eugene led an imperial army against the Milanese. The French commander was Catinat, who had gained such successes in the last war. But, hampered by royal orders, he could neither oppose Eugene's entry into Italy, nor resist his further advance. He was too independent and upright to be popular at court, and Louis was easily induced to give a superior command to Villeroy, his own personal favourite, and the most fatally incompetent of all the French generals. Villeroy not only gained no successes, but by his arrogance disgusted the duke of Savoy, and almost alienated him from the French alliance. Against the unanimous advice of his council, he determined to attack the imperialists at Chiari, and was repulsed with great loss (Sept. 1701.) As he was quartered in fancied security at Cremona, the town was surprised by a night attack of Eugene, and Villeroy himself was taken prisoner. To repair these losses the command was given to the duke of Vendome, a great grandson of Henry IV. Though a glutton and a sluggard, Vendome had great military talents, and though his indolence often led him into difficulties, his ability hardly ever failed to extricate him from them. He was beloved by the soldiers, whose vices he made no efforts to check. Under him the balance of power in Italy and the reputation of the French arms were restored. He forced Eugene to raise the siege of Mantua, and won a somewhat indecisive victory at Suzzara. But he was unable to drive the imperialists from Italy, and could only protect Mantua and Milan. And his successes, such as they were, were more than counterbalanced by the defection, in 1703, of the duke of Savoy. In spite of his close relationship with the Bourbons—he was the father-in-law both of the duke of Burgundy and of Philip V.—he had embarked in the war solely from motives of self-interest. The emperor now offered him territorial concessions, and a larger subsidy than France had given him. The bribe was quite sufficient to change the allegiance of a prince, whose "geography made it impossible for him to be a man of honour." From this time the French cause in Italy steadily declined.

§ 25. There were two other important scenes of operation—the Netherlands and Germany. There, as in Italy, the French had an excellent position to start with. The Spanish Netherlands were wholly in their hands, and they had two powerful allies in the electors of Cologne and Bavaria. But the war was no more successful than that of the Milanese. Troops from Prussia and the Palatinate took the important fortress of Kaiserwerth (June, 1702), and at one blow rendered powerless the elector of Cologne. He had already been placed under the imperial ban, and he now retired to Navarre. The command of the allied forces was undertaken by Marlborough, who, with a diplomatic ability quite equal to that of William III., combined far superior military talents. Though at first he was hampered by disunion and jealousy among the allies, his forces were very superior to the French under the duke of Burgundy and Boufflers. One fortress after another fell into his hands, though he was unable to fight a pitched battle. In 1703 he took Bonn, and drove the French altogether from the electorate of Cologne. One solitary success attended the French arms. A detachment of Dutch troops, under Opdam, attacked Boufflers' line at Eckerne, and was repulsed with great loss. The French were driven from the Rhine, but they still held Brabant, Hainault and Flanders defended and intact. It was no slight disadvantage for Louis that at a moment when all his forces were required for external war, a revolt broke out among the Huguenots of Languedoc. The mountaineers of the Cevennes, who had long endured rigorous persecution, at last rose in defence of their churches and pastors. Under the leadership of a brilliant youth named Cavalier, they gained considerable successes, and though ultimate defeat was inevitable, they occupied for several years some of the best troops and generals of France.

In Germany the command of the French army was given to Catinat, who left Italy to assume it. But he was not strong enough for decisive action. The imperialists, under the command of Lewis of Baden, took the fortress of Landau without any attempt being made to relieve it. Alsace was now open to attack, and would speedily have been overrun, but for a diversion effected by the elector of Bavaria. He declared war against Austria, and seized Ulm. Lewis of Baden was compelled to withdraw from Alsace to meet this new danger. The elector, in danger of being crushed between two hostile armies, urged the French to advance to his relief. Catinat, always cautious, refused to run the risk, but the task was undertaken by one of his lieutenants, Villars, an active and enterprising commander. He marched towards the Black Forest and, more by accident than anything else, defeated the imperialists at Friedlingen (Oct. 14, 1702). For this victory he was made a marshal of France, while Catinat retired from the command in disgrace. Early in 1703 Villars effected the desired junction with the elector of Bavaria, and their combined forces seemed capable of some great achievement. Villars wished to march upon Vienna, and the Austrian capital would probably have fallen. But the elector preferred an invasion of Tyrol as more practicable, and because the conquest of that province would sever Austria from Italy. The duke of Vendome was to co-operate by a simultaneous advance from the south. But the enterprise was a failure. The Tyrolese, like the Swiss, were invincible in their own mountains, and the elector failed to effect a junction with Vendome. Meanwhile, Bavaria was attacked both by Lewis of Baden, and by a new Austrian army under count Styrum. The elector returned only just in time to prevent a junction between the two hostile armies. With the aid of Villars he repulsed Lewis of Baden, and then, returning to the Danube, defeated Styrum at Hochstedt. And in Alsace the French recovered ground. Marshal Tallard, taking advantage of the absence of Lewis of Baden in Bavaria, besieged and took Landau. Thus the campaign of 1703 proved a brilliant success for the French. But unfortunately, Villars and the elector of Bavaria had quarrelled, and could no longer act cordially together. In deference to his ally, Louis recalled his ablest general, and sent him to put down the *Camisards* —as the rebels in the Cevennes were called. The command in Bavaria was left in the comparatively incapable hands of Marsin, while Tallard continued to lead the army in Alsace. At the same time the French cause in Europe was immensely weakened by the defection of Savoy and Portugal. The latter country was bribed by the commercial advantages offered by England in the Methuen treaty.

§ 26. The campaign of 1704 was the decisive turning-point in the war. The elector of Bavaria took Passau, and Vienna was exposed to immediate attack. The emperor was the centre of the Grand Alliance. If he could be crushed, the war might easily be ended. The greatest exertions were necessary to prevent such a result. Prince Eugene left Italy to concert measures with Marlborough. It was decided to leave a small force in the Netherlands, and to make a bold advance upon Bavaria. Easily eluding the incapable Villeroy, who had escaped from prison to bring renewed discredit on the French arms, Marlborough marched directly towards the Danube. The elector's troops were posted in a strong position at Schellenberg, but Marlborough forced his lines, and drove him to retreat. A junction with Eugene was triumphantly effected. The other imperial commander, Lewis of Baden, jealous of Marlborough and Eugene, preferred to act independently. Meanwhile, Tallard had quitted Alsace, marched through the Black Forest, and joined Marsin and the elector. Their combined troops were numerically superior to the allies, and they determined to risk a general engagement at Blenheim. There ensued one of the great battles in the world's history, in which the allies, through superior generalship, won a complete victory. Marlborough was opposed to Tallard, Eugene to the Bavarians. Marsin and the elector, after an obstinate struggle, were able to make an orderly retreat, but Tallard's army was cut to pieces. Austria, and the interests of the Grand Alliance were saved. Bavaria was completely overrun by the allies, and Maximilian Emanuel sought refuge in France, where he met his equally unfortunate brother, the archbishop of Cologne. Landau was retaken by the margrave of Baden, while Marlborough reduced Trarbach, and occupied Trier.

§ 27. These successes on the part of the allies suggested the bold move of a direct invasion of France. The new emperor, Joseph I., who succeeded his father in May, 1705, was eager for this, and Marlborough was willing to undertake it. Great hopes were entertained of a decisive co-operation of the rebels in the Cevennes. But the German commander, Lewis of Baden, was opposed to the plan, and his tardy movements sacrificed the opportunity. Villars had already crushed the Camisards with relentless severity, and was now called upon to protect the threatened frontier. Marlborough received intelligence that Villeroy, taking advantage of his absence, was threatening Liège. With bitter complaints against the dilatory Germans, he gave way before Villars, and retreated to resume his work in the Netherlands. Liège was relieved, and Villeroy driven back to his old lines. But no attempt at fresh conquests was possible. The success of these defensive measures, in 1705, encouraged the French to new efforts for the next year. Louis and Chamillart strained every nerve to send reinforcements to the favoured Villeroy, who was authorised to take the offensive. Nothing could have suited Marlborough better. At the village of Ramillies he fell upon Villeroy, and completely defeated him (May 23, 1706). The battle of Ramillies was as decisive for the Netherlands as that of Blenheim had been for Bavaria. All the great cities, Brussels, Ghent, and Bruges, fell into Marlborough's hands. The archduke was proclaimed king of Spain, as Charles III.

In Italy, also, decisive events took place in the same year, 1706. Vendome had returned in 1703 from his fruitless compaign in Tyrol to oppose the duke of Savoy who had gone over to Austria. The French attacked Piedmont and reduced most of the strong places. The emperor, who attached supreme importance to the retention of northern Italy, sent Eugene thither in 1705. But Vendome more than held his own in a battle near Cassano, and when Eugene returned to Vienna, on the news of the emperor's death, the Austrians were completely defeated. The French now laid siege to the capital of Piedmont, Turin, and this pressing danger again called Prince Eugene across the Alps. The siege was entrusted to a royal favourite, La Feuillade, while Vendome undertook to oppose the advance of the Austrian general. But just at this critical juncture he was recalled to take the place of Villeroy, who had been disgraced at Ramillies. It is doubtful whether Vendome could have held his own against Eugene; it was certain that his succesors, the duke of Orleans and Marsin, could not. The Austrians attacked the French position, and carried all before them. Marsin was killed, and the whole army routed. Orleans, a man of considerable ability, wished to make a stand at Casale, but his defeated troops would not follow him, and fled in confusion towards the Alps. Not only was Turin relieved, but the French cause in Italy was ruined. A small Austrian force entered Naples, and proclaimed Charles III. without opposition. The pope found it necessary to acknowledge the archduke as king of Spain.

The Portuguese alliance had meanwhile opened the peninsula to the allied forces, and extended the objects of the war. Hitherto the allies had aimed only at a partition of the Spanish monarchy. But the king of Portugal could never be secure as long as Philip V. remained at Madrid, and henceforth the allies endeavoured to transfer the whole monarchy to the archduke Charles. An English fleet escorted the archduke to Lisbon in 1704, but all attempts to invade Spain from the west proved futile. The English commander, Sir George Rooke, gained an important success by surprising Gibraltar (August 4, 1704), which England has ever since retained. The archduke now proceeded to Catalonia, which had lately been alienated by the conduct of Philip V. The command of the English forces was undertaken by the brilliant but eccentric earl of Peterborough. Barcelona capitulated (Oct., 1705), and Charles III. was acknowledged as king by the provinces of Catalonia, Aragon and Valencia. A great effort was made by Philip V. in the next year to recover the lost provinces. Barcelona was blockaded by land and sea, and was on the point of surrender when it was relieved by the arrival of the allied fleet. Philip's army was dispersed, and he could only return to Madrid by getting round to Roussillon and crossing the Pyrenees. No sooner had he arrived there than he was forced to retreat by a double attack from Portugal and the west. The allies entered Madrid in triumph, and Charles III. was proclaimed in the capital of Spain.

Thus in one year the French had been driven from Italy and the Netherlands, and for the moment their cause seemed ruined in the peninsula. But the Spanish crown was saved to the Bourbons by the provincial jealousies still existing in that country. Castile and Aragon, although subject to the same ruler ever since the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella, had never laid aside their mutual hostility. The Castilians refused to accept a king who came to them supported by Aragonese forces. And their Catholic bigotry was aroused by the predominance of Protestantism among the allies. Charles III. was called "the Most Catholic King by the grace of heretics." An outburst of popular feeling drove the allies from Madrid and restored Philip V. (October, 1706). The allied forces were now commanded by Ruvigny, a French refugee, and contained a regiment of Camisards under their old leader Cavalier. The men whom Louis' bigotry had driven from his kingdom became everywhere the most bitter enemies of their former monarch. The Franco-Spanish army was led by the duke of Berwick, a natural son of James II. and Arabella Churchill, and thus a nephew of Marlborough. He seems to have possessed much of his uncle's military capacity, and proved one of the most eminent and trustworthy of French generals. He drove the allies out of Castile into Valencia, and when Ruvigny attempted to resume the offensive he completely defeated him in the battle of Almanza (April, 1707). Cavalier's regiment was cut to pieces and the allied army dispersed. Valencia and Aragon were compelled to submit to Philip. Charles III. still held Barcelona, and thus kept his hold on Catalonia, but there seemed little prospect of his wresting the crown from his rival.

§ 28. It was not in Spain alone that the French arms were successful in 1707. Everywhere the progress of the allies seemed checked. Villars, who in the preceding year had remained inactive for want of forces, was now strong enough to cross the Rhine and to force the lines of Stolhofen, which were weakened by the recent death of Lewis of Baden. The French advanced almost as far as the Danube carrying all before them. Although compelled to fall back across the Rhine by a superior force under the elector of Hanover, Villars had collected a large booty, and had given renewed courage to the French soldiers. And his successes also affected the campaign in the Netherlands. Marlborough had to send reinforcements to Germany, and thus weakened could effect nothing of importance. Vendome was enabled to maintain his defensive position and to protect the provinces which still remained in French hands. Great excitement was aroused in this year by the appearance in Germany of the brilliant warrior Charles XII. of Sweden. Louis XIV. made great efforts to entice him to his side. But Charles was directly opposed to the religious policy of the French king, and a personal visit from Marlborough decided him to remain neutral. He quitted

Saxony to resume hostilities against Russia, which was rapidly rising to greatness under Peter the Great.

§ 29. The comparative successes of 1707 were a poor compensation for the financial exhaustion which the great war was causing in France. Every method of raising money, honest or dishonest, had been resorted to by Louis and his minister Chamillart. Old taxes were increased, and new ones imposed; offices were created merely in order to sell them; the value of the coinage was arbitrarily raised. The kingdom seemed rapidly advancing towards bankruptcy, and the misery among the lower classes was appalling. Regardless of the murmurs, more or less distinct of his people, Louis pursued his way with truly royal obstinacy. His displeasure was visited on all who ventured an unfavourable criticism on his government. Fénelon, the blameless archbishop of Cambray and the tutor of the young duke of Burgundy, was suspected of satirical intentions in his *Télémaque*, and was exiled from the court. Vauban, touched by the popular miseries, published a scheme for an equitable readjustment of taxation. Louis, indignant at his presumption and forgetful of his past services, ordered the book to be burnt, and the patriotic author, unable to bear disgrace, died soon afterwards. But evils could not be removed by punishing those who pointed them out. Chamillart, worn out and despairing, petitioned for leave to retire. The king at first refused, but finally transferred the finances to Desmarets, a nephew of Colbert, and endowed with some of his uncle's abilities. His appointment restored the public credit for a moment and enabled new supplies to be raised on loan. With these Louis determined on a grand effort for 1708, and actually set on foot five armies. Besides this, another attempt was made in favour of the Stuarts. A French fleet received orders to convey the Pretender to Scotland, where public opinion was hostile to England on account of the recent Union (1707). But the naval supremacy of England was now firmly established, and the expedition was lucky in being able to return in safety to Dunkirk. It was in the Netherlands, however, that the French king decided to strike a decisive blow. An enormous army was raised, not without great difficulty, but with almost inexplicable fatuity Louis entrusted the joint command to the duke of Burgundy and Vendome. No two men could be more utterly different in character, the former pious and methodical, the latter a libertine and the most irregular and eccentric of strategists. Their quarrels ensured the failure of the enterprise. But at first everything seemed favourable. The Catholics of the Netherlands were alienated by the rule of Charles III., which only nominally concealed the domination of the hated Dutch Calvinists. They welcomed the French as deliverers.

Ghent, Bruges and other towns hastened to open their gates to them. Marlborough, hampered as usual by divisions among the allies, despaired for a moment of success, but his courage was restored by the arrival of Eugene, who had dexterously eluded the French under Berwick and made his way to Brussels. Burgundy and Vendome, disputing almost every movement, were now advancing on Oudenarde. There the allies attacked them and gained a complete victory. The victors at once laid siege to Lille, a fortress of great strength, which was regarded as Vauban's masterpiece and which was defended by Boufflers with a large force. Eugene undertook the conduct of the siege, while Marlborough covered him from attack. The disputes between the French commanders were embittered by the arrival of Berwick, who, out of jealousy of Vendome, supported the duke of Burgundy. Vendome wished to attack Marlborough, but was finally overruled, and Lille was left to its fate. Boufflers, after a heroic defence, was forced to surrender (December 8, 1708). Ghent, Bruges and the whole of Flanders had to submit.

To these military disasters were added an empty treasury and famine. The winter of 1708–9 was excessively cold in France, and the general misery found expression in a discontent that might easily become rebellion. Louis XIV., whose dynastic policy was the cause of these evils, was at last compelled to give way and to implore peace. His minister, Torcy, was despatched to the 'triumvirate' who directed the affairs of the allies, Eugene, Marlborough and Heinsius. These men were the bitter opponents of Louis XIV. and were determined to weaken and humiliate him as the enemy of Europe. Their chief demands were, the exclusion of the Bourbons from all share in the Spanish monarchy, the erection of a strong barrier for Holland, and the restoration to the empire of all acquisitions made since the peace of Westphalia. These demands were perhaps not too excessive, considering the condition of France and the successes of the allies. But to these they added the exasperating condition that Louis should himself assist in expelling his grandson from the Spanish dominions. With a reminiscence of his old greatness he declared that if he must fight, it should be against his enemies rather than his own children, and broke off the negotiations. By Torcy's advice he published a direct appeal to the nation, detailing all the circumstances and calling on them for assistance. His subjects, touched by this unparalleled condescension of their aged ruler, responded with enthusiasm. Another army was raised and entrusted to Villars, the only general who had met with no great disaster. He was unable to prevent Marlborough from taking Tournay, but blocked his way to Mons. At Malplaquet the most stubbornly contested battle of the war was fought (Sept. 11, 1709). Villars was wounded and the army retreated under Boufflers. Though the allies were nominally victorious, and Mons surrendered to them, they suffered enormous losses, far more than their opponents. The courage of the French was immensely raised when they learned that the invincible Marlborough might be faced without the certainty of defeat.

§ 30. Louis was able to resume negotiations in 1710 on somewhat better terms. A congress met at Gertruydenburg, and the French offered great concessions. The acknowledgment of Charles III., the withdrawal of all assistance from Philip V., the cession of the barrier fortresses to the Dutch, and the restoration of all territory acquired since the time of Richelieu, seemed sufficient to satisfy the most exacting of enemies. But the triumvirate were inexorable. They maintained that there could be no valid security for Philip's abdication, unless the French supported the allies in compelling it. On this point Louis could not in honour give way, and the negotiations came to an end. All the time the war continued, to the constant disadvantage of the French. Douai, Aire, Bethune, and a number of other towns were taken. Villars, with an inferior force, could do nothing but save Arras from attack. Louis' acquisitions in the north, which he had hoped to form into an unassailable frontier, had been conquered one after another. The allies had now advanced to the old borders of France, and, if they could only hold together, seemed likely to invade and to conquer the kingdom.

But this was not to be. It was soon made evident that the allies, in pressing too hardly upon Louis, had injured their own cause. Public opinion, an important though incalculable force, sympathised with the king who so resolutely refused to turn against his grandson. At the very moment when affairs seemed most hopeless, when Louis himself had determined to induce Philip to make a voluntary abdication, more favourable prospects showed themselves. It was from Spain that the first good news came to France. There the war had been by no means terminated by the triumph of Philip V. in 1707. The archduke Charles still held out in Catalonia, and in 1710, strengthened by reinforcements from England under Stanhope, and from Austria under Stahremberg, was able once more to take the offensive. The Franco-Spanish forces were defeated at Saragossa, and, by Stanhope's advice, Charles once more occupied Madrid. But the geographical position of the Spanish capital makes it one of the least important towns of Spain from a military point of view. No advantage was gained by its occupation, and the people remained resolute in their attachment to the Bourbon king. The presence of the Protestant English roused all the religious antipathies of the orthodox Castilians. Charles soon found it advisable to evacuate Madrid. And now Vendome appeared in Spain to recover the reputation he had lost at Oudenarde. Attacking Stanhope at Brihuega, he took prisoners the whole English detachment. Following up his success, he completely defeated Stahremberg at Villa Viciosa. This victory secured to Philip V. the Spanish crown. Aragon and Valencia were reduced, and the archduke was once more confined to Catalonia.

Still more favourable to the French was the ministerial revolution that took place at this time in England. Anne was by nature inclined to the Tory party, to which power had been entrusted at the commencement of her reign. But the opposition of the Tories to the continental war forced Marlborough, whose influence was supreme with the queen, to rely more and more upon the Whigs, and at last a purely Whig ministry was formed under Godolphin. But English public opinion was gradually turning against the costly and apparently endless war. The losses at Malplaquet made a profound impression. The duchess of Marlborough, so long dominant at the court, was supplanted in the queen's favour by Mrs. Masham. The impeachment of Sacheverel for a sermon against the Whig theories alarmed Anne for the safety of the established church. The Whigs were turned out of office to make room for the Tories under Harley and St. John. The new ministers at once set themselves to reverse the policy of their predecessors, and opened secret negotiations with France.

At this juncture a decisive event occurred. The emperor, Joseph I., died in April 1711, without children. The heir to his territories was the archduke Charles, the claimant of the Spanish crown, who became emperor as Charles VI. To allow him to obtain the Spanish succession would be to revive the empire of Charles V., and would be even more dangerous to the balance of Europe than the recognition of Philip V. Thus the attitude of the allies was in a moment completely changed. The object for which they had been making such immense exertions was now a result to be averted at any cost.

§ 31. These events seemed to make peace inevitable, but till the terms could be arranged, the war continued. Marlborough still held his command in the Netherlands, and was preparing for the projected invasion of France. He broke through the lines which Villars had fortified, and invested Bouchain, which surrendered. But this was his last success. His enemies in England at last had the courage to recall him, and he was deprived of all his offices. The duke of Ormond, who succeeded to his command, received orders to act strictly on the defensive. The preliminaries of peace had already been arranged between Torcy and St. John, now viscount Bolingbroke. In January, 1712, the diplomatists met in congress at Utrecht. The emperor was still eager to prolong the war, and sent Eugene to London. But the great commander met with nothing but insults, and was convinced that he must carry on the war alone. England and France agreed to a truce in May, and Louis ceded Dunkirk as a pledge for the honesty of his designs. In spite of this defection, Eugene had still a large army, with which he laid siege to Landrecies, as a preliminary to an invasion of France. But the danger was averted by a brilliant move on the part of Villars. He determined to break the enemy's line of communications by an attack on Denain, which was held by the Dutch. The design was as happily conducted as it was conceived. Eugene hurried up, just in time to witness the defeat of his allies. The siege of Landrecies was raised, and Villars, after reducing Douai, Quesnay, and Bouchain, returned in triumph to Paris. France was secure and a powerful impulse was given to the negotiations at Utrecht.

The great object of England, which took the lead in the negotiations, was to prevent the union of the crowns of France and Spain on the same head. Accordingly two alternatives were offered to Philip V.: either the Italian provinces of Spain with the prospect of the succession in France, or Spain and the Indian empire with a renunciation of all claims to the French crown. He at once decided in favour of the country which had shown such devoted attachment to him. In a sitting of the Cortes he formally renounced all rights to the French succession. At the same time the two nearest princes of royal blood in France, the dukes of Berry and Orleans, made a similar renunciation of all claims upon Spain. Thus all obstacles in the way of peace were removed. The Dutch, who were at first inclined to stand out, and were bitter against the defection of England, gave way after the battle of Denain. On the 11th of May, 1713, the series of treaties known as the peace of Utrecht, were signed by all the belligerent powers, except the emperor. Philip V. was recognised as king of Spain and the Indies, on condition of the above-mentioned renunciation. England reaped the greatest advantages from the war of which she had borne the chief burden. The Protestant succession was secured, and the Stuarts excluded from France. The cession of Gibraltar and Minorca established English predominance in the Mediterranean. Dunkirk was to be dismantled. Newfoundland, Acadia (Nova Scotia), and Hudson's Bay were ceded by France, and a favourable commercial treaty was concluded. Spain also made great commercial concessions to England. The Dutch obtained the coveted barrier fortresses of the Spanish

Netherlands, the rest of which were to go to Austria. The duke of Savoy received Sicily with the title of king. Prussia was recognised as a kingdom, and obtained Upper Gelderland. It is a lasting disgrace to the allies that no stipulations were made in favour of the Catalans, who had rendered loyal service during the war, and were now left to the tender mercies of the Spanish monarchy.

§ 32. The emperor refused to accept the treaty of Utrecht, and continued the war against France. Louis XIV., with the help of Desmarets, raised the necessary funds for a last campaign. Villars took the command of the army, and it was soon evident that Austria, unsupported by the allies, was no match for France. After reducing Landau, Villars crossed the Rhine, and in spite of the efforts of Eugene, besieged and reduced Freiburg. These successes forced the emperor to come to terms. The two generals undertook the negotiations, and the treaty of Rastadt was concluded with Charles VI. (March, 1714). Soon afterwards a supplementary treaty was arranged at Baden with the whole empire. The emperor received as his share of the Spanish inheritance, Naples, Milan, Mantua and Sardinia. About the Netherlands he was to make his own terms with Holland. He agreed to restore the electors of Bavaria and Cologne to their territories and rights. France kept Landau, Strasburg and Alsace, but ceded Freiburg, Breisach, Kehl and all other places which the French occupied on the right bank of the Rhine. Thus the general pacification of Europe was at last completed.

V. LAST YEARS OF LOUIS XIV.

§ 33. While France was occupied with the great war, the internal agitation on religious questions continued to attract attention. The Huguenots were finally crushed by the reduction of the Cevennes, but the Jansenists still existed, and with increased influence. As Louis XIV. grew older, he fell more and more under the influence of the Jesuits, who sought to identify the Catholic cause with that of the monarchy. His confessor was no longer the mild and politic La Chaise, but Le Tellier, a peasant's son, harsh and cruel, and living only in the narrow interests of his order. The result was that every element of opposition to the government was naturally inclined to Jansenism. The disasters of the war and the reckless financial administration raised the sect to the greatest importance. Noailles, the successor of Harlay in the archbishopric of Paris, was himself a moderate Jansenist, and took under his patronage a book by Quesnel, which the Jesuits accused of containing heretical doctrines. Louis, who had always aimed at the absolute unity of France both in religion and politics, could not tolerate the existence of a sect which divided the nation into two hostile camps. Moreover, he saw among the Jansenists all those tendencies represented which he had tried to crush; the constitutional longings of the old Fronde, the independence of the nobles, the provincial liberties, and the exclusion of state control in church matters. It was easy for Le Tellier to induce him to take vigorous measures. The first step was directed against Port Royal, the original home of Jansenism. The monastery was now occupied only by aged nuns, as the admission of novices had been long prohibited. They were called upon to sign a declaration acknowledging the heresies of their first teacher, but they preferred martyrdom to submission. Accordingly the aged ladies were forcibly dispersed and some of them imprisoned, and the monastery of Port Royal was rased to the ground. Not content with this, the Jesuits induced pope Clement XI. to issue the bull *Unigenitus*, in which he explicitly condemned Quesnel's book which the archbishop of Paris had formally approved. This exercise of papal authority produced the greatest ferment. Noailles and eight other bishops refused to accept it and were supported by the Parliament of Paris and a crowd of followers. The king was induced to support the bull and to regard the opposition as a revolt against the royal authority. A persecution followed, less important and less open than that of the Protestants, but quite as discreditable. The number of sufferers is reckoned at thirty thousand of the most cultured and orderly classes. They were allowed no trial, but were arbitrarily imprisoned by *lettres de cachet*. Noailles was allowed to escape through the favour of Madame de Maintenon, whose niece was married to the archbishop's nephew. This secret and cowardly persecution casts a gloom over the closing years of Louis' reign.

§ 34. The general depression which overspread the court at this time and which contrasts so strongly with the gaiety and festivities of Louis' youth, was caused in the first place by the military disasters and the universal misery of the people, but was deepened by losses in the royal family. In a country like France, where centralisation had been carried to extremes, and everything centred round the monarch, such losses had a far more general and definite importance than in constitutionally governed countries. And Louis had always laid great stress on the position and alliances of the members of his family. He wished to form them into a separate caste between the crown and the great nobles, and thus to lower the latter in the social scale. It was an inestimable advantage to him that his only brother showed none of those tendencies towards independent action which had been so common with previous princes of the blood. Philip, who became duke of Orleans on the death of his uncle Gaston, was always completely submissive to his elder brother. He supported his domestic policy, he rendered substantial military service as long as he was allowed to lead armies, and where fraternal jealousy withheld this occupation, he retired contentedly to St. Cloud, where he imitated the superior grandeur of Versailles. He was married twice, first to Henrietta of England, the favourite of king and court, and the negotiator of the treaty of Dover, and afterwards to Charlotte Elizabeth of the Palatinate, whose obstinate adherence to the customs and principles of her fatherland made her a conspicuous but isolated figure at the royal court. One son, Philip, was born of his marriage, and on his father's death in 1701 he became duke of Orleans. He was a man of considerable and versatile talents, but he disgraced them by a libertinism which was without parallel even in those days. The king, who became more decorous than ever in his later years, regarded his nephew with the gravest suspicion and mistrust.

Louis himself had only one son, the dauphin, with whose education the greatest pains were taken. The Delphin edition of the classics was drawn up for his special use, and it was for him that Bossuet wrote his universal history. But all these pains were thrown away. He grew up without any intellectual tastes, and plays a very subordinate part in the history of the reign. His father's wishes were law to him, and he unhesitatingly adopted Louis' religious and dynastic policy. He was married to a Bavarian princess, who lived unhappily with him, but brought him three sons, the dukes of Burgundy, Anjou, and Berry. The second of these became king of Spain as Philip V. Besides these legitimate descendants, Louis had a number of natural children, who also absorbed a great share of his attention. These, too, he was prepared to exalt above the heads of the great nobles. The most important of them were his two sons by Madame de Montespan, who were created duke of Maine and count of Toulouse. They had been early separated from their mother and entrusted to the care of Madame de Maintenon, who seems to have felt for them an affection which they reciprocated. The duke of Maine received high military command and the important governorship of Languedoc. The count of Toulouse was made admiral of the fleet. For his natural daughters, too, Louis secured lofty alliances, and employed them to bind the nobles closer to his person. One was married to the prince of Conti; another to a grandson of the great Condé; and a third to the young Philip of Orleans, much to the disgust of that prince's mother, who had German notions on the subject of rank and birth.

In 1711 the dauphin, who had so long been regarded as the successor to the throne, and was expected to continue his father's policy, died suddenly and unexpectedly of small-pox. His death attracted universal attention to his eldest son, the duke of Burgundy, who now became dauphin. His education at the hands of Fénelon had been far more successful than that of his father. He had become learned and devout, and what was more important, had conceived a real desire to appreciate and to remedy the grievances of the people. He had little sympathy for the policy and character of his grandfather, and held himself as much as possible aloof from the court. His accession to the throne would probably have altered many of his views, but must have proved a great era in the history of France. His wife, a daughter of the duke of Savoy, was in every respect the antithesis of her husband, but in spite of this she was devotedly attached to him, and would have supplied many of the deficiences of his character. Light-hearted and anxious to please, she delighted in the court festivities, and the charm of her out-spoken gaiety completely won over the king and even Madame de Maintenon. The grief of the court was intense when the dauphine was seized with fever in February, 1712, and died after a few days' illness. But the grief became consternation when the dauphin, scarcely a week afterwards, fell a victim to the same disease. The hopes and expectations of every disinterested patriot had been based on his accession, and they were suddenly dashed to the ground. Two sons had been born to the dauphin, but the elder followed his parents to the grave, and the younger, an infant two years old, was only saved by the most careful nursing. These deaths following so closely after each other, were a terrible blow to the old king. The family on which he had based such hopes seemed suddenly annihilated. The one great-grandchild was a sickly infant whom no one expected to survive. The second grandson was the king of Spain, who was excluded from all prospect of succession. There remained of the king's direct descendants only the duke of Berry, who possessed neither virtue nor ability, but who seemed destined to rule France either as regent or as king. But in 1714 this prince also died in the same sudden manner and with the same symptoms as his relatives.

§ 35. This fourth death suddenly gave the position of first prince of the blood to the king's nephew, Philip of Orleans, and in the natural course of things he would become regent on Louis' death. But popular rumour persistently accused him of having poisoned all who stood between him and this position. There were suspicious circumstances attending the deaths of the princes, and Orleans' character was such that no crime was considered impossible.

Louis XIV. probably did not share the prevalent suspicion, but he had always disliked his nephew, and could not endure the idea of leaving the government in his hands. To avoid this he determined to strain his royal authority to the utmost. In July, 1714, he issued an edict by which he conferred on his two natural sons, Maine and Toulouse, the rank of princes of the blood royal, and declared them heirs to the throne in case of the failure of the legitimate line. This attempt to treat the crown as a private property, and the violation of the laws of morality and religion, provoked the greatest discontent, especially among the nobles, who felt themselves most directly injured and insulted. Regardless of this prevalent sentiment, the king made a last will, nominating the duke of Maine guardian of the infant heir to the throne, and appointing a council of Regency, of which the duke of Orleans was to be only president. Thus he hoped to secure the continuance of his policy. Orleans would be excluded from personal influence over the young king, and was to be powerless in the council against the duke of Maine and the Jesuits. This attempt to prolong his arbitrary will, even after his death, was the last important act of the "*grand monarque.*" He had the mortification of seeing the House of Hanover established in England by George I.'s accession, to the perpetual exclusion of his protégés the Stuarts. On Sept. 1, 1715, Louis XIV.'s long and eventful reign came to an end, and his infant great-grandson became king, as Louis XV. Madame de Maintenon, who had long wearied of her husband and the gilded slavery in which she lived with him, retired at once to St. Cyr, where she had established a school for the daughters of noble families. There she spent the rest of her life in absolute retirement, and died in 1719.

Louis XIV. succeeded to a strong centralised monarchy, which had been established by Richelieu, and saved by Mazarin. In his domestic government he followed the lines which they had laid down, with the important difference that the king himself took the place formerly held by the minister. All institutions which claimed to check or control the government were weakened or destroyed. The States-General fell into oblivion, and the Parliament was reduced to submission. The religious unity, which to other rulers had appeared desirable but dangerous, was effected by the repression of Huguenots and Jansenists, though at the expense of much that was best and most wholesome in the life of France. The nobles were excluded from the political influence which had once seemed to be their inalienable right. At the same time their allegiance to the crown was secured by exemptions and social privileges, which raised them above the other classes, but, by arousing jealousy and hatred, proved the ultimate cause of their downfall. Members of the middle class were raised to official power, and even to rank, but the class from which they sprang reaped no benefit from their elevation. The reckless expenditure in royal magnificence and aggressive wars destroyed the commercial prosperity which the monarchy had once attempted to foster. The work of Colbert perished almost before it was accomplished. The misery which the king caused and disregarded, gave an origin and a justification to theories of opposition, which were destined to ripen into revolution.

In his foreign policy Louis was marvellously successful as long as he was content to follow the footsteps of Richelieu and Mazarin. France, by successive acquisitions, acquired a frontier which was almost impregnable, and which was never wholly overstepped, even in the subsequent period of military failure. But Louis' successes made him regardless of the necessary limits of his power. Forgetting the means by which France had risen to such greatness, he first alienated his Protestant allies, and then, under these altered conditions, recommenced his old quarrel with his Catholic neighbours. In the struggle that ensued, France displayed an abundance and readiness of resource that dismayed and astounded Europe. But these extraordinary exertions were too exhausting to last, and the result was a defeat which narrowly escaped becoming a conquest. It would have been well for Louis' reputation if he could have died before the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, or at latest just after the treaty of Ryswick. By the disastrous policy of the succession war, a war due only to his dynastic ambition, he forfeited all claims to the gratitude of France, while he earned the reprobation of Europe.

CHAPTER XIV.

PETER THE GREAT AND CHARLES XII.

§ 1. Decline of Sweden and rise of Russia. § 2. Peter the Great; character and policy; his travels; domestic reforms. § 3. Hostility to Sweden; triple alliance between Russia, Poland, and Denmark. § 4. Charles XII. of Sweden; attack on Denmark; treaty of Travendahl. § 5. Defeat of the Russians at Narwa; conquest of Livonia and Courland; Charles decides to attack Poland. § 6. Condition of Poland; Swedish success in 1702–3; Augustus renews the alliance with Russia; election of Stanislaus Leczinski; reduction of Lithuania. § 7. Charles XII. in Saxony; Augustus compelled to resign the Polish crown; camp at Altranstadt. § 8. Charles XII. marches towards Moscow; his defeat at Pultawa. § 9. Revival of the triple alliance against Sweden. § 10. Charles XII. at Bender; alliance with the Porte; critical position of the Czar; treaty of the Pruth; Charles quits Turkey. § 11. Events in the North during Charles' absence; ministry of Görz. § 12. Sweden allied with Russia and with Spain; chimerical schemes; death of Charles XII. § 13. Accession of Ulrica Eleanor; establishment of an oligarchy in Sweden; execution of Görz; treaties of peace. § 14. Government of Peter the Great; family policy; death of the Czar. § 15. Reigns of Catharine I. and Peter II.; accession of Anne of Courland.

§ 1. In the 17th century Sweden, thanks to a succession of able sovereigns, and to the military ardour of its inhabitants, had attained to a position in Europe wholly disproportionate to its resources. This position could in the nature of things be only temporary, and the decline of Sweden would have been as unimportant as it was inevitable, but that it was accompanied by the rise of another power of vastly superior strength and extent, which for good or evil has exercised the greatest influence on European history. Russia had emerged from the Tartar yoke, and under Iwan the Terrible had obtained immense extensions of territory in the east and south. But as yet it was hardly a European power. Its religion was Greek; its civilisation, so far as it had any, was Asiatic. Its only port, Archangel, was closed for more than half the year by ice, and was at all times difficult of access. To enable Russia to enter into the European state-system, and to obtain even a superficial amount of western civilisation, further increase of territory was necessary, and a connection must be established with the Black Sea and the Baltic. The dispersion of the territories of the Order of the Sword had offered an opportunity for acquisitions on the Baltic, but the attempt had failed. Sweden and Poland had shared the coveted lands, and Russia remained excluded from free contact with the west. To reverse this condition of things was the grand design of Peter I., and its accomplishment rightly earned for him the title of "the Great."

§ 2. Peter had been recognised as Czar in 1682, on the death ot Feodor, his half-brother Iwan being passed over as incapable, and his half-sister Sophia as a woman. But Sophia was too ambitious to remain content with the life of seclusion to which Asiatic ideas condemned her. With the help of the *Streltsi*, the guards who had been instituted by Iwan the Terrible, she organized a revolution, which ended in the acknowledgment of Iwan and Peter as joint Czars, and of herself as real ruler of the empire. This arrangement lasted only till 1689, when Peter, conscious of his ability to rule, drove his sister into a cloister, and assumed the supreme control of the government. It is difficult for the modern student to realise the character of this extraordinary man. Personally he was a savage, cruel, lustful, regardless of human life, stained with the grossest crimes, yet at the same time, undoubtedly the ablest and the most successful ruler of his time. It is as if a criminal of the lower classes were called upon to govern, and were found to be endowed with the highest qualities of constructive statesmanship. From the first Peter realized clearly the objects before him, and never for a moment relaxed in his pursuit of them. Russia must extend her frontiers to the south and west. European usages must supplant the old-established customs which had come from Asia. Above all, the military system must be reorganised so as to enable Russia to compete successfully with the western powers. Everything in church and state must be removed which could restrict the absolute authority of the Czar. There were great obstacles in the way. The Russians were madly jealous of foreigners, and were devotedly attached to the usages and institutions of their ancestors. But these obstacles were trampled under foot by the reckless energy of the Czar. It is quite possible to doubt the wisdom of Peter's reforms, to say that a superficial civilisation was forced upon a people unprepared and unfitted to receive or appreciate it. But there can be no question of the enormous influence which was exercised by the genius of a single man. Russia has had to follow, more or less unwillingly, in the lines laid down for her by Peter the Great.

Peter's first act, after he began to reign, was his intervention in the Turkish war, by which he obtained possession of Azof, and thus opened a connexion with the Black Sea. In 1697 he started on the first of his famous journeys. Passing through Prussia and Hanover, he spent most of his time in Holland and England. There he studied, not as a visitor, but as a workman, the arts and employments of an industrial community. More than 700 skilled artisans were induced by him to emigrate to Russia. On his return journey he visited Vienna, and was preparing to go to Venice, when he was recalled by the news of disturbances at home. His absence had been taken advantage of by the opponents of reform to attempt a revolution. It was proposed to expel all foreigners, to replace Peter by his infant son Alexis, and to give the regency to Sophia during the latter's minority. The priests were at the bottom of the scheme, and the *Streltsi* were to be employed to carry it out. But these forces were no match for the small body of regular troops which Peter had already formed under a Scotchman, Gordon. The movement was practically suppressed before Peter arrived to take vengeance. The ringleaders were barbarously punished, and Peter himself is said to have wielded the executioner's axe. Sophia was confined in a narrow cell, at the window of which three of the rebels were hanged, with a petition to her in their hands.

The suppression of the revolt gave Peter the opportunity to introduce some of his reforms. The *Streltsi* were disbanded and their place taken by an army formed on the European model, and consisting of eighteen regiments of infantry (2000 men in each) and two regiments of dragoons. Russian customs, and especially the practice of wearing a beard, were interdicted at court and among the nobles. Women were released from the oriental seclusion in which they had hitherto been kept, and the Czar invited both sexes to his entertainments. Nobles were compelled to educate themselves and to travel, under penalty of forfeiting their rank. Nobility was made to depend upon service rather than upon birth. Peter actually sent his own wife into a cloister on account of her conservative prejudices. Perhaps his most important reform was that of the church. Hitherto the Patriarch had occupied a position hardly inferior to that of the temporal sovereign. In 1700 the office became vacant, and Peter, instead of appointing a new Patriarch, had the duties performed by an administrator. This was only the prelude to further change. In 1721 he erected the "Holy Synod" which was to rule the church in complete subordination to the court. The Czar now became as supreme in ecclesiastical as in temporal affairs.

§ 3. Peter the Great was now able to turn his attention to what has proved the most permanently important of his successes, the acquisition of an opening to the Baltic. That sea was practically a Swedish lake. Finland, Carelia, Ingria, Esthonia, Livonia and the greater part of Pomerania, all belonged to Sweden. Russia could only gain its desired object by the dismemberment of this Scandinavian empire. And there were other powers interested in bringing this about. Poland, Brandenburg, and Denmark had all suffered considerable losses to aggrandize Sweden, and were ready to seize any opportunity that offered of recovering their former territory. The arbitrary government of Charles XI. (1660–1697) had alienated the subject populations of his monarchy. Their resentment found a vigorous representative in John Reinhold Patkul, a Livonian noble, who had represented the grievances of his country to Charles XI. in 1690, and had been condemned to death for his patriotic freedom of speech. Escaping from prison he became the soul of the general hostility to Sweden, and was determined, with foreign assistance, to free Livonia from the hated oppressor. He first applied to Brandenburg, where a little earlier he might have found a ready hearer in the Great Elector, but he failed to make any impression on his sluggish son. Ultimately he turned to Augustus, elector of Saxony and since 1697 king of Poland. Poland had a hereditary quarrel to fight out with Sweden, and the loss of Livonia and Esthonia was too recent to be forgotten. But Augustus was not influenced so much by Polish interests, as by a desire to make his power in his kingdom as absolute as it was in his electorate. The Poles were determined to restrict in every way the authority of the king whom they had chosen, and were resolutely hostile to the employment of Saxon troops within their borders. This opposition could only be overcome by the outbreak of war, and hence arose the willingness of Augustus and his minister Flemming to embark in a contest with Sweden. In November, 1699, Patkul was able to negotiate a treaty between Augustus and Peter, by which the latter was to obtain Ingria and Carelia, while Poland occupied Livonia and Esthonia.

A third member of the alliance against Sweden was found in Frederick IV. of Denmark. The house of Oldenburg on their accession in 1449 had united to the Danish crown the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. But Christian III. (1534–1558), out of affection for his brother Odolf, had arranged a curiously intricate joint rule over these duchies. This arrangement proved the source of endless quarrels between the Danish kings and their relatives of the line of Holstein-Gottorp, the descendants of Odolf. The former were always endeavouring to annex the duchies to their monarchy, while the dukes wished to make themselves independent, Every time that a king of Denmark had almost succeeded in attaining his object, he was foiled by the intervention of the neighbouring powers. Finally, in 1689, the independence of Holstein had been guaranteed by England, Holland and Sweden, in the treaty of Altona. This arrangement Frederick IV. was determined to overthrow. But the duke of Holstein, another Frederick IV., had married the sister of Charles XII., who was devotedly attached to his brother-in-law. The Danish king could only effect his object in defiance of Sweden. Therefore he readily undertook to invade Schleswig and Holstein, while the Poles and Prussians overran the Swedish provinces in the east of the Baltic.

It is interesting to compare this triple league of the north with the Grand Alliance which was arranged at the Hague almost at the same time. In the latter there was at least one common motive, hostility to France. But the northern powers were in pursuit of entirely personal and selfish objects, and sought only to use each other for their own ends. Augustus committed himself to the war without obtaining or even seeking the approval of the Poles. The king of Denmark cared nothing about the eastern Baltic if only he could acquire the coveted duchies. Peter the Great would not move a finger to put Poland in possession of Esthonia and Livonia, and thought only of making himself master of the mouth of the Neva.

§ 4. The allies based their hopes of success, not so much on their united co-operation, as on the supposed weakness of Sweden. In 1697 Charles XII., then fifteen years of age, had succeeded his father Charles XI. As there were three years to elapse before he attained his majority, the regency was entrusted to his mother. But Charles, with the help of Count Piper, who became henceforth his chief adviser, got this arrangement altered, and took the reins of government into his own hands. Hitherto he had been occupied only with hunting and similar amusements; and his youth and inexperience flattered his opponents with the prospect of an easy victory. But Charles was a born soldier, conspicuous even among a race of military rulers. In 1700, the news reached him that the Danes had entered Schleswig, that Augustus II. had laid siege to Riga, and that the Russians had advanced to Narwa. From that moment the young king gave up every other occupation and devoted himself heart and soul to the trade of war. On the 8th of May he quitted Stockholm, which he never saw again. While Frederick IV. was in Holstein, the Swedish fleet sailed directly to the coast of Zealand. It was a great advantage to Charles that the maritime states, anxious to prevent the outbreak of war in the north, had sent a fleet into the Baltic to compel the observance of the treaty of Altona. The Danes were unable to oppose the landing of the Swedes, and Copenhagen was defenceless. Denmark must have fallen into the hands of the invaders but for the mediation of England and Holland. Frederick IV. was fortunate to escape with nothing worse than the peace of Travendahl (August 20, 1700), by which he restored the independence of the duke of Holstein-Gottorp, and withdrew from all hostile alliances against Sweden.

§ 5. The other allies were not more fortunate. Riga was ably defended by Dalberg, and Augustus had to withdraw his troops without having effected anything. Charles XII. was now able to meet the most formidable of his opponents, Russia. With little more than 8000 men he attacked an army of 63,500 before Narwa. Peter withdrew before the conflict, either through the cowardice of inexperience or, as he asserted, to seek reinforcements. The Russian troops were ill-trained and suspicious of the foreign officers who commanded them. The engagement was rather a panic than a battle. The Swedes took more prisoners than their own numbers, and regard for their own safety compelled them to dismiss all the common soldiers. The victory was a great and decisive one, but its results were more fatal to Sweden than to Russia. Charles XII. was intoxicated with success, deemed himself invincible, and despised his enemy as cowardly and incapable. Peter, on the other hand, had gained experience and had lost only an army, no great matter to the despot of Russia. Report attributes to him the prophetic saying that "the Swedes will often beat us, but in the end they will teach us to beat them."

Charles XII. followed up his success at Narwa by entering Livonia. Routing the Saxon troops on the Düna, he reduced the whole province and also the duchy of Courland to obedience. In July, 1701, the Swedish king had defeated all his enemies and might have concluded the war. But he had not yet had his fill of glory and was determined to win fresh laurels. The question now arose as to which of the two hostile powers, Russia or Poland, he should attack. All his wisest and most experienced advisers urged that Augustus was really powerless, that the power and even the existence of Sweden were involved in the depression of Russia. The destinies of Europe depended on Charles' decision. He allowed himself to be guided by revenge rather than by policy, and determined to make his first object the deposition of Augustus from the Polish throne. Early in 1702, he invaded Poland and occupied Warsaw.

§ 6. Affairs in Poland were in a condition which would have been impossible in any other state. The king was at war, but the republic was not. Augustus had disregarded the constitutional obligation of consulting the diet, and this was in itself enough to disgust the nobles with the enterprise. They also feared the king's design to make himself absolute with the help of Saxon troops. The diet, therefore, refused all assistance; the treaty with Russia remained unconfirmed; Augustus was called upon to withdraw his own army and was not allowed to levy that of Poland. It was one of the great defects of the elective monarchy, that the king, chosen by a faction, remained always the head of a faction. The powerful Lithuanian family of Sapieha had already assumed an attitude of open hostility to the king in opposition to the Oginsky, who supported him. And many of Augustus' own partisans had been alienated by his rule or were absorbed in the pursuit of selfish objects. Prominent among them was the Cardinal-Primate, Radziejowski, the arch-intriguer of this period, who wished to give the crown to a creature of his own, so as to make himself the real ruler of Poland.

The opposition to Augustus did not at first take the form of an alliance with Charles XII. The early embassies of the diet called upon him to quit the territory of a state which had given him no cause of quarrel. But the continued successes of the Swedish king speedily induced the malcontents to rally to his standard. In June, 1702, he routed the Saxon forces at Clissow, and followed this up by the reduction of Krakau. His presence alone seemed to ensure success. In the next year he took Lublin and Pultusk, and the West-Prussian towns of Thorn, Elbing and Danzig. He made no secret of his stern determination to compel the deposition of Augustus, cost him what time and toil it might.

It was in vain that Augustus applied for assistance to the powers of central Europe: no one was willing to take a step which might throw the Swedish conqueror on to the side of Louis XIV. Nothing remained but to renew the alliance with Russia, which had hitherto been of little assistance. This was negotiated by Patkul, who had now entered the service of Peter the Great, as a more useful instrument to avenge his own wrongs and those of Livonia. The Saxon army was reinforced by Russian troops and by the Polish partisans of Augustus. But it was too late to arrest the progress of events. In February, 1704, an assembly at Warsaw, under the presidency of the Cardinal-Primate, declared that Augustus had forfeited the crown, which was therefore vacant. The choice of a successor would have fallen upon James Sobieski, the son of the defender of Vienna, but for a dexterous move on the part of Augustus. A small body of Saxons captured James Sobieski and one of his brothers, and carried them prisoners to Leipzig. Charles XII. was urged to assume the crown himself, but he insisted on the election of Stanislaus Leczinski, woivode of Posen. The choice was not a fortunate one. Leczinski was personally able and disinterested, but he had no considerable following, and his elevation disgusted those who deemed themselves his equals. Radziejowski, who saw himself baulked of the results of his ambition, was especially alienated. But there was no opposing the resolute will of Charles. On the 12th of July, 1704, amidst ill-concealed discontent, Leczinski was formally elected king of Poland. It was obvious from the first that he could only wear his crown as long as he was supported by a Swedish army.

The election of a rival under foreign dictation gave a momentary impulse to the cause of Augustus. While Charles was employed in reducing Lemberg, Augustus made a sudden attack upon Warsaw, captured the Swedish garrison, and Stanislaus had to escape in haste to the camp of his protector. Charles hastened back to repair the loss, recovered Warsaw without difficulty, and defeated the Saxons at Wehlau. After witnessing the formal coronation of Stanislaus in the Polish capital, the Swedish army was led into Lithuania, which had been invaded by the Russians in accordance with the terms of the agreement with Augustus. In spite of the difficulties caused by the marshy nature of the country, Charles continued his successes and forced the invaders to retire. Elsewhere the Swedes were equally fortunate. Levenhaupt entered Courland from Riga, and defeated the Russian general Cheremitief (July, 1705). In the next year another Swedish commander, Rhenschild, won a great victory at Frauenstadt (February, 1706), over a vastly superior army of Saxons, Poles, and Russians under the command of count Schulenburg.

§ 7. Charles XII. had completed the reduction of Lithuania, but it was a necessary result of his position that his successes lasted only so long as he was present in person. No sooner had he marched into the southern province of Vollhynia than Augustus was able to recover much of the lost ground in Lithuania. Charles now determined to reduce his enemy to submission by an invasion of Saxony. Uniting the army of Rhenschild with his own, and leaving only a small detachment under Mardefeld in Poland, he passed the frontier of Germany without any permission from the Emperor, crossed the Oder at Steinau, and marching straight into Saxony, where no preparations had been made to resist him, he took up his quarters at Altranstadt, near Leipzig. The invaded country was compelled to suffer for the errors of its rulers, and to pay contributions for the support of the Swedish army. Augustus was now in a dilemma. Freed from the presence of his dreaded foe, and secure of assistance from Russia, he could easily recover the crown of Poland. But then he was not prepared to sacrifice his hereditary electorate for the sake of his foreign kingdom. In this difficulty he resorted to dissimulation. While professing his adherence to the Russian alliance, he sent two envoys, Imhof and Pfingsten, with purposely vague powers, to negotiate with Charles. The envoys tried to buy off the Swedish king by proposing a partition of Poland, a favourite design of Augustus. But Charles would have nothing but revenge, and adhered to his original ultimatum, the abdication of Augustus. Against his iron will, arguments of friend and foe were alike useless, and on the 25th of September the envoys agreed to a treaty, by which Augustus renounced the Polish crown in favour of Leczinski; but kept the royal title, withdrew from all alliances against Sweden, especially that with the Czar, and promised to release James Sobieski and his brother. The treaty was now sent to Augustus for ratification. His position was more difficult than ever. He had been joined by the Russian general Menschikoff, who was urging him to attack the inferior force of Swedes under Mardefeld. Augustus dared neither refuse nor consent. He ratified the treaty of Altranstadt and sent secret warning to the Swedish general. But Mardefeld treated this as a ruse and risked a battle, in which he was completely defeated (29th October). Augustus tried hard to excuse his conduct to Charles XII. who contemptuously replied by publishing the treaty to the world. This forced the hand of the elector, who escaped as best he could from the Russian allies whom he had deceived, and appeared in December at Dresden. Charles had an interview with his defeated rival, forced him to write a letter of congratulation to Leczinski, and induced him to surrender Patkul, who had been sent as envoy by the Czar to the Saxon court. In defiance of the law of nations and of the dictates of humanity, Charles had the unfortunate noble broken on the wheel as a rebel against his lawful sovereign. Augustus had to pay another penalty for his shifty intrigues. The Swedish army remained for a year longer on Saxon soil, living at the expense of a country which was too weak to require conquest, and which, in spite of the strictness of Swedish discipline, had to suffer the usual hardships of a foreign occupation.

At this period the eyes of all Europe were fixed on the camp of Altranstadt. In 1707, Villars had broken through the lines of Stolhofen, and penetrated far into Swabia. If his army were to be joined to that of the Swedish hero, Germany would be at their mercy. Louis XIV. spared no pains to induce Charles XII. to play the part of Gustavus Adolphus to his Richelieu. The Grand Alliance was alarmed at the magnitude of the danger. The emperor

Joseph I. sent his ablest diplomatist, Wratislaw, to Altranstadt, and even condescended to make concessions to his Protestant subjects in Silesia at the dictation of a foreign monarch. Marlborough also appeared in the Swedish camp. It is difficult to ascertain whether the English general had any success in his mission. It was rumoured that he bribed Piper and other ministers of Charles. It is certain that he satisfied himself that the danger was less than it appeared. Charles was at this time a sincere Protestant, and had no more sympathy with the dynastic designs than with the religion of Louis XIV. And there was another enemy with whom he had to cope, and whom he had too long neglected, the Czar of Russia.

§ 8. At Altranstadt, Charles XII. was at the zenith of his greatness. At the age of twenty-five he had an apparently invincible army at his back, and seemed able to dictate to Europe. But his fall was more rapid than his rise had been. Ever since the battle of Narwa, he had pursued a radically unsound policy. His campaigns in Poland and Saxony had not only given Peter time to recover from defeat, but had indirectly furthered his cause. The only result of the humiliation of Augustus was to give Russia a larger share of the Swedish territories than had originally been dreamt of. Not only had Peter reduced Ingria and Carelia, and laid the foundations of his new capital on the swampy banks of the Neva, but his troops had also overrun Livonia and Courland. It was now to be seen whether the Swedish king could recover the losses for which his own conduct was chiefly to blame. It is probable that if Charles had marched directly to the eastern coasts of the Baltic, he would have carried all before him. But he determined to pursue the same tactics that had been so successful against Frederick IV. and Augustus, and to checkmate his adversary by a direct attack on his capital. He was destined to find that Russia was a very different country from Denmark, Poland or Saxony. At the end of 1707, he collected all his forces, amounting to 33,000 of the finest troops in the world. Early in 1708 he started to march directly to Moscow. Levenhaupt had orders to follow him with 18,000 men. By September, Charles was still 300 miles from the Russian capital. Peter had adopted the wise tactics of watching and molesting the enemy without risking a pitched battle. The Swedes might still have been saved if Charles had been willing to wait for the arrival of Levenhaupt with supplies and reinforcements. But he was led away by an agreement which he had made with Mazeppa, a hetman of the Cossacks, who hoped with Swedish aid to free himself from Russian sovereignty and to found an independent Cossack empire. To join him Charles turned from the direct road and marched southwards into the Ukraine. He discovered that Mazeppa was unable to fulfil his grandiloquent promises, and could only bring 5000 Cossacks to his aid. The Swedish troops, hardy as they were, suffered terribly from a winter of unparalleled severity. Peter took prompt advantage of his adversary's error. Falling upon Levenhaupt with immensely superior forces he cut his army to pieces, and destroyed his convoy. Levenhaupt displayed the most conspicuous courage and generalship, but he could only bring the shattered remnant of his army to join his master. From this time the ruin of the Swedes was only a matter of time. As soon as spring had put an end to the worst sufferings, Charles laid siege to Pultawa, an enterprise which want of artillery rendered hopeless from the first. Everything was now prepared for the final blow. In June, 1709, Peter arrived with 60,000 men to crush the worn-out Swedes, who only numbered 29,000. To make matters worse Charles had received a bullet-wound in the foot, which compelled him to exchange his horse for a litter and to entrust the chief command to Rhenschild. On the 27th of June the great battle was fought which decided a momentous question for Europe, and transferred to Russia the position which Gustavus Adolphus and his successors had won for Sweden. Rhenschild, Piper, and more than 20,000 officers and men were taken prisoners and dispersed through Russia, never to see their native country again. Charles, with a few companions, fled southwards, and just succeeded in escaping into Turkish territory. There he was hospitably received, and suddenly disappeared from the view of Europe in his famous retirement at Bender.

§ 9. The northern states took no heed of the great change which Pultawa made in the balance of power. Instead of recognising the fact that Russia had now become their most formidable rival, they thought only of the fall of their ancient enemy, and how they could profit by the spoils of Sweden. The triple alliance between Russia, Poland, and Denmark, which Charles XII. had so triumphantly crushed, sprang into life again on his defeat. Peter was naturally able to secure the lion's share of the booty. He completed his conquest of Livonia and Esthonia, and captured Riga, Dünamunde, Revel, and other important towns. His hold on the Baltic was now secure, and he could continue the building of St. Petersburg without fear of attack. Augustus was not slow to find a pretext for breaking the treaty of Altranstadt. The Pope absolved him from his obligations, and the negotiators, Pfingsten and Imhof, were condemned to severe punishments on a trumped-up charge of having exceeded their powers. The crown of Poland was recovered as easily as it had been lost, and Leczinski, who was powerless without Swedish aid, was driven into Pomerania, whence he made his way to join his unfortunate patron at Bender. Frederick IV. had no scruples about throwing up the treaty at Travendahl. Ever since its conclusion he had been occupied in improving his military forces. Not only did he resume his designs against the duchy of Holstein he also sent an army across the Sound to attack the southern part of Sweden. But the Swedes, though exhausted by the long war, and demoralised by the loss of their army and the absence of their king, were still able to resist invasion. The Danes were utterly routed under the walls of Helsingborg by a hastily collected army of peasants, and were compelled to retire into Zealand. The maritime states, afraid lest the northern complications might impede their war with France, concluded a treaty at the Hague, by which the German territories of Sweden were to be held as neutral. But no force could be raised to enforce the neutrality, and as Charles XII. rejected the treaty with scorn, it remained little more than a dead letter.

§ 10. While the Swedish territories were being scrambled for in the north, Charles was living at Bender, absorbed in an attempt to induce the Porte to declare war against Russia. He could urge obvious reasons of policy. The Turks had more reason than any other European state to dread the growth of the Russian power, which was a constant magnet to their discontented Slav subjects. But since the treaty of Carlowitz it was difficult to persuade the Porte to adopt an energetic policy, and Peter was untiring in his endeavour to prevent a rupture. Charles' agent, the Pole Poniatowski, who had helped him to escape from Pultawa, was active in all the intrigues at Constantinople, and was supported by the French envoy, Désaleurs. They succeeded in overthrowing one vizier after another, but the Czar was more lavish of his bribes than they could afford to be, and it was not till the end of 1710 that war was declared against Russia. Early in the next year a large army was collected under the grand vizier, Mehemet Baltadschi. Peter was not slow to take measures for repulsing the invasion. Leaving a senate to conduct the government in Moscow, he advanced into Moldavia, where the Hospodar Kantemir had led him to expect a general rising of the population on his behalf. In this act Peter imitated the relations of Charles XII. with Mazeppa, and the result was precisely similar. Kantemir joined him in person, but brought hardly any followers. Peter found himself on the banks of the Pruth in as hopeless a situation as that of Charles at Pultawa. He was shut in between the river, a morass, and a vastly superior Turkish army. Both the Czar and his officers were in dismay, and were in momentary expectation of annihilation. From this impending disaster

Russia was saved by the folly of the vizier and the energy of a woman. Peter was accompanied by his mistress, Catharine, originally a peasant-girl of Esthonia, and destined to be the Czar's wife and successor. She assembled a council of officers, collected what treasure she could, and with its aid opened a negotiation with the Turkish leader. Baltadschi, probably thinking it better to obtain solid advantages, without risking a battle with troops maddened by despair, accepted the following terms, which are known as the treaty of Husch or of the Pruth (July 23, 1711). Peter undertook to restore Azof, to destroy all fortresses on Turkish territory, and to allow a free passage to Charles XII. The loss of Azof was a blow to the Czar, but it was a very small price to pay for his escape from so great a danger. Charles XII., thinking that at last he had his hated enemy in his grasp, arrived in the Turkish camp just in time to hear of the conclusion of the treaty. He vented his rage in abuse of the vizier, whose dismissal he subsequently obtained from the Sultan; but he failed altogether to bring about a renewal of the war. In spite of this blow to his hopes, he clung to his project with an obstinacy that verged on madness. Hints, entreaties, commands, threats, were powerless to induce him to quit Turkey, where his entertainment involved considerable annoyance and expense. At last the Sultan gave orders to his officers to expel him by force. With a handful of servants he defended his house against regular troops, and held it till it was fired above his head. The Janissaries were forced into admiration of the "Iron-head," as they called him. He was carried a prisoner to Demotica, where he feigned sickness and took to his bed. At last he was roused to action by the news that his enemies were stripping him of his German possessions. Leaving Turkey, after a five years' residence, he travelled night and day with a single companion through Hungary and Germany, and entered Stralsund on the 27th November, 1714.

§ 11. Charles arrived to find Swedish affairs in an almost hopeless condition. In 1713 the Russians had taken Helsingfors and reduced Finland. In the next year they occupied the islands of Aland, and threatened Stockholm. Peter evidently aimed at acquiring the same position as a German prince that the treaty of Wesphalia had given to Sweden. He had two nieces, daughters of his half-brother Iwan. One of them, Anne, he had married to the duke of Courland, the other, Catharine, to the duke of Mecklenburg. These marriages were intended as preliminaries to a Russian annexation of these provinces. Peter's ambition was rapidly rousing the jealousy of his allies, but at present they were only absorbed in looking after acquisitions for themselves. In 1712 the Danes had taken

Bremen and Verden, and prepared to invade Pomerania. But Sweden, exhausted as she was, was not yet powerless. Stenbock, the general who had driven the Danes from Helsingborg in 1710, now crossed to attack them on the continent, and won a complete victory at Gadebusch (December, 1712). Instead of turning to attack the Saxons and Russians in Pomerania, he was induced by commercial jealousy to destroy, with great barbarity, the flourishing port of Altona. Thence he turned to Holstein, where the minister, Count Görz, admitted him into Tönningen. Meanwhile the Danes obtained Russian and Saxon reinforcements, which gave them the superiority. After seizing Kiel, Gottorp, and Schleswig, they forced Stenbock to capitulate with his whole army at Tönningen. This event destroyed the last chance of maintaining the southern coast of the Baltic for Sweden. Prussia, where Frederick William I. had succeeded his father in 1713, at last joined the anti-Swedish alliance, in the hope of enforcing the old Hohenzollern claims on Pomerania. Hanover, whose elector, George I., had just become king of England, was induced to take the same side by being allowed to purchase Bremen and Verden from Denmark. Against this invincible combination Charles XII. carried on an obstinate but hopeless conflict. To make matters worse, discontent was rife in his own kingdom. The oligarchy, which had been so ruthlessly put down by Charles XI., was beginning to raise its head again, and could maintain with plausibility that it was uncontrolled despotism that had brought such accumulated disasters. Charles' heroism was unable to hold Stralsund against the overwhelming force that advanced to lay siege to it. The capture of the island of Rügen by Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau made the town untenable, and Charles with great difficulty escaped to Sweden. His departure was followed by the complete reduction of Pomerania. With Wismar fell the last Swedish possession on German soil (April 20, 1716).

Charles had been absent from Sweden for sixteen years, but he characteristically refused to revisit Stockholm till he could do so as a conqueror. He found the nobles actively engaged in intrigues to recover their lost privileges. Charles himself was still unmarried, so that his death would raise a question as to the succession. He destined the crown for the young duke of Holstein, the son of his elder sister Hedwig. But the aristocratic party had induced a younger sister, Ulrica Eleanor, to marry the prince of Hesse-Cassel without her brother's permission, and was prepared to bring her forward as a claimant. Charles treated these intrigues with lofty contempt, and took no steps to crush them. His reckless bravery made him still popular with the lower classes, in spite of the evils he had brought upon them, so that his return forced his enemies to carry on their plots in complete secrecy. He himself thought only of continuing the war. For this the first requisite was funds, and in raising them he found an able instrument in count Görz, who deserted the service of Holstein for that of Sweden. Görz was a libertine in private life, but was endowed with restless ambition and great diplomatic ability, and was an adept in the wild financial schemes that were so common in Europe at the time. He raised money by expedients that would now be called fraudulent, and gradually obtained a complete ascendancy over Charles, who appointed him chief minister, to the intense disgust of the nobles and the official class.

§ 12. Görz conceived the happy idea of saving Sweden by taking advantage of the manifest discord among her opponents. His plan was to buy off the most formidable of these opponents, Russia, and to combine with her against the rest. Peter the Great would be satisfied with the acquisition of the provinces to the east of the Baltic, Carelia, Ingria, Esthonia and Livonia. In return for them he would allow Sweden to regain the German territories, and to obtain compensation at the expense of Denmark and Hanover. Prussia might be compensated for the loss of Pomerania with a portion of Poland. There was much to recommend this to the Czar, who readily fell in with Görz's plans at an interview at Amsterdam. Peter despised his old ally Augustus, he cared nothing for the Danes, and he positively detested George I., who had acquired Bremen and Verden without doing much for the common cause, and who had displayed a morbid antipathy to the advancing power of Russia. The great obstacle to the success of the scheme lay in the naval power of England, which had now fallen to the House of Hanover. It was here that Görz's plans came into contact with those of the Spanish minister Alberoni. Alberoni wished to deprive the French regent Orleans of the support of England by restoring the Stuarts in that country. Görz was willing to employ the forces of Sweden and Russia for the same object.

Proofs were soon furnished of the changed relations of the northern powers. In 1716 Charles XII. invaded Norway, advanced to Christiania, but retired without having effected anything. This showed that he had ceased to have any dread of Russia. In this very year, Peter had arranged to co-operate with the Danes in an invasion of Sweden. But though he sent 40,000 men for the purpose, twice the number agreed upon, he refused to take any part in the enterprise. The Danes were convinced that but for the presence of an English fleet in the Baltic, these troops would have been employed against Copenhagen. Meanwhile a great blow had been given to the scheme of a Jacobite restoration in England. Gyllenborg, the Swedish envoy, had been seized in London, and Görz himself was for a short time imprisoned in Holland. Their papers disclosed the plot, and its discovery rendered its accomplishment almost impossible. Still Görz persevered in his plans. The year 1717 was spent in military preparations. In May, 1718, Görz and Gyllenborg met two Russian plenipotentiaries in Losoe, one of the Aland islands. There the heads of a treaty were agreed upon. In return for the cession of the eastern Baltic provinces, Peter was to assist Charles to recover the German territories of Sweden and to make further acquisitions from Denmark, Hanover and Poland. Leczinski was to be restored to the Polish throne. Sweden was to be allowed to annex Norway, but only after she had combined with Russia to give the crown of England to James Stuart. Suddenly news came which put an end to these negotiations. Charles XII. had again invaded Norway and laid siege to the fortress of Friedrichshall. As he was going round the trenches he was killed by a bullet, fired, according to a rumour which has almost become a certainty, not by the enemy, but by a traitor in the service of the aristocratic party.

§ 13. Charles' death was followed by a complete revolution in Sweden. The rightful heir, Frederick of Holstein-Gottorp, a feeble prince, refused the offer of General Dücker to proclaim him as king before the army. The council at Stockholm hastened to take advantage of his incapacity. Ulrica Eleanor was acknowledged as regent, but only on condition that she should immediately summon a diet and ratify any changes that should be made in the constitution. Then the council proceeded to apprehend Görz, who was hastening to obtain Charles XII.'s approval of the preliminaries agreed upon at Losoe. The projected treaty with Russia was annulled. The diet met in February, 1719, and speedily agreed upon the reforms that were to be imposed on the queen. The despotism which Charles XI. had established was swept away. The crown was to be no longer hereditary but elective. Side by side with the sovereign was erected an imperial council or senate of twenty-four members, under the presidency of the five chief ministers. Without the consent of the council, the queen, who was allowed two votes, could do nothing, not even appoint to civil or military offices. The council was to be responsible to the diet alone, but as the diet lost importance from this time, it was practically irresponsible. Thus the government of Sweden ceased to be a monarchy and became once more a close oligarchy. Still further concessions were extorted from the queen as the price of her husband's elevation to the throne in the next year.

The first act of the oligarchy was one of revenge. Count Görz was brought before a specially constituted tribunal, and after a shameful parody of a trial was condemned and executed (March, 1719). His financial projects were abandoned without any regard to public faith. But the new government could not be secure as long as the war continued. The army was better disposed to the monarchy than to the nobles, and moreover the enemies of Sweden might at any time gain an advantage by taking up the claims of the duke of Holstein. The council hastened to disband a portion of the army, already weakened by the loss of 7000 men who had been frozen to death in Norway, and to open negotiations with the hostile powers. Terms of peace were speedily arranged for Hanover by the English minister Carteret (November, 1719). On payment of a million thalers the elector-king obtained Bremen and Verden. With Poland there was no longer war, as the republic in 1716 had openly refused to allow Augustus to continue it. The only obstacle to a complete pacification lay in the position of Stanislaus Leczinski, to whom Charles XII. had given a residence in Zweibrücken, a principality which had hitherto belonged to the Swedish kings as the heirs of Charles X. Zweibrücken now passed to a nephew of Charles X., the prince of Kleeberg, who was an ardent Protestant and already under obligations to Augustus. He compelled Stanislaus to quit his territories, and the unfortunate prince had to seek a new place of exile in Alsace. This removed all cause of hostility between Sweden and Poland, and Augustus promised to compensate his rival for his confiscated possessions, a promise which was never fulfilled. With Prussia Sweden made a treaty in February, 1720. Frederick William I. obtained the part of Pomerania lying between the Oder and the Peene, including the towns of Stettin and Danzig and the islands of Usedom and Wollin, and agreed in return to pay two million thalers. The negotiations with Denmark were more difficult, in spite of the fact that the traditional jealousy of the two Scandinavian powers was modified at the moment by their mutual antagonism to the duke of Holstein. But in July, 1720, a treaty was concluded by the mediation of Carteret. Frederick IV. restored to Sweden the German territories which she had occupied in the war, viz., Stralsund, Greifswald and the island of Rügen. Sweden on her part resigned her exemption from the Sound dues, and allowed Frederick to annex Schleswig to his kingdom. He was only prevented from taking Holstein too by the intervention of the emperor and the German princes.

Russia was now the only remaining enemy of Sweden. To enforce compliance with his demands, Peter sent a fleet into the

Baltic which inflicted enormous damage on the Swedish coast. Still the government held out in the confident hope of receiving assistance from England. But the English parliament was resolutely hostile to any measures that looked like a concession to Hanoverian interests, and against this opposition George I.'s ministers were powerless. At last the Swedes gave way, and the treaty of Nystädt was signed on the 10th of September, 1721. Sweden had to surrender Ingria, Esthonia, Livonia, and the greater part of Carelia, while Peter promised to restore Finland, and to abstain from interference in the internal affairs of Sweden and especially in the question of the succession. This destroyed the last chance of the duke of Holstein, who was resident in Russia and who had hoped to obtain his rightful crown with Peter's assistance. The treaty of Nystädt finally settled the great question of the supremacy in northern Europe. The position which the disunion of Germany and the genius of Gustavus Adolphus had won for Sweden was henceforth transferred to Russia. The only thing which to some extent neutralised the results of the transfer was the as yet almost unnoticed development of Prussia into a state of first-rate importance.

§ 14. Peter's foreign policy had proved triumphantly successful in all points but one. He had failed to obtain the coveted position of a German prince. His attempt to retain the hold on Mecklenburg which his niece's marriage had given him, was foiled by the steady resistance of the emperor Charles VI., and the intervention of Hanover compelled him to withdraw his troops from the province. After his peace with Sweden, Peter only undertook one more war, that with Persia, which enabled him to extend his territories to the Caspian. Throughout his active career he had never relaxed his reforming energy. Nothing was too minute for his attention, no obstacle so formidable as to daunt him. By constructing roads and canals he facilitated intercourse within his vast dominions; by treaties with maritime powers he gave an opening to the newly-born Russian commerce. The navy was under his personal supervision and special patronage. The transfer of his residence from Moscow to St. Petersburg is significant of the grand purpose of his life. Moscow remained the centre of everything that was ancient and traditional in Russia. Through the new capital was to be admitted the civilisation of the west which he so ardently studied and appreciated, though he could so imperfectly imitate it. The whole system of government was remodelled in imitation of the institutions he had seen abroad. In 1711 he abolished the ancient *douma* of the boyards, and replaced it by a senate which consisted of the chief ministers of the Czar. In 1718 he suppressed the *prikayes* or commissions, and created ten "colleges," similar to those which the regent Orleans had established in France. A special police department was set on foot, and its powers extended by the formation of an inquisition, which rendered great services to despotism, but inflicted equal misery upon the Russian people. The whole provincial administration was reorganised on a regular system. But there was one defect which even Peter was unable with the greatest efforts to remedy. He could appoint officials and regulate their duties, but he could not make them cease to be corrupt. His special favourite, Menschikoff, whom he had raised from a humble position, was found to be tainted with the prevalent vice, and is said to have received summary chastisement from the Czar's own hand.

Peter's reign, like that of many other successful rulers, was marred by family troubles. His first wife, Eudoxia, whom he repudiated and divorced, had borne him a son, Alexis, who inherited his mother's antipathy to his father's policy and person. He became the centre of the conservative opposition to reforms and foreigners, and the alienation was increased when Peter married his mistress, Catharine. In 1712 he attempted to reconcile his son with foreign manners and institutions by marrying him to a German wife, Charlotte of Brunswick. But the expedient proved a failure; Alexis ill-treated his wife, who died in 1715, after giving birth to a son, afterwards Czar as Peter II. In 1716 Peter undertook one of his journeys westwards, and left the regency to Alexis, whom at that time he destined to be his heir. At Copenhagen Peter heard that his son was taking measures to reverse his whole policy. To escape the threatened vengeance of his father he fled, first to Vienna, and then to Naples. Thither he was tracked by the emissaries of the Czar, and compelled to return to St. Petersburg. A commission was appointed to try him, and torture was employed to extort a confession of conspiracy against his father's government. He was condemned to death, but before the sentence could be executed he died in prison, probably from the effects of fresh tortures, which were applied to compel further disclosures. Peter had now no male heir, except his grandson, of his own name, and he was naturally averse to leave his crown to an infant. Accordingly, in 1722 he issued a ukase, which conferred upon the reigning Czar the right of nominating his successor without any regard to birth or hereditary right. This was generally considered to imply a determination to give the succession to his wife Catharine, in whose capacity he had unlimited confidence. This was confirmed by the fact that in 1724 Catharine was solemnly crowned as empress. In the same year he gave great alarm to the Swedish government by betrothing Anne, his eldest daughter by his second marriage, to the duke of Holstein. The expected nomination of a successor was never made. On the 8th of February, 1725, Peter the Great died at the age of fifty-three. His name will always live among those of the heroes of history, as the creator of the greatness of modern Russia.

§ 15. Peter's death was followed by a confused period of Russian history. The question of the succession was one rather of parties than of persons. The conservative opponents of the late reforms, headed by the Jalitsynes, Dolgoroukis and other noble families, put forward the claims of the younger Peter, who was now twelve years old. Menschikoff, on the other hand, and all the partisans of the new régime, were warmly in favour of the widow, Catharine. The preference of the army decided the question in her favour. During her short reign of two years, Peter's system of government was continued, and Menschikoff, from whose service she had passed to become the Czar's mistress, was all-powerful in Russia. Before Catharine's death, in 1727, she nominated Peter II. as her successor, and appointed a council of regency during his minority, of which the chief members were Menschikoff and the duke of Holstein. In the new reign Menschikoff, whose daughter was betrothed to the young Czar, became more powerful than ever. He compelled the duke of Holstein and his wife to quit Russia for their duchy, and he caused himself to be nominated Generalissimo. But his arbitrary conduct soon alienated Peter, who secured his liberty by dismissing and banishing his dictator and would-be father-in-law. Iwan Dolgorouki, the favourite companion of Peter II., was now supreme. Under his régime the hopes of the old-Russian party revived. The Czar recalled his grandmother Eudoxia from the cloister to the court, and went so far as to quit St. Petersburg, to take up his residence in Moscow. But the danger of reaction was ended by the sudden death of Peter II., of small-pox, in 1730. The male line of Peter the Great was now extinct, and the succession was more open than ever. Of Peter's daughters, Anne and Elizabeth, the former had died in 1728, leaving a son, afterwards Peter III. There were two other female candidates, the daughters of Peter's brother Iwan, Catharine, duchess of Mecklenburg, and Anne, duchess of Courland. Iwan Dolgorouki actually conceived the bold idea of claiming the succession for his sister Catharine, on the ground that she had been betrothed though not married to Peter II., Ultimately the party of the nobles, who were now supreme, determined to choose one of the imperial family, but to depart as far as possible from the rules of hereditary succession. By this means they hoped to obtain concessions which would establish their own power on a firm basis. They therefore offered the crown to Anne of Courland, but drew up a sort of capitulation for her acceptance, which would have transformed Russia into an oligarchical republic. The crown was to be elective, and the sovereign was to do nothing without consulting a high council, which was to consist of eight members and to fill up vacancies by co-optation. Anne accepted the crown and the conditions with which the offer was accompanied. But no sooner had she entered Moscow than she determined to break her compact. The people, and especially the army, preferred autocratic rule to that of a clique of nobles. Secure of national support, she boldly repudiated the capitulation, and punished its authors by exile and imprisonment, The system of Peter the Great was restored in all its entirety, and the first attempt to impose constitutional restrictions on a Russian sovereign ended in complete failure.

CHAPTER XV.

FRANCE AFTER THE DEATH OF LOUIS XIV.

§ 1. Situation of affairs; character of the Regent Orleans. § 2. The bastards; overthrow of Louis XIV.'s will; reactionary policy. § 3. Financial affairs; the *chambre ardente;* Law's schemes; the Mississippi Company. § 4. Financial crash. § 5. England and Spain. § 6. Elizabeth of Parma and Alberoni; revival of the Spanish power. § 7. Dubois; the Triple Alliance; Spanish conquest of Sardinia and Sicily. § 8. The Quadruple Alliance; Byng defeats the Spanish fleet; Alberoni's alliance with Sweden and Russia; conspiracy of Cellamare. § 9. Collapse of Alberoni's schemes; his dismissal; Spain makes peace. § 10. Dubois becomes a cardinal; alliance with Spain; end of the regency; death of Dubois and Orleans. § 11. Ministry of the duke of Bourbon; Louis XV. marries Marie Leczinska; religious persecution; Fleury becomes chief minister; his domestic policy.

§ 1. The death of Louis XIV. was an event of the greatest importance to Europe, and much more so to France. He had established a centralised monarchy, which crushed all independent life in the capital and the provinces, and which had obtained absolute control not only over politics, but also over religion and literature. The government was one vast machine which was worked by the will of a single man or of those who could influence him. For a time the system had been triumphantly successful. France had extended its frontiers, increased its resources, and raised itself almost to supremacy in Europe. But in the later years of the long reign these successes had been overshadowed by failures. Religious intolerance had crushed domestic industry, and had raised a powerful combination of foreign enemies. In a war of dynastic ambition France had squandered her resources till the state was well-nigh bankrupt, and had lost that military reputation which had been the most popular gift of the Bourbon kings. The question now arose as to whether the system of Louis XIV. could possibly survive him. It is probable that he himself recognised the impossibility, and in fact he was partially responsible for it. In his later years he had surrounded himself with docile followers of his own will in preference to able ministers, and the result was that he left behind him no statesman capable of carrying on his work. Even his own descendants had shown themselves by no means enamoured of his principles of government. His grandson, the duke of Burgundy, the pupil of Fénelon and the idol of popular hopes, had drawn up schemes of reform which were directly antagonistic to the system of the *grand monarque.* Had he lived to ascend the throne, France would have had an opportunity of testing the worth of that paternal despotism which was so popular in the eighteenth century, and which found its ablest exponents in Frederick the Great and Joseph II. But his early death had marred this prospect, and had left the succession to his second son, Louis XV., a sickly infant of five years old.

The future of France depended on the choice of a regent. Custom rather than definite law assigned the office to the nearest prince of the blood royal, who would be the natural heir in case of the minor's death. In the present case this was the young king's uncle, Philip V. of Spain. But then the treaty of Utrecht and his own renunciation excluded him from the succession in France, and any attempt to give him the regency must have aroused a new European war. Next to him stood Philip duke of Orleans (born 1674), the second son of Louis XIV.'s only brother Philip, and of Elizabeth Charlotte, daughter of the elector palatine. He was the most brilliant prince whom the house of Bourbon had produced since Henry IV. Not only was he accomplished as a painter and a musician, he had studied philosophy under Leibnitz, and natural science under Homberg, and his natural abilities enabled him to master any subject without exhausting effort. As a general he had shown himself both brave and competent, had gained the affection of his troops, and might have won the laurels of a conqueror if he had not been hampered by his uncle's jealousy. But all his great qualities were marred by still more conspicuous defects. The same ambition which induced him to study widely if not deeply, led him also to seek pre-eminence in frivolity and vice. His natural inclination to sensual indulgence had been encouraged by a congenial tutor, the abbé Dubois. His mother used to apply to him the old fable of the prince who received every good quality from his fairy godmothers, until one old fairy, indignant at not being invited, added a curse which rendered all the other gifts useless. At Louis XIV.'s court Philip of Orleans had come to be regarded as a monster of iniquity. The successive deaths of the royal princes had been attributed by popular rumour to his ambition to obtain the crown for himself, and he had been allowed no opportunity to clear himself from the suspicion. This was the man who was destined to govern France for the next eight years, and to leave a permanent impress on his country's history.

§ 2. It was natural that Louis XIV. should regard the prospect with misgiving, and that Madame de Maintenon should suggest measures to avert it. A will was drawn up with the intention of ensuring the permanence of the existing system. For this purpose Louis had no one to rely upon but his illegitimate children by Madame de Montespan, the duke of Maine and the count of Toulouse. Though they had been born in the lifetime of M. de Montespan and acknowledged by him, the king had not scrupled to give them, first the name of Bourbon, then a rank immediately after the royal family, and finally, in 1714, the right of eventual succession to the throne itself. Madame de Maintenon, who had risen to influence as the governess of the two bastards, spared no pains to secure their advancement. The royal will entrusted the government during the minority to a council of fifteen, including Maine, Toulouse, Villeroy, Tallard, etc. Of this council the duke of Orleans was to be president, so that the only power allowed him was that of giving a casting-vote in case of an equal division. The guardianship of the young king's person was entrusted to the duke of Maine, who was also to have the command of the royal guards.

This arrangement had too many inherent defects to be lasting. A council of fifteen was obviously too large a body to govern a country like France, which was now habituated to despotic rule. This would have been the case even if there had been tolerable unanimity among its members, but there were certain to be endless quarrels between the dukes of Orleans and Maine. The former determined from the first to get rid of the will and to obtain the power which he considered to belong to him by right. He had on his side all the classes who were discontented with the late régime; the nobles who wished to recover some of their former power, and who were disgusted by the elevation of the bastards; the members of the Parliament of Paris, which had been reduced to powerless insignificance by the late king; the Jansenists, who saw an opportunity of escaping from their Jesuit persecutors. The duke of Orleans roused himself for a moment from his inglorious dissipations, and spared no pains to ensure the success of his scheme. The instrument which he intended to employ was the Parliament of Paris, which seventy years ago had revoked the will of Louis XIII., and was eager to seize a new chance of enforcing its claim to political power. On the 2nd of September, 1715, the Parliament held a formal session, at which the princes of the blood royal and the peers of France were present. Without any difficulty the duke of Orleans obtained the ratification of his wishes. He was appointed regent with full powers of granting offices and disposing of the revenue. The command of the household troops was taken away from the duke of Maine, although he was allowed to remain guardian of the young king.

Thus the system of personal government was retained in France, but in the hands of Philip of Orleans instead of Louis XIV. The regent was practically pledged to a policy of reaction, in order to gratify his supporters among the nobles and the Parliament. He was guided to a great extent by the schemes that had been drawn up by the duke of Burgundy and by the advice of St. Simon, whose memoirs give us the most vivid if not the most trustworthy picture of the history of this period. A council of regency was appointed, with the duke of Bourbon, the representative of the legitimate princes, as its president, but including amongst its members the duke of Maine and the count of Toulouse. Then followed the distinct departure from the late régime. Instead of entrusting the various departments to ministers, acting in direct subordination to the crown, six councils of ten members each were created, for war, the navy, commerce, finance, home and foreign affairs. A seventh council, of conscience, to regulate ecclesiastical matters, had been created by the late king, but it was now employed for wholly different objects. The presidency was given to cardinal Noailles, the representative of the opposition to the Jesuits and the bull *Unigenitus*. Père le Tellier was banished, and the Jansenists flocked back to Paris. Literature became once more independent. Fénélon's *Télémaque* was published and Voltaire began to write. The regent even meditated a restoration of the edict of Nantes, but was dissuaded from making so violent a change. In all points the old repressive government was given up to make way for a milder and more constitutional system. The Parliament of Paris was allowed to resume the right which it had lost of making remonstrances before registering the royal edicts.

The change was so complete as to amount to a revolution. If it had proved successful and permanent it would have made the most material difference to the history of France. But it failed lamentably, and the causes of its failure are not far to seek. The institutions were good enough, but there was a woful lack of capacity and honesty in the men who were to work them. The nobles, who had a majority of places in the councils, were wholly untrained to the work of administration, and were jealous of their colleagues, the lawyers, who possessed the requisite training and intelligence. Above all the regent himself was no duke of Burgundy; he had carried through the reforms not for their own sake, but merely to secure his personal power. Once he had obtained this object, he returned to the pursuit of his own selfish pleasures. He surrounded himself with worthless associates whom he cynically called his *roués*, because they deserved to be broken on the wheel. His orgies at the Palais Royal were a disgrace not only to his country, but to his age. No prosperity could be enjoyed by France under the rule of so vicious a profligate. Thanks to Dubois, the government was carried on not without ability and with some amount of success. But there was one department, that of finance, in which reform was urgently needed, but where it could only be effected by conspicuous ability and honesty. It was here that the regency found its greatest difficulty, and met with its most unqualified failure.

§ 3. The war of the Spanish succession had exhausted the resources of France. The annual expenses amounted to 243 millions of francs, while the revenue was only 186 millions, and that had been anticipated for two years to come. There was an immense floating debt consisting of government paper, which had sunk to a third of its nominal value. There was evidently a difficult task before the council of finance, which the regent appointed under the presidency of the duke of Noailles. St. Simon, imbued with aristocratic contempt and hatred for financiers and men of business, proposed to ruin the state creditors by summoning the States-General and declaring a national bankruptcy. This expedient was rejected, but the measures which the government adopted were scarcely less revolutionary or more inconsistent with the lawful rights of property. An extraordinary tribunal, known as the *chambre ardente*, was erected to inquire into the conduct of the financiers, and to confiscate what it pleased the government to call their ill-gotten gains. Informers were to be rewarded with a share of the spoils. For a year the work of judicial robbery was carried on with rigorous severity and amidst popular applause. But it was soon discovered that the nation profited little from the persecution. The confiscated wealth passed not into the treasury, but into the pockets of the regent and his associates, who also found a new mode of acquiring riches in selling their protection to the terrified millionaires. Finally, in 1717, the authority of the tribunal was revoked by an edict, which did not hesitate to avow that corruption was too wide-spread to be investigated or punished. The financial difficulty was as great as ever, and Noailles and his council had failed to meet it.

The regent was now induced to listen to the advice of a congenial spirit, John Law, the son of an Edinburgh goldsmith, who had pursued his financial speculations at the gaming-tables of Europe. He was a fanatical believer in the power of credit, which was just beginning to play a new and unprecedented part in commercial transactions. In his opinion it was credit which had enabled England and Holland to bear the expenses of the recent war so much more easily than France had done. His scheme was to form a bank which should have at its back all the resources of the state, as security for the issue of paper-money. As further security he intended gradually to get the whole commerce of the country under the control of the central bank. Thus an almost unlimited amount of paper could be put into circulation, which would perform all the functions of specie, indefinitely multiply the national wealth, give a new impulse to manufactures and trade, and enable the government to pay off the debt without effort or sacrifice. The scheme had a political as well as a financial significance. If successfully carried out, it would give the monarchy a power far greater and more centralised than Louis XIV. had ever dreamed of obtaining. At the same time the issue of paper money would enable the government to re-purchase the offices which had been sold to individuals, and thus to recover absolute control over the magistracy. It was this aspect of the scheme which led Montesquieu to call Law the greatest supporter of despotism that ever lived, and it was this which raised against him the opposition of the Parliament and other institutions whose independence was threatened.

The gigantic proportions of the scheme fascinated the mind of the regent. But it was based upon a fundamental error, which is easily to be discerned by the light of modern political economy. In those days money was regarded not so much as an instrument for effecting the exchange of wealth, but as wealth itself. If this was erroneous in the case of specie, it was still more erroneous in that of paper-money. This was what Law failed to perceive. To him every increase of the circulating medium, and such an increase could certainly be effected by his plan, implied a direct increase of wealth. The nation was destined to suffer for the erroneous opinions which he shared with almost all his contemporaries.

Law's proposals had at first been rejected by the influence of Noailles, but he was allowed in 1716 to found an independent bank, which proved a great success. In the next year it was raised to be a government institution. Law was now enabled to develope his scheme without hindrance. He formed the great Mississippi Company, to which the regent granted the recently discovered territory of Louisiana, and the capital was named New Orleans in his honour. The company soon displayed extraordinary activity. It assumed the management of the tobacco monoply, and advanced 1200 millions to the government at three per cent. to redeem debts which had been contracted at a much higher rate of interest. The shares were greedily sought after and rapidily rose to four times their original value. A perfect mania for stock-jobbing set in, which can only be paralleled from the history of the contemporary South Sea Company in England. The Rue Quincampoix, where the company took up its headquarters, was thronged with eager and excited speculators. Meanwhile all sorts of paper-money, bank notes and company's bonds, were circulated in profusion and readily taken up, although many of the cooler speculators, including Law himself, were not slow to realise their paper in the purchase of landed estates. In spite of this success the scheme met with vehement opposition in the Parliament of Paris and elsewhere, which the regent put down with a firm hand. Noailles, who refused to have anything to do with Law, was dismissed and replaced by D'Argenson. The seals were taken away from the chancellor D'Aguesseau and were also transferred to D'Argenson. The regent did not scruple to depart altogether from the engagements which he had made to secure his power. The Parliament was deprived of its right of remonstrance, the administrative councils were suppressed, to the great disappointment of the nobles, the bastards of the late king were degraded from the royal rank to which he had raised them, and the personal guardianship of the young king was taken from the duke of Maine and given to the duke of Bourbon. Finally, Law became a Roman Catholic, and this removed the obstacle to his appointment as financial minister.

§ 4. In 1720 came the inevitable crash. There had undoubtedly been an increase of wealth in France, because speculation had given some impulse to commerce. But it was nothing in comparison with the enormous increase in the circulating currency. The result was soon visible. Whenever the medium for circulating commodities increases out of proportion to the commodities which it has to circulate, the result is that each commodity commands a larger part of the medium, that is, its price increases. This was the first effect of Law's employment of credit. Prices rose all round without any benefit to either consumer or producer. This, if not advantageous, was not in itself harmful. But matters became worse when the paper-money began to drive specie out of circulation. Those who possessed gold and silver either hoarded it or sent it out of the country. It was in vain that edicts were issued imposing a penalty on hoarding and endeavouring to maintain the paper at a fictitious value. They served only to shake the confidence of the public, upon which the whole stability of the scheme rested. Everybody who held paper hastened to realise, and there were no sufficient funds to meet the demand. Shares fell at once and a panic set in which involved both bank and company in a common ruin. The regent published an absurd edict which reduced the value of the company's paper by half, and fixed the shares at their original price of 500 livres. He had to withdraw the edict after three days, but the popular indignation was so great that it is marvellous how the government managed to survive the crisis. There was no one in France to play the part which Walpole played in England, when the South Sea bubble burst. In fact it is stated that the regent and his associates were partially responsible for the extent of the disaster. Careless what means they employed to acquire wealth, they had issued paper-money from the bank of their own accord, beyond even the very extreme limits prescribed by Law. The bank had to cease payment, and thus the national bankruptcy which St. Simon had so cynically advocated, was brought about without intention. Law had to escape for his life and he carried with him but a scanty remnant of the enormous fortune which he had amassed. He died in poverty at Venice in 1729, still preserving an unshaken belief in the principles of his system.

The disaster seemed for the moment to have ruined France, but it proved ultimately to be less serious than could have been anticipated. The losses had fallen rather on individuals than on the nation as a whole. Credit was shaken, but the national wealth was undiminished. The winding up of affairs was entrusted to the brothers Paris, the ablest financiers of the old school. The bank was abolished, but the Mississippi Company continued to exist as a trading corporation. Ruinous as the excitement had been, it had yet given a real and lasting impulse to commercial and colonial activity. And, what was of more immediate moment to the government, the state emerged from the crisis with a substantially diminished debt.

§ 5. The duke of Orleans was more successful if not more disinterested in the management of foreign affairs than in that of finance. In both he acted, not on his own initiative, but on the advice of an adventurer, in the one case of Law, in the other of the abbé Dubois. At the time of his accession there were two powers with which France was brought into the closest relations, and with which it was necessary to be on terms either of alliance or hostility England and Spain.

England had been the most determined and formidable opponent of Louis XIV. In the war of the Spanish succession she had ruined the prestige of the French arms. At the very time of his death the late king was engaged in furthering a rebellion, which aimed at the expulsion of the new Hanoverian dynasty. The regent had already opened a connexion with George I., but he did not venture to depart all at once from the traditions of French policy. The pretender was allowed to cross France without hindrance, and to embark at Dunkirk for the coast of Scotland. On the suppression of the revolt (1716), no opposition was made to his return, and he took up his residence at Avignon. The presence of the Stuarts within the French borders was a constant menace to the English, who also clamoured against the rising fortifications of Mardyck, which threatened to be a second Dunkirk. Moreover the position of the regent depended altogether on the provisions of the treaty of Utrecht. That treaty had been the work of the Tories, and was extremely distasteful to the Whig ministry, which had come into power with the accession of George I.

Spain was ruled by Philip V. who, after Louis XV., was the head of the house of Bourbon. Although he was thus the natural ally of France, he was equally the bitter enemy of the duke of Orleans. Weak, hypochondriacal, bigoted, the slave of his wife, his character was diametrically opposed to that of the regent, whom he always regarded as the murderer of his brothers and nephew, and as the supplanter of himself. For in spite of his solemn renunciations and the guarantee of the European powers, Philip V. clung obstinately to his claim to the French crown. In what was regarded as the probable event of Louis XV.'s death, he was determined to enforce his claim, even if he had to abdicate the throne of Spain. He had one other guiding passion, bitter enmity to the emperor Charles VI., who still retained the title of king of Spain, and who had robbed that monarchy of its fairest provinces in Italy. These provinces Philip was determined to regain at all costs, and in this he was encouraged by the two people who had supreme in-influence over him, his wife, and his minister.

§ 6. In 1714 Philip V.'s first wife, Maria Louisa of Savoy, had died. Her favourite, the princess Orsini, who had governed Spain through her, was anxious to perpetuate her influence by finding a submissive successor for her late mistress. While she was hesitating Alberoni, who was acting as representative of Parma at Madrid, suggested Elizabeth Farnese, niece of the duke of Parma. He painted her character in accordance, not with truth, but with the wishes of the princess, and the match was arranged. The first act of the new queen was to dismiss the princess Orsini with brutality, and the exiled favourite had to retire to France. Elizabeth of Parma, in spite of the retirement in which she had been brought up, soon developed unbridled ambition and an aptitude for intrigue. As Philip's children by his first wife would exclude her own sons from the Spanish crown, she was anxious to obtain for the latter the reversion of the duchies of Parma and Tuscany to which she had had an eventual claim. It was with this end in view that she encouraged her husband's designs in Italy, while her own ambition made her eager to see him on the French throne.

Elizabeth's influence over her husband secured pre-eminence to her own countryman, Alberoni, who had contributed so essentially to bring about her marriage. Alberoni was the son of a gardener in Piacenza, where he was born in 1664. By his own ability and industry he had raised himself from obscurity, and he sought in the church the only career that was open to talent without birth. He acquired the favour of Vendome, by a skilful combination of the functions of a buffoon and a cook, had accompanied that commander to Spain, and remained there after the death of his patron. Though nominally only agent for the court of Parma, he became in reality prime minister of Spain. In this position he conceived an ardent affection for the country of his adoption, and determined to raise it from depression to the commanding position which it had once occupied in Europe. He spared no pains to develop the internal resources which had been so long neglected. Commerce and industry of all kinds revived under his patronage; the army was reorganised, and the revenue increased. But his chief attention was given to the navy. It was on the sea that Spain had risen to greatness, and it was by the sea that Alberoni sought to revive it from torpor. Foreigners who had known Spain during the succession war were astounded at the strides which the country had made under the new administration. Alberoni himself is said to have assured Philip, that with five years of peace he would make him the most powerful sovereign in Europe. But these years of peace he was not destined to have. While devoted to Spain, he was not forgetful of the interest of his native Italy, which he was anxious to free from the hated domination of Austria. This was to be the ultimate employment of the revived power of Spain, and it was this which made Alberoni agree cordially with Philip's detestation of Charles VI. At the same time his own position as a foreigner who was detested by the Spanish nobles made him completely dependent on his master's favours, and he was thus compelled to fall in with the designs upon the French crown and the hostility to the regent Orleans. It was necessary for Spain to have allies, and her most natural and most efficient ally was England. To England Spain could offer two bribes, the prompt fulfilment of the commercial stipulations of the Utrecht treaty, and the severance of French and Spanish policy which had been the essential object of the late war. Alberoni did all in his power to purchase at this price the adherence of England to the interests of Spain.

§ 7. The attitude assumed by Philip V. and Alberoni really left the regent little choice as to the policy which he should pursue.

But it is doubtful whether of his own accord he would have acted with such firmness and decision, but for the influence of his adviser and former tutor, Dubois. Dubois was a native of southern France, of distinguished talents but detestable character. Appointed as tutor to the young Philip when duke of Chartres, he had gained a fatal influence by at once cultivating his intellect and encouraging his inclination to vicious pleasures in which he himself indulged. When Philip became regent, Dubois was appointed a councillor, and at once assumed the chief direction of foreign affairs, in which he displayed the greatest skill and dexterity. His policy, as was natural, was dictated rather by the interests of the house of Orleans than by those of France. He conceived the bold idea of departing altogether from the traditions of Louis XIV. and forming a close alliance between France and England. The link was to be the common interests of the two families of Orleans and Hanover. Both were threatened by rivals, the one by the Stuarts, the other by the king of Spain on the one hand and the legitimised princes on the other. Each could secure the other against its enemies. This alliance was destined to prove fatal to the magnificent schemes of Alberoni.

In July, 1716, Dubois visited Holland on a pretence of purchasing books, and there had an interview with George I. and his minister Stanhope, who were on their way to Hanover. The terms of a convention was speedily arranged. France undertook to destroy the fortifications of Mardyck, to compel the pretender to depart from Avignon, and to afford him no further countenance or assistance. Both powers undertook to guarantee the execution of the treaty of Utrecht, especially of the articles which secured the Protestant succession in England and the exclusion of the Spanish king from the throne of France. In January, 1717, the treaty was accepted by Holland, and has since been known as the Triple Alliance.

It marks a complete revolution in European politics. French historians are never tired of reviling a treaty which, according to them, made France the slave of England, much as Charles II. had been dependent upon Louis XIV. forty years before. They have certainly a formal ground of complaint. George I. was allowed to retain the title of King of France, while Louis XV. had to content himself with the designation of Most Christian King. It was stated, and not improbably with truth, that Dubois received a pension from the Hanoverian court.

Not content with his alliance with England, Dubois also commenced a project which involved a departure from the treaty of Utrecht. George I., as elector of Hanover, was bound to the

Hapsburg interests, and had recently concerted an arrangement with Charles VI., by which the latter was to obtain Sicily, which the treaty had given to Savoy, and to compensate the duke by the cession of Sardinia. Dubois induced the regent to approve of this arrangement, and France and England endeavoured to obtain the consent of Spain by offering to guarantee the claim of Don Carlos, the elder son of Philip and Elizabeth, to the duchies of Parma and Tuscany. But the negotiation proved fruitless. Alberoni had just extorted the cardinal's hat from the pope, and was resolute in his opposition to a proposal which would strengthen the power of the emperor in Italy. He was still anxious to avoid a war until the warlike preparations which he was conducting with boundless energy were completed. But his hand was forced by an unexpected event. The grand inquisitor of Spain, as he was returning from Rome, was arrested in Lombardy as a rebellious subject of Charles III. of Spain. This insult roused the bitter indignation of Philip V., who resolved on an immediate rupture. Alberoni's remonstrances were unavailing, and all he could do was to postpone an attack upon Naples or Sicily to an invasion of Sardinia. In August, 1717, a Spanish army landed in Sardinia, was favourably received by the inhabitants, and in little more than two months made itself master of the island.

The conquest of Sardinia roused the greatest enthusiasm in Spain, so long unaccustomed to military successes. Alberoni alone refused to be carried away by the general triumph. But it was too late for him to turn back, and he was forced to hurry on the preparations for the attack upon Sicily, which was to be made in the next year. His energy seemed to galvanise the inert mass with new life. Forgotten industries were revived, ships were built and fitted out, and troops were raised even in the discontented provinces of Aragon and Catalonia. In July, 1718, the fleet sailed from Barcelona to Palermo. Victor Amadeus of Savoy had characteristically refused to commit himself to either side. Conscious that, whichever won, he could not retain Sicily, he withdrew most of his troops from the island, so that no effective resistance was made to the Spanish occupation.

§ 8. Meanwhile the emperor had appealed to the members of the Triple Alliance to assist him in repelling so unprovoked an attack and to uphold the treaty of Utrecht. A conference was opened in London at which France and the maritime powers concerted measures to force peace upon Spain. Dubois was again the moving spirit of the negotiations, which ended in the drawing up of a treaty in August, 1718. By this the emperor was to renounce all claims upon Spain and the Indies, while Philip made a similar renunciation of the Spanish provinces which had passed to Austria. Savoy was to give Sicily to the emperor in exchange for Sardinia; the succession to Parma and Tuscany was to be secured to the children of Philip's second marriage. The treaty was at once signed by the imperial representative, and thus became known as the Quadruple Alliance. No pains were spared to induce Spain to accept the proffered terms. The English ministers went so far as to risk their popularity by offering to restore Gibraltar. But Philip and Alberoni, probably trusting that the emperor's allies would content themselves with protests, were obstinate in refusing to negotiate on these terms. Their hopes were doomed to disappointment. Already an English fleet under admiral Byng had been sent into the Mediterranean. It is impossible to acquit England of the desire to crush the maritime power of Spain, which had once been so formidable and which was so unexpectedly revived. On the 11th of August, Byng attacked the Spanish fleet off Cape Passaro and completely destroyed it. This was a decisive triumph for the Quadruple Alliance. Dubois, its chief author, was rewarded with the portfolio of foreign affairs, the council which had hitherto directed them having been dissolved.

Alberoni was now driven in despair to form those projects which are usually associated with his name, and which have created the unjust impression that his policy was chimerical and unsound. He must meet coalition by coalition. With regard to Austria his hopes had been disappointed. The attempts to raise a new rebellion in Hungary had failed, and the Turks, who had hitherto occupied the emperor's attention and arms, had just concluded the treaty of Passarowitz. But the governments of England and France were both threatened by formidable enemies, to whom the Spanish minister now turned. He invited the Pretender to Spain, prepared a new expedition on his behalf, and concerted with count Görz a grand scheme by which Sweden and Russia were to be reconciled, and were to combine in supporting the Jacobites against the Hanoverian dynasty. At the same time, through the Spanish envoy Cellamare, he opened a connection with the malcontent opponents of the regency in France. A conspiracy was arranged, of which the duchess of Maine and Cardinal Polignac were the centre, to depose the duke of Orleans and to give the regency to Philip V., who promised as his first act to summons the States General.

§ 9. All these projects failed one after the other. Charles XII. was killed before Friedrichshall, and the plan of a northern coalition against England came to nothing with the execution of Görz. The Spanish fleet which was to carry the pretender to the English coast was destroyed by a storm in the bay of Biscay. The conspiracy of Cellamare was no secret to Dubois, who only waited a favourable opportunity to crush it. The ambassador himself, the duke and duchess of Maine, and a number of others were arrested and thrown into prison. An attempted rising in Brittany was suppressed before Alberoni had time to send the promised assistance. Dubois now induced the regent to declare war against Spain, and a French army under Berwick crossed the Pyrenees (April, 1719). The Spanish army being engaged in Sicily, the only opponents of the invaders were worn-out veterans and raw recruits. An English squadron under Stanhope gratified the national love of a maritime monopoly by burning along the coast the vessels and docks which it had been the pride of Alberoni to create. The emperor, freed from the Turkish war, was able to send an army into Sicily, and the Spaniards after a heroic defence of Messina had to evacuate the island. It was impossible for Spain to continue the war, but the allies were determined not to make peace until they had procured the dismissal of the minister whom they unjustly accused of having broken it. Philip V. was dexterously influenced by the production of some letters, in which Alberoni had spoken contemptuously of his master's ability. On the 5th of December, 1719, Alberoni received orders to quit the capital and the kingdom. Even in his exile he was pursued by the bitter hostility of the sovereign whom he had served too well. It was not till the death of Clement XI. that he ventured to visit Rome, where he spent the greater part of his remaining days, and where he died in 1752, at the age of 87. On his withdrawal, Spain sank back into the lethargy from which it had been roused by the genius and enterprise of a single man. In February, 1720, Philip V. accepted the terms of the Quadruple Alliance. Charles VI. obtained Sicily, and Victor Amadeus had to put up with Sardinia, which his family has ever since retained.

§ 10. With the close of the Spanish war, and the ruin of Law's financial system, the regency of Orleans loses its importance in European history. Dubois was now all-powerful, but he was anxious to secure his position by obtaining a rank which corresponded to it. This could only be done by inducing the pope to grant him a cardinal's hat. The intervention of England easily persuaded the regent to appoint him archbishop of Cambray. But with Rome there were two difficulties to be overcome; the notorious character of the aspirant to the purple, which might possibly be overlooked, and the favour which the regency had shown to the Jansenists. This latter obstacle was a serious one, but Dubois determined to surmount it. Turning his attention to religious matters, he obtained such an interpretation of the bull *Unigenitus*, that even its great opponent, the cardinal Noailles, was induced to accept it Thus the schism in the Gallican church was healed. Still Clement XI. remained inexorable, but his successor, Innocent XIII., proved more complacent, and in 1721 Dubois was raised to the cardinalate. He now assumed a seat in the council of regency immediately after the princes of royal blood, and before long was made chief minister of France.

What he had gained by this dexterous change in internal politics he was prepared to confirm by a change in foreign relations. Spain, being no longer formidable to the regent, might now be won over to his side. A double marriage was arranged, by which Louis XV. was betrothed to the infant daughter of Philip V., while the daughter of the duke of Orleans was married to the prince of Asturias. To conciliate the prejudices of Philip, the court was restored from Paris to Versailles. It says much for Dubois' ingenuity that this Spanish alliance was contracted without at all interrupting the cordiality between France and England.

In February, 1723, Louis XV. obtained his legal majority at the age of thirteen, and the regency came to an end. But all precautions had been taken to prevent a change of government. Villeroy, the preceptor of the young king and a devoted adherent of the system of Louis XIV., had been driven from court, and Dubois remained all-powerful minister. But he was not destined to enjoy his power long. His constitution was worn out by debauches, and he died suddenly from the effects of a slight accident (August 10, 1723). His place as minister was taken by the duke of Orleans, but he too was carried off four months later by a stroke of apoplexy (December 7).

§ 11. On the death of Orleans, the chief influence over the young king was exercised by his preceptor, the abbé Fleury. He might have seized the reins of power at once, but his habitual caution restrained him. He persuaded the king to appoint as chief minister the duke of Bourbon, who, after the young duke of Orleans, was the nearest prince of the blood-royal. Bourbon, who is usually known as *Monsieur le Duc*, was a grandson of the great Condé, but wholly unworthy of the descent. He possessed neither ability nor character, and was the slave of his mistress, the marquise de Prie. The guiding motive of his policy was to secure the influence of the house of Condé at the expense of his relatives of Orleans. With this object in view, the recently arranged marriage for the king was revoked and the infanta sent back to Spain, on the pretext that she was too young for a king who had no heir. A new bride was found for Louis in Marie Leczinska, daughter of Stanislaus ex-king of Poland, who was now living in retirement at Weissemburg in Alsace. The comparative obscurity of her origin made it probable that she would remain grateful to those who had raised her to power. But the duke discovered that he gained little by the move. His domestic policy made him hated, while there was nothing about him to inspire respect. He persecuted the Protestants with revolting cruelty. He imposed a tax upon land and extorted it from the privileged classes, the nobles and clergy. All the malcontents turned to Fleury, who had just been made a cardinal, and who now determined to grasp the authority which he had always coveted. In June, 1726, the duke and his ministers received orders to leave the court. The king announced his intention of ruling in person, but this was only intended as a flimsy disguise for the supremacy of his preceptor.

Fleury, who was sixty-three years old, was laborious, economical, disinterested, a very favourable contrast to the recent rulers of France. But his age and his natural temperament made him averse to activity of any kind, and his administration is a period of lethargy with no particularly notable features. In domestic affairs he returned to a great extent to the system of Louis XIV., and thus reversed the superficial reaction that had set in under the regency of Orleans. The finances were set in order, the expenses reduced by rigid economy, and public credit recovered from the shock which it had received. The only dispute which arose in France during his ministry was connected with religion. Fleury was a devoted adherent of the Jesuits, who regained their former supremacy. The persecution of the Jansenists was resumed, and in 1730 the king held a bed of justice to compel the Parliament of Paris to register the bull *Unigenitus.* The members protested against this compulsion, and when they were answered by an edict forbidding them to meddle with politics, they abdicated their functions. The government sent them into exile, and for a time there was no supreme court of justice. At last they were recalled, but the squabble lingered on for several years. In foreign politics Fleury was pre-eminently a peace minister. He took affairs as they came and made no attempt to direct their course. Yet it is as a foreign minister that he has acquired such fame as attaches to him, but the record of his activity is to be sought not in the history of France, but in that of the states with which he was brought into contact.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE REIGN OF THE EMPEROR CHARLES VI.

§ 1. Charles VI.'s attachment to Spain. § 2. War between Venice and the Porte; Austria joins Venice; victories of Eugene; peace of Passarowitz. § 3. Charles VI. and Spain; congress of Cambray. § 4. Succession to the Hapsburg territories; the Pragmatic Sanction. § 5. The Netherlands; formation of the Ostend Company; irritation of England and Holland. § 6. Philip V.'s abdication and return; Ripperda and his schemes. § 7. Alliance of Vienna; League of Hanover; Prussia gained over to Austria. § 8. Disgrace of Ripperda; siege of Gibraltar; general war averted. § 9. Congress of Soissons; treaty of Seville; second treaty of Vienna; Don Carlos obtains Parma and Piacenza. § 10. The European powers and the Pragmatic Sanction; succession question in Poland; election of Stanislaus Leczinski; his fall; accession of Augustus III. § 11. France allied with Spain and Sardinia by the league of Turin; campaigns of 1733, 1734 and 1735; treaty of peace; Lorraine under Stanislaus Leczinski. § 12. Death of Eugene; Bartenstein. § 13. Austria involved in the Russo-Turkish war; ill-success of the Austrian troops; treaty of Belgrad. § 14. Relations with Prussia; secret treaty with France; death of Charles VI.

§ 1. The conclusion of the treaties of Utrecht and Rastadt destroyed Charles VI.'s last chance of making good his claim to the Spanish crown. It was with undisguised reluctance that he recognised this. He had conceived the greatest affection for Spain, and especially for Catalonia, the province which had shown such signal and such ill-requited devotion to his cause. This feeling led him to shower favours upon the Spaniards who had accompanied him on his return to Vienna. He went so far as to form a separate ministerial department, called the Spanish Council, in which Spanish and not German was the official language. As he had never acknowledged Philip V. nor made peace with Spain, it was probable that he would seize the first opportunity that might offer to re-assert his claims, in spite of the expressed will of Europe. The result was the formation of a German party at court, which counterbalanced the influence of the Spaniards, and which was unwilling to allow the interests of Austria to be sacrificed for the acquisition of a distant kingdom in the west. At its head stood the greatest general of his age, Prince Eugene of Savoy. It was perhaps fortunate for this party that events occurred in eastern Europe which at a critical time diverted Charles' attention from his ambitious and impossible dreams.

§ 2. For ten years after the treaty of Carlowitz the Turks had remained sullenly acquiescent in the losses which they had sustained. The urgent representations of Louis XIV. and of the Hungarian rebel Ragocsky had failed to induce them to embark in a new war with the empire. But the residence at Bender of Charles XII. of Sweden, though it had availed little for his own interests, succeeded at least in reviving the military activity of the Porte. By the treaty of the Pruth the Russian conquest of Azof had been recovered. This success encouraged the hope of repairing the other losses that had been incurred in the former war. There were two states which had aggrandised themselves at Turkish expense, Austria and Venice. Of these the republic was far the less formidable and was naturally chosen as the first object of attack. A pretext was found in the protection which Venice had given to some Montenegrin fugitives, and in December, 1714, the Porte declared war. Venice was entirely unprepared, and moreover had failed to acquire popularity amongst her Greek subjects. In 1715 the grand vizier, Ali Cumurgi, landed in the Morea, and by the end of the year was master of the whole peninsula. Sailing thence he captured Suda and Spinalonga, the two last fortresses that Venice had been allowed to retain in Crete.

The republic naturally appealed to her old ally, Austria, which had guaranteed her possessions by the treaty of Carlowitz. The advice of Eugene decided the Viennese government to renew the offensive and defensive alliance, and to call upon the Porte to observe its treaty obligations. As the Turk refused to give any satisfaction, war was inevitable. The intervention of Austria saved Venice from ruin. The grand vizier and the main body of the Turkish army had to be employed in Hungary. Still a considerable army and fleet was sent to attack Corfu. The Venetian troops were commanded by count Schulenburg, who had won a great reputation in the northern war, and whose services had been procured for the republic by Eugene. A heroic defence ended successfully, and in August, 1716, the Turks were compelled to raise the siege. "It was the last glorious military exploit in the annals of the republic, and it was achieved by a German mercenary soldier."

Meanwhile the vizier, with an army of 150,000 men, had laid siege to Peterwardein, the most important of the Austrian border-fortresses in Hungary. Underneath the walls Eugene forced on a battle which lasted five hours and ended in the vizier's death and the complete victory of the Christians (August 5, 1716). Eugene followed up his success by besieging Temesvar, the last of the Ottoman possessions in Hungary, which had to surrender after a stubborn defence of two months. The winter was occupied in fruitless attempts at mediation on the part of the maritime powers. In 1717 Eugene recommenced the campaign with a large army, including volunteers whom his reputation attracted from all parts of Europe. His object was the reduction of the famous fortress of Belgrad, which had been for a century and a half the strongest bulwark of the Turkish power on the Danube. The new vizier, Chilil Pasha, advanced to its relief, and on the 16th of August, Eugene fought the battle of Belgrad, the most glorious of all his victories. At one moment the day seemed lost, but his consummate generalship averted the disaster, the Turkish army was scattered to the winds, and only a small remnant escaped with the vizier to Nissa. On the next day the garrison surrendered Belgrad. Eugene now occupied Orsowa, and led his troops into winter quarters at Semlin. The Porte was compelled by these disasters to seek for peace and to accept the proffered mediation of England and Holland. A conference was opened in the Servian village of Passarowitz. The difficulty of the negotiations lay in the conflicting interests of the two allies. Austria was content with the *status quo*, but Venice wished to recover the Morea which it was unable to reconquer. The emperor was at first inclined to insist upon extreme demands which might have compelled a prolongation of the war. But the Spanish occupation of Sardinia and the threatened attack upon Sicily compelled him to be moderate, and in July, 1718, the treaty of Passarowitz was signed. Austria retained all its conquests, thus completing its possession of Hungary by acquiring the Banat of Temesvar, and adding to it Belgrad and a strip of Servia. The Turks on their side kept the Morea, while Venice was confirmed in its possession of Corfu and Santa Maura together with the conquests which it had made in 1717 in Albania and Dalmatia. The Porte engaged to render no assistance to the Hungarian leader Francis Ragocsky, whom the Sultan had recently invited to Turkey, and who now received a residence in Asia Minor, where he remained till his death, in 1736. The treaty of Passarowitz is an object of legitimate satisfaction to the Austrian historians, but it is doubtful whether their country's interests might not have been better served by the complete reduction of European Turkey, even if it had involved the loss of Sicily and Sardinia.

§ 3. The peace with the Turks set the emperor free to cope with the ambitious schemes of Alberoni, which have been described in the last chapter. With the help of the Quadruple Alliance, he was able to overthrow the formidable minister, to recover Sicily, and to add that island to his territories by handing over Sardinia to the duke of Savoy. There were still several unsettled disputes between Spain and Austria. Charles VI. had not laid down the title of king of Spain, and he claimed the grandmastership of the order of the Golden Fleece as the direct descendant of its founders, the dukes of Burgundy. These and other points were referred to a congress which was to meet at Cambray under the mediation of England and France. But it was soon evident that a decision would not be arrived at by the ordinary methods of European diplomacy. The mediating powers were hardly sincere in their efforts; and England especially was concerned more in advancing its commercial interests and justifying its retention of Gibraltar, than in anything else. Two years were wasted in disputes about precedence and etiquette, and it was not till 1724 that the congress of Cambray began its work, and even then it devoted itself to other matters than the reconciliation of Austria and Spain.

§ 4. The treaty of Passarowitz and the accession of Spain to the Quadruple Alliance mark the zenith of Charles VI.'s power. For a whole generation, ever since 1683, Austria had been absorbed in almost incessant wars in which, thanks principally to Prince Eugene, it had reaped a full share of military glory. But from this time a period of decline sets in. Military activity is superseded by diplomacy, always confused and often wearisome. There is one central point round which it is possible to group the ever changing relations of Europe, viz., the constant effort of Charles to procure the confirmation of his favourite Pragmatic Sanction.

The succession to the Hapsburg territories had always been a source of dispute. Rudolf, the founder of the house in the 13th century, had declared his possessions indivisible. But his descendants had departed from this wise rule, and had resorted to the practice of subdivision. Even after the various provinces had been re-united under Maximilian I., they had been again divided among the children of Ferdinand I. Matters had been rendered worse by the fact that Hungary always, and Bohemia at times, claimed the right of electing their king. Successive rulers had found it necessary to settle the succession during their lifetime. The latest arrangement of the kind had been made in 1703 by Leopold I., when he and his elder son Joseph renounced their claims on the Spanish crown in favour of the archduke Charles. This was accompanied by a *pactum mutuæ successionis*, by which Joseph and Leopold were to inherit Spain if Charles died childless, and the succession in Austria was thus settled (1) Joseph and his male heirs; (2) Charles and his male heirs; (3) Joseph's daughters and their descendants; (4) Charles' daughters.

In 1711 Joseph I. died leaving two daughters, Maria Amelia and Maria Josepha, and the Austrian territories fell to Charles VI. From the first he seems to have turned his attention to the succession question, and in 1713 he brought before the council a document, which is known as the Pragmatic Sanction. It contained three articles: (1) The Austrian states are one and indivisible; (2) Males of the house of Hapsburg are to succeed in order of primogeniture; (3) In default of male heirs, the succession is to go first to the daughters of Charles VI., then to those of Joseph I., and lastly to those of Leopold I. It was this last article which was at complete variance with the agreement of 1703. But the council had no right of remonstrance, and the decree was accepted, though as yet it was not made public.

In 1713 Charles VI., who had married the beautiful Elizabeth Christina of Brunswick, was still childless. It was not till 1716 that a son, Leopold, was born, whose life would have removed all difficulties, but he died in a few months. In 1717 the empress gave birth to a daughter, the famous Maria Theresa, and in the next year to another daughter. By 1720 the prospect of male descendants had become so distant as to be almost hopeless, and now Charles produced the Pragmatic Sanction and set himself to obtain its confirmation from the estates of the subject provinces. One after another they were induced to give their consent with more or less readiness; first Austria and Silesia in 1720, then Hungary and Transylvania, and lastly Bohemia and the Netherlands. In 1724 a grand assembly was held at Vienna, to which all the provinces sent deputies, and the Pragmatic Sanction was formally proclaimed as an irrevocable law. The daughters of Joseph I. were compelled on their marriage to renounce all claims to the succession, and their husbands had to accept the renunciation. From this time Charles made it the grand and almost the sole object of his foreign policy to induce all the powers of Europe to guarantee the succession of his eldest daughter, Maria Theresa. It was in vain that his ministers lamented the sacrifice of Austrian interests, and that Eugene maintained that the succession would be better guaranteed by an efficient army and a well-filled treasury than by any number of hollow and interested promises.

§ 5. Besides the settlement of the succession, there was one other matter in which Charles VI. took a great personal interest. In point of territories he was one of the most powerful princes in Europe. He had inherited Austria, Styria, Carinthia, Silesia, Bohemia with Moravia, Hungary and Transylvania, Tyrol and the

Breisgau. To them he had added, by the treaty of Rastadt, Naples, Milan, and the Netherlands; by the treaty of Passarowitz, Temesvar, Belgrade and northern Servia; and by the Quadruple Alliance, Sicily. But there was one great defect in his power which had always hampered the Austrian Hapsburgs. The revenue only amounted to 30 millions of gulden, a sum entirely disproportionate to the extent of his territories and the number of his subjects. To increase his revenue was naturally an object that lay very close to the emperor's heart. Not unnaturally he turned for this purpose to his recent acquisition, the Netherlands, which had once enjoyed the most flourishing commerce in the world, and which had been the chief source of wealth to the Spanish Hapsburgs. But since the war of independence the prosperity of the Netherlands had immensely declined. Dutch jealousy had insisted, in the treaty of Westphalia, on the closing of the Scheldt, and the trade of Antwerp had passed to Amsterdam. Charles VI. determined to revive Flemish commerce as a means of at once filling his own coffers and conciliating his subjects, who had substantial grounds for complaint in the way they had been transferred to Austria without any pretence of consulting their wishes, and in the barrier-treaty which had handed over their chief fortresses to the hated Dutch.

Prince Eugene had been appointed governor of the Netherlands in 1716, and although the Turkish war and the necessity of making head against the Spanish party at Vienna prevented him from fulfilling his duties in person, he was anxious to do what he could for the province which had been entrusted to him. He therefore seconded the emperor's wishes, though he tried to restrain him from measures which would excite the jealousy of England and Holland. The re-opening of the Scheldt was too extreme a measure to be ventured upon, but there was an alternative port to Antwerp in Ostend. The merchants of Ostend were encouraged to undertake a trade with India on their own account, and in 1717 several ships made the voyage with great profit. But the Dutch were on the alert to preserve their monopoly, and did not hesitate to use force against the rival traders. Charles was indignant at the insult, but did not venture to risk a rupture as the complaints of Holland were reiterated by England. He determined however to carry out his schemes in defiance of the maritime powers. In 1722 he founded an East Indian Company at Ostend under direct imperial patronage. Its capital was fixed at six million gulden in 6000 shares of 1000 gulden each. Foreigners were allowed to purchase shares but were excluded from the meetings of shareholders. The company was to have an independent administration, and was authorised to carry the imperial arms and flag. In return for these concessions it was to pay six per cent. on its profits to the imperial treasury. The company was speedily formed, and in a few months the shares had all been taken up.

Before the treaty of Westphalia, European wars and diplomacy had mainly been directed by religious differences. But from that time to the French Revolution religion was superseded by commercial rivalry. This was one of the results of the so-called "mercantile system." International trade was regarded in those days not as a bargain which was profitable to both parties concerned, but as a contest in which one gained and the other lost. Hence the frequent war of tariffs and repressive duties which often did much more harm to the resources of both states than open hostilities could have done. It was commercial rivalry which had caused the English wars against Holland under Cromwell and Charles II.; it was the measures taken against a tariff of Colbert's that induced Louis XIV. to make war on the Dutch in 1672; and commercial interests were at the bottom of the war of the Spanish Succession. So now the formation of the Ostend Company put an end for a time to the long alliance between Austria and England which had been formed in opposition to the House of Bourbon, and which had been confirmed by the accession of the House of Hanover to the English throne. England was determined to suppress the company at all costs, and Charles VI. was resolute to defend it. The anger raised by the English pretensions to a commercial monopoly naturally brought Austria closer to Spain, which had many similar grounds for complaint, and thus facilitated the conclusion of an agreement which the congress of Cambray had hitherto found it impossible to effect.

§ 6. In spite of the disasters which led to the fall of Alberoni, Philip V. of Spain and his wife Elizabeth of Parma still clung to their schemes of obtaining an Italian principality for their sons, and of securing the eventual succession to the throne of France. In 1724 Europe was astounded by the news that Philip had abdicated in favour of his eldest son Don Luis, and had gone into retirement at St. Ildefonso. The real motive lay, not in weariness of the world, but in a desire to remove all obstacles in the way of his accession in France, where Louis XV. was expected to die before long. But the move was not successful, Louis XV. lived, and the queen soon wearied of her retirement. Luckily for her, Luis died eight months after his accession. To the surprise of the world, and not altogether to the satisfaction of his subjects, Philip V. left his retreat to resume the crown which he had laid down of his own accord.

At this time the chief influence over the queen was exercised by another of those foreign adventurers who at this time found in Spain a ready market for their talents. Ripperda was a native of Groningen, who rose to prominence in the service of Holland, and after the treaty of Utrecht was sent as Dutch minister to Madrid. Foreseeing the possibility of advancement in Spain he resigned his office, became a naturalised Spaniard, and rendered considerable service to Alberoni in matters of trade and finance, of which he had a real knowledge. Having incurred the displeasure of the minister, Ripperda had to leave Spain, for a time. In Germany he came into contact with prince Eugene, who gave him a pension, and it is possible that his later conduct was dictated to him from Vienna. On the fall of Alberoni he returned to Spain and won the favour of the king by changing his religion, and of the queen by the readiness with which he fell in with her favourite plans. The one creditable motive which can be assigned to him was the desire to restore the commercial prosperity of Spain by annihilating the maritime power of England. He persuaded the queen that the best chance not only of acquiring a principality in Italy for Don Carlos, but also of regaining Gibraltar, lay in breaking altogether with England and France and in a close alliance with the emperor. Accordingly, at the end of 1724 he was sent to Vienna, which he entered incognito as Baron Pfaffenburg, and held secret conferences with the minister Sinzendorf.

§ 7. While he was in Vienna a great impulse was given to the negotiations by the sudden dismissal of the Spanish infanta from France in order to marry Louis XV. to Marie Leczinska. This insult caused the bitterest indignation in the minds of Philip and Elizabeth, and disposed them to use any possible means of obtaining revenge. The emperor being at this time at enmity with England on account of the Ostend Company, and being also anxious to obtain from Spain the confirmation of the Pragmatic Sanction, Ripperda had little difficulty in arranging terms, and the work which the congress of Cambray had found impossible was completed in a few days. On the 30th of April, 1725, the alliance of Vienna was concluded. Charles VI. renounced his claim to the Spanish crown, while Philip made a similar renunciation of Naples, Sicily, Milan, and the Netherlands. The succession to the duchies of Parma and Tuscany was promised to Don Carlos, the eldest son of Philip and Elizabeth. Spain undertook to guarantee the Pragmatic Sanction, and the emperor pledged himself to use his influence with England to obtain the cession of Gibraltar and Minorca. On the 1st of May a commercial treaty was drawn up, by which Philip sanctioned the Ostend Company and opened the Spanish ports to it, and, to conciliate the empire, he promised to transfer to the Germans the commercial privileges in Spain which had hitherto been enjoyed by England and Holland. Besides these two public treaties there was a third, which was to be kept perfectly secret, and the conditions of which were only made known precisely by the revelations of Ripperda. By this the emperor pledged himself to aid Spain, if necessary by force, to recover Gibraltar, and in the event of George I. proving obstinate, to assist the Jacobites in deposing the Hanoverian dynasty. There was also an arrangement, although it was doubtful how far the emperor committed himself to it, that Maria Theresa and one of her sisters should be married to two of the sons of Philip V. This close alliance with Spain was made in direct opposition to the advice of Eugene, who was anxious to avoid so complete and open a breach with England.

So sudden a reconciliation between such old enemies as the Hapsburgs and the Spanish Bourbons naturally caused great excitement in Europe, but need not have inspired alarm if the last treaty had been kept sufficiently secret. But the indiscreet vanity of Ripperda led him to boast of the great results which he had achieved, and the English and French envoys were soon able to transmit sufficiently accurate information to their respective governments. The English ministers were thrown into consternation by the news, and France was also threatened, though less directly, and moreover was unable to allow the possible union of Austria and Spain by the marriage of Maria Theresa and Philip's son. Accordingly the two powers formed the opposition league of Hanover in September, 1725. Frederick William of Prussia also joined the league, though not immediately interested, partly because he had several grounds of quarrel with the emperor, and partly in the hope of obtaining Jülich and Berg from the Palatine house of Neuburg. Europe was divided into two hostile leagues, each of which endeavoured to obtain as many allies as possible. Jealousy of the Ostend Company induced Holland, and the prospect of English subsidies induced Denmark and Sweden to join the league of Hanover. The emperor, on his side, gained over several of the south German princes and also Catharine I. of Russia, who had succeeded to Peter the Great's dislike of Hanover. A still greater success was the separation of Prussia from the side of his enemies by the treaty of Wusterhausen (Oct. 1726).

§ 8. Meanwhile Ripperda, the author of all this turmoil, had fallen into disgrace. On his return to Madrid he was received with the greatest honours, raised to the rank of duke, and appointed minister of foreign affairs. This sudden advancement seems to have turned his head. Hitherto he had shown real ability for business, henceforth he was conspicuous only for vanity and overweening presumption. He openly threatened to drive the kings of England and Prussia from their thrones. It soon became evident that he had deceived others as well as himself. The arrival at Madrid of an Austrian envoy, Königsegg, convinced the queen that little had really been gained by the treaty of Vienna. Instead of bringing troops, the envoy only demanded money, which Ripperda had boastfully promised, but of which Spain had but a scanty supply. To raise supplies he resorted to extortion, debasement of the coinage, and other extreme measures, which increased his already great unpopularity among the native Spaniards. The emperor also showed no great readiness to conclude the projected marriage of the archduchess, and excused himself on the ground that it excited great discontent among the German princes. The queen was the last to give up her belief in the minister who had promised her so much. At last, however, Ripperda received a notice of dismissal from office in May, 1726. In childish terror he sought refuge in the house of the English minister Stanhope, to whom he disclosed all the secrets of the cabinet. Enraged at this conduct Philip imprisoned him in the castle of Segovia, but after fifteen months he made his escape to England, and thence to Morocco, where he entered the service of the emperor, became a Mohammedan, and died in 1737. He has naturally been compared with Alberoni, whom he rivalled in ability, especially for domestic government, but to whom he was infinitely inferior in the essentials of character and conduct.

Ripperda's policy was continued by his successor, Don Joseph Patino, who adhered to the Austrian alliance and dispatched a fleet to lay siege to Gibraltar. A general European war seemed to be inevitable. Charles VI. set himself to increase his army and to form the rudiments of a navy. France collected troops on the Spanish frontiers. The English parliament was roused by the projected intervention in favour of the Jacobites and by the prospect of losing Gibraltar to vote lavish subsidies. The army was strengthened, and a fleet sent to attack the Spanish galleons at Porto Bello.

In spite of all these warlike preparations the war came to nothing. The chief causes of this were: (1) the pacific tendencies of Walpole in England and of Fleury in France; and (2) the growing coolness between the emperor and Spain. The alliance of Vienna was essentially unnatural and could not last. It would have been impossible to marry Maria Theresa to a Spanish prince, even if she had not been destined for Francis Joseph of Lorraine. Moreover, the prospect of the erection of a Spanish duchy in the centre of Italy was extremely distasteful to the emperor. Other causes combined to incline Charles to peace. The king of Prussia, though he had deserted the Hanoverian alliance, was not really anxious to support the emperor, and maintained an obstinate neutrality. And the death of Catharine of Russia deprived the league of Vienna of its one powerful supporter. Accordingly, in May, 1727, while the siege of Gibraltar was proceeding, Charles threw over his obligations to Spain and signed the preliminaries of a peace with England, France and Holland. The Ostend Company was to be suspended for seven years, and all other questions were referred to a European Congress at Aachen, which was afterwards, for the convenience of Fleury, transferred to Soissons. Spain hesitated for some time to accept this arrangement, and was encouraged in the delay by the death of George I. But when it was seen that George II.'s accession made no difference in the attitude of England, and that Walpole's power was unshaken, Philip was unable to hold out any longer, and in March, 1728, signed the convention of the Pardo.

§ 9. The congress met at Soissons, but proved as ineffective and useless as the previous assembly at Cambray. The emperor, anxious to gain the assent of England and France to the Pragmatic Sanction, severed himself altogether from Spain and made no pretence of supporting her demand for Gibraltar. Philip V. was now almost imbecile and his wife was practically absolute. The attitude of Charles VI. induced her to give up all hopes of obtaining her ends with the help of Austria. The birth of a son to Louis XV. in 1729, destroyed all prospect of the Spanish Bourbons acquiring the French crown, and made her more anxious than ever to obtain an Italian principality for her son. For this purpose she determined to throw herself into the arms of France and England, and in November, 1729, she accepted the treaty of Seville. Spain, England and France concluded an offensive and defensive alliance, which was immediately afterwards joined by Holland. No mention was made of Gibraltar and Minorca, which were virtually resigned by Spain. The commercial privileges accorded by the treaty of Vienna to the Ostend Company and the emperor's subjects were revoked. Don Carlos was to succeed to the duchies of Parma and Tuscany, and to secure his rights those provinces were to be occupied by 6000 Spanish troops.

The news of the treaty of Seville excited the greatest indignation in the mind of Charles VI., who saw himself completely duped. He collected an army of 30,000 men in Italy to oppose the threatened occupation of the Italian duchies, and when the old duke of Parma died in January, 1731, he seized upon his territory as a fief of the empire. Elizabeth called upon her allies to enforce the treaty, but neither France nor England was willing to make war. But there was one bribe which could overcome the emperor's opposition. Walpole determined to act independently of France, and opened a separate negotiation with the Austrian government. In March, 1731, the second treaty of Vienna was concluded. On condition that England should guarantee the Pragmatic Sanction, Charles agreed to dissolve the Ostend Company and to confirm the treaty of Seville. In 1732, Don Carlos and the Spanish troops were conveyed to Italy in English ships, and took possession of Parma and Piacenza with the emperor's sanction. At the same time the aged duke of Tuscany acknowledged the Spanish prince as his heir. Thus the long and tedious series of disputes and agreements came to an end, and Europe seemed likely to enjoy peace for a time.

§ 10. The temporary settlement of Italian affairs enabled Charles VI. to turn his whole attention once more to the Pragmatic Sanction. The first European power to undertake its guarantee had been Spain in 1725. Russia had followed in 1726, and now in 1731 England and Holland were pledged to the same effect. France was resolute in its refusal to agree to the emperor's scheme, and even intrigued in the other European courts to obtain its rejection. It was of especial importance to Charles to gain over the German princes, of whom only one, the king of Prussia, had as yet given his consent, on condition that his claims upon Jülich and Berg should be acknowledged. In January, 1732, a diet met at Ratisbon, and the Pragmatic Sanction was formally accepted by all its members except the three electors of Saxony, Bavaria, and the Palatinate. The two former had themselves some claims on the Austrian succession and hoped to obtain at least a share on Charles' death. The elector palatine was alienated by the prospect of Prussia acquiring Jülich and Berg.

As Augustus of Saxony was determined in his refusals to recognise the Pragmatic Sanction, the emperor on his side opposed the elector's favourite scheme of making the Polish crown hereditary in his family by procuring the succession of his son, another Augustus. The other prominent candidate was the deposed Stanislaus Leczinski, the former protégé of Charles XII., who had recently regained importance as the father-in-law of Louis XV. The prospect of the establishment of French influence in Poland was very distasteful to the northern powers, who were already looking forward to a partition of that kingdom. Accordingly a treaty was projected between Austria, Russia and Prussia, by which they agreed to exclude both the Saxon claimant and Leczinski, and to give the Polish crown to Emanuel prince of Portugal. But before the treaty was signed, Augustus of Saxony and Poland died in February, 1733. The vacancy in this remote, and on account of its constitution powerless, kingdom was destined to involve Europe in an almost universal war.

In Poland there was a strong feeling that the foreign rulers had brought nothing but disasters on the country, and that a native should be elected. This was much in favour of Leczinski, but he had little chance of being chosen unless France would espouse his cause. Fleury was as usual averse to war, and protested against the idea of ruining France for the sake of the king's father-in-law. He was not very well disposed to Marie Leczinska, whose marriage had been the work of the duke of Bourbon, and besides Louis XV. was not devotedly attached to his wife. But the same qualities which inclined Fleury to a policy of peace rendered him incapable of resisting the pressure of the strong war party in France. This was composed partly of the surviving veterans of Louis XIV.'s reign, such as Villars and Berwick, and partly of the young courtiers who had never seen a war and were anxious for the opportunity of distinguishing themselves. Their representations forced the king and minister to promise assistance to Stanislaus, who made his way in disguise to Warsaw and was there elected king by a majority of the Polish nobles.

This event caused great excitement in northern Europe. Russia was determined not to tolerate the restoration in Poland of a king whom Peter the Great had expelled. The empress Anne, who had recently freed herself from the aristocratic restrictions imposed at her accession, made an alliance with the young Augustus of Saxony and sent an army to support him. The emperor was induced to take the same side when Augustus undertook to guarantee the Pragmatic Sanction. Austrian troops were massed in Silesia on the Polish frontier, but were never employed, as the Russians and Saxons were quite able to do the work by themselves. Leczinski was driven from Warsaw and took refuge in Danzig, where he impatiently waited for the promised succour from France. But Fleury, though he had committed himself to the war, was not prepared to pursue it with energy. He feared lest the despatch of a French fleet to the Baltic might offend the susceptibilities of England, and moreover he saw an easier way of benefiting France in the south than in the north of Europe. Only 16,000 men came to the assistance of Stanislaus, and in spite of the heroism which they displayed, they were unable to force an entrance into Danzig. The result of this disappointment was that Danzig had to surrender to the Russians, and the Poles had nothing left but to acknowledge Augustus III. as king. Stanislaus escaped into Prussia, where he was hospitably received by Frederick William, who had remained neutral during the war, and who refused to give up the fugitive on the demand of the emperor.

§ 11. It would have been well for Charles VI. if he had imitated the prudent policy of Prussia and not committed himself to either side. The accession of Augustus was effected without his intervention, which brought him no advantage beyond the Saxon confirmation of the Pragmatic Sanction, while on the other hand it involved him in a disastrous war with France. It is probable that he was misled by excessive confidence in the pacific tendencies of Fleury, but nevertheless, his conduct in the Polish succession is the most conspicuous illustration of the evils that were brought upon Austria by Charles' insane desire to have his daughter's succession universally guaranteed.

Fleury had displayed no very keen desire to maintain Stanislaus Leczinski on the Polish throne, but he showed great ingenuity in using the pretext for war to obtain other ends. Italy was to be freed from the Hapsburg supremacy, and instead of being united to any single great power was to be divided into small principalities, which would serve the purposes of France. At the same time there was a possibility of obtaining a direct advantage to France in the direction of Lorraine, an imperial fief which was almost surrounded by French territories and had often been occupied by French arms, but had as yet escaped annexation. The province was of greater importance than ever at the present moment, because the duke Francis was betrothed to Maria Theresa, and her accession in Austria would bring the Hapsburg power inconveniently near to the French frontier.

For these purposes Fleury sought and obtained the alliance of Spain and Sardinia. Elizabeth of Spain was far from being satisfied with what she had gained by the treaty of Vienna. It was true that Don Carlos was established in Parma and had been recognised as heir to the duke of Tuscany. But the emperor had taken no pains to disguise his dissatisfaction with the arrangement, and had protested against the homage done by the Tuscan estates as being null without the imperial consent. The queen readily grasped at the opportunity of increasing the power of her family in Italy by renewing the alliance between the two branches of the house of Bourbon. Savoy and Sardinia were ruled by Charles Emanuel. who had come to the throne on the abdication of his father Victor Amadeus. Charles Emanuel inherited that eager desire for territorial aggrandisement which had characterised all his predecessors. They had aimed, it was said, at eating up Lombardy leaf by leaf like an artichoke; he wished to swallow it at once, In September and October, 1733, the league of Turin was concluded between France, Spain, and Sardinia. Don Carlos was to renounce Parma and the succession to Tuscany in favour of his younger brother Don Philip, and was to acquire Naples and Sicily as a kingdom for himself. Both the kingdom and the duchies were to revert to Spain in case of the male line of their rulers becoming extinct. The king of Sardinia was to annex the Milanese to Piedmont, and thus to form a kingdom of Lombardy. When the conquest was completed, Savoy was to be handed over to France.

No time was lost in commencing hostilities. Two French armies were collected. One under Berwick entered Lorraine, while the other under the aged Villars crossed the Alps to assist Charles Emanuel. Before the end of the year Lorraine had been overrun, and great part of the Milanese, including the capital, had been lost to the emperor. Charles VI. was entirely unprepared for this sudden attack, which his own imprudence had brought upon himself. He made urgent appeals for assistance to England, but Walpole resolutely refused to take part in the war. Then he turned to Germany, where the diet voted supplies, but the resolution lost much of its importance through the open opposition of the three Wittelsbach electors of Bavaria, Cologne and the Palatinate. Worst of all, the great Austrian general, Eugene, was old and worn out, and there was no successor to take his place.

The military operations of 1734 are devoid of interest and importance except as regards their results. On the Rhine Eugene undertook the command of a large imperial army to oppose Berwick, who had broken through the lines of Ettlingen. But Eugene displayed none of his old genius or energy, and was unable to prevent the French from capturing Philipsburg, although Berwick was killed during the siege. In northern Italy Villars had planned a triumphant campaign with the aid of Sardinia and Spain. But he was foiled by the conduct of his allies. Charles Emanuel refused to take part in operations in the open field and contented himself with a war of sieges. Don Carlos, intent on his enterprise in the south, had no particular interest in the aggrandisement of Sardinia. Villars resigned his command in disgust, and on his way back to France died at Turin (17 June, 1734), at the age of eighty-two, the last of the great generals of Louis XIV. The result of the campaign was that the Austrian general, Mercy, though defeated near Parma, was able to keep the strong fortress of Mantua and thus to maintain his hold upon eastern Lombardy. More decisive results were achieved in the south. Don Carlos entered Naples with a small army and was welcomed by the inhabitants, who disliked the German government, and who preferred to be ruled by a resident king rather than by a viceroy. The imperial forces had been diminished for the protection of the Milanese, and the remaining troops were crushed by the Spaniards at Bitonto.

In 1735 the Spanish troops crossed into Sicily and reduced the island without any difficulty. In Lombardy Königsegg, who had succeeded Mercy, had to retire beyond the Adige. On the Rhine Eugene was again in command and was reinforced by auxiliaries from Russia. But nothing of any importance took place, and the chief powers, France and Austria, were absorbed not so much in the war as in negotiations. Walpole had offered to mediate, and, Fleury, in constant fear lest England should desert her neutrality, was eager for peace. Charles VI. was naturally inclined the same way, partly by his losses in the war, partly by the desire to gain a new confirmation for the Pragmatic Sanction, and partly by the danger of a new Turkish war. On the 3rd of October, 1735, the preliminaries of a treaty between France and Austria were signed at Vienna. Stanislaus Leczinski renounced the Polish crown in favour of Augustus of Saxony, but was allowed to retain the title of king for his lifetime. As compensation he was to receive the duchy of Lorraine, which on his death was to pass into the hands of France. Francis of Lorraine, the destined son-in-law of Charles VI., was to receive Tuscany on the death of the last grand-duke of the house of Medici. Don Carlos was to be recognised as king of Naples and Sicily, his former duchy of Parma and Piacenza being handed over to the emperor. All other conquests made by the allies, including Lombardy, were to be restored, with the exception of Novara and Tortona, which were to be given to the king of Sardinia.

It is evident that Fleury had given up the design of freeing Italy from the Hapsburgs. Not only did the emperor recover Lombardy, but he added to it Parma and Piacenza, and his son-in-law in 1737 obtained Tuscany. Thus by resigning the distant provinces in the south, he gained a compact territory in northern and central Italy. The great advantage to France, which has given Fleury a distinguished place among French ministers, was the arrangement about Lorraine. Stanislaus took possession of the duchy in 1737, and at last obtained an opportunity for displaying his really eminent qualities as a ruler. After a beneficent administration of twenty-nine years he died in 1766, and Lorraine was absorbed in France. It had been so long practically separated from Germany, that its loss, though resented, was not much felt, while it was of considerable importance to the French as rounding off their frontiers. It was the last of the great accessions of territory which the country owed to its Bourbon rulers. Elizabeth of Spain was bitterly discontented at the proposed terms, and especially at the loss of Parma and Tuscany. But she was powerless to continue the war by herself, though she succeeded in postponing the conclusion of the definitive treaty till 1738. In this France undertook in the most explicit terms possible to guarantee the Pragmatic Sanction.

§ 12. Austria had suffered serious losses of prestige if not of power in the war of the Polish succession; but she was destined to undergo still greater humiliations in the succeeding years. On the 21st of April, 1736, Prince Eugene died at the age of seventy-two. His career is coincident with what is on the whole the most glorious period of Austrian history, since Charles V. had little direct connection with Austria. His claim to the affectionate and admiring recollection of the country which he served is to be measured by the collapse which followed his death. The most powerful man in Vienna was now Johann Christopher von Bartenstein. He was the son of a professor in Munich and had received his education at Paris. He came to Vienna in 1714, became a Roman Catholic, and entered the service of the government. Though he never held any higher office than that of secretary to the cabinet, and was despised by contemporaries for his plebeian origin, he obtained complete supremacy over Charles VI., who placed unlimited confidence in his honesty and his devotion to the Hapsburg interests. Unfortunately these were his only recommendations. Bartenstein was before everything a jurist, with all a jurist's love for pettifogging details, and filled with an unbounded belief in the cumbrous and obsolete constitution of the Holy Roman Empire. He had not the slightest pretensions to statesmanship, no insight into character, no powers of administration. What he excelled in was the drawing up of protocols and engagements with foreign powers. It was his influence to a great extent that induced the emperor to attach such exaggerated importance to the reiterated guarantees of the Pragmatic Sanction.

§ 13. One of the most humiliating episodes of Austrian history is the Turkish war of 1737–9, in which Charles was involved by his alliance with Russia. That country had never ceased to desire the re-acquisition of Azof, the conquest of which had been the first achievement of Peter the Great, but which he had lost again by his disastrous campaign on the Pruth in 1711. The Czarina Anne after the settlement of the Polish question seized the opportunity to declare war in 1736 against the Porte, which was at this time engaged in a contest with Persia. One army under Munnich entered the Crimea, broke through the lines of Perekop, and overran the peninsula, while another under Lascy recovered Azof.

By the treaty with Catharine I., in 1726, Russia and Austria had pledged themselves to send 30,000 auxiliaries to each other in case either were involved in war with the Turks. This agreement had been confirmed in 1735 as the price of a Russian contingent to help Eugene on the Rhine. Anne now called upon the emperor to fulfil his engagement. If he had been content with sending the 30,000 men no great harm would have been done. But the Russian successes of 1736 had created the impression that recent losses might be compensated by a war of conquest, and Charles and his advisers determined to commit Austria to the war, not as an auxiliary but as a principal. The command was entrusted to Seckendorf, whom Eugene had pointed out as his successor, but who laboured under the disadvantage of being a Protestant. On his arrival at the Hungarian frontier, Seckendorf found everything in the most deplorable condition, the troops were ill supplied, the fortresses had been neglected, the garrisons were insufficient. He wished to resign, but was induced to go on with the campaign. He succeeded in taking Nissa, the chief fortress which remained to the Turks in Servia. But two months afterwards the vizier arrived with overwhelming forces, forced the Austrians to retire, and recovered Nissa, so that the campaign ended without anything having been effected. The Jesuits maintained that no victory could be gained against the infidels as long as a heretic was allowed to command. Seckendorf was not only recalled but even thrown into prison. His successor in 1738, Königsegg, succeeded in forcing the Turks to raise the siege of Orsowa. But his success was only temporary, he was driven back to the walls of Belgrad. Orsowa and several other fortresses fell into the hands of the enemy. The government at Vienna could think of no other resource than to treat failure as a crime and punish it by disgrace. Königsegg was replaced by count Wallis, who proved even less successful than his predecessors. In the battle of Crocyka (July, 1739), the Turks won a complete victory and now threatened Belgrad, the greatest of Eugene's conquests. These continued disasters impelled the emperor to desire peace.

If the military operations had been sufficiently discreditable and ill-managed, the subsequent negotiations were still more so. Charles began by sending Wallis full powers to treat with the grand vizier. He had already commenced negotiations and had recognised the necessity of surrendering Belgrad, when Neipperg, a hostile officer, arrived with independent powers from the emperor. Neipperg was imprisoned by the vizier for maintaining that he had no authority to grant the cession of Belgrad which had already been arranged by Wallis. However, he was released on the intercession of the French envoy, Villeneuve, who now undertook to mediate between the two powers. On the 1st of September the treaty of Belgrad was drawn up, perhaps the most humiliating treaty that Austria ever concluded. Belgrad and Orsowa were surrendered, together with all the territories acquired by the treaty of Passarowitz, with the exception of Temesvar. Meanwhile the Russians, though they had won no great successes, had at any rate held their own. But the secession of Austria compelled the termination of the war, and on the 18th of September peace was also arranged between Russia and the Porte. All the Russian conquests were restored except Azof, and its fortifications were to be dismantled and the district laid waste. The Czarina had to promise not to maintain a single vessel on the Black Sea or on the sea of Azof, and to conduct all commerce with Turkey by Turkish vessels. Thus the sole gain of Russia from a war that had cost much treasure and more lives was the acquisition of a barren strip of useless land.

§ 14. The treaty of Belgrad was mainly the work of Villeneuve, who considered that he had rendered a service to France in exalting Turkey at the expense of Austria. Charles VI. felt the disgrace keenly and it threw a gloom over his remaining days. His government was imprudent and incapable to the last. There was one power, Prussia, whom it was his most obvious policy to conciliate. Frederick William had been the first German prince to guarantee the Pragmatic Sanction, he was the best able to fulfil his promise, but at the same time he had the greatest temptations to break it. A weak and divided Austria would at once give Prussia the supremacy in Germany. In spite of these considerations Charles did not scruple to alienate this prince without any particular motive. In 1728, he had promised the king to secure his succession to the duchy of Berg. In January, 1739, a secret treaty was made at Versailles between France and Austria, by which, on the death of the elector palatine, provisional possession for two years of Jülich and Berg was to be given to Karl Theodore of Sulzbach. This was intended to exclude the Prussian claims. As the elector survived Charles VI. the question did not arise during his lifetime, but it illustrates the reckless imprudence with which he threw obstacles in the way even of his own most cherished schemes. On the 26th of October, 1740, Charles VI. died. He left a disjointed, ill-governed, and exhausted collection of territories to his daughter Maria Theresa, whose succession was not one whit the more secure for the numerous and solemn engagements that had been entered into by the powers of Europe.

CHAPTER XVII.

PRUSSIA BEFORE THE ACCESSION OF FREDERICK THE GREAT.

§ 1. History of the House of Hohenzollern acquisitions of territory § 2. The Great Elector; his foreign policy; claims upon Silesia; treachery of the Austrian government. § 3. Domestic policy of the Great Elector. § 4. Frederick I.; he acquires the title of king of Prussia. § 5. Frederick William I.; his army; his civil administration; his foreign policy; relations with Austria. § 6. The royal family; Frederick William's quarrel with his son. § 7. Attitude of Prussia in the war of the Polish Succession; gradual alienation from Austria; death of Frederick William I.

§ 1. The mark of Brandenburg had been formed in the tenth century on the northern frontier of Germany, for the combined purposes of defence and aggression against the Slavonic tribe of Wends. In the hands of the Ascanier margraves it became a powerful principality and one of the four secular electorates of the empire. At the Council of Constance in 1415, Brandenburg was given by the emperor Sigismund to Frederick of Hohenzollern, and was thus united to the considerable territories which the Hohenzollerns already possessed in Franconia. Subsequently the family split into several branches, the elder line keeping the electorate, while the younger took the Franconian territories, which were known as the principality of Culmbach, and were afterwards divided into Anspach and Baireuth. In 1603 and 1618 these younger lines died out, and their possessions fell to the reigning elector. But during their existence they had made acquisitions and founded claims which are of great importance. In 1524 George of Anspach had acquired by purchase the principality of Jägerndorf in Silesia. And in the next year his younger brother Albert, the grand master of the Teutonic Order, abandoned his ecclesiastical dignity and obtained the duchy of Prussia under the suzerainty of the king of Poland. Albert's son, another Albert (1568–1618) married Maria Eleanora, eldest daughter and heiress of William duke of Cleve and Jülich. The marriage produced only daughters, but of these the eldest was married to John Sigismund, elector of Brandenburg.

Joachim Frederick, who was elector from 1598 to 1608, did not keep the Culmbach territories when they fell in to him in 1603, but granted them out again to his brothers Joachim Ernest and Christian, thus founding two new lines of Anspach and Baireuth. Jägerndorf he gave to his second son John George, from whom it was confiscated in 1623 by the emperor Ferdinand II. The electorate passed to Joachim Frederick's eldest son, John Sigismund (1608–1619), who succeeded in 1618 to the duchy of Prussia, which was still under Polish suzerainty. John Sigismund plays an important part in history. In 1609 the duchies of Cleve and Jülich becoming vacant by the death of duke William, he at once claimed them as the husband of the lawful heiress. He was opposed however by the palatine house of Neuburg, which had a rival claim through marriage with a daughter of William of Cleve. This dispute, which nearly kindled a great religious war in Europe, remained unsettled for many years, both the claimants keeping a firm hold of part on the inheritance. To emphasise his opposition to the Neuburg family, who had gone over to Catholicism, John Sigismund became a Calvinist. Henceforth Calvinism was the court religion of the Hohenzollern princes, although the bulk of their subjects were and remained Lutherans.

§ 2. In the Thirty Years' war George William of Brandenburg (1619–1640), as has been seen, played a very sorry part, and the only result of his attempted neutrality was that his territories suffered more than those of many princes who took an open and honourable side. But a new epoch opened for the house of Hohenzollern with the accession of his son Frederick William, the Great Elector and the real creator of the Prussian monarchy. His first task was to redeem the disasters of the late rule. Departing altogether from his father's policy, he succeeded in ridding his territories of foreign troops, and in the peace of Westphalia he emerged from the war with considerable acquisitions, Lower Pomerania and the secularised bishoprics of Halberstadt, Minden and Magdeburg. This success was continued throughout his reign. By his dexterous conduct in the northern war (1655–1660) which was kindled by Charles X. of Sweden, he achieved his greatest triumph, and freed Prussia for ever from the suzerainty of the Polish crown. In 1666 he concluded a final treaty of partition with the Neuburg family, by which they were to have Jülich and Berg, while he kept Cleve, Ravensberg, and Mark. On the extinction of either family the territories were to pass to the other, to the exclusion of all collateral claims. This arrangement becomes of considerable importance later on. When Louis XIV. provoked a war by his attack upon Holland in 1672, the Great Elector, always a keen supporter of Protestantism, joined the league against France. To draw him away from the Rhine, Louis induced the Swedes to invade Brandenburg. Frederick William had an old quarrel to fight out with Sweden. Hurrying northwards by forced marches, he not only repulsed the invaders and defeated them at Fehrbellin (June, 1675), but even drove them away from Upper Pomerania, which had been given to Sweden by the treaty of Westphalia in spite of the Hohenzollern claims. This great acquisition, which would have given Brandenburg the desired opening to the Baltic, it was found impossible to keep. Louis XIV. insisted that the Swedes should not suffer for their alliance with him, and to the elector's great disgust he had to restore his Pomeranian conquests in 1679. To compensate himself in some measure for this loss, Frederick William now demanded that the emperor Leopold should satisfy his claims in Silesia, which require some explanation. In the first place there was the duchy of Jägerndorf which had been confiscated by Ferdinand II. in 1623, a high-handed action which had been constantly protested against by the Hohenzollerns. There were also other claims. In 1537 the elector Joachim II. had concluded an *Erbverbrüderung*, or treaty of mutual inheritance, with the dukes of Liegnitz. By this the dukes of Liegnitz were to obtain a part of the Brandenburg territories if the electoral line became extinct, while on the other hand, if they themselves died out, their Silesian possessions, Liegnitz, Wohlau and Brieg, were to pass to the Hohenzollerns. Ferdinand I., Charles V.'s brother, maintained that the dukes of Liegnitz had no right to make such a treaty without his consent as king of Bohemia, and compelled them to revoke it. But the house of Brandenburg had always refused to recognise this revocation, and maintained that the treaty was perfectly valid. In 1675 the last duke of Liegnitz died, and the emperor Leopold at once took possession of his territories. At the moment Frederick William was occupied with the Pomeranian war, but as soon as that was concluded he demanded that the treaty should be executed and that he should also be put in possession of Jägerndorf. At first the court of Vienna was obstinate in its refusal. But the threatening attitude of Louis XIV. both in political and religious matters, as illustrated in the *réunions* and the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, compelled a reconciliation between the two chief German powers, and a compromise was arranged in 1686. By this Frederick William renounced his claims to Jägerndorf and Liegnitz, in return for which the emperor ceded to him the circle of Schwiebus in Silesia and guaranteed the Hohenzollern succession in East Friesland. But even this concession was a mere sham. At the very moment of concluding this treaty the Austrian ambassador made a secret agreement with the elector's son and successor, by which the latter pledged himself to restore Schwiebus immediately on his accession.

§ 3. The domestic policy of the Great Elector was even more important than his foreign relations. He succeeded, not to a single united state, but to a number of provinces, separated from each other geographically as well as by laws and customs, and having little in common except their German name and language and subjection to the same ruler. A Prussian could hold no office in Brandenburg, nor a Bradenburger in Cleve: each province excluded all but native troops. In Brandenburg the soldiers had to take an oath to the emperor as well as to the margrave, and in Prussia the estates could at first appeal to the king of Poland, and even when that connexion was broken off they were more than once inclined to restore it. In each province there were recognised assemblies of estates, intent only on provincial objects, and on maintaining their independence by checking the central power. The elector's revenue came partly from his own domains and partly from taxes which were granted by the provincial assemblies. The internal condition of the country was discouraging. The peasantry were crushed in serfdom to the nobles and the fields had been laid waste during the war. Owing to the same causes, trade and manufactures had perished in the towns, and the schools and universities were deserted. There was perhaps more than one way in which material prosperity might be restored and some amount of unity given to the jarring interests of classes and provinces. But there was one way which was undoubtedly quicker and surer than any other, and which could alone commend itself to a ruler in the 17th century. This was the establishment of a strong central power, which should govern not for its own sake but for the general good, and this, the foundation of a paternal despotism in the best and only true sense, was the object which Frederick William set before himself. He had no sympathy with constitutional government, and it is certain that the time and the circumstances were unsuited for it.

His first act was the formation of a standing army, which gained him respect abroad and made him irresistible at home. For its support he induced the towns, not without difficulty, to grant him a permanent excise, which was a valuable addition to his revenue. The estates or *Landstände*, the strongholds of provincialism, gradually lost most of their powers. The nobles were deprived of their political independence, though allowed to retain their mastery over the peasants, and were induced to look for honour and promotion in the service of the elector. Thus was created an absolute rule which represented and formed the unity of the state, and this power was uniformly exercised, not for selfish objects, but for the real welfare of the subjects. Agriculture and commerce were fostered in every way, and speedily recovered from the ravages of the war. Marshes were drained, and under the elector's own supervision a canal, which bears his name, was cut between the Elbe and the Oder. To repair the losses in population foreigners were encouraged to settle in the country, and the revocation of the Edict of Nantes brought nearly 20,000 industrious Huguenots into the elector's territories.

§ 4. Frederick William's successor, Frederick I. (1688–1713) is noteworthy chiefly because he obtained the title of king of Prussia. This was conferred upon him in 1700 by the emperor Leopold, who was anxious to obtain allies for the approaching war of the Spanish succession. Before this Frederick had had to keep his promise about restoring Schwiebus, but he protested that he had been deceived in the matter, and that therefore the renunciation of the Silesian territories was invalid and null. In domestic government the king departed from the traditions of his predecessor. Anxiety to support his new dignity led him to maintain a magnificent and expensive court, and this produced confusion and loss in the finances. Prussian troops played a distinguished part in the great war, but without much advantage to their own country. In one way perhaps Frederick's reign was productive of good. It brought Prussia more into contact with Europe and contemporary civilisation than at any previous period. The king himself, and still more his wife Sophia Charlotte, the sister of George I. of England, were disposed to encourage learning and literature. The university of Halle was founded, and Leibnitz and other distinguished men were well received at the Prussian court.

§ 5. The work of the Great Elector was carried on and to some extent completed by his grandson, Frederick William I., whose eccentricities, which almost amounted to madness, have won for him a name in history which he really deserved on other grounds. His first act on his accession was to dismiss the numerous court officials of his father and to establish the strictest economy both in his own household and in the public administration. His chief attention throughout his reign was given to military affairs, to the formation and training of a large standing army. Rejecting the schemes of a militia or of compulsory service for all, he arranged that each district should furnish a certain quota of soldiers, who were to be enlisted by force if necessary. Artisans, tradespeople, and citizens generally, were exempted. In this way rather more than half of the army was raised. The rest was supplied by voluntary enlistment, which was carried on with great vigour in every part of Europe. At his accession the numbers of the army were 38,459, in the year of his death they were 83,436. Among these troops the most careful discipline was maintained. The articles of war which had been drawn up by the Great Elector were re-issued, but the punishments were made more severe. The system of drill, which became the model for Europe, was due chiefly to Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau, the inventor of the iron ramrod. Before this time, in Prussia, as in all other countries, the chief officers had the appointment to inferior places. Frederick William reserved all appointments whatever to himself, and was careful to make them depend on merit alone. Every regiment was inspected at least once a year by the king in person, and an officer's chance of promotion depended very much on the impression which his men made. The king himself had a special regiment of guards at Potsdam, which it was his mania to fill with the tallest men possible. The absurd lengths to which he carried this fad not only brought considerable ridicule upon him, but involved him in expenses which he would never have sanctioned for any other object, and also gave rise to unpleasant quarrels with foreign states, whose territories were often treated with scant respect by zealous Prussian recruiting-sergeants.

With regard to the army, Frederick William merely improved and developed the old established levies of the feudal times. The officers were in almost all cases nobles, while the common soldiers were their natural subjects, the peasants. But his civil administration was wholly alien to feudalism. The officials were mostly chosen from the burgher class and acted solely as the instruments of the crown. In 1722 the system was fully drawn up and put into working the next year. The old administrative colleges were abolished and their place taken by a single "general directory." This was appointed to superintend every conceivable branch of the administration. It had subordinate chambers in the provinces, and the councils of each circle, which consisted chiefly of nobles, were placed under its control. Thus a centralised government was established such as no country in Europe had yet experienced. No detail was too insignificant for the king's paternal care and attention. He compelled people to build houses both in Berlin and Potsdam, where many of the streets owe their origin to him, In order to encourage domestic manufactures he imposed severe penalties on all who wore or used foreign productions, and this, unlike most sumptuary laws, was successful. The clothing of the army provided a stable market for the Prussian wool, which had hitherto been made up in England. To agriculture the king paid special attention. By improving the management of the royal domains he obtained a great increase of revenue, and his economic habits enabled him always to have a reserve fund at his command. In the last reign a famine had desolated Lithuania, he re-peopled it with foreign emigrants. The Lutheran peasants of Salzburg, being persecuted by their bishop, were offered a refuge by the Prussian king, and more than 17,000 of them were transferred at his expense to their new home. In religious matters Frederick William was tolerant of every form of belief except Roman Catholicism and scepticism. He himself attended the Calvinist service in the morning and the Lutheran in the afternoon. In fact, though he remained nominally a Calvinist, he had the greatest repugnance to the fundamental tenet of predestination. For learning he displayed a contempt which is to be explained by a consciousness of his own deficiency in that respect. The scientific society which had been founded by his father, received from him as president one Gundling, a man of considerable attainments but worthless character, whose recommendation to the king was his admirable qualities as a court buffoon and laughing-stock. On the whole, while it is as difficult to admire Frederick William's administration as his character, it is impossible to deny that Prussia owes to him no inconsiderable debt.

In foreign politics Frederick William plays a much less distinguished part than either of his two immediate predecessors. It has often been said that he was so attached to his machine-like troops that he was unwilling to expose them on the battle-field. But the real explanation is that he had absolutely no capacity for foreign affairs, and that he was perfectly conscious of it. His great anxiety was to make Prussia perfectly independent, and he was afraid of risking this independence by engaging in European complications, in which more capable and designing powers might use him as a tool. The Great Elector had made it a cardinal point of his policy to take part in all great affairs, so as to make the influence of Prussia felt and respected. His grandson pursued an exactly opposite plan, and in all negotiations tried to avoid committing himself to definite obligations. There was only one war in which he took part as a principal, that against Charles XII. of Sweden. This gave him his one great territorial acquisition, the town of Stettin and the adjacent district which opened the Baltic to Brandenburg. Before this the treaty of Utrecht had handed over Spanish Gelderland to Prussia.

After the conclusion of his treaty with Sweden in 1720, Frederick William adopted a neutral policy, and his troops were never employed again except as auxiliaries. We can trace several motives which helped to direct his actions. He was anxious to maintain the balance of power, as the best security of Prussian independence. At the same time he inherited the old Hohenzollern loyalty to the empire, and was eager to perform his obligations as a German prince. If the Austrian government had acted with any prudence or foresight, Prussia might have been made a devoted ally instead of becoming an enemy and a rival. One of the most important points in Frederick William's reign was his gradual and involuntary estrangement from the emperor. His peaceful tendencies never made him lose sight of that territorial aggrandisement which had hitherto been so conspicuous a feature of Prussian history. The question about Jülich and Berg was rapidly coming to a head. The last male of the house of Neuburg was the elector palatine, Charles Philip, and on his death the two duchies were to fall to Brandenburg by the treaty of 1666. But the elector palatine was anxious to break the treaty and to leave his territories undivided to the collateral branch of Sulzbach. Frederick William spared no pains to obtain guarantees for what he considered his unquestionable rights. But the legal question was complicated by religious differences. Düsseldorf, the capital of Jülich, was regarded as a border fortress of Roman Catholicism, and the Catholic powers were averse to allowing it to fall into the hands of the most powerful Protestant prince in Germany. This explains the reluctance of the emperor to comply with the king of Prussia's wishes on this subject.

In 1725 came the first great crisis in European relations, caused by the activity of Ripperda and the alliance of Vienna between Spain and Austria. In a personal interview with George I. and Townshend, Frederick William was convinced that the balance of power was in danger, and the promise that England would support his claims on Jülich and Berg induced him to conclude the treaty of Hanover with France and England. But no sooner had he taken this decisive step than he repented of it. He felt that if war arose his territories would be the first to suffer. He saw that the maritime powers aimed chiefly at the suppression of the Ostend Company and of Spanish commerce, matters in which he had no interest whatever. The characteristic doubt arose in his mind, whether England, presuming on family connexions, was not using him as an instrument for its own designs. While he was thus hesitating, matters were decided by the arrival of an Austrian envoy, Count Seckendorf, with whom he had an old acquaintance. Seckendorf, who had been sent for that express purpose, succeeded in detaching the king from the league of Hanover. By the treaty of Wusterhausen (Oct. 12, 1726), the emperor pledged himself to do what he could to induce the elector palatine to recognise the Prussian claims to Jülich and Berg, and Frederick William accepted the Pragmatic Sanction and promised to assist Charles VI. if his German territories were attacked. If Prussia could have been induced to throw itself altogether on the Austrian side, the emperor would probably have prosecuted the war. But as this was impossible, Charles VI. had to content himself with what he had gained, and in 1727 he threw over Spain, and signed a preliminary treaty with the allies. Meanwhile Seckendorf continued his activity at Berlin, and in December, 1728, a secret treaty was arranged which was a more definite confirmation of the terms of Wusterhausen. Frederick William promised 10,000 men for the defence of the emperor's German territories, and again guaranteed the Pragmatic Sanction, stipulating only that the archduchess must marry a German and not a Spaniard or any other foreigner. For the next few years the policy of Prussia was really dictated from Vienna. The king's most trusted minister, Grumbkow, was in receipt of an Austrian pension, and he and Seckendorf played into each other's hands. To such an extent was the intrigue carried, that they gained over the Prussian minister in London and induced him to send garbled reports, so as to increase the king's alienation from England.

§ 6. These years are the darkest period of Frederick William's reign. His Austrian connexion and the influence of Grumbkow and Seckendorf involved him in quarrels with his own family which became the chief subject of contemporary gossip, and have therefore become most conspicuous in later records. Frederick William was closely connected with the house of Hanover. His mother was a sister and his wife a daughter of George I., and the latter, Sophia Dorothea, was extremely anxious to continue the connexion by marrying her eldest daughter to George II.'s son, Frederick Prince of Wales, and her own eldest son, the crown prince Frederick, to the English princess Amelia. This double marriage was at first acceptable to Frederick William, and negotiations went on about it for a long time.

But the close alliance with Austria involved a separation from England, especially after the conclusion of the treaty of Seville in 1729. There were also other grounds of quarrel, in the measures taken by Hanover to put a stop to Prussian enlistments, in the disputes about the property left by George I.'s wife, and the dissatisfaction expressed in Hanover at the Prussian claims to succeed in East Friesland. It was just at an unfortunate juncture that Sir Charles Hotham arrived in Berlin with formal proposals about the double marriage (1730). Frederick William was willing enough to marry his daughter to the Prince of Wales, but he was determined not to allow family alliances to influence his policy, and therefore refused to make any agreement about the marriage of the crown prince. The English government, whose object was naturally to secure the alliance of Prussia, would not agree to one marriage without the other. As a last resource Hotham disclosed the relations between Grumbkow and the envoy in London, Reichenbach, which had been recently discovered. But this step had a wholly unexpected result. Instead of resenting Grumbkow's treachery, the king fell into a violent rage at the interference of a foreign government between himself and his ministers. Hotham was dismissed with insult, and though apology was made for this, the negotiation was altogether broken off.

This was a great blow to Sophia Dorothea, a woman of scarcely inferior obstinacy to her husband. She clung resolutely to the hope of the English alliance, and induced both her son and daughter to promise that they would never make other marriages than those which had been proposed. Frederick William, a despot to the core, was thrown into an ungovernable fury by this opposition in his own family. He had already grounds of displeasure with his eldest son, who had developed a character and habits very different from his father's, and who preferred effeminate pursuits like literature and music to drilling and hunting. The king did not hesitate to vent his rage in acts of brutal ferocity and violence. Not only Frederick but also Wilhelmina could hardly venture into their father's presence without the certainty of blows and insults. On one occasion Frederick William took his son with him to a great review held at Mühlberg by Augustus of Saxony and Poland, and there publicly flogged him and taunted him with cowardice for his submission. This last indignity was too much for the high spirited prince, who determined to escape from a life that was no longer tolerable. His plans were concerted with a favourite companion, Lieutenant von Katte. Advantage was to be taken of the king's journey into Upper Germany to escape from the Rhine country into Holland. Everything was prepared to make the attempt from Steinfurt, near Mannheim, but the project was discovered by the vigilance of those who had been appointed to watch the prince. Frederick William was almost driven out of his mind by this last instance of insubordination. He was convinced that his son was concerned in a secret plot against his crown and possibly his life, and he determined to have him tried as an officer guilty of desertion. Frederick was sent back into Prussia and closely imprisoned in the fortress of Cüstrin.

His accomplice, Von Katte, was also arrested and condemned to perpetual imprisonment. But the king, enraged at the clemency of the sentence, ordered that he should be executed before his son's windows. Meanwhile the court-martial which sat on the crown-prince sentenced him to death for desertion. Great fears were entertained that the king might play the part of Brutus, and numerous princes, including the emperor himself, intervened on behalf of the prince. At last he was induced to relent, but it was a year before he would see his son again, and even after a partial reconciliation had been effected, it required a great deal of self-control and no small amount of hypocrisy on Frederick's part to avoid an outbreak of the quarrel. All prospect of the English alliance was of course at an end, especially as the king suspected the English minister of encouraging insubordination in his family. In spite of the anger of the queen, Wilhelmina was married to a junior Hohenzollern, Frederick of Baireuth, while a wife was found for the crown prince in Elizabeth Charlotte of Brunswick-Bevern, who was a niece of Charles VI.'s wife. This marriage, which strengthened the connexion between Austria and Prussia, was settled in 1732 and solemnised in the next year. The crown prince now obtained a separate establishment at Rheinsberg, where he was able to carry out his own scheme of life without coming into collision with the iron will of his father.

§ 7. In 1733 the death of Augustus II. kindled the war of the Polish succession, which was of great importance to the history of Prussia, especially as it broke off the close alliance that had existed for the last eight years with Austria. Frederick William had considerable interest in the Polish question, and was especially anxious to prevent the accession of the late king's son, Augustus III., as the union of Saxony and Poland was disadvantageous to Prussia. He himself was not averse to the election of Stanislaus Leczinski, but as this was distasteful to both Austria and Russia, he accepted the treaty of Löwenwolde (Dec. 1732) which aimed at procuring the crown for Emanuel of Portugal. Events speedily made this arrangement impossible, and before long Charles VI. was induced by hostility to France and the desire to get rid of a formidable opponent of the Pragmatic Sanction, to take up the cause of Augustus. This was a great blow to the Prussian king, but the French invasion of the empire kept him firm to his alliance, and on condition that his claims on Berg should be again confirmed, he offered to send 30,000 troops to act on the Rhine. To his intense surprise the offer was rejected. Still he loyally sent the 10,000 men that had been arranged for in 1728, and himself with his son joined Prince Eugene in the fruitless campaign of 1734. In the next year Charles VI. made a peace which in two points ran exactly counter to the wishes of the Prussian king. The integrity of the empire was sacrificed by the cession of Lorraine, and the elector of Saxony was acknowledged as king of Poland. To make matters worse, the preliminaries of the treaty were not communicated to Frederick William, and he had to learn them independently. The Viennese government actually went so far as to blame the conduct of the Prussian troops in the late campaign. To these slights was added a growing coolness on the subject of Jülich and Berg. The emperor was now allied with France, and France had always supported the wishes of the elector palatine. It became evident that the numerous pledges on the emperor's part were entirely worthless, and that the Prussian rights would be little regarded in comparison with the possibility of inducing the elector palatine to accept the Pragmatic Sanction. Frederick William's natural irritation was increased by the thought that he had been a dupe all along, that Austria had always regarded Prussia as an inferior vassal state instead of an independent ally, and that in his blind adherence to a humiliating connexion he had involved himself in all the miseries of a family quarrel. It was under the influence of these feelings that he one day pointed to his son with the prophetic words: "There stands one who will avenge me."

A last attempt was made to induce the emperor to fulfil his engagements. On the outbreak of the Turkish war Prussian assistance was offered on condition that the treaty of 1728 should be confirmed, but the offer was refused. In fact, Charles VI., as we have seen, had practically decided to take the opposite side, and early in 1739 he concluded his arrangement with France, by which provisional occupation of the disputed territories was secured for two years to the prince of Sulzbach. Repeated disappointments induced Frederick William to depart altogether from his previous policy and to open direct negotiations with France, the power to which he had hitherto displayed a patriotic antipathy. Fleury was always willing to have two alternatives to choose between, and he offered to secure to Prussia part of the duchies when they became vacant. This was accepted by the king, on the ground that a part was better than nothing, and a secret treaty was arranged at the Hague to this effect. Frederick William would have been placed in a very difficult position if the question had come up for solution in his lifetime and he had found himself in open hostility to the emperor. But the elector palatine survived him, and he escaped the turmoil and confusion that followed on his death (31 May, 1640). The crown of Prussia passed to his son, a far abler, far more cultivated, and at the same time a far less honest prince, who had early been trained not only to endure hardship but also to practise deceit, and it is difficult to decide which of the two lessons was the more useful to him.

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE WAR OF THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION.

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THE NORTHERN STATES.—§ 25. Reign of Anne; revolutions in Russia in 1740 and 1741; accession of Elizabeth. § 26. Foreign policy of Russia; war with Sweden; conquest of Finland; treaty of Abo; Swedish affairs. § 27. Alienation of Russia from Prussia; alliance with Austria.

I. MARITIME WAR BETWEEN ENGLAND AND SPAIN.

§ 1. IN the fifth decade of the 18th century a period of open war succeeded to the confused diplomacy which had occupied Europe since the treaty of Utrecht. The occasion of this war was the disputed succession to the last male of the Hapsburg line in Austria, just as the former great war had followed the death of the last male of the Spanish Hapsburgs. But before this occasion arose, a smaller conflict had broken out between England and Spain, which requires a few words of explanation. England was still governed by Walpole, who had been at the head of a Whig ministry for twenty years, and who had made it one of his chief objects to keep the country at peace. There were two grand motives for his peace policy: to allow the country to recover from the exhaustion of the Spanish Succession war, and to deprive the Jacobites of the support of foreign powers. But powerful as the minister was, he was unable to continue this policy in the face of a growing desire among the people to avenge the insults offered by Spain to the maritime power of England. Spain was still ruled nominally by Philip V., but really by his second wife, Elizabeth of Parma, the "termagant," as Carlyle calls her, who had kept Europe embroiled by her constant efforts to obtain Italian principalities for her children. Besides the dynastic ambition of the queen, Spanish policy was directed to another object, the revival of that naval and commercial prosperity which the country had not enjoyed since the reign of Philip II. The great obstacle in the way was the irritating claim advanced by England to absolute supremacy by sea. Common jealousy of England was powerful enough to terminate the ill-feeling between France and Spain which had been aroused during the regency of Orleans, and in 1733 a Family Compact was concluded between the two branches of the house of Bourbon, by which they undertook to support each other in attacking the naval supremacy of England. The treaty was kept so carefully secret that no hint of it reached the English ministers, but it undoubtedly encouraged the Spaniards to bolder measures in the maintenance of what they considered their undoubted rights.

The treaty of Utrecht had given England the right of importing negroes into the Spanish colonies, but had restricted the general trade to the sending once a year of a single ship of 600 tons burden. This restriction had been evaded by the rise of a system of smuggling on the part of the English traders which was the chief grievance of which Spain complained. To put a stop to it the Spaniards rigidly exercised their right of search, often seizing British vessels on the high seas and treating the crews with unjustifiable brutality. This gave rise to the greatest ill-feeling between the two nations, which was increased by other colonial disputes about the right of gathering logwood in Campeachy Bay and about the frontiers of Florida. Stories of the atrocities committed by Spanish sailors reached England, where they roused a tempest of popular indignation which was encouraged by the opposition in order to discredit Walpole. The most famous of these stories was that of Jenkins, an English captain, who maintained that he had been tortured and his ears cut off by a Spanish *guarda costa.* The truth of this statement has never been established, but it was sufficient to rouse the people to a furious demand for reprisals. Walpole was forced against his will to declare war in October, 1739. The hostilities which followed were insignificant. During the long peace the naval organisation of England had fallen into disorder, and the conduct of the war was impeded by party jealousies. Admiral Vernon captured Porto Bello to the intense delight of the opposition. Anson plundered Paita, and with the Centurion made his famous voyage round the world. These were the only successes. An attack upon Carthagena was repulsed with great loss, and the war was soon swallowed up in the general European conflict. Its chief importance lies in the fact that it helped to direct English policy in the Austrian question, and that it led to the overthrow of Walpole, who retired from the ministry in January, 1742.

II. THE FIRST SILESIAN WAR.

§ 2. Frederick William of Prussia died on the 31st of May, 1740, a year that was also fatal to Pope Clement XII., the Emperor Charles VI., and the Czarina Anne of Russia. Great expectations had been formed of the young king of Prussia, Frederick II., who succeeded his father at the age of 28. For the last few years he had lived in retirement at Rheinsberg, apparently absorbed in literary pursuits and in correspondence with Voltaire and other French men of letters. Men built utopian anticipations upon the prospect of seeing a philosopher ascend a throne. His previous life, and above all, his famous quarrel with his father, led men to expect a complete reversal of the existing system of Government. But events proved the falsity of these hopes. Frederick was perhaps the only man in Europe who could fully appreciate the merits of his father's system, which he determined strictly to uphold, while removing the excesses that had excited derision. The army was actually increased, but the costly regiment of giants at Potsdam was abolished. Economy was still made a paramount object in both the court and the public administration, though the former was somewhat extended and improved. Ministers were retained in their offices, and the friends of the crown prince found that merit rather than past services could gain favour from the king. From the first Frederick maintained that absolute supremacy over every department which had been the most striking characteristic of his father's system. The changes that were made were only superficial, although they clearly illustrate the difference in character between Frederick and his father. Perfect liberty was allowed to the press, torture was abolished except in a few carefully specified cases, and complete toleration was assured to all religious beliefs so long as their holders behaved as good subjects and abstained from proselytism. In foreign politics the first four months of Frederick's reign are important only as proving his determination to use for ambitious purposes the forces collected by his father. His first object was naturally the enforcement of those claims upon Jülich and Berg which had absorbed Frederick William's attention. The Elector Palatine was now eighty years old, so that the succession question must come up for decision before long. It was with this in view that Frederick started to travel through his western territories and paid the famous visit to Strasburg. The only result of the journey was a growing conviction that nothing but opposition was to be expected from Vienna, and this was strengthened by the emperor's attitude in a dispute between the king and the bishop of Liège. In this Frederick convinced Europe of his determination to maintain his rights at all hazards, and the threat of invasion forced the bishop to purchase the disputed succession to Heristal by the payment of 200,000 thalers. Soon afterwards a wholly new direction was given to Frederick's ambition by the news of Charles VI.'s death (20 October, 1740).

§ 3. Two great questions were raised by this event; the succession to the Empire, which was nominally elective, but since 1438 had been practically hereditary in the house of Hapsburg, and the succession to the Austrian territories, which were absolutely hereditary, but had never yet fallen under the rule of a woman. This latter question had absorbed the attention of Charles VI. for the last twenty years, and the Pragmatic Sanction gave the inheritance to his elder daughter, Maria Theresa. Her hand had been a great prize in the matrimonial market, but her father's wish and her own inclination had chosen as her husband Francis of Lorraine, who had found it necessary to purchase his bride by exchanging his hereditary duchy for the alien state of Tuscany. The hope of a male heir had kept Charles VI. from seeking the election of his son-in-law as King of the Romans during his own lifetime, and this omission left the imperial succession to the interests or caprices of the electors.

In the Austrian territories Maria Theresa assumed the government without any opposition. The young queen, who was just twenty-three years old, found her position the reverse of encouraging. The well-armed troops and the full treasury which Eugene had recommended as the best guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction, were non-existent. The finances were in the most lamentable condition, and the army, partly through want of funds and partly through the disasters of the Turkish war, contained only half its numbers. The soldiers were scattered through the numerous and distant provinces, and were dispirited by recent reverses, while the most distinguished of the Austrian generals were expiating their ill-success in prison. To assist her in the work of government the queen had no one to rely upon except the octogenarian ministers of her father. Her only strength lay in her own character. In spite of her feminine weakness and her absolute inexperience, she was endowed with a resolute courage, which enabled her to win the affection of her subjects, and to save Austria from misfortunes that at one time seemed inevitable. If not the most successful, she is certainly the most attractive sovereign of the eighteenth century, and her memory is still affectionately cherished in the country that she ruled. The first object that she set before herself was to procure her husband's election as emperor, and to give him the requisite rank and dignity she named him as joint ruler of the Austrian States. Her next care was to reform the army and the finances, in order to meet any possible danger from without, and she inaugurated her reign by an act of justice and mercy when she released the imprisoned generals, Seckendorf, Neipperg and Wallis. But before time had been given to prosecute the needful reforms, the new government was called upon to confront difficulties and dangers far more serious than had been anticipated.

The Pragmatic Sanction had been guaranteed over and over again by almost all the European Powers, and it was now to be discovered that Charles VI.'s precautions were as useless as they had been costly. The first opposition came from Charles Albert, elector of Bavaria, who was closely connected with the Hapsburgs through his wife, the second daughter of Joseph I. But his claim had an older basis than this marriage. In 1546 Charles V. had purchased the support of the duke of Bavaria against the League of Schmalkalde by a treaty, which secured the eventual succession in Austria to the Bavarian line. The then duke, Albert, had married

Anne, daughter of Ferdinand I., whose will was supposed to have named her descendants as heirs in case of the male line of Hapsburg becoming extinct. Directly after Charles VI.'s death the Bavarian envoy at Vienna made a formal protest against the accession of Maria Theresa, and demanded to see the will of Ferdinand I. The will was accordingly produced, and it was found to provide for the extinction not of "male," but of "lawful" descendants. Charles Albert, however, maintained that the document had been tampered with, recalled his envoy, and made no secret of his intention to enforce his claim. He was also the most prominent candidate for the vacant Imperial throne.

Of the other claims the most important were those advanced by Saxony and Spain. Augustus III., elector of Saxony, had guaranteed the Pragmatic Sanction in 1733, to obtain Charles VI.'s support in his candidature for the Polish crown. In spite of this he brought forward the claim of his wife, the elder daughter of Joseph I., protested against the appointment of Maria Theresa's husband as joint ruler in Austria, and loudly maintained that he could not be allowed to give the Bohemian vote at the Imperial election. From the first it was evident that the Saxon claim was a manifest breach of treaty obligations, and that it was only advanced to be bought off by some concession from one or other of the competitors. The Spanish claim was still more baseless, but more formidable. Philip V., instigated by his ambitious wife, did not scruple to appeal to the old arrangement between the two Hapsburg lines, in defiance of which he had obtained his crown. The Spanish Hapsburgs were to inherit when the Austrian branch died out, he was the heir of the Spanish Hapsburgs, therefore the Austrian territories ought to go to him. It was obvious, not only that this claim was absurd, but that all Europe would combine against it, and it was never seriously considered. But it gave Spain the desired opportunity to reclaim those Italian provinces which Charles VI. had obtained by the treaty of Utrecht. Elizabeth had already won the two Sicilies for Don Carlos, she now hoped to acquire a similar principality for her second son, Don Philip, in Lombardy and Tuscany.

§ 4. It was certain that the succession, both in Austria and the Empire, would not be settled without the intervention of the great powers of Europe. The most important of these, not only in itself, but also in its relations to the rival claimants, was France. After long hesitation France had, in 1735, guaranteed the Pragmatic Sanction in the amplest terms; and on this guarantee Charles VI. had relied with implicit confidence during the last five years of his reign. On the other hand, France was closely allied by gratitude to Bavaria, and by relationship to Spain. The all-powerful minister, Fleury, was inclined by temperament to evade these difficulties by pursuing a waiting policy, but it was doubtful whether he would be able to resist the strong martial party which was rapidly gaining ground at the French Court. Next to France the most important of European powers was England. As elector of Hanover, George II. was bound to a close alliance with the house of Hapsburg, while English interests, especially during the war with the Spanish Bourbons, made it imperative to maintain the power of Austria as a balance to that of France. There was, therefore, no doubt that England would fulfil its obligation to support the Pragmatic Sanction, and that Holland would, as usual, follow in the wake of England. Russia had been one of the first powers to accept the Pragmatic Sanction, and Charles VI. had thought to make certain of its support by his conduct in the Turkish War. But this close alliance had been broken off by the death of the Czarina Anne, and by the accession of the infant Iwan VI. The chief power was now in the hands of Marshal Munnich, who was known to be better disposed to Prussia than to Austria. On the other hand, the Czar's father, Anton Ulric of Brunswick, was a nephew of Charles VI.'s widow, so that some reliance was placed on his influence. But in the end the attitude of Russia proved unimportant, in consequence of a series of palace revolutions, which rendered impossible any decisive line in foreign affairs. The only other state of any importance was Sardinia. Charles Emmanuel was descended from Philip II., and was therefore able to put forward a claim somewhat similar to that of Philip V., i.e., that he represented the Spanish Hapsburgs. But this was a merely formal contention, and it was to be expected that he would oppose any further increase of the Bourbon power in Italy. Charles Emmanuel's policy was dictated, like that of his predecessors, by the desire of territorial aggrandisement. He inherited the traditional scheme of obtaining Lombardy, and he was willing to sell his support to whichever side offered him the largest bribe.

From what has been said it was evident at Vienna that hostility was to be expected from Bavaria and Spain, that the attitude of France, Saxony, and Sardinia was doubtful, and that Maria Theresa could rely with certainty upon the support of England and Holland and upon the neutrality of Russia. So far the prospect of affairs, if not encouraging, was at any rate not hopeless. But a sudden and unexpected danger arose from a quarter where it was least expected. Of all the guarantors of the Pragmatic Sanction the most thoroughgoing had been Frederick William of Prussia, and the assent of the Ratisbon diet in 1731 was mainly attributable to his influence. In spite of a growing alienation from the emperor, Frederick William had never shown any desire to repudiate his obligations, and moreover Prussia had been so long at peace that its neighbours had grown quite accustomed to seeing its army increased and trained, and never dreamt of its being actively employed. The most intense surprise and consternation was aroused when it appeared that the young king was about to revive the obsolete and almost forgotten claims of his family in Silesia and to enforce them at the sword's point. There seems no doubt that Frederick formed this determination the moment he heard of Charles VI.'s death. Throwing off the ague from which he was suffering, he at once set to work, and summoned to his side Podewils and Marshal Schwerin, who were his only confidants in the matter. There were two alternative lines of policy to pursue. Either Frederick might offer to support Maria Theresa against all opponents and demand Silesia as the price of his assistance: or he might ally himself with Bavaria and France and conquer Silesia in conjunction with them. Ultimately Frederick decided to seize Silesia and to leave the choice between the two alternatives open. If Maria Theresa would accept his terms, he would support her and give his vote for her husband, otherwise he would join her enemies and vote for Bavaria. In either case he was willing to give up his claims upon Jülich and Berg, which had comparatively little value in his eyes. Historians have taken very great pains to analyse and discuss the merits of the Silesian claim. But it is noteworthy that Frederick himself says hardly anything about them. His motives, according to his own account, were "ambition, interest, and the desire to make people talk of me." There can be no doubt that the claims were legally almost valueless, and that the invasion of Silesia was under all the circumstances an act of the most unjustifiable aggression.

On the 16th of December, Frederick commenced his march, and almost on the same day his ambassador presented himself at the Court of Vienna. His instructions were to enlarge upon the dangers which threatened Austria, and to point out that the only security lay in the Prussian alliance, which could be purchased by the cession of Silesia. Maria Theresa and her husband rejected the insidious offer with scorn, and refused to negotiate as long as a single Prussian soldier remained on Austrian soil. But the danger was as great as it was unforeseen. There was no army to oppose Frederick's march, and he met with no resistance except from the garrisoned fortresses of Glogau, Brieg and Neisse. The Protestants, who had suffered from the orthodox rule of Austria, welcomed the Prussian King as they had formerly appealed to Charles XII. of Sweden. One town after another opened their gates to him, and even the capital, Breslau, undertook to remain neutral so long as it was allowed to retain its municipal independence and to be free from a foreign garrison. On the 8th of March the first of the three fortresses, Glogau, was stormed by the younger Leopold of Dessau, and Frederick now laid siege to Neisse. Here he was surprised by the sudden arrival of an Austrian army under Neipperg. Hastily raising the siege, the Prussians retreated towards Ohlau which they had previously occupied. But the enemy contrived to get in front of them, and to prevent being utterly cut off from supplies and communications it was necessary to fight the battle of Mollwitz on the 10th of April. The Prussian cavalry was the weakest arm of the service and was completely routed by the Austrian charge under Romer. Frederick was induced or compelled to quit the field, narrowly escaped being captured at Oppeln which had been seized by the Austrians, and spent sixteen hours in almost solitary flight. Meanwhile the day had been retrieved by the steadiness of the Prussian infantry under Schwerin. At last the careful drill introduced by Frederick William and the old Dessauer produced its fruits. With their iron ramrods the Prussians could fire more than twice as fast as the enemy, and this gave them a tremendous advantage. The Austrians were compelled to retire upon Neisse and the first of a long series of Prussian victories was won. Frederick was extremely chagrined at the part he had played in the battle and never pardoned Schwerin. But in spite of his personal humiliation his hold on Silesia was saved, and an immense impression had been made on public opinion in Europe. Frederick after Mollwitz undertook the siege of Brieg, which was forced to surrender, and then, as Neipperg's position was too strong to be attacked, he went into camp at Strehlen, where he busied himself with diplomacy and with the training of his cavalry so as to remove those defects which had been so conspicuous in the late battle.

§ 5. Meanwhile, Maria Theresa was still endeavouring to secure her husband's election as emperor. The great obstacle in the way was that the Lorraine family had come to be regarded as Frenchmen rather than Germans, and that Francis, now that he had lost Lorraine, had not a single possession in Germany. If his wife died he would be a merely nominal emperor, without any independent power of his own. In spite of these difficulties his election, in the early months of 1741, appeared by no means impossible. The electors of Mainz and Trier were in his favour. The archbishop of Cologne was not on the best terms with his brother, the elector of Bavaria, and this family quarrel might be utilised to gain him over. The attitude of England seemed to leave no doubt as to the

Hanoverian vote. The Elector of Saxony wished to be emperor himself, but if that were out of the question, it seemed at least as likely that he would vote for Austria as for Bavaria. The Elector Palatine could be gained over by guaranteeing Jülich and Berg to the Sulzbach branch. Even the Prussian vote might be purchased, if absolutely necessary, at the price of Silesia. The right of voting for Bohemia had been transferred by Maria Theresa to her husband, but Saxony had formally protested, and the interesting question as to the rights of a female elector would have to be settled by the electoral college.

Prussia was still the only active enemy of Maria Theresa. Bavaria and Spain were powerless without the help of France. Bavaria had neither men nor money; and as long as the English fleets held the sea, Spain was cut off from Italy, unless France would grant an overland passage to Spanish troops. It therefore depended upon the attitude of France whether there should be a general war about the Austrian succession, or whether it should be restricted to the campaign in Silesia. If Louis XV. and Fleury had been left to themselves they would probably have remained neutral, and in that case the war would never have reached any serious dimensions. The motive for French intervention lay in the memory of the long contest against the house of Hapsburg. The policy of Richelieu, Mazarin, and Louis XIV. had brought such glory to France that men forgot that this policy had gained its end, and that the Hapsburgs, since the extinction of the Spanish branch, were no longer dangerous to France or to Europe. The leader of the aggressive party was Charles Louis Fouquet, count of Belleisle, the grandson of Louis XIV.'s famous minister, and the representative of the rising generation who found themselves shut out from a career either at home or abroad by Fleury's jealousy of rivals and his inveterate love of peace. Belleisle's scheme, as presented by him to the ministers, aimed at the partition of the Austrian territories. France was to annex the Netherlands and Luxemburg, Bavaria was to have Bohemia and the imperial crown, Sardinia and Spain were to divide Lombardy, Parma and Tuscany. Opposition from England might be bought off by the grant of commercial advantages. Russia could be rendered powerless either by a domestic revolution or by a war with Sweden. Saxony might be conciliated with a small slice of territory, afterwards settled as Moravia. Maria Theresa would be powerless against so many foes, so that it would be hardly necessary to draw the sword. Austria once partitioned, the supremacy of France would be assured, and the Bourbons would be the dictators of Europe.

The scheme was grand enough to fascinate the inexperienced, while Fleury was worked upon by the fear that Francis, if he became emperor, would endeavour to recover Lorraine. The correspondence with Maria Theresa became less and less cordial, while Belleisle was raised to the rank of marshal, and sent as envoy to Germany. After visiting the courts of the Rhenish electors, where he was lavish in bribes and promises, he went on to Bavaria, and on the 22nd of May, 1741, concluded the treaty of Nymphenburg with Charles Albert. France undertook to support the elector's claims to the Austrian succession as well as to the empire, and to send at least 16,000 men to his assistance. In return, the French were to be allowed to retain any conquests that they might make in the Netherlands. On the 28th of May a similar treaty was made by the Spanish envoy, who also promised men and money to Bavaria on condition that all conquests of the Spaniards in Italy should be confirmed to them.

Prussia had not yet joined the great league that was forming against Austria; and Frederick, who saw through the French schemes for a division of Germany, was eager to force Maria Theresa to purchase his alliance by the cession of Silesia. His chief hope was based upon the intervention of England. The English parliament had declared warmly for Maria Theresa, but neither George II. nor Walpole wished for war against Prussia, the king for fear of Hanover being attacked, the minister because he deemed the coalition too strong. England was actuated solely by hostility to France, while common Protestantism was a link with Prussia. The primary object of English policy, therefore, was to induce Maria Theresa to grant Frederick's demands. But the efforts of the two envoys, Lord Hyndford and Sir Thomas Robinson, were foiled by the obstinate determination of the Archduchess not to break the Pragmatic Sanction by any cession of territory. The failure of these negotiations forced Frederick reluctantly to sacrifice his patriotism as a German to his interests as a Prussian king, and to join France. On the 5th of June the treaty of Breslau stipulated mutual assistance in case of attack, while in the secret articles Frederick promised his vote to the elector of Bavaria, and resigned his claims upon Jülich and Berg. Louis XV. guaranteed to him Lower Silesia, with Breslau, and promised to send 40,000 men into Germany within two months, and to induce the Swedes to make war on Russia. Before the end of July, Augustus III. of Saxony joined the French alliance on condition of receiving Moravia and Upper Silesia. About the same time the Elector of Bavaria captured Passau.

§ 6. The league against Austria being now complete, France prepared to take an active part in the war. Two armies were formed, the one under Belleisle to co-operate with the Bavarians against Austria, the other under Maillebois to advance into the Netherlands, so as to threaten Holland and Hanover with invasion. As Belleisle was still occupied with diplomacy, his troops crossed the Rhine on the 12th of August, under the command of Lenville. To prove that they were auxiliaries rather than principals in the war, they assumed the Bavarian colours. Without opposition they joined the elector's troops, and the combined forces took Linz on the 10th of September, so that they stood within three days' march of Vienna. Everything seemed to favour the League. Sweden declared war against Russia, and George II., frightened by the advance of Maillebois, concluded a convention by which Hanover was to remain neutral and the Hanoverian vote was promised to Charles Albert.

The terror which was inspired at Vienna by the news of the French advance forced Maria Theresa to resume the project of buying off the hostility of Prussia. Robinson was sent to Frederick's camp at Strehlen, but the concessions which he was authorised to offer were insufficient, and were haughtily rejected by the king. To emphasise his adhesion to the French alliance, Frederick now occupied Breslau, which had hitherto retained its independence. At the same time he urged the allied armies to advance from Linz against Vienna.

It was a critical moment for Maria Theresa. Her husband was unpopular, and she herself was absent in Hungary, the province which for nearly a century had been in constant revolt against the Hapsburgs. At this juncture she determined to disregard the advice of her German ministers, and to grant the Hungarians the right of arming themselves, which had hitherto been studiously withheld. This proof of confidence, and the visible annoyance of the hated Germans, roused the sensitive Magyars to enthusiastic devotion. An *insurrection*, or armed levy of the whole population, was unanimously voted, and no opposition was made to the appointment of the grand-duke Francis as joint-ruler. It is true that the queen had to purchase these concessions by the grant of constitutional privileges, which seriously limited the central power, and that the Hungarian troops, always disorderly and unmanageable, did not render very effective assistance. But the moral effect was prodigious. At the moment when everything seemed lost, when the capital was being deserted and there was no ally to be called in, the province which had shown the greatest aversion to Hapsburg rule suddenly set an example of loyalty which made a profound impression both in Austria and in Europe. At the same time Maria Theresa was materially aided by disunion among her enemies.

Vienna must have fallen if it had been promptly attacked. But the French, either for military reasons or through jealousy of Prussia and Bavaria, refused to advance from Linz, and leaving Vienna on their right entered Bohemia.

The immediate danger to Austria was over, but it had already produced an important result in compelling Maria Theresa to consent to concessions. To save her capital she had opened simultaneous negotiations with France and with Prussia. An envoy was sent to treat with Belleisle at Frankfort; and he offered to give France Luxemburg, to hand over the Netherlands to Bavaria, and to satisfy Spain in Italy. In return for this the invasion of Austria was to be given up, Prussia was to be compelled to restore Silesia, and the grand duke Francis was to obtain the empire. These proposals were based on the supposition that the object of France was to obtain territorial acquisitions. But this, in Belleisle's mind, was wholly secondary to the humiliation of Austria, and the proposals were unhesitatingly rejected. More successful were the negotiations which Marshal Neipperg was authorised to conduct with Prussia. The real mediator was Lord Hyndford. On the 9th of October a secret conference was held at Klein Schnellendorf, at which only five persons were present, Frederick himself and Colonel Goltz for Prussia, Neipperg and Lentulus for Austria, and Hyndford. The terms of a convention had been already agreed upon. The Prussians were to be allowed to take Neisse after a sham siege of fourteen days. Neipperg was to be allowed to withdraw his army without molestation, the Prussian troops were to winter in Upper Silesia, and Frederick promised to abstain from all hostilities against Austria and Hanover. Within a few months a formal treaty was to be arranged, by which Lower Silesia was to be definitely ceded to Prussia. The contracting parties swore to keep the convention completely secret, and Frederick declared that if this were broken he should hold himself freed from all obligations. Nothing was signed on either side, and the only record of the convention was a writing in the hand of Lord Hyndford. The siege of Neisse was commenced, and after a formal cannonade the fortress surrendered on the 2nd of November. Neipperg was allowed to march off with his army to the defence of the Austrian territories.

The convention of Klein Schnellendort is one of the great stumbling-blocks in the way of Frederick's apologists, and as a masterly piece of treacherous double-dealing it has no equal. Maria Theresa's object is unmistakable. It was absolutely necessary to withdraw from Silesia the one army which Austria possessed, and this could only be effected by a sacrifice. She may also have hoped to irritate the other allies against Prussia. Frederick's policy is more intricate but equally obvious. It was a great thing for him to obtain possession of Neisse without having to strike a blow for it. Lower Silesia passed absolutely into his possession, and he was able to recruit his exhausted troops. At the same time his future actions were left entirely untrammelled. The condition of secrecy could not possibly be observed. Even if nothing had been betrayed on the part of Austria, the sham siege of Neisse and the departure of Neipperg's army could not fail to arouse the suspicion of his allies. He gained a great immediate advantage by making promises which he never intended to keep, and in fact he provided himself beforehand with a convenient pretext for breaking them. The only people whom he sacrificed were his allies, who suddenly found that they had to reckon with Neipperg's army, which had hitherto been occupied in Silesia.

§ 7. It is probable that when Frederick concluded the convention he expected the allies to fail in their invasion of Bohemia, and at the moment this appeared more than possible. Their communications with Upper Austria and Bavaria were cut off by the march of Neipperg's army into Moravia. Charles Albert wished to turn back for the maintenance of his Austrian conquests, which had been left in the charge of Count Ségur. But the French officers insisted upon attacking Prague. Belleisle himself hurried up from Frankfort to assume the command, but was detained by a serious illness at Dresden. To everybody's surprise Prague was taken at the first assault (25th Nov.), thanks to the energy and good fortune of the young Maurice de Saxe, a son of Augustus II. and the Countess of Königsmark. The loss of Prague was a terrible blow to Maria Theresa, and was followed by even worse disasters. On the 5th of December a revolution in Russia deprived Austria of a friend. The Regent Anne, who governed for her infant son Iwan, was overthrown, and the government was assumed by Elizabeth, the youngest daughter of Peter the Great, who was inclined to a French alliance. Worst of all, the fall of Prague decided Frederick to break the convention of Klein Schnellendorf. With cynical audacity he announced to Lord Hyndford his determination to stand by the winning side, and sent Schwerin to invade Moravia. On the 27th of December the Prussians occupied Olmütz, and Frederick promised to join them early in the next year.

At the end of 1741 Maria Theresa's position seemed almost hopeless. Upper Austria and great part of Bohemia were held by the French and Bavarians. The Prussians occupied Silesia, and had begun the invasion of Moravia. The only Austrian army, that of Neipperg, lay at Budweis unable to move in either direction. But the courage of the queen was never more conspicuous, and fortune turned at the critical moment. Belleisle's illness had led to the appointment of a new commander, Broglie, who was sluggish and incapable, unpopular with his own officers, and personally detested by Frederick. From this time we can trace a growing alienation between Prussia and France, which encouraged Austria to adopt a bolder attitude. Regiments were withdrawn from Italy, and, with the Hungarian levies, were formed into a second army under Khevenhüller. Early in January, 1742, these troops advanced into Upper Austria, where they were welcomed by the population. On the 23rd Linz was captured, and on the next day Passau surrendered to an advanced body of hussars under Bärenklau. The Austrian provinces were recovered.

These successes came too late to influence the course of events at Frankfort, where the Elector of Bavaria was chosen emperor as Charles VII. by eight votes on the 24th of January, the very day of the fall of Passau. Before his coronation, the luckless emperor heard that his own territories were invaded. Khevenhüller overran Bavaria in three weeks, and captured the whole province except Strassburg, Ingolstadt, and a few other fortresses. He was prevented from completing the work by an order to send 10,000 men to join the main army at Budweis, the command of which was transferred from Neipperg to Charles of Lorraine, Maria Theresa's brother-in-law.

§ 8. Meanwhile Frederick, not without great difficulty, had obtained the assistance of the Saxon army and a French detachment, which were placed under his command for the Moravian campaign. His object, which has often been misunderstood, was to force Maria Theresa to give up Bohemia to Bavaria, Moravia to Saxony, and the whole of Silesia with Glatz to himself. He had no real desire to aggrandise Saxony and Bavaria, but he felt that they would be safer neighbours than Austria. As long as Maria Theresa kept Bohemia and Moravia, she would always aim at the recovery of Silesia; if she lost those provinces, Silesia would be safe. At Olmütz he was met by an Austrian envoy, who offered the cession of Silesia; but Frederick, confidently anticipating success, refused to desert his allies. On the 15th of February he took Iglau, where the French troops were recalled by Broglie, and after some difficulty he induced the Saxons to join him in the siege of Brünn. But Frederick found the Moravian campaign a very different affair from that in Silesia. Mixed forces were far more difficult to handle than his own subjects, and the population was bitterly hostile to the invaders. Before the sluggish Charles of Lorraine had decided which enemy to attack, the Prussian king had given up the enterprise in disgust. On the 25th of April the Prussians evacuated Olmütz, and marched to Chrudim in Bohemia, where they encamped for a period of rest. The Austrians found that they had nothing to do but occupy the deserted fortresses, and Prince Charles now determined to follow the enemy into Bohemia.

The failure of the Moravian campaign, and Frederick's evident alienation from his allies, led to a renewal of negotiations with Austria. Maria Theresa had recently been strengthened by the fall of Walpole's ministry, which had been partly due to his failure to give efficient support to the Austrian cause. Foreign affairs were now in the hands of Carteret, who was regarded as the champion of intervention in Germany. Parliament declared strongly for supporting Austria against France, and voted a subsidy of half-a-million. But on one point Walpole's policy was followed by his successors. They gave it to be understood that England could take no part in the war until terms had been arranged with Prussia. Maria Theresa was now eager for an agreement which would give her the support of the maritime powers, and ensure the triumphant expulsion of the French from her territories. She was willing to give up Lower Silesia with Glatz and great part of Upper Silesia, but she demanded that, in return for these ample concessions, Frederick should join her against France and Bavaria. This the king unhesitatingly refused. He would be neutral, but even he was not capable of such a political somersault. Moreover he wished to keep Silesia, and not to fight for it over again with France and Saxony. On this difference the negotiations, which were again conducted by Hyndford, broke down, and it was obvious that the war must go on until one or other party should give way.

Charles of Lorraine was now marching from Moravia into Bohemia, and the Prussians lay between him and Prague. If the negotiations had succeeded he would have been allowed to attack the French without hindrance. That was now impossible, and on the 17th of May the Prussian and Austrian armies met for the second time in a pitched battle at Chotusitz or Czaslau. The result was the same as at Mollwitz, with the great difference that the victory was not won in Frederick's absence, but was gained in great measure by his own skill and energy. The battle was a diplomatic move rather than a great military achievement, and was fought by Frederick to force Austria to fall in with his demands. This was fully realised at Vienna, and the negotiations were at once resumed.

The news of Chotusitz had roused the French to make some show of energy. A detachment of Broglie's troops won a small victory at Sahay over the Austrians under Lobkowitz, who had been left in

Bohemia by Prince Charles. The French might have held their position in Pisek and Pilsen if they could have prevented the union of the Prince's army with that of Lobkowitz. Belleisle, who had returned from Frankfort after the election, hurried off to Frederick's camp to induce him to do something. There he must have seen pretty clearly through the king's designs, especially as the Prussians made not the slightest effort to check the enemy's retreat. Prince Charles joined Lobkowitz without any difficulty, and at once advanced against the French. Broglie decided that he could not resist so large a force, and retreated from point to point. First Pisek and then Pilsen were taken by the Austrians, and the French were compelled to retire ignominiously under the walls of Prague. This news decided Frederick. He was afraid that if Prague were taken, Maria Theresa would withdraw the powers that had been given to Hyndford, and try to recover Silesia. He sent off a courier at once to his minister Podewils, urging him to arrange a treaty with Hyndford as soon as possible. He was to stipulate for Lower Silesia and Glatz, with the border-counties of Bohemia if possible; if not, then he must get as much as he could of Upper Silesia. Podewils, who had always wished to come to terms with Austria and England, had already commenced the negotiations of his own accord, so that the matter was readily settled. On 11th June, the very day on which the courier arrived, the preliminaries of peace were signed at Breslau. Maria Theresa surrendered Lower Silesia, Upper Silesia with the exception of Teschen, Troppau, etc., and the county of Glatz in full sovereignty for ever. Frederick renounced all claims elsewhere, and undertook to withdraw all his troops from Austrian soil within sixteen days. Difficulties arose about the exact line of frontier, and further negotiations were transferred to Berlin, where the final treaty was signed on the 28th of July, 1742. The example of Prussia in deserting France was promptly followed by Saxony. Augustus III. tried hard to obtain some advantage from the bargain, but Maria Theresa refused to give up another foot of territory. Ultimately, just to satisfy the king's desire to save his dignity, Austria promised to assist Saxony in obtaining Erfurt, if this could be done with the consent of the archbishop of Mainz, to whom it belonged. On the 7th of September the treaty was formally signed at Dresden.

III. PERIOD OF PRUSSIAN NEUTRALITY.

§ 9. The defection of Prussia and Saxony ruined all the French schemes of partitioning Austria, and Fleury and Belleisle had nothing to aim at but the release of the troops from their imprisonment in Bohemia. This was first attempted by diplomacy, and terms were offered which contrasted strongly with the haughty tone hitherto employed by the court of Versailles. But Maria Theresa, eager for revenge upon an unprovoked assailant, and encouraged by the prospect of English assistance, refused to listen to any proposal of peace. She had hopes of obtaining some compensation for Silesia, and wished to force Charles VII. to alienate part of Bavaria in exchange for the Netherlands and a strip of northern France. To effect this the military strength of the French must be more completely broken than it would be if their army were allowed to march peaceably out of Bohemia. But the practical measures of Austria were less energetic than her intentions. Khevenhüller in Bavaria was still weakened and discontented by the loss of part of his troops, and the grand duke Francis, who superseded his brother Charles in Bohemia, was not ready to besiege Prague until the end of July. France, on the other hand, was discouraged rather than defeated. At the risk of opening the way for English intervention, Maillebois' army was ordered to march eastwards to reinforce Broglie and Belleisle, while another detachment was sent under Harcourt into Bavaria. These energetic measures nearly succeeded in wresting their expected success from the Austrians. Francis, alarmed at the approach of a new hostile army, left 12,000 men under Festetics to watch Prague, while he himself, with the bulk of his troops, marched to meet Maillebois. Khevenhüller, who had failed to prevent the entrance of the French into Bavaria, tried to redeem matters by joining the grand duke. But by this step he left the duchy undefended. Seckendorf, the second imperial general who had deserted the Hapsburg cause when it seemed to be unfortunate, was now in command of the Bavarian troops, and he found no difficulty in taking Munich (7th October), and recovering the whole of Bavaria except Schärding and Passau.

Meanwhile the combined armies of Khevenhüller and the grand duke contented themselves with holding the Bohemian frontier against Maillebois by a series of marches and counter-marches. As the French commander was not more active or capable than his opponents, this proved a sufficiently easy task. It was now decided to send Lobkowitz with reinforcements to join Festetics before Prague. Marshal Broglie had already left the city to supersede Maillebois, so that Belleisle was left in sole command. He had taken advantage of the cessation of the siege to bring supplies into Prague, and could have stood a siege for some time, if there had been anything to gain by it. But his one thought now was to leave the city as soon as possible, and to march by Eger into Bavaria. He deceived Lobkowitz by the measures which were taken for a feigned defence, and on the night of the 16th of December the French troops, numbering about 14,000, started on their march. They suffered frightful hardships from the cold, and from the attacks of the light-armed Hungarian cavalry. But Belleisle's resolution overcame all obstacles, and by marching night and day he reached Eger on the 27th of December after having lost more than 2000 men on the way. In Prague some 6000 men had been left under Lieutenant Chevert, not so much to defend the place as because they were unable to bear the hardships of a winter march. Even this force Lobkowitz did not venture to attack, but opened negotiations with Chevert. On 25th December the capitulation was signed by which the garrison was allowed to march out with all the honours of war, and Prague returned to the possession of Austria.

Thus the Austrians, after an arduous campaign, had gained less than they might have done by accepting the despised overtures of peace. Prague had been won back, but Bohemia had not been evacuated, as the French still occupied Eger. And to gain this they had sacrificed nearly all their conquests in Bavaria. Broglie, when he assumed the command in the place of Maillebois, had given up all idea of entering Bohemia, and had marched to Bavaria in the hope of taking Passau before the close of the campaign. The Austrians, once more under Charles of Lorraine, Francis having returned to Vienna, followed close upon the French, and foiled this attempt, but were themselves repulsed from Braunau. After these indecisive movements the two armies went into winter-quarters to recruit themselves for the next year's campaign.

§ 10. It is now necessary to turn for a moment to Italy, which in 1742 had also become the scene of military operations. The treaties of Utrecht and Rastadt had given Charles VI. considerable possessions in Italy; Milan with its fertile territories, the impregnable Mantua, the strong places on the Tuscan coast, and Naples. Sardinia, which on account of its distance was comparatively useless, had been exchanged in 1720 for the far more profitable island of Sicily. In Italy, as in Germany, Austria was indisputably the foremost power. But Charles VI. and his "Spanish Council" had not been successful rulers in Italy, and the result was the loss of Naples and Sicily in 1735 to Don Carlos of Spain. As compensation, the emperor had received Parma and Piacenza, and, in a sense, the grand duchy of Tuscany, which was given to his son-in-law as an equivalent for Lorraine. At the same time a considerable strip of the Milanese had been ceded to Sardinia.

Maria Theresa succeeded therefore by the Pragmatic Sanction to

Milan with its diminished territories, Mantua, the Tuscan ports, and Parma and Piacenza, while her husband was grand duke of Tuscany in his own right. The independent states in the peninsula, were Naples under Don Carlos, the papacy now held by Benedict XIV., Venice, Sardinia, which included that island with Savoy and Piedmont and was ruled by Charles Emanuel III., and Modena, under one of the Este family. No hostility was to be expected from the papacy or from Venice. The duke of Modena was unimportant, and Charles Emanuel was married to the sister of the grand duke of Tuscany, so that his support might be relied on, unless some opportunity occurred for gratifying the traditional greed of his family for increasing their territories. The only ruler who was likely to be hostile was Charles of Naples, but he was very distant from the Austrian territories, and was not very formidable, unless he received support from his relatives in Spain. It was on Spain, therefore, that the question depended whether Maria Theresa's accession would be followed by disturbances in Italy similar to those in Germany. Of the attitude of Spain there was no doubt for a moment. The restless wife of Philip V. had never been reconciled to the loss of the duchy of Parma, where she had been born and bred, and determined to spare no effort for its recovery. The great difficulty in the way of such an enterprise was the journey between the two peninsulas. The sea was held by the hostile English fleet, and to effect the land passage it was necessary to pass through the territories both of France and Sardinia. From France, when once Fleury had decided to follow the policy of Belleisle, no difficulty was anticipated, but the attitude of the king of Sardinia, who held the passes of the Alps, was much more doubtful. It was obviously to the interest of Sardinia to maintain the *status quo*, to balance the Bourbons and the Hapsburgs in Italy so as to prevent either of them from obtaining a predominance which would be dangerous to its own independence. Of the two families the Bourbons were the more dangerous, because of the neighbourhood of France to Savoy. If the Hapsburgs were supreme in Italy, it was always possible to join France against them. As against these considerations of policy there was the never-ceasing desire to obtain as much as possible of Lombardy. Lombardy was in the hands of Austria, not of Spain, and the court of Turin was well aware that the largest concessions would be made by the party not in possession. In fact Spain proposed to expel the Hapsburgs from Italy, to cede Lombardy as far as the Adda to Sardinia, and to be content with Mantua, Parma and Piacenza. On these terms Charles Emanuel joined the alliance that had been made at Nymphenburg, and from this time was regard by Spain as an ally. But the king of Sardinia was fully conscious of the politic arguments against the aggrandisement of the Bourbons in Italy. He formed the alliance for the mere purpose of forcing Austria to pay him a good price for breaking it. It was of the greatest importance to Maria Theresa to buy over Charles Emanuel, but it was difficult for her to consent to the cession of territory which was demanded, not only a large portion of Lombardy as far as Pavia, but also territory belonging to Genoa, which Sardinia wanted as an opening to the Mediterranean. England undertook the mediation with Sardinia as with Prussia, but failed to induce the queen to make such extreme sacrifices. Suddenly, in November, 1741, came the utterly unexpected news that the Spaniards had eluded the English fleet and had landed an army in the gulf of Genoa. This gave a great impulse to the negotiations, but a serious obstacle still existed in the claim which Charles Emanuel put forward to the Austrian succession as a decendant of Philip II. Naturally Maria Theresa was unwilling to admit an ally into the fortresses of the Milanese who might maintain that they were his own by right. Ultimately the question of territorial cessions to Sardinia was postponed, and on the 1st of February, 1742, a provisional convention was signed to settle military arrangements. According to this the Austrian troops were to march southwards and to occupy Mantua and Mirandola, so as to prevent the Spaniards from entering Lombardy. Charles Emanuel was to send auxiliary troops, and if necessary was to advance with his whole army. But his claims were not to be prejudiced by the convention. As long as it lasted he was pledged to do nothing to enforce them, but he reserved the right to repudiate the bargain by a month's notice, and within the month he was to withdraw all his troops from Austrian territories.

Luckily for the allies, Montemar, the Spanish general, showed none of the energy that had characterised his movements when he conquered Naples and Sicily in 1734. Instead of advancing at once against Lombardy, he marched into the papal states to wait for Neapolitan reinforcements, and it was not till March, 1742, that he was ready for the campaign. The Austrian commander was Count Traun, who had been trained under Guido Stahremberg and proved a worthy pupil of that able general. The first object of the two armies was to occupy the territory of Modena, where duke Francesco d'Este had hitherto been allied with the Hapsburgs but had been induced by Maria Theresa's misfortunes to join Spain. The Austrians and Sardinians had little difficulty in taking Modena (June, 1742), and the duke had to fly to Venice. This first success decided the campaign. The allies seized Mirandola, and advanced to meet Montemar, who promptly retreated through Rimini and Ravenna to Foligno. The Spanish disasters were completed when an English fleet appeared before Naples, and by the threat of a bombardment compelled Don Carlos to recall his troops and to promise strict neutrality for the rest of the war. The Government of Madrid was so dissatisfied with Montemar's conduct that, in spite of his former services, he was superseded by a younger officer, Count Gages. Maria Theresa was encouraged by the substantial victory of her troops to aim at the recovery of Naples and Sicily and the complete expulsion of the Bourbons from Italy. But here she came into collision with her ally. Charles Emanuel had been willing enough to exclude the Spaniards from Lombardy, but he was not eager to drive them from Italy, simply to restore the Hapsburgs to their old supremacy in the peninsula. Not only did he refuse to advance, but he found a pretext for withdrawing his troops in the attack that was threatened against Savoy by another Spanish army under Don Philip which had marched through southern France. The other ally of Austria, England, refused to employ its fleet for the conquest of Naples: and the pope would not admit the Austrian troops into his territories. Traun was therefore compelled to withdraw his army to the north of the Tanaro where he occupied a strong position. Montemar's successor, Gages, had advanced against Modena, but then gave up the enterprise and went into winter quarters near Bologna, which was governed by the ex-Spanish minister Alberoni; so the campaign of 1742 ended, leaving Austria in secure possession of its territories and ot Modena, but with no other advantage being gained.

§ 11. The first important event of 1743 was the death of Cardinal Fleury, on the 29th of January, at the age of 93. His ministry had lasted 17 years, and was rendered illustrious by the annexation of Lorraine, but otherwise he had conferred few benefits upon France. He had been compelled at the close of his career to give up the policy of peace which was congenial to him, and the result was disaster and disgrace to the French arms. For several years speculation had been rife as to his successor. Louis XV. declared that he would imitate his great-grandfather, and be his own minister: but his disinclination for business made this an empty profession. The chief result of Fleury's death was that unity in the administration was replaced by discord. There was no one who could be regarded as first minister, but there were several rivals for the chief influence over the king. The most important of these were three men who held no office, Cardinal Tencin, the persecutor of the Jesuits, Marshal Noailles, and the duc de Richelieu, who owed a brief tenure of power to the favour of the king's mistress.

Besides these, there were the ministers proper, Orri, the controller-general of finance, Amelot, minister of foreign affairs, Maurepas of marine, d'Argenson of war, and the chancellor d'Aguesseau. The government of Fleury had not been successful, that of so many rival pretenders to his place was not likely to be more fortunate. The brilliant Belleisle, who two years ago had been regarded as certain to be the next minister of France, had just returned with the remnants of his Bohemian army. The failure of his grand German schemes involved the ruin of his prospects at home, and he retired into temporary obscurity.

The treaty of Berlin had been purchased at a great sacrifice, but that it was worth the loss of Silesia is proved by comparing the situation of Maria Theresa at the beginning of 1743 with that which she had occupied the year before. The project of partitioning the Austrian territories, at one time so certain of success, was now a thing of the past. Upper Austria, Bohemia and Moravia, which twelve months ago lay at the mercy of her enemies, had been triumphantly recovered. Eger was the only place which the French still held in Bohemia. Charles VII., the nominal head of the hostile league, had suffered great losses, France was humiliated, the Spaniards had utterly failed in their attack on Lombardy. The powers which a year ago had been so energetic in their aggressions were now compelled to stand on the defensive. England was at last about to take a decisive part in the war. The Swedish war with Russia, on which France had relied to occupy the great northern empire, had been unsuccessful, and before the close of the year Sweden had to accept the humiliating peace of Abo. The attitude of Maria Theresa changed with the altered circumstances. No longer was she content to uphold the Pragmatic Sanction, she would take vengeance for the unprovoked attacks that had been made upon her, and would extort from her enemies some compensation for the loss of Silesia.

§ 12. The military events of 1743 are more important in their results than in themselves, and the three campaigns, in Bavaria, Western Germany, and Italy, may be passed over in rapid review. In Bavaria, Charles of Lorraine and Khevenhüller had a very easy task. Broglie, who commanded the army of Maillebois, refused to give any assistance to Seckendorf, and finally marched back to France without striking a blow. The Bavarian troops were now completely outnumbered. Munich was retaken by the Austrians, and the unfortunate Charles VII. had to fly from his capital to Frankfort. On the 27th of June the convention of Niederschönfeld was signed, by which the whole of Bavaria, except Ingolstadt, was handed over to Austrian occupation until the conclusion of a general treaty. In August the French had to give up Eger, the last relic of their Bohemian conquests. Before this Charles of Lorraine had advanced from Bavaria to the Rhine, to co-operate against France with the allied troops which England had brought into Germany.

In 1742 a mixed English and Hanoverian army had entered the Netherlands, and early in the next year it commenced its march towards Germany with some 20,000 Austrian auxiliaries under the duke of Arenberg. The "Pragmatic Army," as it was called, was commanded by Lord Stair, and so dilatory were its movements, that it did not cross the Rhine till April. Through the whole of May it remained in complete inactivity near Mainz and Frankfort. To oppose the allies, a French army was formed out of the remnant of Belleisle's troops with fresh recruits, and placed under the command of Noailles. He contented himself with carefully following the enemy, so as to frustrate any attempt either to attack France or to interfere in Bavaria. The explanation of Stair's inactivity is to be found in the negotiations which England was conducting to induce the Dutch to take part in the war. For a long time the republic, which had no real interests at stake, was persistent in its refusal. But at last the Orange party, which wished for an opportunity to restore the stadtholdership, got the upper hand, and in May, 1743, Holland undertook to send 20,000 men to support the cause of Maria Theresa. The prospect of this reinforcement impelled Stair to more active measures, and leaving his magazines at Hanau, he advanced towards Aschaffenburg. But Noailles, who carefully watched all his movements, outmarched him and blocked the way. At this juncture George II. arrived to assume the command in person. To extricate himself from the difficult position, George determined to return to Hanau. But Noailles, anticipating this resolve, was again too quick for the enemy, and occupied a strong position at Seligenstadt, while he sent his nephew the duc de Grammont to seize the village of Dettingen, about half-way between Aschaffenburg and Hanau. The king found himself compelled to fight a battle in a disadvantageous position (26th June), and he would certainly have been defeated but for an error of Grammont, who left his position at Dettingen to meet the enemy in the valley below. This deranged all Noailles' elaborate plans, the battle became a confused melée, and the French had ultimately to retreat. But the victory, such as it was, proved of very slight importance. Noailles was not pursued or harassed in any way, and George II. was quite content to have secured his one object of removing all obstacles to his return to Hanau. So hasty was he in effecting this that he actually left his wounded on the field of battle to the humanity and courtesy of the French commander.

The news of the battle of Dettingen was received with the greatest enthusiasm at Vienna. Maria Theresa was confident that the junction of Charles of Lorraine with the victorious allies must compel France to yield. But nothing came of these expectations. Quarrels arose between the English and Hanoverian troops, and Lord Stair in disgust threw up his command. Charles of Lorraine, eager to win glory for himself, refused to join the English king. At last it was decided to attack France in two divisions. The Austrians under Charles were to enter Lower Alsace by Alt-Breisach, while the Pragmatic Army was to cross the French border further north. Two French armies were set on foot to oppose the invasion; one under Coigni against the Austrians, the other under Noailles against George II. The defence was completely successful. Prince Charles advanced to Alt-Breisach, but failed to effect a passage across the Rhine. The Pragmatic Army crossed the Rhine below Mainz, but made no effort to attack Noailles. Ultimately the two invading armies gave up their enterprise and went into winter quarters. The French were excluded from Germany, but their own frontiers were secure from attack.

In Italy the Spanish commander, Gages, received orders to renew the enterprise in Lombardy which had failed in the preceding year. Crossing the Tanaro, he attacked the Austrians under Traun, but was completely defeated at Campo Santo and compelled to retire to Rimini. Traun wished to follow the enemy and complete his discomfiture, but was prevented by the attitude of his ally, the king of Sardinia. Charles Emanuel had not yet extorted from Maria Theresa any definite promise of territorial concessions, and until that was effected he was determined not to continue the war. To give greater force to his demands he entered into negotiations with the courts of Versailles and Madrid, which were eager for the Sardinian alliance. English mediation had to be called in to effect a reconciliation between Austria and Sardinia. As in the case of Prussia, England did not hesitate to urge unwelcome sacrifices upon Maria Theresa, with a vehemence that may have been politic but was certainly unwelcome at Vienna. But too many interests were at stake for the queen to hold out. On the 13th of September, 1743, the important treaty of Worms was arranged between England, Austria, and Sardinia. Maria Theresa ceded to Charles Emanuel the Milanese west of the Ticino and Lake Maggiore, the cities and districts of Pavia and Piacenza, and the right of re-purchasing the marquisate of Finale from the Genoese. Finale had been sold by Charles VI. to Genoa for 1,200,000 piastres, but the emperor had reserved the right of reclaiming the territory on paying back the money. The transference of this right to Sardinia was bitterly resented by the Genoese and ultimately drove them to side with France and Spain. In return for these concessions, Charles Emanuel guaranteed Maria Theresa in the possession of all her other territories, and promised to assist Austria with 40,000 men until the conclusion of a general peace. The settlement of the Sardinian difficulties enabled the Austrians to take the offensive in Italy. Khevenhüller having lately died, Traun was recalled to take his place in Germany, and his command in Lombardy was given to Lobkowitz. At the head of a mixed force of Austrians and Sardinians, Lobkowitz attacked the Spaniards in the papal territories and drove them back from point to point. Ultimately, at the end of October, Gages went into winter quarters at Pesaro.

The treaty of Worms was a serious blow to France and Spain, and to meet it they concluded a new alliance at Fontainebleau (25th October). By this the two Bourbon lines pledged themselves to a permanent union. France promised to declare war against England and Sardinia; to assist Spain in conquering the Milanese and Parma for Don Philip; not to negotiate with England until Gibraltar, and if possible Minorca too, had been restored to Spain; and to force England to resign the colony of Georgia, which had recently been usurped from the Spaniards. This treaty, which pledged France to obtain such enormous and almost impossible advantages for Spain, without any recompense for itself, was the work of Maurepas. It is characteristic of Louis XV. that he saw and expressed clearly the defects of the treaty, but had not sufficient strength of mind to refuse his signature to it. The first result of this new Family Compact was seen in the energy with which Savoy was attacked from the French side. For two years a Spanish army had been assembled in southern France under Don Philip, but as yet it had done nothing. In October of this year an attempt was made to force a passage through the Alps, but Charles Emanuel's defensive preparations were fully sufficient and the attack was repulsed.

§ 13. The war was far more vigorously prosecuted in 1744 than in the preceding year. One cause of this was a sudden outburst of energy on the part of Louis XV. His third mistress, Madame de la Tournelle, who became duchess of Chateauroux, strove to play the part of an eighteenth-century Agnes Sorel, and to inspire the king with a love of military glory. At the same time the national spirit of the French was roused by the threatened attack on their frontier, and the old hatred of England was revived in all its force. The first enterprise of the year, a maritime expedition under Maurice de Saxe to restore the young Pretender, was frustrated by a storm. Hitherto France and England had professed to take part in the war as auxiliaries only. This farce was terminated by a declaration of war against England in March, and against Austria in April. It was determined to make the Netherlands the chief seat of hostilities, and in May a large army set out, accompanied by the king in person. The real commander was Maurice de Saxe, who was now made a marshal of France. The allied army had wintered in the Netherlands, the English under General Wade, the Dutch under Lewis of Nassau, and the Austrians under Arenberg. They had been weakened by the withdrawal of several English regiments to resist the threatened invasion, and the want of unanimity among the three generals rendered them quite unable to oppose the enemy's advance. Courtrai, Menin, Ypres and other fortresses were captured by the French in rapid succession, and it was difficult to foresee any limit to their conquests when the campaign was suddenly interrupted by news from Alsace.

Prince Charles of Lorraine had been married in the winter to Maria Theresa's younger sister, the archduchess Marianne. In the spring he resumed his command, accompanied by Marshal Traun, who in this year proved himself the ablest Austrian general since Eugene and Guido Stahremberg. Prince Charles had decided to renew the enterprise that had been foiled in 1743, to cross the Rhine into Alsace, to recover from Germany the lost provinces, and to inflict such losses on the French monarchy that it should make peace on terms dictated from Vienna. To oppose him there were the Bavarian troops under Seckendorf, which had left Bavaria after the convention of Niederschönfeld and now occupied a strong position at Philipsburg, and the French army under Coigni. To deceive the enemy Prince Charles pretended to meditate crossing the Rhine near Mainz. Seckendorf at once left his position and marched up the river to Speier, while Coigni advanced directly upon Mainz. Before the enemy could be undeceived the Austrians commenced their passage lower down on the 30th of June, and effected it without serious difficulty in three days. Lauterburg and Weissemburg were taken, and the Austrian light cavalry devastated Alsace to the borders of Lorraine. Prince Charles would gladly have advanced at once to the recovery of the inheritance of his family, to the renunciation of which he personally had always refused his assent. But he was afraid to go too far from the Rhine, lest the bridges might be broken behind him and his communications cut off. And at this juncture he found that he had to face a more formidable enemy than had been anticipated. As soon as he heard that the Austrians were actually in Alsace, Louis XV. determined to undertake the defence of his own territories. Leaving Marshal Saxe to occupy a defensive position in the Netherlands, he marched southwards with the main body of the French army. At Metz the king was seized (4th August) with a sudden and dangerous illness. The greatest excitement was aroused by the news in Paris, and so great was the popular devotion to the king, and so enthusiastic the rejoicings when he was out of danger, that this episode in his reign gave Louis the epithet of the *Bien-aimé*. This illness exercised a fatal influence on the conduct of military affairs. Noailles, who assumed the command, was absorbed in watching the king's health, and it was not till the 17th of August that the army of Flanders effected its junction with Coigni. But before that time the news that Frederick of Prussia had invaded Bohemia had reached the Austrians, and Prince Charles received orders from Vienna to quit Alsace.

IV. THE SECOND SILESIAN WAR.

§ 14. The Austrian successes in 1743 had inspired Frederick the Great with considerable misgivings for the safety of Silesia. He was especially alarmed by the treaty of Worms, and by a defensive alliance between Austria and Saxony which had been concluded at Vienna in December. In both of these the Austrian territories had been guaranteed without any exception, and the Saxon alliance could hardly be directed against any power but Prussia. He professed to have found definite proofs of hostile intention in a letter from George II. to Maria Theresa; but the assertion is probably unfounded, as England was especially anxious not to alienate Prussia. As a supporter of Charles VII., Frederick resented the occupation of Bavaria, which made the emperor a powerless fugitive in Frankfort, the laughing-stock of both enemies and allies. From the very beginning of 1744 he meditated a new breach with Austria, not only to secure what he had already obtained, but also in the hope of gaining that portion of Bohemia which he had failed to get in the treaty of Berlin. In May he formed the Union of Frankfort, which was joined by Charles VII., the Elector Palatine, and the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel. Its objects were to restore the lawful constitution of the Empire, to induce Maria Theresa to restore Bavaria, to settle the disputes about the Austrian succession, and to arrange a final peace. As no other German princes would join the league, it was of slight practical importance, but it served Frederick's purpose so far that it gave him a pretext for war with Austria as the champion of German interests and of the imperial constitution against wanton aggression.

At the same time Frederick resumed his connection with France, and sent Count Rothenburg as his envoy to Paris. A court intrigue led to the dismissal of Amelot from the ministry of foreign affairs, and enabled Rothenburg to conclude a treaty at Paris on the 5th of June. The French undertook to attack the Netherlands, so as to prevent the maritime powers from sending aid to Austria. Another French army was to march through Westphalia to attack Hanover, and France undertook to induce Sweden and Russia to conclude a defensive alliance with Prussia. Frederick himself promised that if the main Austrian army invaded Alsace he would at once attack Bohemia with 80,000 men. But to this promise two very definite conditions were attached. If Charles of Lorraine were compelled by Frederick's action to quit Alsace, the French were to pursue him closely, to recover Bavaria for the emperor, and to harass the Austrian territories. To compensate Frederick for his exertions the four Bohemian circles to the right of the Elbe (Bunzlau, Leitmeritz, Pardubitz and Königingratz) were to be united with Silesia and ceded to Prussia. It was still necessary to obtain the Emperor's consent, but this was effected by a secret treaty between Charles VII. and Frederick (24th July). By this Frederick pledged himself to use all possible means to carry out the objects of the Union of Frankfort and to conquer Bohemia for Charles, who, on his part, confirmed the proposed cession of the four circles to Prussia.

During his two years of neutrality Frederick had never lost sight of a possible renewal of the war. By strict parsimony and regular administration his exhausted treasury had been re-filled. The Silesian fortresses, Neisse, Glogau, Brieg, Cosel and Glatz, had been repaired and strengthened. The Prussian army had been increased and incessantly trained, and everything was prepared for the outbreak of hostilities. The news of the invasion of Alsace by the Austrians decided Frederick to fulfil his engagements, although the stipulated alliance with Sweden and Russia had not been concluded. On the 7th of August his envoy at Vienna, Count Dohna, made a formal declaration that, as a German elector, he could no longer endure to see the emperor oppressed and the constitution broken by Austria, that he was determined to send auxiliaries to aid Charles VII., but that his conduct was in no way a breach of the treaty of Berlin. The same contention was made in a manifesto which he published at Berlin. On the very same day he demanded from the Saxon government a free passage for his troops as imperial auxiliaries. Augustus III. was in Warsaw, whence he ordered that the demand should be refused. Fortunately for Saxony this order arrived too late from Poland, the Prussian troops were already on the spot, and the authorities did not venture on a refusal. In four columns, the Prussians, 80,000 strong, crossed the

Bohemian frontier, three under the king in person, and the fourth from Silesia under Marshal Schwerin.

§ 15. The news of the Prussian movement was received in Vienna rather with joy than with dismay. For more than a year Maria Theresa had made her chief object to obtain some compensation for the loss of Silesia. But endless obstacles had been interposed, by her allies as much as by her enemies. Now the far more desirable prospect was opened of recovering Silesia itself. Hitherto that had been impossible, because England, the only important ally of Austria, had guaranteed the treaty of Berlin. But Frederick himself had now broken the treaty and England was bitterly indignant at his conduct. From this time Maria Theresa determined to subordinate every other enterprise to the re-conquest of Silesia and the humiliation of the Prussian king. She herself paid another visit to Pressburg, where her presence exercised the same magical influence as before, and the Hungarians voted a second "insurrection." The Austrian commander in Bavaria, Count Batthyani, was ordered to march with the main body of his troops to Bohemia. Reinforcements were sent to Count Harsch, the governor of Prague, and his garrison was raised to 14,000 men. But the chief reliance was placed in the army of Charles of Lorraine, who received orders to give up the invasion of Alsace and to return as speedily as possible to the defence of Bohemia.

But for the moment Bohemia was almost defenceless. Batthyani had barely 20,000 men, and it was hopeless to oppose them to the Prussian army. Early in September Prague was besieged, and on the 16th Harsch had to surrender unconditionally. Opinions were divided as to future movements. Schwerin advised an immediate attack upon Batthyani, and after crushing him proposed to take Pilsen and to occupy the passes between Bohemia and the Upper Palatinate, so as to bar the advance of Charles of Lorraine. Belleisle, who had recovered some of his influence as France became more active in the war, and who had recently arrived in the Prussian camp, urged on the other hand that the Prussians should advance boldly southwards and conquer the whole of Bohemia. His advice was followed by Frederick. Tabor, Budweis, and other strong places were taken and compelled to swear fealty to Charles VII. By the fourth of October the Prussians had advanced almost to the Austrian frontier. But this was destined to be the limit. Saxony obstinately refused to support Prussia, and carried out the treaty of Vienna by sending 20,000 men to co-operate with the Austrians. Still more fatal to Frederick's projects was the failure of the French to fulfil their obligations.

Charles of Lorraine had determined, even before his instructions arrived from Vienna, to recross the Rhine. But this was a task of appalling difficulty. The armies of Noailles and Coigni had just been united and were considerably superior to his own. The genius of Traun and the negligence of the French enabled the Austrians to triumph over all obstacles. On the 23rd of August the passage was effected with a loss of only 300 men in the very face of the hostile armies. It was an achievement that naturally inspired the troops with confidence both in themselves and in their leaders. On the 10th of September they reached Donauwörth, whence Prince Charles set out for Vienna, while Traun organised the defence of Bavaria. General Bärenklau was left in command of the province with 20,000 men. Then the Austrians continued the march eastwards, and on the 2nd of October effected a junction with the forces of Batthyani. The French had been bound by the treaty with Frederick to molest the Austrians on their retreat and to follow them with 40,000 men Neither condition was fulfilled, nor was the stipulated army despatched against Hanover. Noailles contented himself with laying siege to Freiburg, and with sending 12,000 men under Ségur to assist Seckendorf in Bavaria. The plan of Frederick's campaign was ruined. He had deserted the French in 1742, they now paid him back in his own coin.

In Bohemia Frederick waited in uncertainty as to what would be the enemy's movements. To his surprise, instead of attacking Budweis, they marched northwards to meet the 20,000 Saxons, who joined them on the 22nd of October. Their numbers were now about 70,000, while Frederick's were reduced to 60,000. Still the latter might have been successful if he could have forced on a decisive battle. But in this attempt he was foiled by the masterly strategy of Traun, who was the guiding genius of the Austrian campaign. Traun's plan was to occupy an unassailable position which barred the advance of the Prussians, and to hold it until want of supplies compelled them to retreat to another district: then he followed them and repeated the manœuvre. Frederick chafed at this intangible obstacle in his way, but could do nothing. Traun, as he honestly confessed, completely out-generalled him, and he was forced to retire step by step towards the Silesian frontier. Throughout the campaign the Austrians were immensely assisted by the native population. By the end of November, Frederick recognised the necessity of giving up Prague and his other conquests and of evacuating Bohemia altogether. The enterprise which ended in such complete failure had been a costly one. Of the 80,000 men who had entered Bohemia, barely 40,000 returned to their homes. Frederick, thinking the campaign was over, entrusted the command to Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau and hurried off to Berlin. But the Austrians, at the express command of Maria Theresa, disregarded the winter climate and entered Silesia. Frederick had to return to urge the methodical old Dessauer to hasten his preparations. The Prussians took the offensive in January, 1745, and speedily forced the enemy to retire into Moravia. But it was not till February that they were able to go into winter quarters.

Meanwhile the efforts which the Austrians had made in Bohemia had cost them their hold on Bavaria. As soon as Prince Charles was well out of the way, Seckendorf, reinforced by the French under Ségur and by troops from Hesse and the Palatinate, marched to Donauwörth, which was captured on 2nd October. Bärenklau had not sufficient forces to venture upon a conflict with the enemy. Munich, which was of slight military importance, was taken on the 12th of October. This welcome news brought Charles VII. back to his native country, and on October 23 he re-entered his capital amidst the jubilation of its inhabitants. Ultimately the whole of Bavaria was recovered except Ingolstadt, Schärding, and Braunau, which the Austrians still held. In November the allied troops were disposed in winter quarters, and Seckendorf, having completed his task, retired from the command. The French army on the Rhine attempted nothing after the capture of Freiburg, which cost them a three months' siege. The Breisgau, which had belonged to the Hapsburgs since the 14th century, passed for a few months into the hands of France. In the Netherlands nothing of importance took place after Louis XV.'s departure. The Pragmatic Army, with its triplet of incompetent commanders, Wade, Nassau, and Arenberg, remained obstinately inactive, and allowed Marshal Saxe with a very inferior force to keep possession of the French conquests.

In Italy the campaign of 1744 was in the highest degree indecisive. According to the treaty of Worms, a combined attack was to have been made upon Naples. But this depended on the joint action of English, Sardinians and Austrians. Admiral Mathews refused to co-operate; and Charles Emanuel thought more of his own interests than of those of his allies. His first object was to obtain possession of Finale from Genoa, but his attention was soon called away to resist a threatened invasion of Piedmont. 20,000 French under the Prince of Conti were combined with the same number of Spaniards under Don Philip. In April they took Nice and attempted to pass the Alps. But they spent several months in the siege of a small fortress called Cori, and in October the beginning of the rainy season drove them back into Dauphiné after they had lost nearly half their troops. Jealousy between the French and Spaniards contributed to bring about the failure of the enterprise.

Meanwhile the defection of the Sardinians left the Austrian commander Lobkowitz to act alone in central Italy. In April he advanced from Rimini towards the Spanish camp at Pesaro. But Gages, without waiting to be attacked, retired into Neapolitan territory. The Austrians marched as far as the frontier of Naples and there, in accordance with custom, waited for instructions from Vienna. Meanwhile the favourable moment was passed. Don Carlos, regardless of his enforced promise of neutrality, at once espoused the cause of his fellow-countrymen. Thinking it better to wage the war in foreign territory rather than in his own kingdom, he entered the papal states and encamped at Velletri. On the 10th August, Lobkowitz made a night attack upon the camp, which was momentarily successful but ultimately repulsed after a desperate combat. The intense heat in the marshy plains gave rise to fever among the Austrians, and Lobkowitz, after losing more men by disease than by war, commenced a retreat which did not end till he had again reached Rimini.

§ 16. In 1745 the aspect of affairs was entirely altered by ihe sudden death of the Emperor Charles VII. (20th January) before he had completed his 48th year. The electorate of Bavaria passed to his son, Maximilian Joseph, who was only eighteen years of age. Maria Theresa had never given up the hope of recovering the imperial crown for the Hapsburgs in the person of either her husband or her son. As the latter was only four years old, there was no alternative but to urge on the electors the older but less popular candidate. Maria Theresa saw that the best chance of securing her husband's elevation, and also of regaining Silesia, lay in a reconciliation with Bavaria, which might easily lead to peace with France. The young elector had declared immediately on his accession that he would not be a candidate for the imperial crown, but he by no means abandoned his claims to the Austrian succession, and in fact assumed the title of archduke. There were no less than four French envoys at his court all urging him to remain steadfast to his father's policy. On the other side were his mother, Maria Amelia, herself a Hapsburg, and Seckendorf, the Austrian renegade, who used all their influence to bring about a reconciliation with Austria. Maria Theresa lost no time in publicly announcing her desire for peace, but at the same time she gave weight to her proposals by military preparations. As the young elector, distracted by opposite influences, could not make up his mind, the Austrians commenced the attack. The Upper Palatinate was speedily overrun: Batthyani defeated the Bavarians and the French, and the latter under Ségur promptly evacuated the duchy and retreated to the Rhine. Within a few weeks the whole of Bavaria was for the third time in the hands of the Austrians. At the same time the Austrian troops under Arenberg threatened to advance through Westphalia to Bavaria. The young elector, who had fled from his capital to Augsburg, was compelled to negotiate. Füssen, a small town belonging to the archbishopric of Augsburg, was selected as a meeting place for the diplomatists, and there a treaty was signed on 22nd April. Maria Theresa recognised the deceased Charles Albert as emperor and his widow as empress: she restored to Maximilian Joseph all his father's territories as they had stood in 1741, and withdrew all claims to compensation for the expenses of the war. On his side, the elector renounced all claim to the Austrian territories, guaranteed the Pragmatic Sanction, and promised his vote to the grand duke Francis. Until the imperial election was settled, Braunau and Schärding, with the strip of Bavaria on the right bank of the Inn, remained in the hands of the Austrians.

Meanwhile the vacancy in the empire threatened to terminate the alliance between Austria and Saxony. France was as anxious as ever to prevent the election of the grand duke, partly on account of his Hapsburg connection, and partly because he was regarded as a personal enemy to France on the score of Lorraine. The most obvious means of effecting this object was to offer the imperial crown to Augustus III. as the price of his desertion of Austria. Frederick, though bitterly opposed to the elevation of Saxony, was compelled to support the French proposal. Augustus himself was averse to any increase of business, but his wife was eager to rival her younger sister who had married Charles VII., and his empty-headed minister, Count Brühl, wished to pose as the prime minister of an emperor. At Vienna the danger of Saxony joining France was fully appreciated, and great efforts were made to renew the recent alliance on a more permanent basis. Ultimately jealousy of Prussia prevailed at Dresden, and Augustus determined to adhere to Maria Theresa. But a great difficulty was raised by the king's demand of a territorial reward for his fealty at the expense of Silesia. Maria Theresa was determined not to submit to further losses, and it took some time to arrange a compromise. By this Austria was to give up the circle of Schwiebus, but all further compensation to Saxony must be obtained at the cost of Prussia. On the 18th of May a treaty was arranged to the following effect. The two powers agreed not to lay down their arms until they had conquered from the king of Prussia not only Silesia and Glatz but also a part of his inherited territories. As regards the imperial election, Augustus promised not to become a candidate himself nor to oppose the candidature of the grand duke: but he refused to pledge his vote, and declared that if the majority of electors chose him he would accept the crown.

§ 17. The invasion of Silesia by the Austrians and Saxons is by far the most important event of the year 1745, but before considering it, it is necessary to turn to Frederick's only remaining ally, France. Since the last campaign Louis XV. had conceived a passion for war, but it must be a war which could be waged without danger and with a fair certainty of success. These conditions could only be secured in the Netherlands. Accordingly three French armies were set on foot, one under Maillebois to assist the Spaniards in Italy, another under Conti to act on the German frontier, to defend Alsace from attack, and to watch over the approaching election at Frankfort. The third and largest was to act in the Netherlands with Marshal Saxe as its commander, but accompanied by the king in person. The allied army in the Netherlands consisted chiefly of English, Hanoverians and Dutch, with only 8000 Austrians, the remainder under Arenberg having marched into Germany to threaten Bavaria. The experience of the last campaign had shown clearly the evils of a divided command, and it was determined to entrust the army to a single general, the duke of Cumberland, while Maria Theresa sent the experienced Marshal Königsegg to serve by his side. The Dutch troops were led by the Prince of Waldeck. In April Marshal Saxe, who suffered so severely from dropsy that he had to be carried in a litter, took the command of his army, and laid siege to Tournay. Louis XV. was present with his new mistress, Madame de Pompadour. The duke of Cumberland, who could not be accused of want of courage, advanced to the relief of Tournay. Marshal Saxe, leaving 20,000 men to continue the siege, occupied a strong position at Fontenoy, where a pitched battle was fought on the 11th of May. The stubborn courage of the English, whose advance remains one of the great feats of war, nearly carried the day in spite of their general's want of strategy. But they were ill-supported by the Dutch. Marshal Saxe brought up his reserves at the critical moment, and the attack was repulsed with great loss. The victory of the French decided the fate of the campaign. Tournay surrendered on the 23rd of May, though the citadel held out until the 20th of June. No more opposition was made to the French advance. The outbreak of the Jacobite revolt recalled the duke of Cumberland and most of his troops to England. The history of the campaign from this time is merely a list of successful sieges. Ghent, Bruges, Oudenarde, Dendermonde, Ostend and Nieuport opened their gates one after the other. With the capture of Ath on the 8th of October the French closed the campaign. They had scarcely reaped as much profit as they might have done from their victory, and they had certainly done little to help their ally. Frederick himself bitterly declared that the battle of Fontenoy might as well have been fought on the Scamander.

In the east the Austrian army was once more entrusted to Charles of Lorraine, whose success in Bohemia had given him a great but, as it proved, an undeserved reputation. Traun, to whom the whole credit of the last campaign was really due, was regarded with jealousy by the prince, and was sent to command the army in Germany, which was to overawe the electors at Frankfort. With his usual want of promptitude Prince Charles delayed till May his advance to the frontier of Silesia. At Landshut he was joined by 30,000 Saxons under the duke of Sachsen-Weissenfels. His army now numbered considerably more than 100,000 men, and was numerically far superior to the Prussians. But the latter had a great advantage in their unity and their undivided command. Frederick, as soon as he learnt the enemy's design to invade Silesia, encamped by Schweidnitz at the foot of the *Riesengebirge*, or Giant Mountains, which separate Silesia from Bohemia. On the first of June the allies commenced the passage of the mountains. Charles of Lorraine had the campaign ready mapped out in his mind. He would manœuvre the Prussians out of Silesia as he had manœuvred them out of Bohemia. Frederick would retreat, the Austrians would occupy one strong position after another, and everything would go well. But it was one thing to carry out Traun's policy with him to help, and another to do it in his absence. The hypothesis on which the whole plan was based was erroneous. Frederick did not intend to retreat. As soon as the Saxons, who formed the vanguard of the allied army, had appeared on the plain by Hohenfriedberg, they were attacked by the Prussians, and, in spite of a valiant resistance, were routed almost before Prince Charles was aware that a battle was being fought. When the situation was realised the Austrians were formed in order of battle, but it was too late to reverse the fortunes of the day. The Prussian cavalry, which had been so defective at Mollwitz, now carried all before it. The Austrians were completely defeated, and had to seek safety in recrossing the mountains. Frederick followed them into Bohemia, not for the purpose of making conquests, but in order to support his troops at the expense of a hostile state.

The battle of Hohenfriedberg was a great blow to Maria Theresa, and the conquest of Silesia seemed for the moment impossible. But the Queen's courage remained unshaken, and she determined not to give up the enterprise on the first reverse. Her great fear was lest the fidelity of her allies, Saxony and England, should be shaken, and her first act was to send an envoy to Dresden and Hanover to urge the prosecution of the war. With regard to England her fears proved well founded. The common interests which had led to the alliance with Austria no longer existed. The sole object of England in joining the war was to weaken France. Maria Theresa had now subordinated her enmity to France to the desire of humiliating Prussia, in which England had no interest, or rather the reverse. The Austrian troops had been recalled from the Netherlands, and the whole burden of the war had been thrown upon the allies. The result was the defeat of Fontenoy, the loss of the Flemish fortresses, and the outbreak of the Jacobite revolt. English interests imperatively demanded the conclusion of peace with Prussia, and Frederick was not slow to take advantage of this turn in his favour. On the 26th of August he concluded the convention of Hanover with George II. England undertook to negotiate a peace between Prussia and Austria within six weeks on the basis of the treaty of Berlin. Frederick's possession of Silesia was to be guaranteed by all the European Powers, and on this condition he promised to give his vote to the grand-duke of Tuscany. The claim of England to act as a sort of guardian to Austria, and to make terms in her name, was not likely to commend the convention to Maria Theresa. On the 29th of August she answered it by a new treaty with Saxony. The two Powers again pledged themselves not to lay down arms till they had accomplished their object. Maria Theresa undertook to send reinforcements from her German army into Silesia; and Augustus pledged himself to employ his whole forces in the war instead of the bare contingent of 30,000 men. English mediation failed altogether to effect its object, and the war continued.

But before it could be resumed the attention of Europe was called away for a moment to the approaching election at Frankfort. In spring a French army under Conti had crossed the Rhine, occupied Frankfort and advanced to Aschaffenburg on the Main. The task of expelling the invaders was entrusted to the veteran Marshal Traun, who assumed the command of the Austrian troops in Bavaria, and was joined by the grand-duke in person. Traun advanced to the Main, where he was reinforced by Arenberg' forces from the Netherlands. By a series of masterly marches and counter-marches, and without risking a battle, the Austrian commander forced the French to evacuate Germany and to recross the Rhine. The result of the election was now assured. The Archbishops of Mainz and Trier were devoted to Austria. The elector of Cologne was gained over when it was certain that his nephew would not be a candidate. The Bavarian vote was secured by the treaty of Füssen, those of Hanover and Saxony by previous treaties. This time no objection was made to Maria Theresa's exercise of the Bohemian vote. The only opponents were Prussia and the Palatinate, the former at open war with Austria, and the latter completely under French influence. On the 13th of September the grand-duke Francis was elected Emperor by seven votes. His elevation made no difference in the relations between husband and wife. Maria Theresa remained, by virtue of her natural qualities, the master-spirit, and in Vienna she was welcomed by the populace as the Empress-Queen.

§ 18. Frederick had made great efforts to gain over Saxony as well as England after the battle of Hohenfriedberg. But the new treaty which Augustus III. made with Austria convinced him that he must resort to stronger measures. Accordingly he ordered the old Leopold of Dessau to form a camp at Halle, and to prepare for an invasion of Saxony. But he still hesitated to give the final order, because Elizabeth of Russia had declared that any attack upon Saxon territory would be regarded as an act of hostility against Russia. The only immediate result of the preparations was that the duke of Sachsen-Weissenfels, with the bulk of the Saxon troops, quitted Charles of Lorraine and returned to the defence of his native country. Meanwhile the result of the imperial election had encouraged Maria Theresa to resume hostilities. Before starting for Frankfort she sent orders to Prince Charles to drive the Prussians out of Bohemia. But Frederick himself had already determined to retreat. The country was exhausted, his troops were almost starved, and his treasury empty. On the 29th of September he arrived at Soor, at the entrance of the mountains. The Austrians followed close on his steps, occupied the surrounding heights, and determined to attack. Their position was immensely superior, their numbers were larger, and if the attack had been made at once it could hardly have failed to be successful. But the habit of procrastination was inbred in the Austrians, and their delay gave Frederick time to make his preparations. He determined to be the attacking party instead of waiting to be attacked. The Prussian troops stormed the heights with resistless courage, and drove the enemy from their positions. Considering the circumstances it was Frederick's greatest victory as yet, and reflected the greatest discredit on Prince Charles and his associates. But the results of the victory were small. Frederick could not and did not wish to re-enter Bohemia, and he continued his retreat with such rapidity that his camp fell into the hands of the Austrians. The Hungarian irregulars harassed his march, and inflicted considerable damage. At last he crossed the frontier by Trautenau and re-entered Silesia. Having no doubt that the campaign was over, and that the battle of Soor would force Austria to accept the convention of Hanover, he sent his troops into winter quarters, and ordered the Prince of Anhalt-Dessau to do the same.

But Saxony and Austria were determined to carry on the war through the winter months, and to attack Brandenburg as well as Silesia. Great hopes were entertained that Russia, closely allied at this time with Saxony, would at last take part in hostilities against Prussia. Count Rutowski, one of the numerous bastards of Augustus II., had superseded the duke of Sachsen-Weissenfels. He was instructed to join Charles of Lorraine with the main army of Saxony, and the combined forces were to advance to the frontier of Brandenburg and Silesia. Thus they would cut off the Prussians from their communications, and could attack them at leisure. At the same time a detachment which had been sent from Traun's army was to march upon Berlin. These hostile schemes were divulged to Frederick by the indiscretion of Count Brühl, and the king took prompt measures to meet the danger. Berlin was prepared to stand a siege, and Leopold of Dessau was ordered to reassemble his troops at Halle. Frederick himself hurried off to Silesia to take the command of 4000 men, who were hastily collected from their winter quarters. As soon as he heard that Charles of Lorraine had entered Lausitz, Frederick ordered Leopold to invade Saxony, while he himself opposed the Austrians. On the 21st of November he crossed the frontier, and on the 23rd he crushed a Saxon contingent at Gross Hennersdorf. Prince Charles, as soon as he realised how matters stood, retreated before the Prussians to Bohemia, which he re-entered on the 28th. Meanwhile Leopold of Dessau invaded Saxony from the north, took Leipzig without meeting any resistance, and advanced towards Dresden. Frederick now made a last attempt to induce Augustus to come to terms. As his overtures met with an evasive reply he continued his march from Lausitz upon Dresden, keeping a careful watch upon the Austrian movements. At the same time he sent urgent orders to the old Dessauer to advance with speed, and to attack the Saxons under Rutowski wherever he might find them. The cautious tactician conducted his march with a slow precision that roused the anger of the king, but which proved quite effective. On the 12th of December he occupied Meissen; on the 15th he attacked the Saxon camp at Kesselsdorf, and won a complete victory. Two days later the king joined the veteran marshal, and overpowered him with expressions of gratitude. The combined Prussian army was now nearly 80,000 in number, and was irresistible. Prince Charles had entered Saxony too late to support Rutowski, and returned finally to Bohemia. On the 18th of December Frederick entered Dresden in triumph.

It was obvious that Saxony must make peace at once; the only question was whether Austria would consent to do the same. Several circumstances combined to force Maria Theresa to give way. Without the Saxon alliance it was hopeless to think of recovering Silesia; without English subsidies, which would cease if the Prussian war continued, Austria was utterly powerless. And just at this juncture came news from Italy that the Spaniards had taken Milan. It was evident that if she prolonged the hopeless conflict with Frederick she must make up her mind to sacrifice her Italian provinces. The negotiations were hurried on, and on the 25th of December the treaty of Dresden was signed. There were really two treaties, one between Prussia and Saxony, the other between Prussia and Austria. Augustus was to pay to Prussia a million thalers in gold, he guaranteed the cession of Silesia, and his wife renounced all claims on the province which might descend to her as the daughter of Joseph I. In return Frederick restored all conquests, and his army evacuated Saxony. Maria Theresa renewed the cession of Silesia and Glatz on the same terms as in the treaty of Berlin; conceded to Frederick the same rights that had already been given to Saxony and Hanover, and confirmed the privileges that had been assured to the King of Prussia by the late Emperor, Charles VII. Frederick on his side recognised Francis I. as Emperor, and acknowledged the validity of the Bohemian vote at the recent election. Both parties guaranteed each other in the possession of their respective territories, but Frederick's guarantee extended only to the German provinces of Austria. Hanover, the Palatinate, and Hesse-Cassel were included in the treaty.

Thus ended the Second Silesian War, which was much fuller of military incidents than its predecessor, but had certainly less decisive results. Frederick had immensely increased his reputation as a commander, but as a politician he had not been so conspicuously successful. So far as he had embarked in the war to obtain territorial acquisitions he had failed. He had secured Silesia, but that was all. The real importance of the war is to be found in its effects upon German relations. The house of Hapsburg had recovered the imperial dignity. One of the first acts of Francis I. was to recall the Aulic Council to Vienna, and the Diet to Ratisbon. But it was certain that the imperial power, even in Hapsburg hands, could no longer be what it had been. The privileges which Charles VII. had assured to Frederick in 1741, and which were confirmed by the treaty of Dresden, practically released Prussia from its obligations and duties as a member of the empire, while it retained all the advantages of membership. From this time Prussia is not so much a state of Germany as an independent European power.

V. Conclusion of the War.

§ 19. Maria Theresa's obstinate preference of the Silesian enterprise to everything else was as disastrous to Austrian interests in Italy as in the Netherlands. The Spaniards determined to make a great effort in 1745 for the conquest of northern Italy. They were encouraged by the active assistance of France, whence an army under Maillebois was sent to co-operate with Don Philip, and by the conclusion of a close alliance with Genoa, which had hitherto been neutral, but now espoused the cause of the Bourbons as the only means of saving Finale from Sardinia. Lobkowitz, the Austrian commander, had wintered near Rimini after the failure of his expedition against Naples. In February the Spaniards under Gages advanced to drive the enemy out of the papal territories. Lobkowitz promptly retreated to Modena, where he received notice of recall, which had been too long delayed, and his place was taken by Schulenburg. Gages was still intent upon attacking the Austrians, when he was stopped by an order to march to Genoa in order to join the combined Spanish and French armies which Maillebois and Don Philip were leading in Italy. With conspicuous skill and courage Gages effected the difficult passage of the Apennines, and at Acqui joined the army from the north. With the accession of 10,000 Genoese the allied forces numbered nearly 70,000 men. In August they commenced the campaign with the siege of Tortona, which held out till the 3rd of September. Meanwhile Schulenburg and the king of Sardinia had joined their forces, and occupied a strong position at Bassignano at the junction of the Tanaro with the Po. In both armies there prevailed differences of opinion as to the movements to be undertaken. While the French wished to reduce Piedmont as the best means of detaching Sardinia from the Austrian alliance, the Spaniards were eager to conquer Lombardy. On the other hand, Charles Emanuel was intent upon the defence of his own territories, while the Austrians made it their first object to resist an invasion of the Milanese. The determination of the Spaniards carried the day with their allies, and after the fall of Tortona they marched against Parma and Piacenza which surrendered without resistance. On the 20th of September they stormed Pavia and now threatened Milan itself.

Schulenburg would remain inactive no longer. Leaving Charles Emanuel to defend himself, he hurried into Lombardy to protect the capital. This separation of the Austrians and Sardinians was the very object at which the enemy had been aiming. As soon as he heard the news, Gages left Pavia and marched directly upon Bassignano. The Sardinian camp was stormed on the 27th of September: Charles Emanuel escaped first to Valenza and then to Casale, where he was again joined by Schulenburg. The French were now eager to prosecute the war in Piedmont so as to follow up the blow against the Sardinian king. But Gages was equally resolute to complete the conquest of Lombardy. On the 6th of October the Bourbon army laid siege to Alessandria, took the town in six days, and then, leaving the citadel strictly blockaded, advanced to the capture of Valenza. Schulenburg had recently been superseded by Prince Lichtenstein, but the latter was unable to alter the fate of the campaign. Like his predecessor, he wished to enter Lombardy, from which he would be excluded if once the enemy seized Casale and Novara. But he was detained in Piedmont by the threat of Charles Emanuel that if the Austrians deserted him he would make a separate peace with France. The Spaniards were thus enabled to conduct their operations without risk. In November they captured Asti and Casale, and on the 16th of December Milan itself opened its gates, although the Austrian garrison still held out in the citadel. The Italian campaign of 1745 had been one of almost unmixed disaster for Austria.

§ 20. These disasters were not unnaturally attributed by the Sardinians to Maria Theresa's employment of all her forces against Prussia. There can be no doubt that matters might have gone very differently if the Austrian troops in Italy had been sufficiently strengthened. Their inactivity was the unavoidable consequence of their weakness. It was no wonder that Charles Emanuel, inspired by this conviction, lent an ear to the offers that France was constantly making to him. D'Argenson, the French minister of foreign affairs, had drawn up an elaborate scheme for the settlement of Italian affairs. The Hapsburgs were to be driven altogether out of Italy, and their possessions were to be divided among a number of native princes. Underlying the scheme we can trace the first germ of a conception that has become familiar in recent times, the independence of Italy. None of the princes were to have external possessions, or to be subject to foreign states. In fact a special clause was inserted to prevent the union of Naples and Parma with each other, or of either with the crown of Spain. But there were several circumstances which ensured its failure. In Italy there was as yet no effectual demand for that national independence which in this century became an object of passionate striving; and if there had been, Sardinia was not yet sufficiently developed to take the lead in satisfying it. Charles Emanuel saw clearly that the abolition of the imperial suzerainty, which had so long been exercised from Germany, would only establish a more practical and oppressive suzerainty in the hands of France. And for his own state the scheme involved immediate dangers. Two of the new principalities would not be really self-dependent. How could he make head against Charles of Naples or Don Philip, if the latter were backed by the two Bourbon monarchies of France and Spain? As long as the Hapsburgs retained their hold on Italy, Sardinia occupied a secure and to some extent a commanding position, because it could hold the balance between them and France. But if the Hapsburgs were expelled and he incurred the displeasure of France, where could he find an ally to fall back upon? If the scheme was thus unacceptable to Sardinia, it was far more so to Spain. The ambition of Elizabeth of Parma was not likely to be satisfied with the very moderate principality offered to her second son. And against the will of the Spaniards, who held most of the territory conquered from Austria, it would be difficult to force on any settlement.

But though Charles Emanuel was unable to accept D'Argenson's proposals as they stood, he did not on that account abstain from negotiations with France. Austria seemed too absorbed against Prussia, and England with the Jacobites, to interfere in Italy. The citadel of Alessandria held out for the present, but if it fell there was nothing to prevent Turin from being besieged. Though he had no wish to see the Hapsburg power annihilated in Italy, he felt that if that were destined to occur it would be better to make terms for himself than to share the fate of his ally. On the 26th of December he went so far as to draw up preliminaries for a peace with France. Nothing was said of Italian independence, of the abolition of imperial suzerainty, or the transference of Tuscany to Charles of Lorraine. The only point touched was the division of the Austrian possessions. Sardinia was to have the whole of Lombardy on the right bank of the Po, and also on the left as far as Scrivia. The rest was to go, with Parma, to Don Philip, except a part of the duchy of Mantua, which was to be shared between Venice and Modena. Genoa might have Oneglia, but neither Nice nor Finale. January and February were spent in negotiations on these points, but a definite treaty was never concluded. Spain protested bitterly against the suggested terms, and opened separate negotiations with Vienna; and a complete change of circumstances was brought about by the treaty of Dresden. Maria Theresa, having ended the northern war, was able to spare some of her troops for the Italian struggle.

§ 21. In March, 1746, Charles Emanuel gave up his negotiations and again took up arms. The Sardinian troops took Asti, and compelled the Spaniards to raise the siege of the citadel of Alessandria. At the same time Austrian reinforcements arrived under Marshal Browne to join Lichtenstein. Don Philip had to quit Milan in haste on the 19th of March, and the capital of Lombardy was recovered for Maria Theresa. With startling rapidity the whole of Piedmont was re-conquered with the exception of Tortona. The Spanish army, under Don Philip and Gages, evacuated Lombardy and retreated to Piacenza. The Austrians took Parma in April and prepared to crush the enemy at one blow. But the Spaniards were also aware that a critical moment had arrived. Conscious that they could not hold Piacenza much longer, they summoned Maillebois to their assistance, and determined to attack the Austrians before they could be joined by the Sardinian army. On the 15th of June the battle of Piacenza was fought, and ended in a complete victory for the Austrians. The attack was repulsed, and the Spaniards driven back under the walls of the city. Maria Theresa was so delighted with the news of the recovered glory of her arms that she at once gave up those negotiations with Spain to which distrust of Sardinia had impelled her. But the victory was not attended with proportionate results. Lichtenstein's ill-health compelled him to resign his command immediately after the battle. Military etiquette chose as his successor, not the ablest of his subordinates, Browne, but the senior in standing, the Marquis Botta, who had been envoy to Berlin at the outbreak of the first Silesian war. Botta was unable to concert any joint action with Charles Emanuel, and the allies were only saved from disaster by the fact that similar discord prevailed between the French and the Spaniards. More than a month was wasted in inactivity or in fruitless manœuvres.

While affairs were in this position, the important news arrived from Spain of the death of Philip V. on the 9th of July, and the accession of his only surviving son by his first marriage, Ferdinand VI. The first result of the change was the loss of power to the widow, Elizabeth of Parma, who had been absolute ruler of Spain for thirty years, and whose ambition had been one of the chief disquieting influences in Europe. The new king was not likely to expend more of his country's blood and treasure to obtain a principality for his step-brother. One of his first acts was to supersede Gages, who had shown conspicuous ability throughout, by the marquis de las Minas. The Spaniards had already, thanks to Botta's inactivity, been allowed to retire to Tortona. In spite of the vehement remonstrances of Maillebois, Las Minas continued the retreat. Garrisons were left in Gavi and in Boghetta, the bulwark of Genoa; but the main army of the French and Spaniards marched out of Italy by the coast. On the French frontier they separated, and the Spaniards entered Savoy, which they had occupied since 1742, and which Don Philip hoped to retain as a principality, even if he had to resign the hope of acquisitions in Italy. The Austrians now advanced to the siege of Genoa, which had to pay dearly for its alliance with the Bourbons. Resistance being deemed impossible, the city surrendered unconditionally in September. An enormous sum was demanded as compensation, and the citizens were treated with a haughtiness and severity that roused dangerous disaffection. Meanwhile Charles Emanuel, always looking after his own interests, made himself master of Finale and Savona. He had done hardly anything for the common cause, yet he was bitterly discontented at not receiving a larger share of the booty.

§. 22. In the Netherlands the campaign of 1746 was far less encouraging to the Austrians. At the beginning of the year the French had every advantage on their side. The duke of Cumberland had withdrawn the English troops and their Hessian auxiliaries, to crush the Jacobites at home. It was imperatively necessary for Maria Theresa to make a great effort to retain any hold at all on her western provinces. But it was an axiom of politics at Vienna that the defence of the Netherlands against France might safely be left to the maritime powers, and therefore she preferred to send the majority of the troops which were released by the treaty of Dresden to Italy. The result was that the allied forces were too weak to oppose the progress of the French. In January Marshal Saxe advanced against Brussels, which surrendered, after a brief siege, on the 20th of February. Antwerp was besieged in the presence of Louis XV. himself; the town capitulated on the 20th of May, the citadel on the 3rd of June. The French followed up their successes by the capture of Mons and Charleroi. Maria Theresa was now compelled to send reinforcements, while the victory at Culloden (16th April) enabled the English to return to the Continent. The allied army was raised to nearly 80,000 in number, and on the 21st the command was undertaken by Charles of Lorraine. This was an error on the part of the Austrian government. Maria Theresa's affection for her brother-in-law ought not to have blinded her to the fact that he had given conclusive evidence of incapacity. At the same time the appointment put a distinct slight upon the

English and the duke of Cumberland, whose success in Scotland had made him a hero in the eyes of his countrymen. Charles of Lorraine attempted to protect Namur, but he was forced to retreat towards Liège, while Namur was taken behind his back. Marshal Saxe now followed the enemy, and Charles, eager to win back some of his lost reputation, insisted on fighting a battle in a disadvantageous position and with inferior numbers. The result was that he was completely defeated near the village of Raucoux (11th October). But the French victory was not productive of any important consequences, and the two armies were soon afterwards dispersed into winter quarters. The whole of the Netherlands, with the exception of Limburg and Luxemburg, were lost to Austria.

While the French arms were carrying all before them in the north, France itself was exposed to invasion on two points. At the end of September an English squadron landed some troops on the coast of Brittany, which attempted to surprise Lorient, but were repulsed without much difficulty. More serious was the enterprise in Provence. After the capture of Genoa, debates arose between the Austrians and Sardinians as to what further operations should be undertaken before the close of the year. The Austrians naturally wished to carry out the provisions of the treaty of Worms, and to renew the attempt to conquer Naples, which had failed so lamentably in 1744. Charles Emanuel, however, who was not so anxious to aggrandise the Hapsburgs, wished to secure what had been so fortunately conquered. The difference was settled by the intervention of England. The guiding motive of the English throughout the war had been hostility to France. They now induced their allies to combine in an invasion of southern France. Their object was to crush the French maritime power in the Mediterranean, and this could be best effected by the capture of the great naval arsenal, Toulon. In November Browne led 40,000 Austrian and Sardinian troops across the Var into Provence. The French retreated before them, and a third of the province was speedily overrun by the invaders. But the English still pressed for an attack upon Toulon, and for this Browne required heavier artillery than he had been able to bring with him. A request was therefore sent to Botta, who had remained in Genoa, to dispatch some of the large guns from that city. But the attempt to dismantle their fortifications was more than the already disaffected Genoese could endure. A revolt broke out, which speedily attained such dimensions that Botta, with the Austrian troops, was driven to retire into Lombardy. This event decided the campaign in Provence. Marshal Belleisle, who had superseded Maillebois, received reinforcements from the army in Flanders, and was enabled to take the offensive. Browne had to give up the enterprise as hopeless, and in February, 1747, the Austrians and Sardinians re-crossed the Var and evacuated the territory of France.

In the winter of 1746–7 the first serious effort was made to bring about a general peace by negotiations. It was natural that the lead in these should be taken by the Dutch, who had no very special interests involved in the war, and who were terrified for their independence by the loss of the barrier fortresses, and the consequent danger of a French invasion. France also was inclined to peace. Louis XV. had gained successes in the Netherlands which his great-grandfather had found impossible. But France seemed no longer in earnest in its foreign politics. Conquests had been made, but no one dreamed of retaining them. Public opinion was not very much excited about the campaigns, whether successful or the reverse. The only general of conspicuous merit that France could produce was a German. The court was more interested in petty intrigues than in the interests of the country. Just at the moment when the result of so many years' warfare was about to be decided, one of these intrigues overthrew the foreign minister, D'Argenson, who not only possessed more ability than any other French statesman, but also represented that hostility to the house of Hapsburg which had involved France in the war. His place was filled by the obscure and incompetent marquis de Puysieux. Besides the general indifference of the people and the Court there were other motives for desiring a peace. Successes in the Netherlands had been counterbalanced by losses in Italy and in the colonies. The English had captured Cape Breton, and it was feared that they might invade Canada. Breda was agreed upon by France and Holland as the site for a diplomatic conference; but the negotiations came to nothing. England insisted on the admission of an Austrian envoy, and Maria Theresa was determined to continue the war. Any project of peace was distasteful to her which did not offer to Austria some compensation for the loss of Silesia, and for the concessions to Sardinia. Such compensation was out of the question as matters stood, and in fact further sacrifices were demanded to satisfy the Spanish Infant, Don Philip. With the renewal of hostilities in 1747 the Conference of Breda was broken up.

§ 23. Diplomacy having failed, Louis XV. determined to detach Holland from the hostile alliance by force. Two French armies were set on foot in the Netherlands. One, under Maurice de Saxe, confronted the allies, who were led once more by the duke of Cumberland, Charles of Lorraine having been sent to try his fortune in Italy. The other, under Lowendahl, a Dane, and another of those foreign generals whose services were so useful to France at this time, commenced the campaign by attacking Holland. French invasion in 1747 produced the same result as the more famous attack of 1672. The people clamoured against the republican government, and demanded that the authority of the stadtholder, which had been in abeyance since William III.'s death, should be restored. The aristocratic party was powerless to resist the popular will. William IV. of Orange, the great-nephew of William III. and a son-in-law of George II., was declared stadtholder of Holland. A few months later the office was made hereditary for his descendants, not only male but female. Thus the constitutional monarchy which had grown up with the independence of the state, which had once been abolished and another time had sunk into abeyance, was formally re-established. But if any hopes existed that the change of government would result in the repelling of invasion they were doomed to disappointment. William IV.'s elevation resembles in some points that of William III., but it was all that the two men had in common. Lowendahl met with no resistance of any moment, and captured in speedy succession fortresses which had held out against the power of Spain. Meanwhile Marshal Saxe advanced to attack Maestricht, and was met by the duke of Cumberland at Lauffeld (2nd July). The battle was a mere repetition of that of Raucoux in the previous year. The French won a victory, but it was not sufficiently decisive to enable them to undertake the siege of Maestricht under the eyes of an army which, though defeated, had lost fewer men than themselves. The only result of the battle was that it prevented the allies from opposing Lowendahl's advance. He received orders from Marshal Saxe to attack Bergen-op-Zoom, the masterpiece of Cohorn's art, and regarded as one of the strongest fortresses in the world. After the siege had lasted more than a month, the French commander determined to attempt a storm. The very boldness of the plan favoured its success. The French climbed the walls by ladders, and the garrison was so astounded at finding the enemy inside their impregnable fortifications that they hardly thought of resistance. With the fall of this fortress on the 16th of September the campaign in the Netherlands closed.

In Italy the chief event of the year 1747 was the siege of Genoa. Botta, whose conduct had been so productive of disaster, and who was personally disliked by Charles Emanuel, was recalled, and Schulenburg for the second time undertook the command of the Austrian troops. He was compelled to undertake the siege alone, as the Sardinians refused assistance on the ground that all their forces were required to resist a threatened invasion from

France. Genoa, thanks to the help which it received from France, held out for two months, and at the end of June Schulenburg had to raise the siege. Meanwhile the Spaniards under Las Minas and the French under Belleisle remained inactive in Dauphiné. The two commanders could not agree upon a plan of operations. The Spaniards wished to enter Italy by the Riviera, Belleisle by Mont Cenis; at last the marshal's brother, the chevalier de Belleisle, obtained permission to attempt a passage by Mont Genèvre. On the 15th of July, he entered the Alps, and on the 19th he was confronted by a detachment of Sardinians on the Col d'Assiette. After an obstinate conflict the French were on the point of storming the enemy's position when their leader was killed by a bullet. This decided the engagement; the French retreated with great loss, and no further attempt was made to invade Italy from the north. The campaign had not been very successful for the Austrians and Sardinians. The former had failed in their attack upon Genoa, and the latter had done nothing to recover their transalpine territories, which were still in the hands of the Spaniards.

The military operations of 1747 had not effected any great change in the relations of the European powers, and the winter was spent in negotiations at Aix-la-Chapelle with little more prospect of success than those at Breda the year before. The chief representatives of their respective courts were: for England, Lord Sandwich; for France, the count of Saint-Severin; for Spain, the marquis of Sotomayor; and for Austria, Kaunitz, who now commenced what was destined to be a long and distinguished career. In many points the negotiations at Aix-la-Chapelle recall those of Utrecht, especially in the leading part taken by France and England, the willingness of the latter to sacrifice its allies for commercial advantages, and the reluctance of Austria to accede to the proposed terms. The most difficult question before the conference was the demand of a principality in Italy for Don Philip. France, which had once made great efforts to bring this about, was now very remiss in its support of Spain. On the other hand, England, the ally of Austria, threw all its weight on to the Spanish side. The motive was the desire to advance commercial interests by making advantageous terms for trade with Spain and its colonies. Maria Theresa might well complain that the English alliance had been a costly one to her. In all the negotiations, at Breslau, at Worms, and now at Aix-la-Chapelle, England had forced Austria to make sacrifices. After seven years of war the queen thought she had done enough in giving up Silesia to Prussia, and great part of Lombardy to Sardinia, without having to carve off another slice of her territories for the Spanish Infant. If Don Philip was to have a principality, let him keep Savoy, which he already held. This obstacle was fatal to the negotiations for a time, and, as no truce was arranged, hostilities were resumed in 1748.

§ 24. This was a result which was not displeasing to several individuals, even in the states which were most desirous of peace. The duke of Cumberland, for instance, was indignant at not being made plenipotentiary at the conference. If he could not distinguish himself as a diplomatist, he would at least regain some of the military laurels which he had lost at Lauffeld. The Prince of Orange also, who had been made stadtholder by the anti-French party, was anxious to gratify his supporters and to strengthen his own position by a successful campaign. They gladly acquiesced in Maria Theresa's desire to renew the war, and exerted themselves to strengthen the allied army. Great expectations were raised by the fact that Russia had promised to take part in the hostilities by a treaty concluded in 1747. In fact 30,000 Russians were actually sent into Germany; but the summer had arrived before they reached Mainz, and by that time the war had come to an end. Meanwhile France had realised that peace could only be secured by active exertions. If some great humiliation could be inflicted upon Austria, she would be compelled to come to terms. This could be best effected, as Marshal Saxe was never weary of pointing out, by the capture of Maestricht, the last great fortress except Luxemburg which the Austrians retained in the Netherlands. Saxe united his troops with those of Lowendahl, and in April, 1748, the siege was commenced. The duke of Cumberland advanced to Roermonde to attempt the relief of the fortress.

But the fate of Maestricht was decided by diplomacy instead of by arms. On the 30th of April England, France and Holland, seeing no other way of effecting a peace, signed the preliminaries of a treaty at Aix-la-Chapelle. By a secret article it was agreed that Maestricht should surrender to the French on the understanding that it should be restored to Austria. This was a convenient method of forcing Maria Theresa to accept the proposed terms. Another secret article decreed that any power which rejected the preliminaries should forfeit all the advantages secured by them. The terms which were thus dictated to Europe provoked bitter complaints from the other negotiating powers. Kaunitz issued a formal protest in the name of his mistress. Spain, Naples and Sardinia found numerous details to carp at. But opposition proved futile in face of the resolute attitude of England and France. Some slight changes were made, but the preliminaries of April formed the basis of the important treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, which was accepted in October by all the powers except Sardinia. On the 7th of November Charles Emanuel gave his signature to the treaty.

All conquests made during the war were resigned, with certain specified exceptions. Don Philip received Parma, Piacenza and Guastalla as a hereditary principality, but if his male descendants became extinct these territories were to revert to Austria. The king of Sardinia recovered Savoy and Nice, and was confirmed in the possession of the portions of Lombardy which had been ceded to him by the treaty of Worms. The Prussian acquisition of Silesia was guaranteed. With these exceptions, the Pragmatic Sanction was once more formally confirmed. Francis I. was acknowledged as emperor by France and Spain. Genoa and the duke of Modena recovered all territories they had held before the war, so that Charles Emanuel had to relinquish his hold on Finale. The French evacuated the Netherlands, and the barrier fortresses were restored to Dutch garrisons. To England were confirmed the commercial advantages with Spain which had been arranged at Utrecht. The Hanoverian dynasty was again acknowledged, and Louis XV. undertook to exclude the Pretender from French soil. The fortifications of Dunkirk on the land side were permitted to remain, but those facing the sea were to be destroyed. In the colonies the treaty produced important results. England had to give up Cape Breton, and thus lost its opening towards Canada; but at the same time Madras was recovered, and the French were checked at a moment when it seemed probable that they, and not the English, would found an empire in India.

Thus ended the second great succession war that had distracted Europe in the 18th century. The most conspicuous impression that its history produces is of the immense decline of the power of France. Of all the grand schemes which Belleisle had proposed at the beginning of the war not one had been realised. No territories had been acquired and no military glory had been won. The only successes gained by the French arms were due to the genius of foreigners. Not a single general of note had been produced by a country which within the last century had boasted such names as those of Condé, Turenne, Luxemburg, Vauban, and Villars. The supremacy at sea rested with the English. By land the Bourbons are henceforth a distinctly weaker power than the Hapsburgs, whom eight years ago they had determined to annihilate. Only two powers emerged from the war with directly increased strength, Prussia and Sardinia. Prussia had established itself as a first-rate European power, had won a permanent military reputation, and, whatever the rights of the case, had kept a firm hold upon Silesia Sardinia by its acquisitions in Lombardy had taken another step in advance towards the founding of an Italian monarchy. In a certain sense Austria may also be regarded as a state which had profited by the war. It is true that she had suffered territorial losses, but these were as nothing when compared with the dangers that had threatened her at the outbreak of hostilities. Fleury's declaration that "the house of Austria has ceased to exist" had some foundation when it was uttered; in 1748 its absurdity was manifest to the world. Of the immediate results of the war the most important were the weakening of the close alliance between Austria and England which had been formed to resist the aggressions of Louis XIV., and had now lasted more than seventy years, and the bitter personal enmity between Maria Theresa and Frederick the Great, which becomes for a time the centre-point of European politics.

VI. RUSSIA AND THE NORTHERN STATES DURING THE WAR OF THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION.

§ 25. The death of Peter II., in 1730, extinguished the male descendants of Peter the Great. Two of his daughters by his second wife, Catharine I., were still living, Anne married to Charles Frederick of Holstein-Gottorp, and Elizabeth, who was unmarried. But these were both passed over in favour of the descendants of Peter's elder brother Iwan. Iwan had also left two daughters, Anne of Courland, and Catharine, duchess of Mecklenburg, who had died, and whose daughter, another Anne, was married to Antony Ulric of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel. The crown of the Czars passed in 1730 to Anne of Courland, who pledged herself to accept a constitution which she speedily overthrew. Anne's reign (1730—1740) is remarkable chiefly for the subjection of Russia to German ministers. The chief power was exercised by her personal favourite, Biren, for whom she obtained the duchy of Courland, the rival candidate being Maurice de Saxe. In every department Anne admitted Germans only; foreign affairs were entrusted to Ostermann, the army was commanded by Lascy and Munnich. The rule of these foreigners was advantageous so far as it carried out Peter the Great's policy of forcing western civilisation upon Russia, but it was extremely distasteful to the natives. In foreign politics the closest alliance was maintained with Austria both in the matter of the Polish succession and in the Turkish war, and Russia was the power on which Charles VI. thought he could implicitly rely for the maintenance of the Pragmatic Sanction.

But in 1740, just as the great question came up for decision, Anne died suddenly. She had chosen as her successor her own grand-nephew Iwan, the infant son of Anne of Mecklenburg and

Antony Ulric. The Germans were terrified lest without the support of an actual sovereign they might fall victims to popular hatred. To secure their position, Anne's will gave the regency during the minority to Biren, who would naturally continue the policy of his late mistress. But this arrangement was very distasteful to the parents of the Czar, the Germans split into parties as soon as the immediate danger was past, and Field-marshal Munnich undertook to effect a revolution. Before the end of November, Biren was imprisoned and banished to Silesia, Anne of Mecklenburg was acknowledged as regent, and her husband was appointed commander-in-chief. Munnich was now all-powerful at court, and he had been alienated from Austria by the latter's conduct in the Turkish war, and was inclined to ally himself with Prussia. Not only were Maria Theresa's demands for assistance refused, but Frederick, who had now entered Silesia, received encouraging letters from the marshal. But these relations were not destined to last long. Munnich's claim to supremacy was resented by the other Germans, and especially by Ostermann, who was inclined to support Austria. The regent was easily induced to oppose the man who had conferred power upon her. Munnich, haughtily convinced that his services were indispensable, thought to overpower opposition by offering his resignation. To his astonishment the offer was accepted in March, 1741; his appointments were taken from him; and though he retained his personal liberty, all his political power was gone. This second revolution involved a change in foreign policy. Ostermann, who now enjoyed the chief influence with the regent, prepared to render active assistance to Maria Theresa. It was to avert this danger that France and Prussia instigated the Swedes in the summer of 1741 to declare war against Russia, in the vain hope that they might recover some of the territories that Peter the Great had acquired from them by the peace of Nystädt. In September the war, which never attained any serious dimensions, was commenced by an encounter at Wilmanstrand in Finland, where the Russians under Lascy won a complete victory.

In the winter of 1741 a new plan was devised for breaking off the alliance between Russia and Austria. The French envoy at St. Petersburg, La Chétardie, gave his countenance to an intrigue which aimed at the deposition of the regent and the elevation to the crown of Peter the Great's surviving daughter, Elizabeth. So careless and incompetent was Anne, that she took no steps to foil a conspiracy which was hardly a secret at all. The soldiers were won over to the cause of Elizabeth, and the Russian hatred of foreigners was a powerful impulse in her favour. In the night of the 5th of December the revolution was accomplished without difficulty and without bloodshed. The regent, her husband, and the infant Czar were seized in their beds. All the ministers, including Ostermann and Munnich, were imprisoned. Elizabeth was proclaimed Czarina on the spot, and the whole of the next day was spent in the ceremony of doing homage. She had lived a careless and dissolute life, but she had one great merit—good-nature. The sentences of death which were passed on most of the prisoners were commuted to perpetual banishment. Anne and Antony Ulric never returned to Russia, and their unfortunate son Iwan VI., as he is called in Russian history, lived in solitary confinement till 1764, when he was murdered at the age of twenty-four. Ostermann died in exile; but Munnich, whose spirit was unbroken by adversity and who made himself quite a power in Siberia, survived Elizabeth, and was recalled by her successor to St. Petersburg.

§ 26. Elizabeth's accession was a victory of the national party in Russia against the foreigners who had been introduced by Peter the Great, and had been raised to supremacy under the descendants of Iwan. In order to exclude the latter from the throne, Elizabeth, who refused to marry, chose as her successor Charles Peter Ulrich of Holstein-Gottorp, the son of her elder sister Anne. The natural impulse of the new government was to desert Austria and to throw itself into the arms of France and Prussia. But on the other hand, Bestoujef, who now became minister of foreign affairs, was inclined to an Austrian alliance, and France had compromised itself by its relations with Sweden. Elizabeth, who was naturally pacific, offered to renew the peace of Nystädt. But the Swedes thought that the recent revolution had weakened Russia, and not only refused the offer, but demanded the restoration of southern Finland with the town of Wiborg. It was impossible for a daughter of Peter the Great to resign any of her father's conquests, and the war was continued through 1742. A Russian army prepared to invade Finland with General Lascy as commander-in-chief, and as his subordinates Keith and Lowendahl, both of whom won a reputation afterwards, the one in Prussian and the other in French service. The opening of the campaign was delayed by a mutiny. The antipathy against foreigners, which had just been so successful in the capital, naturally extended to the army, where hardly any natives were admitted to offices. It was not without great danger and difficulty that Keith's resolute measures put an end to the mutiny. In June the Russians entered Finland, and carried all before them. The Swedes, led by an incapable nobleman, Lœwenhaupt, made no resistance, but allowed themselves to be driven back to Helsingfors, where they capitulated to an army of about their own number. Never did a nation sink so suddenly and utterly from that military reputation which had made the Swedes, under Gustavus Adolphus, Charles X., and Charles XII., the terror of Europe. The blame rests, in the first place, with the oligarchical government which had established itself in Sweden with the accession of Charles XII.'s sister Ulrica Eleanor. She had died childless in 1741, and the crown passed to her husband Frederick of Hesse-Cassel, who was even more impotent than his wife had been. The nobles, being absolutely supreme in the State, split into two parties, which were known as the "hats" and the "caps." Party rivalry extended itself to the army, and rival officers and soldiers eagerly watched for an opportunity to bring accusations against their opponents. In these circumstances it is no wonder that no unity or courage was displayed by the Swedes, and that the Russians were astounded at the ease with which their conquests were effected. The humiliation of the Swedish army made it absolutely necessary to make peace, and in March, 1743, negotiations were opened at Abo. The great difficulty was that success had induced Elizabeth to demand further cessions of territory, and that she also wished to settle the succession to the Swedish throne. For this there were two prominent candidates, Frederick, crown-prince of Denmark, and Peter the Great's grandson, Charles Peter of Holstein-Gottorp. The majority of the Swedes, especially the lower classes, inspired with bitter hatred of Russia, wished for the elevation of the Danish prince. They hoped that the union of the three Scandinavian kingdoms, Sweden, Denmark and Norway, might be able to resist the encroachments of their powerful Slavonic neighbour. But the nobles saw the only chance of retaining their authority in conciliating Elizabeth, and therefore decided to offer the crown to her nephew. But Charles Peter, ambitious of succeeding his aunt and becoming the Czar of Russia, refused the offer. Elizabeth now suggested that the Swedes should choose Adolf Frederick of Holstein-Eutin, who held the bishopric of Lübeck. The will of Russia was accepted without further resistance. By the peace of Abo (1743) Adolf Frederick was recognised as heir to the throne, and Russia acquired the whole of southern Finland as far as the river Kiümen.

§ 27. The continuance of the Swedish war foiled all the efforts of La Chétardie to ally Russia with France and Prussia. But at the same time the chancellor Bestoujef was unable to interfere on behalf of Austria. In 1743 another complication arose. A conspiracy was detected, in which the Austrian envoy Botta was supposed to be implicated. The conspirators were sentenced to exile, and Elizabeth imperatively demanded the punishment of Botta. As Maria Theresa refused to treat her ambassador as a criminal until his guilt was established, and as the necessary proofs were not forthcoming, an open quarrel broke out between the courts of Austria and Russia. Frederick took prompt advantage of this to restore his influence at St. Petersburg. Elizabeth demanded one of his sisters in marriage for her nephew and heir, Charles Peter of Holstein. When Frederick refused this, the Czarina was so far from being irritated that she asked his advice as to the choice of some other princess. The king suggested the daughter of Christian August of Anhalt-Zerbst. The suggestion was adopted, and in July, 1744, the betrothal took place. The princess was admitted to the Greek Church, and re-baptised with the name of Catharine, under which she was destined to become very prominent in the history both of Russia and of Europe.

But this good understanding between Prussia and Russia was not destined to last long. The first cause of quarrel was Frederick's intervention in Sweden. In December, 1743, Christian VI. of Denmark had cemented a close alliance with England by marrying his eldest son to a daughter of George II. The Swedes, in order to redress the balance of power, sought to ally themselves with Prussia, and proposed a marriage between the heir-apparent to the throne, Adolf Frederick, and Frederick's sister Ulrica Eleanor. The marriage was concluded in 1744, but this would not have sufficed in itself to alienate Russia if Frederick had not used his influence in Sweden to foil the Russian designs; and reports were brought to Elizabeth that in his familiar conversation the king was in the habit of using scornful language about her and her lovers. A personal slight the Czarina could never forgive, and from this time she was inspired with the bitterest hatred against Frederick. It was this rather than any political motive that induced her to compromise the quarrel about Botta, and to conclude a close alliance with Maria Theresa in 1747. In accordance with the terms of the treaty 30,000 troops were despatched to Germany, where they arrived only to find that peace had been concluded, and that their services were not required. But Elizabeth's enmity to Prussia was not cooled by this ineffectual act of hostility, but remained to become in the future an important factor in European politics.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR.

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I. THE DIPLOMATIC REVOLUTION IN EUROPE.

§ 1. THE Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle produced no immediate change in the relations of the great European powers. For the next seven years they remained divided into two hostile camps, England and Austria against France and Prussia. This division appeared to statesmen of the old school so natural and so consonant with political traditions as to be completely unalterable. During this period, however, a great revolution was working itself out, and was suddenly consummated in 1756 at the outbreak of the Seven Years' War. This was no less than the cessation of the long-standing rivalry between the houses of Bourbon and Hapsburg, the breaking off of the alliance between Austria and the Maritime States, and the formation of a wholly new balance of European forces, France and Austria combining against England and Prussia. The individual who, more than any other, is responsible for this novel combination is Count Kaunitz, recently Austrian plenipotentiary at Aix-la-Chapelle, who returned to Vienna in 1749 to receive a seat in the Cabinet, and to direct the policy of Austria for more than forty years. He was at this time thirty-seven years old, and though he had the exterior of a fop and the habits of a sybarite, he must be regarded as the most successful diplomatist of his age.

To an impartial observer it appeared that Maria Theresa had reason rather to congratulate herself than to complain of the results of the succession war. She had escaped the annihilation that at one moment seemed inevitable, and her arms had been fairly successful except when opposed to the invincible Prussians. But the empress-queen was more impressed with the losses she had suffered than with the dangers she had avoided. Valuable territory had been sacrificed to Prussia, to Sardinia, and to Don Philip, and all attempts to obtain compensation had proved unsuccessful. These sacrifices, and this is a point which was constantly present to her mind, had been exacted from her quite as much by the pressure of her allies as by the victories of her opponents. It was not unnatural that, guided as she was rather by feminine impulses than by statesmanlike calculations, Maria Theresa felt dissatisfied with the results of the war and inclined to try the chances of a new course of policy. In 1749 she invited each of her ministers to draw up an independent statement of their opinions as to the line of conduct which Austria should pursue in the future. The emperor Francis and the older ministers pointed out that there were three chief enemies whom Austria had to fear, Prussia, Turkey, and France, while several lesser powers, such as Sardinia and the new duke of Parma, were eager to aggrandise themselves at her expense. To obtain security in this difficult position, the first essential was to reform the finances and to strengthen and improve the army. As foreign alliances were also necessary, it would in their opinion be best to maintain the old connection with the maritime powers, and at the same time scrupulously to observe the terms of the treaty, so as to give the king of Prussia no excuse for renewing his hostility. Kaunitz, on his part, drew up a very different and more aggressive manifesto, which is important as the first clear statement of the future policy of Austria. He also admitted that Austria had three natural enemies in France, Prussia and Turkey, while she had four natural allies in England, Holland, Russia and Saxony. Chief among the hostile powers he placed Prussia, and he did not hesitate to declare that the first object of Austrian policy must be the recovery of Silesia. For this, however, the existing alliances were insufficient. The weakness of Saxony had been clearly demonstrated in 1746, when it had compelled the acceptance of the treaty of Dresden. Russia was for the moment a devoted friend, but no reliance could be placed on a country where everything depended on the whims of a despot. England was, of course, the foremost ally of Austria, but English aid could never be expected against Prussia. George II., as elector of Hanover, was well-disposed to support the Hapsburgs against the Hohenzollerns, but that in itself was enough to alienate the large party in England which hated the Hanoverian connexion and refused to accept a policy which favoured Hanoverian interests. At the same time community of religion formed a close bond between England and Prussia. In the late war the English ministers had merely used Austria as an instrument to humble France, and had never ceased to urge Maria Theresa to buy off Frederick by giving up Silesia. This conviction that the English alliance was useless against Prussia is the key-stone of the policy of Kaunitz. Holland, which always followed in the wake of its powerful neighbour, was equally out of the question. Therefore the recovery of Silesia was absolutely hopeless unless some other ally could be secured in addition to Russia and Saxony. The only power which would be of any service in this matter was France, and the practical conclusion of Kaunitz's argument was that Austria should use every possible means to disarm the enmity of France and to gain her over as an ally. The difficulty of the problem was fully recognised, and the only method which the minister could suggest was to do something for Don Philip of Parma, who was Louis XV.'s son-in-law, and for whom the French wished to secure a principality near their own border. If he would give up his Italian duchy he might receive either Luxemburg or possibly Savoy. In the latter case Austria would have to compensate the king of Sardinia by resigning the Milanese to him. From this outline the motives of Kaunitz's policy are fairly obvious. He thought little of the outlying territories in comparison with the German provinces which formed the kernel of the Austrian monarchy. He was willing to make any sacrifices in the Netherlands if only he could recover Silesia. The importance of this province to Austria was not to be measured merely by its wealth or its population. It was an essential part of the German-speaking provinces which formed the chief civilising element in the empire of mixed races. Any decrease of the Germans in proportion to the Slavs was a distinct danger to Austria. At the same time the loss of so extensive a province was a serious blow to the power and prestige of the Hapsburgs, as heads of the empire. Its recovery was essential if the imperial power, immensely weakened by the recent crisis, was ever to return to its old proportions. Another point, which had perhaps more weight with the empress than with Kaunitz, was that the acquisition of Silesia by a Protestant king was a great blow to the Roman Catholic influence in Europe.

§ 2. From this time we can trace two parties in the Austrian government; on the one side, the adherents of the old policy, including the emperor and the chief ministers, and on the other, Kaunitz and his partisans. Maria Theresa, to whom the recovery of Silesia was naturally an object of ardent desire, was won over to the views of Kaunitz and determined to give him the opportunity of realising them. In 1750 he was appointed Austrian envoy at Versailles. There he was brought face to face with the enormous difficulties which confronted him. The French government was in a state of hopeless confusion. Louis XV., a slave to the most degrading vices, had altogether lost the popularity that had once given him the name of *bien-aimé*, and in 1750 a revolt broke out in Paris which was the precursor of future disorders. Madame de Pompadour, though she was no longer actually the king's mistress, was all-powerful at court, and secured her influence by ministering to the king's pleasures. Most of the ministers were her creatures, and they were changed with a frequency that makes it almost impossible to remember the order of succession. The department of foreign affairs was transferred in 1751 from Puysieux to Saint-Contest, and on the death of the latter in 1754 was given to Rouillé, who had previously had charge of the marine. But these ministers had only a slight control over the conduct of affairs. Louis XV., averse as he was to the burden of business and incapable of forming a serious decision, took a puerile interest in the minutiæ of diplomacy. It pleased him to carry on private negotiations without any reference to his responsible ministers. Most of the French envoys at foreign courts had a double set of instructions, one from the government and the other from the king himself, and they often found it difficult or impossible to harmonise their conduct to both. This secret diplomacy, which has only recently been investigated with any thoroughness, makes the French history of this period an almost trackless labyrinth. One of the king's objects was to secure the succession in Poland to the prince de Conti, who was at this time his chief confidant. Kaunitz found it impossible to come to any definite understanding with the French government, although he succeeded so far as to gain the personal favour of the king and Madame de Pompadour. But while he was at Paris, Austria was able to come to terms with one at least of the Bourbon states. Spain, which under Philip V. had been bitterly opposed to the Hapsburgs, now took the lead in proposing an alliance. In 1752 the treaty of Aranjuez was concluded, and was accepted also by the kings of Sardinia and Naples and the duke of Parma. Spain and Austria guaranteed to each other all their European possessions. A similar guarantee was arranged with the other powers, but only extended to the Italian provinces of the Austrian monarchy. It was hoped that this treaty might influence the court of Versailles, but since the accession of Ferdinand VI. Spain had severed itself so entirely from the Family Compact with France that the expectation was baulked. Kaunitz left Paris in 1753 and was at once promoted by Maria Theresa to be her chief minister. But the promotion of Kaunitz by no means implied the immediate adoption of the new policy. On the contrary, his residence in France seemed to have convinced him that his scheme was hopeless. He was now prepared to leave Prussia in undisturbed possession of Silesia and to maintain the most intimate relations with the maritime powers. But circumstances worked for him in an unexpected manner, and before long he was able to resume his plans with a better prospect of success.

In spite of the alliance which had lasted for half a century, and of the undoubted services which England had rendered to Austria in the recent war, the relations between the two countries were by no means harmonious. The Austrian government was displeased with the part which England had played in negotiating the treaties of Berlin, Dresden, and Aix-la-Chapelle, and with the hectoring tone that was so often adopted by English ministers at Vienna. It was in vain that George II. sought to make his peace by joining in 1750 the alliance between Austria and Russia, and by proposing the election of the archduke Joseph as King of the Romans. The Austro-

Russian alliance had been concluded in 1746 really, though not ostensibly, against Prussia, but England was resolute in refusing to accept it in that sense. And the proposed election of the archduke proved a source rather of discord than agreement. Only three votes could be reckoned upon with security, Hanover, Saxony and Bohemia. Prussia, backed up by France, was openly hostile to the election of a minor. The other neutral electors might possibly have been purchased, but only by concessions which Maria Theresa refused to make. The negotiations were carried on for two years, but ultimately George II. had to abandon the project on account of the lukewarm support he received from the very power in whose interests it had been conceived. At the same time there were more substantial grounds of difference between the two powers. By the treaty of Utrecht, England and Holland had procured the cession of the Netherlands to Austria, but only for their own security against France. Special provisions were made for the occupation of the fortresses by Dutch troops, and for preventing any possible commercial rivalry. The attempt of Charles VI. to form the Ostend Company had given a clear illustration of the selfish jealousy with which the Maritime States were determined to uphold their monopoly. The old provisions about the fortresses and trade were renewed in the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. Maria Theresa was disinclined to sacrifice her own subjects to their overbearing neighbours. She refused to pay the subsidies to Holland, and in conjunction with Charles of Lorraine, the governor of the Netherlands, she began to take measures for the revival of commerce. This at once provoked vehement remonstrances, both from the English and Dutch, which were in the highest degree displeasing to a sovereign who was accustomed to absolute rule in her territories.

§ 3. If the hostility between Austria and Prussia is the most conspicuous point in European politics, the quarrel between England and France, which arose out of conflicting colonial interests, was equally deep-seated and important. The vagueness which necessarily existed about the rights of discoverers and settlers in the vast continents of America and Asia was certain to lead to disputes, and in the eighteenth century these proved a most fertile source of international contests. It was easy to admit the right of the first settler to a small island, but if a man planted a flag on the eastern coast of America, it was impossible to allow that he had thereby established a right to the whole territory from the Atlantic to the Pacific. In two opposite hemispheres the English and French found themselves face to face. In India the open war between them had been stayed by the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, but it speedily broke out again in a new form as the two nations mixed themselves up in the quarrels of the native princes. This time the genius of Dupleix was met and foiled by the courage of Robert Clive, and in 1754 the French government decided to recall their enterprising but unsuccessful representative. In America the quarrel was more complicated and was less easily settled. The first dispute arose about the boundaries of Acadia or Nova Scotia, which had originally been a French colony, but had been ceded to England at Utrecht. Commissioners had been appointed to decide the question, but no settlement had been agreed upon. And still more serious questions were raised about the general limits of the rival colonies. By this time the English had established themselves firmly along the east coast of what is now the United States. But the French held Canada and Louisiana, and they now sought to unite the two provinces by claiming the two great valleys of the St. Lawrence and the Mississippi. Their object was to coop the English up within the Alleghany Mountains, and to prevent any further extension of their settlements. The governor of Canada, Duquesne, sent troops to seize the territory of the Ohio, where they built Fort Duquesne. The Virginians and Pennsylvanians were ordered by the home government to resist this aggression. In 1754 George Washington at the head of the Virginian militia cut a French detachment to pieces, but was himself defeated by a superior force at Great Meadows. So far the quarrel was purely colonial, but it soon extended to the mother-countries. Public opinion was profoundly excited both in England and France. Regular troops were despatched to America under General Braddock, but he allowed himself to be drawn into an ambuscade and his whole force was annihilated. The French, on their side, sent a fleet into the Atlantic, and a great naval battle was only avoided through a fog, which enabled the French vessels to escape from the English with the loss of two of their number. War had not yet been declared, but the English privateers did not scruple to attack the French shipping, on which they inflicted serious damage.

War between England and France was now inevitable, and George II.'s fears were at once aroused for the safety of Hanover. The French were not likely to have the best of the naval war, and they were certain to avenge their losses on the sea by attacking the continental possessions of the English king. The treaty by which Hesse supplied troops in return for a subsidy had recently expired, and was at once renewed, in spite of the outcry of the anti-Hanoverian party in Parliament. But a more powerful ally was needed to oppose France, and there were only two powers which could give the requisite security, Austria, as mistress of the

Netherlands, and Prussia. Naturally George II. made his first appeal to Austria. Now was the time for Maria Theresa and Kaunitz to decide definitely on the policy they intended to adopt. If they refused to assist England, the old alliance must be finally abandoned. If, on the other hand, they acceded to George's demand, they must resign all hope of an agreement with France, and therefore of recovering Silesia. For a moment they hesitated. They pointed out to the English ministers that Hanover might also be attacked by Prussia as the ally of France, and advised them to hire Russian troops with a subsidy. The advice was followed, and negotiations were at once commenced at St. Petersburg, which resulted in a treaty (September, 1755), by which an annual payment of £100,000 was promised to the Czarina Elizabeth, and she undertook to send 55,000 men to the assistance of Hanover if attacked. The English government now renewed its demand that the Austrian forces in the Netherlands should be strengthened, so as to oppose the threatened passage of the French. But Kaunitz and Maria Theresa decided to refuse the demand on the ground that the sending of troops to so distant a province would leave the Austrian territories exposed to invasion from Prussia. Thus the first step was taken in the great change of diplomatic relations. The alliance between England and Austria, which had been called into being by the ambition of Louis XIV., and had been cemented by the exploits of Eugene and Marlborough, was at an end.

Nothing now remained for England but to appeal to Prussia, and Lord Holderness was despatched as envoy to Berlin. Ever since the treaty of Dresden, Frederick had been absorbed in the cares of domestic government. He had reformed the judicial administration with the help of Cocceji, he had improved the finances, and above all he had strengthened his army. But there is no ground for charging him, as the Austrian ministers did, with cherishing new scheme of aggrandisement, like the conquest of Silesia. On the contrary, his chief wish in 1755 was to remain at peace, and the approaching war between England and France filled him with dismay. He regarded France as his natural ally, but he had never guaranteed her American colonies, and he was not willing to sacrifice his own interests for them. Moreover, neither party was very firmly attached to the alliance. France was not likely to forget that Frederick had twice deserted her cause in the late war. Frederick, on his side, resented the way in which the court of Versailles treated Prussia as a subordinate power, and was extremely unwilling to allow the French to make themselves supreme in Germany. They were now about to attack Hanover, and would certainly call upon him for assistance. If he supported them he would be exposed to a triple attack, from England through Hanover, from Russia, and from Austria. The French would very likely involve him in the war, and then leave him to his fate. At this moment came the overtures from England, and a little later the news of the treaty which England had concluded with Russia. The latter decided Frederick's conduct. By accepting the overtures he could rid himself at once of two formidable enemies, and at the same time keep the war outside the limits of Germany. Russia was bitterly hostile to him, but then Russia would never go to war without ample subsidies, and the money which had been promised by England could never be supplied from the exhausted treasury of Austria. Accordingly, on the 16th of January, 1756, the Convention of Westminster was agreed upon. England and Prussia confirmed the previous treaties between them, and guaranteed each other's territories. They also agreed, in case any foreign troops should invade Germany, to combine their forces for their expulsion. This was the essence of the compact; Prussia was to protect Hanover from France, and in return England was to give up the design of bringing the Russians on to German soil.

Hitherto the French government had carefully avoided any overt act of hostility against England. But early in 1756 an edict was issued confiscating all English property in France, and at the same time extensive military and naval preparations were commenced at Brest and Dunkirk. The English government, which was headed at this time by the feeble duke of Newcastle, believed that the intention was to invade this country. Great efforts were made to induce the Dutch to support their old ally. William IV., who had been made stadtholder during the last war, had died in 1751, and the government was now in the hands of his widow Anne, a daughter of George II. But the republican party was still numerous, and strong enough to carry a resolution by which Holland remained neutral. The government, conscious that the national defences were in a lamentable condition, took the unpopular step of summoning Hanoverian and Hessian troops into England. In the end the panic proved groundless. The preparations at Brest and Dunkirk were only a blind to call off attention from an expedition which was being fitted out at Toulon to attack Minorca. The duke of Richelieu, the vicious companion of the king's pleasures, was appointed to command, and the fleet sailed from Toulon early in April. The island was entirely unprepared for resistance, and General Blakeney was forced to withdraw the garrison from Port Mahon, and to throw himself into Fort St. Philip, where he was besieged by the French. It was not till a month had elapsed that Admiral Byng advanced to relieve Minorca, and then, after an indecisive conflict with the French fleet, he retired without having effected anything. Fort St. Philip had to surrender in May, and Minorca, one of the most important acquisitions of the treaty of Utrecht, was lost to England. The government, whose incapacity was the chief cause of the disaster, tried to throw the blame upon Byng, and he was condemned by a court-martial, and shot in the next year. The attack upon Minorca at last extorted from the belligerents a formal declaration of war, which was issued by England in May, and by France in June, 1756.

§ 4. Meanwhile the imminent outbreak of a continental war had forced Austria to come to an all-important decision. If France carried out its intention of attacking Hanover, the Netherlands could not possibly escape becoming a field for military operations. Maria Theresa had refused to support England by strengthening her forces in the Netherlands. Neutrality would have suited the interests of Austria, but it was impossible for a great power to remain neutral while one of its provinces was occupied by foreign troops. The only possible way out of the difficulty lay in an alliance with France, which opened the additional prospect of revenge against Prussia. Now or never Kaunitz must carry out the grand scheme which he had propounded in 1749, but which had hitherto proved impossible of achievement. The Austrian minister was equal to the occasion. In August, 1755, he drew up a statement of the offers which were to be made to France. Louis XV.'s son-in-law, Don Philip, was to exchange Parma, Piacenza and Guastalla, for a more extensive principality in the Netherlands. Austria would undertake to support Conti in his candidature for the Polish throne, and to bring France into cordial relations with Russia, Spain and Naples. The allies of France, Sweden, Saxony and the Palatinate, were to receive advantages at the expense of Prussia, and that state was to be reduced to the position which it had held before the peace of Westphalia, so that it should be powerless in the future to disturb the peace of Europe. France, for its part, was to renounce the alliance with the Prussian king, and to share with Austria the expense of the undertaking. The plan was approved by Maria Theresa without consultation with the other ministers, and was embodied in instructions to Count Stahremberg, who had succeeded Kaunitz as envoy at Paris. The magnitude of the scheme, which involved a complete revolution in the politics of Europe, is best expressed in Kaunitz's own words: "A great power was to be convinced that the whole political system which it had hitherto pursued was in direct opposition to its true interests. It was to be persuaded that what it regarded as the only means for overcoming the difficulties with England, were really unsuited to the purpose, and that it was pursuing a radically false policy when it made the support of Prussia the central object of all its alliances. Nothing less was aimed at than to root up the old rivalry of France against the house of Austria, and to completely alter the national character of a whole ministry." The plan would hardly have escaped failure but for an unexpected combination of favouring circumstances.

On the 29th of August, Stahremberg received his instructions, and two days later he made his first overtures to the court of Versailles through Madame de Pompadour. It was a great point in his favour that the all-powerful mistress, like Elizabeth of Russia, was bitterly enraged by the reports that had reached her of insulting expressions used by Frederick in private conversation. Throughout this period she is the chief opponent of the Prussian alliance and the most influential supporter of the Austrian policy. She induced Louis XV. to conceal the matter from his ministers for a time, and to entrust the negotiations with Stahremberg to one of her own favourites, the Abbé de Bernis. On the 3rd of September the two diplomatists held their first conference in a country house at Sèvres. The answer to the Austrian proposals was by no means encouraging. The French king definitely refused to agree to any enterprise against Prussia unless conclusive proofs were given of a secret understanding between Prussia and England. At the same time he called upon the empress to combine with him against England as a disturber of European peace. The decision expressed in this answer forced Kaunitz to change his attitude. French assistance against Prussia was out of question. But it would be absurd for Austria to make war upon England when the only reward which made such an enterprise worth undertaking was withheld. Kaunitz therefore fell back upon the idea of neutrality, and proposed a defensive treaty with France, by which the war should be kept outside Germany. On these terms Stahremberg recommenced negotiations, this time not with Bernis alone, but with several of the ministers, Rouillé, Machault and Séchelles. From d'Argenson and Belleisle, who were regarded as enemies of Austria, the affair was still kept secret. But it was obvious from the first that the new proposals had a very slight prospect of success. The object of France was to humiliate England: in a naval war England was certain to win in the end: the French must seek compensation by land, and this could only be done by attacking Hanover. Therefore the proposed neutrality of Germany was directly opposed to French interests. At the same time, if the choice lay between two possible allies against England, Prussia could render vastly greater services than Austria. The latter had not only no naval force, but it was so distant from Hanover that armed intervention there was almost impossible. Without rejecting the Austrian proposals, the French ministers determined to send the duke de Nivernois to Berlin to conclude a definite alliance with Frederick. Nivernois arrived in January, 1756, just in time to receive the first news of the Convention of Westminster. This was the turning-point in the negotiations between France and Austria. The French king and ministers were furiously indignant that the prince whom they regarded as their natural and necessary ally should have concluded a treaty with their hated enemy, and guaranteed that very neutrality of Germany which would foil the military designs of France. It was France which now took the lead in demanding the revival of Kaunitz's original scheme for an alliance against Prussia. The negotiations between Stahremberg and Bernis were resumed on the old basis. But there were still considerable difficulties in the way of a complete understanding. The French representative insisted on reciprocity of action as an essential preliminary of the alliance; that is, France was not to do more against Prussia than Austria would undertake to do against England. But Austria was unable, from its position, to take any direct share in a war with England, therefore France would not join in any attack upon Prussia. Moreover France was willing to allow the recovery of Silesia, but was opposed to a complete humiliation of Prussia, which would restore to Austria its supremacy in Germany. Kaunitz saw that time alone could overcome these difficulties; that when once war had begun, France would have to do more than fulfil the bare stipulations of a treaty, and therefore instructed Stahremberg to urge the conclusion of the general alliance, and to leave the details for future settlement. Accordingly on the 1st of May three distinct treaties between France and Austria were signed at Versailles. By the first, which was a treaty of neutrality, Austria undertook to remain neutral during the war between France and England, and France pledged itself on no account to attack the Netherlands or any other territory of Maria Theresa. The second was a defensive alliance. Both powers guaranteed each other's possessions, and in case they were attacked by any foreign state, agreed to raise an auxiliary force of 24,000 men, or, if required, to furnish an equivalent sum of money. This engagement was not binding as regards the war between England and France. The third treaty contained five secret articles. (1.) Although the war between England and France had been expressly excluded from the previous treaty, Austria undertook to send the stipulated assistance to France if attacked by any foreign power as an auxiliary of England; and France made the same pledge to Austria. (2.) The allies who were to be invited to join the defensive alliance were, the emperor as grand duke of Tuscany, the kings of Spain and Naples, Philip of Parma, and such other princes as might be subsequently agreed upon. (4.) The two powers pledged themselves not to conclude any new alliance nor to confirm an old one without mutual agreement. The third and fifth articles were merely formal. The treaty of Versailles was regarded by both parties only as a preliminary to a more definite alliance. In the months of May and June Stahremberg pushed on the negotiations with great vigour. On the French side Bernis pointed out that the principality in the Netherlands for Don Philip was a very small price for Austria to pay for the recovery of Silesia and Glatz and the duchy of Parma. To induce France to take an active part in the war it would be necessary to cede to her all the Netherlands, except the portion set apart for the Spanish Infant. Kaunitz was quite willing to sacrifice the Netherlands, but he was conscious that such an increase of the power of France would excite the bitter hostility of the Maritime States, and would probably alienate those powers that might otherwise be allies. He offered therefore to cede the whole of the Netherlands to Don Philip, with the exception of those provinces which had at any previous period belonged to France. But he insisted that none of these promises should be fulfilled until Silesia and Glatz were actually recovered for Austria, and he demanded that France should earn such great advantages by sending an army into Germany, and by paying ample subsidies to Austria and her allies. Although Louis XV. and Madame de Pompadour had practically decided to accept the offer of Kaunitz, a definite agreement was postponed on account of the prepossession in favour of Prussia which existed among the French people and was shared by several of the ministers. The Austrian government, on the other hand, was impelled to haste by the attitude of Russia. The Czarina Elizabeth had concluded the alliance with England simply out of hostility to Prussia, and in ratifying the treaty she had expressly stated that her troops should be employed against no other power. The Convention of Westminster, therefore, at once annulled the treaty of St. Petersburg: Elizabeth not only refused the English subsidies, but was filled with bitter indignation. She determined to have revenge at any rate, and offered to join Maria Theresa with 80,000 men against Prussia, and not to lay down her arms until Silesia and Glatz had been conquered. Nor was this the only loss to which the Czarina wished to subject Frederick. Prussia proper was to return to Poland, with the exception of Courland and Semgallen, which Russia demanded for itself. Saxony was to have Magdeburg, Sweden Prussian Pomerania, and Frederick was to be left with little besides the original marks of Brandenburg. Kaunitz was encouraged by so favourable an offer, but he was compelled to moderate the ardour of his ally, lest any permature aggression on the part of Russia should induce France to break off the negotiations. Elizabeth was urged to wait patiently until the alliance had been concluded. Nothing could contribute more to this result than that Frederick should put himself in the wrong by breaking the peace.

Meanwhile Frederick, by means that were characteristic of the employer, had obtained sufficient if not complete information of the designs that were being formed against him. The result was seen in energetic military preparations and the massing of troops on the Prussian frontier. Austria was extremely alarmed at this. Bohemia was defenceless, and any attempt to increase the forces in that province might induce Frederick to attack it. Moreover the government desired to postpone active operations until the next year, when the arrangements with France would be completed. But Frederick, with his accustomed audacity of resolution, was determined to strike the first blow. With great reluctance Austria had at last followed the example of Prussia, and commenced to put Bohemia and Moravia into a posture of defence. Frederick at once instructed Count Klinggräff, his envoy at Vienna, to demand the meaning of these preparations, and to ask whether it was true that an alliance with Russia had been concluded against himself. The demand was intended merely to obtain a decent pretext for hostilities. It was replied that Prussia had begun to arm itself long before Austria had done so, and that no such alliance with Russia had existed or did exist. On the 25th of August, 1756, Frederick received this answer from Vienna. On the next day he commenced the Seven Years' War by advancing with his army, not as was expected into Bohemia, but into Saxony.

II. OUTBREAK OF THE WAR.

§ 5. That Frederick was justified in beginning hostilities there can be no doubt. Although it was literally true that no alliance had as yet been concluded between Austria and Russia, yet those powers and France were diligently concerting measures which threatened Prussia with annihilation. If Frederick had remained inactive, the war would only have been postponed till next year, when his enemies could have attacked him at their leisure. It was by the help of a traitor that Frederick had obtained his knowledge of these hostile designs. Ever since 1753, Menzel, a clerk in the Saxony Chancery, had been in Prussian pay, and had sent copies to Berlin of all the important documents that passed through his hands. Among these was the proposal for a partition of Prussia which had been communicated by the Russian chancellor, Bestoujef, to the Saxon minister at St. Petersburg. But while this discovery justified Frederick in attacking Austria, the same cannot be said for his invasion of Saxony. He was doubtless aware that Augustus III. and his minister Brühl regarded him with bitter animosity, and that neither they nor their subjects had forgotten the humiliations of 1746. But nevertheless Saxony was not a partner to the projected alliance against Prussia. Though both Austria and Russia had suggested that some share of the spoil might be given to Saxony, the consent of the government at Dresden had never been asked nor given. The motive for Frederick's action must be found in military considerations. In the last war he had ample experience of the danger of invading Bohemia while Saxony was left free to act behind him, and he had also convinced himself that that country offered the best base of operations for an attack on the Austrian territories. He had also another motive. In Dresden were the originals of those documents whose contents had been divulged to him by Menzel. If he could seize and publish them he might convince Europe of the rectitude of his conduct, and prove that he was not the unprovoked robber and aggressor that his enemies loved to paint him.

Frederick's intention was to march through Saxony into Bohemia before the Austrians had time to arrange any effectual resistance. But to avoid leaving a hostile army in the rear, he demanded that the Saxon troops should take an oath of fealty to him and combine with the Prussians against Austria. He relied on the well-known weakness of Augustus III. and the terror inspired by a sudden attack to lend force to this outrageous request. But the Saxon king had not fallen so low as to surrender his army without a blow. Acting on the advice of the French envoy, the Count de Broglie, he threw his troops into Pirna, an almost impregnable mountain fortress on the Elbe a few miles above Dresden. Here he could hold out until assistance came from Austria, or possibly also from Russia. This step, undoubtedly the best under the circumstances, was resented at Vienna. The Austrian ministers had wished the Saxon troops to retreat into Bohemia, and to join the army that had been collected there under Marshal Browne. They were afraid that the occupation of Pirna would prove only a preliminary to an understanding with Prussia. The demands for assistance were therefore very coolly received. Browne refused to quit Bohemia, for fear of leaving that province exposed to a Prussian attack. When at last he consented to march to the relief of Pirna, it was only to effect a junction with the Saxons so as to facilitate their retreat into Bohemia. Frederick was well informed of his intentions, and leaving half of his army to watch Pirna, he advanced with the rest to meet Browne. At Lobositz the two armies came into conflict (October 1st). For once the Prussians failed to gain a victory, although they kept possession of the battle-field. The Austrians, who had displayed distinguished courage, were able to continue their march without further opposition. As the left bank of the Elbe was occupied by the enemy, they had to take the right bank, and it was arranged that the Saxons should cross the river to join them. The latter failed to perform their share of the operations, and Browne gave up the enterprise and retreated into Bohemia. Nothing now remained for the Saxons but to capitulate, which they did on the 16th of October. The officers were released, after giving their word not to serve against Prussia in the present war, but the common soldiers were compelled to join Frederick's army. Augustus III. retired to his second capital, Warsaw, leaving his wife behind in Dresden. The unfortunate queen was compelled, not without threats of personal violence, to surrender the Saxon archives, from which Frederick compiled a *mémoire raisonné* in justification of his conduct, which was sent round to all the European courts. The season was now too late for an invasion of Bohemia, and that enterprise had to be postponed till next year. By holding out in Pirna the Saxons had rendered an inestimable service to Austria.

§ 6. The unexpected outbreak of hostilities forced Austria to hurry on the formation of the great anti-Prussian alliance. The first power that was gained over was the Empire. In September, 1756, the emperor Francis issued a formal declaration that Frederick by invading Saxony had broken the imperial constitution, and exposed himself to the penalties of such an act. But the personal authority of the emperor counted for little unless it was backed up by the formal adhesion of the German states. This was not difficult to obtain. France and Austria, which on previous occasions had pulled different ways, were now on the same side. This combination of influence was irresistible, and in January, 1757, the diet of Ratisbon issued a recess authorising the emperor to take measures for the compensation of Saxony and the defence of Austria and Bohemia, and promising to support him with an imperial army. The recess was opposed by Prussia and Hanover, but was carried by a majority in all three chambers.

This manifesto of the diet gave more moral than practical assistance to the Austrian cause. The military organisation of the Empire was as distracted and powerless as ever, and for real help in the war Austria relied chiefly upon Russia and France. With

Russia there was little beyond details to settle. Elizabeth, who had been raised to the throne in 1741 in opposition to Austria, had completely changed her original policy, and since 1746 had become the close ally of Maria Theresa and a bitter enemy of Frederick the Great. All her ministers, especially Woronzow and the powerful Schuwalow family, were on the same side. The only persons from whom opposition might be dreaded were the Chancellor Bestoujef, who was known to have been corrupted by English bribes, and the heir-apparent, Peter of Holstein, who was a devoted admirer of Frederick. There was a constant risk that Elizabeth's death might bring about a complete change in the attitude of Russia. This was an additional reason for hastening the negotiations. On the 11th of January, 1757, the Convention of St. Petersburg was signed, by which Russia accepted the defensive treaty of Versailles between Austria and France, although, to satisfy the scruples of the latter power, its provisions were not to be enforced in case of a war with Turkey or Persia. Three weeks later, on the 2nd of February, an offensive alliance against Prussia was arranged between Russia and Austria. Both powers pledged themselves to bring 80,000 men into the field, and not to lay down their arms until Silesia and Glatz had been wrested from Frederick. They also agreed to reduce the power of Prussia within such limits that it should no longer be formidable to the peace of Europe. Sweden and Denmark were to be induced to join the alliance by the offer of territorial advantages, and Saxony was to receive as compensation the district of Magdeburg. Maria Theresa undertook to pay to Russia an annual subsidy of a million roubles during the continuance of the war. An army had already been assembled at Riga under Apraxin, but military affairs were so ill-organised in Russia that it was doubtful whether it could commence operations with any promptness.

It now only remained for Austria to bring its negotiations with France to a satisfactory conclusion. The whole situation was altered by Frederick's invasion of Saxony. The court of Versailles was extremely indignant, especially as the injured king was the father-in-law of the dauphin. The outbreak of war at once brought into operation the defensive alliance that had been concluded in May, and Louis XV. offered to send the stipulated 24,000 troops to the assistance of Austria. But at the same time the chief obstacle was removed in the way of the offensive alliance which was already being negotiated by Stahremberg. France was no longer unwilling to impose further losses upon Prussia besides Silesia and Glatz. The negotiations were pressed on with redoubled rigour, but there were still endless difficulties, in the discussion of which several valuable months were spent. One of these lay in the relations into which France was necessarily brought with Russia. If the Russian troops attacked Prussia they would have to march through Poland, and for some time it had been a prominent object of French policy to oppose the growth of Russian influence in that country. That Louis XV. gave way on this point exposes him to considerable responsibility for the subsequent partition of Poland. Another considerable dispute arose about that part of the Netherlands which was to be cut off from the principality of Don Philip and ceded to France. The French demanded that the two ports of Ostend and Nieuport should be included, to which Austria was opposed on the ground that it would excite most vehement hostility on the part of England and Holland. But the great source of difficulty lay in the divergent objects of the two powers. To Austria the chief enemy was Prussia, for whose humiliation every effort was to be made. French hostility, on the other hand, was directed in the first place against England. It was proposed that the French army, instead of marching to the assistance of Saxony or Bohemia, should first attack Hanover, and thence invade Prussia from the west. This was extremely distasteful at Vienna. In the first place the treaty of Versailles had expressly excluded the war between France and England, so that, while France was bound to oppose Prussia, Austria had undertaken no such stipulation with regard to England. Besides, there were very grave arguments against the attack upon Hanover. The very crime of which Frederick was accused, the attack upon a member of the empire, would then be committed by the Hapsburgs, whose position bound them to enforce the imperial laws. And it was probable that the French troops would find sufficient occupation in Hanover to prevent them from taking any part in the combined attack upon Prussia. Maria Theresa's object was to induce George II. to arrange for the neutrality of Hanover as he had done in the former war, and this not unnaturally provoked a suspicion in France that Austria was still inclined to favour English interests.

External events helped to remove some of these obstacles. While the Hanoverian ministers were inclined to fall in with the suggestions of Austria, public opinion in England, always hostile to the connection with Hanover, was eager to throw the country definitely on to the side of Prussia. In November, 1756, the feeble ministry of Newcastle retired, and the king was compelled to confide in William Pitt, the representative of the popular voice and the greatest war minister that England has ever produced. The result of the ministerial change was seen in the tone of the king's speech at the opening of Parliament in February. It expressed the most bitter antipathy to France, and the determination to support Prussia at all costs. This declaration of English policy exasperated Maria Theresa, and rendered her willing to comply with the wishes of France. Matters were still more facilitated by a change in the French ministry. In January a madman named Damiens stabbed Louis XV. with a knife. The wound was never dangerous, but the king was terrified lest the weapon might have been poisoned, and took to his bed. The court at once deserted Madame de Pompadour to surround the dauphin, and though the king's recovery speedily restored her to her old position, she had seen the weakness of her position and determined to strengthen it by removing those ministers she could not fully trust. Both d'Argenson, who had always ranked as her opponent, and Machault, the minister of marine, who had hitherto been one of her supporters, received their dismissal. The latter was sacrificed to the enmity of the Parliament of Paris which had been aroused by his daring financial reforms and his attack upon antiquated privileges. One result of these changes was the admission into the ministry of the Abbé de Bernis, who had played the most prominent part in conducting the negotiations with Stahremberg. From this time he, with Madame de Pompadour and Belleisle, who had now completely abandoned his policy of antagonism to Austria, exercised the chief influence on the direction of French policy.

These two events, the avowal of England's determination to support Prussia, and the changes in the French ministry, facilitated the work of Stahremberg, and enabled him to conclude the second treaty of Versailles on the 1st of May, 1757. France undertook to pay to Austria a subsidy of twelve million gulden a year, to take into her service 6000 Wurtembergers and 4000 Bavarians, and to bring into the field 105,000 troops of her own. These exertions were to be continued not only till Silesia and Glatz had been conquered, but until Prussia had definitely given them up by a formal treaty. Other provinces were to be extorted from Prussia, but were not equally insisted upon. The principality of Crossen and some other territory not definitely specified were to be added to the Austrian share; Magdeburg, Halle and Halberstadt were to be given to Saxony; Pomerania to Sweden; Prussian Cleve to the Elector Palatine; Gelderland to Holland. The obvious intention was to deprive Brandenburg of all the acquisitions that had been made by the Great Elector and his successors. Austria, on her side, promised to hand over to Don Philip in exchange for his Italian duchy the whole of the Netherlands, except Ostend, Nieuport, Ypres, and other districts, which were to go to France;

but this obligation was not binding until Silesia and Glatz were acquired. Ostend and Nieuport were to be placed in French occupation directly the first subsidy was paid, but were to be restored if the enterprise proved unsuccessful. Also Austria renounced all previous alliances with England, as France did with Prussia. If the duke of Parma accepted the Netherlands, his claims to the Two Sicilies were to revert to the descendants of the present king of Naples, who was to resign the Tuscan *stato degli presidii* to Austria.

Thus was completed the great diplomatic revolution which Kaunitz had been the first to suggest, but which had appeared for years to be a chimerical dream. France had at last given up its traditional enmity to the house of Hapsburg, and had allied itself with Austria against a German power, which it had hitherto been the grand object of French policy to support. The Abbé de Bernis had reversed all the plans of Richelieu. The treaty had not been concluded without a considerable strife of interests, but there can be no doubt that the ultimate terms were to the advantage of Austria. It is usual to assert that in the alliance against Prussia religious motives regained an ascendency in Europe which they had lost since the treaty of Westphalia. But this aspect of the Seven Years' War has unquestionably been exaggerated, mainly through the influence of Frederick himself, who loved to represent himself as the champion of Protestantism against Catholic intolerance. Louis XV. and Maria Theresa were both superstitious and bigoted enough to have embarked upon a war of persecution. But Kaunitz, the real author of the alliance, was a philosopher rather than a devotee, and it is absurd to regard as essentially Roman Catholic a league which included Russia and Sweden, as well as several of the Protestant states of Germany. All that can be said of the Seven Years' War is that religion had some influence in directing the partiality of states for one side or the other, but the real guiding motives were as purely political and secular as in the war of the Spanish succession.

III. The War from 1757 to 1760.

§ 7. Great preparations were made by Frederick and his opponents to make the campaign of 1757 decisive. In Vienna it was deemed certain that a concerted attack upon Prussia from Bohemia by the Austrians, from Westphalia by the French, from the south by the army of the Empire, and from the north by the Swedes and Russians, must force Frederick to relinquish his hold on Silesia and Saxony, and to make peace on humiliating terms. England, at most, could only ward off the French attack by holding Hanover against invasion. As usual, Frederick's superior activity enabled him to disconcert his enemies. Instead of standing on the defensive, he determined to resume the enterprise of the last year and invade Bohemia. By the end of April the Prussian army had crossed the frontier. The defence of the province was no longer in the hands of Marshal Browne. The bitter experience of the succession war had not sufficed to overcome Maria Theresa's partiality for her brother-in-law, and Charles of Lorraine was allowed to give new proofs of his incapacity. By his orders Browne made no opposition to the Prussians, but retreated from point to point upon Prague. Here at last it was necessary to make a stand, and the position seemed favourable enough to ensure success. Frederick, who had marched steadily after the retreating enemy, was determined on a battle, and without allowing any rest to his troops, he attacked the Austrian intrenchments on the 6th of May. The engagement was the bloodiest that had been fought in Europe since Malplaquet. Schwerin, the hero of Mollwitz, was killed on the field, and Browne received a wound that proved mortal. The losses on each side were nearly equal, but the Prussians carried the day. The larger part of the Austrian army sought refuge within the walls of Prague, and the rest escaped southwards to join Daun, who was bringing up reinforcements.

Frederick at once laid siege to Prague, and if he could have taken it at once might have defeated Daun, and crushed all opposition in Bohemia. But the large number of defenders made a storm hopeless, and it was necessary to resort to the slower process of blockade. Twenty thousand men were detached under the duke of Brunswick-Bevern to prevent any attempt to relieve the city. But Prague held out, and the delay enabled Daun to receive reinforcements. When his army was about 54,000 strong, he turned upon Bevern, before whom he had hitherto retreated. Frederick had now to decide whether he would raise the siege or wait to be attacked, or whether he would stick to his enterprise, and also meet Daun in the field. Unfortunately he chose the latter alternative. Leaving the bulk of his forces to maintain the blockade, he hurried off to join Bevern with only 14,000 men. His recent success had inspired him with contempt for his foes. At Kolin (June 18) the superior numbers of the Austrians gave them a complete victory. Frederick had to give up his enterprise as hopeless. The siege of Prague was raised, and in two detachments the Prussian army quitted Bohemia. Frederick himself made good his retreat into Saxony; but the other portion of his army, which was led by his brother Augustus William, suffered very serious loss on its march into Lausitz.

Charles of Lorraine followed him across the frontier, and took the town of Zittau. But here the Austrian advance was checked. Charles ought to have completely crushed the detachment which he was content to pursue. Frederick now joined his brother, and the Prussians regained their numerical superiority. The Austrians had to stand on the defensive at Zittau, but their position was too strong for Frederick to attack them. The victory of Kolin, decisive as it was, produced no other immediate result than the expulsion of the Prussians from Bohemia.

§ 8. But the victory had more important indirect results. On every side Frederick's enemies were encouraged to attack him, and his destruction seemed almost certainly imminent. Early in the year a large French army under Marshal d'Estrées had marched upon Hanover, with the intention of invading Brandenburg from the west. They were opposed by a mixed force of English, Hanoverians and Hessians, under the duke of Cumberland, who had won a reputation at Culloden, but had never been otherwise than unfortunate on the continent. At Hastenbeck (July 26) he was defeated, though indecisively, by the French, and retreated northwards to Stade. D'Estrées was superseded by the incompetent duke de Richelieu, who reaped the profit of his predecessor's victory in the Convention of Closter-Seven (September 10), by which Cumberland undertook to disband his army, and thus surrendered Hanover and Brunswick to the French. The Hanoverian ministers were anxious to induce George II. to act as he had done in the previous war, and to stipulate for the neutrality of his German territories. There was now nothing to prevent Richelieu from invading Halberstadt and striking at the heart of the Prussian monarchy. But the duke's incapacity, and the want of discipline in his army, allowed the opportunity to slip.

But this was not the only danger which Frederick had to face. The battle of Kolin had hastened the collection of an imperial army, which was to carry out the decrees of the Ratisbon diet and was placed under the command of the prince of Hildburghausen. A French force under Soubise advanced from Alsace to co-operate with the Germans. Numerically the army was formidable, but the military organisation of the Empire had for centuries been inefficient, and it was soon proved that the old defects were as prominent as ever. There was no unity among troops collected from various provinces, most of which had no direct interest at stake, and the junction of the French, instead of being an advantage, only increased the confusion. But the situation was sufficiently threatening to Frederick. A Russian army under Apraxin entered East Prussia, defeated Marshal Lehwald at Gross-Jägersdorf

(August 30) and devastated the province with relentless barbarity. At the same time Swedish troops were sent to Stralsund, and prepared to attempt the recovery of their former possessions in Pomerania.

It was impossible for Frederick to remain inactive while his territories were exposed to invasion at four different points. All his efforts to force the Austrians to give him battle had proved unavailing. Leaving Bevern to oppose Charles of Lorraine and Daun as best he might, he himself marched to Thuringia to oppose the armies of France and the empire. On the news of his approach, Soubise compelled Hildburghausen to retire against his will to Eisenach. Frederick's march was interrupted by the news that Hadik, a Hungarian officer, had led a body of light cavalry to Berlin, and had even levied a contribution on the capital. But the affair proved to be a mere raid, and had no political or military importance. The slight retrograde movement of the Prussians was to some extent advantageous, as it emboldened the enemy to leave the hilly country round Eisenach and to risk an engagement. They had received reinforcements from Richelieu under the duke de Broglie. At Rossbach (November 5) Frederick with 22,000 men utterly routed the allied army, which was more than twice as large as his own. The battle was a turning-point in the history of Europe. The projected humiliation of Prussia, which so lately seemed inevitable, was in a moment rendered almost impossible. On every side the tide of victory turned. The Russian general Apraxin retired from East Prussia, probably because the Czarina's illness offered the prospect of a change of rulers, and the heir, Peter of Holstein, was certain to desert the Austrian alliance. Lehwald was now enabled to employ his forces against the Swedes, who were speedily driven from all their possessions in Pomerania except Stralsund. Still more encouraging to Frederick was the news from England. Pitt, who had been driven from office by royal dislike in April, was restored three months later by the popular favour. He at once undertook the supreme control of the war. The Convention of Closter-Seven was disavowed, and Frederick was requested to allow prince Ferdinand of Brunswick to take Cumberland's place at the head of the army in Hanover.

There was still one enemy to be faced before Prussia could be regarded as secure. Directly Frederick had marched to Thuringia the Austrians gave up their inactivity, forced Bevern to retire, and drove him before them into Silesia, where he took up his position under the walls of Breslau. While the main army kept watch upon his movements, a detachment undertook the siege of Schweidnitz. At last it seemed likely that Maria Theresa would recover the province whose loss had been her greatest and most keenly felt disaster. Eight days after his victory at Rossbach, Frederick set out to recover the ground that had been lost. But the news that reached him on his march seemed to prove that he came too late. Schweidnitz surrendered, and Charles of Lorraine, spurred to activity by reproaches from Vienna, at last attacked and defeated Bevern at Breslau, and the Silesian capital fell into his hands. Liegnitz, another important fortress, fell, Bevern was taken prisoner, and the Austrians seemed secure of winter-quarters in the heart of Silesia. But, in spite of their successes, they were guilty of serious mistakes. They ought never to have allowed the junction of Bevern's troops with Frederick, which took place at Parchwitz on the 28th of November. The victors of Rossbach inspired their defeated comrades with their own jubilant confidence. On the 5th of December Frederick won the greatest of his victories at Leuthen. The rout of the Austrian army was so complete that no one thought of further resistance. Breslau and Liegnitz surrendered before the end of December, and the whole of Silesia was recovered to Prussia with the exception of Schweidnitz. It had been a very critical year for Frederick the Great. His aggressive campaign had been ruined by the defeat of Kolin, and the Prussian monarchy had been threatened with annihilation. But two great battles had removed the danger, and restored the contending powers to their original position.

§ 9. It is obvious that the war was as far from an end as ever. Various schemes of pacification were proposed, but nothing came of them. On the contrary, the two hostile alliances were more closely cemented. It was all-important for Frederick to retain the support of England, and this was assured by the accession to power of William Pitt. The English interests in the war were purely colonial, and English hostility was directed against France, not against Austria. But Pitt saw clearly that the only chance of success in America and India lay in occupying the energies of France in Europe. This he determined to do, not by employing the chief forces of England on the continent, because they were required elsewhere, but by subsidising the king of Prussia, and thus enabling him to carry on the war after his own resources had been exhausted. This determination frustrated the schemes of Maria Theresa, who hoped to emphasize the division of interest between England and Hanover, and to induce the latter province to assume a neutral attitude. This was rendered hopeless by the successes of the general whom Frederick had sent to Hanover at Pitt's request, Ferdinand of Brunswick. At the beginning of 1758 the French held a commanding position in northern Germany stretching from

Bremen to Brunswick. This position Ferdinand was determined to attack. His task was facilitated by the incompetence of his enemies. Richelieu had been recalled to Versailles, but his successor, Clermont, was still more incapable and inexperienced. By a series of masterly movements the prince of Brunswick, who was backed up by the appearance of Henry of Prussia in the territory of Hildesheim, forced the French to retreat from one line of defence to another, until they finally crossed the Rhine near Emmerich on the 27th of March. In less than six weeks, Hanover, Westphalia and Hesse had been freed from foreign occupation. These events, following as they did upon Rossbach and Leuthen, excited the greatest enthusiasm in England, and removed all danger of opposition to Pitt's policy in parliament. On the 11th of April, 1758, a new convention was concluded between England and Prussia, in which the terms agreed upon at Westminster were confirmed, England promised an annual subsidy of £670,000, and both parties agreed not to come to terms with the enemy without mutual consent.

§ 10. The expulsion of the French from northern Germany convinced the Austrian Government that the desired humiliation of Prussia could not be effected by Austria and France alone. This had in fact been proved by the events of 1757. The victory of Hastenbeck and the Convention of Closter-Seven had brought no proportionate advantage to the Austrian cause. This conviction led naturally to another, that the chief reliance must henceforth be placed upon Russia. Already, directly after the battle of Leuthen, an urgent request had been made at St. Petersburg not only that the Russian attack upon Prussia should be conducted with greater energy, but also that a large contingent of Russian troops should be sent to join the main Austrian army. Both these demands were approved by Elizabeth, who had recovered from her recent illness, and whose enmity against Frederick blazed as fiercely as ever. In January, Apraxin was superseded by Fermor, who at once advanced from Memel, took Königsberg, and by the end of February compelled the whole of Prussia proper to do homage to the Czarina. Other events raised still more sanguine expectations at Vienna. The great obstacle to the efficient interference of Russia in the war had been the chancellor, Bestoujef, who was suspected with justice of having been bribed with English gold. But in the inquiry that was instituted into the conduct of Apraxin disclosures were made which implicated the chancellor. He was proved to have been privy to a plot not only to dethrone the Czarina, but also to exclude her heir Peter of Holstein, and to transfer the government to Peter's wife, Catharine, as regent for her infant son. This discovery, which alienated from him both the chief parties at court, ruined

Bestoujef. He was arrested, deprived of all his offices, and condemned to death, a sentence which Elizabeth commuted to perpetual banishment. But his dismissal brought few of the expected advantages with it. Woronzow, who succeeded to the chief direction of affairs, was more slavishly devoted to his mistress's will, but he had little of Bestoujef's capacity with a large share of his dishonesty. The chief result of the change was the conclusion of a new treaty between Austria and Russia, almost exactly contemporary with the convention between Prussia and England.

§ 11. Meanwhile Frederick had made great preparations for the coming campaign. His strength lay in the concentration of his forces, which made him unable to resist invasion at different points, but on the other hand enabled him by rapid marches to inflict successive blows upon his enemies. His first act was to lay siege to Schweidnitz, which surrendered on the 16th of April, and thus the recovery of Silesia was completed. But Frederick was not content to maintain the integrity of his own territories. In spite of the odds against him, he determined once more to assume the aggressive, in the hope that a conspicuous success would force the court of Vienna to come to terms. Accordingly he astounded the Austrians by suddenly invading Moravia, and on the 5th of May he commenced the siege of Olmütz. But he met with a more determined resistance than he had anticipated. Maria Theresa had at last been induced to withdraw her confidence from Charles of Lorraine, and the command of the Austrian army was entrusted to Daun. A bold attack might have crushed the Prussian forces, but Daun adhered to the cautious tactics in which he excelled. Advancing to the neighbourhood of Olmütz, he threatened Frederick's communications with Silesia, and endeavoured in this way to compel him to raise the siege. But the king obstinately persevered in his enterprise, until the destruction of an important convoy by Laudon, who founded a great reputation in this engagement, rendered it hopeless. On the 1st of July he quitted Olmütz, and marched into Bohemia and thence to Silesia. This march, which he conducted in the face of a vastly superior forces and without disaster, must be regarded as one of his greatest military achievements. But he had failed to carry out the plan he had formed, and this failure forced him to accept the English subsidies, which he had hitherto hoped to dispense with.

The Prussian army was not allowed any rest after its arduous services. The Russians, having completed the conquest of Prussia, had occupied Poland, thus dealing a final blow to French influence in that kingdom, and now threatened to invade Brandenburg and to march upon Berlin. To oppose them there were no troops except those which, under Lehwald, had held Pomerania against the Swedes, and which were now commanded by Dohna. Frederick determined to march in person against the Russians who were besieging Cüstrin. His intimate knowledge of the country served him in good stead, but he found the enemy more formidable than he had anticipated. At Zorndorf a great battle was fought on the 25th of August. The Russians were badly led, but they fought with dogged courage, and it was only the great superiority of the Prussian cavalry under Seydlitz that decided the day after ten hours' hard fighting. The Prussians had suffered great losses, but they had gained their object. Fermor retreated to Poland and gave up all idea of co-operating with the Swedes. Brandenburg was secured from invasion on this side.

No sooner had Frederick overcome one danger than he had to face another. Daun had taken advantage of his absence to enter Lausitz, and had received orders to crush Prince Henry of Prussia and to recover Dresden. He was to be assisted by the army of the Empire, of which Hildburghausen had surrendered the command to the prince of Zweibrücken. A second Austrian army under Harsch had entered Silesia and invested Neisse and Cosel. Daun's invincible sluggishness allowed the favourable moment to escape. By a march of marvellous rapidity Frederick was able to join his brother before the decisive blow had been struck. A series of manœuvres followed, in which Frederick sought to entice Daun from his impregnable position at Stolpen. At last after a month's inactivity Daun left Stolpen on the 5th of October, only to occupy an equally strong position at Kittlitz. Losing all patience at the delay, and anxious to decide matters before the Silesian fortresses could be taken, Frederick disregarded the advice of his generals, and exposed his troops under the Austrian camp by the village of Hochkirch. Daun was not slow to take advantage of the opportunity given him, and attacked the enemy in the early morning. Although taken by surprise, the Prussians fought with desperate courage, and it was only after enduring great losses that the Austrians could claim the victory. As regards results, the battle was more advantageous to Frederick than Daun. The latter thought that he had done enough if he excluded the Prussians from Silesia. But Frederick, who re-formed his army with great celerity, determined on a bold move when he found that Daun declined to follow up his success. Marching right round the Austrians, he hurried off to Silesia, and forced Harsch to raise the siege of Neisse and Cosel. Meanwhile Daun had advanced upon Dresden, which was defended with admirable skill by Schwettau. By another forced march Frederick re-appeared in Saxony, and Daun, giving up the enterprise as hopeless, retired into winter-quarters in Bohemia.

The Prussian successes were completed by the repulse of the Swedish attack on Pomerania.

§ 12. Frederick could hardly have been so successful in 1758 but for the fact that he had nothing to dread from the French. This danger was averted by the successes of the allied army under Ferdinand of Brunswick. After his first achievement in driving the French back to the Rhine, Ferdinand had rested for a time to recruit his exhausted troops. Meantime great efforts were made by France to redeem the recent disasters. The experienced Marshal Belleisle was appointed minister of war, and he took great pains to reform the military administration. It was determined that Clermont should advance at the beginning of July to recover the lost territory. But Ferdinand was the first to move. Early in June he crossed the Rhine, and on the 26th he defeated the French at Crefeld. It seemed probable that the war would be transferred to the old battle-ground, the Netherlands. So great was the danger, that Maria Theresa released the French government from its engagement to send Soubise with a second French army into Bohemia. Soubise, with Broglie as second in command, now invaded Hesse-Cassel. The latter defeated the defending force at Sangershausen, and the province was once more occupied by the French. At the same time Clermont was superseded by the more capable de Contades. Ferdinand found it impossible to continue his advance, and in August he re-crossed the Rhine, followed by the French. The arrival of reinforcements from England enabled the prince to maintain a defensive attitude, and the campaign ended without either side gaining further advantages. Ferdinand had rendered conspicuous service to Prussia, and had established his reputation as a general.

Meanwhile France had entirely lost that superiority at sea which had been obtained at the outbreak of the war. Pitt maintained that his share in the continental struggle was wholly subordinate to the naval and colonial interests of England. He organised a series of attacks on the French coast which were very expensive in proportion to their results, but which were sufficiently galling to a great power, and inflicted considerable damage on the French shipping. More important were the losses inflicted upon French commerce, and the interruption of the connection between France and its colonies. But it was in the colonies themselves that the chief English successes were won. In India the foundations of a new empire were laid by Robert Clive, who took the French settlement of Chandernagore, and won a great victory at Plassy (July, 1757) over the Nabob Surajah Dowlah. In Madras a great effort was made to revive the French power by Lally

Tollendal, who was appointed commander-in-chief in 1758. He captured Fort St. David, the most important of the English fortresses, and razed it to the ground. But his overbearing temper alienated his colleagues, and his ignorant disregard of Indian customs exasperated the natives. He failed in an attack upon Madras, and in 1759 the struggle was finally decided in favour of the English by Coote's victory at Wandewash.

It was in the American war that the greatest interest was felt both by English and French. In 1757 Montcalm with inferior forces had successfully defended Canada against General Loudoun. But Pitt's accession to office entirely changed the aspect of affairs. Loudoun was replaced by Abercrombie, with whom were sent out Amherst, Wolfe, Howe, and other officers chosen for their abilities rather than their standing. In June, 1758, the fortress of Louisburg, with almost the whole of Cape Breton, was captured, and thus the way into Canada was laid open. Abercrombie was repulsed from an attack upon Ticonderoga, but this failure was more than made up for by the capture of Fort Duquesne (November 25), which received the name of Pittsburg. The loss of this fortress cut off the connection between the French territories in Canada and on the Mississippi, and destroyed the greatest danger that had threatened the English colonies.

§ 13. The results of the year 1758 were summed up by Frederick the Great: "Our campaign is ended, and neither side has gained anything except the loss of many brave soldiers, the ruin of several provinces, the plundering and burning of several flourishing towns." A French minister said the same thing in different words: "Whether through ill-luck or through errors, the powers of a great league like ours have no advance to show for the last two years. This is as humiliating to us as it is honourable to our enemies." The Prussian king had more than held his own. His defeat at Hochkirch had served only to show off his brilliant qualities as a leader and the sterling merit of his troops. Against the occupation of East Prussia by the Russians and of Hesse by the French were to be set the retention of Saxony by Frederick, the conquest of the Westphalian bishoprics by Ferdinand of Brunswick, and the colonial successes of the English. Of the allies the greatest sufferer was undoubtedly France, which had the least interest at stake, and which had in fact been involved in the European war by the mere whim of an incompetent king and his mistress. The French treasury was empty, and the loss of colonial trade made it especially difficult to refill it. It was no wonder that these considerations had a depressing effect upon the chief minister, Bernis, who had been a prominent agent in concluding the treaty of Versailles. Throughout the year he had insisted upon the necessity of making peace. But Maria Theresa and Kaunitz refused to listen to such a proposal, and their obstinacy carried the day with Louis XV. and Madame de Pompadour. Conscious that he was incapable of confronting the difficulties of the situation and that his vacillation was losing him his favour at court, Bernis petitioned that the ministry of foreign affairs might be entrusted to Stainville, the French envoy at Vienna, who had lately been created duc de Choiseul. The request was granted, but Bernis soon discovered that he had introduced a rival rather than a colleague. In December he was not only removed from office, but banished from Paris, and Choiseul became chief minister. The new appointment was as unpopular among the French people, who had always hated the war, as it was welcomed at Vienna. Choiseul was a native of Lorraine, his father was in the service of the grand duke of Tuscany, and his accession to office was regarded as a proof that the close alliance between France and Austria was to remain intact. But these expectations were not exactly fulfilled. Choiseul was too able and ambitious to follow slavishly the policy of Bernis or the wishes of Madame de Pompadour. While he was still envoy at Vienna, he had not disguised his conviction that the terms of the treaty of Versailles were far too favourable to Austria, and his first act as minister was to insist on its being revised. Kaunitz was naturally anxious to retain the old provisions, but he was compelled to authorise Stahremberg to open fresh negotiations. The result was the conclusion of two new treaties, one public and the other secret, which were dated the 30th and 31st December, 1758, but were not really signed until March, 1759. By them the former secret treaty was altogether abrogated, and thus France freed itself from the obligation not to make peace until Silesia and Glatz had been recovered. At the same time France engaged to do all in its power to assist in the recovery of these provinces, and to continue the payment of subsidies to Austria and its allies. Nothing was said of any further partition of Prussia in favour of Saxony or Sweden. Neither party was to conclude a separate peace without the other. The scheme of dividing the Netherlands was abandoned. At the same time the family alliance between the Hapsburgs and Bourbons was strengthened by an agreement that the archduke Joseph should marry a princess of Parma, and that the second archduke, who was destined to succeed his father in Tuscany should marry a Neapolitan princess. The new terms were more equitable than those of 1757, but the advantage was still decidedly on the side of Austria. France was bound to continue its exhausting efforts in a continental war which ruined its colonial power and the object of which was to make acquisitions for Austria. It was impossible even to come to terms with England without the consent of the empress-queen. It was no wonder that the Austrian alliance was cordially detested by the French, and that the continuance of the war weakened the hold of the monarchy on its subjects.

§ 14. Successful as Frederick had been, the prospect of affairs in 1759 was by no means encouraging. His territories were so comparatively small that victory was far more exhausting to him than defeat was to his enemies. He contrived to raise his army to its old numbers, but the new recruits were by no means equal to the veterans he had lost. The military superiority of the Prussian troops was a thing of the past; his own genius and the ability of the officers he had trained were the only advantages left. And he was in serious straits for want of money. His father's hoards had long been consumed, the English subsidies and the ordinary taxes were insufficient to defray his enormous expenses. To raise supplies he had to resort to the debasement of the coinage, and other measures which could only be excused by extreme necessity. In 1759 he realised for the first time that it was impossible for him to act on the offensive. He must wait for his enemies, and then do all in his power to resist invasion. But he allowed himself one blow against the enemy. Prince Henry made a successful inroad into Bohemia, destroyed the Austrian magazines, and then turning into Franconia, he drove the army of the empire back to Bamberg and Würzburg, whence he was recalled to the defence of Saxony. Daun had collected a large army with which he hoped to reduce Silesia, and, if possible, to recover Saxony, but he refused tc move until the Russians had advanced to the Oder, and for two months Frederick remained inactive on the Silesian frontier.

Elizabeth of Russia had transferred the command of her army from Fermor to the inexperienced Soltykoff, who delayed the opening of the campaign till the summer. At last he marched from the Vistula through the unfortunate Poland, and at Züllichau he crushed a detachment of Prussian troops under Wedell. The Russians now laid siege to Frankfort-on-the-Oder, and Frederick saw that he must march against them in person unless he wished to give up Brandenburg and Berlin to the enemy. Before he could arrive, the Russians had been reinforced by 20,000 Austrians under Laudon, so that their numbers were now 80,000 to Frederick's 50,000. In spite of his inferior forces the king did not hesitate to attack their strong position at Kunersdorf (August 12th, 1759). At first the headlong valour of the Prussians carried all before them, and the battle might have been won, if Frederick had only desisted from further hostilities, But he was determined to annihilate the enemy, and forced his exhausted troops to attack the last intrenchments. The attack was repulsed, and a well-judged charge of the Austrian cavalry under Laudon turned the defeat into an utter rout. Frederick, who had recklessly exposed his life on the field, was with difficulty induced to fly. For a short time he fell into complete despair and even meditated suicide. But he was saved by the action of the enemy. The Russians might have advanced into the heart of Brandenburg, but they thought that they had done enough for their allies, and determined to leave the completion of their work to Daun. Frederick soon found himself once more at the head of a considerable force, and the return of the Russians to the Vistula removed the most immediate danger that threatened him. The only direct result of the battle of Kunersdorf was the loss of great part of Saxony. There were no troops to defend the province, and the imperialists had no difficulty in compelling Leipzig, Torgau, and even Dresden to capitulate. The Prussians hastened to repair these losses, but they were unable to take Dresden, which Daun undertook to defend. To harass the Austrians, Frederick sent 12,000 men under Finck to cut off their communications with Bohemia. The expedition was as unlucky as it was ill-judged. Daun surrounded Finck's troops with vastly superior numbers, and forced him to capitulate at Maxen (November 21st). This was a final blow to Frederick, whom the events of 1759 had brought to the verge of ruin.

§15. It was fortunate for Frederick that the war was more successful in the west of Germany than in the east. Choiseul had conceived the bold scheme of recovering the French colonies by invading England itself and by conquering Hanover. The latter project was foiled by Ferdinand of Brunswick. The French had two armies in the field, one under Contades, and the other under the duke de Broglie, who had succeeded Soubise. Ferdinand determined to anticipate attack, and marched into Hesse against Broglie. But at Bergen (April 13th) he was defeated and compelled to retire into Westphalia. The two French armies were now united, and their combined strength carried all before it. Minden was taken, and Ferdinand saw that the only way of saving Hanover was to fight a battle. By masterly manœuvres he enticed the enemy into the open country, and won a complete victory on the 1st of August. The French only escaped annihilation through the extraordinary refusal of Lord George Sackville to lead the cavalry into action. For this conduct he was subsequently tried by court-martial and dismissed from the service. The battle of Minden secured to the allies the possession of Westphalia, and further operations drove the French from Hesse.

Still more conspicuous was the failure of Choiseul's other grand scheme, the direct invasion of England. Never did the English vindicate their claim to naval supremacy more convincingly than in 1759. The Toulon fleet was destroyed by Boscawen in the battle of Lagos (August 17), and three months later Hawke gained a still more complete victory over the Brest fleet off Quiberon (November 20). But the greatest English success was the capture of Quebec, an enterprise which cost the life of the two rival commanders, Wolfe and Montcalm. With the latter perished the last hope of maintaining Canada for France. These disasters forced upon Choiseul the conviction that peace was an absolute necessity. It had been a great disadvantage to France that no help was to be obtained from Ferdinand VI. of Spain. But in August, 1759, Ferdinand died, and the crown passed to Charles of Naples, who was married to a daughter of Augustus of Saxony, and who had never forgotten the way in which England had treated him during the Austrian succession. He was also under an obligation to Maria Theresa, who had enabled him to leave Naples and Sicily to his younger son, whereas by previous treaties they ought to have passed to his brother Philip of Parma. These were substantial grounds for expecting that he would give cordial support to France. But, on the other hand, Charles III. was vividly impressed with the traditional hostility of the Bourbons to the Hapsburgs, and he resented the new French policy of alliance with Austria. It was unadvisable for a new king to excite the hostility of England, and Charles contented himself at first with offering his services as a mediator. Choiseul was anxious to conclude a separate treaty with England which should detach that power from the continental war. But Pitt, in his loyalty to his ally, rejected the proposal with decision. Prussia and England, however, proved their desire for peace by issuing a joint declaration at Ryswick (October, 1759) in which they suggested the summons of a European congress to settle all dispute. But the suggestion was taken as a proof of weakness, and Russia and Austria refused to listen to it. Maria Theresa had to pay a heavy price for the faithfulness of her northern ally. The Czarina demanded some compensation for her exertions in the war, and Austria was compelled with great unwillingness to sign the Schuwalow treaty (March 21, 1760), by which Russia was to retain permanent possession of Prussia proper and Danzig. This arrangement was in the highest degree irritating to France, which had always posed as the opponent of Russian influence in northern Europe, and it threatened ruin to the smaller powers on the Baltic, Sweden and Denmark.

§ 16. 1760 was the last great year of the war, the last in which pitched battles were fought and strenuous exertions made by the various powers. The main armies of Prussia and Austria had wintered side by side in Saxony. As usual, Daun was inert and sluggish, and the campaign was opened in Silesia by his more active colleague Laudon. Laudon was opposed by one of Frederick's favourite generals, Fouqué, who left his position at Landshut on the approach of the Austrians. Frederick ordered him to hold the position at all hazards, and Fouqué obeyed with the blind obedience that was required of Prussian generals. The result was a disaster hardly inferior to that of Maxen. Fouqué's troops refused to surrender, and fought with the courage of despair against three times their number (June 23). In the end they were annihilated, Fouqué was captured, and Laudon was enabled to take the fortress of Glatz. But Breslau, which he next attacked, made a resolute and successful resistance. Silesia now became the chief scene of hostilities. A large Russian force crossed the Oder and entered the province. Frederick himself hurried up from Saxony, and Daun followed hard upon him. A junction of the three hostile armies must have resulted in the loss of Silesia. But Frederick was saved by Daun's inactivity, which enabled him to fall upon Laudon and to defeat him at Liegnitz (August 15) before assistance arrived. The victory averted the danger for the moment. The king could march to Breslau, the Russians retired without effecting anything, and a junction was impossible. But Frederick's position was not encouraging. A large force of Russians and Swedes were besieging Kolberg, the key of Pomerania, and an Austrian and Russian detachment had entered Brandenburg, marched upon Berlin, and for the second time levied contributions upon Frederick's capital. And the campaign in Silesia had left Saxony undefended. This was taken advantage of by the imperial troops, who took the strong fortress of Torgau and almost drove the Prussians from the whole electorate. These dangers forced the king to quit Silesia, and again Daun, whose Fabian tactics were wholly unsuited to existing circumstances, marched after him. But on the news of Frederick's approach the enemy evacuated Berlin, and at the same time the garrison of Kolberg succeeded in repulsing the besiegers. Frederick now turned fiercely upon Daun, who occupied an almost impregnable position near Torgau, and here the last pitched battle of the war was fought (November 3). The Prussians stormed the entrenchments with devoted courage, but the tremendous cannonade of the Austrians forced them to retreat each time. Daun had even sent tidings of his victory to Vienna, when Ziethen with the reserves joined Frederick, and a last assault was ordered. After a contest in which each side suffered terribly, the Austrian position was carried, and Daun retreated upon Dresden, where he went into winter-quarters. The campaign had been exhaustive to all the combatants, but it had made no essential differences in their relative positions. Frederick had not been driven out of Silesia or of Saxony, but neither had the Austrians.

§ 17. In western Germany the events of 1760 were equally indecisive. The French under Broglie, the ablest of their rather inferior commanders, recovered their hold on the unfortunate province of Hesse-Cassel; but all attempts to reduce Westphalia and Hanover were repulsed by the superior strategy of Ferdinand of Brunswick, who gained a small success at Warburg (July 31). The exertions of the French were absolutely resultless, except so far as they exhausted the resources of the government and made it more anxious to conclude a peace. In the colonies England continued its uninterrupted successes, and the surrender of Montreal (September 8, 1760), and of Pondichéry (January 26, 1761) finally established English rule in Canada and in India. But the most important event in English history was the death of George II. (October 25, 1760) and the accession of his grandson, George III. The new king, who had been brought up under the influence of his mother and of her favourite Lord Bute, was anxious before everything to overthrow the Whig domination, and as a first step to get rid of the present ministry of Pitt and Newcastle. To effect this it was absolutely necessary to end the war, as the nation would not entrust its conduct to any one but Pitt. No immediate change was made in foreign policy, but from this time influences were at work which had a distinct influence on the continental war.

IV. CONCLUSION OF THE WAR.

§ 18. The winter was spent in discussing a proposal to hold a congress at Augsburg, but nothing came of it, and the war had to be resumed. All the powers were exhausted by the efforts they had made. Even Austria found it necessary to diminish its military establishment. The general exhaustion is evident in the conduct of the various campaigns, which cease to have any notable importance. In Silesia Frederick held his own against an Austrian army under Laudon and the Russians under Buturlin. The two commanders found it impossible to agree, and the Prussians reaped the benefit of their disunion. But in October Laudon succeeded in taking Schweidnitz, and this success enabled the enemy to take up their winter-quarters in Silesia. In Saxony Prince Henry commanded for his brother, and contrived to hold his own without fighting a battle against Daun, whose caution seemed to increase as the war made on. In the west a great effort was made by the French, and Broglie was reinforced by a second army under Soubise. The joint numbers were now nearly 150,000, but they made little progress. Ferdinand of Brunswick defeated them at Bellinghausen and foiled all Broglie's attempts to advance beyond Hesse. In the north the siege of Kolberg was recommenced by the Russians, who took the fortress in December after an obstinate defence, and thus established their hold upon eastern Pomerania. But they failed to reduce Stettin, and the advance of the Swedes was checked by the Prussians under Belling. In June, 1761, the English captured Dominique in the West Indies, and Belleisle on the coast of France.

§ 19. Throughout the year negotiations had been carried on between England and France. But Pitt's demands were very exorbitant, and it was evident that he aimed at the complete annihilation of the French naval power. Choiseul now redoubled his endeavours to drag Spain into the war. Charles III.'s indignation against England had been constantly increasing, and in June the French envoy demanded on behalf of Spain the restoration of some prizes taken by the English, the acknowledgment of Spanish rights to the fishing in Newfoundland, and the withdrawal of English settlements from Honduras. These demands were rejected by Pitt, and in August a new Family Compact was arranged between the two Bourbon powers. It was agreed that Spain should declare war against England if peace were not arranged by May, and France and Spain guaranteed to each other their respective possessions. The existence of this treaty was suspected in England, and Pitt proposed to anticipate hostilities by declaring war against Spain, and by sending expeditions to Havannah and Martinique. But the enemies of the minister seized this opportunity to effect his downfall. The proposal was rejected by the council, and on the 5th of October Pitt resigned. Newcastle remained nominally prime minister, but Bute became the real head of the government. Circumstances, however, forced the minister to follow Pitt's policy. In January, 1762, war was formally declared with Spain, which had already prepared an expedition into Portugal. The successes of the English arms were as brilliant as ever. Martinique was taken in February, and in August Havannah was captured. English auxiliaries helped to expel the Spaniards from Portuguese territory. In Germany Ferdinand of Brunswick took the aggressive against the French, who were commanded by d'Estrées and Soubise, drove them out of Hesse to the Rhine, and recovered Cassel.

§ 20. In spite of these successes Bute clung obstinately to his desire for a peace, without which his ministry was insecure. He declined to continue the Prussian subsidies, and left Frederick face to face with the European coalition. This desertion inspired

Frederick with a permanent distrust of England and its parliamentary constitution. He was only saved from destruction by a stroke of extraordinary good fortune. On the 5th of January, 1762, Elizabeth of Russia died, and Peter of Holstein became czar as Peter III. He had always been a devoted admirer of Frederick the Great, and he signalised his accession by breaking with Austria and withdrawing his troops from Silesia. Not content with this, he proposed a defensive and offensive alliance with Prussia, which was concluded on the 5th of May. Without Russian support the Swedes were powerless, and they also made peace at Hamburg (May 22). For a moment the prospect was opened to Frederick of revenging himself upon his enemies. Leaving his brother to continue the war in Saxony, he marched into Silesia to attempt the recovery of Schweidnitz. The Russian troops under Czernitscheff, which had so lately opposed him, now returned to his assistance. But these favouring circumstances were not of long duration. In less than six months Peter succeeded in alienating every class and every interest in Russia. His wife, Catharine, who had long aspired to rule, seized the opportunity of effecting a revolution at St. Petersburg. On the 9th of July Peter was deposed, imprisoned, and soon afterwards murdered. Catharine ascended the throne, and naturally abandoned her husband's policy. The Russian troops were recalled, and Frederick was left once more to his own resources. But Catharine resolutely refused to renew the alliance with Austria, and accepted the peace which Peter had arranged with Prussia. Frederick was more than a match for Austria alone. In October he forced Schweidnitz to surrender, and thus recovered some of the lost ground in Silesia. At the same time Prince Henry defeated the imperial army at Freiburg, and Prussian troops made another raid against the German states which had helped Maria Theresa, took Bamberg and Nuremberg, and terrified the diet at Ratisbon into making a formal declaration of neutrality. A truce was arranged both for Silesia and Saxony, and this practically terminated open hostilities.

§ 21. Meanwhile the negotiations between England, France and Spain had been hurried on and brought to a conclusion in November in the preliminaries of Fontainebleau, which were converted into the final Peace of Paris on the 10th of February, 1763. The terms were extremely favourable to England, but not so favourable as the events of the war would have justified or as might have been obtained if Pitt had been still in office. For instance, Manilla and the Philippine Islands, which were captured before the preliminaries were signed, were surrendered without any compensation whatever. The islands which were restored to France and Spain were more valuable than those which were retained. Some of Bute's colleagues remonstrated against the way in which lawful advantages were thrown away in the determination to effect a peace. But, with all deductions, the treaty was a triumph for England and marks a great era in the history of her maritime and colonial power. France restored Minorca, the first and greatest of her conquests, and surrendered the whole of Canada, Nova Scotia, and Cape Breton. The Mississippi was fixed as the boundary of English territory in the west, and Spain purchased the restoration of Havannah by ceding Florida. The Spanish claim to share in the Newfoundland fisheries was withdrawn, but France retained its rights. England kept Senegal, Grenada, St. Vincent, Dominique and Tobago, but restored to France Belleisle, Goree, Guadaloupe, Martinique and St. Lucia. In India, all conquests made since 1749 were restored, but the French possessions were to be merely commercial factories, and they were forbidden to erect fortifications or to maintain troops. Dunkirk, an old bone of contention, was to be placed in the condition required by the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle.

The treaty of Paris terminated the war in western Germany, as the allied army was broken up by the withdrawal of the English contingent, and the French agreed to evacuate all their conquests. Prussia and Austria were now left face to face, and it was obvious that peace could not be long delayed. Maria Theresa could expect nothing but loss from the continuance of the war under existing conditions, and she was forced to abandon the scheme of reducing Prussia to powerlessness. Augustus of Saxony was eager for a peace which should restore to him the electorate from which he had been excluded for six years. The diplomatists met at his castle of Hubertsburg, where the treaty was signed on the 15th of February, 1763. Maria Theresa had demanded at first that she should retain Glatz, and that some compensation should be given to Saxony. But Frederick was determined not to sacrifice an inch of territory, and his iron will prevailed. The suggestion that the fortifications of Glatz should be dismantled he also rejected. Ultimately the treaty restored matters exactly to their position before the war. Maria Theresa resigned all territorial claims, and practically renewed the previous treaties of Berlin and Dresden. By a secret article Frederick pledged himself to give his vote for the election of the archduke Joseph as King of the Romans. To Augustus III. Frederick promised to evacuate Saxony, and the demand for compensation was dropped.

From a purely European point of view the great result of the war was the elevation of Prussia to an equality with Austria, and the consequent establishment of a dual leadership in Germany. This was entirely due to the marvellous endurance and military genius displayed by Frederick, who had held his own against the three great powers of Europe and emerged from the struggle without loss, and with a well-merited reputation. But regarding the war as an episode in the world's history, its great significance lies in the decision of the quarrel between England and France for the New World in the east and west. The definite establishment of the English power in India and the exclusive assumption of North America by the Anglo-Saxon race, are events of the most far-reaching and stupendous importance. At the same time the English conquest of Canada prepared the way for another great event, the revolt of the American colonies. By removing all dangers from the French it destroyed the one great motive for dependence upon England, while the expenses incurred in the war necessitated those schemes of taxation which proved the ultimate occasion of the revolt. There is one other result of the war which ought not to be overlooked, the humiliation of France, which for a time loses its place among the great powers, and the alienation of the French people from the monarchy. The Austrian alliance was the work of Louis XV. and Madame de Pompadour, and it is significant of the change of popular sentiment that this in itself was enough to make the war hateful to the nation.

CHAPTER XX.

EUROPE AFTER THE PEACE OF HUBERTSBURG.

I. SOUTHERN EUROPE AND THE FALL OF THE JESUITS.—§ 1. Influence of Literature in the 18th century. § 2. Choiseul's ministry in France; Madame du Barry; fall of Choiseul; the *Parlement Maupeou;* death of Louis XV. § 3. Spain under Charles III.; Pombal's ministry in Portugal; expulsion of the Jesuits. § 4. Expulsion of the Jesuits from France and Spain; attitude of the papacy; suppression of the Order by Clement XIV.; subsequent history of Spain and Portugal. II. EASTERN EUROPE AND THE FIRST PARTITION OF POLAND.—§ 5. Austria after the war; accession of Joseph II. to the empire. § 6. Frederick's administration in Prussia. § 7. Policy of Catharine II. § 8. Constitution of Poland; question of the succession; interests of the European states. § 9. Death of Augustus III.; election of Stanislaus Poniatowski. § 10. Russian supremacy in Poland; proposal of religious toleration; Confederation of Radom; reforms. § 11. Indignation of the Poles; Confederation of Bar; Russia at war with Turkey; policy of Frederick; Russian successes against the Turks. § 12. Interviews between Frederick and Joseph II.; Prussian proposals at St. Petersburg; the treaty of partition; treaty of Kutschuk Kainardji. III. THE BAVARIAN SUCCESSION.—§ 13. Aggressive policy of Joseph II. § 14. Extinction of the Bavarian line; claims of Joseph II.; opposition of Prussia; treaty of Teschen. IV. JOSEPH II. AND THE LEAGUE OF PRINCES.—§ 15. Administration of Maria Theresa; accession of Joseph II.; his domestic reforms; his policy in Germany; discontent of the princes. § 16. Attitude of Prussia; alliance between Austria and Russia; Catharine's aggressions in Turkey. § 17. Project to exchange the Netherlands for Bavaria; the *Fürstenbund;* death of Frederick II. V. THE EASTERN QUESTION, 1786–1792.—§ 18. Character of Frederick William II. of Prussia; intervention in Holland; treaties of the Hague. § 19. Relations of Joseph II. and Catharine II.; renewal of Russo-Turkish war; Hertzberg's policy. § 20. The eastern war; Sweden attacks Russia; treaty of Werela. § 21. Prussia at the head of a great coalition; question of war with Austria; death of Joseph II.; skilful administration of Leopold II.; treaty of Reichenbach; treaties of Sistowa and Jassy. VI. THE SECOND AND THIRD PARTITIONS OF POLAND.—§ 22. Alliance of Poland and Prussia; reform of the Polish constitution; attitude of the neighbouring states; the Confederation of Targowicz; death of Leopold II.; the new constitution abolished. § 23. Catharine II. negotiates the Second Partition with Prussia; indignation of Austria; diet of Grodno. § 24. Revolt of Kosciusko; failure of Prussian intervention; Russia puts down the revolt; the Third Partition; *finis Poloniæ.*

I. Southern Europe and the Fall of the Jesuits.

§ 1. A period of comparative peace followed the treaties of Paris and Hubertsburg, and at the same time the history of Europe loses the unity that has characterised it since the formation of the great league against Louis XIV. England abdicates the commanding position which it had assumed under Pitt, and its energies are absorbed in domestic questions, such as the Wilkes quarrel, or in attempting to suppress the rising liberties of the American colonies. On the continent the great powers divide themselves into two great leagues; in the south the Bourbon states held together by the Family Compact, in the north and east, Russia, Prussia and Austria. In the north, the all-absorbing question is the succession to the Polish crown, which we must consider subsequently. In the south, historical interest centres rather in the men of letters than in political events. In the fifteenth century, literature had for the first time become a living force, had broken through the trammels of mediæval ideas, and had given birth to the Reformation. The idea of individual liberty then established had never been developed to its logical extent. With the Catholic reaction and the splitting up of the Protestants into rival sects a period of stagnation had set in. In most of the countries of Europe absolute governments had been set up, and literature had become subservient and therefore degraded. In France there had been one conspicuous movement of opposition, that of Jansenism. But the Jansenists were only partially progressive, and their opinions never emancipated themselves from the bonds of sect and class. One country alone, England, had maintained the struggle for liberty, and had thus preserved the independence of literature. With the English philosophers, especially Hobbes and Locke, originated most of the ideas which spread to France in the eighteenth century and there became productive of vast political results. It is impossible here to treat of the great philosophic movement which connects itself with the names of Voltaire, Montesquieu, and Rousseau. Voltaire was the great distinctive teacher of the new school. In almost every form of literature he excelled his contemporaries, and in all his numerous writings he brought the keen edge of his satire to bear upon the ordinary conceptions of religion, politics, and society. The lesson for which posterity owes him gratitude is one which he vindicated in practice as well as in theory, that philanthropy ought to be one of the aims of government, that the welfare of the subjects is higher than even the interests of a ruling family or the privileges of a class. Montesquieu, in his *Lettres Persanes*, struck a vein of satire as effective though more genial than Voltaire's, and in his *Esprit des*

Lois he introduced the historical method of enquiry which was destined to prove the most powerful solvent of traditional errors. But the most influential teacher of the century was Rousseau, who inspired men with a passion for the old free life of nature, and who developed as the basis of a new social organisation the theory of Hobbes, that royal authority originated in a contract between king and people. The new spirit inspired by these writers found ready acceptance in the literary coteries that were so prominent a feature of Parisian society. In every department of learning their influence was visible. Buffon begins a new era in natural science. Condillac and Helvetius develop the philosophy of mind and morals. Diderot, d'Alembert and the Encyclopædists apply the new doctrines to every subject. Of special practical importance are the advances made in political economy. The mercantile system, which had so long regulated the relations of Europe, received a fatal blow from the dteaching of Quesnai, Turgot, and Aam Smith. Nor was the new spirit confined to men of letters. Frederick of Prussia, Catharine of Russia, and Joseph II., with a number of smaller sovereigns and statesmen, prided themselves on being the leaders of a new movement. The attempt to force enlightenment upon their subjects by a paternal government was naturally not altogether successful, but it produced indirect results which were not without influence upon the subsequent course of history. Even in the states of southern Europe, where the Catholic reaction had fully worked itself out, the new ideas found at any rate temporary admission. Their most conspicuous achievement was the destruction of the order of the Jesuits, the aggressive champions of Catholicism. In the last century the Jesuits had had to face a bitter and resolute attack from the Jansenists, and though they had emerged successfully from the contest, their credit and influence had been seriously impaired. The renewal of the onslaught in the eighteenth century was not solely due to the progress of enlightenment. The Jesuits had mixed themselves up in commerce, had employed their influence to obtain privileges and monopolies, and had thus become possessed of enormous wealth. They had utilised their position as missionaries to acquire political power in the colonies, and in some cases, as in Paraguay, they had formed a state in complete practical independence of the home government. These commercial and colonial establishments brought them into collision with the secular power even in countries where the desire for reform was altogether non-existent.

§ 2. The most important of the southern states were France and Spain, both ruled by Bourbon princes. France remained after the conclusion of the peace under the domination of Madame de

Pompadour and Choiseul, and when the king's mistress died in 1764, the minister's position was unshaken. Choiseul's great ambition was to revive the naval power of France, so as to recover what had been lost to England during the war. Domestic affairs he was willing to subordinate to foreign politics. But his designs were never destined to be realised. As a minister he compares very favourably with his immediate predecessors and successors, and personally he was honourable and patriotic, but he did very little for France. At home he was worried by the question of the Jesuits, and the incessant quarrels with the Parliament of Paris which fill up the history of France during the century. The Parliament set itself in opposition to the unlimited exercise of the royal power in taxation and in the administration of justice, and especially against the practice of arbitrary imprisonment by means of *lettres de cachet.* But unfortunately its opposition was dictated by the interests, not of the people, but of the privileged classes, and its success or failure was a matter of little moment to the bulk of the people. Choiseul tried to compromise matters by making slight concessions, but the reconciliation was purely temporary. Abroad, France made two acquisitions of territory during his ministry. Lorraine fell in to the crown on the death of Stanislaus Leczinski in 1766, and in 1768 Genoa, unable to put down the revolt of Pascal Paoli, sold Corsica to the French, who took possession in the next year, after crushing the rebels with relentless severity. Soon afterwards Choiseul was deprived of office, and his fall marks a new degradation in the history of France. Louis XV. lost his wife, Marie Leczinska, in 1768, and after a brief period of remorse fell into worse debauchery than ever. His new mistress, Madame du Barry, was a degraded woman belonging to the lower classes, but she obtained complete ascendency over the brutalised king. Even the most submissive of French courtiers shuddered with horror at this novel infamy, and Choiseul's pride refused to bend before the new favourite. On the 24th of December, 1770, he received a curt letter from the king dismissing him from all his offices, and ordering his immediate retirement to his estates.

He was succeeded by a triumvirate, consisting of Maupeou, the chancellor, the Abbé Terrai, minister of finance, and d'Aiguillon, who had charge of foreign affairs. Maupeou, the guiding genius of the government, neglected foreign affairs in order to put down discontent at home. His measures were characterised by brutality and resolution. As the Parliament of Paris continued its opposition to the royal will, it was abolished, and the provincial parliaments shared the same fate. A council of seventy-five nominees of the crown was appointed for Paris and received the nickname of the

Parlement Maupeou. To supervise the administration of justice in the provinces six *conseils supérieurs* were created for the chief local centres. It is significant to notice that the liberal party hesitated whether to deplore or welcome the change. Voltaire and some of his associates approved the action of Maupeou. The Parliament had been a close privileged institution, and its members held office by the payment of a recognised bribe. The new judicial system, if less independent, was more prompt in action and less expensive. On the other hand, the mass of the people felt, and felt rightly, that it was better to have some restraint upon the royal power even if that restraint was often exercised from selfish motives. Louis XV. had entirely lost the popularity that had once given him the name of the *Bien-aimé.* His death was now as eagerly desired as his life had been in 1744. His son, a gloomy reactionary, had died in 1765, leaving three sons, all of whom subsequently came to the throne as Louis XVI., Louis XVIII., and Charles X. On the 10th of May, 1774, Louis XV.'s death gave the crown to his eldest grandson, and relieved France of one of the most worthless kings the world has seen. "He had lived 64 years, and reigned 59; he had passed his life in destroying little by little the prestige which the two great Bourbon kings, Henry IV. and Louis XIV., had given to modern royalty, a prestige already much weakened in the old age of Louis the Grand."

§ 3. The throne of Spain had been occupied since 1759 by Charles III., who had learned to rule in his previous kingdom of Naples, and who carried with him the affection and respect of his former subjects. Charles was by no means a partisan of the new philosophical ideas; he was a devoted adherent of the church, but at the same time he had an exaggerated idea of the royal power and a firm determination to maintain and advance it. In Naples, with the help of his minister Tanucci, he had restricted the exercise of the papal supremacy, forced the clergy to contribute to the taxes, and struck a blow at the feudal system which had so long flourished in the kingdom. When the death of his half-brother, Ferdinand VI., gave him the Spanish crown, he left Naples to his third son, Ferdinand IV., and entrusted the government during the minority to Tanucci, who carried it on on the old lines. In Spain, Charles III. continued the same policy of putting an end to those exclusive privileges and pretensions, whether of the church or the nobles, which stood in the way of royal absolutism. It was this which brought him into collision with the Jesuits, whom he would otherwise have been unwilling to attack.

But the first blow against the order had already been struck in a state which they had learnt to regard as their special property.

Under John V. (1706–1750) Portugal had fallen into complete insignificance. The wealth produced by its commerce passed mostly into the hands of the English. The government was carried on by ecclesiastics, the people were slaves to the grossest superstitions. John's successor, Joseph I. (1750–1777), was not a whit more enlightened than his father. On the contrary, he was absorbed in vicious pleasures, and left the cares of government altogether to a minister who would have obtained a great reputation in history if he had belonged to one of the more important states. This was Sebastian Joseph de Carvalho, better known by his later title of the Marquis de Pombal. He obtained such complete ascendency over the feeble character of the king that he became absolute despot at Lisbon. He employed his power to introduce the most thorough reforms into every department of government, and he enforced them by means that stand in complete contrast to the liberal spirit in which they were conceived. The great obstacle in his way was the opposition offered by the privileged classes, the nobles and clergy, and especially by the Jesuits, who had become all-powerful under the late king. The first opportunity for attacking the order arose from events in South America. By a treaty in 1750 Spain and Portugal agreed to exchange their respective colonies of Paraguay and San Sacramento. The Jesuits, who had made themselves absolute masters of Paraguay, were bitterly hostile to the transfer, and induced the Indians to oppose it with arms. The result was a war which lasted several years, and it was not till 1756 that the resistance of the natives was crushed. The expense which this entailed upon the Portuguese government naturally excited enmity against the order which was responsible for the war. At the same time the Jesuits encouraged the popular discontent roused by the domestic reforms of Pombal. The minister resolved on their destruction. In 1757 the Jesuits were forbidden to approach the court without leave, and in the next year they were prohibited from trading, preaching, and the confessional. Both parties appealed to the pope, but Benedict XIV. died before he had arrived at any decision. His successor, Clement XIII., was a devoted adherent of the Jesuits, and Pombal would hardly have succeeded as he did if terror had not given him the unconditional support of the superstitious Joseph I. In September, 1758, as the king was returning from a visit to the wife of the Marquis of Tavora, he was fired upon and wounded. For three months an enquiry was conducted apparently without success. Suddenly all members of the two great families of Tavora and Aveiro were seized, and in their papers evidence was supposed to be found of a conspiracy against the king and minister. The Jesuits were implicated in the conspiracy, and when the nobles were put to death application was made to the pope to permit the trial and punishment of the priests. As Clement XIII. hesitated to give the desired permission, Pombal took the decisive step of seizing all the Jesuits and transporting them by sea to Civita Vecchia, where they were left to be maintained at the pope's expense (Sept. 1759). The property of the society was confiscated, and this act was followed by a complete breach between Portugal and Rome. Those Jesuits who had been imprisoned for complicity in the plot were tried, and Father Malagrida, a fanatical enthusiast, was executed in 1761. Pombal employed the Inquisition in the interests of the crown, and was thus led to prolong the existence of an institution which otherwise he would probably have suppressed.

§ 4. Meanwhile the example of Portugal had been followed by other countries. A great scandal was caused by the bankruptcy of La Valette, the head of a great Jesuit establishment at Martinique, who had involved himself in considerable mercantile undertakings The credit of the society was immensely shaken by this affair, and Venice and Genoa at once took steps to restrict their privileges. In France the Parliament of Paris undertook to revise the constitutions of the order, and in 1761 issued edicts condemning them as inconsistent with the laws of the realm. The provincial parliaments took the same line, and were supported by the influence of Choiseul and Madame de Pompadour. Clement XIII. tried in vain to stay the storm, and the efforts of the orthodox party headed by the dauphin were equally fruitless. In 1764 a royal edict was issued which abolished the Jesuits in France.

Clement XIII. answered this edict by issuing the bull *Apostolicum pascendi munus*, which renewed the confirmation of the order and denied the truth of the recent charges. The only result of the bull was to intensify the opposition of the secular governments, which were now reinforced by the support of Spain. In 1766 a tax imposed by the finance minister Squillace provoked a rising in Madrid, and Charles III. was compelled to satisfy the populace by dismissing the unpopular foreigner. This was a serious affront to a king, who held a high conception of his prerogative, and when the subsequent enquiry pointed to the Jesuits as the authors of the revolt, Charles's devotion to the church was overcome by the desire for revenge. In April, 1767, an edict was issued which banished all Jesuits from the kingdom, and measures were at once taken to carry this into effect. The unfortunate fathers were crowded into ships and carried to Civita Vecchia. The pope refused to receive them, and it was not until two months of hardship had elapsed that Choiseul allowed them to land in Corsica. The Bourbon states in

Italy followed the example of Spain, and the Jesuits were expelled from the Two Sicilies and from Parma.

Pombal now proposed that the various states should combine to force the hand of the pope, and a rash act of Clement XIII. gave additional weight to his representations. The weakest of the hostile powers was Parma, which, since the death of Don Philip in 1765, was governed by a French nobleman, du Tillot, as regent for the infant duke Ferdinand. The pope, as claiming to be feudal superior of Parma, excommunicated the duke and declared his principality confiscated. The insult to the house of Bourbon was promptly avenged. France seized Avignon and the Venaissin, while the Neapolitans invaded Beneventum. In January, 1769, the ambassadors of Spain, Naples and France demanded the suppression of the order. Before he could give an answer, death removed the pope from the difficulties that had gathered so thickly round him. Great efforts were made by both parties to influence the new election, and the Jesuits nearly succeeded in carrying their candidate. Ultimately the choice of the cardinals fell upon Lorenzo Ganganelli, a moderate man who had declared for neither side. The new pope, who took the name of Clement XIV., hesitated for some years about his decision. On the one side was the persistence of the secular powers, on the other the undisguised threats of the vengeance which the Jesuits would take. Ultimately the pope had to give way when Maria Theresa, orthodox as she was, declined to support the order, and Bavaria, the stronghold of Catholicism, expelled its members. In July, 1773, Clement XIV. issued a brief, suppressing the Jesuits, to the intense delight of the progressive party throughout Europe. But Clement's fears proved to be well-founded. In the next year he was suddenly seized by a fatal illness, and the symptoms left little doubt that he perished of poison. The fall of the Jesuits was not final. The reaction against the excesses of the Revolution gave them before long a new lease of existence.

Pombal continued his reforming activity in Portugal until the death of Joseph I. in 1777, when the crown passed to his eldest daughter Maria, who had married her uncle Don Pedro. The minister who had rendered such services to his country was dismissed, and persecuted by hostile accusations till his death in 1782. The new government adopted a reactionary policy, and Portugal relapsed into its former lethargy. In Spain the reforms of Charles III. were more moderate and therefore more lasting. Two ministers belonging to the liberal party, Campomanes and Florida Blanca, governed the state during his long reign, and after his death in 1788 the latter retained his power for four more years. The outbreak of revolutionary violence in Paris was fatal to the cause of reform in other countries.

II. EASTERN EUROPE AND THE FIRST PARTITION OF POLAND.

§ 5. The policy of Maria Theresa and Kaunitz was unaltered by the disasters of the Seven Years' War. They continued to uphold the alliance with France as the only secure means of counterbalancing Prussia. But Austria had suffered one very severe loss in the defection of Russia. All attempts failed to induce Catharine II. to adopt the same attitude as Elizabeth had done. This compelled Austria to desist from its projects of aggression and revenge, and to direct its efforts to avoid the outbreak of a new war. In 1764 the archduke Joseph was unanimously elected King of the Romans, all difficulties having been removed by the withdrawal of Prussian opposition. In the next year the emperor Francis I. died suddenly. He had been kept in the background by the superior qualities of his wife, and had distinguished himself only in reforming the Austrian finances, a task for which his business capacities and tastes admirably fitted him. Joseph now became emperor, and was appointed by his mother joint-ruler of the Austrian states. His younger brother Leopold succeeded to the grand duchy of Tuscany. From this time the administration at Vienna loses much of its unity. Maria Theresa, as she grew older, became more orthodox and conservative, and more disinclined to commit herself to an energetic foreign policy. Joseph, on the other hand, was an ardent champion of the new ideas, eager for religious toleration and domestic reforms, and ambitious to increase the power that had fallen to him.

§ 6. In Prussia the great problem which Frederick had to solve after the peace of Hubertsburg was to repair the ruin that the war had brought upon his kingdom. He grappled with the difficulty with characteristic energy, and the centralised administration which he had established gave him great advantages in carrying out the work. Fortunately he had avoided running into debt, and had even collected money for a new campaign should it be necessary. Regardless of the lessons of the new political economy, he employed his capital in subsidising industry of all kinds, and he took stringent measures to restrict both the exportation of raw produce and the importation of manufactured goods, so as to make his country self-supporting. His policy was wonderfully successful within certain limits, and Prussia owed to him the revival if not the creation of its industrial prosperity. But he could never have done this if he had not been careful to maintain the peace of which the country stood in such earnest need. To insure peace it was necessary to keep his army on a footing that would inspire respect, and to raise supplies for this purpose he incurred great unpopularity by imposing an excise and by introducing French officials to organize and collect the tax. But he also needed allies. France and Austria were suspicious and their friendship was not to be relied upon. England was distrusted by Frederick ever since Bute had succeeded in ousting the ministry of Pitt, and moreover England had withdrawn to a great extent from continental politics. It was therefore a great relief to the king when Russia proffered her support. He eagerly accepted the overtures made to him, and was willing to risk considerable sacrifices to maintain an alliance on which the security of Prussia and the duration of peace equally depended.

§ 7. In spite of the ease with which the revolution of 1762 had been accomplished, Catharine II. was far from feeling secure upon the Russian throne. She was anxious to carry out those reforms, religious and political, which had roused such a storm against her husband. The result was wide-spread disaffection, and the foreign envoys reported that the new government was not likely to last long. But Catharine had gained over the soldiers, and she took prompt measures to check a rising. The unfortunate Iwan VI. had been imprisoned ever since 1740. Advantage was taken of a conspiracy for his release to put him to death, and thus a pretender whose birth made him formidable was removed. But Catharine was fully conscious that her position, as a foreigner, could never be really safe until she could identify herself with the hopes and aspirations of the national party. For this end she reverted to the ambitious schemes of Peter the Great and endeavoured to distract the attention of her subjects by a vigorous policy of aggrandisement. Russia had suffered less than the other combatants in the war, and was now the most powerful state of northern Europe. It was Catharine's task to make this power felt and recognised, and she perceived that this could best be accomplished by an alliance with Prussia. France was the old opponent of Russian influence in the north, and though this duty had been recently neglected, there was no doubt that it would be resumed now that the connection with Russia had been severed. To counterbalance the alliance that existed between the Bourbon states and Austria, which had been cemented by several intermarriages, Catharine was anxious to form a great coalition of the north between Russia, Prussia and England.

§ 8. The pivot on which the relations of the eastern states turned at this period was the fortunes of Poland. The time had long passed since Poland had been an object of terror to its German neighbours.

Its decline was due in the first place to internal anarchy. The government was nominally a monarchy, but really a republic, in which the nobles had a monopoly of power. There was no middle class to act as a link between the nobles and the crowd of oppressed and powerless serfs. The constitution, such as it was, rested upon a triple basis; the elective character of the monarchy, which enabled the nobles to make their own terms with the king of their choice; the *liberum veto*, by which a single noble could frustrate the decisions of the diet; and the right of confederation, which authorised any number of nobles to combine to effect an object, if necessary, with arms. The disorder to which such institutions naturally gave rise were complicated by religious differences. In the latter part of the 16th century Poland had become the northern centre of the Catholic reaction, and from that time orthodoxy had been maintained by rigid persecution. In 1733 a decree was passed which declared all non-Catholics incapable of holding any office or even of sitting in the diet. The "dissidents," as they were called, consisted of two chief classes, the Protestants in the western districts, and the adherents of the Greek Church in the east near the borders of Russia. Both had been treated with equal injustice by the dominant sect, and their complaints had given frequent excuses for intervention on the part of foreign powers. For two generations Poland had been ruled by members of the Saxon house, Augustus II. and III. If another member could obtain the succession, the crown might possibly be rendered hereditary. But in Poland itself there was a strong feeling against perpetuating the Saxon connection, and it was also certain that too many foreign interests were involved for the matter to be regulated as a purely domestic question for the Poles.

Perhaps the interest most directly involved in the fate of Poland was that of Prussia. Frederick, though he had few religious convictions, had found it advantageous to follow the example of his father, and to pose as the champion of Protestantism. He was therefore the natural ally of a large number of the Polish dissidents, and was in fact bound by treaty to support them. Again, Saxony was the rival of Prussia in northern Germany, and the two states had recently been engaged in a bitter quarrel. It was a natural wish of Frederick's to prevent his neighbours from obtaining hereditary possession of the Polish crown. But he had still more vital interests at stake. Prussia, the territory from which his kingdom took its name, the modern East-Prussia, had been a Polish fief; and though it had been freed from dependence by the Great Elector, it was cut off from Brandenburg by the considerable province of Polish-Prussia on the western side of the Vistula. The result of this separation was clearly manifest in the recent war, when it had been utterly impossible to defend East Prussia against the Russians, and but for Elizabeth's death the province might have been annexed to the empire of the Czars. It was urgently necessary for Prussia to obtain possession of the intervening territory, and Frederick was from the first eager to arrange a partition of Poland by which he could make the acquisition without exciting alarm and jealousy. But, as matters stood, he could not take the initiative, and was compelled to fall in with the designs of Russia until the opportunity presented itself for effecting his own aims.

Russia was almost as directly interested, and was more determined to execute its intentions. In the Seven Years' War, Poland, in spite of its nominal neutrality, had served as a convenient base of military operations for the Russians. On the conclusion of the peace the troops were withdrawn, but Catharine determined to retain her hold on a province which had been so useful. This could no longer be done directly, but it could be made quite as effective by indirect means. Catharine, like Frederick, wished to exclude the Saxon house from the throne. Saxony was the ally of Austria and France, the two powers which were jealous of the progress of Russia. Moreover Catharine had already quarrelled with Saxony about Courland, where she had replaced the exiled Biren, after expelling Prince Charles, one of the sons of Augustus III., who had been established by Elizabeth in 1759. Her plan was to place a native *piast* on the throne, who should be bound to her by gratitude and by the need of support, and through whom she could practically govern Poland. If possible, she would have preferred to annex the kingdom altogether. Parts of Poland, White Russia, Black Russia and Little Russia, had once belonged to the territory of St. Vladimir, and the national party at St. Petersburg, which the Czarina was anxious to conciliate, was very eager for their recovery. But Catharine was averse to a partition, and an annexation was impossible without forcing on a new European war, so she was content to pursue the more moderate plan, and to wait for favourable circumstances to develop it.

France had at one time had a strong party in Poland. A French prince had once occupied the throne, and several had aspired to the same place. Quite recently Louis XV. had entertained schemes for obtaining the crown for the Prince of Conti. But these plans and the French party had been overthrown by the change of policy effected by Madame de Pompadour and Bernis. Alliance with Austria had compelled France to give up opposing the designs of Russia, and virtually to hand the kingdom over to the rival influence. The marriage of the dauphin to a daughter of Augustus III. had brought France into close connection with the house of Saxony, and it was now proposed to back up the efforts of that house to retain its hold upon Poland. Thus France placed itself in a wholly false and illogical position. Severing itself from its old friends, the party of reform, who wished to strengthen the monarchy and to abolish the *liberum veto*, it allied itself with the adherents of Saxony, the party of anarchy, who wished to perpetuate the old abuses and who arrogated to themselves the name of "patriots." And this line of policy, when once taken up, was not pursued with the energy needed to ensure success. Choiseul was too absorbed in the dream of regaining naval supremacy from England to pay proper attention to affairs in Poland, and when he was at last aware of his error it was too late to remedy it.

Austria acted in concert with France in support of the Saxon claims, and its conduct is open to the same criticism. But Maria Theresa and Kaunitz were resolved not to sacrifice anything for their candidate. The first object of their policy was to avoid a war, the second to prevent a partition of Poland. As long as these were realised they were fairly satisfied to let Catharine have her own way about the election. The bold and decisive attitude assumed by Russia contrasts strongly with the vacillation of Austria and France.

§ 9. In the midst of all the various schemes and intrigues Augustus III. died on the 5th of October, 1763. Catharine was already prepared with her candidate, Stanislaus Poniatowski, one of her former lovers and a nephew of the Czartoriskis, the leaders of the anti-Saxon party among the native Poles. In opposition to them was a strong party opposed to the establishment of Russian influence, and headed by Branitzki and Radziwill. They were inclined to put forward the new elector of Saxony, Frederick Christian, and he would have had the support of Austria and France. But in December, 1763, he followed his father to the grave, and the electorate passed to his son, Frederick Augustus, who was only thirteen years old, and whose election in Poland was impossible. There were two other sons of Augustus III., Xavier and Charles, but neither had a great following in the country. Branitzki himself was put forward as a candidate, and his position as commander of the army gave him considerable advantages. But the party had ceased to be unanimous, and had now a very slight prospect of success. Some of the Poles offered to support Prince Henry of Prussia, but Frederick promptly refused to allow him to come forward. Meanwhile Russian troops had entered Poland to assist the Czartoriskis. Austria and France were provoked by this into issuing a declaration of their intention to maintain the freedom of election (March, 1764). This was answered in the next month by the conclusion of a formal treaty between Catharine and Frederick. Ostensibly only a defensive alliance for eight years, it contained secret articles by which the two sovereigns agreed to protect the dissidents, to maintain the Polish constitution intact, and to bring about the election of a native *piast*. This practically settled the question. France was too far off to interfere otherwise than by diplomacy, and Austria was convinced that the sending of troops into Poland would force Prussia to take a similar step and rekindle the war. The Czartoriskis were anxious to introduce reforms, and especially to abolish the right of veto, but they were prevented by Catharine. The election was decided by the presence of the Russians, and on the 7th of September, 1764, Stanislaus Poniatowski was unanimously chosen by a diet from which the vast majority of electors absented themselves.

§ 10. The election was a great triumph for Russia. The character of the new king, who was full of good intentions but weak and vacillating, seemed to ensure his remaining a submissive tool. Repnin, the Russian ambassador, acted as if he was the real ruler of the country, and he retained the troops in order to enforce his will. Catharine was determined to carry one great measure, the enfranchisement of the dissidents from all the disqualifications that had been imposed upon them. But the task proved even more difficult than had been anticipated. The mass of the Poles were fanatically Catholic, while Stanislaus and the Czartoriskis were eager to introduce constitutional rather than religious reforms. Now that the subservience of Poland seemed assured, Catharine was less unwilling to strengthen the kingdom by putting an end to anarchy than she had been before. But here the interests of Prussia were wholly opposed, and Frederick maintained that though Stanislaus' intentions might be good, yet under his successors a reformed Poland might be a dangerous neighbour. Ultimately Repnin declared that the dissidents must be made eligible to all offices, to the diet and the senate, but that no restriction should be imposed on the *liberum veto*. Stanislaus was obliged to comply against his will, and in the diet of 1766 he brought forward the question of the dissidents. The Russian proposals were so extreme as to provoke a storm of disapprobation. It might have been possible to obtain toleration for the proscribed religionists, but to expect the Catholics to admit their hated opponents to a share in the making and administration of the laws was absurd. Frederick had already seen this, and had vainly urged the Czarina to moderate her demands. The diet was carried away by hostility to foreign intervention, and instead of granting concessions it decided that all the old laws against the dissidents should be maintained intact. The diet was at once dissolved (Nov. 30, 1766).

Catharine was not in the least shaken in her determination by this untoward decision, but she perceived that other means must be found to carry it out. The Czartoriskis had proved themselves insufficient allies, therefore the reform must be effected without, and if necessary against, them. By its attitude in the question of constitutional changes Russia had practically espoused the cause of the "patriots," who wished to retain things as they were. By granting their wishes in this respect it might be possible to induce them to support the wishes of Russia. Repnin set to work to organise confederations of the dissidents in 1767. They were joined by a large number of the patriot party, who were led to expect that the Czartoriskis would be expelled from office and that probably Stanislaus would be deposed. In June the smaller unions were combined into one general confederation at Radom under the leadership of Radziwill, who had been induced to come over to the Russian cause. The presence of Russian troops compelled the confederation to accept an "instrument," by which they undertook to obtain complete religious equality for the dissidents, and requested Russia to guarantee the laws that should be made in the approaching diet. No pains were spared by Repnin to influence the elections by bribes and intimidation, and the diet met in October. But the assembly was not inclined to accept the instrument of Radom unconditionally. It was now manifest that the Czarina did not intend to depose Stanislaus, and the patriots felt that they had been deceived. But opposition was overawed by Repnin, who promptly imprisoned the bishops and the leading malcontents. The diet gave way, appointed a delegation to draw up the proposed reforms, and prorogued itself till it could receive the report. When it met again in February, 1768, it was only to confirm the statutes which the delegation had prepared in the interval under Repnin's dictation. The dissidents were to be placed on an equal footing with the Catholics as regards all political rights, intermarriages were permitted, and all ecclesiastical disputes were to be decided by courts in which Catholics and dissidents were to be equally represented. At the same time new secular laws were drawn up for the constitution of Poland. In all matters of state the necessity of unanimity was retained, except in financial questions when a majority could decide. Some few reforms were introduced: the right of a lord to put his serf to death was abolished, and tribunals were established to adjudicate between the two classes. The diet declared these laws to be perpetual and unalterable; no change could be made even by a unanimous vote in the future.

On the 24th of February the diet, and with it the confederation of Radóm, was dissolved.

Russia had for the moment carried matters with the strong hand, but the latter measures had been disapproved by Frederick. Now that Catharine had established her control over Poland it was her interest to introduce such changes in the state as should make it stronger and more useful to herself. But Frederick had always maintained that Prussia could only be secure while Poland was weak. If this was true when the kingdom was subject to Saxony, it was still more so now that it had fallen under Russian domination. His treaty with Catharine was only for eight years, and when they had elapsed it was quite possible that Russia might employ its ascendency in Poland to attack Prussia.

§ 11. The hopes which the Russians had based upon the decision of the diet proved fallacious. The wildest discontent prevailed in Poland. The Prussian envoy at Warsaw sent the following report to Berlin: "The guarantee of the constitution irritates the Poles even more than the toleration of the dissidents. They fear that they have become a province of Russia. They would submit to a foreign rule; but Russia talks always of their rights and liberties, and then tyrannises over them; this is intolerable to them." In southern Poland the reaction was strongest, and there an enormous number of nobles formed the confederation of Bar, and swore to uphold their religion and their independence. The Russian troops which had begun to leave the country were recalled to put down the opposition, which they did with equal severity and success. But the Poles were not wholly dependent upon their own exertions. The rapid strides made by the Russian power had at last opened the eyes of France to the real significance of events in Poland, and Choiseul was now eager to repair the losses for which his negligence was partially responsible. Not content with encouraging the rebels in every way, he combined with Austria to urge the Turks into war with Russia. In July the Russian troops had pursued the confederates into Turkish territory and destroyed the town of Balta. This occurrence forced the Porte into war, and thus brought about the very result which Frederick had striven to avoid. Hitherto he had watched the course of events with interest but without anxiety, now he strained every nerve to prevent the quarrel becoming a general one. Choiseul made overtures in Berlin with the object of detaching Prussia from the Russian alliance, but Frederick listened to them with something approaching to scorn. But at the same time the Austrian government, at French instigation, made advances to Prussia; and it was arranged that an interview should take place in 1769 between Frederick and the emperor Joseph. This held out considerable advantages to the Prussian king. His great desire was to separate Austria from France, and so form a substantial alliance between Austria, Russia, and Prussia. This could only be effected by bribing the court of Vienna, and now for the first time the idea of a partition presented itself to him as a feasible plan. In January, 1769, he communicated to Solms, his ambassador at St. Petersburg, the outlines of a scheme that had been suggested by Count Lynar, the negotiator of the convention of Closter-Seven. Austria was to help Russia against the Turks, and to receive as a reward Lemberg and the territory of Zips. Frederick himself was to have Polish Prussia and the protectorate of Danzig; and Russia, as compensation for its military expenses, was to take the adjacent part of Poland. The project, which Frederick himself described as "chimerical," was coldly received by the Russian minister, Panin, and was allowed to drop.

By this time the Turkish war had broken out. The Sultan, Mustafa III., was opposed to intervention in Poland; but his hand was forced by a rising in Constantinople, and he declared war against Russia in October, 1768. Hostilities were not commenced till the next year, and they never assumed considerable proportions. The Turkish army was in the last stage of inefficiency, and the Russians, who were wholly unprepared for war, were little better. Galitzin, an incompetent commander, defeated the grand vizier, and took Khoczim after his first attack had been repulsed. His successor, Romanzow, "the Russian Turenne," acted with greater energy. He drove the Turks from Moldavia, and in 1770 he occupied Wallachia, won a great victory over vastly superior numbers at Kaghul, and advanced into the Crimea. At the same time a Russian fleet appeared in the Mediterranean with the avowed intention of restoring Greece to independence. But the admiral, Alexis Orloff, mismanaged the expedition. After encouraging the Greeks to rebel, he left them to the horrors of a Turkish revenge, and sailed towards Constantinople. A victory over the Turkish fleet gave him possession of Chios and other islands of the Archipelago, but he refused, in spite of his English officers, to attempt the passage of the Dardanelles. So far from being able to assist the Poles, the Turks were reduced to the greatest straits, and were compelled to think seriously of peace. In Poland the Russians had easily crushed the confederates of Bar and re-established their hold on the kingdom. Wherever their authority failed to reach, the greatest anarchy prevailed, and Austria took advantage of this to take possession of the territory of Zips, to which it could advance ancient but not very valid claims. This act was resented at St. Petersburg, and was productive of not unimportant results.

§ 12. Meanwhile Joseph had paid Frederick the proposed visit in October, 1769, at Neisse in Silesia. The place was well suited for an interview which was intended on the part of Austria to express its final renunciation of the province for which so much blood had been shed. Both king and emperor were favourably impressed with each other, but the meeting had no great political results. It was an indirect advantage to Frederick, inasmuch as it raised the value of his alliance in the eyes of Russia, and the renewed treaty which was arranged before the end of the year contained stipulations more favourable to Prussia than had been secured in 1764. In the autumn of 1770, Frederick paid his return visit to the emperor at Neustadt, and at this interview, which was politically much more important than the former one, Kaunitz was present. The great subjects of discussion were the affairs of Poland and the Turkish war. No definite agreement was come to, but Kaunitz undertook to state clearly the views and intentions of Austria. The successes of the Russian arms had excited well-founded alarm in Vienna. It would be intolerable if the Russians were allowed to establish themselves in Moldavia and Wallachia on the very frontiers of Austria. Kaunitz declared that any attempt to do this would force Austria into war, which he and Frederick wished to avoid. This was the point at which Austrian and Prussian interests converged. Both powers were eager to arrange a peace, and it was hailed as a fortunate coincidence that during the interview letters arrived in which the Porte solicited the mediation of Austria and Prussia. Frederick undertook to communicate the views of Austria to St. Petersburg, and to support them by his own influence. This important negotiation was entrusted to Prince Henry of Prussia, who arrived in St. Petersburg in October, 1770. It was this embassy that originated the scheme of partition as the best practical method of solving the difficulties. Catharine, referring to the Austrian occupation of Zips, remarked that everybody seemed able to take what they liked in Poland. From this time the arrangement of a partition became the chief object of diplomacy. It was necessary, in order to secure peace, that Russia should resign its Turkish conquests. For this moderation it could only be compensated at the expense of Poland. Prussia, as we have seen, had obvious motives for desiring the acquisition of Polish Prussia, which could be taken as repayment of the subsidies paid to Russia. Austria could best be satisfied with a share of the booty.

The practical advantages of a partition are obvious, and from what has gone before it is equally obvious that no one can be specially accused of having suggested it. The scheme was in the air, and had been so for a long time. John Casimir had prophesied this fate for Poland more than a century ago. Frederick, ever since his accession, had looked forward to it as a dream which he could hardly hope to realise. Even France, which afterwards made the loudest outcry about the injustice of the transaction, was not without responsibility. Choiseul had definitely offered to Frederick Courland and Ermeland as the price of his desertion of the Russian alliance. It is none the less true because it has become a commonplace that Poland deserved no better fate. Its anarchical constitution could not be regarded as a domestic matter, because it invited and practically compelled the intervention of its neighbours. It had become a firebrand in the midst of Europe, and the other powers were justified in taking measures to suppress it.

These considerations may be regarded as justifying the partition itself, but hardly the means which were adopted in carrying it out. For nearly two years the negotiations went on, and finally resolved themselves into a scramble for the largest share of the booty. The chief burden of the diplomacy fell upon Frederick, who had the greatest interest in arranging a permanent peace. Matters were facilitated somewhat by the downfall of Choiseul, whose continuance in office might have altered the course of events. His successor left the eastern powers to settle the matter among themselves. Catharine was stirred to new enmity against Poland by an attempt of the confederates in 1771 to seize the person of Stanislaus. The greatest difficulties were raised by Austria. Maria Theresa was opposed to the partition, but her wishes were overruled by Kaunitz and Joseph. Their demands, however, were so excessive, that a long time was spent in inducing them to moderate them. Ultimately a treaty was signed at St. Petersburg in August, 1772, between the three powers, which virtually settled the matter. Russia obtained Polish Livonia and part of Lithuania, a territory containing 2500 square miles and about a million and a half of inhabitants. To Austria were assigned the county of Zips and the province of Red Russia, about 1300 square miles, with a population of two and a half millions. Prussia renounced Danzig, but took the coveted district of West Prussia, which gave complete control of the Vistula, and the population of which amounted to about 900,000. It only remained to secure the approval of the Polish diet, and this was effected by a combination of bribes and intimidation. The diet met in 1773, was converted into a confederation to avoid the veto, and finally sanctioned the treaty in September. The three powers had already sent troops to occupy the shares assigned to each respectively. Stanislaus remained king of the rest of Poland; but he could only rule in complete dependence upon Russia, and his power was a mere shadow compared to that of the Russian envoy at Warsaw.

Meanwhile the Turkish war had not been ended. A truce had been arranged in May, 1772, and a congress had assembled to settle the terms of peace. But the Russian demands were too excessive for the Porte to accept, and the Turks resumed hostilities in 1773. They attempted to recover Moldavia and Wallachia, and for a time they succeeded in forcing the Russians to retreat. Mustafa III. died in December, and was succeeded by his brother Abdul Hamid. In the next year Romanzow won a complete victory, and compelled the grand vizier to accept the terms dictated to him at Kutschuk Kainardji. The Russians restored the conquered provinces except Azof and Kinburn, only stipulating for toleration for the Christian population. The Tartars of the Crimea and Kuban were declared independent of the Porte, and authorised to elect their own Khan. Russian ships were allowed free passage through the Dardanelles, and the right of sailing in the Turkish seas and on the Danube. Poland, for which the Turks had undertaken the war, was not even mentioned in the treaty.

III. The Bavarian Succession.

§ 13. Joseph II., the second emperor of the house of Lorraine, was the most ardent and daring exponent of the reforming ideas that spread through Europe in the eighteenth century. No regard for tradition or prejudices could stay him, no task was too difficult for his ambition. For some time his powers were limited. His mother, Maria Theresa, kept a firm hold of the Austrian government, and her opinions and objects were the very reverse of her son's. The only field of action left open to him was the Empire, and he at once undertook the hopeless task of reforming its obsolete institutions. Measures were taken to purify the Aulic Council from the bribery and partiality which prevailed in it, and a commission was appointed to examine into the working of the Imperial Chamber. But these well-intentioned efforts proved utter failures, and Joseph was not the man to carry out a determination in spite of all obstacles. He resolved to leave the empire to its fate, and set himself to gain as much influence as he could over the states that were destined to fall to him. From the management of home affairs he was jealously excluded by Maria Theresa, but he succeeded in making his influence felt in foreign politics. His great object was the territorial aggrandisement of Austria, and his first achievement was the arrangement of the partition of Poland.

The value of the Austrian acquisition in this affair was small compared with that of the other contracting powers. Prussia obtained a territory which was urgently needed to weld together its disjointed provinces, and Russia advanced her frontiers considerably towards the west. This was the all-important result of the partition. The most powerful Slav state in the world—a state whose gigantic resources were still undeveloped—was now placed in immediate connection with the German powers which had so long striven to repress and crush the Slavs. The fate of Europe depended upon the attitude which Germany would assume in face of this new danger. Frederick the Great comprehended the real nature of the crisis, but his isolation had compelled him to assist rather than oppose the progress of Russia. This state of things could only be altered by the termination of the long and bitter enmity between Austria and Prussia and their union against a common enemy. Such a result might have been anticipated from the two interviews between Frederick and Joseph, but it was not to be. Joseph was a professed admirer of the Prussian king, but his admiration took the form of a desire to imitate him. If Prussia, a small state of recent origin, had been able to gain such signal successes, why should not Austria do the same? His profession that the loss of Silesia had been forgotten was untrue. He had no stronger wish than to recover the province or some compensation for it. Both he and Kaunitz left Neustadt with feelings of distrust and enmity against their visitor. Instead of unity between the two leading German states, the old rivalry broke out again. This was an inestimable advantage to Russia, and it was this rivalry which necessitated the partition of Poland. The conclusion of the treaty of Kainardji was a new blow to Austria. It was true that Russia did not retain any of her conquests, but the establishment of Tartar independence would undoubtedly give her an ever-ready pretext for intervention in Turkey. As a counter-move to the treaty, Austria induced the Porte to cede the territory of Bukowina, which had once belonged to Transylvania, and served as a useful link between that province and the recent acquisitions in Poland. This act, which was accomplished without any pretence of consulting the other powers, excited great discontent both at Berlin and St. Petersburg, and Catharine would probably have gone to war if Frederick had not dissuaded her. The king had already noted in the first interview the ambitious character of the young emperor, and he was now determined to be on his guard against any further aggrandisement of Austria. To make matters worse, it was reported from Vienna that Kaunitz had used threatening language about the necessity of destroying Prussia, and had declared that if a new war arose the sword would not be sheathed until one or other of the two powers had been ruined.

§ 14. While relations were thus strained, an event occurred which threatened to involve Europe once more in a general war. With the death of Maximilian Joseph of Bavaria (30 December, 1777) the younger branch of the house of Wittelsbach became extinct, and the electorate of Bavaria, which had been conferred upon them in 1623, came to an end. By virtue of the original partition in 1310, the duchy of Bavaria ought to pass to the elder branch of the family, represented by Charles Theodore, the Elector Palatine. But Joseph saw the possibility of securing valuable additions to Austria which would round off the frontier on the west. The Austrian claims were legally worthless. They were based chiefly upon a gift of the Straubingen territory which Sigismund was said to have made in 1426 to his son-in-law, Albert of Austria, but which had never taken effect and had since been utterly forgotten. It would be impossible to induce the diet to recognise such claims, but it might be possible to come to an understanding with the aged Charles Theodore, who had no legitimate children and was not likely to feel any very keen interest in his new inheritance. Without much difficulty the elector was half frightened, half induced to sign a treaty (3 January, 1778) by which he recognised the claims put forward by Austria, while the rest of Bavaria was guaranteed to him and his successors. Austrian troops were at once despatched to occupy the ceded districts. The condition of Europe seemed to assure the success of Joseph's bold venture. France was bound to Austria both by treaty and by marriage alliance. England was too absorbed in the American war to dream of interfering on the continent. Russia was occupied in a dispute with Turkey about affairs in the Crimea, and was likely to have her hands full.

There was only one quarter from which opposition was to be expected, Prussia. Frederick promptly appealed to the fundamental laws of the Empire and declared his intention of upholding them with arms. But he could find no supporters except those who were immediately interested, the elector of Saxony, whose mother, as a sister of the late elector of Bavaria, had a legal claim to his allodial property, and Charles of Zweibrücken, the heir apparent of the childless Charles Theodore. The other German princes, even the Protestants, refused to take any part in a contest which indirectly affected their most vital interests. Frederick, left to himself, despatched an army into Bohemia, where the Austrian troops had been joined by the emperor in person. But nothing came of the threatened hostilities. Frederick was unable to force on a battle, and the so-called war was little more than an armed negotiation. Maria Theresa, whose courage was somewhat cooled by advancing years, and who found herself more and more opposed to the views of her son, was anxious to make peace by withdrawing the extravagant pretensions that had been advanced. And events soon occurred to cool the ardour of Kaunitz and even of Joseph himself. Louis XVI., in spite of his marriage with Marie Antoinette, the emperor's sister, had just concluded a treaty with the American colonies and refused to hamper himself by embarking in a German war. At the same time Russia, not at all embarrassed by the Turkish difficulties, showed a distinct inclination to listen to Frederick's appeals for aid, and had already addressed serious remonstrances to the court of Vienna. France and Russia undertook to mediate, and negotiations were opened in 1779 at Teschen, where peace was signed on the 13th of May. Austria withdrew the claims which had been recognised in the treaty with the Elector Palatine, and received the "quarter of the Inn," i.e. the district from Passau to Wildshut. Frederick's eventual claims to the succession in the Franconian principalities of Anspach and Baireuth, which Austria had every interest in opposing, were recognised by the treaty. The claims of Saxony were bought off by a payment of four million thalers. The most unsatisfactory part of the treaty was that it was guaranteed by France and Russia, and thus a new opportunity was offered for foreign powers to interfere in Germany. But, on the whole, it was a great triumph for Frederick and an equal humiliation for Joseph II. His schemes of aggrandisement had been foiled by the prince in imitation of whom they had been undertaken, and he allowed Prussia to pose as the champion of the imperial laws and constitution which he, the head of the empire, had attempted to infringe. But in the next year the death of his mother (29 November, 1780) gave him the means of resuming his ambitious designs with greater independence and on a more extended scale.

IV. JOSEPH II. AND THE LEAGUE OF PRINCES.

§ 15. The memory of Maria Theresa is still affectionately cherished in Austria, not so much for the merits of her government as for her lofty character and courage, the purity of her domestic life, her devotion to her husband and children. She had saved Austria from the ruin and disintegration that had threatened the country on her accession, and her long reign had not passed without the accomplishment of many useful reforms. The military administration had been completely altered under the auspices of Daun and Lascy, and at the close of the Seven Years' War the Austrian army was no unequal match for the Prussians, who had been taken as a model. The law courts had been purified and their procedure improved. Financial affairs had made rapid strides under the painstaking care of Francis I., whose qualities fitted him to be a man of business rather than an emperor. Even in religious matters, in which Maria Theresa had been resolutely orthodox, persecution had been avoided. Hungary had been bound more closely to the monarchy, and thus an important step had been taken towards the concentration of the various provinces which had been brought together in the course of centuries. But in all her actions Maria Theresa had been hampered by the traditions of the Hapsburg family, of which she was a loyal descendant, and in her later years she had shown more and more repugnance to reform.

Her successor was not a Hapsburg at all, but a Lorrainer, and this serves to explain the lack of reverence with which he attacked the most cherished customs and deserted the oldest traditions of policy. He had already endeavoured to imitate Frederick II. in the management of foreign relations, he now aspired to copy his domestic government. The strength of Prussia he attributed to its marvellous centralisation, to the machine-like way in which everything moved in obedience to the royal will. This was the system which he wished to introduce into Austria, utterly forgetting that the way had been prepared for Frederick by the exertions of his predecessors, whereas he succeeded to a state of which the government had been conducted for centuries on principles diametrically opposed to his own. No contrast can be more striking than that between the sternly practical activity of the Prussian king, who never set his arms too high and never stopped till he had reached them, and the doctrinaire and revolutionary haste with which the young emperor undertook the most sweeping reforms at the same moment, and long before they had been accomplished hurried on to other tasks which would have needed the work of generations. Joseph is like the boy playing with chemistry, who loves to mix together the strangest compounds and to produce startling results; Frederick treats his materials with the economy and straightforward purpose of the trained man of science. But it would be unfair to deny that a real enthusiasm for progress and love of humanity underlay the reforms of Joseph II., or that many of them would have been of lasting and incalculable benefit if he had only been more prudent and practical in carrying them out.

The great principle which underlay all the reforms of Joseph II. was that no personal or class interest should stand in the way of the general welfare, and of this welfare he was the sole judge and interpreter. It is easy to realise what enormous confusion would be created in any state by the attempt to carry such a principle into immediate action and without ample compensation. It is only fair to say that Joseph included himself among his own victims. The court expenses were immensely reduced, the emperor lived in the simplest and most unostentatious way, the pension list and even the allowances to the archdukes were cut down. The money thus saved was not used in reducing taxes, as had been fondly hoped, but in increasing a revenue which was still insufficient for the uses it was put to. The personal labour which Joseph undertook was immense; the attention and industry with which he studied every detail recall the bureaucratic activity of Philip II. The ministers were encouraged to apply for instruction upon all doubtful points, and the blindest obedience was exacted from them. The judicial administration was reformed so as to ensure the equality of all men before the law. The privileges of the feudal nobles, the exclusive corporations in the towns, the accumulation of unproductive wealth in the hands of the clergy, were simultaneous objects of attack. Perhaps none of the innumerable reforms of these years are more illustrative of the spirit in which their author worked than the attempt to abolish serfdom in the Austrian dominions. A first edict, limiting the rights of the lord to inflict punishments, was followed by others which gave the peasant personal freedom, allowed him to marry as he pleased, and compelled the lord to give his serfs property in land on receipt of a fair rent. The same spirit is seen in the effort to raise the people from their superstitious ignorance by founding and endowing schools for elementary education and by conferring complete liberty upon the press. Less enlightened but equally characteristic were the measures taken to suppress the Magyar nationality in Hungary, by compelling the natives to adopt the German language and customs, and by abolishing the old constitution for a new centralised system which was worked by German officials.

In all these changes a great share was taken by Kaunitz, the Chancellor, to whom the change of rulers must have been a great relief. He had always been a partisan of the new movement, and his leanings were strongly anti-clerical, but he had been compelled to disguise them out of deference to the mistress who had raised him to power. He had now to deal with a sovereign who was willing to go quite as far as himself and to whom he was bound by none of the old ties of dependence and gratitude. The minister ceased to attend the court almost altogether; the emperor paid him visits, as Louis XIV. had done to Mazarin. In religious matters the attitude of Kaunitz was even more pronounced than that of Joseph, and these are perhaps the most conspicuous subjects of reform during the reign. The church was made subservient to the state and freed from all dependence upon external authority. All papal bulls and briefs were to be submitted to the secular magistrates and were not to be circulated until they had received the imperial sanction. All newly elected bishops were to take their first oath of fealty to the emperor, so that no subsequent oath to the papacy should affect their primary obligations as subjects. Appeals from ecclesiastical consistories were to be made not to Rome but to the secular courts. All foreign ecclesiastics, heads of monasteries and others, were expelled and their places filled by natives. Those monastic orders which took no part in education, in hospital work, in preaching or at the confessional, but had been formed for a life of contemplation, such as the Carthusians, were abolished and their revenues confiscated. At the same time Joseph secured toleration and equal citizenship to all dissenters, whether Lutherans, Calvinists, or members of the Greek church. This measure marks the completeness of the departure from the policy which had been pursued by the Hapsburgs from Rudolf II. to Maria Theresa.

Meanwhile Joseph II. had once more turned his attention to Germany, but no longer with the object of reviving or extending the central power over the innumerable large and petty states that owned his nominal sovereignty. That scheme had failed once and for all, and he now resumed the old policy of the Hapsburgs, and determined to employ his position as emperor to extend the territorial influence of his family. He had already secured the election of his brother Maximilian to the archbishopric of Cologne and the bishopric of Münster, and had thus obtained not only a strong supporter in the electoral college, but also a preponderating influence among the states of western Germany. This was followed by a series of attacks upon the imperial constitution. There were a number of independent bishoprics, such as Salzburg and Passau, whose sees extended over Austrian territory. Joseph announced his intention of confiscating this part of their sees and transferring them to native bishoprics. These and other high-handed actions excited a feeling of dismay among those small states which clung to their territorial independence and to the old conception of "German liberty." The natural appeal lay to the Diet, but the action of this assembly was nullified by the supremacy which Austria had established over the college of princes, as nothing could be done without the agreement of the three colleges. There was only one remedy left, the formation of a league against the emperor on the same principles as those of the League of Schmalkalde against Charles V. But to carry this out it was absolutely necessary to secure the support of some great power, and here there was considerable difficulty. France and Russia, the two guarantors of the treaty of Teschen, were out of the question, and the only hope lay in Prussia. But many of the injured states were held by Roman Catholic ecclesiastics, who had great scruples about accepting the protection of the leading Protestant state of Germany. Ultimately these scruples were overcome by the imminence of the danger, and an appeal for assistance was made to Berlin.

§ 16. Frederick II. had foreseen the dangers which threatened both Germany and himself from the accession of Joseph, and had taken measures to meet them. His plan was to renew his close alliance with Russia, and to extend it by including Turkey and either England or France. This would enable him to check the ambition both of Catharine and Joseph, to uphold the integrity of the Turkish empire, and to act as an arbiter of European relations. But the plan was doomed to failure at the outset. At St. Petersburg the foreign minister Panin, who clung to the Prussian alliance, had been practically superseded by the Czarina's favourite Potemkin, under whose influence Catharine threw herself into the most boundless schemes of aggrandisement at the expense of Turkey. From this time the watchword of Russian policy was the advance upon Constantinople. Frederick's proposal of an alliance of which the Porte should be a member was wofully ill-timed and promptly rejected. Even if the king could be induced to fall in with the Russian scheme and to approve of the dismemberment of Turkey, it was obvious that his support could not be so valuable as that of Austria. And Austria was more than willing to meet Russia half-way. Kaunitz saw clearly that the great obstacle to the success of his policy had been the alliance between Russia and Prussia, which had been formed on the death of Elizabeth, and which had recently compelled the relinquishment of the designs upon Bavaria. If this alliance could be broken off, Joseph II. could pursue his schemes of aggrandisement both in the west and the east with every prospect of success. In 1780 Joseph and Catharine met together at Mohileff, and this interview led to the conclusion of a close personal alliance in the next year. The result of this was clearly seen in 1783, when Russia, utilising the advantages it had secured by the treaty of Kainardji, forced the Porte to cede the Crimea and Kuban, and thus extended its frontier to the Black Sea. The consent of Austria to this aggrandisement was purchased by the tacit understanding that Russia would exert its influence in Germany to favour Joseph's designs.

The loss of the Russian alliance left Prussia completely isolated among the great powers. England was still occupied by the American war, and the ministry of Lord North was even hostile to Frederick. The hopes that were based on the accession of the Whigs to office in 1782 were frustrated by their speedy downfall.

France was at war with England, and French policy was so feeble and vacillating that it offered no security for an alliance. Nothing remained for Frederick but to fall in with the suggestions of the German powers, and to form a league against the reckless aggressions of the emperor. He had occupied a somewhat similar position in his early years when he formed the Union of Frankfort to protect Charles VII. against Maria Theresa. Since then he had almost severed himself from the Empire and had devoted himself to the welfare of Prussia as an independent state. In his old age the former policy was once more forced upon him. In 1778 he had stood almost alone as the champion of the established laws of the Empire, now there was the prospect that he might obtain general support in the same cause. With all his accustomed energy he espoused the side of the princes against the emperor and set himself to form a comprehensive league. But there was always great difficulty in inducing German states to combine together, and Frederick's efforts might have failed but for the occurrence of a new danger.

§ 17. Joseph II. had never given up his designs upon Bavaria, and his understanding with Russia enabled him to resume them with greater prospect of success. His plan was to obtain the coveted territory in exchange for the Netherlands. The latter had never been a very valuable territory to Austria, partly on account of their distance and partly through the commercial jealousy with which the provinces were regarded by England and Holland. Moreover the necessity of defending the Netherlands had always hampered Austria in its relations with the western powers, and especially with France. At this very time Joseph II., whose activity extended to every part of his dominions, was endeavouring to force the Dutch to give up the barrier fortresses and to open the Scheldt. The intervention of France brought about the treaty of Fontainebleau (November, 1785) by which the Barrier treaty was annulled, but Joseph withdrew his other demands on payment of nine million gulden, of which France contributed nearly half. It had always been a favourite idea at Vienna to exchange this troublesome possession in the west for some more conveniently situated territory. The acquisition of Bavaria was also a long-cherished design and offered the most irresistible attractions. Charles Theodore was as easily gained over as before, and promised to give up Upper and Lower Bavaria, the Upper Palatinate, Neuburg, Sulzbach and Leuchtenberg, on condition that he should receive the whole of the Netherlands, except Namur and Luxemburg, with the title of a kingdom of Burgundy. The Russian agent, Romanzow, undertook the task of inducing Charles Theodore's heir, the duke of Zweibrücken, to give his consent to the transfer.

The news of this high-handed scheme, which threatened to revolutionise the territorial relations of Germany, gave fresh energy to Frederick and convincing cogency to his representations. In July, 1785, the terms of union were arranged by the representatives of Prussia, Saxony and Hanover. In a very short time they were accepted by the rulers of Zweibrücken, Weimar, Gotha, Hesse-Cassel, Brunswick, Baden, Mecklenburg, Anhalt and many other princes. But the great triumph of the *Fürstenbund,* as it was called, was the adhesion of the archbishop of Mainz, the arch-chancellor of Germany, president of the electoral college, and the chief ecclesiastical magnate of the empire. This important negotiation was entrusted by Frederick to a man who was destined to play a great part in Prussia, the Baron vom Stein, then only twenty-seven years old. The expressed object of the league was the maintenance of the existing constitution of the empire, as established by the peace of Westphalia, and the protection of individual states against unlawful aggression. In secret articles it was agreed to oppose the projected exchange of Bavaria for the Netherlands and all schemes of secularisation and partition, if necessary with arms.

The league was completely successful in its immediate object. Joseph and Charles Theodore not only gave up the project but tried to disavow it. But many members hoped that it might prove a new starting-point for the federal unity of Germany. If these hopes had been realised, Prussia would have gained a very substantial victory over Austria, and might have established a hegemony almost as definite as that which it has now attained. Viewed in this aspect, the league was regarded with disfavour by France and Russia. Russia looked to gain great advantages from its Austrian alliance and was naturally opposed to the weakening of its ally. France was beginning to draw aloof from the court of Vienna, and had always been inclined to support any combination of German princes against the Hapsburgs. But the league which France desired was a league of princes in opposition both to Austria and Prussia, not one in which Prussia was the directing head. None of these fears or hopes, however, came to anything. The league was never anything more than a temporary and successful measure of defence, and it practically perished with the death of its founder.

The formation of the *Fürstenbund* was the last great achievement of Frederick the Great, whose reign of 46 years closed on the 17th of August, 1786. There can be no question that he stands a head and shoulders above the rulers of the century. Even if one estimates morality with intellect there is only one man—George Washington—who can be ranked with him. He succeeded to a state whose internal condition by no means corresponded with the greatness to which he intended to raise it. Its soil was the poorest in Germany, its territories were scattered and its boundaries so unsatisfactory that it was exposed to invasion on every side. This was the state which in two exhausting wars had won for itself a place among the great powers of Europe, and which had developed its resources to a marvellous extent during two unequal periods of peace. "From a territory of 2300 square miles and a population of little over two millions had grown a state of 3600 square miles and six million inhabitants: the army which his father had left him had been increased from 76,000 to 200,000; the revenue of 12 millions had been nearly doubled; the exchequer, in spite of the terrible wars, was filled with some 70,000 thalers. The cultivation of the land, the activity of its inhabitants, the order and care of the administration were everywhere as flourishing as the military power and the diplomacy of Prussia." This progress was due almost solely to the king and to the marvellous administrative system which he had organised. The strength and the weakness of the system lay in its dependence upon a single mind and will. When the guiding genius was removed it became a mere inanimate machine and could no longer produce the expected result. This explains the verdict of those judges who have attributed to the administration founded by Frederick the subsequent decline of Prussia. It is no less true because paradoxical that without that administration Prussia would not have risen to greatness.

V. THE EASTERN QUESTION, 1786–1792.

§ 18. The importance to Prussia of Frederick the Great's personal guidance is manifested by the events that followed his death. He was succeeded by his nephew Frederick William II., the son of Augustus William, who had incurred his brother's displeasure in the Seven Years' War and had died soon afterwards. The new king was made of far weaker metal than his predecessor, more amiable and equally devoted to his subjects' welfare, but less independent in his opinions and actions and more prone to be guided by impulse than by caution. Two unfortunate marriages had ruined his chances of domestic happiness, and made him the slave of mistresses who aspired to play in Prussia the part which Madame de Pompadour had played in France. And Frederick William to some extent resembled the French kings in the combination of immorality with religious superstition. His accession, however, was welcomed with great popular rejoicings, and he received the name of the "well-beloved." It was expected that the new government would free the state from those excessive burdens which Frederick's ambition had imposed upon it, and to some extent these hopes were fulfilled. The royal monopolies were abolished and the French officials dismissed. But these and other measures of relief proved fallacious: Prussia could not exist without an ample revenue, and other forms of taxation had to be employed to make up the deficit. Frederick William's popularity was soon at an end. In religious matters he sought, under the influence of his favourite ministers, Wollner and Bisschofswerder, to effect a complete reaction. In July, 1788, he issued an edict forbidding the teachings of "Socinians, Deists, Naturalists and other sects," and a system of examination was introduced to test the orthodoxy of candidates for orders. This was a direct departure from the almost contemptuous toleration of Frederick II. and was hailed with a chorus of disapproval. But the government adhered to its plan and endeavoured to put down opposition by reviving the censorship of the press (Dec. 1788).

These domestic changes and scandals would have been of slight moment if Prussia had been able to maintain its position among the European powers. For some years the policy of Frederick was carried out under the guidance of Hertzberg, a minister who had been trained by the great king and had completely assimilated the system of his master's later years. The first interference of Prussia in foreign politics was connected with affairs in Holland. In that country the old rivalry between the republican party and the supporters of the house of Orange was as bitter as ever. The second branch of the family, which obtained the stadtholdership in 1748, had failed to produce such distinguished rulers as those who had given such glory to the first dynasty. The republicans, who belonged mostly to the aristocratic and wealthy classes, were supreme in the province of Holland and especially in Amsterdam, while the partisans of the stadtholder were popular with the mass of the people and had the upper hand in Zealand and Guelders. Ever since the high-handed attempt of Joseph II. to get rid of the Barrier treaty and to open the Scheldt, French influence had extended itself widely in the country. As the ruling family was closely allied with England, France joined the republicans to bring about the overthrow of the stadtholder. At the time of Frederick William's accession the quarrel had almost developed into a regular civil war. He had a direct personal interest in Dutch affairs, as the present stadtholder, William V. (1751–1802), was married to his sister. But in spite of this he was unwilling to engage in a war, and endeavoured to arrange a compromise in conjunction with France. This attempt at mediation, however, came to nothing, and an insult to his sister roused the wrath of the susceptible king. In 1787 Prussian troops entered Holland, and in an incredibly short space of time overawed opposition and restored the stadtholder to the Hague. This was a real though easy triumph over France, and was followed in 1788 by the conclusion of important treaties at the Hague with Holland and England, which gave Prussia for the moment a commanding position in Europe. But it was unfortunate that this success gave increased strength to the feeling of self-confidence which was Frederick's most fatal bequest to Prussia. This result is conspicuously visible in the attitude which Hertzberg now assumed in the infinitely more important affairs in Eastern Europe, and still more perhaps in the later intervention of Prussia against the French republic.

§ 19. The alliance between Austria and Russia, which Frederick II. had regarded with such mistrust, was now the all-important factor in eastern politics. But so far the Russians had carried off all the profit of the alliance. They had annexed the Crimea and Kuban, and had forced the Porte to sanction the annexation. And Catharine and Potemkin were not yet satisfied, but were contemplating further acquisitions which should bring them nearer to Constantinople. Joseph II. could not disguise his misgivings for the consequences of his reckless policy. The advance of Russian power to his frontiers could not but be in the highest degree dangerous to Austria. And the compensating advantages in Bavaria and Holland, to obtain which he had entered into the alliance, had slipped from his grasp. There were now only two alternatives to choose between, either to turn round and vigorously oppose the Russians, in which case he could obtain the support of Prussia, or to draw the alliance still closer so as to share what booty might still be obtained. He found himself too deeply involved to draw back, and therefore had to choose the latter plan. In 1787 Catharine paid her famous visit to the newly acquired provinces of her empire, in which Potemkin employed all the resources of art to disguise their natural desolation. Joseph joined Catharine and renewed his alliance with her. From this time Russia employed every means to force the Porte into war, as Austria was only pledged to assistance in case of an attack. The plan was completely successful. The Turks thought that they could rely upon help from Prussia and England, both of which powers had expressed their hostility to the Russian lust of aggrandisement, and in August, 1787, they issued a formal declaration of war. In the following February Joseph II. declared his intention of coming to the help of Russia, and Turkey was exposed to the simultaneous attack of its two most powerful neighbours.

Now or never was the time for Prussia to interfere. There was a strong party at Berlin which wished for immediate war. They urged that Sweden and Poland, where the majority of the nobles were eager to get rid of Russian domination, should be induced to attack Russia, and that the whole force of Prussia should be employed against Austria, which could be humbled in three campaigns. The reward for this energetic action was to be the conquest of the rest of Silesia and parts of Bohemia and Moravia. But Hertzberg clung to Frederick's policy of avoiding hostilities, and he had a plan of his own for settling all difficulties. He contended that Prussia rendered a great service to the Turks by compelling the emperor to retain a large part of his forces upon his northern frontier, and in recognition of this the Porte was to call upon Prussia to mediate a peace. As mediator, he wished to arrange a complicated scheme of cessions and counter-cessions of territory on the model of the recent partition of Poland. Turkey was to give up Moldavia and Wallachia to Austria, and the Crimea and Bessarabia to Russia, and in return for this was to be protected from further losses by a European guarantee of the Danube as its northern frontier, and by an engagement on the part of Russia to desist from further interference in its internal affairs. Austria was to purchase Moldavia and Wallachia by restoring Galicia to Poland, and in return for this Poland was to hand over Danzig and Thorn to Prussia. Russia, on the other hand, was to restore part of Finland to the Swedes, who were to give to Prussia their remaining possessions in Pomerania. But it was obvious that only a very favourable combination of circumstances could enable Prussia thus to dictate her will to Europe. In the first place, the Turks were by no means disposed to make such sacrifices of territory without compulsion, or to regard a guarantee of the European powers as a sufficient compensation. Moreover the manifest selfishness of the scheme was certain to arouse the jealousy which the other powers had never ceased to feel towards Prussia since the first aggressions of Frederick II. Hertzberg, however, succeeded in carrying his point at Berlin. Prussia abstained from taking open part in the war, and waited for the opportunity to interfere as mediator. The Turks were bitterly enraged at losing the support which they had confidently expected.

§ 20. The course of the war did not at first seem likely to realise Hertzberg's anticipations of the Turks being forced to give way. An attack upon the Crimea was repulsed by Suwarow, who won a great military reputation in this war, but Potemkin's attempt to take Oczakow was for a long time foiled by the obstinate courage of the garrison. The Austrians were still less successful. Joseph, who took the command in person, had no military genius, and his chief adviser, Lascy, was an administrator rather than a general. The forces were weakened by being spread over an enormous line of frontier from Galicia to the Adriatic, and it was not until late in the season that Joseph made an attack upon Belgrad, which was repulsed. At the same time Gustavus III. of Sweden, who had overthrown the oligarchy by a successful revolution in 1772, but had since been opposed by Russian intrigues, seized the opportunity to invade Finland, and announced his intention of advancing to St. Petersburg. An attempt of Russia to form an effective alliance with Poland was frustrated by Prussian influence, and a threatened diversion against Sweden by the forces of Denmark was prevented by the conclusion of the triple alliance between Prussia, England and Holland. These powers set themselves in distinct opposition to the schemes of Austria and Russia, and formed an important counterbalancing force to the eastern combination. The Turks were inspired with the greatest confidence, and even Hertzberg was beginning to meditate a revival of his scheme of mediation, when fortune began to turn in the last days of the year. In December Potemkin, wearied and enraged by his failure to take Oczakow, ordered a last assault. The savage energy of the Russians carried them over the defences, and they sated their wrath in a reckless massacre of the inhabitants. In 1789 the Sultan, Abdul Hamid, died, but his successor, Selim III., prosecuted the war with undiminished energy. The Russian successes, however, continued, and both Suwarow and Potemkin gained decisive victories. The appointment of the veteran Laudon inspired a new spirit into the Austrian army; in October he forced Osman Pacha to surrender Belgrad, and followed this up by capturing Semendria and Passarowitz. Russia was freed from what had at one time seemed a serious danger by the repulse of the Swedes, and in 1790 Gustavus III. had to conclude the treaty of Werela, which restored matters to their condition before the war.

§ 21. These occurrences seemed to bring Hertzberg nearer to his desired end, but he had still the difficult task of making his terms with the Porte. The negotiations were carried on by the Prussian ambassador at Constantinople, Diez, who was opposed to the minister's policy and had always urged that the Turks should be openly supported by Prussia. Diez allowed himself to be persuaded into signing a treaty on the 31st of January, 1790, which conceded more to Turkey than was allowed by his instructions. Nothing was said of a Prussian mediation, which was to be rewarded with the cession of Danzig and Thorn, but Prussia was committed to a defensive and offensive alliance with the Porte, which was not to terminate until Russia had been compelled to restore its recent acquisitions. Hertzberg was in a dilemma; he recalled Diez, and postponed as long as possible the ratification of the treaty. But at the same time great military preparations were made, and there could be no doubt that circumstances were not at all unfavourable for active intervention. In Poland the Diet had definitely declared in favour of a Prussian alliance, and Sweden was still engaged in hostilities against Russia. The emperor's reforming activity had raised the most serious discontent among his subjects. Hungary was on the verge of revolt, and the Austrian Netherlands had overthrown the government and formed themselves into a Belgian republic. France was unable, on account of internal disturbances, to come to the assistance of Austria, whereas Prussia could count upon five close allies, England, Holland, Sweden, Poland and Turkey. Hertzberg had no scruples about supporting a revolutionary movement, and was quite ready to welcome help from any quarter, from the malcontents in Hungary, Belgium, or even France. It was a momentous question for Europe at the beginning of 1790 whether Prussia would really employ all the forces of the western coalition to humiliate Austria and Russia. Not only might the power of the two eastern empires have been crippled, but the revolutionary movement in France would have proceeded on its course without receiving fresh fuel from foreign interference. The decision of the question rested with Frederick William II. and Hertzberg, and their ultimate choice was decided mainly by two influences, the growing conviction that events in France were endangering the security of all Europe, and secondly the change in Austrian policy produced by the death of Joseph II. (20 Feb., 1790).

Joseph sadly acknowledged to himself on his death-bed that all his grand schemes had failed. He had wished to elevate and civilise his subjects, and he had earned their hatred instead of gratitude. He had planned to consolidate the Austrian provinces under a centralised monarchy, and he left the state on the very verge of complete dissolution. He had hoped to add territories to his rule, and at the time of his death it seemed probable that his existing dominions would be dismembered by an attack from Prussia and Prussia's allies. It was fortunate for Austria in this crisis that the crown fell to so able a prince as Leopold II., who succeeded to his childless brother. Leopold was also a partisan of the new movement, and had carried on an enlightened and successful government in the grand duchy of Tuscany. But at the same time he was less obstinately enslaved to theories and more conciliatory in his dealings with hostile interests. His first task was to put an end to domestic discontent, and this he did by concessions. To Hungary he restored the diet and the old constitution of the kingdom, and everywhere he redressed some, at any rate, of the grievances of the nobles and clergy. The reaction extended itself to the court arrangements, which recovered some of their old magnificence, and the liberty of the press was restricted by the restoration of the censorship. But the great problem of the new ruler lay in the settlement of foreign complications, as while they lasted the monarchy must be insecure. He determined at once to resign all the ambitious schemes of aggrandisement which his brother had entertained, to withdraw from the Turkish war, and so to avoid the threatened attack from Prussia. With the cautious foresight that characterised all his actions he addressed himself, not to Hertzberg, but to Frederick William himself. The minister was naturally tenacious of a policy which was his own creation, the king was never tenacious of anything. In his letter Leopold urged that he had no desire of increasing his territories, and that he would gladly accept the frontiers of the treaty of Passarowitz, and he laid great stress on the glory which the king would obtain by mediating a moderate and permanent peace. Frederick William was impressed by this personal appeal, but he could not at once overthrow the minister whom he had hitherto supported, and his answer proposed the interchange of territories which would give Prussia Danzig and Thorn. Leopold's refusal was clear and unhesitating. The negotiations were broken off, both Austria and Prussia assembled troops in their respective frontiers, and war seemed more inevitable than ever. But events soon occurred which shook Frederick William's never very stable resolution. It appeared that the allies of Prussia were by no means eager supporters of Hertzberg's elaborate scheme. England was just now engaged in a quarrel with Spain about colonial questions in California, and had no interest in securing Prussian supremacy in the Baltic. If Austria would make peace on condition that matters should return to their condition before the war, that was also the wish of England, and by implication of Holland. At the same time the Poles, though they had concluded an alliance with Prussia (March, 1790), were not at all willing to give up Danzig and Thorn. Frederick William discovered that even if he overcame the unwillingness of Austria, he would still have to face the opposition of his allies. This was sufficient to decide a king who always sought to find the easiest way of getting out of difficulties, and who was also not insensible of the credit which he could claim if he proved his unselfishness in the eyes of Europe. Leopold adroitly managed matters so that the proposal came from

Prussia and was accepted as a concession on the part of Austria. By the treaty of Reichenbach (27 July, 1790) Austria engaged to restore all her conquests to Turkey and to grant an amnesty and their old constitution to the Belgians. Hertzberg, who was completely disconcerted at the turn which affairs had taken, could only secure the insertion of a clause by which, if Austria did make any small acquisition of Turkish territory, it should be with the free will of the Porte, and Prussia was to get an equivalent.

The treaty of Reichenbach, as competent observers saw at the time, marks the first retreat from the policy of Frederick the Great and the first step in the decline of Prussia. A state which had risen to greatness by straining all its resources to the uttermost, must either advance or fall; the slightest retrograde step, which a firmly established power could take without danger, must be fatal. The consequences of the loss of prestige are clearly visible in the subsequent events. Sweden, Poland and Turkey, hitherto the docile clients of Prussia, passed over to Austria. Leopold could afford to disregard the express provisions of the recent treaty. The Belgian revolt was put down with severity, and the people clamoured against the treacherous power that had encouraged only to desert them. The peace with the Turks, to settle which a congress met at Sistowa, was postponed until August, 1791, and then the Porte had to cede the district of Orsowa in direct violation of the treaty of Reichenbach. About the same time Russia, which had continued to gain victories without its ally, had concluded the preliminaries of a peace at Galatz (11 August, 1791). Further negotiations were entrusted to Potemkin, but he died before anything had been settled (15 October). His death removed the greatest obstacle to peace, and the final treaty was signed at Jassy in January, 1792. Turkey gave up Oczakow to Russia, and the Dniester was fixed as the boundary between the two states.

VI. THE SECOND AND THIRD PARTITIONS OF POLAND.

§ 22. Ever since the first partition of Poland, the unfortunate Stanislaus Poniatowski and his reduced kingdom had remained in complete vassalage to Russia. But the outbreak of the Turkish war in 1787 and the occupation of the Russian troops on the Danube and in the Crimea seemed to offer a favourable chance of throwing off this humiliating yoke. England and Prussia formed a league for the repression of Russia, and the Poles determined to appeal for Prussian assistance. Their demand was favourably entertained by Hertzberg, who wished to realise a great object of Frederick the Great by acquiring Danzig and Thorn, and a treaty was signed in March, 1790. The prospect of recovering their independence, combined with the spread of reforming ideas from France, gave a great impulse to the party which desired to strengthen Poland by changing its constitution. Stanislaus was induced to join the reformers, and on the 3rd of May, 1790, a new constitution was accepted by the diet. Its object was to transform the anarchical republic into an orderly and constitutional monarchy. The right of election was abolished and the crown made hereditary. Stanislaus, who was childless, was to be succeeded by Frederick Augustus of Saxony, and he by his daughter, who was proclaimed "Infanta of Poland," and whose descendants, it was hoped, would form a new and independent dynasty of Polish kings. The executive power was to be in the hands of the king and a responsible council of ministers, the legislative functions were to be shared between a senate and an elective diet. The *liberum veto* and the right of confederation, the source of so many evils, were abolished. The Roman Catholic religion was recognised as that of the state, but other forms of belief were to be tolerated.

This grand reform, which was carried through the diet by an artfully planned surprise and which by no means represented the unanimous wishes of the Poles, was completely unexpected by the three neighbouring powers. Russia was profoundly irritated, and Catharine only waited for a favourable opportunity to take summary vengeance. Prussia, already alienated by the obstinacy with which the Poles clung to Danzig and Thorn, was bitterly opposed to the formation of a strong monarchical state in its immediate neighbourhood. On the other hand Leopold II., though he had nothing to do with the introduction of the constitution, was completely satisfied with it. A strong and independent Poland formed the best and most satisfactory bulwark against the westward advance of Russia. He determined therefore to do all he could for the maintenance of the constitution, and he was favoured by the close relations in which he was brought to Prussia by their common interests in regard to France. In July, 1790, he succeeded in inducing the Prussian envoy to sign the preliminaries of a treaty in which "*the* free constitution of Poland" was expressly guaranteed. But in the final treaty of February, 1791, a slight but important alteration was made by the substitution of the words "*a* free constitution of Poland."

Meanwhile Catharine II. had done all in her power to involve Austria and Prussia in a war with France in order to secure herself from their intervention in the east. In January, 1792, she concluded the peace of Jassy with the Turks, and at once ordered her troops to march into Poland. They were aided by a party among the Poles themselves, who formed the Confederation of Targowicz, revived the old name of "patriots," and demanded the restoration of "liberty" and their old constitution. Stanislaus and his adherents appealed for assistance to Prussia, but there the ill-feeling against the constitution had been increased by a subsequent proposal to substitute for the daughter the brother of the elector of Saxony, and so to perpetuate the connection between Saxony and Poland. Frederick William refused his assistance and offered no opposition to the Russian troops, who speedily made themselves masters of the hapless and still divided country. Austria was the only state from which resistance was to be feared, and here good fortune came to the aid of the Czarina. On the first of March Leopold II.'s short but successful reign was ended by a sudden and unexpected death, which involved important consequences both to Austria and to Europe. Six weeks later the war with France was actually commenced, and the Austrian troops had to defend Belgium from invasion. These events removed all difficulties from the way of Russia. Prussia was averse to the aggrandisement of her eastern neighbour, but was not willing to move a hand for the constitution of 1790. Austria thoroughly approved of the constitution, Francis II. was as anxious as his father had been to oppose the ambition of Catharine, but armed intervention was impossible. The Poles, divided among themselves and with no hope of foreign assistance, could make no effective resistance. The feeble Stanislaus was terrified into deserting his party and joining the Confederation of Targowicz. The constitution was formally abolished at the dictation of Russia, the old anarchy was restored under the name of "liberty," and the leaders of the reforming party fled from the country.

§ 23. Catherine II. had triumphed, but she felt that the victory could not be permanent as long as the two great rival powers regarded Russian influence in Poland with envy and mistrust. Almost at the moment that her troops entered the kingdom she suggested a partition. Austria being still clamorous for Polish independence and the constitution of 1790, she turned to Prussia, whose interests did not lie at any rate in that direction. The change of policy which had resulted in the treaty of Reichenbach and the fall of Hertzberg had been mainly the work of Frederick William himself, and had never been acceptable to the courtiers at Berlin, who inherited the traditional jealousy of Austria from the time of Frederick the Great. While there was no desire to truckle to Catharine, there was a strong feeling that it was better to profit by a Russian alliance than to court disaster by adherence to the cause of a natural and treacherous foe. Between Berlin and

St. Petersburg there were nothing but details to settle, and to gain over Austria the Russian envoy proposed to revive the project of effecting an exchange of the Netherlands for Bavaria. Throughout the second half of 1792 incessant negotiations were carried on upon this point, whether Austria would on this condition consent to the aggrandisement of Russia and Prussia in Poland. But the difficulties proved insuperable. Frederick William was willing to approve the projected exchange, but he refused to employ force to overcome any unwillingness of the rulers of Bavaria. Austria was not eager to allow a great and immediate advantage to Prussia in return for the doubtful and distant prospect of an advantage to herself, which after all was nothing more than an improvement of frontier. It was demanded that to Bavaria should be added the old Hohenzollern principalities of Baireuth and Anspach, which had recently fallen in to Frederick William. This was refused by the king, and the conquest of Belgium by Dumouriez at the end of the year made the whole proposal more doubtful and visionary than ever. Ultimately Russia and Prussia determined to settle the matter by themselves, and on the 23rd of January, 1793, the second treaty of partition was concluded and was carefully kept a secret from Austria. After arranging the extent of territory which was to go to each power, the treaty provided that Russia and Prussia should employ their "good services" to effect the exchange of Belgium for Bavaria, that Frederick William should continue his present exertions against France, and that he should not lay down arms until the object of the war, the suppression of disorder, should be attained.

Before this, on the 6th of January, the king of Prussia had issued a manifesto in which he announced his intention of interfering to put down the anarchy in Poland, which he attributed to Jacobin influences. Eight days later his troops crossed the frontier, and in a short time occupied the stipulated territories. This energetic example was followed by Russia with the same success. The share of Prussia, consisting of the coveted towns of Danzig and Thorn, with the provinces of Great Poland, Posen, Geresen and Kalisch, contained more than a thousand square miles, with a population of about a million and a half. The Russian acquisitions in Eastern Poland were four times as great in extent, and comprised twice as many inhabitants. It was not till the 23rd of March that the news reached Vienna, where it excited the most profound indignation. The existing ministers were dismissed, and the conduct of foreign affairs was entrusted to Thugut, who directed them for the next seven years with little credit to himself and with less profit to his country. He definitely refused to accept the treaty of partition, pointed out the utter inadequacy of the terms that were offered, and demanded that Austria should receive immediate compensation in Poland. But the two powers continued their task without any regard to either demands or threats. A diet was summoned at Grodno to legalise by its consent the act of robbery that had been already executed. In spite of the care with which the diet was packed, and the presence of armed force to intimidate its members, they showed some lingering signs of patriotism. It was against Prussia, as a recent ally, that the greatest indignation was felt. On the 23rd of July the Russian demands were granted, and an attempt was made to induce the Czarina to throw over the Prussian cause. For a time there was a serious alarm at Berlin lest all the fruits of their exertions might be lost, but at last the difficulties were overcome, and on the 22nd of September, in the famous "dumb sitting," the partition was finally accepted. Austria was indignant but powerless. When it is remembered that these events took place at the crisis of the revolutionary war, it may be easily understood how this undisguised quarrel about Poland tended to weaken and dissolve the coalition against France. The remaining part of Poland became practically a vassal state of Russia. The unfortunate Stanislaus was compelled to accept a humiliating treaty, known as the "eternal alliance" (14 Oct.), by which the Poles were bound to make no change in their constitution, and to enter into no agreement with foreign powers, without express permission from the Czarina.

§ 24. The Polish malcontents were cowed rather than conquered. In March, 1794, an attempt of General Igelstrom, the Russian representative at Warsaw, to diminish the small remaining native army, provoked a rising in Krakau which speedily assumed formidable dimensions. Kosciusko, who had served under Washington in the war of American independence, and who had been a leading promoter of the reform of 1790, arrived from his refuge in Saxony and was appointed generalissimo. On the 4th of March he gained a slight success over the Russian forces, and on the 18th a desperate rising of the people expelled Igelstrom and his troops from Warsaw. Stanislaus, the puppet of fortune, now offered to acknowledge the constitution once more, but he was no longer trusted, and though allowed to retain the royal title, he was practically superseded by Kosciusko. Rapidly as the insurrection had gained ground, it was evident to any dispassionate observer that it could not be permanently successful, and it must lead sooner or later to the absorption of Poland by its powerful and unscrupulous neighbours. The ministers at Berlin clearly perceived this, and determined by active measures to secure their shear of the booty. At the beginning of June, Prussian troops crossed the frontier, on the 6th they defeated Kosciusko at Rawka, on the 15th Krakau was taken. A rapid march must have resulted in the fall of Warsaw and the collapse of the insurrection. But valuable time was wasted before the siege was commenced, even then it was only languidly pressed; and before long a rising in the recently annexed provinces compelled the Prussians to retire. But by this time the Russians under Suwarow had entered Poland. On the 4th of October, Kosciusko, who had previously suffered several minor reverses, was completely defeated at Maciejowice and taken prisoner. With him fell the last hope of Polish independence. On the 4th of November the Russians stormed Praga, and put the whole population, men, women and children, to death. Four days later Warsaw surrendered, and the whole kingdom lay at the mercy of the conquerors.

Prussia having failed in arms, now resorted to diplomacy, and Tauenzien was sent to St. Petersburg to arrange a partition treaty with Russia on the model of that of 1793. But it was soon apparent that Catharine was determined, upon this occasion, to favour Austria. The motives of her policy are fairly obvious. It was the interest of Russia to balance the two great German powers against each other, and therefore to grant them alternate acquisitions in Poland. Prussia had recently thwarted Catharine's wishes by opening negotiations with the French which led up to the treaty of Basel. Moreover Thugut, the Austrian minister, was willing to conciliate Russia by renewing that aggressive alliance against Turkey which had been so fatal a defect in the policy of Joseph II. Tauenzien discovered that everything was being arranged without his participation, and left St. Petersburg after making a futile protest. On the 3rd of January, 1795, the final partition was arranged between Austria and Russia. Russia was to have the lion's share, about 2000 square miles, while Austria received about 1000 square miles, with the town of Krakau. The remainder, amounting to over 700 square miles, and including Warsaw, was assigned to Prussia.

On the same day the two contracting powers signed a secret declaration which has only recently been discovered. Austria was to accept the treaty of January, 1793, and the terms there inserted about the exchange of the Netherlands for Bavaria; she was to guarantee the Russian possessions in Poland; a similar guarantee was to be extended to the Prussian possessions when Prussia had acceded to the present treaty of partition. In case of a war with Turkey, Austria was to assist with all her forces in compelling the Porte to cede Moldavia, Wallachia, and Bessarabia, and these provinces were to be formed into an appanage for a member of the imperial family of Russia. For this Austria was to be compensated by acquisitions to be made, if possible, in France; but if that failed, then at the expense of Venice. This declaration was never carried out, and its existence was never suspected for half a century, but it throws a lurid light upon the selfish and treacherous diplomacy of those days, and upon the reckless policy of aggrandisement pursued by Thugut.

In March, 1795, the duke of Courland, Peter Biren, was compelled to abdicate, and his duchy was made into a Russian province. On the 24th of October the partition of Poland was finally settled by the adhesion of Prussia to the treaty of the 3rd of January. This adhesion was given with great reluctance, and after much futile grumbling. The greatest objection was felt to giving up Krakau, which was in Prussian hands, to Austria. But Russia silenced every objection by refusing to give up Warsaw as long as Prussia retained Krakau. Thus perished a kingdom which had once played a great part in Europe, but which owed its downfall quite as much to its anarchical constitution and to its want of all the essentials of a sound state, as to the unprincipled greed of its neighbours. Stanislaus Poniatowski, who had been nominal king since 1764, was compelled without difficulty to abdicate. On the death of Catharine II. (17 Nov. 1796), his mistress in both senses of the word, he took up his residence in St. Petersburg, where he died in 1798. Kosciusko, the real hero of the last period of Polish independence, was released from prison by Paul I., and, after several changes of residence, died in Switzerland in 1817.

CHAPTER XXI.

THE REIGN OF LOUIS XVI.

§ 1. The duties of feudalism had perished, while the rights and privileges remained; class jealousies; condition of the peasants. § 2. Character of Louis XVI.; Maurepas; admission of reformers to the ministry; restoration of the Parliaments. § 3. Principles of Turgot; his reforms; opposition of the privileged classes; Turgot's fall. § 4. Financial policy of Necker. § 5. American revolt; France joins the colonies; alliance of France and Spain; the Armed Neutrality; isolation and danger of England. § 6. Necker's reforms excite hostility; his resignation; reaction against administrative reform. § 7. Independence of the United States; siege of Gibraltar; treaty of Versailles. § 8. Financial straits of the French Government; administration of Calonne; hostility to Marie Antoinette. § 9. Financial disclosures: Calonne's plan; the Assembly of Notables; fall of Calonne; Lomenie de Brienne; quarrel with the Parliament of Paris; summons of the States-General and recall of Necker.

§ 1. In France the external fabric of feudalism had been more completely destroyed than in any other country of Europe. The old system, under which the nobles governed their own estates with more or less responsibility to the crown, had given way to a new centralised administration which had been gradually perfected from the reign of Louis XI. to that of Louis XIV. Under the king the supreme control of domestic affairs was in the hands of the controller-general of finances, who was assisted by a central council and by the provincial intendants. The States-General had been powerless since the 14th century, and had never been summoned since 1614, so that their composition and procedure were known only to antiquarians. In five of the outlying provinces, the so-called *pays d'état*, there still lingered some traces of the local estates, but they had no real vitality or importance except in Languedoc and to some extent in Brittany. In the other provinces, the *pays d'élection*, the intendants were absolute rulers. All sorts of officials existed, many of whom had paid large sums for their posts, but their functions had become nominal. The parliaments, or courts of justice, had retained their independence longer than any other institutions, and at one time had threatened to impose formidable checks upon the royal power. But this was due, not to any sympathy with popular liberty, but to the fact that the lawyers had formed themselves into a hereditary and privileged class, and when the old parliaments were suppressed by Maupeou the action was applauded by Voltaire and his followers. The last vestige of the mediæval system had thus been swept away from the path of the royal despotism. The nobles were still the most conspicuous persons in their districts, but they had ceased to govern. The peasants, who had once been their serfs, had risen to be metayer tenants, or in many parts small proprietors. The only career left open to a noble was in the civil or military service of the government. In Paris or with the army he might still acquire fame, on his own estates he was powerless. His rank prevented him from becoming one of the intendants, and they exercised the power that had once belonged to his ancestors.

Yet it is usually said that the French Revolution destroyed feudalism, which had provoked it. This is untrue if we regard feudalism in its old and true sense as a system of government and society. The essential merit of feudalism was the emphasis that it laid upon the duties as well as the rights of property. But as it decayed, as the duties were usurped by the monarchy, the rights were left behind to console the nobles for their impotence. Thus they were exempted from payment of the *taille* and other oppressive taxes, and in its origin the exemption had ample justification. The *taille* was imposed to provide for the maintenance of a military force; but the nobles were bound to serve at their own expense, and therefore were excused. Since then the obligation of military service had lapsed, but the right of exemption had been jealously retained. So they had lost the absolute mastery over their serfs, but had kept the rights which had been the symbol and outcome of that mastery. Many of them had powers of jurisdiction, all had supreme rights of hunting and forestry. They could exact forced labour from the peasants, and could compel them to pay tolls and other dues, and to grind their corn at the lord's mill. These exactions would have been cheerfully acquiesced in as long as the lords were real rulers and gave protection and judicial administration in return for them. But in the 18th century the vast majority of the nobles were absentees, who left the collection of their dues in the hands of extortionate bailiffs and squandered the proceeds in the capital. It was the absence of duties that made the continuance of the rights and privileges absurd, and it was this, even more than their oppressive character, that roused the bitter wrath of the peasants. It was not against the feudal system, but against the effete survival of parts of the system, that the Revolution directed its destructive energy.

The clergy were also unpopular, not so much on account of the spread of irreligion in France, but because they had come to occupy the same anomalous position as the secular lords. The great churchmen were owners of immense wealth, which was wrung from the tillers of the soil and for which no adequate services were rendered. The lesser clergy, who worked in poverty and were excluded from all hope of promotion, shared in the misery and sympathised with the aspirations of the people. Among the third estate there was a similar division of interests. In the cities municipal independence had perished since the days of Richelieu, and the intendant was as active and powerful within the walls as outside. But the old offices were still objects of ambition to the citizens; like all other posts, they had been put up to sale by the government, and had become the exclusive property of a bourgeois aristocracy, as haughty as it was powerless. The lesser citizens groaned under the tyranny of guilds and other associations, originally formed for the protection of trade, but which were now employed to maintain the selfish privileges of the wealthy class. No conception of common interests united the citizens with the peasants, who had far more real grievances to complain of. So heavy was the burden of taxes imposed upon them that all motives for economy or for the improvement of agriculture were destroyed. The *taille* had been gradually increased by the mere will of the government, and its collection was purely arbitrary. Most of the indirect taxes were levied on necessaries, such as salt, and therefore fell with special weight on the poorer population. In addition to the odious exactions of their lords, the crown had now come forward with similar demands. No grievance is more prominent at this period than the *corvées*, the compulsory labour enforced by the central government for the making and repairing of roads. And besides having to bear most of the expenses of the regular forces, the peasants were also compelled to undergo an irksome term of service in the militia. Their case was unquestionably the hardest, but the revolt was commenced by the classes above them. The want of union between classes in France had long been the great safeguard of the monarchy; it ruined the Revolution. After one moment of combination against the crown, men turned against each other to vent a spite that had been ripening for generations.

The monarchy had undertaken the difficult and dangerous task of discharging all the functions of government, and it can hardly be said to have succeeded. For a moment, under Louis XIV. and Colbert, there had seemed to be a fair prospect of the welfare of the country being firmly established. But the dream had soon disappeared. Louis XIV. himself had brought the nation to the verge of ruin, the Regent and Louis XV. had done nothing to save it. The finances are the crucial test of an administration. We have already seen how Law's measures had resulted in bankruptcy, and his numerous successors had found it impossible to revive the national credit. The great problem was to make the revenue cover the expenditure, and this it never did; the continual deficit had burdened the country with an ever-increasing debt. It was now to be seen whether the new king could cope with difficulties which his predecessors had never fairly endeavoured to face.

§ 2. Louis XVI. was born in 1754, and was therefore twenty years old at the time of his accession. Both in his merits and in his defects he presents a marked contrast to the other members of the house of Bourbon. He had been brought up in retirement, and his manners were always coarse and unprepossessing. He had no pronounced tastes except for the manual labour of an artisan and for hunting. But he was free from the gross vices that had disgraced his predecessors, and he was conscientiously eager to secure the welfare of his subjects. Unfortunately he had none of the requisite qualities for the discharge of this necessary task. Unable to form an opinion for himself, he lacked the strength of mind to carry out with resolution a course of action which he adopted on the advice of others. Throughout his life he was dependent upon the influence of those around him, of his aunts, his brothers, and finally of his wife, Marie Antoinette, whom he had married in 1770, but who only gradually obtained that supremacy over his intellect and affections which was ultimately to prove fatal to both of them. The first great question that the king had to decide was the selection of a minister. Public expectation pointed to Choiseul, who had been mainly instrumental in effecting the king's marriage and in cementing the Austrian alliance. But at this time Marie Antoinette was comparatively powerless, and Louis was prejudiced against Choiseul as the opponent of his father. He decided to summon M. de Machault, but at the last moment his aunt, Madame Adelaide, interfered, and the letter which had been written to Machault was sent to M. de Maurepas. Maurepas had held office under Louis XV., but he had for many years been removed from public life, and his character and administrative powers had deteriorated during the interval. Instead of attempting to cope resolutely with the difficulties of France, he thought only of finding expedients to evade them and of securing his own tenure of office. He encouraged the king in his unwillingness to form a resolution for himself, and in his inclination to trust to half-measures. No single man is more responsible for the great convulsion that closed the reign. But Maurepas's first acts seemed hardly to deserve this condemnation. Careless about reforms himself, he was not unwilling to see them attempted by others, provided that his own authority was not shaken. The members of the triumvirate, Maupeou, Terrai, and d'Aiguillon, were dismissed amidst demonstrations of popular scorn and hatred. The ministry of foreign affairs was entrusted to M. de Vergennes, a distinguished diplomatist, who played little part in domestic affairs. The control of the finances was given to Turgot, the ablest and most virtuous of French administrators, and the management of the household to Malesherbes, one of the most amiable and blameless of the partisans of progress.

The most pressing question for the new government to settle was that of the restoration of the ancient parliaments. As Maupeou had fallen, it was generally expected that the institutions which he had created would share his fate. The people, who had forgotten everything but the fact that the parliaments had opposed the crown, clamoured for their revival. Turgot was resolutely opposed to the step. He disliked the claim of judicial bodies to interfere with legislative business, and he knew well that the parliaments were eager only to secure their own interests, and that when those were safe they would oppose all further reforms. On this subject, Voltaire, Turgot, the economists, and all the leaders of advanced thought, found themselves allied with the clergy and the supporters of despotism. The king himself hesitated to undo the work of his grandfather. Maurepas, on whose decision the question ultimately rested, allowed himself to be carried away by the desire of applause. The parliaments were restored on condition of their future good behaviour, a condition which they never attempted to observe. The measure was extremely popular, but it was really reactionary rather than progressive, and it proved to be a serious obstacle to the reforms which Turgot was prepared to introduce.

§ 3. Turgot, who had previously been Intendant of Limousin, came into office with a ready-made scheme for the regeneration of France. The essence of his scheme was the restoration of the local self-government which the monarchy had first degraded and then destroyed. Each village was to be administered by an elective municipality, and the municipal government in the towns was to recover its old efficacy. These local bodies were to send deputies to a larger municipality of the district or *arrondissement*, and these again to the municipality of the province. Above all was to be a grand municipality of the nation, in which the ministers were to have seats, and which was to exercise the ultimate voice in administrative matters. Thus would be formed a grand network of representative institutions, each aiding and strengthening the other. It did not enter into Turgot's designs to entrust legislative power to the grand municipality so as to make it a new States-General. He was no enthusiast for mixed governments, but preferred the simplicity of absolute power. If he had had to create a state, he might probably have preferred a republic. But he was the minister of a king, and he was not anxious to diminish the despotic power of the monarchy on which he relied to put down opposition to his reforms. His first experience in office, however, convinced him that the time was not ripe for such a sweeping change as he meditated, and he put his scheme on one side till he could effect more immediately pressing reforms. The net revenue amounted to 213 millions, the expenditure to 235 millions, so that the deficit was 22 millions a year. Turgot was determined to raise no more loans except when he could borrow money cheaply to pay off debts contracted at exorbitant interest. Neither would he impose fresh taxes. To meet the deficit he resorted to the strictest economy, and with such success that after a ministry of a year and a half he left the government in possession of a surplus of eleven millions. This economy was extremely displeasing to the courtiers, who were accustomed to make their living out of the extravagance of the government, and their discontent was heightened by subsequent measures.

Turgot was a disciple of Quesnai, the founder of the school of economists known as the *physiocrates.* Their fundamental theory was that the land was the sole source of wealth, and that taxes should be levied directly on the produce of the land. From the gross produce were to be deducted the expenses of cultivation and improvement, the subsistence and due remuneration of the labourer. This would leave a net revenue of which the state was joint proprietor with the individual landlord. The share which the state should demand was to be fixed by reason and evidence. Manufactures and commerce are not productive of wealth, but agents of distribution; they should therefore be freed from all the duties and restrictions that had been imposed upon them for generations. Turgot's first measure was to issue an edict establishing perfect freedom of trade in corn within the kingdom; liberty of exportation was postponed. Mutilated as it was, the edict roused a storm of opposition which found an able leader in Necker, whose economical principles were opposed to those of Quesnai and Turgot. All the privileged classes joined in the outcry, the nobles, who foresaw the probable abolition of their exemptions, and the clergy, who were dismayed at the sight of a philosopher and a friend of Voltaire in the ministry. A bad harvest and scarcity of bread gave additional weight to their representations. Riots took place in Paris, and there can be no doubt that this first recourse to revolutionary violence was instigated by some of the nobles. Louis XVI., always weak, was inclined to yield, and it was with great difficulty that Turgot induced him to stand firm and to put down disorder. For the moment the minister seemed more powerful than ever, and the king declared that no one loved the people except himself and Turgot.

The opposition steadily increased in strength. The clergy were seriously frightened by the obvious inclination of the ministers to a tolerant policy, and by the report that Malesherbes wished to restore the Edict of Nantes. A league was formed among the privileged classes, nobles, clergy and lawyers, to protect their vested interests. It was joined by the queen and most of the royal princes, and it had even the indirect support of Maurepas, who began to tremble lest the man he had raised to office should supplant him in his master's favour. Meanwhile Turgot was continuing his work without any heed to the approaching storm. In January, 1776, he proposed to the king in council a series of measures which sufficiently illustrate the scope and objects of his policy. The *corvée* for the making of roads was to be abolished and the expenses defrayed by a tax upon land: all the old taxes upon corn which hindered free trade within the kingdom were to be abandoned: the guilds and other protective associations were to be done away with, so that every man might exercise his natural right to undertake what labour he chose: the *gabelle*, or tax upon salt, was to be altered so as to remedy the glaring inequality of its incidence: the expense of the king's civil household was to be diminished, and the marriages of Protestants were to be legalised. Maurepas put up one of his creatures, Miromesnil, to oppose these measures, but Turgot carried the king with him, and the edicts were signed and sent to the Parliament of Paris for registration. The Parliament justified all the fears which Turgot had expressed at the time of its restoration, and made itself the champion of the threatened privileges. To put down this resolute opposition the king had to hold a *lit de justice*, which, as Voltaire put it, was for once a *lit de bienfaisance*. But here Louis XVI.'s firmness suddenly came to an end. The members of his family urged upon him that he was going too far, and that he was degrading the monarchy by unworthy concessions to the *roturier* class. Maurepas was convinced that either he or the reformers must fall. By adroitly picking a quarrel with Malesherbes he forced him into a hasty resignation. Turgot being more obstinate and less sensitive, other means had to be found. A paper was forged in imitation of his handwriting which contained reflections upon the king and queen, and this was brought to Louis. Forgetting all the services that had been rendered, the king was induced in a fit of pique to dismiss the only man who might have saved his crown and his life. Turgot went into retirement and died in 1781.

§ 4. Maurepas was determined not to run the risk of being overshadowed by another man of genius, and he appointed as Turgot's successor M. de Clugny, an obscure Intendant of Bordeaux. The change was followed by an immediate collapse of credit. The Dutch promptly refused to supply a loan which had been arranged at four per cent. To raise money the government was compelled to resort to the disgraceful expedient of a royal lottery. Most of the recently abolished abuses, including the *corvées* and the trade guilds, were restored. But the outcry against these measures was so general, that Maurepas, always trembling for his position, was planning to dismiss Clugny, when the latter saved him the trouble by his death (Oct. 1776). Another nonentity, Taboureau des Réaux, was appointed to the office of controller-general, but the real management of the finances was entrusted to Necker, a banker from Geneva, who had made a large fortune in business and who had gained a reputation as an economist by his opposition to Turgot about the corn trade. Necker was a foreigner and a Protestant, and Maurepas, afraid to appoint him to high office, gave him the novel title of "director of the royal treasure." Even in the next year, when the controller-general resigned his shadowy functions, Necker retained a subordinate title and was excluded from the council. But it may serve to illustrate the importance of the financial administration that the ministry became, in the eyes both of contemporaries and historians, the ministry of Necker.

Necker was not a great statesman, but he was for his time a considerable financier. In opposition to the physiocrats he returned to the economic principles of Colbert. At the same time he shared that belief in the power of credit which had been carried to fanatical extremes by Law, and he considered that commerce and manufactures might be encouraged by an artificial increase of the currency. But his business habits saved him from carrying these ideas too far, while they enabled him to introduce unaccustomed order and method into the administration. He was extremely desirous to make the revenue cover the expenditure, and he was as willing as Turgot to diminish the latter by rigid economy. He looked to the taxes for supplies in ordinary times, while for exceptional demands he sought to raise loans at a moderate interest. In this his own reputation as a banker served him in good stead, and he obtained money much more easily and cheaply than his predecessors had been able to do. In one way his administration had important results for France. Like Rousseau, he was a native of Geneva, and he imported into monarchical France the ideas and traditions of a free republic. These traditions and the exigencies of credit led him to introduce publicity into the national accounts, and thus to put an end to that secrecy which had been the snare and the security of a decrepit government. He was also willing to obtain the popular consent to taxation, by giving new life and powers to the provincial assemblies. Thus he did much to prepare the way for the Revolution. His taxation led to the States-General, his loans gave the people convincing insight into the condition of the finances. For a time Necker was exceedingly popular. While the court regarded him as their only saviour, the salon of his wife gave him a recognised position among the friends of progress and enlightenment. But his economy soon disgusted his powerful patrons, while the retrograde character of many of his measures forfeited the confidence of the party of progress. In a time of peace his system might have secured to France a period of comparative tranquillity; but, unfortunately for his reputation, he was compelled to raise exceptional supplies for an expensive war.

§ 5. The American colonies were now in open revolt against England. Their discontent had been first roused by the natural attempt of England to impose upon the colonists some share of the expenses occurred in the Seven Years' War. Since then concessions had been made and withdrawn, with the result of increased bitterness on both sides, until the war finally broke out in 1775. On the 4th of June, 1776, the Americans issued their famous declaration of independence which enunciated the rights of man. From the first the greatest enthusiasm had been felt in France for the cause of the colonists. Lafayette and other volunteers crossed the Atlantic to serve in the American armies. Vergennes, who inherited the desire of Choiseul to avenge upon England the disasters of the last war, gave secret but invaluable assistance to the rebels. Still, the king and most of the ministers were averse to a war. Turgot resolutely opposed it, and on this point Necker was at one with his predecessor. But the force of popular opinion proved too strong for the adherents of peace. The most reactionary nation can sympathise with a revolt against a hostile power, while they regard with horror any opposition to their own rule. Franklin became the idol of Paris when he visited France in 1777, and the news of Burgoyne's capitulation at Saratoga roused the excitement of the war party to fever heat. The success of the colonists seemed assured, and the friends of progress were as ready to worship success in the eighteenth as in the fifteenth century. Maurepas had no principles to conflict with his love of popularity, and the scruples of the king and the other ministers had to give way. On the 6th of February, 1778, two treaties were signed between France and the United States. The first stipulated only for friendship and commercial relations; by the second it was arranged that if England took aggressive measures against France, the two powers should combine for defensive and offensive purposes. France promised to make no attempt to recover those possessions in North America which had been recently lost, and neither party was to lay down arms until England had acknowledged the independence of the colonies. The news of this treaty made a profound impression in England. Lord North's courage gave way, and he proposed to open negotiations with America. But Lord Chatham came down to protest in his dying speech against such a humiliation before an ancient enemy. His last act was to insist upon a war which he alone could have successfully directed. The English ambassador was recalled from Versailles, and naval hostilities were immediately commenced.

From a purely military point of view, the action of France was well judged. England had been unable to put down the rebels when they were isolated, she was still less likely to succeed now that they were supported by the whole power of France. But a regard to internal politics amply justified the gloomy anticipations of Turgot and Necker. Peace was absolutely necessary to restore financial prosperity to France. War involved increased expenditure and ultimate exhaustion. And there were still more convincing arguments which ought to have weighed with the supporters of the monarchy. Rebellion is contagious, and it was preposterous to expect that principles which were approved on the other side of the Atlantic could be excluded from European soil. The open intervention of France in the cause of republican liberty gave an enormous impulse to those forces which were gathering to effect the overthrow of the established system of government. But for a time all these considerations were forgotten in the passionate desire for revenge, and in the intoxication of unwonted successes. Not only did the French admirals, like d'Estaing and d'Orvilliers, show themselves a fair match for Howe and Keppel, but all Europe seemed eager to join France against a haughty and dictatorial power. It was to Spain that Vergennes naturally made his first application for assistance. Charles III., as we have seen, was a firm believer in the rights of monarchs, and had no sympathy with the cause of rebels. But the traditional jealousy of England, the Family Compact, and above all the desire of recovering Gibraltar and Minorca, combined to overcome his scruples, and in 1779 a treaty was concluded between France and Spain against England. Spanish forces at once laid vigorous siege to Gibraltar, and England naturally reverted to her old and successful plan of involving France in a continental war. For this a convenient opportunity seemed to be offered by the outbreak of the quarrel about the Bavarian succession. But the caution of Vergennes averted this danger. Louis XVI. refused to assist his brother-in-law, and French mediation forced upon Joseph II. the peace of Teschen. This was followed by a general expression of resentment against the arrogant claim of England to naval supremacy. Of this supremacy the most offensive symbol was the right of search, by which vessels sailing under a neutral flag were boarded to discover whether they were carrying supplies to the hostile belligerents, and if such goods were found they were confiscated. In 1780 Catharine II. of Russia issued a declaration, which involved an important and permanent change in international law, to the effect that neutral vessels may trade freely with belligerents in all articles that are not contraband, and that a blockade need not be respected unless it is effectual, i.e. that a mere formal announcement that a harbour is blockaded is insufficient unless enough ships are provided to prevent the ingress of other vessels. This declaration was accepted by Frederick the Great, who gladly seized the opportunity of displaying enmity to England and to the ministry of Lord North, and by most of the states of Northern Europe. Thus was formed the "armed neutrality," which was a serious check upon English operations, although it did not lead to active hostilities. It was of great importance to England under these circumstances to retain the alliance of its old naval rival, Holland. The House of Orange had been closely attached to England ever since the recovery of the stadtholdership by William IV. in 1748 and his marriage to a daughter of George II. The presen head of the family, William V., whose minority had ended in 1766, was inclined to continue the same policy. But the republican party, which had its headquarters in Amsterdam, was now very strong, and was eagerly desirous of an alliance with France and the United States as the best method of throwing off English dictation. In 1780 an American vessel was captured by the English, on which papers were found which proved that as early as 1778 the Pensionary of Amsterdam had drawn up a projected treaty with the American colonies. It was also known that Holland had sent supplies to the rebels, and that the Dutch island of St. Eustatius had been a great centre for traffic with America. So great was the indignation roused in London by these disclosures, that the envoy was withdrawn from the Hague, and, in December, 1780, war was declared against Holland. England was now left without an ally in Europe. To make matters worse, a great war had broken out in India in this year through the quarrel with Hyder Ali, and a French fleet under the Bailli de Suffren gave the English forces ample occupation. At the same time the ministry was hampered by the Gordon riots, which arose from their concessions to the Roman Catholics, and by the dangerous condition of affairs in Ireland, where the volunteers had assumed the functions of government, and events were rapidly hurrying on to the legislative separation of the two islands in 1782.

§ 6. It is obvious that these circumstances gave France very considerable advantages in the war, and thus enabled her to avenge in some measure the previous humiliations. But there was another side to the picture, in the enormous expenditure which these various and distant operations entailed upon the government. Necker succeeded for some time in raising supplies by loans without increasing the taxes. To do this he had to persevere in his plan of cutting down the expenses of administration. He reduced the number of receivers-general from forty-eight to twelve, and the twenty-seven treasurers of the army and navy to two, whom he made absolutely dependent upon the minister of finance. He also suppressed more than 500 offices in the royal household. While some of his measures, such as the prohibition to export looms and other manufacturing implements, savoured of the protective system of Colbert, others seemed to be borrowed from the principles laid down by Turgot. An edict of 1779 enumerated the evils to commerce caused by the heavy tolls upon roads and navigable rivers, and ordered the proprietors of these rights to report them to the council with a view to their purchase. Another edict in 1780 took the first step in the direction of a great reform, the abolition of the system of farming the taxes, so as to bring them directly into the exchequer. A month later it was announced that the *taille* and other direct taxes should not be increased in the future, except by laws registered in the superior courts. In July of the same year a provincial assembly was created for the province of Berry, which was to consist of twelve nobles, twelve ecclesiastics, and twenty-four members of the third estate. It was to meet for at least a month every two years, votes were to be taken not by estates but by heads, and it was to appoint an administrative committee to supervise affairs during the intervals between its sessions. Necker's idea was to apply this system gradually to all the provinces of France, and to transfer the functions of the intendants and sub-delegates to these representative assemblies.

This apparent conversion of Necker to the ideas of the reformers roused great indignation among the official classes, who became as hostile to him as they had previously been to Turgot. At present he had the complete approval of the king, and could afford to disregard the efforts of the opposition. But towards the end of 1780 he began to find increased difficulty in obtaining loans. To restore credit he obtained from Louis XVI. permission to publish the accounts, and in January, 1781, he issued his famous *compte rendu*. By this he made out that the receipts exceeded the expenditure by eighteen millions. It was really a partial and inaccurate statement, but it succeeded in restoring the confidence of the moneyed classes, and for a time money was easily obtainable. But the effects of the measure were far greater than this. The secrets of the administration were all at once laid bare to hostile criticism, and opponents of the government had now acknowledged facts to point to in support of their denunciations. The outcry among the privileged classes was very loud against a minister who had struck such a blow against the interests of the monarchy. The league against Necker was not so general as that against Turgot: especially, it did not include the queen, who was now a power in France. But Maurepas was eager to get rid of his too pushing subordinate, and he was supported by Vergennes. An open quarrel broke out in the ministry, and Necker boldly brought matters to a crisis by demanding a seat in the council. Maurepas replied that he should be admitted when he abjured the Protestant religion, and Necker, in spite of the urgent solicitations of the queen, resigned his office in May, 1781.

With the fall of Necker terminates the period of administrative reform in France. The reactionary party had succeeded in foiling the plans of those men who stood between themselves and ruin. Maurepas, on whom much of the responsibility rests, died before the end of the year. His nominal successor was Vergennes, but the latter was wholly unfitted to manage home affairs, and the post of chief minister was practically left vacant, except so far as it was filled by the queen. The finances were entrusted to Joly de Fleury, an incapable courtier, who increased the debt without providing any means for paying the interest. The reactionary character of the government is sufficiently illustrated by an edict of 1781, which excluded from offices in the army all who could not prove four generations of nobility on their father's side. Thus the army was made more exclusively aristocratic than it had ever been before, just at a time when the middle classes were beginning to be conscious of their power and their rights.

§ 7. The first important event of this period was the conclusion of the English war. So far as it was waged for the independence of

America, it was practically settled by the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown (18 October, 1781), and by the fall of North's ministry (March, 1782). The Whigs, who now came into office under Rockingham, were pledged by their previous attitude to grant the demands of the colonists. But both France and Spain had private objects of their own, and the peace had to be postponed until these had been settled. Hitherto the English had had very much the worst of the war. Many of the West Indian islands had been lost, and Minorca, which was then regarded as our most important possession in the Mediterranean, had fallen to the Spaniards. Gibraltar was closely invested by land and sea, and its fall seemed imminent in spite of the heroic defence of General Elliott. Fortunately for England, the colonists were quite as alive to their own interests as were their allies. So long as they obtained their independence they cared nothing for the aggrandisement of France and Spain. After the fall of Yorktown they practically withdrew from the war, and, although they were bound not to conclude a separate treaty, they privately agreed with England as to the terms they were to receive. In 1782 the fortune of war turned. Rodney, by the novel manœuvre of breaking the line, won a great naval victory over De Grasse in the West Indies. Later in the year the English red-hot shot completely destroyed the floating batteries before Gibraltar, and the siege had to be raised after it had lasted for three years. These disasters of the allies removed the chief difficulties in the way of peace, and the preliminaries were signed in January, 1783. England surrendered to France the small islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon in the St. Lawrence, Santa Lucia and Tabago in the Antilles, and Senegal and Goree in Africa. France undertook to withdraw assistance from Tippoo, who had succeeded his father, Hyder Ali. Spain obtained Minorca and Florida, but had to cede the Bahamas and to abandon the hope of recovering Gibraltar. Holland, so far from gaining anything by her breach with England, had to give up Negapatam, though her other colonies were restored to her. The independence of the United States was recognised, and their boundaries determined on the terms already arranged. The English claim that the loyal colonists should be compensated for their losses was abandoned. The preliminaries were finally confirmed in the Treaty of Versailles (September, 1783).

§ 8. Long before the conclusion of peace the glories of the war had been forgotten in comparison with the ever-increasing difficulties of the internal administration. Joly de Fleury had no method of raising money except by loans, and these he could not obtain so cheaply as Necker had done. To pay interest he had to impose new taxes. The Parliament of Paris, in its joy at the overthrow of the late minister, accepted the edict, but the provincial parliaments were less submissive, and one of them, the parliament of Franche Comté, raised the first cry for the summons of the States-General. Fleury had to resign after adding three millions to the debt, and d'Ormesson, a young man, equally honest and incapable, was appointed in his place. D'Ormesson was led, by his innocent desire to get out of the difficulties, to postpone the payment of the public obligations, a measure which amounted to a practical acknowledgment of bankruptcy. After holding office for seven months he was dismissed, and the intrigues of the court ladies led to the nomination of Calonne as his successor. Calonne proved to be one of the most reckless and worthless ministers that were ever called to direct the destinies of a great nation. His sole object was to disguise the real situation from the court, from the people, and even from himself. As much as he believed in anything he believed in the doctrine so hateful to political economists, that unproductive expenditure is a benefit to labour. This belief he carried to extremes as fatal as the ideas of Law, and equally delusive for a short time. While the deficit was constantly increasing, he spent money lavishly in public festivities, in useless works, and in gratifying the avarice of the princes and nobles. Even business men were dazzled by so astounding an exhibition of confidence, and for a time loans were readily obtainable. But so hollow a bubble must soon burst, and in 1786 Calonne found himself at the end of all his resources. By this time public opinion had become more and more hostile against the court. The growing influence of the queen had excited ill-feeling, which was aggravated by scandalous rumours about her private conduct. The birth of a daughter in 1778, and of a son in 1781, after a long period of childlessness, had aroused bitter hostility in the house of Orleans, which had hitherto looked forward with confidence to the ultimate succession to the throne. All sorts of reports were spread with malignant industry, and Marie Antoinette's actions, though not inconsistent with perfect innocence, were sufficiently injudicious to give some colour to the assertions of her enemies. In 1785 the trial and acquittal of the Cardinal de Rohan on the charge of stealing and purchasing a diamond necklace of the queen, and of having forged her signature in authority of the transaction, gave a fresh impulse to the current suspicions. It was while opinion was in this excited state that the truth about the financial condition was suddenly disclosed.

§ 9. Since the fall of Turgot the revenue had been increased by 140 millions, partly by the addition of new taxes, partly by the natural development of resources. In spite of this, during the three years of Calonne's administration, years of perfect peace, the deficit had been increased by 35 millions. In August, 1786, Calonne confessed to the king exactly how matters stood, and at the same time proposed a plan for meeting difficulties, in which he borrowed most of the principles of Turgot and Necker, to which his previous administration had been diametrically opposed. The whole kingdom was to be divided among provincial assemblies of three grades, one for the parish, one for the district, and one for the province; and in their hands the assessment of all taxes was to be placed. A regular land-tax was to be imposed, from which no class, and not even the royal domain, was to be exempted. Trade in corn was to be free, except that the provincial assemblies might suspend exportation. Compulsory labour (*corvées*) was to be replaced by a poll tax, levied only on that class which had hitherto furnished the labour. The tolls upon traffic between the various provinces were to be abolished and the *gabelle* upon salt diminished. These changes, according to Calonne's calculation, would add 115 millions to the revenue within a single year. To carry such a sweeping measure, which involved a complete departure from the traditions of the old régime and attacked the foundation of all privileges, exceptional authority was needed, and the king was easily induced to summon an assembly of Notables for the beginning of 1787. Before they met the position of the government was altered for the worse by the death of Vergennes (13 February), who had considerable influence with the upper classes.

It was a grand but chimerical idea to expect the privileged classes to sacrifice their private interests to save the state. The assembly, which met on the 22nd of February, contained 144 members, of whom only six or seven belonged to the third estate. It was soon evident that nothing but strenuous opposition was to be expected from them. Even the people and the partisans of reform ridiculed measures which they would have welcomed from Turgot, when they were offered by Calonne. In the assembly the opposition was headed by Lomenie de Brienne, archbishop of Toulouse, a selfish aspirant for office, and by Necker, who was disgusted at the exposure of the fallacious character of his own financial statement. This formidable coalition convinced the king that he must get rid of the unpopular minister, and Calonne was dismissed. But Louis refused to have anything to do with Necker, whose abrupt resignation he had never pardoned, and gave the vacant post to Brienne. Brienne had no policy of his own: he had posed as the champion of privileges to gain office, he adopted the plans of Calonne to keep it. The only difference was that he brought in the various measures singly, instead of trying to carry them out at once. The Notables, satisfied with having overthrown the minister, approved his policy and were dissolved. But there still remained the Parliament of Paris, which had now become the last resource of the opponents of reform. The edicts about the *corvées*, the trade in corn, and the provincial assemblies, were registered without opposition, but when the equal land-tax upon all classes was proposed, the Parliament refused to accept it. The edict was registered in a bed of justice, and for protesting against this high-handed measure the Parliament was exiled to Troyes. But Brienne soon found that he could not govern by himself, and the court was allowed to return to Paris on condition of accepting the edicts. Thus, by a curious mixture of violence and weakness, the crown gained its first victory over the privileged classes. But the quarrel broke out afresh on the next scheme for imposing a tax, and the Parliament determined to purchase the support of the people by denying its own rights in matters of taxation and by demanding the States-General. Another bed of justice, and the exile of the duke of Orleans and other leaders of the opposition, roused the Parliament to fury. It was quite in vain that Brienne sought to conciliate them by promising concessions to the Protestants and the summons of the States-General within five years. The arrest of two of the most violent members of the court only extorted fresh protests against the arbitrary conduct of the government and gave increased popularity to the Parliament. As a last resource Brienne determined to follow the example of Maupeou, to restrict the Parliament to its judicial functions, and to entrust its political duties to a wholly new court, or *Cour Plénière.* But such general indignation was aroused that it proved impossible to carry out the measure. Risings took place in Dauphiné, Brittany and other provinces. Even an assembly of the clergy, which Brienne summoned in the hope of obtaining money, began its proceedings by demanding the abolition of the *Cour Plénière* and the meeting of the States-General. At last the government gave way, and on the 8th of August, 1788, the States-General were summoned to meet in May, 1789. A fortnight later Brienne, whose administration had been one long failure, resigned, and the king, much against his will, was obliged to summon Necker once more to office.

CHAPTER XXII.

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION.

I. Fall of the Old Régime.—§ 1. Discord in the court and ministry; questions about the constitution of the States-General; attitude of the third estate; the "national assembly." § 2. The hall closed; the oath of the tennis-court; adhesion of the clergy; the royal sitting; victory of the assembly. § 3. The court determines to employ force; disturbances in Paris; the Palais Royal; government assumed by the electors. § 4. Dismissal of Necker; rising in Paris; storming of the Bastille; the king yields; royal visit to Paris. § 5. Continued disturbances; Bailly and Lafayette; the electors superseded by a new municipality. § 6. Provincial risings; abolition of feudal privileges on the 4th of August. II. The Constitution.—§ 7. Parties in the Constituent Assembly; Mirabeau. § 8. The rights of man; a single chamber; the suspensive veto. § 9. Officers' banquet at Versailles; march of the women; riot in the palace; the king and royal family remove to Paris; all the assembly follows; secession of moderates. § 10. Comparative order; the Jacobin and other clubs. § 11. New territorial divisions; judicial reforms. § 12. Financial difficulties; confiscation of ecclesiastical property; *assignats;* civil constitution of the clergy; new attack on the nobles. § 13. The right of peace and war; responsibility of the opposition, the king, and the ministers, for the progress of the revolution. § 14. Mirabeau's relations with the court; his policy and his death. § 15. Flight and capture of Louis XVI.; conduct of the assembly; the monarchy suspended; the Feuillans. § 16. Completion of the constitution; Robespierre's self-denying ordinance; the king's acceptance; the Assembly dissolved. III. Europe and the Revolution.—§ 17. French encroachments in Avignon, Alsace, &c.; complaints of the German princes; the *emigrés* at Coblentz. § 18. Attitude of the European States; Leopold II. inclined to peace; declaration of Pilnitz. IV. The Legislative Assembly.—§ 19. Parties in the new assembly, Feuillans, Jacobins, and Girondists. § 20. Edicts against the emigrants and the non-juring priests; the royal veto. § 21. The Girondists eager for a war; three armies on the frontier; death of Leopold II.; the Girondists in office; declaration of war. § 22. Failure of French troops; the king vetoes two more edicts; dismissal of Roland and his colleagues. § 23. Riot of the 20th of June; temporary reaction; Lafayette in Paris. § 24. The foreign invasion revives hostility to the crown; manifesto of the duke of Brunswick; the Tuileries stormed on the 10th of August. § 25. Impotence of the assembly; the monarchy suspended; Paris under the commune; the royal family

in the Temple. § 26. The Prussians advance to Verdun; Lafayette a prisoner; the September massacres. § 27. Dumouriez saves France; the cannonade of Valmy; end of the monarchy.

I. FALL OF THE OLD RÉGIME, 5TH OF MAY TO 4TH OF AUGUST, 1789.

§ 1. THE recall of Necker and the definite summons of the States-General excited universal enthusiasm throughout France. But the two measures were not steps in exactly the same direction. Necker was by no means in complete sympathy with the reforming party, with which he had allied himself to put pressure on the court. Narrow-minded and unsympathetic, he thought only of administrative reform, the security of credit, and his own tenure of office, and had no conception of the needs and desires of a people amongst whom he was always a foreigner. Neither was he in accord with the court, where the chief influence was exercised by the queen, the count of Artois, and the Polignac faction, who were opposed to all constitutional change beyond what was necessary to evade immediate danger. The differences between Necker and the court divided the ministry, which was therefore without any decided policy. The king, who ought to have taken a line of his own, was incapable of independent action, and vacillated helplessly between one party and another. It was this condition of the government which was the great advantage of the reformers and which gave rise to many of the disasters that were to fall upon France.

The States-General having been summoned, it was necessary to determine their constitution, a matter of some difficulty, as they had never met since 1614. There were two great questions to settle: (1) Were the three orders to have an equal number of representatives, or was the third estate to be the more numerous, as several precedents indicated? and (2) Were the three orders to deliberate separately or together, i.e. were votes to be taken by head or by order? These questions ought to have been decided by the executive government, but there was too little unanimity for this. Ultimately the matter seems to have been arranged by Necker, and his decision offers an excellent illustration of the position in which he stood. To be popular was essential for him, therefore he granted the third estate a number of representatives equal to the other two orders together. To restore the finances the pecuniary privileges of the upper classes must be abolished, and to effect this it seemed desirable that the assembly should be undivided. On the other hand, that measure would make the third estate absolute and would involve danger to the constitution. Unable to decide between these conflicting considerations, the minister left the question of voting undetermined. All citizens over twenty-five years of age who paid the capitation-tax were authorised to choose representatives; and these representatives, the electors as they were called, chose the deputies for their respective estates, and drew up the *cahiers*, or lists of grievances and instructions to the deputies. These *cahiers*, which touch upon nearly every department of government and of social organisation, offer the most instructive picture of ancient France, and throw a flood of light upon the aims and wishes of its various classes.

On the 5th of May the assembly was opened by colourless speeches on the part of the king, Necker and other ministers. The total number of deputies amounted to 1139, of whom 291 represented the clergy, 270 the nobles, and 578 the third estate. The different classes had mainly chosen their own members, but the nobles included twenty-eight members of the parliament, whose rank was official, while the commons had chosen twelve nobles, including Mirabeau, and two ecclesiastics, of whom one was the Abbé Sieyès. From the first the third estate assumed a resolute attitude on the question of procedure, demanded that votes should be taken by head, and refused to verify the powers of its deputies, until the assembly had been constituted by the adhesion of the other orders. Among the nobles there were a number of moderate reformers, of whom the most prominent were Lafayette, Lally-Tollendal, and Clermont-Tonnerre, who urged this course of action upon their colleagues. But the majority, influenced by the queen and the count of Artois, refused to give up their separate existence, and maintained that deliberation by order and the right of each estate to a veto were essential parts of the constitution. The clergy were more evenly divided. Most of the great ecclesiastics were inclined to support the nobles, and to oppose a union of the three orders which would leave them powerless to defend their interests or their religion. But the majority of the order was composed of ill-paid *curés*, who had little sympathy with their haughty and high-born superiors, and were inclined to throw in their lot with the third estate. On the motion of the clergy commissioners were appointed to devise some compromise, but the attempt failed. Nothing could be more adroit than the tactics of the commons, who succeeded in throwing all the blame of their prolonged inactivity upon the other estates. At last it was decided to act with decision. On the 12th of June they invited the clergy and nobles to join them in a common verification of powers, and at once proceeded with that necessary preliminary of business. A few *curés* appeared among them, and on the 17th they took the all-important step of assuming the name of *national assembly*, thus ignoring the separate existence of the rival estates. This daring measure was followed by others equally bold and prudent. They declared that all the existing taxes were illegal, because they had not been granted by representatives, and then proceeded to authorise their continuance during the session of the assembly. This provided them with a valid security against an attempted dissolution. They then guaranteed the public debt, and appointed a committee to consider the food question and to concert measures for averting a threatened famine. Late on the 19th of June the clergy, by 138 votes to 129, decided to join the third estate. The majority was mainly composed of the lower clergy, but it contained several bishops, and was headed by the archbishop of Bordeaux.

§ 2. The government was astounded at the rapidity with which events had marched. Necker was as irritated as the most pronounced supporter of despotism and privilege. The establishment of a single legislative assembly, in which the commons were practically supreme, was fatal to his favourite scheme of a double chamber like the English parliament. He advised the king to hold a royal sitting, much the same thing as a *lit de justice*, to conciliate the people by granting the most essential reforms, and to order the separate deliberation of the three estates on all matters concerning the interests of classes. This was a measure which might have succeeded earlier, but was now much too late, and moreover was not exactly carried out. The court party succeeded in gaining the king's ear, and convinced him that the interests, not only of the crown, but of religion, were at stake. It was determined to effect a real *coup d'état* and to strike terror into the hearts of the opposition. But in the meanwhile it was important to prevent any further sessions, for fear lest the union of the clergy with the third estate might make their subsequent separation more difficult. On the pretext that the hall had to be prepared for the royal sitting it was occupied by workmen, and when Bailly, the president, arrived in the morning he was informed that no session could be held. The assembly was roused to indignation by so palpable a trick, and, after some violent proposals had been rejected, they adjourned to the adjacent tennis-court. There, on the motion of Mounier, a deputy of Dauphiné, and one of the most moderate ot the reformers, all with one exception took a solemn oath "not to desert the assembly and to meet wherever circumstances shall require until the constitution is firmly established on a solid foundation." The next day the count of Artois engaged the tennis-court, but the deputies found more respectable and comfortable quarters in the church of St. Louis. Here they were immensely encouraged by the arrival of the majority of the clergy, who were welcomed with transports of joy (21 June).

The court blindly adhered to the programme that had been agreed upon. On the 23rd of June Louis XVI. entered the assembly with all the impressive pomp of the old régime. Necker showed his disapprobation of the changes made in his scheme, and revived his waning popularity, by absenting himself. The king, who had learnt his lesson only too well from his advisers, proceeded to rate the assembly in terms which were equally opposed to prudence and to his own acquiescent temper. He declared that the national representatives could only be composed of the three estates deliberating apart; only on special occasions and with royal permission could a joint meeting be held. He prohibited the discussion of all burning questions, such as the property and privileges of classes, and ordered the immediate consideration of certain specified reforms which he would accept without hesitation. The decrees of the 17th were declared to be unconstitutional and therefore annulled. Finally he ordered the immediate dissolution of the assembly, and the meeting in different chambers on the next day. "I can say with truth that no king has ever done so much for any nation: support me in this benevolent undertaking, or else I will alone secure the welfare of my people and will regard myself as their only real representative." The clergy and nobles obeyed the order to separate at once, but the third estate remained in sombre silence until Mirabeau rose and inveighed in burning words against the insulting dictation they had listened to. On the arrival of the Grand Master of the Ceremonies to remind the deputies of their instructions, the orator turned upon him fiercely and bade him tell his master that they were there by the will of the people, and would not depart unless compelled by bayonets. It was unanimously decided to maintain the edicts of the 17th, and to declare the inviolability of the national representatives.

The *coup d'état* had already failed when those against whom it was directed had shown that they were not intimidated. Louis himself was the first to recognise a defeat which he had courted under the influence of others. The assembly by its firmness had ousted the king from the highest position in France, and the first great step in the revolution was taken. On the next day the majority of the clergy again joined the third estate, and their example was followed by 43 nobles, among whom was a prince of the royal blood, Philip of Orleans. On the 27th the king sent a special request to the rest of the nobles and clergy that they would also join the national assembly. With unfeigned reluctance they obeyed the royal order and henceforth sat among the men whose measures they hated and dreaded. They were encouraged by representations from the court that their complaisance would not be permanent and that means would be found to defeat the hostile projects of the revolutionists.

§ 3. The first alarm being over, the court party began to repent of the weakness they had shown in allowing the assembly to gain so easy a victory. The king was carefully separated from Necker and other moderate advisers, so as to give free play to the influence of the queen and the count of Artois. The new scheme was to employ force to repress a movement which had become too dangerous to be despised or tolerated. From all parts of the kingdom troops were collected, and before long Paris was surrounded by 40,000 men. The supreme command was entrusted to Marshal Broglie, a veteran of the Seven Years' War, who took his measures as if he had to conduct a regular campaign against a foreign enemy. Such public preparations naturally aroused the alarm of the assembly. On the motion of Mirabeau a deputation was sent to the king to express apprehension and to demand the withdrawal of the troops. Louis replied that he had supreme control of the army, that his only object was to ensure tranquillity, and that if the deputies were alarmed they might withdraw to Noyon or Soissons. Such an answer was equivalent to a confirmation of the worst fears.

But already the initiative in resistance had been taken by a far more dangerous enemy than the assembly, the people of Paris. For a long time the capital had been in a very disturbed state, chiefly owing to the scarcity of food and the consequent riots for bread. But since the meeting of the States-General the disorders had become more organised and more political. It is difficult to decide how far this change was due to chance or to premeditation. There can be no doubt that a large number of contemporaries believed that the chief instigator of disturbances was the duke of Orleans, and that the leading rioters received pay from him. Orleans was the bitter and unscrupulous enemy of the queen, and had sufficient ground to complain of the treatment he had received from Louis. His personal character was base enough to make no charge against him incredible. On the other hand, he was too timid, too weak, and too wanting in talents, to be the leader even of a riot. But it is probable that he was really the instrument of abler men, who used his wealth and his name, and promoted disorder for their own ends. It is quite possible, though not so certain, that they wished to depose the king and to raise Orleans to the crown, or at any rate to the regency. The malice of his numerous enemies has included Mirabeau among these members of the Orleanist faction, but the calumny has been sufficiently refuted. But there is no doubt that he was fully aware of the designs of the revolutionists, and that he was equally willing to make use of them or to defeat them as circumstances dictated.

The head-quarters of the disorderly element in Paris was in the cafés which had grown up round the garden of Orleans' residence, the Palais Royal. There was formed a sort of club, which had no definite existence, but which used to meet to discuss affairs and which sent out emissaries to promote the course of action which it desired. It was their dictation which gave to the popular movements a consistency and definiteness of object which they must otherwise have lacked. One of the chief aims of their intrigues was to corrupt the soldiers, and in this they were conspicuously successful. The result of the agglomeration of troops in the capital was that those troops became untrustworthy and insubordinate. A colonel arrested some of his men for acting in the interests of the Palais Royal, the mob released them, and the regiment went over to the popular side. It became known that the native regiments would not act against the people, and Broglie had to resort to the still more unpopular measure of summoning foreign troops to effect the designs of the court. The excitement in Paris steadily increased, and there was no adequate authority to put down the tumults. In this crisis the government of the city was assumed by the electors who had chosen the deputies for the States-General, and they fulfilled their self-imposed task with an energy and devotion that reflected the highest credit upon them. It was mainly due to their exertions that supplies were obtained and that the city was saved from the horrors of famine.

§ 4. Meanwhile the court party adhered to their plan. On the 11th of July Necker and three of his colleagues were summarily dismissed and banished, and their places filled by devoted royalists, Breteuil, Broglie, Foulon, and Laporte. This was a tremendous blow to the assembly, which was now confronted by a united and avowedly hostile ministry. A deputation was sent to demand Necker's recall and to renew the petition for the dismissal of the troops. An unsatisfactory answer from the king provoked edicts in favour of the fallen ministers, and the assembly decided to sit night and day to prevent a forcible closing of the hall. To relieve the president from the fatigue involved by this measure Lafayette was elected vice-president. But again it was evident that the real battle was to be fought in Paris and not at Versailles. The news of the dismissal of the ministers reached the Palais Royal on the 12th: at once Camille Desmoulins, the most eloquent of the popular orators, denounced the king's action as the tocsin for a St. Bartholomew of the patriots, and called upon the people to rise in defence of their lives and liberties. The mob rose in obedience to this suggestion, and in the Tuileries gardens came into collision with a German regiment. Blood was shed in the skirmish, but the French guards joined the citizens and forced the Germans to retreat. It was feared that a general attack would be made upon the capital, and the troops and citizens remained on the defensive all night. The next day the mob repaired to the Hôtel de Ville and demanded arms from the electors. Flesselles, the provost of the merchants and head of the old municipality, put them off with promises and assurances that were never fulfilled. The greatest disorder prevailed, and the criminal classes took advantage of it to commit the worst outrages with impunity. To serve the double purpose of restoring tranquillity and defending the city, the electors determined to organise the citizens into a military force, and thus laid the foundation of the famous National Guard. All that was now wanted was arms, and they were obtained by an attack on the Invalides. The attention of the mob was now directed to the famous fortress of the Bastille, the most conspicuous monument of the old despotism, which commanded the Faubourg St. Antoine, whence the worst class of the rioters were furnished. After a siege of several hours the garrison compelled the commander, De Launay, to surrender on condition that the lives of the garrison should be spared. The leaders of the attack did what they could to observe their promise, but the mob was too infuriated to listen either to reason or to authority. De Launay with several of his subordinates was murdered, and the rest of the garrison, who were carried to the Hôtel de Ville, were with difficulty saved by the electors. Attention was now called to the failure of Flesselles to fulfil his promises of procuring arms, and a letter which had been found upon De Launay was considered to prove that he had all along been betraying the people until succour could arrive. Flesselles tried to brave the matter out and agreed to accompany his accusers to the Palais Royal, but on the way he was shot. The mob was supreme in Paris, the troops which had been so assiduously collected were utterly untrustworthy, and the commander, Besenval, could do nothing but withdraw from the city.

The very night which witnessed these events in Paris had been destined by the court for their great *coup d'état.* The king was to renew his declaration of the 23rd of June, of which several thousand copies had been printed for circulation. The military force was to compel its acceptance by the assembly, which was then to be dissolved. To provide for immediate financial necessities, notes had been struck off for more than a hundred millions. The danger from the mob of Paris was ill understood, and despised by the ignorant and thoughtless courtiers. The assembly was perfectly aware of these designs, and was sitting in momentary expectation of a crisis, when the news came of the disturbances at Paris. One deputation after another was sent to the king to demand the removal of the troops as the one method of securing tranquillity, but he refused to yield. At last it was announced that the Bastille had fallen, and that De Launay and Flesselles had perished. A third deputation was proposed, but Clermont-Tonnerre interfered with the words: "No, let us leave them the night for reflection; kings, like other men, must pay for experience." In the morning the question of a deputation was again discussed, when the news came that the king was on his way to the assembly. He was received in profound silence until in a few spontaneous words he expressed his trust in the deputies and announced that he had ordered the troops to quit both Paris and Versailles. Enthusiastic applause welcomed these words, the assembly rose in a body and escorted the king to the palace amidst the cheers of the crowd. Louis followed up his tardy policy of concession by declaring his willingness to recall Necker, and by asking the assembly to act as mediator for him, both with the minister and with the citizens. A deputation of a hundred members was appointed to carry the welcome news to Paris, where they were received in triumph. Bailly, the first president of the National Assembly, was elected mayor of Paris, and Lafayette, who was hailed by his admirers as the champion of liberty in two hemispheres, was made commander of the newly formed National Guard. It was determined to signalise the restoration of peace by inducing the king to visit his capital. Louis, who lacked everything except courage and good-nature, undertook the journey in spite of the misgivings of his family, and the royal entry was made on the 17th of July with every external appearance of success. The promoters of the *coup d'état* were forced to acknowledge their defeat, and the most prominent of them, the count of Artois, the princes of Condé and Conti, and the Polignac family, evaded the popular fury by speedy flight to Turin, where they strove to restore their failing cause by foreign intervention. Necker returned from exile, and his journey through France resembled a triumphal procession. Never, either before or afterwards, did he enjoy such unlimited popularity, but he owed it rather to his sufferings than to his achievements, and another year of office lost him both the regard of the people and his reputation as a statesman.

§ 5. The 14th of July was the second of the great days of the Revolution. The 23rd of June had given supreme legislative authority to the assembly; the fall of the Bastille established the sovereignty of the people. Such conspicuous and speedy successes seemed to justify the expectation that tranquillity would now be restored, but this was not the case. The disturbances in Paris continued. Foulon and his son-in-law Berthier, who were suspected of having helped to bring about the scarcity of corn, were brutally murdered in spite of the efforts of Lafayette to save them. It is almost certain that these and other outrages were concerted, and were not due to the spontaneous passions of the mob. It must be remembered that the Orleanist faction was still disappointed. They had hoped for the deposition if not for the death of the king, but Louis had been formally reconciled with the people. Their only chance lay in urging on the movement of revolution, in discrediting the new authorities and overthrowing the supremacy of the middle class, who were opposed by nature and interest to further employment of violence. Bailly and Lafayette, the representatives of this class, did all they could to restore order and confidence. The latter organised the National Guard and gave them as their colours the famous tricolour, composed of the blue and red, the colours of Paris, and the white of the monarchy. Bailly, a student of astronomy and mathematics, who had little experience of practical affairs, found his post an almost intolerable burden. The electors, just as they were beginning to cope successfully with the task they had undertaken, were dismissed with ingratitude, and replaced by 120 deputies, two from each district. The new administrators had the will but not the experience to rule, and showed scanty respect for the mayor whom popular acclamation and not their own choice had selected. And their own authority was not absolute. Everywhere the fatal doctrine was adopted, that representatives can only carry out the will of their constituents. This gave enormous advantages to the underground agitators. If a committee opposed them, they appealed to the municipality, if that body was equally resolute they complained to the districts. Everybody wished to govern, no one to obey. The great problem was still to supply the capital with food, and Bailly spent night and day at the deliberations of the committee of subsistence. The destruction of the barriers and the consequent cessation of the *octroi*, or tax on provisions, left the city without funds, and the money which purchased corn for Paris, often at a ruinous loss, had to be furnished by the central government. Even in fulfilling this necessary duty the committee was hampered by the reckless conspirators. All sorts of expedients were employed to disgust the people with the bread that was supplied them, and the National Guard had to be employed in protecting the convoys of corn and the bakers' shops. The duke of Orleans was even accused of buying up corn so as to increase the scarcity. Bailly's *Memoirs* give a vivid picture of the anxieties and worries of each day that elapsed before the new harvest could be got in.

§ 6. Meanwhile disorders had spread from the capital to the provinces. Everywhere the old authorities were replaced by new ones, and the sudden change of system destroyed all the repressive powers of government. In the north the lower classes suddenly refused to pay the accustomed services and dues, and thus deprived their superiors of the means of subsistence. In the southern provinces the peasants set themselves to take a terrible vengeance for the oppressions which they had endured for centuries. Auvergne, Dauphiné, and Franche-Comté were the scene of frightful atrocities; castles were burnt, nobles and their families were tortured and killed, and all the horrors of the old Jacquerie were renewed with complete impunity.

The intelligence of these events reached the National Assembly on the 4th of August, and roused the members from an academical discussion of the rights of man, which had been started by Lafayette. The assembly was the only body which could restore order, but it was rightly felt that this must be preceded by a removal of grievances. Two nobles, Noailles and d'Aiguillon, began the work of destruction by proposing the abolition of all feudal rights and of all exemptions and privileges enjoyed by individuals and corporations. The proposals were received with acclamation, and the assembly promptly decreed that it "annulled the feudal régime, abolished all privileges with regard to subsidies, and declared every citizen admissible to all offices and dignities, ecclesiastical, civil, and military." A perfect frenzy of self-abnegation seized the deputies, every one hastened to resign or abolish something, whether he possessed it or not. The sitting was prolonged till midnight, while one decree after another was carried with reckless haste, and finally Louis XVI. was formally declared the "restorer of French liberty."

The famous 4th of August, which was afterwards called the "St. Bartholomew of property," destroyed the last relics of the feudal system in France and marks the final termination of the *ancien régime*. The following is a brief summary of the decrees that were adopted by the assembly. Serfdom, *corvées*, and all the customary services that the lords had been accustomed to exact from their peasants were abolished: the exclusive rights of hunting and the savage punishments for poaching were done away with: the guilds and other close corporations in the towns were dissolved: offices were no longer to be sold, and the administration of justice was to be gratuitous: the lords lost all their old rights of jurisdiction: tithes were to be redeemed and converted into a money-tax: the payment of annates to Rome and the plurality of benefices were forbidden. It is perfectly true that these changes were too sweeping and too important to be made all at once and with so little consideration; it is true that the work of destruction ought not to have been accomplished until a new system was ready to replace the old; it is true that the deputies acted under the influence of an excitement that overpowered all considerations of statesmanship or even of justice. Nevertheless the work was essentially necessary, and there was something grand and impressive in the spirit of self-sacrifice that had been shown. The decrees of the 4th of August inflicted great temporary disasters upon France, but they have given great blessings to humanity. They vindicated for all time the freedom of labour and the equality of all men before the law.

II. THE CONSTITUTION, 4TH OF AUGUST, 1789, TO 30TH OF SEPTEMBER, 1790.

§ 7. The old system having perished, the monarchy having abdicated its powers to the assembly and the nation, the privileges which divided classes having been abolished, it was now imperatively necessary to commence the great work of establishing a new constitution which should give permanence to the great changes that had been made. From the time the assembly began to grapple with real definite work, in which questions of principle were involved, parties began necessarily to form themselves in its midst. On the right sat the partisans of reaction, all members of the clergy and of the noble class, who wished not so much to prevent further change as to undo what had been already accomplished. Hitherto they had mostly maintained a contemptuous silence, in the hope that the court would find some means of changing the course of affairs. Now that they began to take part in business they posed as the champions of prerogative and privilege. But their conduct was still factious and reckless: not infrequently they allied themselves with the extreme party in the hope of carrying measures which would bring the assembly into disrepute. Their most prominent representatives were Maury, an ecclesiastic, Cazales, a noble and an officer, and d'Eprémesnil, the champion of the Parliament of Paris. But on the whole the party was not conspicuous either for ability, prudence, or patriotism, and it gradually lost ground as its numbers were decreased by the continuous emigration.

In the centre sat the moderate party, the allies of Necker, headed by honest and capable men such as Mounier, Malouet, Lally-Tollendal, and Clermont-Tonnerre. They had been disgusted by the popular excesses in Paris and elsewhere, they were eager to stop a movement which they could no longer hope to control, and they wished to direct all their efforts to the formation of a permanent and effective constitution. Their ideal was a system like that of England, the division of the legislative power between the king and two chambers, triennial elections, and the retention of executive power by the king and ministers whom he selects. There can be no doubt that the triumph of this party would have saved France from many of its subsequent disasters, but unfortunately it was too much bound up with Necker. Had he been the great statesman that his admirers deemed him, he might have directed the course of events and maintained both himself and the monarchy. But he was a mere financier, with no adequate conception of the great issues that were being raised, and with no ability to grapple with the great practical difficulties that stood in his way. The failure of his administration involved the defeat of the party with which he was identified.

The left was occupied by the great mass of the deputies who had no particular union, and who by no means shared the same opinions on all subjects. Generally they sympathised with the revolution, and they were united by a common antipathy to despotism and to class privileges, but they included the most opposite views as to where the movement was to end. On the extreme left sat a small and as yet unnoticed group of fanatics who already dreamed of a republic. Among them were Robespierre, Pétion, and Buzot; but no one could foretell their future prominence. The most extreme of the prominent leaders of the assembly were the heads of the Breton Club, Barnave, Duport, and Lameth, whose youth and ardent courage made them willing to accept and make the best of any change. They believed in the people, and were ready to pardon even its excesses. More prudent and still more prominent were two men who played a great part in the constituent assembly, Sieyès, its legislator, and Mirabeau, its orator. Mirabeau was undoubtedly the great man of the day. Born of a noble family, he had been driven to vice and despair by the persecutions of his father, and he had conceived a bitter loathing for the political and social system that had made such treatment possible. Hence he had thrown himself heart and soul into the revolutionary movement, had employed his pen and his voice to maintain the courage of the assembly and to excite the wrath of the people. So incessant was his activity and so wide-spread were his connections that his enemies attributed every outbreak to his intrigues. His attacks upon the queen had roused the bitter enmity of the court, where he was regarded as the apostle of rebellion and of unbelief. But Mirabeau, though liable to lose his self-control in fits of passion, was not a mere destroyer, and was not without a plan of his own for the regeneration of France. His enmity was satisfied by the destruction of the privileged classes from which he had severed himself; he had no quarrel with the monarchy, of which he now became the champion. He was convinced that the changes that had been made were not inconsistent with the existence of a strong central power, or even with that of a new aristocracy. He was confident that he could build up a new organism in place of the old, and he eagerly sought for an opportunity to make the attempt. His ambition—and this was well known both to friends and opponents—was to be a minister. It would perhaps have been well if the court could have made up their minds to employ him; but the queen regarded him as a monster and as the author of all the mischief, while the king disliked him as a libertine almost more than he feared him as a politician. As long as he was excluded from office, Mirabeau was forced to side with the opposition, both to maintain the popularity in which lay his strength, and to force his way to the position that was denied him. His great disadvantage was that he had no organised following—that he was his own party. His haughty and independent temper would brook no associates on terms of equality. He despised the assembly of which he was the guiding spirit; he despised mediocrities like Lafayette and Necker, whose popularity made them a power; and while he knew of the intrigues of the duke of Orleans, he always regarded that prince with unmixed contempt. Another point on which his conduct was open to attack was his pecuniary difficulties. He was constantly harassed by his creditors, and even when the death of his father left him a considerable property he never had the time to arrange his affairs. These circumstances and his lavish habits made the acquisition of money unusually important to him, and this laid him open to charges of venality and corruption which it was not easy to refute. It is impossible to assert that Mirabeau could have succeeded in carrying out the grand schemes which he so confidently propounded, or that he could have checked the revolutionary movement, but it is equally certain that no one else could.

§ 8. The first work of the assembly after the 4th of August was to resume the discussion about the rights of man, which ended in the issuing of the declaration on the 27th. It was a feeble and unnecessary imitation of the great American manifesto. Philosophical definitions were laid down by the vote of a majority, and principles were enunciated which, if logically carried out, would put an end to all government. Then the assembly took into consideration the proposals of a committee which had been authorised to prepare a scheme of the constitution. The first great dispute arose on the question whether the legislature should consist of one or two chambers. The suggestion was that the first chamber should consist of six hundred members chosen by the people, while the second or senate should contain two hundred members, nominated by the king on the presentation of the departments. On the left the cry was raised that this would destroy the equality which had just been laid down in the declaration of rights; on the right the nobles and clergy resented a proposal which disregarded all their claims and pretensions. The union of these two extremes decided the matter, and it was carried by a large majority that the legislature should be indivisible. Then came the still more burning question as to the relations of the crown and the legislature. It was proposed that the king should have a veto upon all laws adopted by the assembly. The left raised a loud outcry against a proposal which left the interests and wishes of twenty-five millions at the mercy of one man. Mirabeau, who had previously announced his opinion on this point, vigorously opposed any further encroachment upon the royal power. But opinion was becoming agitated outside the assembly. The Palais Royal taught the cry *à bas le veto* to a mob which thought it meant a kind of tax. Necker, always afraid of losing the popularity which had restored him to office, induced the king to accept a compromise. The veto was to be suspensive and not absolute, i.e. the king could postpone an act of the assembly for four years; but if two successive legislatures adhered to it his opposition had to be withdrawn. The supporters of the crown found themselves deserted by their own leader, and the suspensive veto was decreed on the 21st of September.

§ 9. Meanwhile the disorders went on in the provinces as well as in Paris. In the latter the number of representatives had been increased from 120 to 300, but without introducing any unanimity into the administration. The real power was in the hands of the national guard and of its idolised commander, Lafayette. They represented the *bourgeoisie*, or middle class, and succeeded in repressing the worst outrages. The Orleanists saw that a new effort must be made to attain their objects. Their most prominent leaders were the journalists, Desmoulins, Loustalot and Marat, and mob-orators like Danton and St. Huruge. But the real directors were a small knot of men who immediately surrounded the duke.

They conceived the plan of either murdering the king or of terrifying him into flight. In either case the duke could be raised to power as regent if not as king. The discussion about the veto had given occasion for fresh disturbances, and the question of the king's flight had been seriously debated at Versailles. But Louis himself refused to leave the coast clear for his ambitious and worthless relative. It was necessary to try some more direct attack. The conduct of the court afforded a convenient opportunity. The royal guards had been strengthened by the arrival of the regiment of Flanders, and the officers of the former entertained the new-comers at a banquet in the palace (October). Late in the evening the royal family appeared in the hall and were received with an outburst of enthusiasm. It was reported, probably with intentional exaggeration, that the tricolour had been trampled under foot in drunken excitement and that all the guests had adopted the white cockade. In Paris the greatest alarm was felt and simulated, and the most disquieting rumours of an intended counter-revolution were industriously circulated. On the 5th of October a mob of women marched to Versailles accompanied by the riff-raff of the population. They entered and harangued the assembly, and a deputation gained admission to the king, who satisfied them with promises of bread and kind words. The national guard called upon Lafayette to lead them to Versailles for the maintenance of peace, but he refused to march till he had received orders from the municipality, and it was not till late in the afternoon, after the mob had come into armed collision with the guards, that he appeared upon the scene. His arrival restored order, he replaced the guards by his own troops, and after guaranteeing the king's security he retired to rest. In the early morning a party of rioters obtained admission into the palace by a neglected door. Murdering the guards whom they met, they advanced to the queen's apartments, and it was only with great difficulty and by the heroic self-sacrifice of her defenders that she was enabled to escape to the king. Lafayette, who had been roused by the unwelcome intelligence of this new outbreak, now brought up his troops and cleared the palace. But outside the utmost disorder and excitement prevailed, and the cry was raised which had already been heard in the capital, "the king to Paris." Louis was compelled to show himself at a window and to make a sign of acquiescence. Without delay the compulsory journey had to be undertaken, and on the evening of the 6th the royal family arrived at the Tuileries. They had been preceded by the mob bearing the heads of the murdered guards, and they were accompanied by a crowd of women who declared that there was no longer any fear of famine as they brought with them "the baker and the baker's wife and the little baker's boy."

The 5th of October marks a new and disastrous change in the course of the revolution. The presence of the king and the government in Paris confirmed the supremacy which that city had assumed in France, and gave irresistible powers to the mob. So well appreciated were the inevitable results that when the assembly determined to follow the king, and took up its quarters in the riding-school near the Tuileries, more than a hundred members, including Mounier and Lally-Tollendal, refused to retain their seats. It was no wonder that men sought to discover the originator of the popular rising. The court attributed it to the evil influence of Mirabeau, but his innocence was subsequently proved to the satisfaction even of Marie Antoinette, and the charge is based merely upon the fact that he had early information of the rising. The real authors of the mischief were the duke of Orleans and his associates, and subsequently a letter was found in his handwriting to the effect that "the money has not been earned, as the simpleton still lives." The court was probably aware of his atrocious designs, and forced him to retire for a time to England. It was on this occasion that Mirabeau expressed his contempt for the prince who had wished to be his king, and whom he would not employ as his lackey.

§ 10. The removal to Paris had one unexpected result, the restoration of comparative order for a time. The middle classes, having obtained the supremacy that they desired, showed an unwonted determination to exercise it with firmness. When the mob rose and murdered a baker named François, the assembly, on Mirabeau's motion, carried a strong measure which authorised the summary procedure of martial law, and entrusted its administration to the old court of the Châtelet. Lafayette and his national guard became masters of Paris, and the rioters, having lost their paymaster, retired into obscurity. But opinions were none the less excited because they ceased to be translated into action. This is the era of the clubs, which contributed to define more clearly the lines of party divisions, and which acted as a sort of link between the assembly and public opinion. By far the most important was the club which had been originally founded by the deputies from Brittany, but which obtained the name of Jacobin from the quarters which it took up in Paris. Its character was now wholly altered, and it began to admit others besides members of the assembly and to affiliate corresponding clubs in the chief provincial cities. As its numbers increased, its opinions became more extreme, and several of its former leaders, Lafayette, Sieyès and Chapelier, deserted it to form a new club, that of '89. The nobles and clergy who were opposed to the revolution sought to imitate the tactics of their enemies and formed a club of their own, which, after several changes of name, was suppressed by the municipality as a source of disorder. These and numerous other clubs served to maintain the public interest in political questions, while the assembly took advantage of the restoration of order to continue its work of establishing the constitution. It will be convenient to summarise their labours instead of endeavouring to follow the chronological course of their decrees, which took several months to elaborate.

§ 11. One of the earliest and most important tasks which the assembly undertook was to destroy the old system of provincial administration, as they had already destroyed that of the central government. On the 23rd of December, 1789, the old provinces were completely abolished, with all their separate privileges and institutions, with all that marked the fact that they had once been independent states. France was divided into eighty-three departments, whose boundaries were merely geographical and whose names had to be invented on the spot. The departments, which were as nearly as possible equal in extent, were subdivided into districts, and these again into rural cantons, containing five or six parishes, and into communes. All these divisions were to have a regular organisation based upon the same model. The department had an administrative council of thirty-six members and an acting directory of five; the district had also a smaller council and directory, though subordinate to those of the department. The canton was originally intended to be merely an electoral unit, in which all active citizens assembled to choose electors, and these latter were to choose every two years the members of the various councils or directories, and also the deputies to the next legislative chamber. An active citizen was a man who paid a direct tax amounting to at least three days' wages: to be a member of any of the councils a man must pay at least fifty days' wages, while a still higher qualification was exacted for members of the legislature. These subdivisions were sufficiently contrary to the rights of man, but they serve to show how entirely the middle class had the upper hand at this time. The commune, which was the most important of the newly organised divisions, was to be governed by a council and an executive municipality, their number were to be proportioned to that of the population, and they were to be chosen, not by intermediary electors, but directly by the people. These changes were not exactly models of legislative wisdom. Their object was to establish the national unity, to make people no longer Normans or Bretons or Gascons, but simply Frenchmen. But one evil was only avoided by incurring a greater. The units were so much stronger than the central government that the 44,000 communes seemed likely to develop into so many independent republics. But it was a sufficiently striking departure from the old system when a score or two of intendants under the minister of finance governed the whole of France. Now it was reckoned that one man out of every thirty-four was an elected official. Naturally the greatest discontent was aroused in the provinces, which were proud of their separate existence; and in some, as in Dauphiné, an attempt was made to oppose the will of the assembly. But the passion for unity was strong in France, and the efforts of the champions of provincial independence were soon swallowed up in the more dangerous movements of the privileged classes.

The reforms in the judicial administration were almost equally sweeping and extensive: that they were more prudent is probably due to the presence of numerous able and experienced lawyers in the assembly. The old parliaments, one of the sturdiest elements of the old régime, disappeared as a matter of course. Now that offices were no longer saleable and the administration of justice was gratuitous, their existence became impossible. Trial by jury was unanimously introduced in criminal cases, but the lawyers successfully opposed its employment to decide civil cases where questions of law were mixed up with those of fact. The new judicial institutions were naturally based upon the local divisions. Every department had a criminal court, every district a civil court, a supreme court of cassation was established in Paris. Even the canton was made a judicial unit and received *juges de paix*, or justices of the peace. Torture and *lettres de cachet* were prohibited, heresy and witchcraft ceased to be crimes, and the punishment of death was limited to a very few offences. A great stand was made by the royalists on the question whether the judges should be appointed by the king. But the natural dread of royal intervention in judicial matters was too strong, and it was carried that they should be chosen from among the lawyer class by the electors of the various districts and departments. This was the great defect of the new system. The old courts may have been corrupt, but they were at least independent. In the administration of justice the influence of the mob is at least as dangerous an evil as the despotism of a monarch.

§ 12. While these great measures were being discussed, the assembly was always being confronted with the great problem of France, the finances. Their condition had been steadily going from bad to worse, because the disorders of the revolution had cut off many of the sources of revenue, while the expenditure had been enormously increased. Huge sums had been swallowed up in providing Paris with corn, in organising the national guard, and in compensating the members of the parliaments. The assembly had naturally wished to postpone the granting of money until the constitution was completed, but the pressure of immediate necessities had been too strong. Necker pursued his usual policy of disguising the real condition of things, and sought only to postpone bankruptcy by temporary palliatives. He had demanded and obtained two loans, one of thirty and another of eighty millions, but through deficient information the assembly fixed the rate of interest too low, and neither was successful. Then he demanded a patriotic contribution of a fourth of every income, the assessment to be made on the declaration of each individual. This had been carried by the impetuous oratory of Mirabeau, who insisted that as the assembly depended for its financial information on the minister, he must be implicitly trusted and must accept the sole responsibility for the measures which he recommended. Still the needs of the government were as pressing as ever, and Necker's resources seemed to be exhausted. He had hoped for a moment that the tithes might be employed for state uses, but the deputies had preferred to make a present of them to the landowners. It was in these circumstances that Talleyrand pointed to what seemed at first sight a source of boundless wealth, the estates of the church. He maintained that the clergy were not the owners but only the administrators and trustees of their domains, and he therefore proposed that the nation should appropriate them, and at the same time undertake to provide for the clergy and for the expenses of public worship. A tremendous outcry was raised by the class whom it was proposed to despoil, but in vain, and it was decreed that the property of the church stood at the disposal of the nation. It was hoped that this measure would give renewed security to public credit, but as the hope was disappointed it became necessary to proceed to action. A decree of the 19th of December, 1789, ordered the sale of church property to the value of 400 millions. But the general feeling of insecurity was so great that no purchasers could be found, and for some time the edict was fruitless. It was not for three months that a way was found out of the difficulty. The muncipalities, Paris at their head, undertook to purchase the estates in the hope of gradually selling them to individuals and making a profit out of the transaction. As they could not afford to pay in ready money they were allowed to issue bonds on which interest was given, and these were employed by the state to satisfy its creditors. Before long this use of paper money was adopted by the government itself on a larger scale. *Assignats* in proportion to a given amount of church property were issued by the state and their circulation was made compulsory. On application the holder of one of these *assignats* could realise in land, and thus the property was gradually sold, while becoming immediately available for the needs of the exchequer. Thus at last the financial problem was solved, though only for a time and not without disastrous results in the future.

The clergy, who had at first been more in sympathy with the revolution than the nobles, became now equally antagonistic, and did all in their power to obstruct the progress of affairs. The reforming party now discovered that the church was an essential part of the old régime, and, as a privileged and exceptional body, was inconsistent with the revolutionary organisation. The financial needs which had suggested the attack on property were replaced by other and less practical motives when it came to altering the constitution. There were a number of Jansenists in the assembly who had a long score of oppression and ill-treatment to settle with the orthodox clergy. There were a still larger number of men who had imbibed the doctrines of Voltaire and the encyclopædists, and who were not likely to neglect an opportunity of giving expression to their opinions. The first step was taken by destroying the monasteries and all the orders except those which employed themselves in works of charity. Their wealth was confiscated, but their members received pensions from the state. In July, 1790, the assembly took a further step, and decreed the civil constitution of the clergy. The old geographical divisions were abolished and every department was made into a bishopric. The bishops and parish priests were to be chosen, like the secular magistrates and officials, by the electors of the departments and districts. The cathedral chapters were abolished, no demand was to be made for a papal confirmation, and the authority of no bishop or metropolitan was to be recognised whose see did not lie within the boundaries of France. The pecuniary treatment of the church was neither lavish nor parsimonious. The salaries of the bishops were lowered, but those of the *curés* were raised.

The civil constitution roused the clergy to open war against the revolution, which at this time celebrated with great pomp the first anniversary of the 14th of July. The assembly was exasperated into following up one false step by another. In November it was ordered that all the clergy should take an oath to observe the civil constitution under penalty of dismissal. This provoked an immediate schism which gave speedy occasion for a civil war. An enormous number of priests refused the oath and were replaced by others. But the refractory priests were in most cases the most virtuous, and naturally retained their hold on their congregations in many places. This schism proved one of the most serious obstacles to the revolution. Before this the assembly had completed its attack upon the nobles by abolishing all titles and liveries. Henceforth the privileged classes formed a close alliance for the recovery of their rights. "The opposition of the magistrates had caused agitation without result; that of the clergy kindled a civil war; that of the nobles, in which the other classes combined, was destined to produce the foreign invasion of France."

§ 13. In 1790 a quarrel broke out between England and Spain about the territory of Nootka Sound, in California, and it seemed likely that the Family Compact of the Bourbons would involve France in the contest. This gave rise to an important discussion as to whether the right of making peace and war should be invested in the crown under the new constitution. The revolutionary party, still influenced by an overpowering suspicion and dread of the royal power, wished to transfer this right to the assembly. Mirabeau triumphantly pointed out that sufficient trammels had been imposed to remove all danger of royal despotism, and denounced the absurdity of attributing an essential function of the executive to a legislative assembly. This defection of the great tribune disconcerted the majority. The Jacobins put up Barnave to answer him, and a pamphlet was hawked about the street, "The Great Treason of Count Mirabeau." But the next day Mirabeau returned to the attack, tore Barnave's eloquent sophistries to pieces, and compelled the reluctant assembly to accept a compromise. It was decreed that "war can only be decided upon by a decree of the assembly, based upon a formal and express proposition from the king and sanctioned by him. The king alone can maintain relations with foreign powers, appoint negotiators, take preliminary measures for war, and direct its operations." In spite of this victory, as it was regarded at the time, the royal power was seriously lessened. The title of "King of the French" was substituted for that of "King of France," and the holder was regarded merely as the chief official of an all-powerful people. His domains were taken as national property, and a civil list of 25 million francs allowed him in their stead.

The rapid march of the revolution must not be attributed only to the energy of the extreme party. The adherents of the old régime pursued a miserable policy, which showed that their passions had overcome their reason. Instead of accepting what was inevitable and conciliating the people by a moderation which would have won them many adherents, they sought only to discredit their adversaries by irritating them into taking violent measures. By studiously insulting speeches, by disorderly conduct, which several times brought the assembly to the verge of open fighting, they discredited themselves and the monarchy; and when the most important questions came on for decision they usually walked out without voting. Equally blameable was the invincible weakness and vacillation of the king, who remained perfectly passive, and could never bring himself to refuse his sanction to the most harmful decrees. But the most culpable of all were the ministers, Necker at their head, who simply obliterated themselves and left the whole responsibility of the government to the assembly and the local councils.

§ 14. The true policy of the king was to have allied himself closely with the moderate party, and to have exercised by their means an influence over the course of events. There was one man whose friendship was as valuable as his enmity was dangerous, Mirabeau, who after the abolition of titles became plain M. Riquetti. An opponent of the old régime, but a supporter of the monarchy, he took the first step in offering his assistance to the court. His most intimate friend, the count de Lamarck, was a Belgian noble who was attached both by origin and sympathy to Marie Antoinette, and he acted as mediator in the matter. Mirabeau, falsely accused of being an author of the rising on the 5th of October, was really profoundly opposed to the king's residence in Paris. Directly afterwards he drew up a memorial, in which he urged Louis to escape to some other town in France, and dwelt earnestly on the inevitable results of remaining in the hands of the Paris mob. The document was conveyed by Lamarck to the count of Provence, but no notice was taken of it. It was at this time that Mirabeau conceived the design of forcing himself into the ministry, and to facilitate this he proposed that the ministers should be invited to take seats in the assembly. But his attitude and ambition inspired distrust amongst his former associates, and a law was carried (6 November, 1789) that no member of the assembly should hold office during its session. This was a direct blow to all his hopes, and also to the prospects of stable government in France. It was evident that the prejudices against him at court were very strong, and for some time he gave way to despair. Lamarck left Paris until he was suddenly recalled by the Austrian ambassador, de Mercy. It had at last been decided to make use of Mirabeau, but the king insisted that the matter should be kept an absolute secret from the ministers. The agreement was made in May, 1790. The king paid Mirabeau 6000 francs a month, and discharged all his debts, amounting to 208,000. Mirabeau, on his side, undertook to defend the monarchy, to keep the king informed about the course of affairs, and to advise him as to the policy which he considered advisable. The arrangement was hardly followed by the results that were expected by either party. Mirabeau's advice was taken, but rarely followed, and he found that he was no more powerful than he had been before. He still urged the king to leave Paris, even at the risk of exciting civil war; but he warned him against encouraging a foreign invasion, which would only unite the whole nation against him. A great obstacle in his way was Lafayette, now the most powerful man in France, whom he regarded with mingled distrust and contempt, but whom he was compelled to try and gain over without success. The return of the duke of Orleans was a slight advantage, because it raised a rival to the popular general, who seemed to aspire to the part of a second Cromwell. But on the whole the situation of affairs was very adverse. The queen, on whose courage and decision he relied to influence the king, took no keen interest in public affairs, and was easily induced to take a hopeful view of things. Necker and most of the ministers, whom he still denounced with bitter malignity in the assembly, were hostile, and it was not for some time that he established a connection with the minister of foreign affairs, M. de Montmorin. The departure of Mercy to the Netherlands was a great blow to him, as he thus lost the only man who could have induced the king and queen to adopt his views. In September, 1790, Necker suddenly threw up his office and quitted France, where his departure excited no regret and hardly any attention. Soon afterwards his colleagues, with the exception of Montmorin, were dismissed. But Mirabeau reaped none of the expected advantages from the change. The new ministers were nearly all nominees of Lafayette, and all co-operation with them was impracticable. Still he continued his prodigious activity, and sought, by a regular organisation in Paris and the provinces, to prepare public opinion for a reaction. He had no intention of restoring the old system, and he had easily convinced the king that such a thing was impossible. But he thought, and rightly, that France might be socially democratic and yet subject to a strong and orderly government. The first essential was to induce the king to seek some other residence, and Lamarck was sent to sound the fidelity of M. de Bouillé, the governor of Metz. Mirabeau became more and more sanguine as his grand scheme seemed to approach realisation. His eloquence was triumphantly displayed in denouncing the proposal of a tyrannical law to prevent emigration. But his health had long been undermined by his incessant labours, and by the excesses of his private life. On the 27th of March, 1791, he was seized by a serious illness, and on the 2nd of April he died in the arms of Lamarck. With him perished the greatest man of the revolutionary epoch, and the last hope of the French monarchy.

§ 15. The position of the king was naturally not improved by the loss of his most powerful ally, and the project of flight continued to occupy the attention of the court. The people were profoundly indignant at the employment of non-juring priests by the royal family, and when the king proposed to pass Easter at St. Cloud his carriage was forcibly arrested by the mob. Bailly and Lafayette did all in their power to induce the people to respect the liberty of their sovereign. The national guard refused to obey their leader, who resigned his command, only to resume it after three days. This proof that he was a prisoner impelled the king to resume the plan which had already been concerted. On the evening of the 20th of June he left the Tuileries with the queen and their three children, and took the road to Montmédy, where the troops were prepared for his reception. At the same time his brother, the count of Provence, departed by another road, and succeeded in reaching Brussels without risk. But Louis XVI. was less fortunate. At St. Ménéhould he was recognised, and at Varennes he was arrested. Bouillé with his dragoons arrived too late to release him, the troops were even doubtful in their allegiance, and their commander hastened to join the emigrants beyond the frontier. The unfortunate king was brought back to Paris and escorted to the Tuileries amidst the ominous silence of an enormous crowd.

The news of his departure, which became public on the morning of the 21st, created a profound impression in the capital. For a moment the opponents of the revolution hoped for an outbreak of anarchy which would favour and justify their reactionary designs. But the assembly showed itself equal to the occasion. After a proclamation, which the king left behind to explain his motives, had been read, it was decreed that the ministers and all other functionaries should be bound to obey the assembly; that an oath should be taken to that effect both by them and by the military officers; that all edicts should have the force of law without sanction during the king's absence; that foreign courts should be assured of the pacific intentions of France; and that commissioners should be appointed to arrange for the defence of the frontiers. "In less than four hours," says Ferrières, "the assembly was invested with all powers, the government went on, there was no shock to public tranquillity. Paris and France learnt by this experience, which has proved so disastrous to royalty, that the monarch is almost always a stranger to the government which exists in his name."

On the king's return it was decided that his provisional suspension should be continued until the completion of the constitution, and that he should be strictly guarded. The next three months were a real interregnum in France, and during this period party differences and passions revived with a vigour that seemed to threaten a renewal of the disorders of 1789. More than 200 of the extreme royalists protested against the king's suspension and withdrew from the assembly. On the other hand the most advanced section of the Jacobins, and the Orleanist party which revived under these favourable circumstances, clamoured that the king had forfeited his crown, and demanded either a new ruler or a republic. The destruction of the monarchy would involve the utter ruin of the constitution which the assembly had spent so much time and labour in preparing. The majority, who regarded their own work with a reverence almost amounting to awe, were not prepared to sacrifice it for the gratification of a few fanatics like Robespierre, Pétion, Danton, Brissot and Marat. But Robespierre succeeded in gaining the ear of the people and in maintaining his supremacy in the Jacobin club. It is at this crisis that he becomes for the first time a great power in France. His enemies were compelled to secede and to form a new club of their own, the *Feuillants* or the Constitutionalists. Lafayette, Bailly and Sieyès found themselves reinforced by unaccustomed allies, Barnave, the two Lameths, Duport, Chapelier and others, and for a time they seemed to carry all before them. But the Jacobins stood firm, and their affiliations in the provinces soon gave them a great superiority. Their emissaries stirred the people to fresh outbreaks in order to intimidate the assembly. On the 17th of July the national guard came into violent collision with the mob on the Champ de Mars, and after long hesitation Lafayette gave the fatal order to fire. Two hundred were killed or wounded and the tumult was suppressed, but Lafayette's popularity was gone.

§ 16. The constitution had already been completed by the spring of 1791. In May Robespierre had carried a self-denying ordinance which was destined to ruin all that had been accomplished. It was decided that no member of the present assembly should be admissible either as an elector or as a deputy to its successor. This entrusted the government at a critical time to men without experience, who would naturally be induced to question the wisdom of their predecessors, and who would be elected at a time of unparalleled excitement. The adoption of this lamentable and fatal decree was due to a combination of the extreme left with the reckless party of reaction, who cared little to what evils they exposed France so long as they overthrew the hated constitution. The last few months were passed in revising the work already accomplished, and only the firmness of the moderate majority prevented the adoption of fundamental changes. Finally, to secure the permanence of their creation they decreed that "the nation has the right to revise its constitution when it pleases; but the assembly declares that its interest invites it to suspend that right for thirty years."

On the 3rd of September the constitution was submitted to the king, who demanded time for its consideration. On the 14th he issued a letter in which he said: "I accept the constitution. I engage to maintain it within, to defend it against all attacks from without, to enforce its execution by all the means that it places at my disposal; I declare that, informed of the adhesion which the great majority of the people gives to the constitution, I renounce the share which I had claimed in the work; that, as I am responsible to the nation alone, no one else, when I have made this renunciation, has the right to complain." The last acts of the constituent assembly were a futile attack upon the Jacobin club, and a decree of amnesty to all persons accused and imprisoned for complicity in the king's flight. On the 30th of September it dissolved itself.

III. EUROPE AND THE REVOLUTION.

§ 17. The course of events in France was naturally followed with the keenest interest and anxiety by the European powers. The declaration of the rights of man involved open hostility to the principles on which the government of other states was carried on. The spread of the revolutionary propaganda, which was avowed as an object by so many of the most enthusiastic Frenchmen, was a danger which could not be disregarded by rulers who wished to maintain the old régime. Many of the sovereigns of Europe were allied by family ties with the royal family of France, and regarded their sufferings with unmingled pity and horror. The kings of Spain and Naples were themselves Bourbons, and looked up to Louis XVI. as the head of their house. The king of Sardinia, Victor Amadeus III., was the father-in-law of the count of Artois. The successive emperors, Joseph II. and Leopold II., and also the elector of Cologne, were brothers of Marie Antoinette. Moreover open inroads were made upon the rights of neighbouring princes at the very outbreak of the revolution. The county of Venaissin and the city of Avignon had belonged to the papacy ever since the 14th century, but in consequence of disorders which were aroused by the civil constitution of the church, the constituent assembly had decreed their union with France and their formation into an 84th department. Again, in Alsace and other border-provinces which had once belonged to the empire, a number of rights and possessions had been expressly reserved by treaty to several German princes. All these were abolished by the famous resolutions of the 4th of August and by the subsequent measures to effect the unity of France. Although compensation had been offered, it was too scanty to be accepted. The injured princes, including the great Rhenish electors, the bishops of Strasburg, Speier and Basel, the rulers of Wurtemberg, Zweibrücken, Hesse-Darmstadt, Baden and many others, clamoured for redress to the diet, which adopted their cause and called upon the emperor to take practical measures to carry out its decrees.

These circumstances gave great encouragement to the hopes of the emigrants, who never disguised their policy of forming an European coalition against France, and restoring the old system of government with the help of an irresistible force. They established a sort of court in Coblentz, and their followers thronged in all the neighbouring towns of the Rhine district. The king's brothers claimed to represent the real government of France, and as such to conduct independent negotiations. They were utterly reckless of the dangers to which their conduct exposed Louis XVI.; and when he remonstrated with them they replied that they knew he was not a free agent, and therefore they would pay no attention to letters which must be dictated to him. All the frivolities and rivalries of the old court were revived at Coblentz. A man's merits were reckoned by the date of his emigration, and when Cazales, who had upheld the cause of the monarchy with conspicuous courage to the last moment, arrived among them, he was treated with scornful coolness. The incapable Calonne became a sort of prime minister, and was not a whit more earnest or competent at Coblentz than he had been at Versailles.

§ 18. Offers of sympathy and assistance were not slow in arriving to encourage the extravagant hopes of the emigrants. The electors of Cologne and Trier, in whose territories they had found a home, were eager to espouse a cause which involved interests of their own. By a visit to Turin the count of Artois had secured the co-operation of his father-in-law, the king of Sardinia. The kings of Naples and Spain expressed their willingness to fulfil their obligations as members of the House of Bourbon. Gustavus III. of Sweden, who had restored autocracy in his own kingdom, was eager to head a crusade in the great cause of monarchy. He was encouraged by his recent enemy, Catharine II. of Russia, who saw a grand advantage for her plans in the east if she could involve the western powers in a great war with France. The susceptible Frederick William II. of Prussia, who looked back with complacency to the ease with which he had restored the stadtholder in the Hague, and who was profoundly touched by the disasters of Louis XVI., was not likely to refuse to join in a general movement for his assistance. But the man to whom every one looked to decide the question whether Europe should or should not interfere in France, was the cool and cautious emperor Leopold II. He had escaped from most of the difficulties which the imprudence of his elder brother had bequeathed to him. He had avoided a threatened rupture with Prussia by the treaty of Reichenbach; he had put down the rising in Belgium, and had appeased the internal troubles of Hungary. At first sight it seemed that he must inevitably espouse the cause of the falling French monarchy. His affection for his sister, his experience of the dangers of a revolutionary movement in Belgium and Liège, the neighbourhood of these provinces to France, and his duty as emperor to redress the wrongs of his injured vassals, all seemed to point in the same direction. But Leopold was opposed by temperament to hasty measures and to a military policy, and, like Joseph II., he made the interests of Austria his first care. He had not yet arranged terms of peace with the Porte, and until then his relations with Prussia were uncertain. Above everything, he was anxious about the ambition of Russia, and was determined not to leave Catharine free to carry out her will in Turkey and Poland. But the importunity of the diet, and the news of the king's attempted flight and arrest at Varennes, forced him into some approach to action. From Padua he issued a circular (6 July) to the European powers, in which he called upon them to espouse the cause of the French king as their own, to refuse to recognise any laws in France unless the king were restored to liberty and accepted them of his own free will, and in case these representations were disregarded to resort to arms. But the circular served no purpose except to excite new indignation in France, and to make the imprisonment of the royal family more severe. Leopold was driven still further towards intervention against his will. He concluded the treaty of Sistowa with the Porte and drew closer to Prussia. By personal flattery he gained a complete mastery over the Prussian envoy, Bischofswerder, who signed a preliminary treaty with Austria (25 July) in opposition to the express instructions of his own court. From this time the policy of Frederick the Great and Hertzberg was abandoned at Berlin, and the king acted in defiance of the strong feeling that still existed against an alliance with Austria. On the 27th of August Leopold and Frederick William held a conference at Pilnitz. To their ill-concealed disgust the count of Artois thrust his presence upon them, and demanded their consent to a ready-made scheme in which the selfish arrogance of the emigrants was clearly displayed. The scheme was definitely rejected, and the emigrants were warned that, though their residence on German soil was tolerated, they would not be allowed to conduct armed preparations.

The emperor and king then issued a joint declaration, in which they maintained that the restoration of order and of monarchy in France were matters of great moment for the whole of Europe, invited the other powers to co-operate with them in the work, and "*then and in that case*" promised active intervention. The italicised words give the key to Leopold's policy. He was determined to avoid a war if possible. He knew already that Pitt's ministry had virtually decided on the neutrality of England, and that therefore the hypothetical case in which action was necessary could not exist. The declaration of Pilnitz, accompanied by the answer to the count of Artois, was really an assurance of peace, instead of being the origin of the war, as French historians have represented. Leopold urged Louis XVI. to accept the constitution, and was delighted when the king followed his advice on the 14th of September. As Louis now recovered his crown, and at any rate nominally his liberty, the emperor issued a circular to announce that the necessity for an European coalition no longer existed. The question whether there should be war or not depended now upon the attitude of France itself.

IV. THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY.—OUTBREAK OF WAR.—FALL OF THE MONARCHY.

§ 19. The second national assembly of France, which had been chosen according to the forms of the new constitution during the existence of its predecessor, held its first sitting on the 1st of October, 1791. It contained 745 members, of whom more than 300 were lawyers, and about 70 journalists. From the first it was evident that the *legislative* assembly, as it called itself, was wholly different in character from the *constituent.* The self-denying ordinance had excluded all the former deputies, the court nobles and clergy had exercised no influence over the elections, there were absolutely no adherents of the old monarchy and class privileges. The extreme right was formed by the constitutional party, or *Feuillants*, the firm supporters of the constitution and eager for the establishment of a permanent government. Their leading members, Dumas, Beugnot, Vaublanc, etc., were not men of great importance, but they were supported by the bulk of the middle classes, by a majority of the national guard, and by the great reputation of men like Lafayette, Barnave and Bailly. This was the party with which the king ought to have allied himself. But Louis XVI. at this time was surrounded by royalist ministers, of whom the chief were Bertrand de Moleville, Delessart and Duportail, and he still cherished the hope of evading the checks imposed by the constitution which he had formally accepted. Moreover, the queen had an intense personal hatred of Lafayette, who was now the only man who could stay the course of the revolution. It was a great misfortune, both for themselves and for France, that the Feuillants at this time lost their hold upon the capital. In consequence of changes introduced by the constitution Bailly resigned the office of mayor, and Lafayette the command of the national guard. The latter was now entrusted to six officers, who held it for a month in turn. Lafayette was a candidate for the mayoralty, but the court blindly gave its support to his rival, Pétion, a leader of the Jacobins, who obtained a majority of votes. This was a great blow to the constitutionalists. A minority in the assembly, powerless in the commune, they soon found themselves reduced to complete insignificance in the rapid onward march of events.

On the left of the assembly were the men who wished to develop the revolution, i.e. to introduce a republic. They were divided into two sections, the Jacobins, who were afterwards known as the Mountain, and the Girondists. The Jacobins, led by Bazire, Merlin de Thionville, Couthon, etc., were strong neither in numbers nor in reputation, but they had the all-important support of their great club, with Robespierre at its head, and they were backed up by the active demagogues and the mob of the lower classes. Far more numerous and important, as regards the assembly itself, were their rivals, headed by men from the Gironde, and from other districts of southern France. They were nearly all young men, and ardent believers in the sacred cause of revolution. They disliked the monarchy, and they relied upon the people. Their strength lay in their eloquence, their weakness in their want of statesmanship and of practical experience. They formed an almost unique collection of orators, but they proved utterly incapable of governing France. The guiding spirit of the Girondists was Madame Roland, whose husband was one of the deputies. Among the most conspicuous of the leaders were Vergniaud, the orator of the party, Condorcet, the philosopher who aspired to play the part of Sieyès in the new assembly, Guadet, Gensonné, Isnard, and Barbaroux. Brissot, deputy for Paris and a disciple of Thomas Payne, who had at one time been dictator of the Jacobin club, was the most experienced and practical of the Girondists, who were at first called after him, but his influence gradually declined before the more attractive but shadowy enthusiasm of Madame Roland and her immediate circle. Dumouriez was also regarded as a member of this group, but he soon emancipated himself from the bonds of party to play a brief but dazzling part of his own. Besides these three well-defined divisions of the assembly, there were some 200 independent members, who formed the centre and whose votes were the great object of the various party leaders.

§ 20. From the first it was evident that the relations of the king with the assembly were not likely to be very cordial. The revolution was threatened by two dangerous enemies, the emigrants, who were urging on a foreign invasion, and the non-juring bishops and priests, who were doing all in their power to excite domestic rebellion. The latter were really the more dangerous, and already their bitter denunciations of the "intruders," as they called the clergy who accepted the civil constitution, had aroused tumults in Calvados, Gevaudan and La Vendée. The Girondists clamoured for repressive measures. On the 30th of October it was decreed that the count of Provence, unless he returned within two months, should forfeit all rights to the regency. On the 9th of November an edict threatened the emigrants with confiscation and death unless they returned to their allegiance before the end of the year. On the 29th of November came the attack upon the non-jurors. They were called upon to take the oath within eight days, when lists were to be drawn up of those who refused; these were then to forfeit their pensions, and if any disturbance took place in their district they were to be removed from it, or if their complicity were proved they were to be imprisoned for two years. The king accepted the decree against his brother, but he opposed his veto to the other two. The Girondists and Jacobins eagerly seized the opportunity for a new attack upon the monarchy. They maintained that the two decrees were not laws, but practical measures of immediate importance, and that the veto was out of the question in such a case. There was considerable weight in their arguments, but the fault lay not with the king but with the constituent assembly. By making the veto suspensive they implied that it referred only to legislative enactments; but they had not expressly stated this, and they had failed to provide for circumstances which had never occurred to them. The blame rests partly on the exceptional and deranged position of affairs. The decrees were really intended, whether rightly or wrongly, to protect the kingdom against foreign and civil war. As such they ought to have originated with the king and ministers, and then been submitted to the assembly for approval, instead of originating with the assembly, and being exposed to the royal veto. It is one of innumerable instances of the fatal way in which the legislature at this time usurped, instead of controlling, the functions of the executive.

§ 21. Throughout the winter attention was devoted almost exclusively to foreign affairs. It has been seen that the emperor was really eager for peace, and that as long as he remained in that mood there was little risk of any other prince taking the initiative. At the same time it must be acknowledged that Leopold's tone towards the French government was often too haughty and menacing to be conciliatory, and also that the open preparations of the emigrants in neighbouring states constituted an insult if not a danger to France. The Girondists, the most susceptible of men, only expressed the national sentiment in dwelling upon this with bitterness, and in calling for vengeance. At the same time they had conceived the definite idea that their own supremacy could best be obtained and secured by forcing on a foreign war. This was expressly avowed by Brissot, who took the lead of the party in this matter. Robespierre, on the other hand, partly through temperament and partly through jealousy of his brilliant rivals, was inclined to the maintenance of peace. But on this point the Feuillants were agreed with the Gironde, and so a vast majority was formed to force the unwilling king and ministers into war. The first great step was taken when Duportail, who had charge of military affairs, was replaced by Narbonne, a Feuillant. Louis XVI. was compelled to issue a note (14 December, 1791) to the emperor and to the archbishop of Trier to the effect that if the military force of the emigrants were not disbanded by the 15th of January hostilities would be commenced against the elector. The latter at once ordered the cessation of the military preparations, but the emigrants not only refused to obey but actually insulted the French envoy. Leopold expressed his desire for peace, but at the same time declared that any attack on the electorate of Trier would be regarded as an act of hostility to the empire. These answers were unsatisfactory, and Narbonne collected three armies on the frontiers under the command of Rochambeau, Lafayette, and Luckner, and amounting together to about 150,000 men. On the 25th of January an explicit declaration was demanded from the emperor, with a threat that war would be declared unless a satisfactory answer was received by the 4th of March.

Leopold II. saw all his hopes of maintaining peace in western Europe gradually disappearing, and was compelled to bestir himself. He ratified the decrees of the diet against the aggressions in Alsace, and on the 7th of February he finally concluded a treaty with the king of Prussia. The two princes guaranteed to each other their respective territories, and agreed upon mutual assistance in case of attack. On the 1st of March, while still hoping to avoid a quarrel, Leopold II. died of a sudden illness, and with him perished the last possibility of peace. His son and successor, Francis II., who was now twenty-four, had neither his father's ability nor his experience, and he was naturally more easily swayed by the anti-revolutionary party. But it is doubtful whether Leopold himself could have prevented the speedy outbreak of war. The Girondists combined all their efforts for an attack upon the minister of foreign affairs, Delessart, whom they accused of truckling to the enemies of the nation. Delessart was committed to prison, and his colleagues at once resigned. The Gironde now came into office. The ministry of home affairs was given to Roland; of war to Servan; of finance to Clavière. Dumouriez obtained the foreign department, Duranthon that of justice, and Lacoste the marine. Its enemies called it "the ministry of the *sansculottes*." Dumouriez introduced a more dictatorial tone into the foreign relations, and provoked an answer from Vienna in which was demanded the establishment of order in France for the security of Europe, and the restoration to their rights of the pope, the clergy, and the German princes. This settled the question, and on the 20th of April Louis XVI. appeared in the assembly and read with trembling voice a declaration of war against the king of Hungary and Bohemia.

§ 22. The outbreak of war startled Europe and found Austria isolated. Prussia and Sardinia were willing to move, but had to organise their forces. Russia was occupied in Poland; Spain was uncertain, and England neutral. The most ardent champion of royalty, Gustavus III. of Sweden, had died on the 29th of March. Dumouriez determined to take advantage of these circumstances for the extension of the French boundaries, and he ordered Luckner, Lafayette and Rochambeau to co-operate in an attack upon Belgium, where it was hoped that the recently suppressed rebellion would revive. But the French army was completely disorganised by recent changes, the soldiers distrusted their officers, and on the first approach of the enemy the cry was raised of treason, and all fled panic-stricken. Rochambeau resigned in disgust, and Lafayette and Luckner contented themselves with standing on the defensive.

This first disaster roused a great outcry in Paris, where the most invincible suspicions were expressed about the treachery of the court and the "Austrian committee" which was supposed to surround the queen. The mob was armed with pikes and regularly organised, and from this time the "pikemen," the force of the lower classes, became a formidable rival to the national guard of the *bourgeoisie.* The assembly declared itself in permanent session, disbanded the royal guard, and then issued two very extreme decrees. One, proposed by Servan without consulting either the king or his own colleagues, ordered the formation in Paris of a camp of 20,000 volunteers from the departments. This force, ostensibly destined for the defence of the capital against invasion, was really intended for the maintenance of the Girondist supremacy. The other decree authorised the summary banishment of non-juring priests on the simple denunciation of twenty citizens. The king interposed his veto to both measures, and when Roland wrote him a letter containing severe strictures upon his conduct, he dismissed him, together with Servan and Clavière, who were also closely identified with the Gironde. Dumouriez and the two other ministers whom the king wished to keep, now demanded the sanction of the decrees, and as he was still obstinate about the clergy they also resigned.

§ 23. Louis now tried to ally himself with the Feuillants, who rallied for his defence. The new ministers, all obscure men, were chosen exclusively from their ranks. Lafayette, who kept an anxious eye upon domestic events, took the impolitic step of writing an outspoken letter to the assembly, in which he denounced the Jacobin club as the source of all evils and demanded its suppression. This attempt at dictation only urged the majority to extremes. On the 20th of June a great organised rising took place in Paris. The mob first proceeded to the assembly to present a petition for the recall of the ministers, and then carried their grievances to the Tuileries. The guards refused to oppose them, and the crowd poured into the palace. Louis, who showed conspicuous courage, was forced into a corner, where he had to wear the red cap of the Jacobins and to drink to the people's health. In another room Marie Antoinette and her children were exposed for hours to the insults of the mob. At last Pétion, whose conduct left little doubt that he was a promoter of the riot, arrived to terminate the disorder, and the palace was cleared without difficulty or bloodshed.

The first result of the 20th of June was a reaction in favour of the constitution and the king. The Feuillants took the aggressive, Pétion and other leaders of the riot were formally accused. But the favourable opportunity was lost by the blindness of the king. He expected a speedy release by the foreign troops, and was unwilling to tie his hands by an alliance with any party to the revolution. Lafayette hurried to Paris to restore order by his personal presence. But he was coolly received by the assembly, which reproached him for deserting his command; and when he tried to raise his old troops of the national guard against the clubs he was foiled by the direct influence of the court. He retired in disgust, the constitutional party sunk into entire insignificance, and the last hope of saving the monarchy was gone.

§ 24. The foreign invasion, on which the king relied for security, really assured the victory of his enemies. Francis II. was unanimously elected emperor on the 3rd of July, and his coronation gave the opportunity for a great assembly of German princes and of the emigrant nobles. The Prussian king had now arrived with 80,000 troops, and it only remained to concert the military measures. The French people, thus threatened, felt that they could no longer trust a king whose sympathies were inevitably on the side of their foes. This sentiment was taken advantage of by Girondists and Jacobins to resume the designs which had been interrupted by the failure of the 20th of June. Vergniaud, in a speech of equal bitterness and eloquence, denounced the king as the chief source of danger to the country, and maintained that his treachery paralysed their aims and rendered all attempts at defence hopeless. The camp of 20,000 men, which Louis at last authorised, was summoned to Soissons; but it was decreed that the volunteers from the departments should march through Paris on their way. The contingent from Marseilles brought with them the famous song, composed by Rouget de Lisle, which was destined, as the *Marseillaise,* to be the war-cry of the revolutionary armies. On the 11th of July the assembly declared "the country in danger," and set itself at once to take precautionary measures. Pétion, who had been suspended by the directory of the department, was, on the popular demand, formally acquitted and restored to his office. The great national fête was held as usual on the 14th of July, and gave a new illustration of the depths to which the monarchy was reduced. The king was compelled to renew an oath which every one knew to be insincere, and Pétion was the hero of the day. The imprudent manifesto of the Prussian commander, the duke of Brunswick (27 July), in which he threatened Paris with military execution and total destruction if the royal family were harmed, added fresh fuel to the rapidly growing excitement. The mob demanded the deposition of the king, the summons of a national convention, and the accusation of Lafayette. As the assembly showed signs of resenting this dictation, and especially refused the decree against Lafayette, it was decided to force its hand by a new rising. The Jacobins, always ready to execute what the Girondists could only conceive, undertook to organise an attack upon the Tuileries on the night of the 9th of August. No popular movement was ever more adroitly and carefully arranged. At midnight the signal was given, and the insurgents assembled in the Faubourg St. Antoine. Their first act was to undertake the municipal government. The existing council was dissolved and a provisional Commune, of which Danton was the head, appointed to take its place. The measures which had been taken to defend the palace were adroitly countermanded. Mandat, the commander of the national guard, was summoned to the municipality, and when he appeared was committed to prison. On the way he was assassinated. The Commune appointed in his place the brewer Santerre, one of the leaders of the 20th of June. About 5 o'clock in the morning the king held a review of the troops assembled in the gardens, and discovered to his horror that they were untrustworthy. 20,000 men appeared to attack the palace, and resistance was hopeless. In this crisis the king took the only course that was open to him; with his wife and children he escaped to the assembly, where Vergniaud assured him of their protection. Meanwhile a contest had commenced between the mob and the Swiss guards, who had received no orders to desert their posts. The first volley of the guards cleared the Place du Carroussel, but the insurgents returned to the attack, and their numbers assured them an ultimate victory over the heroic handful of defenders. A deputation of the assembly was sent to calm the people, but could gain no hearing. The deputies sat in impotent silence, listening to the sounds of the combat that raged in their neighbourhood. By 11 o'clock the hopeless struggle was over, and the mob began to stream into the hall, bearing the trophies of their victory.

§ 25. The 10th of August was decisive for the history of France. Not only the monarchy but the assembly was now at the mercy of the mob. The Girondists had good reason to repent of the policy they had pursued. The supreme power was in the hands of the revolutionary Commune of Paris, and there it was not they but the Jacobins who were dominant. The assembly could do nothing but register the decrees dictated to them. The king was suspended and ordered to reside in the Luxemburg, and a National Convention was summoned to revise the constitution. The Girondists, Roland, Servan, and Clavière were restored to office, but with them Danton obtained the ministry of justice. The assembly was compelled to sanction the change in the municipality, and to confirm the election of the Commune, which proceeded to usurp all the functions of government. Its numbers were raised from 60 or 70 to 288, and among the newly elected members was Robespierre, who had hidden himself on the 10th of August, but who now came forward to reap the advantage of a rising in which he dared not take a part. He and Danton became the guiding spirit of the new body which undertook to rule France. The Commune transferred Louis XVI. from the Luxemburg to the Temple, and appointed its own commissioners, Pétion and Santerre, to guard him: it ordered the destruction of all statues of kings, and demanded from the assembly the appointment of an exceptional tribunal to try the enemies of the people. The deputies again gave way, and on the 17th of August decreed the formation of this tribunal, which was to be chosen by the sections and was to decide without appeal. The edicts for the confiscation of the property of emigrants and for the banishment of non-juring priests were now put into force, and the municipalities were authorised to arrest persons on suspicion.

§ 26. Meanwhile the danger of invasion was as great as ever. On the 30th of July the Prussians, under the command of Brunswick, but accompanied by the king, had started from Coblentz and marched by Luxemburg to the frontier of Champagne. They were opposed by two armies under the command of Lafayette and Luckner, while a third French force under Biron and Custine defended Alsace. Then came the news of the 10th of August, and the question was raised whether the army, like the majority of the departments, would approve the action of the Parisians. Lafayette did not hesitate to pronounce against the Jacobins, and called upon Luckner to march with him upon Paris to restore order. But the soldiers were not prepared to take such an extreme course, and the other officers, with Dumouriez at their head, maintained that the duty of Frenchmen was to oppose the foreign enemy rather than their fellow-countrymen. Lafayette, declared a traitor by the assembly and deserted even by Luckner, gave up all hope and fled with his friends towards Holland. On his way he was arrested by the enemy, who treated him as a prisoner of war and detained him in close confinement till the treaty of Campo-Formio. His command was given to Dumouriez, and Luckner was replaced by Kellermann. These disorders gave a great advantage to the Prussians. Longwy capitulated on the 23rd of August, and the fall of Verdun on the 2nd of September left the road open to Paris.

The imminence of this great danger roused great excitement in Paris, and gave occasion for scenes of horror far worse than any that had yet been witnessed. The assembly ordered defensive measures to be taken, and tried to regain its independence by suppressing the Commune. But the Commune not only refused to be suppressed, but took the whole conduct of the defence out of the hands of the assembly. Danton was now the dictator of Paris, and, with the conviction that all means were justifiable to save the country, he determined to defend Paris at once against foreign and domestic enemies. His avowed policy was to "strike terror into the royalists." The police-committee of the Commune was strengthened by the addition of Marat, the apostle of murder, and other members. On the night of the 29th of August the barriers were shut, and each house was visited by commissioners under the pretext of seeking for arms, but really with the intention of discovering the men who were suspected of royalist tendencies.

Three or four thousand priests, nobles, officers, &c., were thrown into prison. Even these arbitrary measures did not satisfy the zealous champions of popular security. On the night of the 3rd of September, after the news had been received of the fall of Verdun, the signal was sounded for a new St. Bartholomew. An organised band of not more than five or six hundred men visited each of the prisons in turn and massacred their inmates. There can be no doubt that the butchers acted under the instructions of the Commune, and received regular pay for their work. For three days the slaughter went on with machine-like regularity. The citizens, as if stupefied, made no attempt to stop the horrors; the national guard had been disorganised by Santerre; the assembly and the ministers were equally powerless. When Roland demanded the punishment of the miscreants, the police committee decided to arrest him, and it was only Danton's influence that prevented its being done. At least two thousand men perished in the massacre, which stopped only when the prisons were empty. A few individuals, e.g. Barnave, were saved by Danton. Among the slain was the princess of Lamballe, the friend and confidante of the queen, whose head was paraded on a pike before the windows of the Temple. The committee actually wrote to the authorities of the chief towns to encourage them to similar measures, in order that they might "march against the enemy, and leave behind no brigands to murder their wives and children." At Versailles, Rheims, Meaux, Lyons and Orleans, the horrible counsel was followed. This was the first result of the triumph of the Gironde, and of the efforts of foreign powers to restore order in France!

§ 27. Meanwhile the danger which had served as a pretext for these outrages had passed away. Directly after the fall of Verdun Dumouriez, assisted by the lethargic movements of the Prussians, hastened to occupy the passes of the forest of Argonne, "the Thermopylæ of France." Again everything seemed lost, when an Austrian detachment under Clairfait carried a neglected pass and threatened the French in the rear. But Dumouriez succeeded in repairing his error. Leaving Grandpré he occupied a strong position at St. Ménéhould, on the south side of the forest, and was there joined by Kellermann's army from Metz. A Prussian attack was ordered against the neighbouring height of Valmy, but it came to nothing more than a simple cannonade. The French troops, which were beginning to be inspired by the revolutionary spirit, showed an unexpected firmness which astounded both the Prussians and the emigrants. This slight success decided the campaign, and from this moment the invaders began to retreat. Dumouriez had saved France.

By this time the elections to the Convention had taken place. The rules prescribed by the constitution were no longer observed. Every Frenchman over twenty-one years of age was considered an active citizen, and every such citizen over twenty-five was eligible as an elector or as deputy. No exclusive regulation was any longer in force, so that members both of the constituent and of the legislative assembly could be chosen. On the 21st of September, the day after the cannonade at Valmy, the Convention met, and its first act was to declare that France was no longer a monarchy but a republic.

CHAPTER XXIII.

THE FRENCH REPUBLIC AND THE EUROPEAN COALITION.

I. The National Convention and the King's Death.—§ 1. Parties in the Convention. § 2. Quarrels between the Gironde and the Mountain. § 3. The war; French aggressions in Savoy and Germany. § 4. Conquest of Belgium; ill-treatment of the province. § 5. Trial of Louis XVI.; his condemnation and death. II. Fall of the Gironde and Reign of Terror to Robespierre's Death.—§ 6. Formation of the European coalition against France. § 7. Renewal of party conflicts in Paris. § 8. Rising in La Vendée; treason of Dumouriez. § 9. Attack of the Girondists; popular risings; fall of the Gironde. § 10. Provincial revolts; military reverses of the French. § 11. Constitution of 1793; Committee of Public Safety. § 12 Suppression of provincial revolts. § 13. Success of the revolutionary armies. § 14. The reign of Terror; introduction of the new Calendar. § 15. The Mountain splits into the three parties of Robespierre, Hébert and Danton; Robespierre triumphs over his opponents. § 6. Opposition to Robespierre; his fall and death. III. Thermidorian Reaction and End of Convention.—§ 17. Reaction against the Terror. § 18. French victories in 1794; treaty of Basel, and break-up of the Coalition. § 19. Risings in Paris; royalist expedition to Quiberon. § 20. Constitution of the Year III.; end of the Convention. IV. The Directory.—§ 21. Success of the domestic administration of the Directory. § 22. Campaign of 1795 in Germany. § 23. Campaign of 1796; Bonaparte in Italy; the Archduke Charles in Germany. § 24. Bonaparte invades Austria; preliminaries of Leoben; treacherous treatment of Venice. § 25. *Coup d'état* of the 18th Fructidor. § 26. Treaty of Campio Formio. § 27. Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt. § 28. Second Coalition; French disasters in 1799. § 29. Discontent in France; Bonaparte's return; *coup d'état* of the 18th Brumaire. § 30. Constitution of the Year VIII.; establishment of the Consulate.

I. The National Convention and the King's Death.

§ 1. The Convention contained 749 members, of whom 65 had sat in the constituent and 164 in the legislative assembly. The deputies had been chosen under the immediate influence of the September massacres. In Paris the Commune and its adherents had their own way. Robespierre was first deputy, then came Danton, Collot d'Herbois, Camille Desmoulins, &c., and finally Marat and the duke of Orleans, now Philippe Egalité. But in the provinces there was a strong feeling of jealousy against the preponderance of the capital, combined with horror at the recent outrages, and at most of the elections Girondists were returned. It was characteristic of the revolution that the extreme party of one assembly became the moderates of the next. Not a royalist or a constitutionalist could be found, and the Girondists occupied the extreme right. They were confident in their superior numbers and in their hold on the ministry from which Danton had retired on his election as deputy. Their old leaders, Vergniaud, Brissot, Condorcet, Guadet, and Gensonné, had been re-elected, and were strengthened by several new comers. They were determined, by reducing the Commune to obedience, to recover the power they had lost since the 2nd of September, and also to free the departments from Parisian dictation. On the upper benches on the left sat the deputies of Paris with some thirty others, and received from their position the name of the Mountain. There was little difference of principle between them and the Gironde. Both parties were republican, and both had appealed to the people to support their measures. But the Girondists wished for orderly government, and a reaction from the recent excesses led them to distrust the mob, and to incline towards the bourgeois class. They had become conservative now that they had secured all that they wished. The Mountain, on the other hand, was eager to continue the revolution. Their leaders wished to obtain the power which the Girondists now held. They were prepared to accept all the consequences of the most extreme democracy, and they denounced as treason any attempt to thwart the will of the sovereign people. Their strength lay in their unity, in the support of the Commune, now the first power of the state, and in their ability to call in the mob to aid them against the majority. Between the two parties were a large number of independent members, known as the Plain or the Marsh, who alternately leant to the side of the Gironde or the Mountain as they were influenced by conviction or by fear.

§ 2. The first measures of the Convention were unanimous. They legalised a Republic which had existed since the 10th of August, and they determined to date the commencement of a new era from the 21st of September, which begins the year I. of the Republic. As the former constitution had thus ceased to exist, it was decreed that all officers should be re-elected, and that all laws should be kept that were not expressly repealed, and appointed a committee to consider a new constitution. In this, as in all the other committees, the Girondists had an overwhelming majority. To secure the confiscated wealth, it was ordered that the emigrants should be banished for ever, and that if any of them should be found on French soil, or be taken with arms in their hands, they should be put to death. These measures having been agreed to, the two hostile parties came into collision on a report of the ministry about the condition of the state. The Girondists denounced the recent massacres, demanded the punishment of their authors, and openly attacked Danton, Robespierre and Marat, as an ambitious triumvirate who aimed at the establishment of a dictatorship. This charge was the grand card of the Girondists, but they played it too soon and too imprudently. They had no evidence to support it, and by making too much of their opponents they helped to bring about the very result which they dreaded and denounced. The three accused rose in their defence. Danton adroitly turned the tables on the Girondists by accusing them of a desire to break France up into innumerable republics by making the departments independent of the capital. These mutual accusations of a dictatorship and of federalism became the chief party-weapons in the Convention. Robespierre, as usual, dilated upon his own virtues. When Marat appeared at the rostrum, a howl of execration rose from the right and centre of the Assembly. Many of the deputies affected to believe that such a monster of iniquity never existed, and that his writings were the work of a royalist who sought to throw discredit on the revolution. Marat exulted in the rage of his adversaries, insisted upon speaking, and gloried in the truth of the charge that had been brought against him. His cynical audacity raised the idea that he was insane, the accusation was dropped, and the Assembly proceeded to the order of the day.

Soon afterwards the Girondists renewed their attack, which was this time concentrated against Robespierre, and led by Louvet. After obtaining an interval of eight days to prepare his defence, Robespierre demolished the flimsy case of his accusers amid the applause of his supporters. The Plain evidently regarded these accusations as merely personal quarrels, to which no weight was to be attached. The conduct of the Gironde was in the highest degree injudicious. They made a charge, failed to substantiate it, and let it drop. Their attacks served only to give greater prominence and popularity to their hated rivals. They decreed the re-election of the Commune, but took no steps to prevent the same men from returning to power. They alienated Danton, the most moderate member of the Mountain, who was willing to prevent the further shedding of blood and might easily have been won over from his associates. Their ministers were equally incapable and wanting in a real policy. The party tended to disintegration, and lost the advantage of superior numbers. Only thirty members habitually voted together, and even they often differed on important measures.

This was a very serious weakness when contrasted with the perfect organisation of the Mountain.

§ 3. Meanwhile the war was still going on. The first check at Valmy had decided the campaign of the Prussians in Champagne. Their troops were already suffering from disease, and from inclement weather. An energetic movement of the French might have annihilated the invaders, but Dumouriez, who kept an anxious eye upon events in Paris, preferred to negotiate. He hoped to gain a great triumph for France, by inducing Prussia to desert the coalition and to recognise the Republic by a treaty. He knew that the duke of Brunswick and most of his soldiers detested the Austrians and the emigrants far more than they did the revolution, and that the king was eager to have his hands free for the complications in Poland. But Frederick William wished for a general not a separate peace, and was too chivalrous to desert Austria at the first reverse. The negotiations were carried on long enough to allow the Prussians an undisturbed retreat from French soil and were then broken off.

This first success inspired the French with a confidence hitherto unfelt, and changed the whole character of the war. No longer satisfied to defend their frontiers, they determined to spread the revolutionary dogmas by force, and to excite a general rising of peoples against their kings. The Convention issued a formal invitation to all discontented subjects to appeal to France for aid. And this propaganda was by no means disinterested. The democracy was fully as aggressive as the monarchy, and the idea of extending France to its "natural" boundaries, so dear to Louis XIV., was revived with equal resolution by the republic. Already in September the army of the south had entered Savoy to punish Victor Amadeus III. for his alliance with the house of Bourbon. As the dukes of Savoy had extended their territories southwards, and become an Italian power as kings of Sardinia, they had lost their hold over the French-speaking population of their original duchy. The people everywhere welcomed the French, the Piedmont troops found resistance to be impossible, and in November both Savoy and Nice were formally annexed to France as the departments of Mont Blanc and the Maritime Alps. Montesquieu was now ordered to attack the aristocratic republic of Geneva. The admission of troops from Berne was treated as a breach of former treaties and a pretext for hostilities. But Montesquieu, a marquis under the old régime, was by no means prepared to accept the revolutionary interpretation of the law of nations, and opened negotiations with the besieged city. For this act of disobedience he was formally accused before the Convention and had to seek safety in Switzerland. Geneva was spared for the moment.

These successes in the south were speedily surpassed by those in

Germany. The constitution of the Empire was as hopelessly divided and impotent as ever. Nowhere was the general disintegration more conspicuous than in the "Priest's Road," the chain of ecclesiastical states along the Rhine valley. The advance of the Prussians into France left these states defenceless, and in September a French detachment under Custine advanced to the attack. He was an enthusiastic partisan of the revolution, and his watchword was "war to the palaces and peace to the cottages." Speier and Worms fell into his hands, and the princes of the neighbouring states fled in reckless haste before an incapable general and a handful of recruits. Nothing more disgraceful to Germany had been experienced since the Hussite wars. Mainz, the chief city of western Germany, surrendered without striking a blow (21 Oct.), and Frankfort for a short time was occupied by the French.

§ 4. Dumouriez in the meantime was no less active in the north. Leaving Kellermann to pursue the Prussians, he induced the ministry to approve his favourite scheme of an invasion of Belgium. Everything seemed to mark out Belgium as an easy prey for the French. The government of Joseph II. had provoked a revolt against Hapsburg rule, which had been put down by Leopold without any cessation of discontent. The provinces were still only loosely bound together, and there was no force to defend them, except some 20,000 Austrian troops under the divided command of Clairfait and the duke of Saxe-Teschen, who had already failed in an attack upon Vauban's great fortress, Lille. Circumstances were very favourable for the dashing tactics of Dumouriez. A single victory at Jemmappes (6 Nov.), the first pitched battle of the war, decided the campaign. The Austrians retired and Dumouriez advanced as far as Aix-la-Chapelle. Everywhere the people welcomed the French as deliverers, and it seemed probable that Holland, equally weakened by party divisions, would prove as easy a conquest.

The Convention was eager to reap the fruits of these great successes. In defiance of treaties which France had guaranteed over and over again, it ordered the opening of the Scheldt, and declared Antwerp a free port (6 Nov.). A decree of the 15th of December went still further in its avowed hostility to the powers of Europe: "In every country that shall be occupied by French armies, the generals shall announce the abolition of all existing authorities: of nobility, serfdom, of all feudal rights and all monopolies. They shall proclaim the sovereignty of the people, and convoke assemblies of the inhabitants to form a provisional government, to which no officer of a former government, no noble, and no member of a privileged corporation shall be eligible. They shall appropriate for the French Republic all property belonging to the sovereign and his adherents or to any civil and religious corporation. The French nation will treat as enemies any people which, refusing liberty and equality, desires to preserve its prince and privileged classes or to make any accommodation." It is evident that the Convention looked to the liberated and conquered peoples to defray the expenses of the war. The first attempt to put these peculiar principles into force was made in Belgium, where it sensibly cooled the ardour of the people for their French deliverers. A number of commissioners, with Danton at their head, were despatched to establish a republican government in a province which was treated as if it had been conquered. Their reckless confiscations, and especially their attacks upon the monasteries and the clergy, aroused the greatest indignation among a people which was then, as now, the most religious in Europe. No one was more indignant than Dumouriez himself, who aspired to establish a protectorate in Belgium, and who saw all the fruits of his victory snatched from him by the rapacious envoys of the Jacobin Club. Unable to protect the people from oppression, he returned to Paris, where he found that events had taken a new and most unwelcome turn.

§ 5. The party conflicts in the Convention went on with ever-increasing bitterness, and at last the Mountain discovered a new means of discrediting their opponents and securing their own supremacy. They demanded that the king should be brought to justice as an enemy of the nation. They saw in his death a permanent rupture with the past history of France, and they hoped to crush the Girondists, if they tried to defend him, under a charge of royalism. The Jacobin club organised a series of petitions in which the death of the king was demanded in terms of revolting barbarity. The more moderate deputies pointed to the constitution of 1791, which decreed the personal inviolability of the monarch, and imposed in certain cases the penalty of deposition. This penalty had been already inflicted, and neither the Convention nor any other body could proceed further. Finally, the question was entrusted to a committee, which reported that the king could lawfully be tried by the Convention. On this report a great debate was commenced on the 13th of November. The Gironde, imperfectly apprehending the tactics of their enemies, still wished to maintain the constitution, while the Plain inclined to adopt the report. But St. Just and Robespierre, who on this point assumed the lead of the Mountain, took a much bolder, and from their point of view a more manly, line. They maintained that the assembly was composed of statesmen, not of judges, that the king's guilt had already been decided by his deposition, that a dethroned king was dangerous to a republic, and that the letter of the constitution could not prohibit a measure which was necessary for the public safety. They demanded the king's death at once and without trial, by the sacred right of revolution. These extreme proposals, which appealed to the passions and the fears of the multitude, forced the hand of the opposition. The Girondists, fearing the loss of their popularity if they appeared as advocates for the king, joined the Plain and voted for his trial before the Convention, which was decreed on the 2nd of December. Before this, the discovery of a secret cupboard in the Tuileries had brought to light all the papers of the king, his correspondence with Mirabeau and Bouillé, and all the schemes that had been entertained for his release or his restoration to power. These papers were the chief basis of the formal accusation that was drawn up against him.

Ever since the 11th of August Louis XVI. had been a close prisoner in the Temple, and in October he had undergone the further punishment of being separated from his family. Never had his character appeared so admirable as during this period of trouble. The irresolution which had been so fatal a quality had entirely disappeared when all responsibility of government was removed. On the 13th of December he appeared at the bar of the Convention, and made no attempt to deny the authority of those who were at once his accusers and judges. Barère, the president, read the charges and asked the questions that had been previously agreed upon. Louis replied quietly and firmly, declared his ministers responsible for his public acts, and denied the authenticity of the concealed documents. The only accusation that moved him was that of having shed the blood of the citizens on the 10th of August. On his withdrawal a stormy debate followed, and the hostile factions nearly came to blows. In spite of the opposition of the Mountain, it was decided to accept the king's demand that counsel should be heard in his defence. He chose Target, who refused, and Tronchet. At this crisis Malesherbes, the most virtuous of French ministers, came forward to offer his services to the king under whom he had held office. Louis XVI. was profoundly touched by this proof of a devotion which even the Convention could not fail to appreciate. On the 26th of December the defence, which had been prepared with enormous labour, was pronounced by Desèze, an advocate who had been associated with Malesherbes and Tronchet. His speech was a masterpiece of temperate and convincing reasoning, and if it lacked the highest qualities of eloquence, it was because the king himself refused to stoop to an appeal for mercy to his judges. The debate in the Convention was resumed on the next day. The Girondists, whose conduct throughout shows their weakness as a party, were anxious to save the king, but dared not pronounce openly for his acquittal. They proposed a formal appeal to the people, which gratified their republican predilections, and would at the same time remove the responsibility from their own shoulders. But the

Jacobins became more imperative as their triumph seemed assured. They filled the galleries with their turbulent adherents, who threatened with death those deputies who endeavoured to save the accused prince. At last the debate was closed on the 14th of January, 1793, and three questions were formally proposed to the assembly. (1) Is Louis Capet guilty? (2) Should an appeal to the people be allowed? (3) What punishment should be inflicted? The first question was answered in the affirmative almost with unanimity, and the appeal was rejected by 484 votes to 292. Lanjuinais then proposed that three-fourths of the votes should be necessary for condemnation, but Danton carried his motion that a simple majority should settle the matter. On the third question votes were given orally by each member in turn, and as several took the opportunity to explain their motives, the process lasted for twenty-five hours. All the machinery of terrorism was put into working to influence the irresolute Girondists, and with fatal success. Vergniaud, the most eloquent advocate of justice and mercy in the preceding debates, was now president of the Convention, and voted for "death to avoid a civil war," and his example decided many of those who were still wavering. Philip of Orleans, amidst general execration, voted for the execution of the head of his family. Finally, Vergniaud rose to declare the result in a trembling voice. 721 deputies voted, so that 361 were necessary to form a majority. 366 voted for death absolutely, and 67 for the same punishment with various conditions; 286 were in favour of imprisonment or exile; and two voted for the galleys. The Girondists made a last effort to get the sentence reprieved for a time, but they were defeated by 34 votes. On the 20th of January, Louis XVI. was allowed a final and agonising interview with his family; on the next day he met his death with heroic fortitude in what is now the Place de la Concorde. The character of Louis has been admirably summed up by Mignet, the most phlegmatic of the republican historians. "He was the best but the feeblest of kings. His ancestors bequeathed to him a revolution. He was more fitted than any of them to prevent or to terminate it; for he was capable of being a reforming king before it broke out, or of acting as a constitutional king afterwards. He is perhaps the only prince who had no passions, not even that of power, and who united the two essential qualities of a good king, fear of God and love of the people. He perished the victim of passions which he did not share: of those of his adherents to which he was a stranger, and of those of the multitude which he had not excited. History will say of him that, with a little more force of character, he would have been a unique ruler."

II. FALL OF THE GIRONDE. REIGN OF TERROR. DEATH OF ROBESPIERRE.

§ 6. By the execution of Louis XVI. the revolution broke down all the bridges behind it, and at the same time bade defiance to the monarchical states of Europe. The immediate result was the increase of enemies both without and within. England had been studiously neutral until its own interests were touched by the threatened annexation of Belgium and the opening of the Scheldt. From that moment Pitt determined on a war against the "armed opinions" which defied the obligations of treaties and the public law of Europe. He had been already strengthened by the secession of Burke from the Whigs, and the king's death, which stirred popular opinion to its depths, removed all obstacles in the way of an active policy. Chauvelin, the French envoy in London, was dismissed, and the Convention, eagerly accepting what was inevitable, declared war against Great Britain on the 8th of February, 1793. The accession of England was speedily followed by the completion of the anti-revolutionary coalition. Holland, as usual, followed in the footsteps of its powerful neighbour. Spain, where the liberal d'Aranda had been supplanted in the ministry by Charles IV.'s incapable favourite, Godoi, was involved in the war in March; Portugal, the Papal States, and Naples joined the alliance. Russia exulted in circumstances which left her free to act in Poland. The only neutral states were Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden, Venice, and Turkey.

§ 7. These external dangers caused a momentary cessation of party conflicts in the Convention. A levy of 300,000 men was decreed; the incapable Pache was removed from the ministry of war and replaced by Beurnonville; 800 millions of *assignats* were issued; and the numbers of the national guard were nearly doubled. But the truce was only momentary. The Girondists had consented to the king's death in order to save themselves, but they were not destined to receive the expected reward of their dishonour. Roland, who had contributed directly to bring about the fate of Louis XVI., resigned office immediately afterwards. His associates found themselves confronted by the implacable hostility of the Mountain and of the Commune. Pache was consoled for his dismissal by being elected mayor of Paris, but his influence was small compared with that of his subordinates, Chaumette and Hébert. Marat and Robespierre were determined to rid themselves of opponents who stood in the way of their designs, and urged the mob to violent measures against the traitors who had endeavoured to save the tyrant. Danton alone of the Jacobins was inclined to moderate courses. He had formed in

Belgium a connection with Dumouriez, and was quite willing to come to terms with the Gironde. But the influence of Madame Roland and Guadet was too strong to allow of an alliance with the author of the massacres of September, and Danton was forced by the instinct of self-preservation to support the associates whom he was anxious to desert. This was a fatal error on the part of the Girondists, who tried in vain to absorb the attention of the assembly in the scheme of a new constitution which had been drawn up by Condorcet. Party feeling was too inflamed for an abstract debate, and before long external events came to the assistance of the Jacobins.

§ 8. The levy of 300,000 men provoked a rising in the province of La Vendée, where the ancient régime survived in its entirety, and where the priests and nobles had lost none of their influence over the virtuous and ignorant peasantry. Able and courageous leaders were found in Cathelineau, Stofflet, Charette, d'Elbée and La Rochejaquelin, and for a long time they were able to foil all the attempts that were made to put down the rebellion. Danger always tended to increase the fanaticism of the capital, and at this time domestic revolt was rendered more serious by successes of the foreign enemies of France. The Austrians and Prussians had determined on great exertions to recover Belgium and Mainz, which had been lost in 1792. Dumouriez, who had failed in the objects of his journey to Paris, returned to the army with orders to attempt the reduction of Holland. Ordering one detachment under Valence to watch the Austrians, and another under Miranda to take Maestricht and then to join him at Utrecht, he crossed the frontier and took Breda and Gertruydenberg. He was recalled by the news that the Austrian commander, the Prince of Coburg, had entered Belgium, driven Valence back to Louvain, and forced Miranda to raise the siege of Maestricht. Hurrying back, Dumouriez risked an engagement at Neerwinden (18 March) and was defeated. This check decided him to put into immediate execution a plan which he had entertained ever since the death of Louis XVI. This was nothing less than to put down the revolution in Paris, to restore the constitution of 1791, and to give the crown to the young son of Orleans, Louis Philippe, duke of Chartres, who was at the time serving in his army. He had intended to carry out this programme with all the prestige of a great conqueror, but, as this was now impossible, he determined to appeal to the enemies of France. The matter was arranged in negotiations with the Austrian general Mack, and Dumouriez made no secrecy of his intentions to the envoys whom the Convention had dispatched on the first news of his treachery. He tried to obtain possession of Lille and Valenciennes, but the gates were closed against him. Like Lafayette under similar circumstances, he discovered that the soldiers, hitherto devoted to him, preferred their country to their general, and were by no means so dissatisfied with the revolution as to consent to a foreign invasion of France. Dumouriez, foiled on every side, fled to the Austrians, and after twenty years of inglorious exile died in London. The command of his army was entrusted to Dampierre.

§ 9. The news of Dumouriez' treachery gave new vigour to the attack upon the party of the Gironde, with which he had formerly identified himself. In order to purge themselves of suspicion, the Girondists accused Danton of complicity with the general, whose acquaintance he had made in Belgium, but the only result was to make an irreconcilable enemy of the most pacific of the demagogues. The general terror enabled the Mountain to carry the most extreme measures. The duke of Orleans and all Bourbons were exiled, the non-juring priests were everywhere persecuted, all the remaining property of the emigrants was confiscated, and the revolutionary tribunal commenced its activity. On the 6th of April a Committee of Public Safety, consisting of nine members, renewable every month, was appointed with dictatorial power. Marat, as head of the Jacobin club, got up popular petitions which demanded the arrest of twenty-two Girondists. This attack upon the privileges of deputies produced a momentary alliance between the right and centre of the Convention. Marat was formally accused, but was acquitted by the revolutionary tribunal, and returned to his seat amidst the applause of the mob. Every day the popular passion increased in vehemence, and the Convention, which on the 10th of May began to sit in the Tuileries, saw itself threatened by an armed force. Guadet proposed to annul the existing authorities in the city, but his party could never agree upon active measures, and Barère was able to carry, as a compromise, the appointment of a commission of twelve to enquire into the relations between the Convention and the Commune. The Twelve commenced their work with great vigour, and ordered the arrest of Hébert, one of the most active promoters of disorder. The result was a popular rising, which compelled the Convention to decree the release of Hébert and the suppression of the Twelve. On the next day the Girondists recovered their supremacy and the Twelve were restored. But the mob had felt their power and were not inclined to submit to defeat. On the 31st of May, a regular insurrection was planned and carried out, under the leadership of Henriot, who now succeeded Santerre as commander of the national guard. Robespierre wished to direct the popular fury against the leaders of the Gironde, but the real object of the rising was the suppression of the Twelve, and it subsided when this was decreed for the second time. Danton was satisfied with the fall of a commission which threatened to extend its enquiries back to the preceding September, but his associates were determined to secure a decisive victory. On the 2nd of June, 80,000 men, with Henriot at their head, besieged the Tuileries and demanded the arrest of the Twelve and of the chief Girondists. Barère proposed that the accused deputies should suspend themselves from their functions, and several yielded in the vain hope of appeasing their enemies. But meanwhile the undisguised dictation of the mob had irritated those members of the Mountain, who regarded the national assembly as inviolable. The Convention advanced in a body to the entrance and ordered their besiegers to withdraw. Henriot's answer was to point his cannon at the deputies, who returned in dismayed consciousness of their impotence. Marat, who revelled in the success of the intimidation, drew up the list of the proscribed, and the imprisonment was decreed of the twelve members of the commission and twenty-two of the Girondist leaders, including Vergniaud, Guadet, Gensonné, Brissot, Pétion, Lanjuinais, etc.

§ 10. The fall of the Gironde was a great triumph for the Mountain, but it only added to the dangers which threatened France. Most of the imprisoned deputies escaped, and raised the standard of revolt in Caen. More than fifty departments rallied to their side and declared against the tyrannical supremacy of Paris. The spirit of the opposition is manifested in the conduct of Charlotte Corday, who journeyed alone to Paris in order to avenge the Gironde by the murder of Marat (13 July). She herself perished on the scaffold, and divine honours were paid to her victim. The flames of civil war extended in every direction. In the south, Lyons, Marseilles, Toulon, Nismes and a number of other towns declared against the Convention. In the north the province of Calvados took up arms for the monarchy. The armies of La Vendée, no longer content with escaping conquest, took the aggressive and attacked Nantes, in order to make themselves masters of the Loire and to open a connection with England. But all these movements were paralysed by want of union. The Girondists had no sympathy with the royalists, who sought to direct a rebellion which they could never have originated. And internal discord only strengthened the hands of the foreign invaders of France, who now made it their chief object, not to put down the revolution, but to make conquests for themselves. The English and Austrians took Condé and Valenciennes and once more opened the route to Paris. The successes of Custine in Germany had already been reversed, and Mainz, which alone offered any resistance, was recovered by the Prussians on the 22nd of July. The Spaniards defeated the French troops in the Pyrenees, and 20,000 Piedmontese invaded France on the side of the Alps. The capital was threatened with famine, and, to make matters worse, the English Government declared all French ports in a state of blockade.

§ 11. It was while affairs were in this critical condition that the Mountain undertook the sole conduct of government in France. They had hitherto resisted all attempts of the Girondists to establish a new constitution in place of that of 1791. They now undertook the work themselves, and in four days drew up a constitution, as simple as it was democratic, which was issued on the 24th of June. Every citizen of the age of twenty-one could vote directly in the election of deputies, who were chosen for a year at a time, and were to sit in a single assembly. The assembly had the sole power of making laws, but a period was fixed during which the constituents could protest against its enactments. The executive power was entrusted to twenty-four men, who were chosen by the assembly from candidates nominated by electors chosen by the original voters. Twelve out of the twenty-four were to be renewed every six months. But this constitution was intended merely to satisfy the departments, and was never put into practice. The condition of France required a greater concentration of power, and this was supplied by the Committee of Public Safety. Ever since the 6th of April the original members of the Committee had been re-elected, but on the 10th of July its composition was changed. Danton ceased to be a member, and Barère was joined by Robespierre, St. Just, Couthon, Billaud-Varennes, Collot d'Herbois, and, in a short time, Carnot. These men became the absolute rulers of France.

The Committee had no difficulty in carrying their measures in the Convention, from which the opposition party had disappeared. All the state obligations were rendered uniform and inscribed in "the great book of the national debt." The treasury was filled by a compulsory loan from the rich. Every income between 1000 and 10,000 francs had to pay ten per cent., and every excess over 10,000 francs had to be contributed in its entirety for one year. To recruit the army a *levée en masse* was decreed. "The young men shall go to war; the married men shall forge arms and transport supplies; the wives shall make tents and clothes and serve in the hospitals; the children shall tear old linen into lint; the aged shall resort to the public places to excite the courage of the warriors and hatred against kings." Nor were measures neglected against domestic enemies. On the 6th of September a revolutionary army, consisting of 6000 men and 1200 artillerymen, was placed at the disposal of the Committee to carry out its orders throughout France. On the 17th the famous "law of the suspects" was carried. Under the term "suspects" were included all those who by words, acts or writings had shown themselves in favour of monarchy or of federalism, the relatives of the emigrants, etc., and they were to be imprisoned until the peace. As the people were in danger of famine, a maximum price, already established for corn, was decreed for all necessaries; if a merchant gave up his trade he became a suspect, and the hoarding of provisions was punished by death. On the 10th of October the Convention definitely transferred its powers to the Committee, by subjecting all officials to its authority and by postponing the trial of the new constitution until the peace.

§ 12. Even before the central government had been strengthened by these decrees, great progress had been made in the suppression of internal rebellions. The movement in the north was the first to succumb. The royalist general, Wimpfen, was defeated on the 15th of July, and on the 3rd of August the commissioners of the Convention entered Caen, which was treated with unusual clemency. Soon afterwards Bordeaux, the centre of opposition in the west, tendered its submission and accepted the constitution. In the south the republican forces carried all before them. Marseilles was taken on the 23rd of August, and Toulon only saved itself for a time by calling to its assistance the English admiral, Hood; in December it had to surrender to the genius of Napoleon Bonaparte. Lyons, the most formidable opponent of the capital, was besieged from August till October, and when it was finally captured the Convention decreed its utter destruction and the erection on its site of a pillar with the inscription, "Lyons made war against freedom, Lyons is no more." The people of La Vendée, in spite of their heroism, were doomed to the same fate. The attack upon Nantes had failed and their leader Cathelineau had fallen. The province was now invaded, and the garrison of Mainz, bound by its capitulation not to serve against the foreign enemy, was transferred to this scene of warfare. The Vendeans were no match for regular troops, and after they had experienced four successive defeats, more than 80,000 of them attempted to escape into Brittany. The attempt was repulsed, and a scattered remnant of this large force was driven to return homewards. The Committee of Public Safety decided to exterminate a population which it was impossible to pacify, and the province was given up to a military execution. By the end of 1793 almost the whole of France had submitted, and the revolutionary commissioners were as absolute in the departments as the Committee of Public Safety was in Paris.

§ 13. Almost equally successful was the conduct of the war with the foreigners, and here, too, fortune favoured the French. Just as the internal revolts were weakened by the discord between Girondists and royalists, so the efforts of the allies were paralysed by the ill-feeling that arose between Austria and Prussia about the second partition of Poland. It was this which prevented the Prussians from advancing after the capture of Mainz, and thus lost the favourable moment for an advance upon Paris. At the same time the open substitution of a policy of territorial aggrandisement for the disinterested motives which had been professed at the outbreak of the war, alienated from the coalition all those classes among the French who might otherwise have sympathised with them. The victory of the democracy in Paris reacted upon the military administration. Carnot, a man of great organising genius, undertook the control of the war. The old aristocratic generals, such as Custine and Montesquieu, were replaced by men who had risen from the ranks, like Jourdan, Hoche and Pichegru. Thus was restored that unanimity between the commanders and the central government which had given the French their great successes at the end of 1792, and the interruption of which had led to the subsequent disasters.

After the capture of Condé and Valenciennes the English and Austrians, instead of continuing their advance, separated to secure their own selfish interests. The prince of Coburg attacked and took Quesnoy, and the duke of York laid siege to Dunkirk, an old object of greed to England. Houchard, who had succeeded Custine in the command of the northern army, was ordered to attack the English, and by a slight success at Hondscoote he forced York to raise the siege of Dunkirk (6 Sept.). As Houchard's conduct was considered unsatisfactory, Carnot replaced him by Jourdan, who defeated the Austrians at Wattignies (16 Oct.). The prince of Coburg retired behind the Sambre, and effected a junction with the English, while the French went into winter quarters. Meanwhile, another Austrian army under Würmser had invaded Alsace in conjunction with the Prussians under Brunswick, forced the lines of Weissemburg, and almost succeeded in taking Strasburg. But the jealousy between the two commanders and between their respective armies ruined an undertaking which had been so successfully undertaken. The French, led by Hoche and Pichegru, and inspired by the presence of St. Just as commissioner of the Convention, took the aggressive, recovered the lines of Weissemburg, and forced the invaders to retire upon the Rhine.

§ 14. These successes were glorious to France, but they were sullied by the terrible measures which the victorious party thought itself justified in taking against domestic enemies. The "reign of terror" was inaugurated in Paris with the same sophistical professions of virtue that had been employed to justify religious persecutions in past ages. The prisons were crammed with more than 5000 suspects, arrested under the decree of the 17th of September. The revolutionary tribunal, hitherto almost inactive, now commenced its bloodthirsty functions. The first victim was Custine, accused of treachery in the surrender of Mainz and Valenciennes. Marie Antoinette followed her husband to the scaffold with not inferior courage on the 16th of October. The imprisoned Girondists, with Vergniaud at their head, shared the same fate. Many of their associates who had escaped, Roland, Pétion, and Buzot, evaded the vengeance of their implacable enemies by suicide. Philip of Orleans, Madame Roland, Bailly, Barnave, Houchard, and a number of other men scarcely less distinguished, perished by the guillotine. Among the almost innumerable victims of the terror was the famous Madame Dubarry, once the all-powerful mistress of Louis XV. In Lyons, Toulon, and above all at Nantes, the same horrors were repeated with even less pretence of judicial forms.

In order to complete the separation from the past a new calendar was introduced on the 6th of October. The year, which began on the 22nd of September, was divided into twelve equal months: *vendémiaire, brumaire, frimaire*, for the autumn; *nivose pluviose, ventose*, for winter; *germinal, floréal, prairial*, for spring; *messidor, thermidor, fructidor*, for summer. Each month contained three decades, and the ten days of each were named after their numerical order: *primidi, duodi, tridi, quartidi, quintidi, sextidi, septidi, octidi, nonidi, decadi.* Every tenth day was to be a day of rest. Five supplementary days were added at the end of the year, called *sans-culotides*, and dedicated respectively to Genius, to Labour, to Actions, to Recompenses, and to Opinion. The abolition of the Christian calendar, and with it of the old Sundays and festivals, naturally led to an attack upon Christianity itself. But in this we see the first trace of divisions in the party which had hitherto carried everything before it by united and unscrupulous action.

§ 15. For some time the Mountain had been tending to split into three distinct divisions, representing the views of its original leaders—Danton, Robespierre, and Marat. Danton's party had justified the employment of terror by the necessity of saving the country; but, now that this object had been attained, they wished to return to a more merciful policy. They were nicknamed the "moderates," and their views were powerfully expressed in *L*

Vieux Cordelier of Camille Desmoulins. They were supported by the vast majority of the bourgeois class, but since Danton's retirement they had lost all hold upon the government, and they were discredited by the looseness and luxury of their private life. The party of Marat had been deprived of its real leader by the act of Charlotte Corday, but it had a number of prominent representatives, and it was all-powerful in the Commune. "Chaumette and his substitute Hébert were its political chiefs; Ronsin, commander of the revolutionary army, its general; the atheist, Anacharsis Clootz, its apostle." The club of the Cordeliers, from which the Dantonists had been excluded, was entirely composed of its partisans. These men, known as the *exagerés* or Hébertists, gloried in the worst excesses of the revolution, and wished to destroy all religion in France. Their opinions were shamelessly expressed in the infamous paper, *Père Duchêne*, of which Hébert was the proprietor and editor. They took the lead in the destruction of the royal tombs at St. Denis, and they forced the Convention to decree the abolition of the Catholic faith and to adopt the religion of freedom and equality. On the 10th of November they celebrated the famous "feast of reason" in Notre Dame, where the goddess was represented by a prostitute. These obscene rites excited the outspoken disgust of Robespierre, who was a sincere believer in the deism which he had extracted from the writings of Rousseau, and who adopted Voltaire's phrase that "if God did not exist it would be necessary to invent Him." Robespierre occupies a middle position between the indulgents on the one side, and the extreme party on the other. He was still master of the Jacobin club and its affiliated societies, and with his allies, St. Just, Couthon, Billaud-Varennes, and Collot d'Herbois, he could command a secure majority in the Committee of Public Safety. The Committee was now definitely opposed to the Commune, and determined to crush its rival by the destruction of the Hébertists. At the same time Robespierre would have nothing to do with Danton and his adherents, who made vigorous efforts to draw him over to their side. He resolved on the destruction of the two parties which threatened to ruin the republic, the one by their anarchical excesses, the other by their ill-timed levity; and he pursued his aim with a combination of obstinacy and dissimulation which excited the admiration of his followers and the bitter wrath of his deceived opponents. He first allied himself with the Dantonists, and on the 15th of March, Hébert, Chaumette, Anacharsis Clootz, Ronsin and others were arrested and soon afterwards executed. A universal feeling of relief spread through Paris and France at the punishment of these ruffians, but it was speedily dissipated on the 30th of

March, when Danton, Camille Desmoulins, and several of their associates were also conducted to prison. The accusation was managed by St. Just, but it broke down beneath the invectives of Danton, who pointed triumphantly to his past conduct, denounced the treachery of his accusers, and defeated all the efforts that were made to silence him. So great was the impression made by his defence, that the Convention was forced to decree the termination of the trial, and the accused were condemned with revolutionary promptness. On the 5th of April the Dantonists, fifteen in number, were led to the scaffold, and met their fate with a resolution worthy of a better cause. A few days later the last remnants of the two defeated parties, including the widows of Hébert and of Desmoulins, were got rid of in the same way.

Robespierre was now at the height of his power, the Committee of Public Safety was as yet undivided, the Commune, in which Fleuriot had succeeded Pache, was devoted to him, and the Convention did not dare to question his will. The reign of terror was continued with increased severity. Nearly 600 victims perished between March and June, and among them were Louis XVI.'s sister Elizabeth, the virtuous Malesherbes and his family, and a number of men who had played an active part in the constituent and legislative assemblies. Carrier at Nantes, and Joseph Lebon at Arras, even surpassed the cruelties of the capital. At the same time Robespierre took steps to revive religion in France under new forms. On the 7th of May, he carried a decree by which the Convention formally recognised the existence of a supreme being and the immortality of the soul. A month later he presided, with almost pontifical dignity, over the "festival of the supreme being," which was intended to drive from men's minds all recollection of the orgies of the feast of reason.

§ 16. But before long the unity of the revolutionary government was destroyed by the rise of new parties. On the one hand were the most bloodthirsty of the leaders, Billaud-Varennes and Collot d'Herbois, who were jealous of the ascendancy of Robespierre, and were anxious to carry the terror to extremes from which even he shrank. They were joined by Barère, whose command of feeble epigrams gave him undeserved prominence, and who was impelled by cowardice to desert any cause that seemed to be failing. As compared with these men, Robespierre and his immediate associates, Couthon and St. Just, were moral and moderate. They had at last begun to perceive an end of the revolution in their own dictatorship and the adoption of their sentimental deism by the people. The terror was to end when they had inaugurated the "reign of virtue." Robespierre went so far as to demand the recall of the infamous Carrier, and to oppose the action of the *Comité de sûreté générale*, which directed the administration of justice and police. The real moderates of the Committee of Public Safety were the men like Carnot, who belonged to no party, and devoted themselves to the executive business that devolved on them.

The opposition to Robespierre was formed by the union of the extreme adherents of Billaud and Collot with the remnants of Danton's party and all who were revolted by the cruelty of the existing system. Indignant at the slightest resistance to his will, Robespierre determined to continue the terror until all his enemies had been destroyed, and proposed to the Convention the infamous law of the 22nd Prairial (10 June). The revolutionary tribunal was to be divided into four sections in order to increase its activity, the only penalty that it could impose was death, and no proof of guilt was required except a "moral" conviction of the jurors. Hitherto no deputy could be brought to trial except by decree of the Convention, now all that was required was an order of the Committee. The measure was received with terrified horror, but Robespierre's personal ascendancy was still so great that it was carried. But from this time the opposition could not rest until it had secured its safety by the overthrow of the tyrant. An attack was made upon Catharine Théot, an old woman who was accused of founding a sect for the worship of Robespierre as a new Messiah; and the latter was so chagrined that he retired from public life for a fortnight. This was a fatal error at a moment when energetic action would have foiled all the plans of his enemies. St. Just vainly urged him to act with daring. The fact was, that Robespierre had hitherto taken advantage of movements originated by others, and never organised a *coup d'état* of his own accord. To the last minute he believed that his personal influence would overawe opposition, and that the employment of force would be unnecessary. The Commune was now his chief stronghold, but no actual preparations had been made when the final attack was made by his enemies in the Convention on the 9th Thermidor (27 July). After a stormy debate, in which Robespierre vainly strove to obtain a hearing, his arrest was decreed, together with that of Couthon and St. Just. Lebas and Robespierre's younger brother shared the same fate on their own demand.

Meanwhile the leaders of the Commune, Fleuriot, Payan, and Henriot, were assembled in the Hôtel de Ville. On the news that the triumvirs were arrested, they at once gave the signal for a general insurrection. Henriot, as he made the round of the streets to call the people to arms, was seized by two members of the Convention. But this reverse was only temporary. The agents of the Commune succeeded in releasing not only Henriot but Robespierre and his fellow-prisoners, who arrived in triumph at the Hôtel de Ville. It was a critical moment for the Convention when Henriot, resuming the command of the troops, induced them to turn their cannon upon the Tuileries. But the gunners refused to fire, and the deputies were encouraged to declare their opponents outlaws. An armed force was organised under Barras and marched upon the Hôtel de Ville. The populace was not really eager to support the triumvirs, and no resistance was made to the troops of the Conventiion Robespierre and his associates were still discussing what measures to adopt when the enemy reached the hall. All except Couthon and St. Just made futile attempts to commit suicide: they were seized, identified before the revolutionary tribunal, and thence despatched to the scaffold, where they perished (28 July). The fall of Robespierre's head was greeted with thunders of applause by the assembled crowd. His name has been identified with all the worst excesses of the resolution and handed down to the execration of posterity. But it is doubtful whether he was the ruthless villain that he has been depicted. He was certainly a better man than Marat, Hébert, Collot d'Herbois, or Barère, and from some points of view he is more estimable than Danton. The hatred against him is due not so much to the enormity of his crimes, black though they are, as to the feeling of horrified surprise that so much evil in the world could be effected by so insignificant a man. Robespierre owed his position not to his abilities, which were mediocre, but to the persistence of a shallow intellect working within narrow limits. His egregious vanity helped him, by blinding his eyes both to moral turpitude and to tactical errors. He was fitted by nature to be the despot, partly respected and partly feared, of a town council or a board of guardians: the malice of destiny called him to be an active agent in an earth-shaking revolution.

III. Thermidorian Reaction. End of Convention.
27 July, 1794, to 26 October, 1795.

§ 17. The fall of Robespierre was followed by a quarrel between the two parties who had combined to bring it about. The party of the Committees, headed by Billaud-Varennes, Barère and Collot d'Herbois, had aimed merely at the establishment of their own power, and had no idea of altering the system of government. On the other hand, the moderates and Dantonists, Boissy d'Anglas, Sieyès, Chénier, Tallien, Fréron, Barras, etc., wished to terminate the terror and to restore confidence by a period of peace and lenity, Public opinion was on their side, they had a majority in the Convention, and after a brief struggle they succeeded in carrying their measures. The vacancies in the Committees of Public Safety and of General Security were filled by Thermidorians, and thus freed from the control of Billaud. The law of 22 Prairial was repealed, the revolutionary tribunal suspended, and its president, Fouquier-Tinville, brought to trial. In order to weaken the authority of the Committees, the law by which a third of their members were renewed every month was strictly enforced, and Billaud with his adherents, finding themselves powerless, resigned their seats. The maximum was abolished, and the Commune of Paris was replaced by two Committees, of finance and police, nominated by the Convention. The terrorists had no longer any constitutional position, and their only hope lay in exciting a movement of the mob by the help of the Jacobin club. To meet this danger an irregular force was formed of members of the wealthy class, known as the *jeunesse dorée* of Fréron. A series of collisions between them and the Jacobins ended in the closing of the famous club by decree of the Convention (Dec. 1794). The reaction reached its climax when Carrier, the brutal oppressor of Nantes, was tried and executed. The liberty of the press was restored, an amnesty was granted to the Vendeans, and finally, after long debates, the 63 Girondists, who had been expelled in October, 1793, recovered their seats in the Convention. Billaud, Collot, and Barère were arrested, and the two first were exiled.

§ 18. The reaction in Paris was materially aided by the success which attended the French arms in the campaign of 1794. Austria and Prussia were hopelessly alienated by the recent affairs in Poland, and the latter made no secret of its wish to retire from the western war. England, the most active member of the coalition, suggested that the Prussian troops should remain at the expense of the allies. As Austria refused to contribute anything for this purpose, England had to undertake the whole burden. In April Lord Malmesbury concluded a treaty at the Hague, by which, in return for a subsidy, 60,000 Prussians under Möllendorf were to be placed at the disposal of the maritime powers. This being settled, it was determined to take Landrecies and to advance thence upon Paris. Coburg, the Austrian commander, took the town on the 30th of April, but the advance of Pichegru, with the army of the north, compelled him to give up the project of invasion and to stand on the defensive. The English troops under the duke of York were defeated at Turcoing, and Ypres was taken by Pichegru's lieutenant, Moreau. But the campaign was decided, not so much by French victories, as by Kosciusko's revolt in Poland, which French intrigues had helped to bring about. The attention of the two great German powers was suddenly called away to the east. In spite of the treaty of the Hague, Möllendorf refused to march to the Netherlands, and the Prussians remained obstinately inactive on the Rhine, while their king hurried off to Poland. Thugut determined to sacrifice Belgium to the chance of acquiring territories nearer home. The French pressed on to attack Charleroi; Prussian inaction enabled Carnot to supply numerous reinforcements under Jourdan, and after a long and obstinate, but indecisive battle at Fleurus (26 June), Coburg retreated behind the Meuse, while York retired into Brabant. Pichegru entered Brussels, and the Netherlands were once more in French possession. French victories on the side of Piedmont and the Pyrenees completed the humiliation of the allies. Their only success was at sea, where Howe utterly defeated the French fleet off Ushant on the first of June.

Coburg, the most capable general of the allies, resigned his command in disgust at the shameful evacuation of Belgium, and was succeeded by Clairfait. After a short delay, the French resumed their advance, drove the Austrians across the Rhine, and occupied Cologne, Bonn, and Coblentz in rapid succession. The retirement of the Prussians at the same time gave to France absolute possession of the left bank of the Rhine. Pichegru, regardless of the winter, now invaded Holland, which was defended by the English under Walmoden, the duke of York having been recalled. No real resistance was made to the invaders, who crossed the rivers on the ice, and a regiment of cavalry captured the Dutch fleet in the Texel. The stadtholder fled with his family to England, and Holland was made into the Batavian republic in complete dependence upon France.

1794 was a great year to France: in addition to Savoy and Nice, she had conquered Belgium, Holland, Germany left of the Rhine, and strips of Piedmont and northern Spain. The coalition fell to pieces under these repeated blows. The grand-duke of Tuscany, brother of Francis II., was the first to come to terms with the republic (Feb. 1795). The obvious interests of Prussia and the persistence of the anti-Austrian party at Berlin, overcame at last the scruples of Frederick William II., and a treaty was signed at Basel in April. France retained the Prussian territories to the left of the Rhine on the understanding that on the conclusion of peace some compensation should be given on the right bank. France recognised the neutrality of the states of Northern Germany as the allies of Prussia. In June, Spain followed the contagious example, and purchased peace by ceding the Spanish Port of St. Domingo. One of the obstacles to this treaty was removed by the death of the dauphin, whom the royalists called Louis XVII. (8 June). The unfortunate prince had never been freed from his imprisonment in the Temple. The royal title was now assumed by the count of Provence as Louis XVIII.

§ 19. The triumph over foreign enemies by no means terminated the distress in France. The *assignats* were debased and Paris was threatened with famine. The opponents of the reaction took advantage of the discontent to provoke a rebellion against the Convention. On 1 Prairial (May 20, 1795) the assembly was attacked by the mob, which demanded "bread and the constitution of '93." One of the deputies was shot, and for six hours disorder and outrage prevailed as in the early days of the revolution. But the dominant party had taken precautions against attack, and 20,000 regular troops under General Menou put down the rising. The leaders of the mob were executed. But the success of the reactionary party involved a new danger by encouraging the royalists. The English government opened negotiations with the *Chouans* in Brittany and the leaders of La Vendée. In order to give consistency to the anti-revolutionary movements, it was determined to invite a number of emigrants to France, and they landed, with the count of Artois at their head, in the peninsula of Quiberon. But the scheme was foiled by the activity of Hoche. After driving the emigrants from French soil, he turned upon the rebels, and succeeded in suppressing them by a judicious combination of firmness and conciliation. In 1796 Charette and Stofflet, the Vendean leaders, were captured and shot.

§ 20. Meanwhile, the Convention had drawn up a new constitution, the work of the Girondists. Legislative power was entrusted to two councils, one, the *Conseil des Anciens*, consisting of 250 members over 40 years of age, the other of 500 members over 30. Every year a third of each council was to retire in favour of new members. The deputies were to be chosen by electors nominated by the primary assemblies which consisted of all citizens over 21 and paying a direct tax. The executive was to be in the hands of a Directory of five persons, one of whom was to retire every year. The Five Hundred were to nominate ten candidates for each place in the Directory, and from these ten the final selection was to be made by the smaller council. The retiring director was determined by lot. The fear of a complete reversal of their policy induced the Convention to add a special article, that two-thirds of the new assembly should be chosen from among its own members, and only one third was to be freely elected. If the electors refused to choose these two-thirds, then the Convention would select them itself. This undisguised resolution to preserve the rule of the dominant majority naturally roused the bitter indignation of all opponents, whether royalists or terrorists. The Convention was called upon to face a new rising in Paris on the 13 Vendémiaire (5 Oct.). The command of the troops was entrusted to Barras, but he handed on the responsibility to Napoleon Bonaparte, a young Corsican, born just at the time when Choiseul annexed that island (1768), who had won considerable reputation in the siege of Toulon, but who had recently been removed from his command on account of his supposed connection with Robespierre. Bonaparte took his measure with characteristic decision. Cannon were brought up from a neighbouring camp, and volleys of grape-shot speedily dispersed the rebels with great loss. On the 26th of October the Convention was dissolved, and the new constitution came into operation.

IV. THE DIRECTORY. 26 OCTOBER, 1795, TO 9 NOVEMBER, 1799.

§ 21. On the 27th of October the newly elected deputies were joined by twice their number of members of the Convention, and the whole body was divided into the two prescribed councils. The Five Hundred took up their quarters in the riding-school where the Constituent Assembly had sat, while the 250 Ancients remained in the Tuileries. The first duty of the new legislature was the election of the five Directors, and out of the fifty nominees the Ancients chose La Réveillère-Lepaux, Letourneur, Rewbell, Sieyès, and Barras. On the refusal of Sieyès to accept office, Carnot was selected in his place. The Directors were installed in the Luxemburg, which was assigned as the seat of the executive government, and at once proceeded to settle their respective functions. Rewbell, an active and experienced lawyer, assumed the control of justice, finance and foreign affairs; La Réveillère, a feeble enthusiast for what he called "theophilanthropy," became a sort of minister for home affairs; Barras, better fitted for intrigue than for government, took the police; Letourneur managed the navy and the colonies; while the direction of the war fell into the experienced hands of Carnot. The choice of the Directors illustrates the primary object of the dominant majority, which was to prevent the possibility of a restoration of the monarchy. They were all men who had voted for the death of Louis XVI., and had thus given hostages to the republic.

The internal condition of France was calculated to inspire the new government with despair. The Directors "entered the Luxemburg without finding even a table to write upon, and the state was in no better order than the palace." The exchequer was empty, the *assignats* had fallen to a thousandth part of their nominal value, the army was without pay, and the people were without food. The abolition of the maximum had done nothing to restore confidence, while it had removed the compulsory character of production and exchange. The Directors were not, as a body, men of distinguished ability, yet they succeeded in grappling with these difficulties with fair success. The comparatively settled character of their rule did more than anything else to put an end to the general sense of insecurity, which was the chief cause of the stagnation of trade. Agriculture and all kinds of industry revived, as the feverish interest in politics declined, and the clubs were deserted for the fields and the workshop. But the finances proved a crucial difficulty. The number of *assignats* in circulation amounted nominally to 45,000,000,000 francs, and further issue was impossible. After several expedients had been tried, the Directors determined to issue a new kind of paper-money, *mandats territoriaux*, each of which entitled the holder on demand to a specified portion of the national domains. *Mandats* to the value of 800 millions sufficed to buy up all the debased *assignats*, and the block from which the latter were printed was broken. The *mandats*, on account of the comparative ease of realisation, were at first welcomed by the people, and their issue gave temporary relief to the government. But before long depreciation began, and the state advanced nearer and nearer to bankruptcy.

But the real credit of the Directory in its early months lies not so much in any particular measures, as in the fact that the domestic history of France loses for a time its exciting character. Parties were at last exhausted by their incessant struggles, and though they had no special enthusiasm for the government they preferred it to anarchy. Brittany and La Vendée were pacified by the admirable measures of Hoche. The old party of the Jacobins made a despairing effort, under Babœuf's leadership, to recover their ascendancy in Paris, but the plot was detected and its originators were put to death (May, 1796). The quietude of internal politics was accompanied, and partly caused, by a tremendous extension of the foreign war.

§ 22. The establishment of a settled government in France offered a favourable opportunity for a general peace, but England and Austria, who had answered the treaty of Basel by a new offensive alliance (May, 1795), refused to take advantage of it. Thugut, who directed foreign politics at Vienna, was inspired with bitter enmity towards Prussia, and was eager to compensate Austria for its exertions by acquiring territory. In England, Pitt for a long time strenuously resisted the growing antipathy to the war, and when at last he opened negotiations, he found that France would not grant his most essential demand, the restoration of the

Netherlands to Austria. Moreover, the allies were encouraged by the fact that the desertion of Prussia had not led, as was expected, to a complete collapse of the war in Germany. The French had begun the campaign by capturing the great fortress of Luxemburg, and their two armies, under Pichegru and Jourdan respectively, received orders to cross the Rhine and take Mainz. But Pichegru, the conqueror of Belgium and Holland, was dissatisfied with the reward of his services and with the course of affairs at home. Like Dumouriez under similar circumstances, he determined to betray his country, and opened negotiations with the prince of Condé. The advance of Jourdan compelled him to obey his instructions, he took Mannheim, and Mainz was closely blockaded. But under these circumstances the conduct of the French was not likely to be very efficient. By a series of masterly movements, the Austrian generals, Clairfait and Würmser, broke up the blockade, recovered Mannheim, and drove the French in disorder across the Rhine. Hostilities were closed in December by an armistice, and Pichegru, whose treachery was suspected though not proved, was recalled by the home government.

§ 23. In 1796 Carnot planned a grand triple attack upon the power of Austria. Two French armies were to advance through Germany, while a third was to enter Italy. It was in the latter country that results of decisive importance were obtained. In 1792 the French had annexed Savoy and Nice, and since then they had been pressing slowly but surely over the Maritime Alps. In 1795 a victory of General Scherer at Loano had secured the entrance into Piedmont. Scherer was superseded by Bonaparte, who had recently married Josephine Beauharnais, the mistress of Barras, and who was supported by Barras and Carnot among the Directors. Bonaparte found his soldiers in the most lamentable condition, starving for want of clothes and food, but he encouraged them with the prospect of the plunder of Italy. He was opposed by 2000 Piedmontese troops under Colli and 40,000 Austrians under Beaulieu, and his first object was to separate the two hostile armies. This he succeeded in effecting by rapid victories at Montenotte and Dego (April, 1796). Determined not to leave a hostile province in his rear, he disregarded the express instructions of the Directors and pursued the Piedmontese to the gates of Turin, where he forced Victor Amadeus III. to sign an armistice. The king withdrew from the coalition, disbanded his army, and surrendered his chief fortresses as hostages till the conclusion of peace. The Directors were compelled to approve the disobedience of the general, and their scruples were overpowered by the sums of money which were extorted from the conquered, and which materially helped the government to cope with financial difficulties. Bonaparte now turned to pursue the Austrians, and a small engagement at Fornbio enabled him to carry the line of the Ticino and to cross the Po. Beaulieu now made a stand on the Adda, the second of those vertical rivers which form the only lines of defence on the Lombard plain. Bonaparte attacked him at Lodi, and by an onslaught carried the bridge and gained a complete victory (9 May). This success gave the whole of Lombardy to the French; the Austrians retreated to the Mincio, to their great fortress of Mantua. Milan sent in its submission, Bonaparte entered the city in triumph, and, in accordance with his usual custom, demanded the payment of twenty millions of francs for the privilege of subjection to France. Still more obnoxious than these pecuniary exactions was the reckless robbery of works of art, which were sent off wholesale to Paris. In despairing indignation the citizens of Pavia rose against their conquerors, but Bonaparte put down the revolt with severity, and took advantage of it to justify fresh extortions. His express instructions were to march upon Leghorn, Rome, and Naples, but he was determined to leave southern Italy till he had crushed the Austrians, and the Directors could not afford to quarrel with a general who poured such lavish supplies into the exhausted treasury. The great difficulty in the way of a French advance upon the Mincio lay in the fact that the district as far as Bergamo belonged to Venice, and Venice was a neutral power. Cynically disregarding the neutrality, Bonaparte occupied Brescia, and thus compelled the Austrians to encroach upon Venetian territory by entering Peschiera. Beaulieu was again defeated at Borghetto and driven to retreat into Tyrol. Bonaparte now picked a quarrel with Venice on the ground that they had admitted the Austrians to their territory, made himself master of the Adige by seizing Verona and Legnago, and then laid siege to Mantua. He was now able to give some attention to the wishes of the Directors. Naples he had admitted to an armistice, but he sent Augereau to occupy Ferrara and Bologna in the papal states, while another detachment under Murat treacherously seized and plundered Leghorn, in spite of the fact that the grand-duke of Tuscany had in the previous year made peace with France. While enjoying the hospitality of the grand-duke at Florence, Bonaparte was treacherous enough to urge upon the Directors the impolicy of leaving a brother of the emperor in possession of his territories.

These easy and not very creditable aggressions were suddenly interrupted by a new danger from the north. The Austrian government determined on a great effort to regain their hold upon Italy, and Würmser, recalled from the Rhine, was despatched with

30,000 men to relieve Mantua. In the Tyrol he was joined by the scattered remnants of Beaulieu's army. Unfortunately, Würmser was compelled, by his instructions from Vienna, to divide his forces, and this enabled Bonaparte to follow his favourite plan of attacking the hostile detachments in succession. Already several of the French positions had been carried, when Bonaparte raised the siege of Mantua, and Würmser, who hurried up to the city, found that his march was useless, and that he had left the bulk of his troops to be attacked in his absence. At Lonato (3 August), Bonaparte crushed one Austrian detachment under Quasdanowich, and then, turning upon Würmser, who had returned from Mantua, he defeated him at Castiglione two days later, and drove him back to the Italian Tyr. Mantua, which had been re-victualled—the only result of these great exertions—was again besieged, but as the French had lost most of their artillery, they had to be content with a blockade. Würmser was preparing to renew his advance when Bonaparte determined to forestall the attack. Hurrying northwards, he routed the Austrians at Bassano, and as he stood between them and their retreat, they were compelled to throw themselves into Mantua, where they were closely imprisoned.

Bonaparte's intention had been, after settling affairs in Italy, to march through the Alps into Germany and to join with the other French forces in an attack upon Austria. In Germany, unfortunately, the French had not the advantage of an undivided command. Two armies were prepared, under Jourdan and Moreau, with instructions to advance eastwards by the valleys of the Main and the Necker respectively. The miserable condition of the troops delayed the opening of the campaign, and by that time everything seemed favourable. The mission of Würmser into Italy left them confronted by only one Austrian army, under the archduke Charles who in this year won a great reputation as a general. The French advanced into the heart of Germany, when the archduke took a bold resolution worthy of Bonaparte himself. Leaving 30,000 men to face Moreau, he threw himself with vastly superior forces upon Jourdan, defeated him in a series of engagements, and drove him across the Rhine. The French campaign was ruined, and Moreau, who had advanced into Bavaria, saw himself in danger of having his communications cut off. He conducted his retreat with conspicuous courage and success, and succeeded in passing the Rhine without any serious losses (25 October). The Austrians concluded the campaign by taking the fortresses of Hüningen and Kiel.

The failure of the French invasion of Germany compelled Bonaparte to remain in Italy, and at the same time enabled the Austrians to make a fresh effort for the relief of Beaulieu in

Mantua. 40,000 men under Alvinzi and 18,000 under Davidowich entered Italy from the Tyrol and marched by different routes towards Verona. Bonaparte had employed the recent interlude in consolidating French influence in Italy. Against the wishes of the Directors he dethroned the duke of Modena, and formed his territories into the Cispadane Republic. Then he tried to induce Piedmont and Venice to join France, but both states preferred to retain their neutral position. This was another of the charges which the general was preparing against Venice. On the news of the Austrian advance, Bonaparte marched against Alvinzi, and checked him at Carmignano (6 November). But meanwhile Davidowich had taken Trent and was approaching Rivoli. Bonaparte, in danger of being surrounded, was compelled to give way, and retreated to Verona, while Alvinzi followed him. Never was the French position more critical, and nothing but a very bold move could save them. With reckless courage Bonaparte attacked Alvinzi at Arcola, and after three days' hard fighting won a complete victory. He then forced Davidowich to retreat to the Tyro. The danger was averted, and the blockade of Mantua was continued. But Austria, as if its resources were inexhaustible, determined on a fourth effort in January, 1797. Alvinzi was again entrusted with the command, while another detachment under Provera advanced from Friuli. Bonaparte collected all his forces, marched against Alvinzi, and crushed him at Rivoli (15 Jan.). But meanwhile Provera had reached Mantua, where Bonaparte, by a forced march, overtook him, and won another complete victory in the battle of La Favorita. The fate of Mantua was at last decided, and the city surrendered on the 2nd of February. With a generosity worthy of the glory which he had obtained, Bonaparte allowed Würmser and the garrison to march out with the honours of war. He now turned to Romagna, occupied Bologna, and terrified the Pope into signing the treaty of Tolentino. The temporal power was allowed to exist, but within very curtailed limits. Not only Avignon, but the whole of Romagna, with Ancona, was surrendered to France. Even these terms, harsh as they were, were not so severe as the Directors had wished. But Bonaparte was beginning to play his own game; he saw that Catholicism was regaining ground in France, and he wished to make friends on what might prove after all the winning side.

§ 24. Affairs in Italy were now fairly settled: two republics, the Cisalpine in Lombardy, and the Cispadane, which included Modena, Ferrara, and Bologna, had been created to secure French influence in Italy. The only open question was the relations with Venice. The French had occupied the Venetian territory from

Bergamo to Verona, and had established close relations with those classes who were dissatisfied with their exclusion from political power. When the republic armed against the danger of a revolt, Bonaparte treated it as another ground for that quarrel which he artfully fomented for his own purposes. But at present he had other objects more immediately pressing than the oppression of Venice. Jourdan's army on the Rhine had been entrusted to Hoche, whose ambition had long chafed at the want of an opportunity, and who was burning to acquire glory by retrieving the disasters of the last campaign. Bonaparte, on the other hand, was eager to anticipate a possible rival, and determined to hurry on his own invasion of Austria, in order to keep the war and the negotiations in his own hands. The task of meeting him was entrusted to the archduke Charles, who had won such a brilliant reputation in 1796, but who was placed at a great disadvantage to his opponent by having to obey instructions from Vienna. The French carried all before them. Joubert occupied Tyrol, Masséna forced the route to Carinthia, and Bonaparte himself, after defeating the archduke on the Tagliamento, occupied Trieste and Carniola. The French now marched over the Alps, driving the Austrians before them. At Leoben, which they reached on 7th April, they were less than eighty miles from Vienna. Here Austrian envoys arrived to open negotiations. They consented to surrender Belgium, Lombardy, and the Rhine frontier, but they demanded compensation in Bavaria. This demand Bonaparte refused, but offered to compensate Austria at the expense of a neutral state, Venice. The preliminaries of Leoben, signed on the 18th April, gave to Austria, Istria, Dalmatia, and the Venetian provinces between the Oglio, the Po, and the Adriatic. At this moment Hoche and Moreau, after overcoming the obstacles interposed by a sluggish government, were crossing the Rhine to bring their armies to bear against Austria. They had already gained several successes when the unwelcome news reached them from Leoben, and they had to retreat. Bonaparte may have failed to extort the most extreme terms from Austria, but he had at any rate kept both power and fame to himself.

No sooner had the preliminaries been concluded, than Bonaparte received intelligence from Venice which he afterwards paraded as a justification for the treaty. On the 17th of April a rising took place at Verona, known as the *pâques véronaises*, in which some French soldiers were killed. Although it was a mere popular outbreak, which the government could not possibly have kindled, Bonaparte seized upon it as a pretext for war, and sent troops to threaten Venice with attack. In the panic caused by this threat the Senate granted all that was demanded of them. The old oligarchical constitution, which had existed for centuries, was abolished; an offensive alliance was concluded with France, and a French garrison was admitted into the city. In secret articles the ordinary tribute of works of art was exacted, and a vague expression about "exchange of territories" was introduced so as to cover the intended cessions to Austria, of which the Venetians had absolutely no idea. The French at once seized Corfu and the other Venetian possessions in the Levant. Soon afterwards Genoa, the other surviving republic of Italy, was compelled by French dictation to receive a democratic constitution.

§ 25. Meanwhile, affairs in Paris were hurrying to a crisis. The cardinal defect of the constitution of the year III. was, that it provided no means of adjusting any difference that might arise between the executive and the legislative powers. As long as two-thirds of the councils were composed of former members of the Convention, the Directors were supported by the majority which had elected them, and this question was avoided. But on the 1 Prairial of the year V. (May, 1797) half of these members had to retire by lot, and at the same time one of the Directors was to vacate his seat. For some time parties had been growing up in the legislative body: the moderates, consisting of almost all the newly elected deputies, who formed one-third of the councils, wished to carry on the policy of reaction, and many of them were inclined to favour a restoration of the monarchy. This party had its headquarters at a house in the Rue de Clichy, and was known in consequence as the *Club de Clichy* or the *Clichyens*. In opposition to them, the members of the Convention wished to stop at the point they had reached, and to maintain the republic at all hazards. A similar division had arisen in the Directory itself. Carnot and Letourneur belonged to the moderate party, while Rewbell, Barras, and La Réveillère were thorough-going opponents of any change that might affect their own power. The elections, as was foreseen, gave a strong majority to the moderate party, and among the new deputies was Pichegru, whose treason had not yet been divulged, and who became a prominent leader of the *Clichyens*. The retiring elector was settled by lot, and this, as many believed unfairly, fell upon Letourneur. His place was taken by Barthélemy, the negotiator of the treaty of Basel, and universally respected for courage and probity. He at once joined himself to Carnot, so that the balance of parties remained the same in the Directory, and the triumvirs, as the other three were called, retained their numerical superiority.

These changes brought the Directors into frequent and open collision with the legislative councils. As there were no constitutional means of overcoming the difficulty, Rewbell and his associates determined to employ force against their opponents, and to make themselves absolute in France. The moderate party played into their hands by attacking Bonaparte's treatment of Venice and Genoa. They thus excited the most bitter hostility of the one man without whose support the Directors would hardly have ventured to take active measures. Hoche was first chosen as the agent of the *coup d'état*, but he drew back as he began to understand the real purpose for which he was employed. The triumvirs then appealed to Bonaparte, who refused to have any part in the business himself, but who sent Augereau, a military democrat, "to kill the royalists." The intention of the three Directors was to feign the discovery of a conspiracy against the republic, and then by active measures to remove their two colleagues, and to purge the councils of their chief opponents. The councils were fully sensible of their danger, and passed decree after decree against the unauthorised assembling of troops and other arbitrary acts. But decrees were a poor weapon against force, and Carnot, in spite of an open quarrel with Barras, seemed resolutely blind to the acts of his colleagues. On the 18th Fructidor (Sept. 4, 1797) the long-prepared blow was struck. Barthélemy was arrested in his chamber, but Carnot contrived to escape by a door into the Luxemburg gardens. At the same time Augereau, with 12,000 men, surrounded the Tuileries, and, as the guard had already been corrupted, occupied the palace without opposition. Pichegru and several other deputies were imprisoned. The councils were now assembled to accept perforce the dictates of the Directory. Carnot, Barthélemy, and fifty-three deputies were to be exiled to any place which the Directors might choose. In forty-nine departments the elections were annulled, and the Directors might appoint nominees of their own. The laws against priests and emigrants, which the moderate party had recently repealed, were renewed. The Directors were invested with absolute powers; they could suppress journals or political clubs at pleasure, and the appointment of all judges and magistrates was placed in their hands. The prisoners were banished to the pestilential coast of Guiana, where half of them perished. Two new Directors, Merlin de Douai and François of Neufchâtel, were elected at the dictation of the triumvirs. The only justification advanced for these measures was the treachery of Pichegru two years before, proofs of which Bonaparte had discovered in the papers of D'Antraigues, an emigrant who had been arrested in Venice. There was absolutely no proof that Pichegru had renewed his schemes, for which the opportunity was long past, or that he had communicated them to any of his colleagues in the council. On these flimsy grounds the Directors had overthrown the constitution, and had set a fatal example by calling in the army to settle domestic affairs. Almost equally harmful was the apathy with which the citizens of Paris watched the overthrow of liberty by a tyrannical executive.

§ 26. Moreau, as a friend of Pichegru, was removed from his command on the Rhine and replaced by Hoche, who died shortly afterwards at the age of twenty-nine. The army was now entrusted to Augereau, whom tho Directors were eager to remove from Paris. Meanwhile, Bonaparte was still engaged in negotiating with the Austrians, who had delayed coming to terms as long as there was a chance of a change of government at Paris. It was this that had made Bonaparte so angry with the attacks upon his conduct in Italy, and had led him to support the executive. Now that the obstacle in the way of peace had been withdrawn, he was by no means eager to approve the *coup d'état*, which had gone much further than he had ever intended. He had no confidence in the Directors, whom he knew to be jealous of his ascendancy, and he was especially indignant at the appointment of Augereau to the command on the Rhine. He showed his displeasure by the independent way in which he hurried on the negotiations. In addition to the territories arranged in the preliminaries of Leoben, Austria demanded the cession of Venice itself, and to this the Directors were obstinately opposed. They wished to compel the acceptance of their terms by the advance of Augereau into Germany. But Bonaparte was determined not to admit a rival to a share in the work, and, in open defiance of his instructions, concluded the treaty of Campo Formio on the 17th of October. France obtained Belgium, Lombardy as far as the Adige, which was made into the Cisalpine Republic, and the Ionian Islands. Austria received Istria, Dalmatia, Venice, and the Venetian territory as far as the Adige. A congress was to meet at Rastadt to arrange peace between France and the Empire, but, by a secret article, Austria undertook to employ all its influence to obtain the cession of the Rhine frontier. All possibility of resistance on the part of Venice was crushed by the city being handed over to the Austrians before the French quitted it. The Directors were bitterly enraged at the news of the treaty, and for a moment dreamt of refusing its ratification. But the unanimous delight with which the nation welcomed the peace compelled them to approve the act of the domineering general.

§ 27. Bonaparte remained in Italy, occupied with the organisation of the Cisalpine Republic, until the middle of November, when he travelled by way of Rastadt to Paris. There he was received in triumph, and many of his friends urged him to seize upon the supreme power. But he was conscious that the moment had not yet come, and refused to mix himself up with political parties. England, now the only remaining enemy of France, had conclusively maintained its maritime supremacy in 1797. Spain having formed an alliance with France in the previous year, the Spanish fleet was attacked and crippled by Jervis at the battle of St. Vincent (14 Feb.). In spite of the mutinies at Spithead and the Nore, Admiral Duncan was able to blockade the Texel, and when the Dutch fleet at last ventured out it was destroyed at Camperdown (6 Oct.). In December Bonaparte was appointed to command the "army of England," and it was universally supposed that the neighbouring island was to be invaded. But Bonaparte himself war determined on another enterprise, the conquest of Egypt. For a long time the East, with its traditions of great conquerors, had exercised an invincible fascination on his ambitious mind. He had also personal motives for his decision. To prevent men from forgetting him he must win new successes, and Europe no longer offered a convenient opening. Moreover, he wished the existing government to ruin itself, and he had a lurking hope that, during his absence, disasters might befall France, which would compel, not only his recall, but also his advance to absolute power. The Directors on their side were not unwilling to get rid of a general whose glory overshadowed their own power. In May he set out with a splendid armament from Toulon, captured Malta through the treachery of some of the knights, and on the 30th of June appeared before Alexandria. In his manifesto he tried to conciliate the native population, by professing that he was the friend of the Sultan and of the Mohammedan religion, and that his only object was the overthrow of the tyrannical rule of the Mamelukes. His troops, the best that France could produce, speedily overcame all resistance, and on the 25th of July he entered Cairo in triumph. A few days later Nelson, who had been vainly hunting the expedition through the Mediterranean, found the French fleet in Aboukir Bay and completely annihilated it in the great battle of the Nile (1 August). This disaster not only deprived the French of the power to retreat, but cut off all communication with Europe.

§ 28. The Congress of Rastadt, which had met in November, 1797, was from the beginning a hollow sham. The lesser German States had sent envoys in the belief that the integrity of the Empire was to be restored. But Austria and Prussia were both pledged to the cession of the left bank of the Rhine, and this was reluctantly confirmed in March, 1797. The question now arose as to how the dispossessed princes were to be compensated, and it was proposed to secularise the ecclesiastical states of central Germany. This was naturally approved by Prussia as a leading Protestant power, but Austria refused its consent. As it became evident that France was inclining more and more to a Prussian alliance, Thugut, in spite of a strong opposition party in Vienna, began to meditate a renewal of the war. In this intention he was encouraged by new acts of aggression on the part of France. In Rome the French envoy, Joseph Bonaparte, promoted democratic intrigues against the papal government, and, in the disorders which arose, General Duphot was shot. This gave the desired pretext for war to the French government, and Berthier, who had been Bonaparte's aide-de-camp, was ordered to advance upon Rome. The populace, already prepared for a revolution, welcomed the invaders. The aged Pius VI., on his refusal to abdicate his temporal power, was removed to Tuscany, and thence to Valence, where he died in the next year. Berthier now surrendered the command to Masséna, who organised a regular pillage of the city, and aroused such general discontent that even his own soldiers insisted on his resignation. Rome, like the other conquests, was organised as a republic on the French model. Only the names were borrowed from classical times. Instead of Directors there were Consuls, and the Ancients and the Five Hundred were represented by a Senate and a Tribunate. Similar measures were taken at the same time in Switzerland. French intrigues provoked a revolt in the Pays de Vaud, and when the Bernese government tried to put down the rebels, France declared war. One of the objects of the campaign was to obtain money, as the Directors were reduced to great straits by the failure of those supplies from Italy which had been so plentiful in the previous year. Berne was taken, and the treasure found there was confiscated. The old constitution of Switzerland was abolished, and a new Helvetic Republic, in which every inhabitant was to have equal political rights, was proclaimed at Aarau in April. Geneva was now united to France, and the German territory on the left of the Rhine was formed into four French departments.

These aggressions aroused once more the wrath of the great Powers of Europe, and England was able to form a coalition still more formidable than that of 1793. Besides Austria, Naples, and most of the German States, Russia and Turkey also took up arms against France. Turkey had obvious grounds for hostility in the invasion of Egypt. In Russia a complete change of policy had followed the death of Catharine II. (Nov., 1796) and the accession of her son, Paul I. Paul, whose mind was hardly sane, was bitterly opposed to the reforming ideas of his mother. He restored all the old forms of despotism in Russia, and his fanatical hatred of Jacobinism led him to form a close alliance with Austria, by which he undertook to send a Russian army into Italy. The war was commenced by Ferdinand IV. of Naples, who was driven to imprudent haste by the energy of his wife, Caroline, a sister of Marie Antoinette, and by the confidence which was inspired by the arrival of Nelson's fleet after the victory of the Nile. On the 22nd of November war was formally declared against France, and a Neapolitan army, organised and led by the Austrian General Mack, marched upon Rome. The French garrison retired, and the authority of the exiled Pontiff was nominally restored. But the action of the Neapolitans proved as fatal as it was ill-timed. Championnet, with a French army, defeated the incompetent Mack and advanced to Capua. Naples was panic-stricken, the royal family fled to Nelson's ships, and by the end of January the whole kingdom was reduced and formed into the Parthenopean Republic. At the same time Charles Emmanuel IV. of Sardinia and the grand-duke Ferdinand III. of Tuscany were deposed, and their territories occupied by the French.

This extension of territory at the beginning of a great war was a serious error for France. Especially fatal was the occupation of southern Italy at a time when the combined Austrian and Russian forces were to be faced on the Adige. The French frontier extended from Holland to Naples, and it was exposed to attack on almost every point. The centre of the line was Switzerland, which had been neutral territory until its seizure by the French. Masséna was in command here, and his instructions were to advance through the mountains so as to cut off connection between the Austrians in Italy and in Germany. On his north Jourdan was to march along the line of the Danube upon Vienna, while in Italy Scherer was to hold the line of the Adige until Masséna could join him from the Tyrol and help him to crush the enemy. The campaign was commenced by Masséna (March, 1799), and he succeeded in advancing as far as the Inn valley. But meanwhile the archduke Charles had defeated Jourdan at Stockach (25 March) and drove him back across the Rhine. A week later Scherer was routed at Magnano and forced to retire to the Adda, where he was promptly superseded by Moreau. Masséna, finding that the two lateral campaigns had failed, and that his own flanks were now exposed to attack, retreated to Zurich. The Austrians now occupied Rastadt, where the Congress was still sitting in spite of the outbreak of hostilities, and the French envoys were killed (28 April). Tradition ascribed this outrage to Thugut, and it is probable that he authorised, not the murder, but the seizure of the envoys' papers. In Italy the campaign of 1799 went decisively against the French. They were opposed by Suwarow, the veteran Russian commander, who had a great advantage over his Austrian predecessors by refusing to take instructions from the military council at Vienna. Suwarow arrived in Lombardy in April, and at once defeated the French on the Adda. With the fall of Milan the Cisalpine Republic suddenly collapsed. Moreau retired to Alexandria, but by a rapid march Suwarow surprised Turin in their rear. Cut off from retreat and from reinforcements, Moreau's only hope lay in the arrival of Championnet's army, which Macdonald was bringing up from Naples. But again Suwarow was too rapid for the French, and, out-marching Moreau, he cut Macdonald's troops to pieces on the Trebbia, after three days of hard fighting (17–19 June). Moreau now collected the remnant of the French forces and conducted a masterly retreat. Suwarow was eager to pursue him and to invade France. But he was paralysed by the selfishness of the Austrian government, which wished to make conquests for itself rather than to crush France or to terminate the war. Suwarow was compelled to remain in Italy, while all the Lombard fortresses were reduced and while Mantua was besieged. Meanwhile the Directors sent a new army into Italy, and this time entrusted the command to Joubert, whose reputation was as yet unsullied by defeat. At Novi, Joubert met Suwarow, but found to his surprise that Mantua had already fallen, and that he had to face two armies instead of one. After an heroic struggle against overwhelming odds, the French were completely defeated and their general left dead upon the field. Italy was now entirely lost to France. Cardinal Ruffo had already effected a revolution in Naples, to which Ferdinand IV. and his family were restored by the English fleet. Nelson affixed an ineradicable stain upon his reputation by supporting the king and queen in a policy of reprisal, which was quite as horrible as the reign of terror in Paris. In spite of a solemn promise of amnesty, 30,000 patriots were thrown into prison and the majority of them were punished with death or exile. It was a proof that kings could be at least as treacherous and as cruel as Jacobins. Just after the French cause in Italy had been ruined at Novi, an English armament, under the duke of York, landed in Holland, captured the Dutch fleet in the Texel, and threatened Amsterdam. It was due rather to York's incapacity than to any success of the French, that this was the first and last success of the invaders.

§ 29. The disasters of 1799 naturally made a profound impression upon public opinion in France, and the new elections in May returned to the councils a large majority hostile to the Directors, upon whose shoulders the blame of failure was thrown. Sieyès, who had emerged from the insignificance into which he had fallen during the Terror, and who was now a leader of the moderate party, was chosen Director in place of Rewbel, whose turn it was to retire. The old quarrel between the executive and the legislature broke out again, the only difference being that this time it was the latter which took the initiative. La Révcillère and two of his colleagues were compelled to retire and their places were filled by Gohier, Moulins, and Ducos. Barras, who had lost all reputation and importance, was now the only remaining member of the original Directory. The general feeling of discontent encouraged Sieyès to plan the overthrow of the constitution of 1795, its chief fault in his eyes being that he had had no share in framing it. His own scheme had been long matured in his mind, but he needed the support of a man of action to carry it through. After some hesitation he fixed upon Joubert as the instrument of his designs, and sent him into Italy to win a great reputation. But the battle of Novi frustrated this plan, and, after vainly trying to gain over Bernadotte and Moreau, Sieyès was obliged to postpone matters.

For a long time nothing had been heard of Bonaparte, whose reputation had grown in proportion to the failures of his successors, and who was popularly regarded as a martyr to the enmity of the Directors. After reducing Egypt, and discovering that his action had forced the Porte into war with France, Bonaparte determined to anticipate attack by invading Syria. For some time he carried all before him, but was at last repulsed from the walls of Acre by the obstinacy of Djezzar Pacha and the bravery of the English sailors under Sir Sydney Smith (May, 1799). This defeat marks a turning-point in his career. His troops were decimated by sickness when he led them back to Egypt. There he found that Murad Bey, the Mameluke leader, had again made head against the French. At the battle of Aboukir the rising was suppressed, but at this moment Bonaparte received intelligence from France. The news of the loss of Italy and the discredit of the Directors convinced him that the long expected moment had come. Regardless of the hardships in which he had involved his army, and of the almost certain fate to which he left it, he decided to return at once to France. Carefully disguising his intentions, he contrived to set sail in a small frigate with Murat, Marmont, Lannes, and Berthier. The deserted troops were left under the command of Kleber, who bitterly denounced Bonaparte's cold-blooded treachery.

Before Bonaparte's arrival France had been saved from the most pressing dangers. General Brune had recovered Holland and forced the duke of York to capitulate. But the great crisis occurred in Switzerland. Suwarow had been compelled by Austrian jealousy to give up his plan of invading France, and had been sent into Switzerland to co-operate with another Russian army under

Korsakow. But before he could effect the difficult crossing of the Alps, Masséna had already fallen upon Korsakow and had utterly crushed him at the battle of Zurich (26 Sept.). On arriving in Switzerland Suwarow found that he had come too late, and that advance or retreat were alike impossible. With desperate resolution, he attempted a new and unexplored passage through the Alps, and after almost incredible difficulties and hardships he brought his army into safety at Coire. Convinced that he had been betrayed by Austria, the veteran general threw up his command and returned to Russia.

Masséna's success had hardly been gained when it was forgotten in the universal outburst of enthusiasm which welcomed Bonaparte on his landing at Fréjus (9 October). From this moment the history both of France and of Europe is bound up with his. Bonaparte was the very man to carry out the design of Sieyès, but a great obstacle existed in the mutual enmity of the two men. However, a short stay in Paris convinced the general that he could gain his end with no other ally, and he felt satisfied that he could easily exclude the Abbé from any real share in power. A reconciliation was easily effected, and Bonaparte undertook to overthrow the existing government, the implied condition being that Sieyès should then be allowed to introduce his constitution. The 18th Brumaire (9 Nov.), was fixed for the *coup d'état* which was to avenge the 18th Fructidor. Sieyès could command a majority among the Ancients; and in the Five Hundred the conspirators possessed a great advantage in the fact that Bonaparte's brother, Lucien, had just been elected president. To prepare the way for intimidation, if it should be needed, the Councils were induced to transfer their sitting to St. Cloud. Bonaparte, with the assistance of his four companions from Egypt, had no difficulty in gaining over the chief officers. The only opponents in the army were Bernadotte, who had ambitions of his own and supported the existing constitution, and Jourdan and Augereau, who were inclined to Jacobinism. Fouché, the head of the police department, was always ready to support the winning side. On the appointed day Sieyès and Ducos commenced operations by resigning their seats in the Directory, and Barras was compelled to do the same. Gohier and Moulins, who courageously refused to resign, were arrested. Bonaparte, accompanied by devoted troops, went in person to St. Cloud and entered the Council of the Ancients. He was so confused that in his harangue to the deputies he made no allusion to the fear of a Jacobin revolt, which was the feigned pretext of the *coup d'état.* On arriving among the Five Hundred, he was received with such a chorus of execration that he had to be carried fainting from the hall. The whole plot seemed on the verge of failure, when Lucien Bonaparte arrived, and encouraged the soldiers to clear the hall by force. This completed the revolution. A small body of carefully chosen deputies was assembled in the evening, and they voted the appointment of a commission to draw up a new constitution, and of a provisional consulate to carry on the government in the interval. The three consuls were Bonaparte, Sieyès and Ducos.

§ 30. Sieyès now brought forward the constitution which had so long been a secret in his own breast, and of which even Bonaparte had as yet no knowledge. The great object of this marvellous conception was to avoid the dangers of frequent popular elections. Every election since 1795 had been more and more reactionary, and there was no doubt that before long a royalist majority might be returned. Against this danger every possible precaution was to be taken, even at the risk of destroying the elementary rights of the people which had been established with such pomp and circumstance in 1789. Sieyès proposed that the adult male population should elect 500,000 men from whom all the municipal officers were to be chosen. The 500,000 were to choose 50,000 who were to furnish all the officials of departments. Finally the 50,000 were to choose 5000, and these alone could fill places in the government and the legislature. The choice of all officials from these lists was vested, not in the people, but in the government, and the lists were not to be altered for ten years. As regards the legislature, Sieyès proposed to create as many bodies as there are processes in any measure. A Council of State was to initiate all laws, they were then to be discussed in a Tribunate, and finally were to be accepted or rejected without discussion in a Legislative Body. To give final security to his system and his party, a Senate, whose members held their seats for life, was to be created, with powers to veto any laws which should infringe upon the constitution. The Senate had the power of electing its own members and also those of the three legislative bodies. The executive power was to be entrusted to two Consuls, one for peace and one for war. Above them was to be a Great Elector, a purely ornamental personage, who should represent the nation in diplomatic affairs. The Great Elector nominated and dismissed the Consuls, and could himself be deposed by the senate.

This elaborate scheme seemed intended to avoid the possibility of change by putting an end to government. Every element was too weak to do anything. As Bonaparte himself described it afterwards, "Sieyès put shadows everywhere—shadow of legislative power, shadow of judicial power, shadow of a government; it required a substance somewhere." There could be no doubt as to where he would place the substance. When the scheme came up for discussion, he accepted the greater part of it with slight alteration, but scornfully swept away the Great Elector and the two Consuls. "Do you know," he said to Sieyès, "a man of mean enough character to play such an apish performance? Can you have imagined that a man with any sense of honour could resign himself to the part of a hog fattened on so many millions?" In the place of these phantom officials he established a First Consul with two colleagues. The First Consul was to have the power of making peace and war, of appointing all state officials and judges, and even of initiating laws, which were only to be drafted by the Council of State. The other two consuls, who were only put in to gratify republican prejudices, had no other function than that of advising their chief.

Thus mutilated, the Constitution of the year VIII. was accepted with hardly a murmur. Bonaparte, of course, became First Consul. As Sieyès refused a place of official impotence, the post of Second Consul was given to Cambacères, an eminent lawyer, who was always willing to serve the established government. The Third Consul was Lebrun, who had been secretary to Maupeou under Louis XV. Everything seemed to prosper well for the new organisation. The people wished for peace and order, and cared little for power. Bonaparte's absence had given him a great advantage in that he was attached to no particular party, and therefore had no professional opponents. He was wise enough to adhere to his profession that the new constitution was to end all civil conflict. Nevertheless the new government was degrading to France, and involved the destruction of all that was most healthy in the work of the Revolution. The Republic was at an end, and the era of despotism had begun.

CHAPTER XXIV.

EUROPE DURING THE AGE OF NAPOLEON.

I. THE CONSULATE.—§ 1. Internal government of France under the Consulate. § 2. Foreign politics; Campaign of 1800; battle of Marengo. § 3. Negotiations; battle of Hohenlinden; treaty of Lunéville. § 4. Armed Neutrality of the Northern Powers; bombardment of Copenhagen; assassination of Paul I. § 5. Affairs in Egypt; capitulation of the French army. § 6. Peace of Amiens. § 7. Bonaparte's despotic government; Consulate for life; Concordat and Civil Code. § 8. French aggressions in Italy, Holland, and Switzerland. § 9. Settlement of German affairs after the treaty of Lunéville. § 10. Renewal of war between England and France; occupation of Hanover by the French. § 11. Royalist conspiracy of Pichegru and Cadoudal; attempted implication of Moreau; murder of the duke of Enghien. § 12. Establishment of the Empire. II. THE THIRD COALITION.—§ 13. European relations in 1804. § 14. French aggressions; Napoleon becomes King of Italy. § 15. Formation of the third coalition. § 16. Projected invasion of England. § 17. Campaign of 1805; Ulm, Trafalgar, Austerlitz. § 18. Treaties of Schönbrunn and Pressburg. § 19. Aggrandisement of the Bonaparte family. § 20. The Confederation of the Rhine. § 21. Prussia quarrels with France. § 22. Collapse of Prussia after Jena. § 23. The Berlin Decree and the Continental System. § 24. Campaign in East Prussia; revival of the coalition. § 25. Battle of Friedland; peace of Tilsit. § 26. Affairs of Scandinavia; English fleet bombards Copenhagen; extinction of house of Vasa in Sweden. III. THE PENINSULAR WAR AND THE CAMPAIGN OF 1809 AGAINST AUSTRIA.—§ 27. French occupation of Portugal. § 28. Intervention in Spain; deposition of the Bourbons. § 29. Popular risings in Spain; capitulation of Baylen. § 30. English in Portugal; battle of Vimiera; Convention of Cintra. § 31. Prussia and the administration of Stein; revival of national spirit in Germany; Stein retires. § 32. Interview of Napoleon and Alexander I. at Erfurt. § 33. Napoleon in Spain; Sir John Moore's retreat to Corunna. § 34. Austrian war in 1809; occupation of Vienna; battles of Aspern and Wagram. § 35. Wellesley in Portugal and Spain; battle of Talavera; the English evacuate Spain. § 36. The Walcheren Expedition. § 37. Treaty of Vienna; annexation of the Papal States; of Holland; of Northern Germany. § 38. Napoleon divorces Josephine and marries the Archduchess Maria Louisa; breach with Russia. § 39. The Spanish Cortes and the new Constitution. § 40. The Peninsular War from 1810 to 1812. IV. THE WAR OF LIBERATION.—§ 41. European relations in 1811. § 42. Expedition to Moscow and disastrous retreat. § 43. Prussia breaks with France; alliance with

Russia and military preparations. § 44. Napoleon's preparations. § 45. The War of Liberation to the armistice of Poischwitz. § 46. Austria joins the coalition. § 47. Second period of the war; battle of Leipzig; Germany freed from the French. § 48. Wellington's campaign of 1813. § 49. The Allies advance to Paris; Napoleon's abdication. § 50. Restoration of the Bourbons; peace of Paris; Louis XVIII.'s Charter. V. THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA AND THE HUNDRED DAYS.—§ 51. Congress of Vienna; settlement of Europe. § 52. Napoleon leaves Elba and recovers his power in France. § 53. Murat's rising in Italy; its failure. § 54. Campaign in Belgium; Waterloo; Napoleon sent to St. Helena. § 55. Fate of Murat. § 56. The Allies again occupy Paris; Louis XVIII. restored; second peace of Paris.

I. THE CONSULATE.

§ 1. BONAPARTE lost no time in setting to work to re-organise the institutions of France. The principles which he followed were those of the old régime rather than of the constituent assembly. The excessive emphasis which had been laid upon the rights of man and the final authority of the popular will, was replaced by an absolute centralisation which Richelieu would have been proud to imitate. Every official in the commune or the department was appointed by the First Consul, and absolutely dependent upon his will. Prefects took the place of the old Intendants, and governed as despotically and effectively as their predecessors. The government of France became a vast machine, in the working of which the people had no control and desired none. It was to Bonaparte's interest to make the administration good, and he was careful in the choice of his agents. Talleyrand was minister of foreign affairs. Fouché kept the management of police, the finances were entrusted to Gaudin, military affairs to Berthier, and the home department to Lucien Bonaparte. There was great competition for places in the new legislative councils. The Senate was filled with tried adherents of Bonaparte, whose fidelity could be trusted. The Legislative Body, the dumb assembly, consisted of nobodies. The Tribunate, whose function was to discuss without being able to alter or reject, contained some brilliant names, Benjamin Constant, Chénier, Ganilh, and J. B. Say. This body, in which the voice of freedom was occasionally heard, was regarded with great jealousy by the First Consul. He did all in his power to discredit it; he made it sit in the Palais Royal, and he transferred as many of its functions as he could to the Council of State, which he intended to use as the chief instrument of his will. No one could be more keenly sensitive to hostile criticism. Not content with suppressing all the independent journals, he banished Madame de Stäel, Necker's daughter, from Paris, because her friend Constant had displeased him by a speech in the Tribunate. The abolition of the old parties, of which he made such parade, was only intended to lead to the creation of a single party, his own followers. He had not the slightest conception of justice and mercy: his one motive was calculating ambition. He offered terms to the rebels in Brittany, because he thought that their devoted courage would be useful to him. When they refused his terms, he had them hunted down like wild beasts. That he had no religious scruples had been proved by his attitude to Mohammedanism in the East, but no sooner had he risen to power than he set himself to gain over the Roman Catholic priests, because he saw that they might become the firmest bulwark of his authority.

§ 2. In foreign politics, as might be expected, Bonaparte was no less autocratic than at home. While the nation desired peace, he wished the war to continue, partly because he hoped for some great success to consolidate his power, and partly because he intended to satisfy the most pressing financial needs by the spoils of conquered nations. This organised pillage, of which he had set the first example in his Italian campaign of 1796, now becomes a definite object of the French government. In spite of these motives he could not afford to run directly counter to the popular wish, and his first act was to express a desire for peace in two letters which he sent directly to George III. and Francis II. This theatrical contempt for diplomatic forms was designed to impress the French, and was thoroughly characteristic of Bonaparte. In England, Pitt who believed France to be exhausted, and that so changeable a people would not long tolerate a military dictatorship, was determined to continue a war which seemed to him on the eve of success. In his reply he hinted at the restoration of the Bourbons as the real object of England, and this enabled Bonaparte to rouse the national wrath against foreign dictation. Austria, which was now in possession, not only of its old territories but of the Papal States and of Piedmont, was naturally unwilling to treat on the basis of Campo Formio, and replied that it could only negotiate in conjunction with its allies. Bonaparte published his own letters and the answers, and thus proved his desire for peace, while he secured the continuance of the war. Great preparations were made in France for the new campaign, which opened with more favourable prospects because Paul I., disgusted with the conduct of Austria, had practically withdrawn from the war. The command in Italy was entrusted to Masséna, who was opposed by vastly superior forces under Melas, the colleague of Suwarow at Novi. The army of the Rhine was led by Moreau. The archduke Charles, disgusted with the policy of Thugut, had retired from the Austrian command, which was entrusted to Kray, the victor of Magnano. A third French army was secretly collected in France around Dijon, but its destination was uncertain, and for a long time its very existence was doubted by the allied powers. The plan of the campaign was elaborated by Bonaparte, and with one great object, that a great blow might be struck by himself. Moreau was to cross the Rhine and drive the Austrians into the Rhine valley. But he was not to advance beyond Ulm, although a great success in Germany was almost certain to drive Austria to submission, and this could not be done by any success, however brilliant, in Italy. Masséna, for his part, was simply to make as good a stand against Melas as he could with his vastly inferior forces. Meanwhile, Bonaparte with the army of reserve, for which all supplies were carefully reserved, was to cross the Alps into Lombardy and take Melas in the rear. Surrounded and cut off from retreat, the Austrians could not possibly escape a great disaster. The plan does as much credit to Bonaparte as a strategist as it proves him to be wanting in all the qualities of a statesman or a patriot.

The first to move was Melas, who attacked the French in the Apennines, separated them by moving on the centre of their line, and drove Masséna with one division into Genoa, while the other, under Suchet, held the line of the Var. In Germany Moreau commenced to cross the Rhine on the 25th of April. By admirably calculated movements, he not only effected the crossing without loss, but within a fortnight he won five victories over Kray, who was forced to retire to Ulm (10th May). Here he was compelled, by Bonaparte's orders, to stop and remain inactive, although one energetic movement would have opened the way to Vienna. It is perfectly certain that if the Directory had given such orders to Bonaparte, he would have disobeyed them. By this time everything was ready for the First Consul, who assumed the command of the reserve army on the 8th of May. He crossed the Alps by the St. Gothardt, an exploit which, according to his flatterers, rivalled the deeds of Hannibal, but was really far less difficult and dangerous than Suwarow's march in the previous year. By the end of May all his troops were in Lombardy, and Melas, who had disbelieved all the reports about the army of reserve, found himself caught in a trap. Everybody expected that Bonaparte would at once march to the relief of Masséna, who had obeyed his orders with the greatest loyalty, and had held out with such stoicism that both garrison and citizens were reduced to the last extremities, But ambition won the day against gratitude and simple duty. Bonaparte thought only of inflicting a crushing blow upon Melas, and left Masséna to his fate. On the 4th of June Genoa was surrendered, but the besieged obtained honourable terms. Meanwhile Bonaparte had taken such elaborate precautions to prevent the escape of Melas, that he very nearly incurred a defeat. In utter ignorance of the enemy's position he arrived at Marengo near Alessandria, and sent off a large detachment under Desaix to Novi, just as Melas had made up his mind to attack the French, and to cut a retreat through them. On the 14th of June the Austrians advanced, and their superior numbers carried all before them. Melas had already retired to his tent to write the bulletin of his victory, when the return of Desaix, who had heard the sound of cannon, completely changed the fortunes of the day. A flank charge of cavalry broke the Austrian column, which fell into a sudden panic and was utterly routed. No victory was ever won more completely by chance, but Bonaparte suppressed all the true accounts of the battle, and the official bulletins attributed every success to the general's strategy. The battle of Marengo, however won, was for the moment decisive. Melas was so utterly crushed that he could not renew hostilities, and an armistice was concluded at Alessandria by which the Austrians surrendered the whole of northern Italy as far as the Mincio. Bonaparte's safe passage of the Alps removed the obstacle in the way of Moreau's advance, and the latter at once gave up an inactivity which he detested himself, and which had excited loud murmurs from his officers. Instead of directly attacking Ulm he marched beyond it, and compelled the Austrians to fight by threatening their stores at Donauwörth. A victory at Hochstett (19th June) forced Kray to evacuate Ulm and to retreat towards Bohemia. Moreau took Munich a week later, and then concluded a suspension of hostilities.

§ 3. After concluding the convention of Alessandria, Bonaparte handed over the Italian army to Masséna and returned to Paris. The temporary cessation of the war was occupied in negotiations. France had contrived to gain over two valuable allies. Paul I. of Russia, whose foreign policy was as insane as his domestic government, was now wholly estranged from Austria, and had conceived an enthusiastic admiration for the First Consul, in whom he saw the real destroyer of the revolution and the champion of absolutism in Western Europe. Bonaparte took care to encourage this feeling by sending back without ransom 6000 Russian prisoners. No definite treaty was concluded, but an understanding was arrived at that peace should be made between Russia and France on condition that Malta and Piedmont should be restored to the Knights of St. John and to the King of Sardinia respectively. Bonaparte had no intention of fulfilling these conditions, but he had no scruples about making promises which would gain so valuable an ally. More distinct was the agreement with Spain, where Bonaparte had obtained a complete ascendancy over Godoy, "the Prince of Peace" and the all-powerful minister of Charles IV. Spain restored Louisiana, which had once been a French colony, and France secretly undertook to give Tuscany, with the title of king, to the duke of Parma, who had married Charles IV.'s daughter. It was not felt as an objection to this treacherous bargain that France had no right over Tuscany, not even that of conquest. In spite of these successes, no progress was made in the negotiations with England and Austria. England could not make peace until affairs were settled in Egypt. Austria had not been seriously weakened by the defeat at Marengo, and was inclined to resent the terms that had been extorted from Melas. Only a few days after the battle Thugut was able to effect the last triumph of his policy, and concluded a new subsidy treaty with England (20 June), by which Austria was pledged not to make a separate peace before February, 1801. In spite of this the negotiations went on, and a prolongation of the armistice was purchased by the cession of Ulm, Philipsburg, and Ingolstadt. A diplomatic conference was opened at Lunéville, at which Cobenzl represented Austria, and Joseph Bonaparte France. But the only object of the Viennese government was to gain time, and a definite refusal to treat apart from England compelled a resumption of hostilities. Moreau, who had received reinforcements, was opposed by the archduke Joseph, over whom he won a crushing victory at Hohenlinden (3 December). The French were advancing towards Vienna, when the archduke Charles, who had superseded his brother, solicited and obtained an armistice at Steyer (25 December). Meanwhile Macdonald, at the head of a detachment of the army of Italy, had accomplished the marvellous feat of crossing the Splügen in the middle of winter. He had already driven the Austrians back to Botzen when he was stopped by the conclusion of the armistice.

The battle of Hohenlinden hurried on the work of the diplomatists at Lunéville, which was also facilitated by the downfall of Thugut and the appointment to the ministry of foreign affairs of Cobenzl, the negotiator of Campio Formio. That treaty was taken as the basis of the new peace, which was signed on the 9th of February, 1801. France recovered its old possessions in Italy with the Adige as their eastern boundary, and its hold upon Holland, Belgium, and the left bank of the Rhine was once more confirmed. The only difference was that, in accordance with the agreement with Spain, Tuscany was transferred to the duke of Parma. The dispossessed princes of Germany and the grand-duke of Tuscany were to receive such compensation for their losses as should be approved by France. The restoration of French power in Italy implied the submission of Naples. But the intervention of Paul I. preserved that throne to the Bourbons, and Ferdinand IV. obtained peace on easy terms by engaging to close his ports against English vessels.

§ 4. England was now isolated in Europe, and had to face other enemies besides France. Great discontent was aroused by the right of search, and by the high-handed way in which England seized upon the commodities which neutral powers were carrying to France. Paul I. was bitterly exasperated by the refusal of England to surrender Malta to the Knights Hospitallers, of which order he had been elected grand master. To show his anger, he revived the Armed Neutrality of the northern powers, which Catharine II. had formed in 1780. A treaty was signed between Russia, Sweden and Denmark on the 16th of December, 1800, and was soon afterwards joined by Prussia, which had remained neutral since the treaty of Basel. The contracting powers announced their intention to resist by force English interference with their commerce. England was at this time occupied with a ministerial crisis. Pitt had in 1800 carried his great measure, the Union between England and Ireland, and had purchased the consent of the Irish by a promise to repeal the oppressive penal laws against the Roman Catholics. The king's obstinate orthodoxy made him unable to fulfil this promise, and at the beginning of 1801 he resigned his office to the feeble hands of Addington. But the retirement of the great minister made no difference to the spirit with which the war was carried on. Determined not to sacrifice the advantages of maritime ascendancy, the government treated the Armed Neutrality as a declaration of war, and sent a fleet under Parker and Nelson into the Baltic. On the 2nd of April, Nelson bombarded Copenhagen and compelled the Danes to retire from the league. He was on his way to attack Russia when he received news which altered the whole aspect of affairs. Paul I.'s insane government had excited universal discontent in Russia, and a conspiracy was formed among the courtiers, to which his son Alexander was privy, for the Czar's deposition. But deposition in Russia involves assassination, and Alexander I. found himself raised to a throne the way to which was prepared by parricide (23 March). This event broke up the Armed Neutrality. Peace was made between England and Russia, in which the points at dispute were compromised. England retained the right of confiscating merchandise intended for France, but agreed that the presence of a man-of-war should protect neutral vessels from privateers, and that a blockade should not be recognised unless it were effective.

§ 5. England and France were both desirous of peace, to which only one serious obstacle now remained, the war in Egypt. By a sort of tacit agreement, negotiations were suspended until that quarrel should be settled by arms. After Bonaparte's desertion, Kleber saw clearly that all chance of a permanent occupation was at an end, and offered to arrange an evacuation with Sir Sidney Smith. On the 24th of February a convention was signed at El Arish by which the French army was to be allowed a free return. At this moment instructions arrived from England that no treaty should be made unless the French laid down their arms. Sir Sydney Smith was compelled to recall the convention, and Kleber at once gave battle to the Turks at Heliopolis, where 10,000 men utterly routed 80,000. The French had recovered Cairo, and seemed more secure in Egypt than ever, when Kleber was assassinated by an obscure fanatic. The command was transferred to Menou, the most incompetent general that France produced during the revolutionary epoch, who had shown such enthusiasm for the Egyptian expedition that he had become a convert to Islam. An English army now landed in Egypt under Sir Ralph Abercromby, and speedily decided the campaign. Before Alexandria (21 March) the English won a complete victory, in which Abercromby was killed, and forced Menou and his army to seek refuge in the city. In June the French garrison surrendered Cairo, and in August the arrival of troops from India compelled Menou to capitulate at Alexandria.

§ 6. The last obstacle to peace was now removed, and on the 1st of October preliminaries were signed in London. England restored all its conquests with the exception of Trinidad and Ceylon. Egypt was to return to the Porte, and Malta to the Order of St. John. On the other hand, France was to evacuate Naples and the Papal States, and the Ionian Islands were to be formed into a republic. The agreement was welcomed with enthusiasm by the English people, but there were many clear-headed men who had watched the career of Bonaparte, and foresaw that his ambition would not be content with what he had already gained. Their misgivings were justified by the high-handed way in which a constitution, designed in French interests, was forced upon the unwilling peoples of Holland and the Cisalpine Republic. The government, however, was anxious to conciliate public opinion, and disguised the resentment which was felt at these acts of aggression. The final treaty was signed at Amiens on the 27th of March, 1802. Europe was to enjoy a short period of peace. But it was soon evident that the peace was a hollow one, that most of the real grounds of quarrel had been omitted, rather than settled, and that nothing but new exertions could check the aggressions of France.

§ 7. Meanwhile the internal government of France, still nominally republican, was becoming more and more centralised to suit the will of the First Consul, who steadily aimed at the establishment of despotism. He took up his residence in the Tuileries, and did all in his power to revive the forms of the old court. In this way many of the emigrants were attracted back to France, where they were received with great favour. No pains were spared to gain over the royalists, and to destroy the republicans, and the hypocritical pretext was always advanced, that arbitrary measures were needed to protect "liberty and equality," and to uphold the principles of the revolution. In December, 1800, as Bonaparte was on the way to the opera, he narrowly escaped from the explosion of an infernal machine. This incident was at once employed to carry out his purposes. To avoid judicial forms the Senate was induced to issue a decree—which was not one of its functions—by which 130 Jacobins were condemned to exile. It was afterwards proved that the attempted assassination was the work of a few Chouans, and that the Jacobins were perfectly innocent; but the difficulty was got rid of by altering the terms of the decree so as to show that the sentence was for their previous conduct. The slightest breath of opposition threw the First Consul into a fury, and to remove the insignificant checks that were imposed upon his power he did not scruple to infringe the constitution. The justices of the peace, the most healthy and independent class of officials, were deprived of their most important functions and diminished in number. Perhaps no law is more characteristic of Bonaparte's system than that which established special tribunals. By this the government could, in political and other cases, dispense with the course of ordinary justice, and conduct the trial by a tribunal consisting of three judges, members of the criminal court, three officers, and two assessors. As the last five were nominated by the First Consul, it is obvious that he could ensure the decision that he wished. The law was strenuously opposed in the Tribunate, there was not a single valid argument in its favour, but so strong was the government influence that it was carried by forty-nine votes to forty-one. This futile resistance was enough to exasperate Bonaparte, and the criticism of some details in his new code induced him to take active measures against a body which dared to express an opinion of its own. By the constitution a ninth of the members of the Tribunate had to retire every year, and the individuals were usually chosen by lot. On the suggestion of Cambacérès, Bonaparte decided that the retiring members should be nominated by the Senate, and thus got rid of all those who had shown the slightest independence. The Legislative Body was "purged" in the same way, and henceforth the two assemblies were submissive instruments.

These open advances of despotism were simply disregarded by the great mass of Frenchmen, who had ceased to take any interest in politics. The few sincere republicans, such as Lafayette, who had recovered freedom by the treaty of Campo Formio, and Moreau, the victor of Hohenlinden, felt resistance to be vain, and retired into private life. A vigilant police, organised by Fouché, carried espionage to lengths which had been unknown under the old régime. At the back of the government was the irresistible force of the army, which was increased by a system of constant recruiting. And the First Consul found new and very powerful allies in the clergy. Himself a sceptic, he fully appreciated the importance of religion as a political lever, and determined to use it for his own ends. In spite of the traditions of the revolution and the repugnance of many of his supporters, he opened negotiations with the Pope, which ended in the conclusion of the Concordat (April, 1802). By this, the Roman Catholic religion, which was already freed, became once more the state religion. Archbishops and bishops were nominated by the First Consul and confirmed by the Pope; appointments to benefices were made by the bishops and approved by the First Consul. To clear away disputes between non-jurors and clergy who had accepted the civil constitution, all existing bishops were removed, but most of them were re-appointed. The Concordat gave considerable immediate advantages to Bonaparte, as the clergy were strictly subordinated to the state and became its willing vassals. But in the end it was the church which reaped the greatest advantage, and from this time we may trace the rise of modern ultramontanism in France. Next to the Concordat, the most important of Bonaparte's permanent measures was the promulgation of the famous *Code Napoléon.* Though it has been called after him, he was not the real originator of this reform. The Constituent Assembly had commenced the work, and the Convention made great strides towards its completion, but, after being interrupted by the Directory, it was resumed and finished in the time of the Consulate. Bonaparte's personal share in it was limited to the alteration of several articles, such as those about divorce, to suit his own special needs. The Code was finally issued in March, 1804.

The conclusion of the peace of Amiens, and the general joy with which it was welcomed, seemed to offer a convenient opportunity for obtaining a more definite sanction for a power which was already great enough for all practical purposes. The Senate, as usual, took the lead in servility, but Bonaparte's real aims were so little understood, that they only offered him a renewal of the Consulate for ten years. Enraged at this paltry gift, yet afraid of compromising himself by seeming to demand what was not offered, Bonaparte adroitly contrived to suggest an appeal to the people, and the question put to the vote was not the Consulate for ten years but for life. To make the matter simpler all votes not given were reckoned as being in the affirmative. The result of the scrutiny (August, 1802) was that out of 3,577,885 voters only 9,626 were against the proposal. Among the minority was Carnot, who had compromised himself by accepting one of the places in the Tribunate vacated by the "purging," but who began to return to the republican cause as its prospects appeared hopeless. After the *plébiscite* a number of changes were made in the constitution. The First Consul was authorised to nominate his successor, and his two colleagues were also to hold office for life. The powers of the Senate were increased, but it was not allowed to meet without a summons from the First Consul. The Tribunate was reduced to fifty members, and from this time lost all independence and importance. Bonaparte was never tired of repeating that the French must be ruled through their vanity, and to conciliate this he caused the formation of the famous *Legion of Honour*, which was to contain 6000 members, civilians as well as soldiers, with the First Consul as their Chief. By the end of 1802 the government of France had become practically monarchical, a change of title was alone needed to put an end to the Republic.

§ 8. During the interval of peace that followed the treaty of Amiens, Bonaparte continued to excite the misgivings of Europe by his high-handed treatment of the lesser states whom misfortune had brought into dependence on France. The Batavian Republic had been organised in October, 1801, and the Dutch were too lethargic to make any opposition. In January, 1802, the Cisalpine became the Italian Republic, and the deputies, assembled at Lyons, were forced to offer the Presidency to Bonaparte. Switzerland could not be treated quite so despotically, so the First Consul encouraged the disputes of rival factions, then interfered as "mediator," and in that capacity established the Helvetic Republic. To secure dependence upon France the federal government was rendered powerless, and extreme independence was granted to the separate cantons, whose number was increased to nineteen. Piedmont, in spite of the representations of England and Holland, was definitely annexed to France (Sept. 1802), and the island of Elba shared the same fate. To get rid of Moreau's army, which shared the independent spirit of its general, and at the same time to revive the colonial power of France, Bonaparte dispatched an expedition to St. Domingo, where the negroes, enfranchised by the Revolution, had been organised under a regular government by one of themselves, Toussaint l'Ouverture. Toussaint was sent a prisoner to France, but most of the troops perished from the unhealthiness of the climate.

§ 9. At the same time the power of France was immensely increased by the settlement of imperial affairs in Germany. The treaty of Lunéville had arranged that the dispossessed princes on the left bank of the Rhine should receive compensation for their losses elsewhere. In 1801 the diet met at Ratisbon to carry out this article, but the real settlement was effected by private agreement of the various German states with France. To strengthen himself, and to conciliate a possible enemy, Bonaparte called in Alexander I. of Russia to assist in the mediation. It was not till March, 1803, that all these various arrangements were collected and promulgated by the diet. Thanks to the grasping ambition of Austria and Prussia, and the unpatriotic greed of the lesser states, France was able to effect a settlement which destroyed all prospect of a national union of Germany, and ensured the permanence of French influence in the country. The material for compensation was found in the territories of the ecclesiastical princes and of the free cities. All the clerical states were secularised, and forty-four out of the fifty cities of the empire were suppressed. Austria, as the most powerful rival of France, was excluded from all share of the spoil, and Prussia was only allowed to increase its territory in the north. Bonaparte's policy was to lean upon the lesser states, Baden, Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Saxony. As these princes were related by marriage to the Czar, their advancement was not only a real gain for France, but a graceful compliment to Alexander.

These changes were not only important to the policy of Bonaparte, they also exercised a permanent effect upon the future of Germany. The balance of power in the Empire was completely changed, the Roman Catholics lost their predominance, and the imperial sovereignty of the Hapsburgs became more nominal than ever. The number of Electors had been eight since the union of Bavaria with the Palatinate in 1777. By the change of 1803 the archbishops of Trier and Cologne disappeared, and their places were taken by Baden, Würtemberg, Hesse-Cassel, and Salzburg, so that the number was now ten. It was in the Chamber of Princes that Austria had so long held the upper hand, and it was through this body that the emperors had been able to control the diet. All this was altered in 1803, the number of votes was diminished from 100 to 82, and though 26 of these belonged nominally to spiritual princes, they were really held by the possessors of secularised territory. The Chamber of Imperial Cities disappeared altogether. Whereas in the old diet the Roman Catholics had had a secure majority, this was now reversed, and the Protestants could command fifty votes as against thirty. This was another blow to Austrian influence. The foundations of the old Empire, long undermined, were now overthrown, and Bonaparte was already meditating the construction of a new edifice.

§ 10. The annexation of Piedmont and the intervention in Switzerland were breaches of the treaty of Amiens, and called forth indignant remonstrances from the English government. But Bonaparte was determined to exclude England from Continental affairs, and he replied by incessant complaints of the freedom of the press in this country, and the way in which the French government was attacked in the newspapers. A stronger ministry would have resorted to hostilities at once, but Addington was so anxious to maintain peace that he tried to satisfy the Consul by prosecuting for libel the editor of a French paper in London. Malta had not yet been given up on account of difficulties which had arisen about the proposed Russian guarantee, and England threatened its retention unless France surrendered some of its recent acquisitions. The appearance in the *Moniteur*, the French official paper, of a report upon the resources of Egypt brought matters to a crisis (January, 1803), and Bonaparte publicly insulted the English envoy, Lord Whitworth. At last the English government presented an ultimatum, in which was demanded the evacuation of Holland and Switzerland, an indemnity for the king of Sardinia, and that England should occupy Malta for ten years. Bonaparte refused these terms, and when war was declared on the 18th of May, he promptly imprisoned all the Englishmen that were found in France.

This war, which continued without intermission till 1814, was at first purely naval, as England had no allies on the Continent. English vessels seized the French colonies, of which Louisiana had just been sold to the United States. Bonaparte replied by closing all the ports of France and the subject states against English goods, and by making vast preparations on the northern coast which were supposed to be destined for an invasion of England. But as such an enterprise required time and its success was doubtful, Bonaparte decided to attack George III. through his German electorate. A French army under Mortier entered Hanover (May, 1803) and occupied the province without difficulty. This act was in direct defiance of the treaty of Basel, which had guaranteed the neutrality of the northern states of Germany. If Frederick William II. had been alive it is probable that Prussia would have taken up arms to avenge this insult. But he had died in 1797 and his son and successor, Frederick William III., under the influence of Haugwitz, had adopted as a permanent policy the neutrality which exhaustion had forced upon his father. After some futile negotiations, Prussia adhered to that inactivity which was destined before long to receive a terrible punishment.

§ 11. The renewal of the English war encouraged the royalists to resume their schemes for a Bourbon restoration. A plot was concerted in which the chief movers were Georges Cadoudal, the Chouan leader, and Pichegru, the renegade general of the Republic. Cadoudal was to organise active measures for seizing the First Consul, while Pichegru was to gain over all who were discontented with the existing system. Great hopes were felt of obtaining the assistance of Moreau, who had been an intimate friend of Pichegru and was known to have quarrelled with Bonaparte. When everything was prepared, the Count of Artois was to appear in France and to take the lead of the movement. From a very early period every detail of the plot was known to the police, but they were instructed to allow matters to go on until all Bonaparte's enemies were compromised and a decisive blow could be struck. Cadoudal and Pichegru both arrived in Paris, and the latter had an interview with Moreau, who refused to be made a tool of the Bourbons, but promised not to betray his old colleague. At last, in February, 1804, the government determined on action. Moreau was arrested, and at short intervals Pichegru and Cadoudal with a number of their accomplices. But Bonaparte was not satisfied until he had obtained possession of a Bourbon prince. He wished to give a signal example of the vengeance he would take upon his enemies. Vain efforts were made to allure the Count of Artois to follow his fellow conspirators, and a new victim had to be found. On the 15th of March a detachment of French troops made a raid into Germany and captured the duke of Enghien, son of the prince of Condé, who was living at Ettenheim, near Strasburg. There was not a tittle of evidence to connect him with the royalist plot, but he was brought to Vincennes, where his grave had been already dug, and after a hasty trial before a military commission was shot. All Europe stood aghast at this atrocious deed, and the fate of the other prisoners was watched with eager solicitude. Pichegru was found strangled in prison, Cadoudal, with several others, was executed, but Moreau, to Bonaparte's intense indignation, was only sentenced to two years' imprisonment. The charges against him had in fact broken down, and his only real crime was that he refused absolute submission to the Consul, and that he was the only man whose reputation and ability made him a possible rival. His sentence was altered by Bonaparte to perpetual exile, and he sailed to America.

§ 12. In France terror stifled the feelings of horror and sympathy which Enghien's murder would naturally have aroused, and Bonaparte was able to utilise this carefully managed plot to attain the great object of his ambition. Together with the congratulations that were showered upon him for his escape came suggestions that France should be saved from similar attempts in the future by the establishment of a permanent form of government. The Tribunate took the lead in proposing that hereditary rule should be conferred upon Bonaparte with the title of emperor. Only one voice, that of Carnot, was raised against the insidious proposal. In the Senate there were four malcontents, who included Sieyès and Lanjuinais. The proffered title was at once accepted by Napoleon, as he henceforth styles himself. The form of taking a popular vote was adhered to, but so little attention was paid to it that the formal proclamation was issued before the voting had commenced (20 May). Napoleon's family now obtained formal recognition. In default of male heirs to himself the empire was to pass to his brothers Joseph and Louis, who obtained the title of Imperial Highnesses. The other two brothers, Lucien and Jerome, were passed over because they had incurred Napoleon's displeasure. Sixteen marshals were created, and included the chief followers of Bonaparte, Murat, Berthier, etc. Cambacères and Le Brun, hitherto colleagues in the Consulate, received the titles of arch-chancellor and arch-treasurer. These and others forms were borrowed from Germany, and Napoleon loved to pose as a new Charlemagne, who had once more brought the imperial dignity from the east to the west. The coronation did not take place till the 2nd of December, when the Pope, Pius VII., was induced to be present in person. But his share in the ceremony was but small, as at the last moment Napoleon seized the crown and placed it upon his own head. The chief result of the pope's visit was that he compelled Napoleon to go through the forms of a religious marriage with his wife Josephine, whom he was already thinking of repudiating. The Bonaparte family, especially the emperor's three sisters, were bitterly hostile to the empress and to her two children by her first husband, Eugène and Hortense Beauharnais. The latter was married to Louis Bonaparte and was treated by her husband with jealous cruelty. The court history of the Empire is full of the ignoble squabbles between the two parvenu families of Bonaparte and Beauharnais

II. THE THIRD COALITION.

§ 13. In France the establishment of the Empire was regarded with complacency. The government was already as despotic as it could be, and the introduction of a new name and of the forms of court life was looked upon as a security for the continuance of that material welfare which personal rule had undoubtedly given to the country. But in Europe the change was rightly regarded as marking the complete destruction of the old system, and it strengthened the antipathy that had been roused by previous aggressions. Externally the state of affairs seemed favourable to the new dynasty, but there were not wanting signs of approaching disturbance. In England Pitt returned to office in May, 1804, and this in itself was an evil omen for France. He enjoyed the confidence, not only of his own nation but of Europe, and he at once set to work to resume the threads of that coalition of which England had formerly directed the resources. Alexander I. of Russia had begun to see through the designs of Napoleon; he found that he had been duped in the joint mediation in Germany, he resented the occupation of Hanover, and he ordered his court to put on mourning for the duke of Enghien. Before long he broke off diplomatic relations with France (Sept. 1804), and a Russian war was now only a question of time. Austria was the power most closely affected by Napoleon's assumption of the imperial title. The old Holy Roman Empire could hardly continue to exist by the side of a younger and hardier rival. But Austria was not yet prepared for hostilities, and Francis II. contented himself with securing his own dignity against probable contingencies. On the 10th of September he assumed the title of "Hereditary Emperor of Austria," so that if his old rank had to be abandoned he would still be on an equality with the rulers of France and Russia. But this was not intended as the basis of a permanent reconciliation. While hastening to acknowledge Napoleon, Austria was busied in military preparations and began to resume its old connection with England. Prussia was the power on which France was accustomed to rely with implicit confidence. But the occupation of Hanover and the interference with the commerce of the Elbe had weakened Frederick William III.'s belief in the advantages of a neutral policy, and, though he could not make up his mind to definite action, he began to open negotiations with Russia in view of a rupture with France. The fluctuations of Prussian policy may be followed in the alternating influence of the two ministers of foreign affairs, Haugwitz and Hardenberg.

§ 14. Meanwhile Napoleon, ignorant or reckless of the growing hostility of the great powers, continued his aggressions at the expense of the lesser states. After visiting the enormous army which had been collected at Boulogne, he made a triumphal progress through Belgium to the Rhenish provinces, where he laid the foundations of that Confederation of the Rhine which was to be called into existence two years later. The vassal states found that they must once more model their institutions upon those of France. The Batavian Republic was reorganised and placed under the rule of a Grand Pensionary, Schimmelpenninck, whose authority was to pave the way for a monarchy (March, 1805). Italy, being more servile, was treated with less caution. The heads of the Italian Republic found it advisable to petition for the formation of the state into a kingdom, and offered the crown to Napoleon himself. The offer was accepted, and on the 26th of May Napoleon placed the iron crown of Lombardy upon his own head. Genoa was annexed to France and its territory divided into three departments. Parma and Piacenza were incorporated with the Italian kingdom. Piombino and Lucca were combined to form a principality for Napoleon's sister Eliza and her husband, the Corsican Bacciocni. Naples was treated with a harshness that portended the speedy overthrow of the Bourbon dynasty. After settling affairs in his new kingdom and introducing the new code and other French institutions, Napoleon appointed his step-son, Eugène Beauharnais, to act as viceroy, and returned to France.

§ 15. These acts gave the final impulse to the hostile powers, and before Napoleon quitted Italy the coalition had been formed. On the 11th of April, 1805, a final treaty was signed between Russia and England. The two powers pledged themselves to form an European league against France, to conclude no peace without mutual consent, to settle disputed points in a congress at the end of the war, and to form a federal tribunal for the maintenance of the system which should then be established. The immediate objects of the allies were the abolition of French rule in Italy, Holland, Switzerland, and Hanover; the restoration of Piedmont to the king of Sardinia; the protection of Naples; and the erection of a permanent barrier against France by the union of Holland and Belgium under the House of Orange. The coalition was at once joined by Gustavus IV. of Sweden, who inherited his father's devotion to the cause of legitimate monarchy, and who hoped to recover power in Pomerania. Austria, terrified for its Italian possessions by Bonaparte's evident intention to subdue the whole peninsula, was driven into the league. Prussia, in spite of the attraction of recovering honour and independence, refused to listen to the solicitations of England and Russia, and adhered to its feeble neutrality. Of the other German states Bavaria, Baden, and Wurtemberg were allies of France. As far as effective operations were concerned, the coalition consisted only of Austria and Russia. Sweden and Naples, which had joined secretly, could not make efforts on a great scale, and England was as yet content with providing subsidies and the invaluable services of its fleet. It was arranged that one Austrian army under the archduke Charles should invade Lombardy, while Mack, with a second army and the aid of Russia, should occupy Bavaria and advance upon the Rhine.

§ 16. Without paying any apparent attention to the storm that was gathering in the east, Napoleon seemed to have at last determined on carrying out the projected invasion of England. To ensure a successful passage it was necessary to have the whole naval force of France at hand, and, if possible, to secure the absence of the English fleet. Napoleon, in spite of his ignorance of maritime war, mapped out a regular campaign, and might have been successful but that no allowance was made for accident. Admiral Villeneuve was ordered to sail with the Toulon squadron to the West Indies so as to entice Nelson in pursuit. As soon as the English fleet was well out of the way, he was to sail back with all possible speed and raise the blockade of Brest. That done, the French would be masters of the Channel, and a calm for twelve hours would bring them to the English coast. Napoleon had forced Spain into a new treaty (Dec. 1804) by which he could command the services of thirty Spanish vessels. The first part of the programme was successfully accomplished. Nelson was drawn to the West Indies, and while he was pursuing the French there, they were in full sail for Europe. But though Nelson discovered his error too late to arrive in time, a swift brig brought the news to the English government, and when Villeneuve arrived off Cape Finisterre he found Calder waiting for him with fifteen ships. The battle was not in itself very decisive, but it was enough to ruin Napoleon's grand scheme. Villeneuve was shut out from the Channel and retired to Cadiz, the blockade of Brest was continued, and all possibility of a French invasion of England was at an end.

§ 17. It was probably fortunate for Napoleon that the enterprise was thus foiled at the start. He must have found more difficulty in conquering England than he had anticipated, and during his absence France would have been left to the mercy of Austria and Russia. So obvious are these considerations that his admirers have maintained that the project of invasion was a mere feint, and that the troops collected at Boulogne were never to act except against Austria. Documentary evidence makes this incredible, but it is certain that Napoleon was fully prepared for failure, and that he changed the destination of his army with a promptness that would have been impossible if the necessity had not been foreseen. He determined to crush the coalition before it had time to form itself. On the 1st of September the camp at Boulogne was broken up, and by the end of the month the "grand army" was in the Danube valley. The Austrians had begun the campaign by a leisurely occupation of Bavaria, so as to give the Russians time to join them. Mack had reached Ulm before he received any news of Napoleon's movements, or even knew that he had left the coast. The French had met with no opposition in the territories of Baden and Würtemberg, and had marched to the north of Ulm so as to cut off the Austrian retreat. At the same time the troops which had occupied Hanover marched in a parallel line under Bernadotte and joined the main army. Mack found himself hopelessly shut in, and on the 20th of October he was compelled to capitulate with all his troops. No such rapid and unexpected blow had ever been struck before, and it proved the utter folly of opposing to the genius of Bonaparte a respectable and learned strategist like Mack. But on the very next day France suffered a blow no less severe. Villeneuve had at last ventured out of Cadiz and Nelson destroyed the combined French and Spanish fleets at Trafalgar (21 October). The English admiral fell in the battle that set the seal upon his glory and really completed the work for which he had lived. The maritime power of France was utterly crushed, and England was secure from any possibility of invasion. Napoleon had no means left of attacking the power which was the real leader of the opposition to his ambition, except by excluding English commerce from every country that he could influence. And this policy ultimately defeated its own ends, because it increased the sufferings of the subject peoples, and led them to welcome any deliverance from so oppressive a yoke.

The capitulation of Ulm altered the whole character of the war. The advanced guard of the Russians, which Kutusow had already brought as far as the Inn, was compelled to retreat to join Alexander I. and the main army. The archduke John evacuated the Tyrol, and the archduke Charles, who had already commenced a campaign in Italy against Masséna, had to return to Hungary. Meanwhile the road to Vienna was left open to the French. Francis II. went to join the Czar, and Murat with his cavalry, after taking the bridge over the Danube by a dishonourable stratagem, occupied the Austrian capital on the 13th of November. Napoleon stayed for a short time at Schönbrunn and then marched to meet the enemy in Bohemia, where he took up his quarters at

Brünn. The coalition had recently been encouraged by the adhesion of a new member. Bernadotte's division, on its march from Hanover, had coolly violated the neutrality of Prussia by passing through the territory of Anspach. This insult was too much even for Frederick William III., and he at last yielded to the entreaties of the war party at Berlin. The catastrophe at Ulm rather cooled the ardour of the Prussian government, but a personal visit of Alexander effected the conclusion of the treaty of Potsdam (3 November). Prussia undertook to demand from Napoleon the evacuation of Piedmont, Switzerland, and Holland. But a month was to be allowed for negotiations; if at the end of that time the demands were refused, Prussia was to occupy Hanover and to send an army to aid the coalition. Haugwitz was entrusted with the negotiation, which he conducted with a half-hearted tardiness which testified to his disapproval of the abandonment of neutrality. The treaty with Prussia was a strong argument for the allies to delay their attack, and if they had done so, it is probable that Napoleon would have been unable to maintain a position so far from his own country. The eager courage of the Czar and his officers refused to listen to the dictates of policy, and they determined to give battle on the ground which Napoleon had himself chosen before Brünn. At Austerlitz the "battle of the three emperors" took place on the 2nd of December. In spite of the superior numbers of the assailants, the admirable tactics of the French gave them the most complete victory that had been won in the whole course of European wars. The Russians, who had suffered enormous losses, promptly retreated homewards, and Francis II. was compelled, two days after the battle, to accept an armistice which was a virtual surrender. The army of the archduke Charles was still intact in Hungary, but Austria had suffered two such crushing blows that resistance was no longer thought of. The coalition was prostrate at the feet of France, and its author, Pitt, already stricken by disease, could not survive the news of Austerlitz. He died on the 23rd of January, 1806, and the government fell into the hands of his old rival, Fox, who strove to obliterate party differences by forming the "ministry of all the talents."

§ 18. The presentation of the Prussian demands to Napoleon, and the union of Prussia with the coalition were now equally out of the question. But no one was prepared for the humiliating treaty which Haugwitz was bullied into signing at Schönbrunn (15 Dec.) without being allowed time to consult the home government. By this the principality of Neufchâtel and the remaining portion of the duchy of Cleve were ceded to France, Anspach was given up to Bavaria, and Prussia was formally allied with France. In return

Prussia was to receive Hanover with the obligation to exclude English vessels from the harbours of the North Sea. The news of these shameful conditions arrived like a thunderbolt in Berlin, where negotiations were being carried on for the receipt of an English subsidy. But it was too late to make an effective protest, and Frederick William III. was compelled to ratify the act of his envoy, though he tried to persuade England that the occupation of Hanover was only a temporary measure until a final peace could be arranged.

Still more shameful were the terms which Napoleon dictated through Talleyrand to the Austrian plenipotentiaries at Pressburg, and which were hurriedly accepted in the feverish desire to rid the country of its hated conquerors. By this treaty, which was signed on the 26th of December, Francis II. recognised Napoleon's kingdom of Italy, and increased it by the surrender of Venice and the district which had been given to Austria at Campo Formio and Lunéville. In Germany even greater sacrifices had to be made to the French allies. Bavaria received the Tyrol with a considerable part of the border territories of Austria. The outlying provinces of the Hapsburgs in western Germany, from which the family had originally sprung, were divided between Baden and Würtemberg. All imperial authority over these three states was abandoned; the electors of Bavaria and Würtemberg were raised to the rank of kings; the elector of Baden assumed the title of grand-duke. Never had "fortunate" Austria been called upon to make such enormous sacrifices. In Italy, where the Hapsburgs had long been the dominant power, they had not a single fief left. The treaty deprived them of nearly three million subjects and a revenue of thirteen million gulden. The headship of the Empire, which the Hapsburgs had held since 1438, with the one interval of Charles VII.'s reign, was no longer of any value even as a title, and before long was formally resigned.

§ 19. The brilliance and completeness of his success seem to have turned Napoleon's head. From this time he is possessed with the chimerical idea of forming an empire which should dominate the whole of Europe through a long chain of dependent kingdoms and principalities. The model which he followed was his own conception of the feudal system, and the first step towards the realisation of his scheme was to find thrones for the members of his family, as the Hapsburgs and Bourbons had done in the past. He first turned his attention to Naples, which had incurred his enmity by joining the coalition. On the day after the treaty of Pressburg a proclamation was drawn up at Vienna which declared that the Neapolitan dynasty had ceased to reign. A French army was despatched to carry out this imperious decree, and for the second time Ferdinand IV. and his wife were compelled to fly from their kingdom. Joseph Bonaparte was proclaimed king of the two Sicilies on the 1st of April. But his power was limited to Naples, as the presence of an English fleet made it impossible for the French to cross the straits of Messina into Sicily. Soon afterwards Holland received a monarchical constitution, with Louis Bonaparte and Hortense Beauharnais as king and queen (June, 1806). Joachim Murat, the dashing cavalry officer who had married Caroline Bonaparte, received the duchy of Berg, and Neufchâtel was given to Berthier as the husband of a sister-in-law of Joseph Bonaparte. While he thus distributed states at his will, Napoleon suppressed one of the last relics of the revolution in France by abolishing the republican calendar on the 1st of January, 1806. Jerome Bonaparte, who had incurred his brother's displeasure by marrying an American lady, was restored to favour on separating from his wife, raised to the princely rank, and re-married to a daughter of the elector of Würtemberg. Eugène Beauharnais, the viceroy of Italy, was betrothed to a daughter of the king of Bavaria. Out of the Venetian states twelve ducal fiefs were carved for Napoleon's marshals.

§ 20. Of more permanent importance was Napoleon's settlement of Germany, which was arranged by Talleyrand in private negotiation with the German princes. The Confederation of the Rhine was formally proclaimed on the 12th of July, 1806. By this act the kings of Bavaria and Würtemberg, the archbishop of Mainz, the grand-duke of Baden, and eight lesser princes were declared to be separated from the empire and formed into a federation under the protection of France. Dalberg, the archbishop of Mainz, and hitherto the arch-chancellor of Germany, who had taken the lead in the negotiations with Talleyrand, was appointed prince-primate of the Confederation. Frankfort was made the capital of the league, and there the diet was to meet and all federal business was to be transacted. The German knights or *ritterschaft*, the lesser tenants-in-chief of the empire, were now abolished. Their territories were declared to be *mediatised*, i.e. annexed to the larger provinces in which they were situated. The members of the Confederation were pledged to support the French emperor in all his wars with 70,000 troops. Austria, the titular leader of Germany, was powerless to resist the thinly-veiled domination of France, and on the 6th of August the Roman Emperor, Francis II., became Francis I., Emperor of Austria. An institution which could trace its history back to Julius Cæsar was overthrown by the will of a Corsican usurper.

§ 21. But there was one state which even more than Austria might be regarded as the champion of German independence. In spite of the miserable part which Prussia had played for the last ten years, the traditions of the great Frederick had not been wholly forgotten. An enthusiastic war-party at Berlin was headed by the popular queen, Louisa of Mecklenburg-Strelitz, and by Prince Lewis Ferdinand, a nephew of Frederick II. This party had succeeded in bringing about the treaty of Potsdam, but the hopes then excited had been dashed to the ground by the battle of Austerlitz and the miserable treaty which Haugwitz had accepted at Schönbrunn. Since then Napoleon had treated Prussia almost as a vassal state. He adroitly involved her in a quarrel with England by the cession of Hanover. To lull suspicion he suggested the formation of a North-German Confederation under Prussian headship, and then interposed obstacles which made it impossible. The Rhenish Confederation was organised without the slightest pretence of consulting Prussia. These and other insults were bitterly resented at Berlin, but the final impulse to the vacillating government was given by the news of secret negotiations between England and France. The accession to the ministry of Fox, long the opponent of the French war, suggested to Napoleon the idea of coming to terms with England. It is doubtful whether this could have been effected, as Napoleon's aggressions had become intolerable, and Fox's sympathies were with republican and not with imperial France. At all events the negotiations were broken off by the minister's death (13 Sept.); but meanwhile the Prussian envoy at Paris discovered that the bribe which had been offered to England was the restoration of Hanover. This intelligence that Prussia was to be quietly deprived of the one reward for its dishonour was too much for the pacific king and ministry. From this moment war with France was decided upon, and was formally declared on the 9th of October. But Prussia was now to pay the penalty of its previous selfishness. England and Russia were willing to forget their grievances against a country which would really fight against France, but neither could furnish immediate assistance. The differences with Sweden were speedily settled, but Sweden now counted for little in Europe. Austria was too busy with repairing its recent losses to venture on another war, and remained neutral. Prussia was left without an ally to face a power that had crushed a formidable coalition. Under Frederick the Great such a task might not have been hopeless, but since his death Prussia had degenerated as rapidly as it had risen. Its greatness had been created by the genius of its rulers, and had perished with them. The whole edifice of the state was rotten at the foundation. The ministers were mere heads of departments; the king was surrounded by a cabinet of irresponsible courtiers. The army was formidable in numbers, but in nothing else. The officers were almost all aged men, trained in a school of tactics which was already obsolete. Many of the common soldiers had been recruited abroad and were inspired with no patriotic devotion to the country which they served. Even the native troops consisted mainly of oppressed and down-trodden serfs who were really little better than mercenaries. Nevertheless, the old confidence which Frederick II. had inspired had not yet been overthrown, and victory was regarded as inevitable. The supreme command was entrusted to Brunswick, the author of the famous manifesto of 1792, and it was determined to advance against the French, instead of waiting to defend the line of the Elbe.

§ 22. The armies with which Napoleon had overthrown the Austrians and Russians had not yet been recalled from Germany, so that it was easy to give a prompt and decisive answer to the Prussian manifesto. The Prussian forces were collected near the Thuringian forest when the French advanced against them with superior numbers. At Saalfeld the latter showed their superiority in a small skirmish which was fatal to Prince Lewis Ferdinand, "the Prussian Alcibiades." Brunswick, alarmed by the presence of the French emperor in person, changed his plans at the last moment, and retreated towards Magdeburg, leaving the left wing under Hohenlohe to hold Jena as long as he could. The result was that when Napoleon arrived at Jena with his splendid army he found himself confronted by a small division, instead of, as he expected, by the united forces of Prussia. Hohenlohe was, of course, utterly crushed by the enormously superior numbers of the enemy (14 Oct.). On the same day a French detachment under Davoust fell in with Brunswick's army and defeated it at Auerstadt. As the Prussians were retreating in good order they fell in with the fugitives from Jena, a sudden panic seized the whole army, and the retreat became a hopeless rout. This double battle was even more decisive than Austerlitz. The Prussian monarchy seemed for the moment to be annihilated. And the spirit which was shown after the defeat was still more lamentable and disgraceful than the defeat itself. The commanders of the chief fortresses seemed to compete with each other in their haste to surrender their charges. Erfurt, Halle, Cüstrin, Spandau, Berlin, etc., opened their gates in rapid succession. On October 28 Hohenlohe capitulated with the remnant of the army of Jena. The only courageous stand was made by Blücher, who fought every point as he retreated, held out in Lübeck till the town was taken by storm, and refused to surrender until the superior numbers of his pursuers threatened to drive him into the Baltic. The whole of Brandenburg was in the hands of the French. Frederick William III. tried to arrange a peace, or at least an armistice. But Napoleon's terms, which were moderate after Jena, rose to extremes as the weakness of Prussia became more and more manifest. Lucchesini, the Prussian envoy, went so far as to sign a convention by which all the fortresses still uncaptured were to be surrendered. But the king, whose character improved with adversity, refused to ratify an act which amounted to an abdication of his crown, and retreated into East Prussia so as to carry on the war with the help of Russia. This worthy decision involved the resignation of Haugwitz, whose feeble truckling to France was one of the chief causes of the evils that had befallen Prussia. But even yet Frederick William could not be induced to entrust the power to Stein, the one minister who commanded the confidence of the nation. Stein irritated the king by protesting against the existence of a cabinet from which the ministers were excluded, and was dismissed from the department of finances. Foreign affairs were entrusted to Zastrow, another incompetent politician of the same school as Haugwitz.

§ 23. Napoleon's success must have been marvellous even to himself, and was ill-calculated to diminish the haughtiness with which he dictated his will to Europe. Northern Germany was now at his feet, and was treated with the same disregard of all but personal interests as the Southern States had been. The rulers of Hesse-Cassel and Brunswick were deposed, and their territories formed into the kingdom of Westphalia. The elector of Saxony, Frederick Augustus, purchased pardon for his very half-hearted hostility by joining the Confederation of the Rhine, for which he was rewarded with the title of king. The small states of Thuringia, Weimar, Gotha, Meiningen, and Coburg followed the example of their more powerful neighbour, and thus escaped the vengeance of the conqueror. On the 21st of November Napoleon issued a decree from Berlin which announced to the astonished world the ultimate object of that conquest of Europe on which he had now set his heart. He could not rest till he had humiliated England, the one country which was safe from his invincible armies, and he determined to accomplish his aim by the destruction of its commerce. The Berlin decree declared the British Isles in a state of blockade, ordered the confiscation of all British merchandise, and forbade all the countries that were dependent upon France to carry on any trade whatever with Great Britain. Thus was founded what was known as the "continental system," the most stupendous proof of Napoleon's incapacity as a statesman, and destined to bring about the collapse of his empire. The policy was based upon the idea that every subject and every ally of the French Emperor was willing to sacrifice the most pressing material interests to enable him to wreak his personal vengeance upon a nation that had dared to thwart his will. It was quite true that England had exercised her maritime supremacy with scanty regard to the interests or the rights of other countries, that the rights of search and of blockade were employed with irritating severity; but these evils were trifling compared to the deprivation of necessaries which was brought about by Napoleon's measures. The results of the decree were not fully appreciated until England began to retaliate. By four successive Orders in Council (Jan. to Nov. 1807) the English government forbade vessels to trade with ports belonging to France or her dependent allies, authorised reprisals against those countries which had seized English property, declared the blockade of all ports from which the English flag was excluded, and made it illegal for a neutral to sell ships to a belligerent power. The policy of these orders has been severely criticised, and it is certain that they did a great deal to irritate the United States against England. But they were certainly justified by the measures of Napoleon, and they were politic in so far as they increased the hostility of the subject populations to the rule of France.

§ 24. The elder Pitt announced in the Seven Years' War that he would conquer America in Germany: Napoleon now ventured on the counter-declaration that he would conquer England on the continent. But to do this he must complete the reduction of Europe, and as yet his power in Northern Germany was bounded by the Vistula. To this river Napoleon advanced directly after the Berlin decree, and prepared for a campaign in East Prussia, where Frederick William was determined to make a last struggle with the help of Russia. By artfully worded bulletins and proclamations, Napoleon inspired the Poles with the belief that he intended to restore their independence. Thousands of the oppressed nation rallied to his standard, and the name of the great patriot Kosciusko was employed to fan hopes which were destined to speedy disappointment. For some time the war was confined to isolated skirmishes about the Vistula, in which the French on the whole maintained their superiority. The first pitched battle was fought at Eylau (8 February, 1807), where Napoleon met the main Russian army under Bennigsen, and found that he had to deal with a very different enemy from any that he had yet encountered. After an obstinate engagement, in which the Russians met the French attack with unflinching stubbornness, both armies remained in their positions. On the third day Bennigsen determined to retreat, but Napoleon also thought it prudent to retire until he could obtain reinforcements. The French now contented themselves with reducing the Prussian fortresses that still held out. Danzig and Kolberg surrendered after a vigorous resistance on the part of the garrisons. If England had taken energetic measures at this juncture, and had sent a fleet into the Baltic to relieve these fortresses, the result of the war might have been altered. But the Grenville ministry, which was now in power, was incapable of apprehending the situation, and preferred to fritter away the resources of the country in futile expeditions to Buenos Ayres, the Dardanelles, Egypt and Sicily. In March Grenville was dismissed by the king for supporting the demand for Catholic emancipation, and Portland formed a ministry, composed for the most part of the followers of Pitt. Foreign affairs were placed in the hands of the youthful Canning, who was eager to repair the errors of his predecessors. One of his first acts was to accept the treaty of Bartenstein (April, 1807) by which the rulers of Russia, Prussia, and Sweden pledged themselves to carry on the war until a satisfactory arrangement of European affairs could be concluded. England now set to work to prepare for the Baltic expedition, but before the fleet was ready to start the revived coalition had unexpectedly collapsed.

§ 25. Before resuming his advance against an enemy whom he had learnt to respect at Eylau, Napoleon was careful to collect reinforcements from every quarter, until he had at last 140,000 men at his disposal. A march upon Königsberg, the capital of East Prussia, compelled Bennigsen to fight a battle at Friedland (14 June). The encounter was as desperate and costly as at Eylau. The Russians were almost decimated, and the French suffered enormous losses, but the superior numbers of the latter gave them the victory, and Königsberg was taken. The Russians retired behind the Niemen, and a few days later an armistice put an end to active hostilities. Alexander I. now determined to negotiate in person with the rival emperor, and on the 25th of June the two sovereigns met at Tilsit, on a raft which was moored in the middle of the Niemen. The details of the conference are a secret, as Napoleon's subsequent account of it is untrustworthy, and no witnesses were present. All that is certain is that Alexander I., whose character was a curious mixture of nobility and weakness, was completely won over by his conqueror. Napoleon seized the opportunity of realising the hopes that had been destroyed by Paul I.'s assassination. Instead of attempting to impose extreme terms upon a country which it was impossible to conquer, he offered to share with Russia the supremacy in Europe which had been won by French arms. The only conditions were the abandonment of the cause of the old monarchies, which seemed hopeless, and an alliance with France against England. Alexander had several grievances against the English government, especially the lukewarm support that had been given in recent operations, and made no objection to resume the policy of his predecessors in this respect. Two interviews sufficed to arrange the basis of an agreement. Both sovereigns abandoned their allies without scruple. Alexander gave up Prussia and Sweden, while Napoleon deserted the cause of the Poles, who had trusted to his zeal for their independence, and of the Turks, whom his envoy had recently induced to make war upon Russia. The treaty of Tilsit was speedily drawn up; on the 7th of July peace was signed between France and Russia, on the 9th between France and Prussia. Frederick William III. had to resign the whole of his kingdom west of the Elbe, together with all the acquisitions which Prussia had made in the second and third partitions of Poland. The provinces that were left, amounting to barely half of what he had inherited, were burthened with the payment of an enormous sum as compensation to France. The district west of the Elbe was united with Hesse-Cassel, Brunswick, and ultimately with Hanover, to form the kingdom of Westphalia, which was given to Napoleon's youngest brother, Jerome. Of Polish Prussia one province, Bialystock, was added to Russia, and the rest was made into the grand duchy of Warsaw and transferred to Saxony. Danzig, with the surrounding territory, was declared a free state under Prussian and Saxon protection, but it was really subject to France, and remained a centre of French power on the Baltic. All trade between Prussia and England was cut off. Alexander I., on his side, recognised all Napoleon's new creations in Europe—the Confederation of the Rhine, the kingdoms of Italy, Naples, Holland, and Westphalia, and undertook to mediate between France and England. But the really important agreement between France and Russia was to be found, not in the formal treaties, but in the secret conventions which were arranged by the two emperors. The exact text of these has never been made public, and it is probable that some of the terms rested upon verbal rather than on written understandings, but the general drift of them is unquestionable. The bribe offered to Alexander was the aggrandisement of Russia in the East. To make him an accomplice in the acts of Napoleon, he was to be allowed to annex Finland from Sweden, and Moldavia and Wallachia from Turkey. With regard to England, Russia undertook to adopt Napoleon's blockade-system, and to obtain the adhesion of those states which still remained open to English trade—Sweden, Denmark, and Portugal.

§ 26. Never were the liberties of Europe more directly threatened than by this union of the two representatives of despotic rule. But fortunately light appeared in the moment of the most extreme darkness. The task, which kings and princes had found too difficult, was undertaken by the peoples, and popular resistance proved a force which even Napoleon's genius could not quell. Prussia, under the ministry of Stein, set the example of a regeneration which was destined to have the most important results, and for which the previous humiliations provided the necessary impulse. And there was one state, England, which was enabled by its insular position to maintain the cause of Europe when the continental thrones were falling in ruins. The English minister had obtained information of the secret agreement at Tilsit, and used it to strike an unexpected blow. France and Russia had determined to seize upon the Danish navy, and to employ it for their own purposes. But an English fleet appeared before Copenhagen, and demanded that all vessels should be handed over until the conclusion of the war. A three days' bombardment compelled the Danish Government to accede to the demand. It was a high-handed act, which could only be justified by the greatness of the danger, and by the necessity of fighting Napoleon with his own weapons. Denmark was naturally driven into a close alliance with France, but the two emperors were disagreeably reminded of the existence of a power which they could not even attack. Meanwhile the other Scandinavian power, Sweden, was left at the mercy of the robbers of Tilsit. Russian troops overran Finland, but Gustavus IV. refused to negotiate even when the enemy was at the gate of his capital. At last the Swedes, disgusted with an obstinacy that was akin to madness, and which did nothing to defend them, determined to depose Gustavus (1809), and gave the crown to his uncle, Charles XIII. A treaty was now concluded by which Finland was surrendered to Russia, but Sweden recovered its possessions in Pomerania on condition of closing its ports to English vessels. With Charles XIII. the great house of Vasa came to an end, and his successor was found in the French Marshal, Bernadotte. Napoleon gave an unwilling consent to the elevation of a man whose ability and independence he had always distrusted; and thus was founded the only one of the Napoleonic dynasties which was destined to have any permanence.

III. THE PENINSULAR WAR. CAMPAIGN OF 1809 AGAINST AUSTRIA.

§ 27. Napoleon was at the very zenith of his power when he returned from Tilsit to France, and he was received with an adulation proportioned to the greatness of his achievements. His first act was to create an imperial nobility which should revive the forms of the old monarchy, and to abolish the Tribunate, the last body that had the power, though not the will, to criticise his actions. But his chief object was to complete the humiliation of England by excluding her vessels from every port of Europe. The only country which had not adopted the continental system was Portugal, which was now governed by a Prince Regent, John, on behalf of his mother Maria, who bore the title of queen. As early as 1801, during the Consulate, he had compelled Spain to attack Portugal, and had thus extorted the closing of the ports of that country. But in 1804, on the renewal of the English war, he had allowed the Portuguese to purchase a formal recognition of their neutrality by the payment of sixteen million francs. Since then the trade with England, which was necessary for the very existence of the kingdom, had continued without interruption. This treaty Napoleon was determined to revoke, and at the same time to conquer Portugal. His motive was a desire to annex Tuscany to his kingdom of Italy, and to find some compensation elsewhere for the titular king of Etruria. Accordingly, he demanded not only the closing of the ports, but also that the Portuguese government should declare war upon England and seize all English subjects and property in the kingdom. On the first symptoms of hesitation to accept such ruinous terms, he ordered Junot to advance with an army which had already been collected on the Spanish frontier. At the same time he compelled Godoy, the Spanish minister, to sign the treaty of Fontainebleau (27 Oct., 1807), which arranged for a partition of Portugal. The northern districts, with the title of Northern Lusitania, were to be given to the young king of Etruria, who was to surrender Tuscany to the Italian kingdom. In the south a principality was to be carved out for Godoy himself. The central provinces were to be kept by France in pledge until the conclusion of a general peace. Half of the Portuguese colonies were to go to the king of Spain, who was to adopt the title of "Emperor of the two Indies." Meanwhile Junot was marching eastwards with a rapidity that reduced his troops to the greatest straits, and at the end of their journey they were barely able to carry their arms. Luckily for them they had no enemy to encounter. The Prince Regent never dreamed of opposing the French, and as soon as they approached the capital he set sail for Brazil with the court and some 15,000 loyal followers (29 Nov.). Half of the English fleet escorted them, while the other half remained to blockade the mouth of the Tagus. On the following day Junot entered Lisbon, and proceeded to take possession of the kingdom. Napoleon announced in a formal decree that "the house of Braganza has ceased to reign,"

§ 28. This rapid success in Portugal was not enough for the French Emperor, who had also designs upon Spain. Ever since 1796 Charles IV., under the influence of Godoy, had been the obedient vassal of France. And this vassalage had brought nothing but disaster to Spain. In the battles of Cape Finisterre and Trafalgar the Spanish navy had been annihilated. At Amiens Napoleon had allowed England to take Trinidad, and since then that country had seized Buenos Ayres. For a long time Spain had depended upon the precious metals of Mexico and Peru, and now these resources seemed likely to be cut off. Only once had Napoleon the slightest complaint to make. At a time when English hostility was more than usually ruinous, and when the coalition was strengthened by the adhesion of Prussia, Godoy had dreamed for a moment of throwing off the yoke, and had gone so far as to issue a belligerent proclamation. But the dream was rudely shattered at Jena, and Napoleon had condoned the offence in the treaty of Fontainebleau. In spite of all this Napoleon was determined to attack Spain, and he only waited to find a pretext for hostilities in internal quarrels. Godoy, who was known to be the paramour of the queen, was bitterly hated by the people for the disasters which his policy had brought upon Spain. At the head of the opposition to the favourite stood the crown prince Ferdinand, as insignificant a creature as his rival, but endowed with all good qualities by the popular favour. Godoy, conscious of the insecurity of his position, did all he could to secure the support of Napoleon, and this explains the abject servitude of the government to France. At last Ferdinand, who was regarded as the opponent of the French policy, determined to imitate his enemy, and also became a suitor for the emperor's favour. He entered into secret relations with the French ambassador, Beauharnais, and went so far as to demand the hand of a Bonaparte princess. Napoleon readily encouraged a proposal that offered to make him arbiter of the court quarrels of Madrid. The decisive moment seemed to have come, when Godoy, who had discovered some of the intrigue against himself, obtained from the feeble Charles IV. an order for his son's arrest. French troops under Dupont were ordered to enter Spain under pretence of supporting Junot, and great efforts were made to mass reinforcements on the frontier. But the moment that Ferdinand's relations with Napoleon were discovered, Godoy hastened to patch up a reconciliation. The pretext for an invasion was thus removed, but Napoleon determined to proceed with his enterprise. The French soldiers were eagerly welcomed by the natives, who fondly imagined that they had come to espouse the prince's cause against Godoy. Charles IV. wrote to demand an explanation of this hostile demonstration, but received a threatening answer, and Napoleon adroitly removed to Italy to escape further remonstrance. Thence he despatched Murat in February, 1808, to take command of the army, which had already occupied the northern provinces of Spain. He gave no hint of his real designs, and Murat felt convinced that the crown of the Bourbons was destined for himself. As the French continued to advance upon Madrid, and resistance was out of the question, Charles IV. and Godoy determined upon flight. The news of this intention roused the smouldering passions of the people. Risings took place at Aranjuez and Madrid, Godoy was maltreated, and Charles IV. was compelled to abdicate in favour of the unworthy idol of the populace, Ferdinand. For the second time the position of the French underwent a sudden and unexpected alteration, but Murat proceeded with a caution worthy of the great personal interests which he believed to be involved. He obtained from Charles IV. a secret declaration that his abdication had been compulsory and invalid, and he occupied Madrid (23 March) without in any way acknowledging the title of Ferdinand. Meanwhile Napoleon had matured his own plans. Advancing in person to the frontier, he sent Savary, the principal agent in the murder of Enghien, to act as his agent at Madrid. Savary persuaded Ferdinand that Napoleon was entering Spain, and that the best chance of securing his crown was to meet the emperor at Burgos. At Burgos the ill-fated victim was lured on to Bayonne, where he found himself a French prisoner and was suddenly confronted with his parents and Godoy. After a dogged resistance, he was intimidated into restoring his crown to his father (5 June), who at once made a second abdication. To the intense chagrin of Murat, Napoleon at last announced his real intentions. A meagre assembly of notables was convened at Bayonne, and was compelled to offer the vacant crown to Joseph Bonaparte, who had been summoned for the purpose from Naples, and who was speedily installed at Madrid.

§ 29. But before this the Spaniards had discovered that they had been duped, and had risen with the courage of despair against their treacherous invaders. Loyalty in Spain was a superstition rather than a sentiment, and in spite of the unworthy character of Ferdinand the popular devotion to him knew no bounds. In every province juntas were formed to direct the military movements, and in a short time the insurrection had spread to every quarter of the kingdom. It was the first time that Napoleon had had to face an infuriated people, and he regarded the novel phenomenon with the contempt of ignorance. He determined to make Madrid the centre of operations, and to send a series of simultaneous expeditions against each of the revolted provinces. The task of subduing a disorderly and inexperienced mob might safely be entrusted to the less prominent of his generals. At first events seemed to justify his calculations. Bessières defeated the insurgents at Rio Leco, near Valladolid, and thus secured the roads from the Pyrenees to Madrid (13 July). This success seemed to Napoleon decisive, but he overestimated the importance of the capital. Madrid had never been a capital in the same sense as Paris, and its military importance was of the slightest. The provincial revolts went on unchecked, the French were repulsed in Valencia, and Dupont, who had advanced into the heart of Andalusia, was compelled to retreat and ultimately to capitulate with all his forces at Baylen (19 July). The Spaniards now advanced upon Madrid, and Joseph had to fly from the capital which he had only just entered.

§ 30. At the same time disasters befel the French in Portugal. On the 1st of August an English force landed at Figueras under Sir Arthur Wellesley, and at once marched to attack Junot at Lisbon. At Vimeira the first battle of the Peninsular war was fought, and the English won their first victory upon the mainland (21 August). The French army was now surrounded and might easily have been annihilated, but at this juncture Wellesley was superseded by his superior officer, Sir Harry Burrard, who opened negotiations with Junot. By the Convention of Cintra (30 August the French agreed to evacuate Portugal, but stipulated that they should be conveyed to France in English ships. The convention was bitterly censured by the English government, which was already preparing to send help to the insurgents in Spain. At last Napoleon was convinced of the serious nature of affairs in the peninsula, and determined to remedy matters by his personal presence. But before he could undertake the journey in safety, it was necessary to settle matters in central Europe, which were beginning to assume a threatening aspect.

§ 31. The year which followed the treaty of Tilsit was a period of supreme importance in the history of Prussia. Napoleon had insisted on the dismissal of Hardenberg from the ministry, and his place was taken by Stein, who received the fullest powers to effect the reorganisation of the administrative system. Never was a country in a more abject state: reduced to half its extent, and deprived of almost all resources to pay the indemnity, Prussia had still to support an enormous number of French troops, who found one pretext after another to postpone their promised evacuation. In all probability it was only a regard for the susceptibilities of Russia that prevented Napoleon from utterly destroying the conquered kingdom. In these terrible circumstances Stein undertook the task of government with a resolute confidence that extorted the wonder and admiration of his contemporaries. He saw clearly that the root of the evil lay not so much in the maladministration, bad as that had been, as in the whole social structure of the system. The Prussian government had been carefully organised so as to suppress all freedom among the subjects, and to make them passive agents of a despotic will. Not only were there three classes—nobles, citizens and peasants—which were absolutely cut off from each other from birth to death; the land was divided in the same way and was equally immutable. The citizens were comparatively free from military service, and were supposed to devote their energies to enriching the country. The nobles supplied the officers in the army and the peasants the common soldiers. The peasants were in a condition of serfdom which had passed away from almost every civilised country in Europe. Neither citizens nor peasants had any self-government, or, it is needless to say, a voice in the direction of the state. The absolute want of any knowledge of, or interest in, public affairs was to Stein one of the most grievous defects of Prussia, and was in itself sufficient to explain the abject inertness with which the invaders had been received.

Stein took office on the 4th of October, 1807, and on the 9th was issued the famous Emancipating Edict, the greatest legislative work of the period. Perfect freedom of trade in land was established, and the old distinction between noble-land, burgher-land, and peasant-land was abolished. The system of caste was done away with, henceforth noble, citizen and peasant might follow any occupation they chose, and a man might pass freely from one class to another. No new relation of serfdom could be created after the date of the edict, and at Martinmas, 1810, all existing serfs were to become free. The edict did not, as has been so often represented, convert the villein into a peasant-proprietor, but left him a free tenant of his lord. The further change was the work of Hardenberg, who in 1811 gave the peasants absolute possession of two-thirds of their holdings, and allowed the lord to take the other third as compensation. Neither Stein nor Hardenberg ventured to interfere with the judicial functions of the noble class, and these survived until 1848.

This great edict, though it is identified with Stein's name, was not really his work, as the main outlines of the reform had been already drawn up by a commission appointed under Hardenberg. Still less direct share was taken by the minister in the military reforms which were carried through by his colleague, Scharnhorst. These reforms were really only sketches of what was to be effected in the future, as at the time want of supplies and the presence of the French army prevented the adoption of military reform on a large scale. Scharnhorst proposed to form an active army of 40,000 men, the number fixed at Tilsit, but to adopt a short term of service, and to draft the soldiers as soon as they were trained into the reserve. At the same time a *Landwehr*, or militia, was to be formed for defensive purposes only. These reforms, accompanied by an abandonment of the obsolete tactics of Frederick the Great, and the abolition of the degrading punishments hitherto employed, did much to revive the military glory of Prussia. Scharnhorst himself did not live to see the result, as he was killed in one of the first battles of the War of Liberation, but the fruit of his labours was reaped by Blücher and Gneisenau.

Meanwhile, Stein was pursuing what was more especially his own scheme—the admission of the people to a voice in their own government. He reorganised the municipalities, and gave the citizens the right to choose their own magistrates and to regulate local affairs. He hoped to establish similar representative institutions in the country districts, and also for the whole kingdom; but neither time nor opportunity was allowed him. There was a strong feeling in Prussia that the erection of a parliament would lead to a Jacobin revolution, and the reforms already accomplished had provoked sufficient opposition. Moreover, foreign politics came to interrupt the course of domestic legislation. The revived national spirit which Stein had called into existence was violently hostile to France. The *Tugendbund* and other secret societies spread themselves in a network over the country, and only waited for the opportunity for a rising. While opinion was in this excited state, the news of the Spanish successes made a profound impression. And Napoleon had now decided to recall his army of occupation from Germany in order to throw overwhelming forces into Spain. But at the same time he determined to impose fresh terms upon Prussia that should remove all danger of a rising behind his back. The indemnity still due was to be fixed at 140 million francs; until it was paid off 10,000 French troops were to occupy Glogau, Stettin, and Cüstrin at the expense of Prussia; for the next ten years the Prussian army was to be reduced to 42,000 men, and all idea of forming a militia was to be given up; and last, in case of a war with Austria, Prussia was to assist France with 16,000 men. Stein urged that a desperate war should be attempted before the acceptance of such humiliating terms. But Frederick William III. had not the courage to follow his minister's advice, and the proposed convention was signed on the 10th of September, 1808. Napoleon had intercepted a letter of Stein's in which the possibility of an alliance with Austria was discussed. He peremptorily demanded the dismissal of a minister whom he now recognised to be still more dangerous than Hardenberg. Again the humbled king gave way, and Stein went into exile. His place was taken for the next two years by Altenstein, who shared his views but was not strong enough to carry them out.

§ 32. Prussia was not the only state in Germany which Napoleon had reason to fear. The treaty of Pressburg had been far too hard a blow for Austria to be accepted as permanent. Under the able ministry of Count Stadion a number of reforms had been initiated, which, less sweeping than those of Stein, had yet given some semblance of national unity to the various races that owned the Hapsburg rule. At the same time the army was carefully reformed by the archduke Charles, and its numbers were vastly increased so as to be ready for the first opportunity. Napoleon complained bitterly of this hostile attitude, but he could do nothing until Spain had been recovered. Meanwhile, he determined to overawe Austria by a new demonstration of his good understanding with Russia, and he proposed a second meeting with Alexander I. at Erfurt. Of the bribes promised at Tilsit the Czar had only obtained Finland, and he could not afford to separate from France until he had secured the Danubian principalities. The proposed interview took place in October with the greatest pomp. All the vassal kings and princes of Germany came to pay court to their suzerain, and Goethe and Wieland were induced to visit Erfurt to give additional proofs of the slavery of their country. The promise of Wallachia and Moldavia was confirmed to Alexander, who undertook to continue his hostility against England, and to support France against Austria in case of war.

§ 33. Convinced that the Erfurt Conference would preserve him from all danger in Central Europe, Napoleon hurried off to Spain. In spite of their great success at Baylen, the insurgents were not in an encouraging position. The local juntas had abdicated their authority in favour of a central junta which was to exercise supreme power. But the latter body contained thirty-four members, far too large a number for executive business, and displayed nothing but hesitation and incapacity. The troops, about 130,000 men, were extended over a long line from Bilbao to Saragossa, and it was easy for Napoleon to break through the centre and then crush the two wings. Blake, with the main body of the Spaniards, was defeated at Espinosa (10th Nov.), and only escaped annihilation by a fortunate accident. The centre of the line was forced by Soult's capture of Burgos, and the left wing under Palafox, defeated at Tudela by Lannes, threw itself into Saragossa. In a week the Spanish army had disappeared from the field, and

Napoleon marched upon Madrid and restored Joseph to his capital. All this time an English force of 20,000 men, under Sir John Moore, had been marching, in spite of great obstacles, to the assistance of the Spaniards. On receiving the news of their utter defeat, he still hoped to strike a blow for the safety of Madrid. When he heard that the capital had fallen, he felt that nothing remained but retreat, but he determined to do something for his unfortunate allies by diverting French attention from southern Spain. He continued to advance against Soult's division, and the news of this movement brought Napoleon from Madrid to crush the English. Sir John Moore retreated before superior numbers, and only the most speedy and exhausting marches saved him from destruction. At last Napoleon saw that the enemy must escape him, and, on the pretext of alarming news from Austria, left the army and the fruitless pursuit of the English to Soult. On the 11th of January Moore reached Corunna, but found to his horror that his transports had not arrived. The French at last overtook him and it was necessary to fight a desperate battle for safety. Soult's attack was repulsed, the English forces were embarked, but Moore was left dead upon the field which he had so heroically held. Spain was now at the mercy of the French, as there were no forces that could meet them in the open field, and only small local risings remained to be put down. Saragossa made a desperate resistance, and was treated with proportionate barbarity when it was finally taken (20 Feb.). The southern provinces were reduced by Victor, while Soult invaded Portugal and occupied Oporto (27 March, 1809).

§ 34. Napoleon had quitted Spain partly because there was no more glory to be won there, and partly because his absence encouraged the hostile schemes of Austria. There can be no doubt that the government of Vienna had determined to make war at the first favourable opportunity, and it was doubtful whether any better chance would be offered than a moment when 300,000 French troops were engaged in Spain and when Germany seemed on the verge of revolt. It was on German discontent that Count Stadion placed his chief reliance: he knew that the Confederation of the Rhine chafed against the foreign yoke, and that a single success would overcome the vacillation of Frederick William III. On the 9th of May Francis I. declared war against Bavaria. Three separate expeditions were set on foot under three archdukes. Charles commanded the main army in Germany, John led an expedition into Italy, and Ferdinand advanced into Poland to attack Warsaw. Welcome allies were found in the Tyrolese peasants, who had been subjected to Bavaria by the peace of Pressburg, and who now rose as one man under

Andrew Hofer, an inn-keeper of the Passeyr valley. Everywhere the Austrians had the advantage of taking the aggressive. The archduke Charles crossed the Inn and was enabled by an error on the part of Berthier to concentrate his forces at Ratisbon. John defeated the French under Eugène Beauharnais, who had none of his step-father's generalship, at Sacile near Venice, and Ferdinand succeeded in capturing Warsaw. But the favourable moment was lost through the invincible sluggishness of Charles, who might have crushed the French under Berthier and Davoust before Napoleon had time to reach the scene of operations. The emperor on his arrival speedily rectified the errors of his lieutenants. By a series of masterly manœuvres, unsurpassed in the history of war, he collected his scattered forces, and in a campaign of five days (18–22 April), each of which was signalised by a French victory, he broke through the enemy's line and drove the Austrians to make a hasty retreat in two divisions. Following up his success with characteristic decision he occupied Vienna on the 13th of May. These events decided the campaigns in Poland and Italy. Warsaw was evacuated, and the archduke John had to hurry back through the mountains to the defence of his country, closely pursued by Eugène. An attempted revolt in Prussia under Colonel Schill had degenerated into petty partisan warfare, which was ended by Schill's defeat and death at Stralsund (25 May).

The capture of Vienna by no means involved the submission of Austria. All the bridges over the Danube were broken down, the northern bank was occupied by the archduke Charles with a large army, and in its presence the passage of the river was a task of great difficulty and danger. Napoleon determined to make the attempt a little below Vienna, where the Danube is divided into two streams by the long island of Lobau. The southern and wider stream was crossed by a bridge of boats, and a flying bridge was thrown across from the island to the northern bank. There the French were attacked by the Austrians at the villages of Aspern and Essling (22 May). Without being exactly defeated, Napoleon found it impossible to maintain his position on the northern bank, and had to withdraw his forces into the island of Lobau, which his artillery made impregnable. This reverse was hailed throughout Europe as a defeat, and the emperor was regarded as a close prisoner in his Danube fortress. It was a critical moment in European history. Prussia only waited for a decisive Austrian success to declare against France. Westphalia was on the verge of revolt against the feebly oppressive rule of Jerome Bonaparte. The duke of Brunswick claimed the hereditary territories that the treaty of Tilsit had taken from him, and attacked the king of Saxony, who was the most submissive vassal of France. The heroism of Schill, futile as it had proved, had made a deep impression in Germany. All attempts on the part of Bavarians and French to reduce Tyrol had been foiled by the obstinate courage of the peasants, aided by the mountainous country. Everything depended upon the success or failure of the French to effect the crossing of the Danube, and Napoleon fully comprehended the importance of the crisis. He collected reinforcements from the Italian army, strengthened the bridges over the southern channel which had broken down during the battle of Aspern, and finally he determined to bridge over the whole of the northern channel with rafts so that his army could manœuvre as well as on dry land. When all preparations had been made the great enterprise was carried out, and the Austrians were astounded to find that the enormous French army had crossed to the left bank in a single night (4 July). For the next two days an obstinate battle was fought on the field of Wagram, and it was not till the evening of the 6th of July that the superior numbers of the French gave them the victory. But the victory was dearly bought, and had nothing in common with such decisive successes as those of Austerlitz and Jena. The archduke Charles retreated in good order to Znaim in Moravia, where an armistice was concluded on the 12th.

The battle of Wagram was followed by a complete change of Austrian policy. The championship of German national unity, so contrary to the Hapsburg traditions, was given up, and a return was made to the old devotion to selfish interests. Before long Stadion retired from office, and his place was taken by Metternich, a skilful diplomatist, but utterly devoid of enthusiasm, and inspired only with hatred of revolutionary doctrines. The archduke Charles retired into private life, and the command of the army was undertaken by a commission presided over by Francis I. in person. There was now no obstacle in the way of peace with France, and the only question was what terms to arrange. By a sort of tacit understanding this question was allowed to depend upon the success or failure of the efforts which England was making in the Spanish peninsula and in central Europe.

§ 35. In 1809 Wellesley was entrusted with the supreme command of the English forces, and was also appointed generalissimo by the Portuguese government. His first task was to free Portugal from the French, and this was accomplished without difficulty. Soult, who had been instructed by Napoleon to plant the French banner on the walls of Lisbon, was forced to evacuate Oporto and to make a disastrous retreat into Spain. Wellesley now advanced by the valley of the Tagus upon Madrid, and the Spanish army under Cuesta was ordered to co-operate with him. But the English general found his allies very untrustworthy; he was kept without information of the French movements, and Cuesta refused to act except independently. Soult was able to throw his army between Wellesley and the Portuguese frontier and thus to cut off his retreat. If the other French commanders had been prudent enough to avoid an engagement, the English would have been caught in a trap and must have been overwhelmed. Luckily for the invaders, Joseph, acting on the advice of Victor, decided to risk a battle at Talavera. The Spaniards fled in panic, but the obstinacy of the English soldiers gave them a victory (28 July), for which Wellesley was rewarded with the title of Viscount Wellington. But the victory was practically useless except as securing the army from destruction. Wellington could do nothing more for the Spaniards, whose conduct he bitterly complained of, and as the line of the Tagus was occupied by Soult, he had to retreat through the mountains into Portugal. This great expedition, on which the eyes of Europe had been fixed, ended in complete failure.

§ 36. Still more conspicuous was the collapse of another expedition which had been prepared with great parade by the English government. On the 27th of July, 1809, 245 men of war convoyed 40,000 soldiers to the mouth of the Scheldt to attack Antwerp. The command was given to Lord Chatham, the elder brother of William Pitt, who proved lamentably incompetent. Valuable time was wasted in the capture of Flushing, while the French made Antwerp impregnable. The army was decimated by fever in the swamps of Walcheren, and at last all but 15,000 men were recalled. More than 2000 of this luckless body had perished before the survivors were allowed to return. It was the most glaring proof that had yet been given of the incompetence of the English government to direct military operations. An army that might have interfered with decisive effect in Spain was thrown away in an ill-judged enterprise which was hopeless from the outset.

§ 37. This double failure on the part of England settled the negotiations between France and Austria, and the treaty of Vienna was signed on the 14th of October. Salzburg, Berchtesgaden, and the district of the Inn were ceded to Bavaria. Western Galicia, which Austria had acquired in the third partition of Poland, with the city of Krakau, was added to the grand duchy of Warsaw. The provinces of Trieste, Friuli, Croatia, and other districts between the Adriatic and the Save were formed into the "Illyrian Provinces" under the direct rule of Napoleon himself. Not only did Austria lose 50,000 square miles of territory and a population of four millions, she was also cut off both from Germany and the Mediterranean. Her political importance and her commerce seemed to be utterly destroyed. The Tyrolese were rewarded for their devotion to the Hapsburgs by being left at the mercy of the conquerors. The peasants were compelled by overwhelming forces to submit, and the heroic Hofer was carried to Mantua and shot as a rebel.

So far Napoleon's power was apparently unshaken by the popular risings against him. But he had advanced no nearer to his dearest object, the destruction of England. To effect this purpose he had no other means than the inclusion of every European country in the systematic blockade. It was for this he had attacked Portugal and deprived Austria of her ports, and he was now determined to remove every obstacle in the way of his designs. In spite of the concordat, Pope Pius VII. had never accepted the position of a submissive vassal of France. He had refused to acknowledge the kings whom Napoleon had placed in Naples, to confirm the French bishops whom Napoleon had nominated, or to close his ports against English vessels. In 1808 Napoleon had ordered his troops under Miollis to occupy Rome, and on the 17th of May, 1809, he issued a decree from his camp at Vienna, by which he confiscated the Papal States and reduced the Pope to the position of a simple bishop of Rome. As Pius VII. refused to submit to this arbitrary act, he was imprisoned, first in Grenoble and then in Savona, where he remained for the next three years. The courageous pope declined all offers of a revenue and a residence in Paris, and Napoleon was compelled to organise the Gallican church in practical independence of the papal authority. The Roman states were divided into three departments, and received institutions on the French model.

This annexation was followed by others in 1810. Louis Bonaparte, king of Holland, had committed the unpardonable crime of preferring his subjects' interests to those of his brother, and had tried to mitigate the rigour of the ruinous blockade. In January he had to sign a treaty by which he surrendered Zealand and admitted French officials to the Dutch custom-houses. Finally, unable to endure the humiliations to which he was exposed, he resigned his crown altogether (1 July), and Holland was incorporated with France. Soon afterwards the whole coast of North Germany, including Hamburg and most of the old Hanse towns, the duchy of Oldenburg, and part of the kingdom of Westphalia, was formally annexed by Napoleon in order to effectually close the Elbe and the Weser against English commerce.

§ 38. Napoleon now revived the idea which he had often entertained before, of allying himself with one of the great ruling families.

A compliant senate and a packed ecclesiastical council pronounced his separation from Josephine Beauharnais, who retired with a magnificent pension to Malmaison, where she died. As previous marriage proposals to the Russian court had not been cordially received, Napoleon now turned to Austria. The matter was speedily arranged with Metternich, and in March, 1810, the archduchess Maria Louisa arrived in France as the emperor's wife. The great importance of the marriage was that it broke the last links which bound Russia to France, and thus overthrew the alliance of Tilsit. Alexander had been exasperated by the addition of Western Galicia to the grand-duchy of Warsaw, which he regarded as a step towards the restoration of Poland, and therefore as a breach of the engagement made at Tilsit. The annexation of Oldenburg, whose duke was a relative of the Czar, was a distinct personal insult. Alexander showed his irritation by formally deserting the continental system, which was more ruinous to Russia than to almost any other country, and by throwing his ports open to British commerce (Dec. 1810). From this moment war between France and Russia was inevitable, unless Napoleon would resign the great object to which he had so long subordinated all other aims. But before considering this quarrel it is necessary to trace the course of the war in the Spanish peninsula.

§ 39. The retreat of Wellington to Portugal after his victory at Talavera left Spain at the mercy of the French. In spite of the harassing guerilla warfare, in which the Spaniards excelled, they succeeded in capturing Granada and Seville, and finally reduced the whole of the southern provinces except Cadiz, which now became the capital of independent Spain. The treaty of Vienna allowed Napoleon to send reinforcements to the peninsula, and if he had appeared in person the war would probably have come to a speedy end. But he underrated the military power of England, and preferred to leave the task to his marshals, while he occupied himself with the annexation of Holland and northern Germany and incessant squabbles with the imprisoned Pope. The progress of the French in Spain was impeded by the jealousy with which the marshals regarded each other, and by the want of sympathy between Napoleon and his brother. Joseph wished to restore peace and order to his subjects and to rule them as an independent nation, while Napoleon was determined to annex the peninsula to his own overgrown empire. These disputes went so far that Joseph resigned his crown, and was with great difficulty induced to resume it. Among the Spaniards the fall of the old monarchy, and the consciousness that the nation was conducting the war on its own behalf, had given a great impulse to the reforming party, which had long existed, but had been reduced to powerlessness under Charles IV. The central junta at Seville had promised to summon the Cortes, but that body was suppressed by the French advance before the promise was fulfilled. But at Cadiz, the last bulwark of independence, the Cortes at last came together in 1810 and set to work to draw up a new constitution. The liberals had matters their own way, and the principles of the French Constituent Assembly were closely followed in the constitution which was promulgated early in 1812. Supreme legislative power was placed in the hands of a single national assembly, and effective checks were imposed to restrict the executive power of the monarchy whenever it should be restored. The freedom of the press was established, the old feudal rights of the nobles were abolished, tithes were remitted, and the property of the clergy was confiscated to defray the expenses of the war. But the great defect of the constitution was that it was the work of one party to which circumstances had given a temporary supremacy, and it failed to command the support of the united nation. The nobles and priests were bitterly hostile to the reforms, and the latter class had far more influence in Spain than they had ever enjoyed in France. Moreover, the democratic character of the constitution was not likely to commend itself to Wellington, and the liberal leaders viewed with mistrust the conservative general to whom they were compelled to confide the defence of their country.

§ 40. In 1810 Napoleon determined to bring the peninsular war, the only one now left on his hands, to a close. He ordered Soult to conduct the operations against Cadiz, while Masséna undertook the more difficult task of driving the English from Portugal. Wellington had foreseen this attack, and had employed the winter in erecting the impregnable lines of Torres Vedras, extending from the Tagus to the sea. His intention was to stand strictly on the defensive and to compel the enemy's retreat by devastating the open country before his lines. He made no attempt to defend the great fortress of Ciudad Rodrigo, the key of the northern route from Spain to Portugal, which was taken by the French on the 11th of July. The cowardice of the people and the incompetence of the regency in Lisbon compelled Wellington to depart from his programme so far as to fight a battle at Busaco (29 Sept.). But though he won a complete victory he had no idea of making a permanent stand, and hastened to re-occupy his position at Torres Vedras. Masséna now found himself confronted by the formidable lines of which neither he nor Napoleon had suspected the existence. The devastated country could furnish him with no supplies, and he was compelled to retreat after losing 30,000 men on his march. Meanwhile Soult had been ordered to leave Cadiz and reinforce Masséna. He succeeded in capturing Badajoz, which commands the southern pass into Portugal; but finding that his colleague had already retreated he returned to the blockade of Cadiz.

In March, 1811, the arrival of reinforcements from England enabled Wellington to take the offensive, and he drew up plans for a grand campaign in Spain. Before leaving Portugal, however, it was necessary to secure his communications by taking the great border fortresses. Wellington himself undertook operations against Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo in the north, while Beresford was entrusted with the siege of Badajoz on the southern road. Masséna had by this time rallied his forces and marched against Wellington, but was defeated at Fuentes d'Onoro (5 May), and as the result of the battle Almeida surrendered. But Soult had rapidly advanced to the relief of Badajoz, and compelled Beresford to fight a great battle at Albuera (16 May). After an obstinate and costly struggle the English gained a victory, in spite of the errors committed by their commander; but the success was wholly without results. The siege of Badajoz was resumed; but before any real progress had been made, Marmont, who superseded the disgraced Masséna, effected a junction with Soult, and compelled the raising of the siege. Wellington could make no head against the overwhelming numbers of the combined French armies, and had to return to his defensive position in Portugal. But Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz remained in French hands, and Marmont went into winter quarters in the valley of the Tagus.

Early in the next year Wellington resumed his enterprise, and captured Ciudad Rodrigo (19 Jan., 1812). Hurrying southwards he stormed Badajoz (6 April), just in time to forestall the advance of Soult. Having thus secured his base of operations, he advanced against Marmont's army, which he drove before him beyond Salamanca. Suddenly the French marshal turned, and by a rapid march placed himself between the English and their line of retreat to Portugal. Wellington had to return to Salamanca and give battle (22 July). Marmont was completely defeated, and so severely wounded that he had to resign the command to Clausel, who conducted the retreat. Wellington now marched upon Madrid, which he entered in triumph (12 August), and Joseph retired to Valencia, where he ordered Soult to join him. Thus all the French troops were concentrated in the east, and the English could not advance without having to face vastly superior numbers. An attack upon Burgos was foiled by Clausel, who had retreated to that town with Marmont's army. Wellington realised that the time had not yet come for the conquest of Spain, and for the third time he evacuated the country to winter at Ciudad Rodrigo.

Joseph returned once more to Madrid to enjoy a sovereignty which was doomed to speedy destruction. For in this year Napoleon had commenced his famous campaign against Russia, and the turning-point in his career had been reached.

IV. The War of Liberation.

§ 41. The alliance between Russia and France, which had been formed at Tilsit and confirmed at Erfurt, was completely undermined by Napoleon's Austrian marriage, by the annexation of Oldenburg, and by Alexander's desertion of the continental system. But the chief grievance to Russia was the apparent intention of Napoleon to do something for the Poles. The increase of the grand-duchy of Warsaw by the treaty of Vienna was so annoying to Alexander that he began to meditate on the possibility of restoring Poland himself, and making it a dependent kingdom for the Czar in the same way as Napoleon had treated Italy. He even went so far as to sound the Poles on the subject; but he found that they had not forgotten the three partitions of their country, and that their sympathies were rather with France than with Russia. At the same time Napoleon was convinced that until Russia was subdued his empire was unsafe, and all hopes of avenging himself upon England were at an end. All through the year 1811 it was known that war was inevitable, but neither power was in a hurry to take the initiative. Meanwhile the various powers that retained nominal independence had to make up their minds as to the policy they would pursue. For no country was the decision harder than for Prussia. Neutrality was out of the question, as the Prussian territories, lying between the two combatants, must be occupied by one or the other. The friends and former colleagues of Stein were unanimous for a Russian alliance and a desperate struggle for liberty. But Hardenberg, who had become chancellor in 1810, was too prudent to embark in a contest which at the time was hopeless. The Czar had not been so consistent in his policy as to be a very desirable ally; and, even with Russian assistance, it was certain that the Prussian frontiers could not be defended against the French, who had already garrisons in the chief fortresses. Hardenberg fully sympathised with the patriots, but he sacrificed enthusiasm to prudence, and offered the support of Prussia to France. The treaty was arranged on the 24th of February, 1812. Frederick William gave the French a free passage through his territories, and undertook to furnish 20,000 men for service in the field, and as many more for garrison duty. In return for this Napoleon guaranteed the security of the Prussian kingdom as it stood, and held out the prospect of additions to it. It was an unnatural and hollow alliance, and was understood to be so by the Czar. Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and other friends of Stein resigned their posts, and many Prussian officers entered the service of the Czar. Austria, actuated by similar motives, adopted the same policy, but with less reluctance. After this example had been set by the two great powers, none of the lesser states of Germany dared to disobey the peremptory orders of Napoleon. But Turkey and Sweden, both of them old allies of France, were at this crisis in the opposition. The treaty of Tilsit had promised Moldavia and Wallachia to Alexander, and in 1809 the Czar had commenced a war for the conquest of these provinces. But the Turks made a more obstinate resistance than had been expected, and Napoleon now did all in his power to induce them to prolong the war. Alexander, however, was willing to moderate his demands as the contest with France approached, and the treaty of Bucharest established the Pruth as the boundary between Russia and Turkey (28 May, 1812). The Swedes were threatened with starvation by Napoleon's stern command to close their ports not only against English, but against all German vessels. Bernadotte, who had just been adopted as the heir of the childless Charles XIII., determined to throw in his lot with his new country, rather than with his old commander. He had also hopes of compensating Sweden for the loss of Finland by wresting Norway from the Danes, and this would never be agreed to by France. Accordingly Sweden prepared to support the cause of Alexander.

§ 42. In May Napoleon had completed his preparations, and had collected an enormous force of about 400,000 men in eastern Germany. With the empress he appeared in Dresden, where the vassal princes, including on this occasion the rulers of Austria and Prussia, assembled to pay him homage. To assure himself of the support of the Poles he sent De Pradt, archbishop of Mechlin, as ambassador to Warsaw. A diet was assembled, which formed itself into a General Confederation, and decreed the re-establishment of the Polish kingdom (26 June). To this act the king of Saxony gave his approval; but Napoleon, afraid of irritating Austria, merely declared that the old limits of Poland could not be restored. In spite of this unsatisfactory answer, the Poles displayed the greatest enthusiasm for the French cause, and fought with all the national gallantry against the hated Russians. On the 23rd of June the French crossed the Niemen and commenced the invasion of Russian Poland. As long as they marched through Polish territory they found no special difficulty, as the population was well-disposed; but when they reached Russia proper the difficulties of the task became evident. The roads were bad and the transports broke down; the health of the soldiers suffered from the extreme heat and the failure of supplies; the peasants showed themselves fanatically hostile to the invaders. Napoleon's plan was to fall upon the Russian troops as speedily as possible, and to inflict a crushing disaster. But he was delayed by numberless obstacles, and the delay was fatal. Barclay de Tolly, a Livonian, who commanded the main Russian army of 140,000 men, fell back from his original position at Wilna to join the southern army of 50,000 men under Bagration. But the latter failed to follow his instructions, and the junction was only effected at Smolensk, 300 miles from the frontier. This retreat, the result of accident rather than of design, was as successful as the most masterly strategy could have been. The invaders had lost nearly 100,000 men before they reached Smolensk. The Russians were now eager for a battle; but Barclay, who saw how successful his previous movements had been, determined to continue his retreat. He allowed the rear of his army to engage in an obstinate and indecisive contest; but in the meantime he fired Smolensk, and the next day the Russians had disappeared from the field (18 August). Napoleon was aghast at tactics of which he had had no previous experiences, but he determined to press on to Moscow, in the conviction that the loss of his capital would compel Alexander to treat. Meanwhile the Czar, listening to the complaints of the officers against a foreign commander, replaced Barclay by Kutusow, a native Russian, who was willing to gratify the general desire for a pitched battle. At Borodino the Russians waited for the French in a strong position, and a desperate struggle ensued (7 Sept.). The losses on both sides were enormous and nearly equal; and Napoleon, though the enemy retreated, had gained nothing but the power to march to Moscow. On the 14th of September he entered the Russian capital, and discovered to his horror that it had been deserted by all the native inhabitants. The next day a grand conflagration began, and, in spite of all the efforts of the French, three-quarters of the city were reduced to ruins. It was known afterwards that the governor, Count Rostopchin, had purposely had the fires kindled when the evacuation was determined upon. Even Napoleon was awed by such a reckless sacrifice of property; but he remained for five fatal weeks in Moscow, in the desperate hope that Alexander would give way. At last he had to resign hope, and on the 19th of October he gave the order for retreat. To avoid starvation he determined to take a more southerly route than that by which he had come. But Kutusow had foreseen this intention, and at Jaroslavetz the French were confronted with the Russian army (24 Oct.). A fierce contest ended in a French victory; but another such battle must result in annihilation, and Napoleon was compelled to take his old route, on which all supplies had been exhausted. From this moment the story of the retreat is one long catalogue of unimaginable horrors. The Russian winter set in with terrible severity, and thousands of the soldiers perished of cold. All discipline was given up, and the troops marched in a disorderly mass. Kutusow and his army, marching by a parallel road, cut off stragglers and constantly harassed the retreat. Ney, who commanded the French rear-guard, spent his time in constant fighting to protect the march, and displayed an unconquerable heroism which earned for him the name of "the bravest of the brave." If Kutusow had chosen, he could easily have annihilated the invaders and captured Napoleon, but he preferred to leave the task to the lower but surer agency of the climate. The crisis of the retreat was the crossing of the Beresina (27 Nov.). The Russians cannonaded the bridge, and nothing but the brilliant courage of the French saved them from total destruction. Soon after this Napoleon, irritated by the news that his death had been reported in Paris and had led to disorders there, quitted the army and hurried to the capital. The command was entrusted to Murat; but the soldiers were bitterly irritated at their desertion by the emperor, and did not hesitate to compare it to his conduct in Egypt. At last, on the 13th of December, a small and shattered remnant of the magnificent army that had started six months before, crossed the Niemen into Prussian territory. At least 200,000 men had perished in the invasion, and nearly as many more were prisoners in the hands of the Russians. Murat, who had been king of Naples since Joseph's elevation to the Spanish throne, thought Napoleon's cause ruined, and determined to make terms for himself. He contrived to pass through Germany in disguise, and arrived safely in his dominions. The command now devolved upon Eugène Beauharnais, who showed an honourable devotion to the man who had deserted his mother, and he succeeded in conducting the remnant of the grand army into safe quarters at Leipzig.

§ 43. The ruin of Napoleon's army made a profound impression in Germany, and especially in Prussia, which had suffered more than any other country from French aggressions. Now or never was the moment for the patriotic party to realise the objects for which they had long been working. But the king and ministry hesitated. The French army was still on Prussian soil and in possession of Prussian fortresses. Deliverance could only be obtained with the help of Russia, and the Russians were allies whom it was easy to call in but difficult to get rid of. The treaty of Tilsit was not yet forgotten, and Prussia might again have to pay the expenses of a reconciliation between France and Russia. On the other hand, if Prussia adhered to its alliance, the French would be saved from further disasters, the Russians would not advance beyond the Niemen, and Germany would remain as it stood. In such a case could not Prussia expect more from French gratitude than from Russian ambition? Moreover, it must not be forgotten that in Prussia, as in all the German states, there existed a strong French party, men who regarded the Empire as the legitimate successor of the Revolution, and who thought the abolition of feudal ideas and institutions a sufficient recompense for other sacrifices. The decision was one of vast importance both for Germany and for Europe, and fortunately it was not left to Frederick William III. General York, the commander of the Prussian contingent in French service, took upon himself to conclude the Convention of Tauroggen (30 Dec., 1812), by which his troops deserted the power they had been sent to assist and undertook to remain neutral. The king was aghast at the compromising act of his general, tried by all means to excuse himself to Napoleon, and went so far as to annul the Convention and to dismiss York. But public opinion was strongly in favour of the Russian alliance, and the king was soon induced to alter his mind. For a moment it was doubtful whether the Russians would cross the Niemen and undertake the task of freeing Germany. The old Russian party, with Kutusow at its head, was strongly in favour of standing on the defensive and leaving the foreigners to settle their own affairs. Alexander's hesitation was removed by the influence of Stein, who eagerly seized the opportunity for which he had long waited. Stein was appointed to administer East Prussia as the Czar's official, and in that capacity, which aroused the suspicion of many of his former colleagues, he did not hesitate to summon a diet at Königsberg (5 Feb., 1813), which decreed a levy in arms of the whole population for a war with France.

Frederick William III. found that his hand had been forced and that his only hope lay in obedience to the popular will. At the end of January he fled from Berlin to Breslau, and a month afterwards he concluded the treaty of Kalisch with the Czar (28 Feb.). Russia agreed to furnish 150,000 men, and Prussia was to supply at least 80,000. The latter kingdom was to be restored to its old dimensions before 1806; but Alexander was careful not to pledge himself to the former frontiers. The understanding was that Prussia should give up some of the Polish annexations and should be compensated with German territory. Vigorous measures were now taken to arm Prussia for the great struggle, and Scharnhorst was at last enabled to complete his military reforms. War was formally declared against France on the 16th of March, and on the next day the king departed from all the traditions of Prussian rule by publishing a touching appeal to his subjects. It was answered by an overwhelming burst of enthusiasm; classes vied with each other in making sacrifices for the public welfare, and in an incredibly short space of time the new military organisation was set on foot. A patriotic literature was called into being, which can boast the names of Körner, Rückert, and Arndt. Already Eugène Beauharnais had led his army from Prussian soil, and Berlin had been entered in triumph by the Russian commander Wittgenstein with York at his side (11 March).

§ 44. Meanwhile Napoleon, on his arrival in Paris, had speedily restored order and set to work to repair the terrible losses he had suffered. As his dynasty seemed to depend only upon his own life, he drew up rules for the administration of the country in case of his death. The Empress Maria Louisa was to be regent for his infant son, the King of Rome, who had been born in 1811. Cambacères, his former colleague in the consulship, was to be First Councillor of the Regency, and Champagny was to be chief Secretary. Further to secure his power he determined to bring his long quarrel with the church to a close. Pius VII. was brought from Savona to Fontainebleau, and there induced to sign a new concordat (25 au. 1813). In this he gave way on most of the points in dispute, authorised the metropolitan to confirm the bishops whom Napoleon had appointed, and practically abdicated his temporal sovereignty by agreeing to take up his residence at Avignon and to receive the proffered income of two million francs. But Napoleon's chief interest was the formation of a new army. The regular conscription of 1813 was collected, and that of 1814 anticipated, the national guard had to furnish 100,000 men, and recruits were collected in every possible way. To the astonishment of Europe the French army was numerically as formidable as ever. The new levies were doubtless raw and untrained, but there were sufficient veterans left to set them an example, and Napoleon and his marshals were unsurpassed in the art of inspiring their troops with courage and inuring them to hardship. But the new army had two fatal defects, it was almost without either artillery or cavalry, and these were the two arms on which Napoleon had been accustomed to rely.

§ 45. The allies commenced the "war of liberation" by issuing from Kalisch an appeal to all Germans to rise in defence of their liberty (25 March). But it met with a very scanty response. The princes of the Confederation of the Rhine were not yet prepared to break their bonds, or to accept any liberty that was not forced upon them. The most powerful of them, Frederick Augustus of Saxony, was so incapable of deciding between his personal wishes and his obligations to Napoleon that he escaped responsibility by flying to Prague, and he had no general to play the part of York. The allies were compelled to resort to arms to compel the adhesion of the states in whose behalf they were fighting. The only power that hastened to join the coalition was Sweden. Bernadotte, who practically ruled the country in the name of Charles XIII., was determined to effect the annexation of Norway, and in April he signed a treaty with Prussia, by which Sweden on this condition promised help against France. One result of this treaty was that Denmark adhered more closely than ever to Napoleon, who promised to guarantee the integrity of her dominions.

The supreme command of the allied forces was entrusted to Kutusow, and under him the chief authority was exercised by Wittgenstein and the Prussian cavalry-leader Blücher. The main efforts of the allies were directed towards Saxony. At Möckern Wittgenstein defeated prince Eugène (5 April), and forced him to retire to Magdeburg. By the end of the month Kutusow and Blücher arrived, and the combined Russian and Prussian armies occupied Dresden (24 April). Even this blow failed to induce the king of Saxony to declare himself, and by this time Napoleon had arrived with his new army, in which he had absorbed Eugène's troops. At Gross Görschen, near the scene of Gustavus Adolphus' great battle of Lützen, the first great contest was fought (2 May). The French were superior in numbers, and Napoleon's strategy gave him the victory. But the allies were neither crushed or dispersed, and might have resumed the battle if the Russians had not preferred to retreat behind the Elbe and to wait for reinforcements. Want of cavalry prevented the French from pursuing the enemy, and the march was conducted in perfect order and without loss. The unfortunate Frederick Augustus was compelled, on pain of deposition, to place his army at the disposal of the emperor and to announce his continued adhesion to the Confederation of the Rhine. Determined to follow up his first success, Napoleon now hastened to cross the Elbe and attacked the allies in the position they had assumed at Bautzen (20, 21 May). Again the Russians and Prussians displayed conspicuous courage, but again superior numbers and strategy gave the French the victory. Wittgenstein was now superseded by Barclay de Tolly, and the allies retreated into Silesia. A vigorous advance of the French might have terminated the campaign, but to everybody's surprise Napoleon opened negotiations and concluded an armistice for two months at Poischwitz (4 June).

§ 46. This armistice was afterwards recognised by Napoleon as one of the gravest errors he had ever committed. His motive is to be found in the threatening attitude of Austria, which had long been entreated to join the coalition. Metternich had no real sympathy with the leaders of the war of liberation. He regarded their dreams of a united Germany and the projected reforms of Stein as revolutionary and jacobinical. At the same time he was naturally anxious to recover for Austria what had been lost in the treaties of Pressburg and Vienna. His diplomacy was marvellously acute and well-timed, and circumstances played into his hands. He held back from the coalition until the Austrian alliance had become imperatively necessary, and he could dictate his own terms. On the 27th of June he concluded the treaty of Reichenbach, by which he undertook the congenial office of mediator, and promised that Austria would join the allies in case Napoleon rejected certain specified terms that were to be offered to him. These terms were wholly different from what had been anticipated in the alliance of Kalisch, and were primarily conceived in the interests of Austria. France was to cede the Illyrian Provinces to Austria, to dissolve the grand-duchy of Warsaw, to evacuate all the provinces which had been taken from Austria and Prussia, and to restore the district in north Germany which had been annexed in 1810. Napoleon was determined from the first to make no concessions, but, after a stormy interview with Metternich, he accepted the proposal of a congress at Prague. The congress was nothing more than a sham. Prussia used every effort to avert the possibility of the Austrian proposals being accepted, and Napoleon thought only of bringing his Italian army into Carniola so as to intimidate the Austrian government into remaining neutral. This scheme was based on a complete misconception, and on the 12th of August Austria declared war against France. From this moment the ultimate success of the coalition was almost assured, but at the same time it forfeited all hopes of carrying out its original programme.

§ 47. The interval of peace had been employed by both sides in military preparations, but in these the allies, being less exhausted, had a great advantage. They were able to put three considerable armies in the field and to plan a campaign on the grand scale. In Bohemia the chief army, 250,000 strong, was commanded by the Austrian Prince Schwarzenberg. Blücher was at the head of 100,000 Russians and Prussians, while the northern army in Brandenburg, consisting of the Swedish contingent and 50,000 troops of the allies, was led by Bernadotte, the crown-prince of Sweden. Great things were expected of the ex-marshal of France, but Bernadotte was not very eager to fight against his own countrymen, and his chief anxiety was to preserve his Swedish soldiers for a war with Denmark. England had concluded subsidy treaties with all the allied powers, and had stipulated for the restoration and increase of Hanover. The plan concerted by the allies was that the three armies should all converge upon Dresden, avoid separate encounters as much as possible, and only strike a great blow when their junction had made them irresistible.

Napoleon had very inferior numbers at his disposal, but he determined to surprise the enemy by a succession of rapid attacks. Oudinot was despatched against Berlin, but he was met and defeated at Gross Beeren by a portion of Bernadotte's army under Bülow (23 Aug.). Napoleon himself started to attack Blücher in Silesia, but his departure encouraged the Bohemian army to advance upon Dresden, and this news compelled him to entrust the command to Macdonald, and to return by forced marches to the defence of his head-quarters. Blücher now fell upon Macdonald and completely crushed him at Katzbach (26 Aug.). Meanwhile Napoleon arrived in time to save Dresden, and in a great battle under the walls the French were victorious (27 Aug.). Among the slain was Moreau, the hero of Hohenlinden, who had been recalled from his exile in America on the advice of Bernadotte as a possible rival to Napoleon in the favour of the French soldiers. The battle of Dresden was a great blow to the allies, but Napoleon was not strong enough to complete their defeat by an energetic pursuit. Vandamme, who had been sent with 40,000 men to attack the Bohemian army in the rear, was surrounded by superior numbers at Kulm, and after an obstinate conflict was compelled to capitulate with all his soldiers (30 Aug.). To complete the French disasters Ney, who had attempted to renew Oudinot's attack upon Berlin, was utterly routed by Bülow at Dennewitz (6 Sept.).

Napoleon's scheme of crushing the allies in detachments had failed. There was now nothing to prevent the junction of the allied forces, and from this moment the freedom of Germany was assured. The only question now left was what organisation should be given to the German states. At Kalisch the idea had been that all the princes of the Confederation should be expelled from their thrones, and if they were restored it should only be on conditions which should establish the unity of Germany. A central commission, with Stein as president, had actually been appointed to administer the territories which should be thus confiscated. But the adhesion of Austria to the coalition had foiled these schemes, and Metternich's conservative policy was enabled to prevail. By the treaty of Töplitz (Sept. 9, 1813), which confirmed the alliance between Russia, Prussia, and Austria, it was decided that all members of the Rhenish Confederation should retain their power and should merely resume their independent existence. The first state to take advantage of these advantageous terms was Bavaria, which had been the constant ally of Napoleon since 1805. By the treaty of Reid, Maximilian Joseph placed his army at the disposal of the allies and agreed to surrender Tyrol, but stipulated that he should receive ample compensation.

The allies were in no hurry to complete the work they had so auspiciously begun, and it was only Blücher's energy that at last induced them to advance. The news that the Silesian army had crossed the Elbe drew Napoleon from Dresden, but he was foiled in his attempt to force Blücher into a battle, and had to retire to Leipzig. Here he determined to make a stand against the enormous forces that were closing round him. After a number of minor but important engagements had been decided on the 16th October, the great "battle of the nations" was fought on the 18th. The French held their own throughout the day, but their losses were so great that they had to retreat in the evening, and they could not halt until they had crossed the Rhine. In Leipzig was found the unlucky king of Saxony, who was sent as a prisoner to Berlin. The French power in Germany, lately so irresistible, was now represented only by the garrisons which occupied the chief fortresses from east to west. Many of these, including Dresden, Danzig, Cüstrin, Stettin, and Torgau, were compelled to surrender in the next few months; but several, such as Magdeburg, Hamburg, and Mainz, held out till the conclusion of peace. The Confederation of the Rhine ceased to exist, and most of its unpatriotic members hastened to purchase the continuance of their rule by accepting the treaty of Töplitz. The only territories which fell to the administration of Stein's central commission were the kingdom of Saxony and the little duchy of Berg, which Napoleon had conferred on his infant nephew Louis after Murat's accession in Naples. Oldenburg and Brunswick were occupied by their former rulers. The kingdom of Westphalia disappeared on the flight of Jerome, and the elector of Hesse returned to Cassel. Outside Germany the effects of Napoleon's fall were equally felt. Holland was freed by General Bülow, and the son of the former Stadtholder was restored as Sovereign Prince of the Netherlands with the title of William I. Denmark was compelled to accept the treaty of Kiel (Jan. 14, 1814), by which the French alliance was abandoned, Norway was ceded to Sweden, and Heligoland to England. As compensation Frederick VI. was to receive Swedish Pomerania and Rügen. Thus Bernadotte received the reward of his adroit but not very generous conduct, and Sweden, losing the last of the acquisitions of Gustavus Adolphus, ceased to have any connection with Germany.

§ 48. To complete the list of Napoleon's disasters, this same year, 1813, witnessed the overthrow of his power in Spain. Soult with a large number of the best troops had been summoned to take part in the German war, and for the first time Wellington had to contend with fairly equal forces. In the spring he advanced from Ciudad Rodrigo, and the French retreated before him to Vittoria, a town on the high road to France. There Jourdan, who now commanded in Soult's place, was utterly defeated, and the Peninsular war was at last decided. Joseph retired from a kingdom which he had never been capable of ruling, and France itself was now exposed to attack. The task of defending the frontier was entrusted to Soult, who discharged it with skill and devotion. Step by step, however, Wellington fought his way through the Pyrenees, and in January he was able to reduce Bayonne.

§ 49. Even after the great successes of Leipzig and Vittoria the allies seem to have doubted their ability to depose Napoleon, and only the very boldest spirits ventured to propose such an enterprise. Invasions of France had rarely been successful in the past, and if Napoleon had enjoyed the real affection of his subjects, the march upon Paris would have been as impossible for Schwarzenberg as it had been for Charles V. or Marlborough. From their camp at Frankfort the allied sovereigns offered the usurper terms that after subsequent events appear impossible. Not only might he keep his crown, but France was to retain the left bank of the Rhine and enjoy its "natural frontier." This proposal, so disgraceful to the champions of Germany, was undoubtedly due to the preponderating influence of Austria, but fortunately Napoleon was still too confident to accept it. On his return to Paris he had roughly suppressed all tokens of the prevailing discontent and had occupied himself with wringing more conscripts from the exhausted people. As some of his acquisitions must needs be surrendered, he made a virtue of necessity by dismissing his two prisoners, Pius VII. and Ferdinand of Spain. He felt certain that the allies would not enter France until the spring, and that by that time he would be ready to receive them. But his expectations were not realised. Stein arrived in Frankfort and recovered his influence over Alexander I. By the end of November it was decided to withdraw the proposals of peace and to cross the Rhine. But the Austrians were only half-hearted in the matter, and it was not till January that the two armies of Schwarzenberg and Blücher arrived on French soil. This winter campaign rendered it impossible for Napoleon to defend the frontier, and he concentrated what forces he could collect in Champagne. Never did he display more desperate courage or more brilliant strategy. Again and again he contrived to separate the hostile forces and to inflict considerable defeats upon them, but want of troops rendered him unable to follow up his successes. To some extent these small victories were disadvantageous to him, for they prevented him from accepting the very favourable terms which were offered to him by a congress which met in February at Châtillon. He might have kept the French crown with the boundaries of 1792, but he persisted in demanding not only the Rhine frontier, but also the Italian kingdom for Eugène Beauharnais and establishments for his brothers Joseph and Jerome. These demands were so extravagant that the congress was dissolved, and the allies, who had renewed the coalition by the treaty of Chaumont (1 March), determined to bring the war to a close by advancing upon Paris. Bernadotte had now brought his army to join the other two, and Napoleon could not venture to meet such tremendous forces in the field. As a last resource he tried to divert the attention of the allies by marching round to their rear and attacking their communications. But no attention was paid to his movements, and the invaders marched steadily upon the capital. Maria Louisa and her son had gone to Blois, and the defence was entrusted to Joseph Bonaparte, who was now commander of the national guard, and Marmont. On the 30th of March, Blücher stormed the heights of Montmartre, and on the next day Marmont capitulated. The allied sovereigns made a solemn entry into Paris, and were welcomed with acclamations by a mob which had learned by experience to side with the strongest.

Napoleon arrived at Fontainebleau the day after hearing of this crowning misfortune which made further resistance hopeless. His marshals called upon him to abdicate, and he was obliged to send a letter to the allies in which he offered to resign his crown to his son. But the offer was refused, and on the 11th of April the terms of the bargain were finally settled. Napoleon abdicated unconditionally, and was allowed to rule as sovereign in the island of Elba, to retain the title of emperor, and to receive an income of two million francs. Just at this moment the last struggle upon French soil was being fought. After crossing the Pyrenees Wellington had pursued Soult from point to point, and finally defeated him at Toulouse (10 April). On the 4th of May Napoleon landed from an English frigate at Elba. His first wife, Josephine, did not long survive his downfall, as she died on the 29th of May. Eugène Beauharnais had to resign his hopes of the Italian kingdom and to content himself with the principality of Eichstädt in Bavaria.

§ 50. The occupation of Paris had placed France at the disposal of the allies, but as yet they had determined on nothing but the deposition of Napoleon. The infant king of Rome had the advantage of being the grandson of the Emperor of Austria, and the Czar was determined not to impose any ruler upon the French people against their will. If there had been any real enthusiasm for the Napoleonic dynasty it would have been allowed to continue. But the French had witnessed too many constitutional changes to have any prejudices as to the manner of their rule, and witnessed a foreign occupation as complacently as the establishment of the Directory or the Consulate. The only party which had any vigour at all was the royalists, and it was soon agreed that the Bourbons should be restored. The management of affairs during the interim was undertaken by the skilful hands of Talleyrand, who had always been a royalist at heart. At his dictation the Senate appointed a provisional government and drew up a constitution. Soon afterwards the count of Artois arrived in Paris with the title of Lieutenant of the kingdom. He concluded a military convention with the allies, by which the French garrisons were to evacuate the fifty-three fortresses which they still held in foreign countries (23 April). On the 29th of April the count of Provence, now Louis XVIII., who had been living during his exile at Hartwell in Buckinghamshire, made a formal entry into the city which he had quitted in 1792. He had enjoyed the reputation of a cultivated and moderate man in contrast with his hot-headed younger brother, but he was really imbued with all the old traditions of his family. He refused to accept the constitution which the Senate had drawn up, and insisted on the restoration of the absolute monarchy. It was only the firmness of Alexander I. that compelled him to make concessions, but he was determined that the liberty of his subjects should be regarded as a voluntary grant from the crown and not as a compact. On the 30th of May he concluded the treaty of Paris with the allied sovereigns. France was allowed to retain the frontiers of 1792, so that the annexation of Avignon and the Venaissin was confirmed, and to them was added several districts of Germany and Savoy, amounting to about a hundred square miles, and containing more than a million inhabitants. Almost all the colonies which England had seized were restored, expcet Mauritius, Tobago, and St. Lucia, and most of the stolen works of art wer, allowed to remain. No indemnity was demanded, and the allies undertook to evacuate French territory at once. Few conquered countries have ever been treated so leniently, especially when one considers the provocation that had been given. Holland was restored to the House of Orange, and it was arranged that its territory should be increased. The navigation of the Rhine was declared to be free. Most of the Dutch colonies were given back but England retained the Cape of Good Hope, Demerara, and

Essequibo. Switzerland was to be independent. The German states were to continue subject to the ruling sovereigns, but were to be united into a federation. Italy, with the exception of the portion to be restored to Austria, was to consist of independent states. All questions still unsettled were to be referred to a general Congress which was summoned to meet at Vienna within two months. At the instance of England a clause was inserted providing that the powers should make joint efforts for the suppression of the slave-trade. Private agreements between the allies settled that the addition to Holland should consist of Belgium; that Austria should receive in Italy the Venetian provinces and Lombardy as far as the Ticino; that Genoa should be given to the king of Sardinia; and that the four militant powers should reserve to themselves all questions about the redistribution of Germany, Italy, and Poland.

On the 2nd of June Louis XVIII. published the Charter of the French constitution, a draft of which had been submitted to the allies before the conclusion of the treaty. Two legislative chambers were to be appointed, the one of peers nominated by the crown, the other of deputies chosen by the people. A deputy must be over forty years old and pay a thousand francs in direct taxes; an elector must be over thirty and pay three hundred francs. The chamber of deputies had the right of granting taxes and supervising expenditure. The king reserved to himself the right of initiating laws; ministers were to be responsible; the peers were to be free; and all citizens were declared eligible to office. The old nobles recovered their titles, and the new nobles were confirmed in their rank. The Roman Catholic religion was declared to be that of the state, but all other beliefs were to be tolerated. The Charter was signed by Louis XVIII. as given "in the 19th year of his reign."

V. THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA AND THE HUNDRED DAYS.

§ 51. The Congress of Vienna was the greatest European assembly that had met since the Council of Constance. Every country except Turkey was represented. Besides the rulers of Russia, Austria, and Prussia, the kings of Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Denmark, with a number of lesser German princes, were present in person. But the most important members were the ministers of the great states: Metternich for Austria; Hardenberg for Prussia; Castlereagh, and afterwards Wellington, for England; Nesselrode for Russia; and Talleyrand for France. A secret article of the Peace of Paris had reserved the most burning questions for the separate decision of Austria, Russia, Prussia, and England.

But this arrangement was overthrown by the audacious and masterly intrigues of Talleyrand, who, at first barely tolerated, gradually managed to share with Metternich the chief influence in the deliberations. The first few weeks were spent in festivities, and it was not till the 1st of November that business was commenced. Even then the formal sittings of the Congress were of slight importance, as the real decisions were arrived at in private colloquies between the chief ambassadors. The Congress marks the formal triumph of the reaction against the principles of the Revolution, but its proceedings were characterised by a disregard of popular rights, of differences of race and religion, and of historical tradition, worthy of Napoleon in his most absolute days. Europe was treated as if it were a blank map which might be divided simply into arbitrary districts of so many square miles and so many inhabitants.

The most critical questions that required settlement were connected with the fate of Saxony and Poland. Alexander I. had set his heart on obtaining the grand-duchy of Warsaw, and Prussia demanded as compensation for its loss in the east the whole of Saxony. But Austria was firmly opposed to such an aggrandisement of its old rival, and was supported on this point by England and France. Bavaria and most of the lesser German states were actuated by bitter jealousy against Prussia. Hardenberg lost ground by foolishly supporting Austria in opposition to Russia in the Polish question, and trusting to the gratitude of Metternich. So high did feeling run that at one time there seemed a prospect of a new European war, and a formal alliance was concluded between Austria, England, and France. Ultimately, however, the matter was peacefully settled. Saxony was divided into two parts, the one including Dresden and Leipzig was restored to Frederick Augustus, the other was ceded to Prussia. As further compensation Prussia obtained Posen with the town of Thorn in the east, and in the west all that had been lost by the treaty of Tilsit, the duchies of Jülich and Berg, the old electoral territories of Cologne and Trier with the city of Aachen, and parts of Luxemburg and Limburg. Russia received the whole of the grand-duchy of Warsaw except Posen and Thorn, and Alexander fulfilled his promises to the Poles by granting them a liberal constitution.

It is impossible to do more than summarise the other decisions of the Congress. Swedish Pomerania had been ceded by the treaty of Kiel to Denmark, but had long been coveted by Prussia. The Danish claims were bought off with two million thalers and the duchy of Lauenburg, but Hanover had to be compensated for the latter by the cession of the devotedly loyal province of East Friesland, one of the acquisitions of Frederick the Great. Hanover, which now assumed the rank of a kingdom without opposition, was also aggrandised by the acquisition of Hildesheim, Goslar, and other small districts. Austria was naturally one of the great gainers by the Congress. Eastern Galicia was restored by Russia, and the Tyrol, Salzburg, and the Inn district by Bavaria. As compensation for the Netherlands, Venetia and Lombardy became Austrian provinces. Bavaria, in return for its losses in the east, received Würzburg, Aschaffenburg, and its former possessions in the Palatinate. Long discussions took place about the constitution to be given to Germany, and here the hopes of the national party were doomed to bitter disappointment. Metternich would hear nothing of the proposed revival of the mediæval Empire, and Prussia was not yet strong enough to assume an imperial position in opposition to Austria. Finally a Confederation was formed which secured the semblance of unity, but gave almost complete independence to the separate states. The members numbered thirty-eight, and included the four remaining free cities, Frankfort, Hamburg, Lübeck, and Bremen, and the kings of Denmark and the Netherlands. The diet was to meet at Frankfort under the presidency of Austria, but in matters concerning religion or the rights of members the decision of a majority was not to be binding. The Confederation was as weak and disunited as the old Empire and had none of its traditions or prestige.

In Italy the same process of restoration and subdivision was carried out. Victor Emmanuel I. recovered his kingdom of Sardinia, with the addition of Genoa as compensation for the portion of Savoy which France retained. Modena was given to a Hapsburg prince, Francis IV., son of the archduke Ferdinand, and Beatrice the heiress of the house of Este. Tuscany was restored to Ferdinand III., a brother of the Austrian Emperor. Charles Louis, son of the Bourbon king of Etruria, was compensated with Lucca and a promise of the succession in the duchy of Parma, which was for the time given to Napoleon's wife, Maria Louisa. Pius VII. had already returned to Rome, and the Papal States now recovered their old extent. But Pius refused at first to accept these terms because he was deprived of Avignon and the Venaissin, and because Austrian garrisons were in occupation of Ferrara and Comacchio. Naples was left for a time in the hands of Joachim Murat, as a reward for his desertion of Napoleon after the battle of Leipzig. Switzerland was declared independent and neutral, but its federal unity was loosened by a new constitution (Aug., 1815). The number of cantons were raised to twenty-two by the addition of Geneva, Wallis (Valais), and Neufchâtel, the last under Prussian suzerainty. The position of capital was to be enjoyed in rotation by Berne, Zurich, and Lucerne. The kingdom of the Netherlands was formed for the house of Orange by the union of Holland and Belgium and the addition of Luxemburg, which made the king a member of the German Confederation. The professed object of this artificial union of Catholics and Protestants was the erection of a strong bulwark against French aggressions.

§ 52. The deliberations at Vienna had been hurried on by the news that Napoleon had suddenly quitted Elba and had landed at Cannes (1 March, 1815). The allies had already recognised the folly of placing an adventurous and reckless man midway between two kingdoms, both of which had once belonged to him and which were still unsettled. In France the Bourbons failed to make themselves popular, and it was difficult for Frenchmen not to contrast the humiliation of receiving a dynasty at foreign dictation with the recent glories of the empire. The prevalent discontent, of which intelligence was despatched to Elba, coupled with the news of disputes among the allies, encouraged Napoleon to make a last effort to regain his power. For the moment everything seemed to favour him. The audacity and suddenness of his movement dazzled and attracted the people. In his proclamations he undertook to give up all thought of aggression and to grant a liberal constitution. All the towns hastened to open their gates to him. His old comrades, Soult, Masséna, and Augereau, espoused his cause, and even Ney, who had completely gone over to the Bourbons, was gained by a few words from his old commander. Louis XVIII. was speedily convinced that resistance was impossible and fled to Ghent. On the 30th of March Napoleon entered the Tuileries, and at once appointed a ministry which included Fouché, Carnot, Maret, Cambacères, etc. In a formal announcement of his return to the allies he offered to accept the treaty of Paris.

§ 53. The news of Napoleon's success decided the action of Murat, who was discontented with his treatment by the allies. He had made terms with Austria at the beginning of 1814, in the hope of obtaining all Italy south of the Po as a kingdom for himself. That hope had been destroyed by the restoration of Pius VII. and of the rulers of Tuscany and Modena, and he felt that Naples would not long be left to him. By secret negotiations he had reconciled himself with Napoleon at Elba, and he now determined openly to espouse the cause of his brother-in-law. He issued a manifesto calling upon the Italians to rise on behalf of their freedom and unity, and led his Neapolitan troops into the Papal States. Austria gladly welcomed the breach of a treaty which had become a serious obstacle to her policy. Murat's early successes were speedily reversed when the Austrian armies had time to unite. He was defeated in a two days' battle at Tolentino (May 2, 3), and, returning to Naples, he embarked with a few of his immediate followers for the south of France. Two days later the Austrian troops entered Naples and restored Ferdinand IV., who now assumed the title of "Ferdinand I. of the Two Sicilies."

§ 54. Meanwhile the allies had refused to listen to Napoleon's proposals and had declared him the public enemy of Europe. Steps were at once taken to prepare for war, and the English and Prussian armies were assembled in Belgium under Wellington and Blücher respectively. Napoleon on his side was eager to strike the first blow and if possible to divide the two armies so as to defeat them separately. He succeeded in thrusting himself between the English and Prussians, but they were so near together that he had to fight a double battle on the 16th of June. At Ligny the Prussians, after an obstinate struggle, were compelled to retreat. But at Quatre Bras Wellington's mixed army of English, Belgians, and Hanoverians, made a successful resistance to the attacks of Ney. Still, on the whole, the French had a distinct advantage, and a rapid and energetic movement might have given them a great victory. But Napoleon seemed to have lost some of his old vigour and resolution. The 17th of June was wasted on a review, and he miscalculated both the losses of the Prussians and their line of retreat. Thinking that they were utterly routed, he detached 30,000 men under Grouchy to pursue them in the direction of Liège. But Blücher, with Gneisenau to help him, had already rallied his troops and retired northwards to Wavre, whence it was possible for him to advance to Wellington's assistance. On the 18th of June the great battle of Waterloo, or of La Belle Alliance, as the Prussians prefer to call it, was fought. Through the whole day the obstinate courage of the English held their position against the desperate assaults of the French. At last the battle was decided by the arrival of the Prussians, which had been wholly unforeseen by Napoleon. His line had to be weakened to oppose them, and the English were thus enabled to assume the aggressive. By the combined exertions of the allies the French army was driven from the field, and the Prussian pursuit completed the rout. Napoleon had fled when he saw that all was hopeless, and on the evening of the 20th of June he returned to Paris. The steady advance of the allies and the obvious disinclination of the citizens to suffer in his personal cause proved to Napoleon that he could not struggle with destiny. For the second time he abdicated in favour of his son, appointed a commission to govern France, and endeavoured to escape from Rochfort to America. But the port was blockaded by the English fleet, and he embarked on the Bellerophon, throwing himself upon the generosity of a country that had never refused to shelter the unfortunate. But with the allies policy prevailed over sentiment, and on his arrival at Plymouth Napoleon learned that he had been condemned to imprisonment in the island of St. Helena. There he lived, surrounded by a few faithful followers, for six gloomy years, until his death on the 5th of May, 1821.

§ 55. Murat's fate was soon decided. Napoleon had disapproved of his rash movement, and had forbidden him to quit the south of France. On the news of Waterloo he determined to return to his former kingdom and to raise an insurrection against the Bourbon king. In October he landed on the coast of Calabria, but the population refused to rise on his behalf. Before he could effect his escape he was captured, tried and condemned by a military commission, and shot (15 Oct., 1815). His rapid rise from an ignoble origin and his tragic fate have given Murat a reputation in history which he hardly deserves.

§ 56. Long before this Wellington and Blücher had appeared before Paris, and, after an attempted resistance on the part of Davoust, the city capitulated on the 3rd of July. The Prussian general was eager to despoil the French, and expressed in a letter to his king the hope "that the diplomatists would not be allowed a second time to lose what the soldiers had won with their blood." Wellington had had great difficulty in preventing his colleague from blowing up the bridge of Jena over the Seine. Again the allies had France at their disposal. But practically the matter had been settled by the intrigues of Fouché, who was president of the provisional government. He convinced Louis XVIII. that moderation was necessary in his own interests, he gained over Wellington, always attached to the cause of legitimacy, and he contrived to secure the tranquillity of Paris. On the 8th of July Louis XVIII. returned, and the allied sovereigns, when they hurried to Paris to settle affairs, were surprised to find that one part of the problem was already solved. Talleyrand and Fouché were both appointed ministers, and their ability was conspicuously displayed at this crisis. A Congress was formed at Paris to arrange a final peace, and this time Prussia pressed very earnestly that France should be rendered powerless for the future. But Alexander I. was inclined to treat the conquered country generously, and the French ministers found means to work upon his susceptible nature. England and Austria took the same view, and ultimately the second Peace of Paris was concluded on the 20th of November. France had to pay an indemnity of 700,000,000 francs, and to maintain for five years an allied army of 150,000 men in the chief northern fortresses. The frontier of France was on the whole the same as had been settled the year before, but several small districts were given to Belgium and Prussia, and the king of Sardinia recovered the ceded portion of Savoy. Still France was larger than before the Revolution, as the Venaissin was twice the size of these last districts. Most of the works of art which Napoleon had collected had already been returned to their original homes.

The territorial changes that followed the downfall of the Napoleonic empire were too artificial to be permanent. The formation of national unity in Germany and Italy was delayed, but not prevented. In Italy, Napoleon's rule, worthless as it was in itself, had created a passion for unity and a feeling of enmity against the Hapsburgs and other dynasties which stood in its way, and these feelings were destined to ripen. In Germany, Prussia had made great, if unconscious, strides towards a national headship. By giving up her Slavonic provinces in the east and obtaining compensation in the west she had become a purely German power. By the acquisition of the Rhenish provinces she had become the champion of Germany against France. All that was needed to complete the work was the exclusion of Austria, as a really Slavonic power, from German affairs, and a new war with France. These conditions realised, Germany was to commence a new era in its history under Prussian guidance.

CHAPTER XXV.

EUROPE AFTER THE GREAT WAR.

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I. Western Europe and the Holy Alliance.

§ 1. **England** had done more than any other country to crush the power of Napoleon, but in the eyes of Europe it was Russia that had contributed most to his final overthrow. The story of the French invasion and of the burning of Moscow had fascinated men's minds and given them a profound impression of the invincible strength of the great eastern empire. Alexander I. found himself the greatest of living sovereigns and elevated to a kind of European dictatorship. He became impressed with the idea that he had a divine mission to restore peace and order to the world, and his enthusiastic temperament gave way to the impulses of religious superstition. He fell under the influence of the Baroness Krudener, a native of Riga, with whom he spent several hours of each day in prayer and consultation. At her instigation he drew up the plan of the famous Holy Alliance, to which he obtained the assent of the rulers of Austria and Prussia on the 26th of September, 1815. The three monarchs solemnly announced their intention of regulating their foreign and domestic policy by the precepts of Christianity, and declared that they would rule justly, promote brotherly love among their subjects, and do all in their power to maintain peace. All princes, except the Pope and the Sultan, were invited to join the alliance, which was to introduce a new era into Europe, and to prevent the recurrence of such convulsions as that which had lately been experienced.

The motives which were expressed in the preamble were sincere at the moment, but they were the outcome of an unpractical enthusiasm that was entirely out of date. The objects of the Holy Alliance were necessarily modified by circumstances. The Revolution had been apparently suppressed, but its principles survived, and to some extent they had been adopted by the conquerors. The French empire had fallen before the power of the peoples, who demanded a share in the government as a reward for their dangers and exertions. The old system of personal and irresponsible rule seemed to be an anachronism, and was regarded as such even by the Russian Czar. Alexander I. promised a constitution to the vassal kingdom of Poland which the treaty of Vienna had subjected to him. Frederick William III. had made a similar promise to Prussia. More conspicuous still, the allies had not only permitted, but had almost compelled, Louis XVIII. to give a charter to France. It seemed likely that before long every country in Europe would receive a constitution on the model of that of England, and that the people would be allowed a voice in the control of taxation and expenditure. But these liberal principles of Alexander and his colleagues were accompanied with important reservations. All these constitutional privileges were to be free grants from the sovereign, any attempt on the part of the people to enforce concessions was regarded as Jacobinism, and any tendency in that direction must be suppressed as endangering the tranquillity of Europe. It was obvious from the first that this presupposed an amount of contentment among the subject populations that did not exist. The arrangements of the treaty of Vienna had been in the highest degree artificial, and they could not be maintained without the employment of force. Before long the Holy Alliance abandoned its high sounding professions and became simply a league of sovereigns against the people—a kind of European police to put down all liberal movements. As such as it was joined by most of the European powers except England, which was necessarily in sympathy with the constitutional aspirations on the continent, and could not honourably withhold from others the blessings which she enjoyed herself. But her refusal in the first instance was due rather to accident than to principle. The Alliance was a personal league of princes, it was simply signed "Francis, Frederick William, Alexander." English traditions made it impossible for the Prince Regent to accept a treaty except through the intervention of a responsible minister. But Castlereagh, who was foreign secretary at this time, was on the whole in sympathy with the reactionary policy of the great powers, and for some years England continued in cordial relations with her continental allies.

§ 2. It was in Germany that the force of the reaction first displayed itself. In Austria the old absolute government had not been shaken by the revolution, and was continued without opposition. The Viennese were too careless and pleasure-loving to desire liberties which involved labour, and the real danger to Austria, the national aspirations of the Bohemians and Hungarians, had not yet arisen. Francis I. was a cautious and not unpopular sovereign, and Metternich, an amiable *roué*, thought only of suppressing disorder during his own generation. *Après nous le déluge* was his favourite sentiment. The finances were so culpably mismanaged that the debt continued to increase in time of peace, and the state fell under the control of Jewish money-lenders. In Prussia the ardent hopes that had been roused by the war of liberation were doomed to bitter disappointment. Frederick William III., well-meaning but weak, submissively followed the lead of Russia, and sought only to secure quiet to his exhausted country. Hardenberg, who remained chief minister till his death, broke off his connection with the reforming party and adopted the royal system. The promised constitution was withheld, and expressions of discontent were carefully suppressed. At the same time the administration was honest and efficient, which helped to prevent any outbreak. But Prussia lost the chance of assuming the leadership of Germany, and the lesser states, who were jealous of her influence, adopted a more liberal attitude as the reaction gained ground in Berlin. In Wurtemberg, Bavaria, Baden, Hanover, Brunswick, and other provinces, the rulers granted constitutions on the model of the French Charter. But care was taken not to allow popular privilege to encroach upon prerogative, and the machinery of the Confederation was employed to suppress the slightest tendency towards liberal opinions. In 1817 a sensation was created by a grand meeting of German students at the Wartburg to celebrate the anniversary of the Reformation. Real alarm was professed two years later when Kotzebue, the dramatist, was assassinated by a student named Sand. The motive for the act was that Kotzebue was in correspondence with Alexander I., and was supposed to have warned him against the liberal spirit in the German universities. Metternich took advantage of this occurrence to hold a conference of ministers at Carlsbad, where it was decided to take active measures. The press was subjected to a rigorous censorship, the control of the universities was transferred to officials appointed by the government, and a commission was established at Mainz to examine into the supposed conspiracy and to punish the guilty. Metternich wished to utilise the opportunity to suppress the constitutions of the lesser states, but in this he was foiled. The rulers of these states wished to be popular with their subjects in order to strengthen themselves against Austria and Prussia, and they were supported by the Czar, who was anxious to keep a hold on Germany. The commission at Mainz continued in activity for some years, but no real conspiracy existed, and the only result of its labours was the removal of a number of liberal professors from their chairs.

§ 3. Few princes have ever been placed in a more difficult position than that of Louis XVIII. after his second restoration in 1815. It is true that any open opposition was impossible as long as the allied troops remained in occupation of French soil; but the very fact that he owed his crown to foreign intervention was one of the great causes of his insecurity. Under these circumstances he took the wisest course open to him and determined to conciliate the people by a punctilious observance of his engagements and by avoiding a revengeful and reactionary policy. But he found himself confronted by vehement opposition from his own family and his immediate followers. A royalist reaction had set in like that of 1660 in England. In the southern provinces the people rose and massacred the Bonapartists. In Paris the emigrant nobles demanded the restoration of the old régime and the punishment of all who were connected with the recent revolution. At the head of this extreme party was the king's brother, the Count of Artois, whose position was the more important as he was heir-apparent to the throne. His residence in the Tuileries, the Pavillon Marsan, became the headquarters of the Ultras, and he went so far as to urge the revocation of the Charter. Louis XVIII. was determined not to yield to the solicitations of this party, or to adopt a policy which must inevitably lead to a new revolution as soon as the first force of the reaction was spent. But certain concessions had to be made, especially as the majority in the newly elected chambers was vehemently royalist. Talleyrand and Fouché were dismissed from the ministry, and their places taken by the duc de Richelieu, who had won an honourable reputation in the Russian service as the founder and governor of Odessa, and M. Decazes. Ney and several others who had betrayed the monarchy on Napoleon's return were tried and executed. Three laws were proposed and carried, to put down seditious cries, to authorise extraordinary arrests by the government, and to create special military courts for the summary trial of political crimes without the intervention of a jury. But here the government determined to stop, and when the majority of the chambers demanded more extreme measures and clamoured against the granting of an amnesty to traitors, Louis dissolved them. On the 5th of September, 1816, he issued an edict on his own authority, which made important changes in the system of representation. The number of deputies was reduced from 394 to 260, and the franchise, as settled by the Charter, was secured to all who paid 300 francs in direct taxes. The measure was a *coup d'état* in the liberal interest, and it was for the moment completely successful. The moderate party was in a majority in the new chamber of deputies, and the danger from the royalists was averted. But the change involved serious dangers in the future. A fifth of the chamber had to be renewed every year, and it was almost certain that the new elections would be more and more liberal in their character. Neither the king nor Richelieu were prepared to free themselves from the party of reaction in order to fall into the hands of the radicals.

But at first this danger was overlooked, the ministry and the legislature were in accord with each other, and a good opportunity seemed to present itself for freeing France from the expensive humiliation of its foreign garrison. In 1817 a part of the allied troops was recalled, and the moderation of Alexander I., who wished France to be strong enough to balance the other western powers, obtained a diminution of the indemnity which was to be paid before the occupation altogether ceased. In September, 1818, a great Congress of princes and ministers met at Aix-la-Chapelle. Here it was agreed that the occupation of French territory should entirely cease by the 30th of November, five years before the stipulated date. Next to the Czar the chief advocate of this generous act was the duke of Wellington, who had won universal respect as commander of the allied army. At the same time France was admitted to a share with the other great powers in regulating the affairs of Europe. By a treaty which was drawn up in November, the five powers, the "pentarchy" as they were called, pledged themselves to act in concord for the maintenance of European peace. In case of any disturbance measures were to be concerted at a congress, either of the sovereigns themselves or of their chief ministers.

This signal diplomatic triumph seemed to give additional security to the ministry of Richelieu. But he was troubled by the increasing liberal majority in the chamber of deputies, and especially by the elections of 1818, at which Lafayette, Manuel, and Benjamin Constant were returned. He attributed these disasters to the edict of September, 1818, which gave a majority of votes to the lower middle class, and he became convinced of the necessity of again changing the electoral law. As the king refused to recognise this necessity, Richelieu resigned in December, and Decazes became head of a purely liberal ministry. A number of popular measures followed. The censorship was abolished and trial by jury was established for cases concerning the press. To prevent opposition from the upper chamber the king consented to the creation of sixty new peers, nearly all of whom were men who had occupied important positions under the empire. The royalists were in despair, and the count of Artois maintained that his brother must have lost his senses. But Louis XVIII. soon discovered that even these enormous concessions had failed to conciliate the extreme liberals either to the crown or to the ministry. One of the chief causes of complaint was an agreement that had been made with the Pope, by which Napoleon's concordat was annulled, and the old concordat between Francis I. and Leo X. (1516) was restored. Decazes found himself attacked on both sides, and at last began to meditate some modification of the electoral edict of 1816. But while the matter was being discussed an event happened which completely revolutionised French politics. On the 13th of February, 1820, the duke of Berry, second son of the Count of Artois, was assassinated by a man named Louvel. His death was the more important because his elder brother, the duke of Angoulême, was childless, and it was to the duke of Berry that men looked for a continuation of the royal line. He had been married in 1816 to Caroline Mary, granddaughter of the king of Naples, who was already the mother of a daughter, and who was pregnant at the time of her husband's murder. An irresistible royalist reaction now set in, Decazes had to resign, and Richelieu once more undertook the direction of affairs, with the support of the right instead of the left in the chambers. The censorship of the press was re-established and a new electoral law was introduced, which placed the election of half the deputies in the hands of the wealthy classes. The feeling in favour of the crown was increased by two events, the birth of a son, Henry duke of Bordeaux, to the duchess of Berry in September, 1820, and the death of the late emperor at St. Helena on the 5th of May, 1821. In December, 1821, Richelieu, who found himself more and more out of harmony with the Ultras, resigned office for the second time, and was succeeded by Villèle, the recognised leader of the royalist party. From this time Louis XVIII., whose energy declined with advancing years, and who fell under the influence of Madame du Cayla, practically resigned his authority to the count of Artois. Another change in the constitution, which abolished the annual election of a fifth of the deputies, and authorised the chamber to sit for seven years, secured the victory of the reactionary party.

§ 4. Nothing illustrates more clearly the wisdom of Louis XVIII. than a comparison of the policy pursued by another restored Bourbon, Ferdinand VII. of Spain. When Ferdinand was released by Napoleon at the beginning of 1814, Spain was still governed by the Cortes which had been created under the constitution of 1812. At first the king undertook to maintain this form of government, but on arriving on Spanish soil he discovered that the liberal administration was by no means popular among the peasants and was detested by the priests. Ferdinand was a worthless and incapable prince, who had learned nothing in his four years' captivity except an aptitude for lying and intrigue, and who was subject to two guiding passions, sensuality and superstition. From Valencia he issued an edict dissolving the Cortes and promising a new constitution in place of that of 1812. So strong was the reaction in favour of the monarchy that this measure was hailed with applause, and the king entered Madrid in triumph. No sooner was he established on the throne than he threw his promises to the wind and restored the old absolutism with all its abuses. The nobles recovered their privileges and their exemption from taxes, the monasteries were restored, the Inquisition resumed its activity, and the Jesuits returned to Spain. All Liberals and all adherents of Joseph Bonaparte were ruthlessly persecuted. The government was conducted by a *camarilla* of worthless courtiers and priests, who encouraged the king to fresh acts of reactionary violence. For six years this royalist reign of terror was continued, and the suppression of isolated revolts gave occasion for new cruelties. The finances of the country were in the most wretched condition, owing to the loss of the American colonies, which had taken advantage of Napoleon's conquest of Spain to establish their independence. Instead of trying to restore prosperity by maintaining peace, Ferdinand squandered large sums upon futile expeditions to recover the colonies. One of his expedients for raising money was the sale of Florida to the United States in 1819. Discontent in Spain found expression in numerous secret societies, for which the model was found in Italy. It was among the soldiers, neglected and ill-paid, that these societies found their most numerous and active adherents. At last, in 1820, the standard of revolt was raised at Cadiz by Riego and Quiroga, two officers of an expedition that had been prepared for South America. Vigorous action at the outset might have crushed the rising, but Ferdinand and his advisers were as incapable as they were tyrannical, and before long the movement had spread over the whole country. In March the king gave way and accepted the constitution of 1812. The royalists, the *serviles* as they were called, were dismissed from office and their places taken by liberals. The Cortes met in July, and at once proceeded to dissolve the monasteries and the Inquisition, to confiscate the clerical tithes, to abolish entails, and to secure freedom for the press and for popular meetings. At first the moderate party, headed by Martinez de la Rosa, endeavoured to suppress disorder and to establish a durable constitutional government. But this the king was determined to prevent, and the moderates were defeated by a factious combination of royalists and radicals. Risings of the loyal and bigoted peasants in the provinces were suppressed, and contributed to the victory of the extreme party. In 1822 the election of Riego as president of the Cortes seemed to mark the final triumphs of the revolution in Spain.

§ 5. The rising in Spain gave the signal for similar movements in other countries. Portugal, as being the nearest, was the first to feel the impulse. The Portuguese had many grievances to complain of. On the first invasion of Marshal Junot the royal family had fled to Brazil. When, in 1816, the death of Maria gave the crown to the former regent, John VI., he continued to reside in Rio Janeiro as ruler of the United Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil, and the Algarves. The government of Portugal was entrusted to a council of regency at Lisbon. But the real power was in the hands of Lord Beresford, who remained commander-in-chief of the army after the conclusion of the war. The Portuguese were naturally indignant that their country should be ruled by a foreigner, and that it should be treated as an appendage of one of its own colonies. In August, 1820, the events in Spain encouraged a rising, for which a convenient opportunity was given by the absence of Beresford at Rio. A revolutionary junta was established at Oporto and speedily obtained adherents in the other towns. The council of regency was compelled to abdicate, and a constitution was introduced on the model of that of Spain. Lord Beresford was refused admittance to Lisbon and had to sail to England, but the government refused to interfere in the internal affairs of Portugal. At the same time the revolutionary movement spread to Brazil, where it found a supporter in the king's eldest son, Don Pedro. The result was that John VI. had to resign the administration to his son, and with the rest of his family sailed to Lisbon, where he arrived on the 3rd of July, 1821. Here he was compelled to accept the constitution which had been established in his absence. These events were followed by the formal separation of Brazil from Portugal. The Cortes at Lisbon was determined to reduce the powerful colony to its former independence, and orders were sent to Don Pedro to return to Portugal. The prince, convinced that such a step would result in the loss of Brazil to the house of Braganza, refused obedience, and was supported by his subjects. In 1822 he was proclaimed Emperor of Brazil and adopted a constitution. The northern provinces, which were averse to a separation from the mother-country, were reduced to obedience with the help of the English admiral, Lord Cochrane.

§ 6. In Italy the house of Hapsburg had recovered even more than its old predominance by the treaty of Vienna. The instinct of self-preservation impelled Austria to do all in its power to crush the tendencies towards self-rule or national unity which had been aroused during the Napoleonic period. In the provinces of Lombardyand Venice a carefully organised system of espionage and police, with an active censorship of the press, reduced the people to dumb, if unsatisfied, submission. But for absolute security it was necessary that the other states of the peninsula should pursue the same system, so that there should be no ground for jealous comparisons. This object was also obtained. The rulers of Parma and Modena obeyed the slightest hint from Vienna, and anxiously copied the Austrian administration in every detail. In Rome, Pius VII., and still more his successor, Leo XII., strove successfully to restore the old traditions of priestly rule. In Tuscany, Ferdinand III. allowed a certain freedom of thought and expression, and Florence became a refuge for men whose utterances were checked elsewhere. But the grand duke was too much of a Hapsburg to extend this liberty to politics; all popular institutions were suppressed, the police were as active as in Milan, and the people were encouraged to forget public affairs in a life of indolent pleasure. In Naples the aged Ferdinand I. owed his restoration to Austria, and was thus compelled, even if he had not wished it himself, to suppress all liberal tendencies. One of his first acts on recovering his independence was to revoke the constitution which he had given to Sicily while he was under the guidance of the English admiral, Lord Bentinck. Any energy that was wanting to the king himself was amply supplied by his wife, Caroline, who constantly urged her husband to fresh precautions against revolution. But the province in which the reaction was most thoroughly carried out was Piedmont. During the French occupation the king, Victor Emmanuel, had lived quietly in the island of Sardinia, completely untouched by all that was passing on the continent. He returned to Turin with all the prejudices and prepossessions of a system that was thoroughly out of date. Regardless of the confusion and absurdity that was involved in such an act, he issued an edict which abolished all laws and regulations introduced by the French, and restored the government as it had existed in 1770. Even the new roads were abandoned, and it was almost decided to destroy the bridge which Napoleon had built across the Po. As compared with the system pursued at Turin the Austrian government of Milan appeared liberal and far-seeing. But liberal opinions survived in Piedmont and were nourished by the neighbourhood of France. Among their adherents was a member of the royal house, Charles Albert, Prince of Carignano. As both Victor Emmanuel and his brother Charles Felix were childless, Charles Albert was the legitimate heir to the throne. But so strong was the reaction, that the idea was entertained of disinheriting him, and securing the succession to the archduke Francis IV. of Modena, who had married a daughter of Victor Emmanuel, and whose reactionary principles were above suspicion.

§ 7. Although the government of the Italian provinces corresponded so exactly to the wishes of Austria, there was still some ground for uneasiness in the numerous secret societies which covered the whole country. The most important and active of these was the famous *Carbonari*, which eagerly watched for an opportunity of overthrowing foreign despotism and effecting the simultaneous union and freedom of Italy. The first opening for active measures was given by the effect of the Spanish revolution in Naples, always closely connected with Spain by dynastic ties. Here, as in Spain, the movement originated with the army. The garrison of Nola raised the first cry for the Spanish constitution, other troops followed the example, and General Pepé, a popular officer, assumed the lead of the rebellion. No semblance of resistance was made by Ferdinand I., who at once undertook to form a liberal ministry and to take the oath to the constitution, of the provisions of which both he and the rebels were completely ignorant. In four days the revolution was accomplished without disturbance, and the king even went out of his way to express his gratitude to General Pepé and his determination to uphold the new system.

Very different was the course of events in Sicily, where the people hated the Neapolitans and wished to break off the connection between the two kingdoms. The news reached Palermo on the festival of St. Rosalia (14 July, 1820), the patron saint of the city. A wild tumult followed, in which a number of lives were lost, and the governor and other officials escaped with difficulty. Envoys were sent to Naples to demand legislative independence and a free constitution. But the Neapolitans were indignant at the excesses that had disgraced the movement in Sicily, and were eager to maintain their hold over the island. An army was sent under Florestan Pepé, brother of the popular hero, to enforce obedience, and Palermo, after an obstinate resistance, was compelled to yield.

§ 8. The rapid spread of revolution in Europe inspired serious misgivings among the great powers, and impelled the Holy Alliance to show its true colours. Austria was especially alarmed by the movement in Naples, which threatened to overthrow its power in Italy, and Metternich convoked a congress at Troppau, in Upper Silesia (Oct., 1820), at which Austria, Russia, Prussia, France and England were represented. Neapolitan affairs were the chief subject of discussion, and it was soon evident that Austria, Russia and Prussia were agreed as to the necessity of armed intervention. England made a formal protest against such high-handed treatment of a peaceful country; but as the protest was not supported by France, and England was not prepared to go to war for Naples, it was disregarded. The three allied powers decided to transfer the congress to Laybach and to invite Ferdinand I. to attend in person. The news of this decision made a profound impression in Naples, but the king was allowed to depart after he had made a solemn promise to adhere to the constitution, and to defend it before the other sovereigns. During his absence the administration was entrusted to his son Francis, who proved to be as profound a master of deceit as his father. The question of principle having been settled at Troppau there was no need for long discussions at Laybach. Ferdinand I. had no idea of observing his promises, and it was decided that an Austrian army should march into Naples to restore his authority. On the 5th of

February 60,000 Austrian troops started from Lombardy under General Frimont. The Neapolitans determined to resist; but their leaders were divided, the inhabitants of the country were not devoted to the cause, and all patriotic efforts were impeded by the treacherous intrigues of the regent. Pepé was defeated in an engagement at Rieti and his troops deserted him. Without further opposition the Austrians entered Naples on the 24th of March. A small detachment was sufficient to reduce Sicily. Ferdinand I. took a terrible revenge upon his opponents, and those who were fortunate enough to escape the scaffold had to seek safety in exile.

§ 9. It was fortunate for Austria that no effective resistance was made by the Neapolitans, for directly after the departure of the troops from Lombardy a revolution broke out in Piedmont. It was effected by a combination of the liberals, who wished to establish constitutional government, with the officers of the army, who were anxious to free Piedmont from Austrian tutelage. The aged king, Victor Emmanuel, was unable to resist a movement that appeared unanimous, and sought to evade the difficulty by abdicating in favour of his brother, Charles Felix (12 March). As the latter was absent in Modena, the administration was entrusted to Charles Albert of Carignano. The latter was placed in a very difficult position. Personally he sympathised with the revolution, but on the other hand he was afraid of losing his chance of the succession if he alienated Austria. His first act was to proclaim the Spanish constitution, and to appoint a new ministry, in which Santa Rosa, the leader of the military party, had a place. But at the same time he sent to Modena to justify these measures on the plea of necessity, and to profess his obedience to Charles Felix. The new king replied by condemning all that had been done, and expressed his intention of appealing for support to the Holy Alliance. On receipt of this answer Charles Albert felt that his position was untenable, and fled to Novara, where he formally resigned his authority. At the same time Austrian troops crossed the Ticino and speedily suppressed the revolt. As Victor Emmanuel persisted in abdicating, Charles Felix ascended the throne and restored the old system, but without any of the cruelties that disgraced the reaction in Naples. Austria urged that Charles Albert should be disinherited as an accomplice in the revolution, but the strong family feeling of the house of Savoy prevented Charles Felix from giving his consent. But the prince had to absent himself from the kingdom for the next two years, and to give proofs of his severance from the liberal party.

§ 10. Meanwhile the disorders in Spain continued, and a rebellion broke out in Greece against the Turks. In October, 1822, another

European congress met at Verona to consider these matters. The French Government, which was now wholly in the hands of the royalists, maintained that any intervention in Spain must be undertaken by France, just as the intervention in Naples had been entrusted to Austria. A French army had been already drawn up on the frontiers, on the pretext that it was a necessary precaution against the yellow fever, which had broken out with terrible violence in Spain. Austria, Russia and Prussia were inclined to distrust France, and favoured the plan of a combined invasion by the allied forces of Europe. On the other hand, Canning, who had become foreign minister on the death of Castlereagh, sent the duke of Wellington to Verona with instructions to protest against any armed intervention whatever. Ultimately the four powers determined to demand from the Spanish government an alteration of the constitution and greater liberty for the king. It was understood that in case of an unsatisfactory answer being received, France would take active measures with the authority of the other three states. As the Spanish ministers rejected the demand of the powers, all the ambassadors except the English envoy left Madrid, and the French army, 100,000 strong, entered Spain under the duke of Angoulême (April, 1823). No effective resistance was made, and Madrid was entered on the 23rd of May. But the Cortes had carried the king to Seville, and on the approach of the French they retreated to Cadiz. The last resistance was overcome by a bombardment of the city, and on the 1st of October Ferdinand VII. was released. His first act was to revoke everything that had been done since the beginning of 1820. The Inquisition was not restored, but the secular tribunals took a terrible vengeance on the revolutionary leaders. The duke of Angoulême protested against these cruelties, but in vain. Even the fear of revolt, the last check upon despotism, was removed by the presence of the French troops, which remained in Spain till 1827. As a protest against this occupation, which he had been unable to prevent, Canning acknowledged the independence of the Spanish colonies.

Once more events in Portugal followed the example of those in Spain. For some time the reactionary party had been gaining in strength, and the news of French intervention in the neighbouring country gave it an easy triumph. The Cortes, deserted both by the people and the army, dissolved itself, and absolute government was restored. John VI., a careless and easy-tempered ruler, wished to issue a general amnesty and to grant a new constitution. But his wife, a sister of Ferdinand VII., and her second son, Dom Miguel, a monster of bigotry and cruelty, were determined to punish the conquered party. The king found himself a prisoner in his own palace, his favourite minister, Loulé, was murdered, and the queen aimed at her husband's deposition and the elevation of Miguel to the throne. At last John VI. escaped to an English ship in the Tagus (May 9, 1824), and the people rallied to his cause. Miguel obtained his father's forgiveness, but retired to Vienna, whence he returned after John's death to bring further troubles on his country.

For the time the Holy Alliance had triumphed, and the revolutionary movement in western Europe seemed to be suppressed. But the resolute attitude which Canning had assumed at the Congress of Verona and in subsequent negotiations had broken up the pentarchy, and deprived the decisions of the other powers or the unity which was necessary for permanence. The death of Alexander I. in 1825 gave a final blow to a league which must either have crushed the growth of liberty in Europe, or have led to another continental war, not less general and destructive than that which had been aroused by the French Revolution.

II. EASTERN EUROPE AND THE INDEPENDENCE OF GREECE.

§ 11. One of the services which the house of Hapsburg rendered to Europe was the defence of the eastern frontier against the aggressions of the Turks. The victories of Montecuculi and Eugene destroyed for ever the terror which the Ottoman arms had once inspired. All the successes of Austria, and the treaties of Carlowitz (1699) and Passarowitz (1718), by which those successes were secured, had been not only acquiesced in but eagerly welcomed and exulted over by the other European states. The infidel was the common enemy of all Christian nations. But in the latter half of the 18th century the great eastern question entered a new phase. Russia began to make rapid strides southwards and obtained a permanent hold upon the Black Sea. The ultimate acquisition of Constantinople became an acknowledged object of the house of Romanof. Catharine II. had taken a great step in this direction by establishing a sort of Russian protectorate over the Christian population of Turkey in the treaty of Kutschuk Kainardji; she had inscribed over the entrance to the Chersonese "the way to Constantinople;" and she had given the name of Constantine to her second grandson as if he were the destined successor of the Palæologi. Alexander I. had pursued the same policy of aggression after the treaty of Tilsit, and although the French invasion compelled him to conclude the peace of Bucharest, he succeeded in extending his frontier to the Pruth, and in reserving the right of Russia to interfere in the domestic affairs of Turkey. But these advances, unlike those of Austria, were by no means welcomed by the other powers. The rapid growth to the great Slavonic empire was regarded as one of the great dangers of Western Europe. From this time the western nations, and especially England and France, began to recognise the necessity of supporting the Mohammedan Sultan rather than allow Constantinople to fall into the hands of the Christian Czar.

The decline of the Turkish power, as has been seen before, was not only due to external defeats at the hands of Austria and Russia, but still more to internal disorders. The authority of the Sultan was perpetually checked by the haughty independence of the dreaded Janissaries, who played the part of the Prætorian guards at Rome, and made a puppet of the sovereign whom it was their function to defend. Selim III. (1789–1807) had sought to free himself from this military oligarchy by forming a new army on the European model, and had paid the penalty for his boldness by deposition and death. His nephew and successor, Mustafa IV., had only ruled a year before he also was murdered. Mahmoud II. (1808–1839), a brother of Mustafa, and a man of considerable energy and resolution, was compelled to purchase his throne by accepting all the demands of the infuriated soldiers, and by promising to abandon all thought of reform. It is true that he only awaited the first opportunity to break his promise, but in the meanwhile he was as powerless as his predecessors. Another source of weakness to the Turks was the independence assumed by the pashas of distant provinces. Two conspicuous illustrations of this existed in the time of Mahmoud. In Egypt, Mehemet Ali, a native of Macedonia, had taken advantage of the disturbances that followed the struggle between the English and French to obtain his nomination as pasha. In that position he had crushed every element of resistance, and was able to treat his nominal sovereign as an equal. Nearer home, Ali Pasha, the famous "Lion of Jannina," had thrown off the Sultan's yoke, and was enabled, by the strength of his island fortress, to defy the forces that were sent against him. Two other officials, the Hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia, who were nominated by the Porte, were far more under the authority of Russia.

§ 12. These and other difficulties in the way of Ottoman rule must have led to the speedy disruption of the empire, but for the military prowess of the Turks and the divisions of the subject populations. The four races that inhabited European Turkey—Slavs, Roumans, Albanians, and Greeks—were not only hostile to each other, but were again subdivided among themselves by differences of religion and by geographical boundaries. Of these races the most active and intelligent, the Greeks, were also the least numerous. The old inhabitants of Greece had been almost lost among the numerous immigrants who had settled in the peninsula since its conquest by the Romans. The mass of the population consisted of Slavs, and the old name of Peloponnese had long given way to the Slavonic appellation of the Morea. In spite of this the scholars of western Europe were in the habit of regarding the Greeks as the descendants of the ancient Hellenes, and this was sufficient to secure them general sympathy in a struggle against Turkish misrule. At the Congress of Vienna great efforts had been made to do something for the cause of the Greeks, and a literary society of their admirers (*ἑταιρεία φιλομούσων*) derived political importance from the fact that one of its leading members, Count Capo d'Istria, was secretary to Alexander I. The Czar had an obvious interest in the cause, and was believed by many to be himself a member of a secret committee of Philhellenes. The risings in Spain and Naples gave the necessary impulse to a movement which had been already prepared. It was commenced, not in Greece itself, but in Moldavia, because that province was near to Russia, from which help was confidently expected. The revolt was headed by Ipsilanti, an officer in the Russian service, whose father had been Hospodar of Moldavia. Ipsilanti was a Phanariote—i.e. he belonged to one of the old Greek families who lived in the Phanar, a suburb of Constantinople. The Phanariotes had long been in intimate connection with Russia, and it was from among them that the Porte usually selected the Hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia. Ipsilanti's rising depended entirely for success on Russian support, but at the Congress of Laybach Alexander expressed his disapproval, and it speedily collapsed. The Turks won a complete victory at Dragatschan (19 June, 1821), and Ipsilanti spent the next seven years in an Austrian prison. But his movement had been the preconcerted signal for another and more general rebellion in Greece proper. Under the leadership of Kolokotroni, Nikitas, Pietro Bey and others, the people rose all over the Morea, and in a few days the Turks were driven to the fortresses, where they were speedily besieged. The rich islands of the Ægean, Hydra, Ipsara, and Spezzia, espoused the national cause, and the skill and daring of their sailors gave the Greeks a maritime superiority which was of decisive importance in the war. Ali Pasha, of Jannina, having quarrelled irretrievably with the Porte, took the side of the Greeks, though he remained a Mohammedan. He rendered considerable service by concentrating against himself the main force of the Turks for a year, thus leaving the Greeks time to gain a firm position. North of the isthmus of Corinth, Odysseus, a famous chieftain of the mountain tribes, revolted against the Turks and barred their passage into the Morea. The Porte was wholly unprepared for war, and though the garrisons of Patras and Nauplia repulsed their besiegers, the important fortress of Tripolitza was taken by storm. The Turks could only avenge their disasters by the murder of the Greek Patriarch in Constantinople and by massacres of the Christian population in Asia Minor. These cruelties led to reprisals on the part of the rebels, and gave the war a bloodthirsty character.

At the beginning of the year 1822, a national convention met in Piada and drew up a constitution. The executive power was entrusted to a convention of five members and the work of legislation to a council of seventy. The president of the convention was Mavrocordato, the descendant of an old family of Chios, but he was regarded with jealousy by the military leaders, and especially by Kolokotroni. From the first the movement was hampered by personal quarrels and divisions. One party looked to Russia for assistance, another to England, while several chiefs, notably Odysseus and Pietro Bey, were fighting mainly for plunder. A great blow was dealt to the cause by the defeat and death of Ali Pasha (Feb. 1822), which enabled the Turkish army to leave Jannina and to turn against the Greeks. In spite of this the balance of success during the year was decidedly in favour of the rebels. The Turkish fleet captured the island of Chios and massacred or enslaved all the inhabitants, but their atrocities were avenged by the destruction of several of their largest vessels by fire-ships, in the management of which the islanders were proficient. A grand expedition which Chourchid Pasha, the conqueror of Jannina, led into the Morea, was repulsed with such loss that the commander had to escape the bowstring by suicide. The first siege of Missolonghi was triumphantly defeated, the citadels of Athens and Corinth were reduced, and finally, Nauplia (Napoli di Romania) was compelled to surrender.

In spite of these successes it seemed probable that the Greeks must ultimately succumb to superior force unless they could obtain the active assistance as well as the sympathy of Europe. The question of intervention was seriously discussed at the Congress of Verona, but in fatal conjunction with the question of Spain. Metternich, at this time the guiding spirit of European diplomacy, succeeded in representing the movements in the two peninsulas as identical in character. Alexander I., the natural champion of Greek independence, and a few years ago the professed adherent of liberal principles, was worked upon through his dread of revolution. He himself declared that he "discerned the revolutionary march in the troubles of the Peloponnese, and from that moment kept aloof from them." By a curious inversion of interests, the English minister Canning, by policy the opponent of Russian influence in Turkey, was personally an eager champion of the Greek cause. But he could not venture to take the initiative, and the practical result of the Congress was a decision that the Greeks, as rebels against legitimate authority, should be left to their fate. It is true that the Russian envoy protested against the Turkish cruelties, and when satisfaction was refused quitted Constantinople. But even this diplomatic rupture did not impel Alexander to desert the neutrality that was enjoined by his new principles.

In 1823 the quarrels among the Greek leaders blazed more fiercely than ever. The central government lost all authority and Mavrocordato had to escape to Hydra. Still the Turks were unable to seize the advantages offered to them. Omer Brione, the successor of Ali in the Pashalic of Jannina, was defeated by the Suliote hero, Marcos Bozzaris, who lost his life in the engagement. The threatened attack upon Missolonghi was averted by this victory, and in the Morea Nikitas succeeded in reducing the citadel of Corinth. In the next year a great impulse was given to the rebellion by the efforts of foreign enthusiasts. Lord Byron and Colonel Stanhope appeared in Greece, and a large loan on the part of foreign capitalists restored credit to the constitutional government. Mavrocordato returned, and his chief opponent, Kolokotroni, was compelled to submit. At the same time Odysseus, who was suspected of intrigues with the Turks, was seized and imprisoned at Athens. The Turkish fleet succeeded in capturing and devastating the island of Ipsara (July, 1824), but Canaris took a signal revenge by destroying more than twenty of the enemy's ships. The European powers began to take an interest in a movement that had shown itself so difficult to suppress. Canning expressed the willingness of England to recognise the Greek blockade, and Alexander I. proposed that Greece should be divided between four Hospodars, who should occupy the same relation to the Porte as the rulers of Moldavia and Wallachia. This scheme, however, offered too many advantages to Russia to be accepted by the other powers, and Metternich succeeded for a time in averting any active intervention.

§ 13. For four years the Greeks had more than held their own, but their resources were so limited that victory was as costly to them as defeat was to the Turks. And their incorrigible dissensions alienated their foreign supporters. The loans were uselessly squandered, and Byron died of fever and disappointment in the swamps of Missolonghi. In 1825 a wholly new character was given to the war by the arrival of an army from Egypt. Mehemet Ali, who hoped to succeed to the position of the house of Othman, determined to prevent the rupture of an empire which he might one day rule. In February his son, Ibrahim, landed at Modon with 17,000 men. From the first it was evident that the Greeks were no match for the Egyptian troops, who had been carefully formed and trained on the European model. Ibrahim captured Navarino and Tripolitza, and advanced through the Morea to the walls of Nauplia. At the same time Redschid Pasha was despatched by the Sultan to resume the siege of Missolonghi. Early in 1826 Ibrahim joined the Turks, and the fate of the town was secured by a rigorous blockade. After enduring the most terrible hardships, the garrison made a heroic effort to cut their way through the besiegers, and only accident prevented their complete success (2 April, 1826). The fall of Missolonghi was followed by the siege of Athens. Another obstinate defence was made, but in spite of the assistance rendered by Colonel Fabvier, Lord Cochrane, and General Church, Athens had to surrender (2 June, 1827). The Greek cause was hopeless unless the European powers would interfere, and the old dissensions broke out again. Fortunately for the Greeks events had occurred which altered the relations of the European states, and frustrated Metternich's determination to uphold the Porte as the champion of legitimate authority against revolution.

§ 14. On the 1st of December, 1825, Alexander I. died suddenly on a journey to the Crimea. As he left no children, his natural successor was his brother, Constantine, who resided in Warsaw as governor of Poland. But Constantine, who had contracted a morganatic marriage with a Polish princess, and who was devoid of ambition, had in 1822 formally renounced all claims in favour of his younger brother, Nicolas. This renunciation had never been made public, and Nicolas, unwilling to act upon it until it had been confirmed, caused the troops to swear fealty to Constantine, as Alexander's successor. But the elder brother positively refused to ascend the throne, and Nicolas was compelled to assume the authority that now devolved upon him. But unexpected difficulties confronted him. Alexander's desertion of liberal principles in his later years had alienated the affection of his subjects, and a secret association had been formed, under Prince Troubetskoi, with the object of forming Russia into a federal republic. The uncertainty about the succession and the consequent interregnum gave the conspirators an unexpected opportunity. They persuaded the soldiers that Constantine's pretended renunciation was a fraud, and that Nicolas was trying to usurp his brother's throne. The result was that, when the troops were called upon to take a new oath of fealty, a cry was raised for Constantine, and the tumult went so far that artillery had to be employed, and the disloyal regiments were almost destroyed before they would yield. The conspiracy was now discovered and its leaders punished.

The accession of Nicolas brought with it a complete change in both the internal and foreign politics of Russia. From the first moment he abandoned the system pursued by his predecessors from Peter the Great downwards. Instead of attempting to civilise Russia by introducing the customs and laws of western Europe, he showed himself an ardent partisan of all the old national institutions, and especially of the Greek church. The Russian language was ordered to be taught in the German and Polish provinces, and a knowledge of it was essential for a place in the public service. If a foreigner married a Russian their children must be educated in the faith of the latter. The zeal for proselytism only just stopped short of actual persecution. At the same time Nicolas claimed to be the head and protector of all members of the Greek church outside his own dominions. It was evident that his attitude in the eastern question would be very different from that of Alexander and that it would be determined by the interests of Russia rather than by the principles of legitimacy. The Holy Alliance had been shaken by the conduct of Canning; it was shattered by the accession of Nicolas. Metternich lost the control of European diplomacy which he had contrived to hold for the last ten years.

Canning lost no time in sending Wellington to St. Petersburg to discuss the question of Greece with the Czar. At first Nicolas haughtily declared that his relations with the Porte concerned no other power, but he soon saw the advantage of making England his accomplice in a partition of Turkey. In April, 1826, a secret convention was signed, which arranged that Greece should be formed into a regular state, but should pay tribute to the Sultan. In case of refusal the two powers were to compel the Porte to accept these terms. The other powers were to be invited to join the alliance.

§ 15. At the same time Nicolas had other matters to settle with the Sultan, and Mahmoud II. played into his hands by choosing this very moment for the reforms which he had been meditating ever since his accession. He issued an ordinance altering the constitution of the Janissaries, though it left the existing members of the corps in enjoyment of their privileges. The result was a general mutiny on the 14th of June. But the Sultan was prepared for extreme measures. He produced the sacred standard of the prophet and called upon all true believers to support him. A wholesale massacre of the Janissaries followed, and the name was abolished for ever. Mahmoud now set to work to raise a new army, which was to consist of 250,000 men armed and trained like European troops. But a long time must elapse before such an elaborate scheme could be carried out, and meanwhile Turkey was defenceless. This compelled the Sultan to accept all the demands of Nicolas in the convention of Ackermann (October, 1826). The treaty of Bucharest was confirmed, and it was agreed that the Hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia should be chosen for seven years, that they should rule with a council of Boyars in complete independence of the Porte, and that they could not be deposed without the consent of Russia. Servia was to elect its own prince and the Sultan was not to interfere in its internal affairs. Russia was to occupy the fortresses on the east coast of the Black Sea, and Russian ships had the right of entering all Turkish waters.

§ 16. One of the Sultan's motives for such abject compliance was a desire to separate Russia from England on the Greek question. But Nicolas was the last man to be turned from his course by an exhibition of weakness, and the negotiations were actively prosecuted at a conference in London. Metternich resolutely refused to countenance rebellion in any form, and induced Frederick William of Prussia to adhere to the programme of the Holy Alliance. In France the moderate Louis XVIII. had been succeeded by the reactionary Charles X., but the strong French sympathy with the Greeks induced the government to disregard the danger of revolution and to join Russia and England. On the 6th of July, 1827, the three powers concluded the treaty of London, which was based on the previous convention of April, 1826. Greece was to be tributary but otherwise independent; hostilities were to cease immediately; and if the Sultan failed to accept the mediation of the powers within a month, the latter would recognise the entire independence of Greece. This treaty, which was forced upon Canning by the fear of allowing Russia to interfere single-handed, was his last conspicuous act. He died on the 8th of August, and the Tories gradually regained the upper hand in the ministry.

The Sultan, whose hopes of success had been raised by the capture of Missolonghi and Athens, haughtily refused to admit the right of any power to interfere between himself and his rebellious subjects. Ibrahim at this time received large reinforcements, which were brought to Navarino by an Egyptian fleet from Alexandria. He received orders to wage a war of extermination in the Morea, and he acted up to the letter of his instructions. Meanwhile the allied fleets of England, France, and Russia had appeared on the scene to enforce the treaty of London. The admirals called upon Ibrahim to cease hostilities, and entered the harbour of Navarino to compel his submission. In these circumstances a battle was inevitable, and in four hours the whole Egyptian fleet was utterly destroyed (20 October, 1827). Mehemet Ali was compelled to recall his son. Such active mediation had not been anticipated in England, where the ministers alluded to the battle as "an untoward event." But the Greeks, whose cause seemed on the very verge of collapse, received the news with frantic enthusiasm. Mahmoud II. complained bitterly of the outrage, and expressed his determination not to yield. In December the ambassadors of the allied powers had to leave Constantinople.

§ 17. That the battle of Navarino really proved an "untoward event" to English interests, was due mainly to the conduct of the ministers, who abandoned the policy of Canning and allowed Russia to attack Turkey single-handed, the very thing which he had striven to avoid. No opposition was made to the election of the Russian nominee, Capo d'Istria, as president by the Greek national assembly. Nicolas was eager to seize the advantages offered to him by the vacillation of England and the destruction of the Janissaries. Time was required to collect the resources of so vast a country as Russia, but in April, 1828, war was declared, and in May 150,000 Russian troops under Wittgenstein crossed the Pruth. To the astonishment of Europe the campaign was a complete failure. The Turks wisely restricted their efforts to the defence of fortresses, in which they have always excelled. The Russians spent so much time in the siege of Schumla, Varna, and Silistria, that winter compelled them to retreat before they had achieved anything beyond the reduction of Varna. The simultaneous campaign in Asia was more fortunate, and Paskiewitsch, who had already made a great name in the wars with Persia, captured the strong fortresses of Kars and Achalzik, which the Turks regarded as impregnable. At the same time the withdrawal of Ibrahim and his Egyptian troops enabled the Greeks once more to hold their own in the peninsula. Still, on the whole the Russians had failed, and Metternich endeavoured to take advantage of this to arrange a peace which should save Turkey from humiliation. But France and Prussia declined to support him, and even Wellington, who was now at the head of the English ministry, would not take any active steps to check the advance of Russia.

In 1829 the command of the Russian army was transferred from Wittgenstein to Diebitsch, a native of Silesia. His plan was to cover the Turkish fortresses and to push on with his main force across the Balkans. A complete victory over the newly-appointed Vizier, Redschid Pasha, was followed by the surrender of Silistria (30 June). The passage of the Balkans, a military feat which the Russians had never yet attempted, was successfully accomplished, and on the 19th of August Diebitsch appeared before Adrianople. But his troops had suffered so much from hunger and disease that he was only followed by about 13,000 men, and a resolute attack on the part of the Turks must have resulted in his utter ruin. Fortunately, his marvellous achievement, and the approach of the enemy to so short a distance from his capital, overcame the courage of Mahmoud II., and he concluded the treaty of Adrianople on the 14th of September. Russia resigned all conquests except some islands at the mouth of the Danube and a strip of territory in Asia which included the fortress of Achalzik. These acquisitions, though small, were of considerable strategical importance. The Hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia were to be appointed for life, they were to have independent sovereign power, and no Mussulman might reside in these provinces, which became practically appendages of Russia. The navigation of the Danube was to be free, and the vessels of neutral powers were to be allowed to pass through the Dardanelles. The Porte accepted the provisions of the treaty of London with regard to Greece.

§ 18. Another conference in London undertook to settle the affairs of the new state, and issued a protocol on the subject in February, 1830. A tardy and ill-timed regard for Turkish sensitiveness gave Greece a niggardly frontier, extending from the Gulf of Volo on the east to the mouth of the river Aspro on the west. The government was to be a constitutional monarchy, and the crown was offered to Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, the widower of Princess Charlotte of England. After some hesitation he refused it, and during the interregnum Capo d'Istria continued to rule. The latter was suspected of aiming at the crown himself, and the opposition to him became so vehement that it led to civil war. The Greek fleet was burnt by Miaulis to prevent its being used by the Russians to support the President. Soon afterwards Capo d'Istria was assassinated (Oct. 1831). At last the allied powers agreed to extend the frontier on the west from the Aspro to Arta, and found an aspirant to the throne in Otho I., a younger son of the king of Bavaria. In 1833 he landed at Nauplia, but two years elapsed before he really undertook the work of government, and fixed upon Athens as his capital.

III. FRANCE UNDER CHARLES X. AND THE REVOLUTION OF 1830.

§ 19. The reaction in France which commenced with the death of the duke of Berry was carried to its height by the ministry of Villèle. The expedition to Spain in 1823 was so completely successful that a royalist chamber was elected and its existence prolonged for seven years. On the 16th of September, 1824, Louis XVIII. died. He had never been popular in France, and he was not a strong ruler; but there can be no doubt that he displayed creditable wisdom and self-restraint. He disapproved of the reaction and foresaw the disasters that it would bring upon his successor, but he was too weak to resist the pressure of his ministers and his own family. The count of Artois, who now became king, was imbued with all the prejudices and prepossessions of the old régime, and he had none of his brother's power of seeing when it was necessary to yield. He contrasts with Louis XVIII. as James II. did with Charles II. But his first measures were popular. He expressed his determination to uphold the Charter, he removed the censorship of the press, and he restored to Louis Philippe, the son of Philippe Egalité, the great possessions of the house of Orleans and the title of Royal Highness. But before long he showed his real intentions. The ministry of Villèle was retained, more than 150 officers of the Empire were dismissed from the army, and the Jesuits, though still proscribed by law, were allowed to return to France and to resume their control of education. The enormous sum of 100,000,000 francs was raised to compensate the losses of the emigrants; and in spite of vigorous opposition the scheme was adopted by the submissive chambers. But it was the king's devotion to the Church that raised the bitterest discontent. The open patronage of the Jesuits, the gorgeous processions through the streets, in which the king himself took part, and a law which proposed to punish sacrilege with death, aroused uncompromising hostility in a city where the teaching of Voltaire still prevailed. In 1825 the funeral of General Foy, the most eloquent leader of the opposition, gave an opportunity for a grand liberal demonstration. To silence criticism the government brought in a new law to shackle the press, but it was received with such disfavour in both chambers that it had to be withdrawn. In 1827, while the king was reviewing the national guard, a cry was raised of "Down with the Jesuits!" and the force was broken up. Villèle now determined on a last effort to maintain his power. The chamber of deputies was dissolved and seventy-six new peers were created. But the new elections went completely against the government, and the liberals secured a majority of 428 to 125. The king was compelled to give way, and Villèle was dismissed (Jan. 3, 1828).

§ 20. A moderate ministry now came into office under the presidency of M. de Martignac. A law was introduced which imposed only slight restrictions upon the press, and a number of ordinances were issued against the Jesuits. But Martignac found that he had a very difficult position to occupy. Charles X. regarded the ministers as forced upon him, and refused to give them his confidence. At the same time the majority of deputies were hostile to them for not carrying liberal measures, which their relations to the king made impossible. Martignac wished to strengthen the monarchy, and to give stability to the constitution, by freeing the provinces from the excessive preponderance of the capital. Early in 1829 he brought forward a proposal to give to colleges in the communes and departments some control over the authority of the mayors and prefects. But this was not well received by the liberals, who had matters their own way in Paris, and who feared the preponderance of conservative and clerical influence in the country. On the 30th of July, 1829, the king dissolved the chambers, and seized the opportunity to dismiss Martignac and his colleagues. He had convinced himself that concessions only encouraged more extreme demands, and he was determined not to yield. At the head of the new ministry was Prince Jules de Polignac, the son of Marie Antoinette's favourite, and the representative of the emigrant nobles. The choice was an unfortunate one, as Polignac was incapable as well as unpopular, but it was dictated to some extent by foreign politics. It was just at this time that Russia and Turkey were negotiating at Adrianople, and Austria and England were anxious to prevent the former from obtaining excessive advantages from its victory. Martignac had been altogether on the side of Russia, and one of his chief supporters had been Pozzo di Borgo, the Russian envoy at Paris. Polignac was a personal friend of Wellington, the head of the Tory ministry in England, and this contributed to his elevation. Still more unfortunate was the choice of the minister of war, General Bourmont, who had deserted to the allies at the beginning of the battle of Waterloo, an act which the French could neither forget nor forgive.

The appointment of the new ministry was greeted with general indignation. Lafayette came forward as the leader of the agitation, and formed a secret society with the name *Aide toi et le ciel t'aidera*, which exercised considerable influence over the elections. When the chambers met in March, 1830, the liberals had an overwhelming majority among the deputies. Their leaders were Royer-Collard and Guizot, the representatives of the constitutional theorists or *doctrinaires*, and the former was elected president. A number of royalist peers, influenced either by jealousy of Polignac or by Russian intrigues, deserted the ministry, and an address expressing want of confidence was carried by large majorities. Charles X. dissolved the chambers again, and determined to make a bold bid for popularity by an expedition against the Dey of Algiers, who had insulted the French consul. The French have always been very eager for military glory, and it was hoped that the news of a brilliant success just at the time of the election would secure a majority for the government. But the scheme was too obvious not to be seen through, and unforeseen accidents postponed the expected triumph until the elections were over (4 July). A chamber was returned which was still more hostile to the government than its predecessor. Matters had now reached a crisis, but Charles X. was resolute to make no concessions. On the 25th of July a ministerial conference at St. Cloud drew up the celebrated Ordinances, which were issued on the next day. The press was subjected to a strict censorship and the chief liberal papers were suppressed. The number of electors was diminished by raising the property qualification, and elections were to be no longer direct but indirect. The recently chosen chamber was dissolved before it had even met, and a new one was summoned for the 8th of September. These exceptional measures were justified by the 14th article of the Charter—"The king makes regulations and ordinances for the execution of the laws and the safety of the state."

§ 21. The Ordinances were wholly unexpected in Paris, where the first feeling was one of stupefied astonishment. If the government had been fully prepared for active measures, an easy triumph was assured. But there were only 12,000 troops in the capital, and the command was in the hands of Marmont, who was unpopular among the soldiers as a traitor to Napoleon, and who personally disapproved of the Ordinances. The first opposition came from the journalists, headed by Thiers and Mignet, who refused to recognise the suppression of their papers as a legal act. The liberal deputies assembled at the house of Casimir Périer, but they distrusted the chances of a popular revolt, and contented themselves with a written protest against the dissolution of a chamber which had never met. Among the citizens there were bolder spirits. The manufactories were closed, the workmen crowded the streets, and a number of collisions with the troops occurred on the 28th of July. Marmont advised concessions, but Charles X., who had gone on a hunting-party as if nothing was happening, sent him orders to stand firm. On the 29th came the decisive conflict. Lafayette, who was absent when the Ordinances were issued, hurried back to Paris and assumed the command of the national guard. The troops were concentrated to defend the Tuileries, the Louvre, and the Palais Royal, and an obstinate conflict took place, in which much blood was shed. At last Marmont's indecision allowed the populace to gain possession of the Louvre, from which the long gallery admitted them to the Tuileries. So strong was the feeling against disgracing the revolt, that the treasures of the palace were left undisturbed, and a man who was detected in the act of plunder was promptly executed By the evening Paris was in the hands of the mob.

When the news of these events reached St. Cloud the old king was at last compelled to recognise the necessity of concessions. Polignac was dismissed, and the duke of Mortemart, a moderate man and acceptable to the Russian court, was appointed in his place. Mortemart lost no time in sending to Paris and announcing the revocation of the Ordinances. But it was too late. The deputies had recovered their courage when the victory had been won for them, and had entrusted the provisional government to a municipal commission, of which Lafayette, Laffitte, Casimir Périer and Gérard were members. They refused to recognise Mortemart, and declared that "the stream of blood which has flowed in Charles X.'s name has separated him from France for ever." The respectable *bourgeoisie* wished to secure themselves against anarchy and to form a durable government. The establishment of a republic would inevitably excite the enmity of the great powers, would lead to another European war, and probably to a third restoration. These considerations urged all moderate men to maintain a monarchical government in France. Fortunately they had not far to look for a suitable candidate for the throne. The duke of Orleans had been the acknowledged patron of the liberal party ever since his return to France in 1815, and the favour shown to him by Charles X. had failed to draw him any closer to the elder branch of his family. He was a Bourbon and therefore might be expected to satisfy the scruples of the monarchical states of Europe. At the same time he would owe his power altogether to the popular choice, and could hardly venture upon unconstitutional government. Laffitte and Thiers were his active supporters, and found no difficulty in gaining over the majority of the deputies. Messengers were sent to Neuilly, where the duke was then residing, to ask him to undertake the office of Lieutenant-General of the kingdom until the chambers could meet to secure the observance of the Charter. Louis Philippe, whose *rôle* was to profess a becoming want of ambition, waited to consult Talleyrand, on whose diplomatic experience he relied to conciliate the European courts. On receiving his approval, he at once journeyed to Paris and accepted the proffered office. At the same time, to secure himself on both sides, he sent a letter through Mortemart to assure Charles X. of his fidelity. The king placed such confidence in these treacherous professions that he confirmed the duke's appointment, and thus helped to drive his own supporters to the side of the usurper. The municipal commission, which was suspected of republican tendencies, was not informed of the action of the deputies until all had been settled. Lafayette, however, was soon won over by Louis Philippe's professions, and the name of Orleans was so popular in Paris that opposition was out of the question.

§ 22. Charles X. was still confident that his crown was secure, but the anxiety of the duchess of Berry for the safety of her son induced him to move from St. Cloud to the Trianon and thence to Rambouillet. There he was persuaded that his own unpopularity endangered the dynasty, and both he and the Dauphin abdicated in favour of the duke of Bordeaux (1 August). The duke of Orleans, whose honesty was still relied upon, was asked to assume the regency for the infant king. But Louis Philippe now saw the crown within his grasp, and was determined to drive his rivals from the kingdom. The cry was raised that Charles X. meditated an attack upon Paris, and a mob of 60,000 men marched upon Rambouillet. At last Charles realised the treachery of his relative and gave up all hope. His misfortunes were respected by the people as he journeyed to Cherbourg, whence he sailed to England, and for the second time took up his residence at Holyrood. On the 3rd August the French chambers were opened, and on the 7th they had decided the future of France. The crown was declared vacant through the abdication of Charles X. and the Dauphin, and no allusion was made to the duke of Bordeaux. By 219 to 33 votes Louis Philippe was raised to the throne with the title of "King of the French." The Roman Catholic church was no longer to be privileged, and all forms of religion were placed on an equal footing; the censorship of the press was abolished; the king was forbidden to suspend any law, to appoint extraordinary tribunals, or to employ foreign troops; indirect election was abolished; deputies were to be chosen for five years; the sessions of the peers were to be public, and the peers nominated by Charles X. were struck off the list; the chambers were to have the right of initiating laws as well as the king, the tricolour was substituted for the white flag. On the 9th of August, Louis Philippe was formally enthroned in the Palais Bourbon. He found little difficulty in procuring the recognition of the European courts, which were only too pleased that the dangers of a republican government in France had been avoided. England was the first to approve a change which was a flattering imitation of her own institutions, and which seemed to ensure a preponderating influence in the neighbouring state. The last sovereign to acknowledge Louis Philippe was the Czar of Russia.

IV. LIBERAL MOVEMENTS IN EUROPE.

§ 23. The contrast between the two Revolutions through which France had passed is conspicuously illustrated by the difference in their results, and this difference is nowhere more obvious than in England. The reaction after the death of Louis XVI. and the reign of terror effectually stayed the progress of English liberties. Pitt abandoned the reforming projects of his earlier years, the government adopted a sternly repressive attitude, the Tories obtained almost uninterrupted rule for forty years, and the Whigs became a powerless and discredited minority. But the Revolution of 1830 fascinated, instead of repelling, the English people. Wellington's ministry fell, and the Whigs came into office under Lord Grey. The Reform Bill of 1832, the first great step in extending to the masses the liberties that had been won in 1688, was carried by the overwhelming pressure of public opinion, and the House of Lords did not dare to persist in its opposition. Throughout Europe the example of the French exercised a similar influence, and encouraged the liberal party to shake off the trammels that had been imposed by the Congress of Vienna and the Holy Alliance. The independence of Belgium, the rising in Poland, the advance of constitutional principles in several of the German states, the movements in Italy, Switzerland, and Portugal, were all more or less direct results of the July Revolution.

§ 24. The treaty of Vienna had united Holland and Belgium into a single kingdom under William I., who had previously been stadtholder of Holland. In doing this the congress had been actuated by purely political motives, and had paid no regard whatever to the interests or wishes of the peoples they dealt with. But the differences which had divided the Netherlands into two halves in the 16th century had by no means been removed by the lapse of 300 years. The second branch of the House of Orange was not likely to succeed where William the Silent and Maurice of Nassau had failed. The Dutch were bigoted Calvinists, the Belgians were equally devoted to Roman Catholicism; the northern provinces were essentially Teutonic, the southern were inclined to the civilisation and language of the Romance lands that lay near them; Holland was a trading, Belgium a manufacturing country. William I., by his obvious preference of his Dutch subjects, had intensified rather than removed these natural differences. The Dutch, though their numbers were smaller, had an equal number of representatives with the Belgians, and the constitution was forced upon the latter in spite of their protests. The Belgians were saddled with the burden of the national debt of the northern state.

The clergy were alienated by the establishment of secular education under state control, and by the placing of the Roman Catholic and Calvinist churches upon an equal footing. A close alliance was formed between the clerical and the liberal parties, and this alliance, though as unnatural as the state itself, was none the less formidable. Ever since 1828 the opposition had been growing in strength, and had been encouraged rather than appeased by the concessions which had been extorted from the king.

Matters were in this state when the news arrived of the Revolution in Paris. For three weeks the quiet prevailed that precedes the storm. On the 25th of August a performance of the "Mute of Portici," an opera of which the plot centres round the revolt of Masaniello, was followed by a rising in Brussels. The residences of Van Maanen and other unpopular ministers were sacked, and the troops, when they were at last called out, were driven back to their barracks. The government practically abdicated its functions and made no further efforts to restore order. A national guard was formed which speedily made itself master of the capital. A provisional government of some of the chief citizens opened negotiations with the king. But the movement had gone too far to be contented with concessions which might have been welcomed a month before. The example of Brussels was followed by the other towns, and in some, e.g. Verviers, the mob was guilty of revolutionary excesses. William I., though determined to maintain his rights, found it necessary to temporise, and sent his eldest son, William prince of Orange, to calm the rebels with promises. The prince went so far as to suggest the legislative and administrative independence of Belgium under the Dutch crown. The king showed no hostility to the scheme, but reserved a definite settlement for the meeting of the States-General, which he summoned at the Hague on the 13th of September.

There would have been no difficulty in carrying through the States-General the scheme of a separate legislature and administration, as the Dutch were quite as eager for it as the Belgians. But the king was really determined not to give way, and the Dutch deputies did not like to thwart him. The matter was not even discussed, and William I. went so far as to recal Van Maanen, whom he had previously dismissed. The Belgians felt that they had been duped, and the rebellion was carried on with new vigour. This time the Liègeois took the lead. Marching to Brussels, they established a new and more democratic provisional government. Prince Frederick, the king's second son, who had been collecting troops while his elder brother was negotiating, attacked Brussels but was repulsed. The Belgian soldiers espoused the national cause, and the

Dutch troops were expelled from most of the fortresses. Antwerp, Maestricht, and the citadel of Ghent alone remained in their hands. The States-General, alarmed at the course of events, now hastened to decree the legislative and administrative separation, but it was too late. On the 5th of October the provisional government proclaimed the independence of Belgium, appointed a commission to draw up a constitution, and summoned a national congress to meet at Brussels. Four days later they declared that the House of Orange had forfeited all claims upon Belgium. If they had had their own way, they would probably have established a republic. But the clerical party, hitherto thrown into the background by its liberal allies, showed its strength in the elections to the national congress, and secured the return of a moderate majority.

§ 25. The Belgian question excited the keenest interest in Europe, and there was a fear lest it might revive a general war. The liberal party was known to desire the re-union of Belgium with France, and this would have been a signal for general hostilities. But Louis Philippe hastened to purchase the recognition of the great powers by promising not to accept the Belgian crown or to allow the erection of a republic. Nicolas of Russia was inclined to support William I., who had appealed for the aid of the five powers, but his hands were full with the contemporary Polish revolution. The Tory ministry in England, which might have backed up the Czar, was hampered by the growing power of the Liberals, and moreover, the interests of English commerce and manufactures demanded the separation of Holland and Belgium. Prussia was afraid lest the revolutionary movement might extend to its Rhine provinces, and Austria was anxious about Poland and Italy. The result was, that the principles of the Holy Alliance were abandoned, and the great powers adopted, for the first time, the policy of non-intervention. A conference of ministers, of which Talleyrand was the guiding spirit, met in London, and its first protocol (4 Nov.) called upon Holland and Belgium to accept an armistice, which was done.

The national congress met at Brussels on the 10th of November, and determined to act as much as possible in accord with the London conference. It was decreed that Belgium should be an independent state, the delicate question of Luxemburg being reserved; that the government should be a monarchy; that the house of Orange should be excluded from the throne; and that the legislature should consist of two chambers. These decrees, and especially the abandonment of republican designs, were acceptable to the powers, and on the 20th of December the London conference accepted the principle of Belgian independence. Early in 1831 the '*bases de séparation*' were drawn up, which preserved to Holland the boundaries of 1790 with Luxemburg, and imposed upon Belgium one half of the Dutch debt. These terms were accepted by William I., but were protested against by the Belgian congress. The Belgians refused to give up their hold upon Luxemburg, and the Dutch retained Antwerp.

The congress now proceeded to draw up a new constitution and to elect a king. Their choice fell upon the duke of Nemours, the second son of Louis Philippe. But the French connection was distasteful to the other powers, and Louis Philippe was compelled by prudence to decline the offer. On the 4th of June the Belgians chose Leopold of Saxe Coburg, the widower of the English Princess Charlotte. The London conference now issued a new protocol (27 June) containing 18 articles, which gave Belgium more favourable boundaries, left Luxemburg *in statu quo*, and made the country responsible only for its own debt and for a share of that which had been jointly contracted. These terms having been approved by the congress, Leopold accepted the crown, proceeded to Belgium, and swore to accept the constitution. William I. protested bitterly against the 18 articles, and on this ground the representatives of Russia, Austria and Prussia postponed their recognition of Leopold.

While Leopold was engaged in a tour through his new kingdom, he was disagreeably surprised by the news that a Dutch army had crossed the frontier. The Belgians, trusting in the support of Europe, were wholly unprepared for war, and their troops were routed in every engagement. On August 11th Leopold himself was completely defeated at Tirlemont and escaped with difficulty to Mechlin. But on the first news of hostilities a French army under Marshal Gérard marched into Belgium, while an English fleet appeared in the Scheldt. The Dutch were compelled to retire and to conclude an armistice. But their energetic action had the desired result of obtaining more favourable terms from the powers. On October 14th the London conference issued 24 articles, by which Limburg on the right of the Meuse was ceded to Holland and Walloon Luxemburg to Belgium, and the latter country was to pay 8,400,000 florins a year towards the debt. With great reluctance the Belgians accepted these altered conditions, and on November 15th all the powers except Russia recognised the kingdom of Belgium. But William I., obstinately trusting to the friendship of the Czar, would have nothing to do with the 24 articles. Even when Nicolas, in May, 1832, at last accepted the protocol of November 15, the Dutch king refused to give way. It was necessary to employ force; an English fleet blockaded the coast of Holland, and Marshal Gérard laid siege to Antwerp. After an heroic defence, General Chassé, the commander of the garrison, was compelled to capitulate on December 23rd. On May 21, 1833, a preliminary treaty was arranged which put an end to hostilities. But it was not till January 22, 1839, that William I. finally consented to accept the 24 articles in a definitive treaty. Meanwhile Leopold had married in 1832 the eldest daughter of Louis Philippe, and had utilised the period of peace to establish an orderly constitutional government in Belgium, under which the moral and material welfare of the kingdom made rapid progress.

§ 26. The kingdom of Poland, which the congress of Vienna had called into being, and to which Alexander I. had presented a constitution on the model of the French Charter, was as artificial a creation as the kingdom of the Netherlands. Ruled by a Russian viceroy, it could hardly be termed a kingdom, and it comprised only a small part of the old Poland. The constitution was utterly unsuited to a country which possessed no middle class to mediate between the crowd of nobles and serfs. Moreover, constitutional checks were inconsistent with the habits and traditions of Russian despotism. The grand-duke Constantine, who had preferred his government at Warsaw to the throne of the Czars, had already broken through the letter of the constitution, and several conspiracies had been detected and punished, when the French Revolution gave a new impulse to the undying love of national independence. In the dusk of the evening of November 29, 1830, a number of young men attacked the residence of the viceroy. Several officers were killed, but Constantine himself escaped to join the Russian troops. The citizens of Warsaw rose at the signal, and the Polish soldiers came over to their side. Constantine made no effort to put down the rebellion, and was allowed to depart from the province without molestation.

The first step in the revolution had been successful, and Poland was free. But from this moment the want of unanimity, which was ultimately fatal to the movement, began to show itself. Chlopicki, who had won renown in the Napoleonic wars, assumed the command of the army, but he was out of sympathy with the people, and eager to make terms with the Czar. At the head of the provisional government was Adam Czartoriski, a descendant of the great house of Jagellon, but wanting in decision and ability. In the diet which met on the 18th of December, parties were hopelessly divided. The extreme revolutionists wished to push on as rapidly as possible, and to kindle the flames of insurrection in all the provinces that had once belonged to Poland. But the moderate party was afraid of alienating Austria and Prussia, and hoped, by laying stress on the breaches of the constitution, to secure the support of the western powers. The result was that the rebellion remained stationary, and envoys were sent to make terms with Nicolas. The Czar refused all concessions, demanded immediate submission, and ordered Diebitsch to advance with an army into Poland. On receipt of this answer, Chlopicki resigned his command, and was succeeded by the honest but incapable Radziwill. The diet now proceeded to decree the deposition of Nicolas, but, to gratify the western powers, announced that Poland should remain a constitutional monarchy. All hopes of foreign intervention, however, proved futile. Louis Philippe took advantage of the Polish difficulty to extort his recognition from the Czar, and the other states thought only of excluding Russian influence in the settlement of the Belgian question.

In February, 1831, Diebitsch, with 114,000 men, crossed the frontier and marched against Praga, the bulwark of Warsaw on the side of the Vistula. Now followed a heroic struggle which casts a ray of glory upon the last days of Poland. In one battle after another the Russians were foiled by the resolute courage of their opponents. The cholera broke out among the besiegers, and carried off Diebitsch on the 10th of June, and the grand-duke Constantine a month later. Paskiewitsch, who now assumed the command, determined to cross the Vistula lower down, and to take Warsaw in the rear. His plans were aided by the bitterness of party quarrels among the Poles. The democrats had alienated the nobles by proposing the emancipation of the serfs. The generals who had defeated Diebitsch were accused of treachery. Moderate men were still led away by the futile hope of French intervention. A rising in Lithuania, which might yet have turned the current of success, was allowed to fail for want of support. Finally, the democratic party gained the upper hand in Warsaw, expelled Czartoriski and the existing government, put to death all who were suspected of treachery, and gave dictatorial power to its own leader, Krukowiecki. While these events were going on, the enemy were at the gates, and resistance became impossible. On September 8th Warsaw capitulated to Paskiewitsch, and on the 28th General Rüdiger entered Krakau. The remnants of the heroic defenders of Warsaw escaped to Prussian territory, where they were disarmed and dispersed as exiles to France and other parts of Europe. Poland was deprived of its constitution, and became a Russian province with Paskiewitsch as governor. An amnesty was promised by Nicolas, but the exceptions were so numerous that it might as well have been withheld. It was computed that in 1832 80,000 Poles were sent to Siberia. The keenest sympathy was excited in Europe by the fate of a country which had fought so bravely for a liberty which it did not deserve.

§ 27. The great evil in Germany at this period was the want of unity. Material prosperity was obstructed, not only by the closing of the mouths of the Rhine and Danube, but also by the strict customs regulations of the numerous petty states. An attempt had been made to remedy this evil by the arrangement of a *Zollverein*, or customs union. This was concluded first between Bavaria and Wurtemberg, and in 1829 was joined by Prussia and the northern states. The Revolution of 1830 exercised a marked influence in Germany, but unfortunately it hindered rather than promoted union. A number of isolated movements broke out to demand constitutional privileges for individual states. It is impossible to trace in detail the petty revolutions by which concessions were extorted from the rulers of Brunswick, Hanover, Saxony, Hesse, etc. In Austria and Prussia no disturbances took place, although a distinct impulse was given to national independence in Hungary. Metternich, however, was alarmed by the prospect of danger to his principles of government, and the machinery of the Confederation was once more put in working to repress the progress of reform. In 1832 the diet confirmed the Carlsbad decrees, forbade all popular assemblies and festivals, and promised military assistance to any government that was threatened by revolution. The foolish attempt of a few enthusiasts to attack the diet at Frankfort (April, 1833) gave a great impulse to the reaction. Russia now sought to exercise that influence in Germany which the treaty of Vienna had given her. In September, 1833, the Czar met the emperor of Austria and the crown-prince of Prussia at Münchengrätz in Bohemia. The eastern powers formed a natural league to resist the liberal tendencies of England and France. The result of this meeting was the holding of a ministerial conference at Vienna under the presidency of Metternich. Here it was decided that the sovereign of each state in the Confederation should defend his rights against the encroachments of the chambers, that military force should be employed when necessary, that a judicial court should be created to decide all disputes between rulers and their subjects, and that the universities and the press should be carefully watched. By these means liberal tendencies were repressed, and the cultivated classes of Germany, excluded from politics, consoled themselves with an almost unique devotion to literature.

§ 28. The desire of the congress of Vienna to provide strong bulwarks against France had brought about a great increase in the territory of Switzerland. Geneva, Wallis (Valais), Tessin (Ticino), Neuenburg (Neufchâtel), and the Grisons (Graubünden), had all been added to the confederation. But for this accession of strength the Swiss had to pay by the restoration in many of the cantons of the aristocratic government that had been swept away by the French conquest. As time went on a strong democratic party was formed in Switzerland, which aimed at the destruction of these revived class privileges. Already, in April, 1830, the oligarchy in Tessin had been overthrown, and the news of the July Revolution gave a fresh impulse to the liberal movement. Zurich, the most powerful canton after Berne, took the lead in the work of reform. In November, 1830, a new constitution was introduced, by which the country districts were to elect two-thirds of the grand council, while the town only elected one-third. This example was followed by nearly all the other cantons, and even the powerful aristocracy of Berne had to resign its privileges. In Basel an obstinate conflict took place between the citizens and the country residents, which was at last settled by the division of the canton into two, *Stadt Basel* and *Landschaft Basel*. In Neufchâtel special difficulties arose because it was subject to the king of Prussia as well as a Swiss canton; but the monarchical party ultimately succeeded in retaining the upper hand. The liberal cantons now endeavoured to complete their work by reforming the constitution of the confederation. In March, 1832, a league was formed, known as the *Siebener-Concordat*, between Berne, Zurich, Lucerne, Solothurn, St. Gallen, Thurgau, and Aargau. They undertook to support each other's liberties with arms, and to remain united until the constitution had been revised. To resist this a counter league, the *Sarner Bund*, was formed by the five conservative and Roman Catholic cantons, Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden, Wallis, and Neufchâtel, and they were speedily joined by Stadt Basel. The conservative party was indiscreet enough to act on the aggressive, and the Schwyzers attacked Landschaft Basel. The attack was repulsed, and the confederate assembly responded by dissolving the *Sarner Bund* (August, 1834) and by recognising the division of Basel into two cantons, against which the conservatives had protested. Thus the liberals gained a decisive victory, which they celebrated by founding the university of Zurich.

§ 29. Italy was declared by Metternich to be "of all European countries, the one which had the greatest tendency to revolution." The secret association of the *Carbonari* aimed at the complete overthrow of political and social relations. The more moderate liberals would have been content to free the peninsula from the despotic influence of Austria and to establish constitutional checks upon the existing governments. The Revolution of 1830 made a natural impression in a country which had many evils to complain of and which had so lately been connected with France. The duke of Modena, Francis IV., sought to make use of the liberal movement to extend his rule over northern Italy. But at the last moment he was terrified by threats from Vienna, turned against his fellow-conspirators, and imprisoned them (Feb. 3, 1831). The people, however, were so alienated by his treachery, that he fled with his prisoners to seek safety in Austrian territory. A provisional government was formed, and Modena was declared a free state. Meanwhile the election of a new pope, Gregory XVI., gave occasion for a rising in the papal states. Bologna took the lead in throwing off its allegiance to Rome, and in a few weeks its example was followed by the whole of Romagna, Umbria, and the Marches. The two sons of Louis Bonaparte, the late king of Holland, hastened to join the insurgents, but the elder died at Forli (17 March), and thus an eventful career was opened to the younger brother, the future Napoleon III. Parma revolted against Maria Louisa, who followed the example of the duke of Modena and fled to Austria. The success of the movement, however, was very short-lived. Austrian troops marched to the assistance of the papacy, the rebellion was put down by force, and the exiled rulers were restored. Louis Philippe, on whom the insurgents had relied, had no sympathy with a movement in which members of the Bonaparte family were engaged. But a temporary revival of the insurrection brought the Austrians back to Romagna, and a great outcry was raised in France against the king. To satisfy public opinion, Louis Philippe sent a French force to seize Ancona (Feb. 22, 1832), but it was a very harmless demonstration, and had been explained beforehand to the papal government. In Naples and Sardinia no disturbances took place. Ferdinand II. succeeded his father, Francis I., on the Neapolitan throne in 1830, and satisfied the people by introducing a more moderate system of government. Charles Albert became king of Sardinia on the death of Charles Felix (27 April, 1831), and found himself in a difficult position between Austria, which had good reason to mistrust him, and the liberal party, which he had betrayed.

§ 30. The only other country in which the July Revolution produced a definite result was Portugal. In 1826 the death of John VI. had given rise to a dispute about the succession. His eldest son, Pedro I., was Emperor of Brazil, and excluded by the Brazilian constitution from succeeding in Portugal. He therefore transferred his rights to his daughter, Maria da Gloria, but she was opposed by her uncle Dom Miguel, who claimed as the nearest male heir. The arrival of English troops in Lisbon secured the accession of Donna Maria, who granted a constitution which had been drawn up by her father. But Pedro, in the hope of satisfying his ambitious brother, negotiated a compromise by which Dom

Miguel became regent in 1828, after taking an oath to observe the constitution. The English troops were now recalled by Wellington, and the regent seized the opportunity to break his engagement. He usurped the crown, annulled the constitution, imprisoned all opponents whom he could seize, and gave way to the most insane excesses of arbitrary power. Donna Maria, who was on her way from Brazil to her kingdom, only got as far as England, where he was received with royal honours. But the Tory ministry refused to support her cause, and she soon returned to Brazil. In 1830 the news of the French Revolution gave rise to disturbances in Rio Janeiro, and early in the next year Pedro was compelled to abdicate in favour of his son Pedro II. He now determined to espouse the cause of his daughter, sailed to Terceira, and landed in Oporto in 1832. The Whigs were now in power in England, and numerous volunteers left this country to support the constitutional cause in Portugal. For a year the usurper held his own against attack. But a naval victory won by Napier, who commanded Pedro's fleet, led to the conquest of Lisbon in 1833, and Donna Maria was crowned queen. Dom Miguel, however, still held out in the provinces, and European intervention was called in. In 1834 the western powers, France, England, Spain and Portugal, concluded a Quadruple Alliance, which was Lord Palmerston's answer to the conference of Münchengrätz. This was fatal to Miguel's cause, and he agreed by the treaty of Evoramente (May, 1834) to quit the peninsula. Later in the year Pedro I. died, and his daughter, now secure upon the throne, was married to the duke of Leuchtenberg. As the bridegroom died within two months of the wedding, a second husband was found for her in Ferdinand of Coburg.

V. THE REIGN OF LOUIS PHILIPPE.

§ 31. The accession of Louis Philippe gave political supremacy in France to the middle classes, who had not made the Revolution but had prevented it from going too far. The king himself loved to pose as a simple citizen, his private life was untainted by profligacy or crime; his chief personal fault was avarice, and he hoped by abandoning the forms of the old court to disguise his real hankering after personal rule. He was surrounded by a group of able men who had studied the English constitution, and thought that its introduction would prove a panacea for all the evils of France. But the constitution which they reverenced was that of the 18th century. Guizot, the most eminent of these *doctrinaire* statesmen, wished to play the part of a French Walpole. His sympathies were really reactionary; he would have "everything for the people, nothing by the people." The chief constitutional changes were the abolition of hereditary peerage (Sept. 1831) and the lowering of the electoral qualification from 300 to 200 francs of direct taxes (March, 1831). The great mass of Frenchmen remained excluded from political privileges. The eminent writer on philosophy, M. Cousin, when solicited for his vote, replied with scorn: "*Monsieur, je suis professeur à la Faculté des Lettres, je suis membre de l'Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques, je suis membre de l'Académie Française, je suis membre du Conseil Royal de l'Instruction Publique, je suis pair de France, j'ai été ministre, je puis le redevenir, mais je ne suis pas électeur.*" This restricted franchise irritated the French love of equality, the most permanent passion that had been created by the great Revolution, and it ensured the ultimate fall of the Orleanist monarchy. It led naturally, in France as in England, to a system of management and corruption. Men of undoubted personal probity, like M. Guizot, did not hesitate to stain their hands with the purchase of votes.

The chief danger to the new monarchy was the discontent of the excluded classes. The peasant proprietors, the most conservative element of the French population, were alienated from a government which refused to trust them, and though they were not likely to risk their property in a new Revolution, they would do nothing to avert it. But the industrial classes in the large towns had none of the orderly instincts and interests of the peasants. They were not slow to discover that the mere change of masters brought them no advantages. The taxes were increased rather than lowered. France was at this time passing through the industrial revolution caused by the introduction of machinery. A change which had caused so much crime and misery in England, was not likely to pass without disorder in France. Louis Philippe's reign is the history of a long conflict between capital and labour, in which all the interests of the governing classes were on the side of the former. Hence arose those socialist theories, which were formulated into systems by St. Simon and Fourier, but which were even more dangerous when they were entertained by ignorant enthusiasts. The rise of socialism to be a political force is one of the most notable facts of this period.

To these internal difficulties was added the discontent caused by foreign politics. Louis Philippe was compelled to purchase the recognition of the European powers by sacrifices which hurt the *amour propre* of Frenchmen who remembered the glories of the Empire. He allowed the English candidate to obtain the crown of Belgium, he offered no serious opposition to Austrian intervention in Italy, and, worst of all, he lured the Poles to their fate by holding out hopes of assistance which were never intended to be realised. The occupation of Ancona, an expedition against Dom Miguel, and the conquest of Algiers, were but a poor compensation for the fall of Warsaw. It was round foreign politics that party and personal rivalries were chiefly concentrated. The king strove hard to maintain the popularity that was essential for his position, but he failed. His reign of eighteen years sufficed to convince the French that the Orleanist monarchy was not, as they had been assured in 1830, "the best of republics."

§ 32. Louis Philippe's first ministry was composed of the men who had taken a prominent part in the "days of July." The duc de Broglie was president, and among his colleagues were Dupont de l'Eure, Laffitte, Gérard, Molé, Guizot, Sébastiani, and Casimir Périer. Outside the ministry the most powerful man was Lafayette, now the idol of Paris, who had resumed his old post as commander of the national guard. The first difficulty which the government had to confront was the trial of the Polignac ministry. The Paris mob clamoured for their death, and threatened a rising if their thirst for blood was not satisfied. A dispute arose between the conservative and republican elements in the cabinet, and victory was secured to the latter by the support of Lafayette, whose services the king could not yet afford to dispense with. Broglie, Guizot, Molé, and Casimir Périer resigned their portfolios, and Laffitte became president (Nov. 1830). In December Charles X.'s ministers were condemned by the Chamber of Peers to imprisonment for life. Disorder in the capital was put down by the national guard, and Lafayette, who had thus lost his popularity, was soon afterwards dismissed by the king, who seized the first opportunity to rid himself of so formidable a rival. Dupont de l'Eure now resigned, and in March, 1831, Laffitte was superseded by Casimir Périer.

Louis Philippe had now definitely severed himself from the republican party, and had thus succeeded in conciliating the legitimist states of Europe. But his reactionary policy was by no means welcome to the French lower classes. Formidable insurrections broke out in Lyons and Grenoble, and military force had to be employed under the direction of Marshal Soult, who had been appointed minister of war. In 1832 the cholera appeared in France, and among its numerous victims was Casimir Périer (16 March), in whom the Orleanist monarchy lost one of its firmest supports. His place was taken by Montalivet, whom the dying minister had recommended to the king. In May the despairing legitimists attempted a rising in La Vendée, where the duchess of Berry appeared in person to encourage the supporters of the house of Bourbon. But the movement was easily suppressed, and the duchess was compelled to escape in disguise. No sooner was this danger at an end than the government had to confront a far more formidable rising in the capital. The funeral of General Lamarque (5 June) was the signal for a republican demonstration which speedily developed into open rebellion. Barricades were raised, the troops were repulsed, and for a moment it seemed likely that the monarchy would be again overthrown. But the court showed a firm front, and the prompt measures of Marshal Soult soon triumphed over the disorderly mob, which had no leaders and no definite aims. This double victory in La Vendée and in Paris, to which must be added the death of Napoleon's only son, the duke of Reichstadt (22 July, 1832), gave great additional strength to the throne of Louis Philippe. But it was felt necessary to make fresh ministerial changes. Soult became president of the council, and the *doctrinaire* leaders, Broglie and Guizot, received the portfolios of foreign affairs and public instruction. With them came into office a man who was destined to play a notable part in French history—M. Thiers. Born at Marseilles in 1797, educated for the legal profession at Aix, Adolphe Thiers had come to Paris in 1821 and had speedily made a great reputation as a journalist. Short and ungraceful in figure, excessively near-sighted, with awkward gestures and an unpleasing voice, he rose to eminence by sheer intellect and energy. He had taken a prominent part in the events of 1830, he had been the first to offer the crown to the duke of Orleans, and he now reaped his reward in becoming a minister of France at the age of 35.

The new ministry was encouraged by an unexpected success. The duchess of Berry, who had hitherto escaped capture by a series of romantic escapes, was betrayed by a Jew named Deutz (Nov. 6), and imprisoned at Blaye. To the delight of the government she was found to be pregnant, and a declaration was extorted from her that she had contracted a secret marriage in Italy. In May, 1833, she gave birth to a son, and announced that the father was Count Lucchese-Palli, a gentleman of the bed-chamber at the court of Naples. This affair, which produced a tremendous sensation at the time, humiliated and discouraged the legitimists, while it contributed to the strength, if not to the credit, of the government.

The ministers had a secure majority in the chambers, and they took advantage of this to obtain large grants of money, which were employed in building the Arc de l'Étoile, in completing the Madeleine, and in commencing the vast chain of fortifications round Paris. At the same time the famous corps of the *Zouaves* and the *Chasseurs d'Afrique* were formed to protect and extend the French colony in Algeria, which was constantly threatened by the neighbouring tribes. The heavy taxation necessary to meet this enormous expenditure caused great discontent among the republicans, who organised themselves in formidable secret societies. In 1834 a second insurrection broke out in Lyons, and was not put down without considerable bloodshed. In the next year Fieschi, a native of Corsica, attempted to assassinate the king with an "infernal machine." Louis Philippe escaped uninjured, but his son and forty other persons were wounded, while Marshal Mortier and thirteen others were killed on the spot. To suppress its unprincipled assailants the government carried through the chambers the severe "laws of September" (1835), which were intended to expedite judicial processes in political trials and to gag the press.

§ 33. The government was now stronger than ever, but internal dissensions became more conspicuous as external dangers were overcome. For a long time the rivalry between Guizot and Thiers had been growing more bitter, and it became impossible for them to act together. Early in 1836 the ministry, which was now headed by the duc de Broglie, was defeated on the budget, and the opportunity was taken to reorganise it. Guizot and the *doctrinaires* retired, and Thiers became president of the Council and minister of foreign affairs. Political parties in France were at this time pretty definitely organised in four great divisions: the right, small in numbers, but headed by a famous orator, M. Berryer; the right centre, consisting of the *doctrinaires* under Guizot; the left centre, of which Thiers was the mouthpiece; and the extreme left, headed by Odilon Barrot. The three last parties were so evenly balanced that domestic legislation was almost impossible, and the attention of the government was wholly concentrated upon foreign affairs. In these Thiers recognised no principle except the interests of France. A second attempt to assassinate the king called attention to Switzerland, where the political refugees of all nations found a refuge from which they could plot in safety against existing governments. Backed up by Metternich, Thiers demanded the expulsion of the refugees, and the threat of a blockade compelled the Swiss to give way. This arbitrary measure gave great umbrage to the liberals, and to regain their confidence Thiers proposed armed intervention on behalf of the constitutional party in Spain. But this brought him into collision with the king, whose love of peace had become a positive passion, and after an existence of barely six months his ministry came to an end (Sept., 1836). M. Molé now became premier, and the leaders of the *doctrinaire* party again came into office, though without the duc de Broglie.

§ 34. The death of Charles X. (6 Oct., 1836) gave occasion for an act of clemency. The imprisoned ministers were set at liberty, though Polignac was banished from France for twenty years. A few weeks afterwards Louis Napoleon made a futile attempt to bring about a rising among the troops at Strasburg. No punishment was inflicted upon the prince, who was shipped off to America and soon returned to Switzerland. His subordinates were acquitted. Early in 1837 a proposal was made to settle a fixed revenue for three of the king's children, the dukes of Orleans and Nemours and the queen of the Belgians. This was quite in accordance with the usages of constitutional monarchy, but the king's avarice was so unpopular that the chambers refused to accept the proposal. A new ministry was now formed (15 April), of which Molé remained the president. The settlement on the duke of Orleans and the queen of the Belgians was carried through the chambers, but the proposal with regard to the duke of Nemours was dropped. The ministry, which had been intended as one of conciliation, found itself confronted in 1838 by the formidable opposition of all the disappointed aspirants to office. A coalition was formed between the left, the left centre, and the right centre, and though much disgust was caused by the unprincipled sacrifice of conviction, it was strong enough to overthrow the ministry in the elections of 1839. But quarrels broke out among the victors about the division of offices, and before they were settled affairs were completely altered by the outbreak of a socialist rising. This was organised by a secret society called *les Saisons*, headed by Bernard, Barbés, and other professional agitators. The Hôtel de Ville was seized, and barricades were erected in the streets. Military force soon put down the revolt, and the king seized the opportunity to form a ministry under Soult, from which the leaders of the coalition were excluded (12 May). But this arrangement could hardly be lasting. In February, 1840, the chambers again refused to grant a settlement for the duke of Nemours, and the ministry retired. After an interval of intrigue Thiers became premier for the second time (1 March), and Guizot was appointed ambassador to London. In order to give a striking proof of the alliance with England and of the termination of internal quarrels, Thiers determined on an act of homage to the great emperor, whose memory his own books had done so much to exalt. It was arranged that the body of Napoleon should be brought from St. Helena to be re-interred with pompous ceremonies in Paris. But events speedily occurred to rob this demonstration of its intended significance. England and France had been for some time estranged from each other about eastern affairs. France, remembering the part it had once played in Egypt, was eager to support Mehemet Ali, who was now at open war with the Porte, from which he had conquered Syria. England, on the other hand, was by no means willing to allow its old rival to regain a secure footing in the east. In 1840 (15 July) England, Russia, Austria and Prussia concluded the treaty of London, by which they agreed to compel Mehemet Ali to withdraw from Syria. This treaty made such a profound impression in France that preparations were at once made for war, and the work of fortifying Paris was resumed with great energy. In the midst of this excitement a new proof was given of the irreconcileable hostility of the imperialists. On the 6th August Louis Napoleon landed at Boulogne and again tried to excite an insurrection. He was captured for the second time, and condemned to perpetual imprisonment at Ham, whence he escaped in 1846 to England. In October another of the numerous attempts to assassinate Louis Philippe, by a man named Darmés, led to the retirement of Thiers. A new ministry was formed (29 Oct.), nominally headed by Soult, but really under the guidance of Guizot, who undertook the control of foreign affairs.

§ 35. This ministry remained in office for the rest of the reign, but, though it lasted so much longer, it was not more fortunate than its transitory predecessors. Its only success was in Algeria, where the French had for many years carried on a desultory war with the heroic Arab chieftain, Abd-el-Kader. In 1844 the emperor of Morocco was drawn into the war and a great expedition was sent out under Marshal Bugeaud. The town of Mogador was taken by storm and the emperor compelled to make peace. Finally, in 1847, Abd-el-Kader surrendered on condition that he should be sent to Egypt. But the condition was disregarded by his treacherous conquerors, and he was thrown into a French prison, from which he was not released till 1853. Meanwhile affairs in Europe were more unpropitious. The dynasty suffered a severe blow in 1842 from the death of the duke of Orleans (13 July), who left two infant sons, the comte de Paris and the duc de Chartres. An injudicious law assigned the regency during the expected minority, not to the widowed mother, Helena of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, but to the unpopular duc de Nemours. The avowed policy of the ministry was one of peace, and especially of alliance with England. To maintain this alliance, France accepted the provisions of the treaty of London with regard to Mehemet Ali, and in 1843, when a dispute arose about the arrest of Pritchard, an English consul, by a French captain in Tahiti, the ministers agreed to pay a pecuniary compensation. These measures may have been prudent, or even necessary, but they certainly irritated public opinion in France, always extremely sensitive to the least appearance of dictation by a foreign power. At the same time discontent was felt at the obstinate hostility of the ministers to all projects of reform, and especially to any change in the electoral system. The rule of the *bourgeoisie* was becoming more and more distasteful to the lower classes, but Guizot declined to entrust political privileges to men who had not been trained to their exercise. While domestic affairs were so threatening, the English alliance, for which such sacrifices had been made, received a severe shock from the conduct of the French government in the once famous affair of the Spanish marriages. Before considering this, it is necessary to give a brief retrospect of affairs in Spain.

§ 36. Ferdinand VII., after having been restored to power by French intervention in 1823, was able to finish his reign in comparative peace. In 1829 he married a fourth wife, Maria Christina of Naples, a sister of the duchess of Berry. Although his three previous marriages had been unfruitful, the king still hoped for children, and issued a "pragmatic sanction" abolishing the Salic law in Spain. Against this act a formal protest was made by the king's brothers, Don Carlos and Francisco, and also by the Bourbons of France and Naples. In 1830 the queen gave birth to a daughter, Isabella, who was at once recognised as heiress to the throne. During a severe illness the king was induced to recall the pragmatic sanction, but on his recovery he was persuaded by his wife to re-issue it. In 1833 Ferdinand VII. died, Isabella II. was proclaimed queen, and her mother undertook the government as regent. Don Carlos at once announced his intention of claiming the crown by legal right, and rallied round him all the adherents of absolute rule, and especially the inhabitants of the Basque provinces. Christina was compelled to rely upon the support of the liberals, and to conciliate them her minister, Martinez de la Rosa, issued a Spanish constitution, the *Estatuto Real*, which established two chambers chosen by indirect election. The Quadruple Alliance of 1834 assured to the Christinos the support of France and Spain. In spite of this the Carlists maintained the upper hand, thanks to the military genius of their generals, Zumalacarregui and Cabrera. The *Estatuto Real*, which had been drawn up under the influence of Louis Philippe, failed to satisfy the advanced liberals, and the Christinos split up into two parties, the *moderados* and the *progresistas* or *exaltados*. In 1836 the latter party compelled Christina to re-establish the constitution of 1812. This cooled the ardour of Louis Philippe for the liberal cause in Spain, and thus helped to bring about the fall of Thiers' ministry in this year. Nevertheless, the regent constantly gained ground, especially after the death of Zumalacarregui in 1835. In 1839 Espartero, the general of the Christinos, compelled the Basque provinces to acknowledge Isabella. Don Carlos renounced his claims in favour of his eldest son, also named Carlos, went to Italy, and died in retirement at Trieste in 1855. Christina now tried to sever herself from the advanced liberals, and to rule with the help of the *moderados*, who were under the patronage of Louis Philippe. But the *progresistas* were supported by England, and found a powerful leader in the victorious general Espartero. In 1840 Christina had to retire to France, and Espartero was appointed regent by the Cortes. But his devotion to the English alliance made him unpopular, the other officers were jealous of his power, and in 1843 he was forced to escape to England. Isabella was now declared of age, Christina returned to Madrid, and the *moderados*, under the leadership of Narvaez, the rival of Espartero, became all-powerful in Spain. In 1844 reactionary changes were made in the constitution, which curtailed the authority of the Cortes and restored many privileges to the crown and the church.

French influence was now preponderant in Spain, and Louis Philippe determined to seize the opportunity of gratifying his dynastic ambition. The great question of the day was to find a husband for the young queen. The interests of England were directly opposed to any marriage which might give the Spanish crown to a French prince; Louis Philippe did not venture to propose a direct alliance with Isabella, but he determined to find a husband for her who would not be likely to have children, and to marry her younger sister, Maria Louisa, to his own son, the duke of Montpensier. This scandalously immoral scheme had the complete approval of Christina. In 1845 Louis Philippe had promised Queen Victoria in a personal interview at Eu, that his son's marriage should not take place until Isabella had given birth to an heir. But the king's honour was weaker than his ambition. On the 10th of October, 1846, the Spanish queen was married to her cousin Francis of Assis, a husband who satisfied the required conditions, and on the very same day the duke of Montpensier married Maria Louisa. Public opinion in Europe was profoundly scandalised by a transaction which must always remain a blot upon the character both of Louis Philippe and of M. Guizot. England was bitterly aggrieved, and although no open rupture took place, the English government was completely alienated from the Orleanist dynasty, which thus lost its firmest support at a time when it was most in need of it. And the intrigue had not even the scanty justification of success. Isabella gave birth to a daughter in 1851, whose paternity was more than doubtful, and before that time Louis Philippe had forfeited the French throne.

CHAPTER XXVI.

REVOLUTION AND REACTION.

I. THE REVOLUTION OF 1848 IN FRANCE.—§ 1. Discontent in France; the political banquets; collision with the troops; abdication of Louis Philippe; proclamation of the Republic. § 2. General recognition of the provisional government; attack on the socialists. § 3. The national assembly; suppression of the socialist rising; Louis Napoleon. § 4. The June riots in Paris; dictatorship of Cavaignac; restoration of order. II. THE REVOLUTION IN GERMANY AND ITALY.—§ 5. Radical movements in Switzerland; war of the *Sonderbund;* new Swiss constitution. § 6. Retrospect of German history. § 7. The March revolutions in Germany; the *Vorparlament.* § 8. The Schleswig-Holstein question; Prussian troops in the duchies. § 9. Italy before 1848; election of Pius IX.; his reforming measures; Austrian occupation of Ferrara; constitutions granted in the Italian states. § 10. Revolt of Lombardy; a republic in Venice; Charles Albert declares war against Austria; retreat of Radetzky to Verona; revolt of Sicily. § 11. The northern war in 1848; successes of Charles Albert; battle of Custozza; Austrian reconquest of Lombardy. § 12. Events in Rome; murder of Rossi; flight of Pius IX.; the Roman Republic; the Republic in Florence. § 13. Movements in Hungary and Bohemia; rising in Vienna; Ferdinand goes to Innsprück; reduction of Prague by Windischgrätz; the Slavs and Magyars in Hungary; Ferdinand returns to Vienna; open war with Hungary; third rising in Vienna; Ferdinand at Olmütz; siege and capture of Vienna; abdication of Ferdinand. § 14. The war in Hungary; successes of the insurgents; Russian intervention; reduction of Hungary. § 15. Charles Albert renews the war in Lombardy; battle of Novara; accession of Victor Emmanuel; Haynau in Brescia; conclusion of peace. § 16. The Austrians in Central Italy; the French in Rome; fall of the Roman Republic; conquest of Venice; reduction of Naples and Sicily. § 17. The reaction in Berlin. § 18. The German Parliament at Frankfort; party divisions; the archduke John chosen as administrator; Schleswig and Holstein; the truce of Malmö; defeat of the democrats. § 19. The "fundamental rights"; the constitution; the "Great German" and "Little German" parties; offer of the hereditary empire to the king of Prussia. § 20. Frederick William IV. refuses the empire; his motives; the May revolutions; end of the Parliament. § 21. Aims of Prussia; the "league of the three kings"; the Interim; second Parliament of Erfurt. § 22. The *Union* and the *Bundestag;* the *Kreuz* party at Berlin; rising in Hesse-Cassel; the conference of Olmütz; humiliation of Prussia; the conference of Dresden; restoration of the

Bund. § 23. Settlement of the Schleswig-Holstein question. III. The Second Republic and the Second Empire in France.—§ 24. The republican constitution; Louis Napoleon is elected President. § 25. Policy of Louis Napoleon; reactionary measures; growing hostility between the President and the Assembly. § 26. The *coup d'état* of December 2, 1851; revival of the empire; Napoleon III. § 27. Condition of France; Napoleon's marriage; his personal character; foreign policy.

I. The Revolution in France.

§ 1. The Orleanist monarchy had long lost all hold upon the affections or the respect of the people. The middle classes still clung to it, but they had no policy and no organisation. They had utilised their period of power to amass wealth and had thought of nothing else. They showed their gratitude by giving the ministry of Guizot a docile majority in the chambers. Satisfied with the material luxury that they enjoyed, they doggedly opposed the introduction of any change. Louis Philippe had not gained in capacity with advancing years: his avarice had grown upon him, and he had lost all touch with public opinion. Lord Palmerston, now foreign secretary in England, showed his indignation about the Spanish marriages by encouraging liberal movements in Switzerland and Italy which could not but react upon France. Outside the *pays légal* of qualified electors the greatest discontent prevailed, but the government paid no attention to it. The workmen of Paris and the other large towns were imbued with the socialist ideas of Louis Blanc. Gross instances of bribery and corruption were made public, but the ministers contented themselves with obtaining a vote of amnesty from their hired majority. The so-called liberals, with M. Thiers at their head, wished to oust their rivals from office, but they had no real desire to alter a system under which they had risen to political power, and they were afraid of going too far for fear of alienating the king. Under these circumstances the only hope of reform lay in the radical party, nominally headed by Odilon Barrot, but really guided by fiery orators like Lamartine, Ledru-Rollin, and Garnier-Pagès. Their object was to force on a measure of electoral reform which should give power to the excluded classes, and strike at the root of the prevailing corruption. Allied with them, but aiming at different and more extensive objects, were the socialists, led by Louis Blanc, Barbès, Blanqui, etc. As the extreme party was in a hopeless minority in the chambers, they were compelled to appeal to the outside public. In 1847 they organised a regular campaign of political banquets, at which toasts were given and speeches made on behalf of reform. Both in Paris and the provinces these banquets were numerously and enthusiastically attended, and the moderate reformers found themselves more and more thrown into the background by the republicans.

When the chambers met in December, 1847, a great sensation was caused by the royal speech, which alluded to the recent agitation as fomented by "*les passions ennemies ou aveugles.*" This was a virtual declaration of war, and the opposition hastened to accept it as such. But all their amendments were rejected by the ministerial majority, and it became more evident than ever that the struggle must be fought out outside the chambers. A grand banquet was organised for the 19th of February, but the prefect of police prohibited it. The date was then altered to the 22nd, and the reformers announced their intention of disregarding the prohibition. A compromise was arranged by which the question of legality was to be settled by a judicial trial. But an invitation to the national guard to attend without their arms was seized upon by the ministers as an infraction of the law, and the banquet was again prohibited. The troops were held in readiness to enforce the order, and the reformers abandoned their intention. The government thought that a great victory had been gained and that all danger was over. The mob, however, ignorant that the banquet was abandoned, assembled in crowds in the streets, and had to be dispersed by the troops. But among the soldiers, and especially among the national guard, discontent was rife, and loud cries were raised for reform and the fall of the ministers. With fatal weakness, Louis Philippe hastened to conciliate the malcontents. Guizot resigned on the 23rd, and M. Molé was entrusted with the formation of a ministry. But the disturbances in the streets continued, and were encouraged by the leaders of the extreme party, who had far greater objects in view than a mere change in ministers. In the evening of the 23rd, the mob was confronted by a troop of soldiers in front of the ministry of foreign affairs. A chance shot was fired by some unknown person, and the soldiers discharged a fatal volley into the midst of the crowd. The bodies of the slain were paraded through the streets, indignant crowds commenced to raise barricades, and the revolution had begun. M. Molé failed to form a ministry, and Louis Philippe turned in despair to M. Thiers. The latter insisted that Odilon Barrot should be allowed to join him, and that electoral reform should at once be granted. The king could do nothing but yield, and the new ministers at once issued a proclamation announcing their appointment and that the troops had received orders to cease firing. But the moment for reconciliation was passed, the proclamation was disregarded, and M. Thiers disappeared. The troops accepted the order as final and began to fraternise with the people. Louis Philippe left the Tuileries to review the national guard, but was greeted with shouts of *Vive la réforme!* He returned with the conviction that all was lost, and abdicated in favour of his grandson, the count of Paris. In defiance of the recent law, it was announced that the duchess of Orleans should be regent instead of the duke of Nemours. The duchess was at once conducted to the chamber of deputies, but the mob stormed the doors and forbade the acceptance of the regency. A provisional government was appointed, consisting of Dupont de l'Eure, the veteran leader of the opposition, Lamartine, Arago, Ledru-Rollin, Crémieux, Garnier-Pagès and Marie. Louis Philippe, after several adventures, succeeded in escaping to England, where he took up his residence at Claremont, and died there after two years of retirement. Most of the members of his family joined him in England, except the duchess of Orleans, who, with her two sons, took refuge with her mother in Germany.

Immediately after their appointment the members of the provisional government proceeded to the Hôtel de Ville, which they found already in the possession of the socialist leaders, Louis Blanc, Marrast, Flocon, and Albert (a working-man). A contest was judiciously avoided by admitting these men to the government, at first as secretaries, but afterwards as full members. In the evening of the 24th a republic was proclaimed, and edicts were issued dissolving the chamber of deputies and prohibiting any meeting of the peers. Rarely in history have so many and such important events been crowded into the space of one day, and perhaps no movement has ever been attended with such unexpectedly sudden success. The hostility against the government was no stronger than it had been for the last few years, there was no sufficient motive for such a complete overthrow of existing institutions, and nothing but the blind weakness of the king and his advisers could have given such a victory to their opponents. It was truly a *révolution du mépris* as Lamartine had prophesied, but it is not often that contempt inspires a revolution.

§ 2. The provisional government was speedily recognised on all sides. The provinces offered no opposition to the will of the capital. Generals Bugeaud and Changarnier offered the allegiance of the army. Even the church hastened to welcome a revolution that showed no hostility to religion. The Archbishop of Paris, M. Affre, took the lead in ordering a solemn service for those who had fallen on the 23rd. A moderate circular was issued by Lamartine, who assumed the control of foreign affairs, to re-assure the neighbouring states as to the peaceful intentions of France. England, as in 1830, was the first to acknowledge the new republic, and most of the continental countries were too absorbed in their own affairs to think of intervention in France. But in spite of this unanimous recognition, the government had one very serious difficulty to deal with in the demands of the working-classes. If the revolution had any real principle, it was a victory of socialism. The socialists had obtained admission to the government itself, and though Lamartine and several of his colleagues realised the hopelessness of their schemes, it was impossible to refuse all concessions to their allies. Accordingly, Louis Blanc and Albert were appointed president and vice-president of a commission to superintend the "organisation of labour." The only expedient which the commission could suggest was to recognize the duty of the state to provide work for every man who demanded it, and to carry this out by the erection of national workshops. This experiment, which had signally failed during the first Revolution, and which could only end in supporting the idle at the expense of the industrious, was again put into practice. Within a fortnight more than 40,000 men had assembled at the workshops, and their numbers continued to be swelled by arrivals from the provinces. But this failed to satisfy the extreme party, and their leaders, Cabet, Blanqui, and Raspail, tried to drive the government to adopt communistic measures. On the 16th of April a mob of artisans marched to the Hôtel de Ville, but they found the national guard drawn up before the building and were received with cries of *à bas les communistes!* For the moment the party of order had triumphed.

§ 3. The national assembly, which had been summoned to draw up a new constitution, met on the 27th of April. All artificial restrictions upon the franchise were swept away, every man of 21 years had a vote, and every man of 25 was qualified to be elected. The number of deputies was fixed at nine hundred, and under the circumstances the elections were conducted with marvellous order and regularity. The provisional government resigned its powers into the hands of the assembly, which at once formally decreed the Republic. The next act was to appoint an executive commission of five members. The result was the election of Arago with 725 votes, Garnier-Pagès with 715, Marie with 702, Lamartine with 643, and Ledru-Rollin with 458. The socialists were altogether excluded, and were driven to adopt extreme measures. They endeavoured to excite the national sympathy for Poland, where a spasmodic attempt had been made to recover independence. On the 15th of May a procession marched to the assembly to present a petition on behalf of the Poles. No preparations had been made for resistance, the mob stormed the hall, and set to work to elect a new government. The slightest weakness might have involved France in ruin. But the government stood firm, the national guard and the *garde mobile*, a body that had been formed by Lamartine out of the *gamins* of the Paris streets, rallied round them, the conspirators lost both their courage and their senses, and order was restored without serious difficulty. Most of the leaders were captured: Barbès and Albert were sentenced to transportation, and Blanqui to seven years imprisonment; Louis Blanc, who had intrigued against the government since his own exclusion, escaped punishment by flight.

Among the numerous adhesions to the Republic, not the least unexpected and embarrassing had been that of Louis Napoleon, who had hastened to leave England for Paris. By the advice of the provisional government he had returned to London. But the reactionary party sought to use his name for their own purposes, and he was elected as deputy for Paris and for two other departments. This gave rise to a serious debate in the assembly. A law banishing the Bonaparte family from French soil had never been repealed, and Lamartine proposed that it should be put in force. But the law was practically obsolete, and two Bonapartes, sons of Jerome and Lucien, were actually members of the assembly. The difficulty was solved by Louis Napoleon himself, who wrote in haughty and ambiguous language, offering to serve his country by remaining in exile, and ultimately declined the offered seat.

§ 4. Meanwhile the public workshops had become an obvious nuisance. The number of workmen was more than 100,000, and the expense of maintaining them amounted to more than 14 million francs. Private enterprise was almost at a standstill. The government determined upon vigorous measures to put down the evil. A decree was issued on the 22nd of June which ordered all unmarried workmen from the ages of 18 to 25 to enter the army, while the rest were to be transferred to the departments. All who refused were to be excluded from the workshops. This decree gave rise to a terrible conflict in Paris. The workmen threw up enormous barricades, defended them with the heroism of despair, and for four days more than held their own. The executive committee had to resign their powers, and General Cavaignac was appointed dictator. The archbishop of Paris, M. Affre, was slain by a chance bullet as he was attempting to mediate a peace, and the losses among the troops were very great. Ultimately, superior numbers and discipline secured the victory, the last barricade in the Faubourg St. Antoine was stormed on the 28th, and the anarchists were compelled to submit. Cavaignac resigned his dictatorship, but was appointed president of the council. A decree was now promulgated abolishing the workshops altogether, and was silently obeyed. Socialism was completely defeated, but in its fall it dragged down the Republic. The fear of democratic anarchy became the dominant motive of all who had anything to lose, and they were now ready to welcome any form of government, however absolute, which would secure the rights of property.

II. THE REVOLUTION IN GERMANY AND ITALY.

§ 5. The example of Paris exerted its wonted fascination over the continental states. The year 1848 is an *annus mirabilis* in European history. On every side thrones and dynasties seemed tottering to ruin, and each day brought the news of another revolution. Among the first countries to feel the revolutionary impulse was Switzerland, always keenly sensitive to French influence, and where the soil had been prepared by previous events. The radical party, humiliated by the enforced expulsion of the political refugees in 1836, had turned its attention to religious questions, and made a determined attack upon the church. In 1839 the famous author of the *Life of Christ*, Dr. Strauss, had been appointed professor at the university of Zurich, but such indignation was expressed by the orthodox inhabitants that the appointment had to be cancelled, and the liberals lost the control of the government of Zurich for the next six years. In 1841 a more important contest was provoked by the abolition of the monasteries in Aargau. The Roman Catholic majority in Lucerne answered this measure by admitting the Jesuits and entrusting to them the management of education. This excited the radicals to active measures, and as the *Tagsatzung*, or assembly of the *Bund*, refused to support them, free bands (*Freischaaren*) were formed to coerce their opponents. The Roman Catholic cantons, Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden, Lucerne, Zug, Freiburg, and Wallis, formed a separate league, the *Sonderbund*, for mutual defence (1845). The great powers tried to bring about an agreement, but were foiled by their want of unanimity. Austria wished to support the *Sonderbund*, while England allied itself with the radicals, and France vacillated between the two sides. In 1847 the war broke out and was speedily ended in the complete defeat of the *Sonderbund*, which was dissolved and its members had to pay the expenses of the war. The Jesuits were expelled and escaped to Italy. The radicals were encouraged by their victory to revive their old plan of forming an orderly and compact federation. The French revolution gave them new strength, and in September, 1848, the new constitution was introduced. The supreme power was vested in two assemblies, the national council, representing the state as a whole, and the council of estates, representing the separate cantons. The two bodies combined to appoint a federal council, which was to sit in Berne and to wield the executive power, and also a federal court of justice.

§ 6. The history of Germany is almost a complete blank between the revolutionary movements of 1830 and 1848. The *Bund*, the only representative of German unity, was a hopelessly inert mass, which did nothing but oppose a passive resistance to reform. The subdivision into innumerable petty states was maintained by the overwhelming influence of Russia, which was always exerted to prevent any aggrandisement of Prussia or Austria. These two states, which absorbed most of the material strength of Germany, regarded each other with a jealousy that made the Czar the necessary arbitrator between them. In Austria, Francis I. had been succeeded in 1835 by his son Ferdinand I., but the change of rulers only gave greater power to Metternich, who continued with cynical obstinacy to maintain an antiquated system of government which was ready to fall at the first touch. In 1837, the death of William IV. separated England from Hanover, and the latter crown, from which females were excluded, fell to Ernest Augustus, duke of Cumberland. The first act of the new king was to abolish the constitution of 1833, and to dismiss seven Göttingen professors who protested against this arbitrary measure. In 1840, Frederick William IV. succeeded his father in Prussia, but he did little to alter the system that had prevailed in Berlin since 1815. The last relic of Polish independence was done away with in 1846, when the republic of Krakau, on the pretext of an insurrection, was incorporated with Austria.

§ 7. In March, 1848, the revolutionary wave broke over Germany with such force that resistance was hardly dreamed of. Rulers hastened to secure their thrones by granting all the demands of their subjects, and by admitting to office the men who had hitherto been the prominent leaders of opposition. The constitution of Baden (3 March) was the model which was copied in the other states. Its chief points were the freedom of the press, trial by jury, political equality of all creeds, responsibility of ministers, abolition of feudal obligations, and equal taxation. Everywhere the people agitated for these or similar reforms, and everywhere they were granted. No day passed without the appearance of a new constitution. In Darmstadt, Nassau, Hesse-Cassel, Oldenburg, Brunswick, the four Hanse Towns, Weimar, and Würtemberg, the outlines of the story are so similar that the details become insignificant. Only the three great middle-states, Saxony, Bavaria, and Hanover, delayed their action to see what was done by their two powerful neighbours.

But the acquisition of constitutional liberties for the separate states was by no means the sole object of the liberal party. Their keenest wish was to reform the *Bund*, and to give substantial unity to Germany as a compact federation. As to the constitution of this federation very opposite views prevailed, the democrats wishing to establish a German republic, while the more moderate party hoped to create a federal empire under the headship of Prussia. It was in the south-western states, where internal liberty was most firmly rooted, that this desire for unity was strongest. On March 8 a number of liberal leaders met at Heidelberg, and issued a formal invitation to the German states to send deputies to a *Vorparlament*, which was to prepare the way for a permanent national representation. It was impossible for the princes to allow the settlement of so great a question to pass out of their hands. Accordingly, Prussia and Austria agreed to hold a conference of princes on March 15, to consider the proposed reform of the *Bund*. But before that date the two great powers had felt the force of the revolution.

The news of the events in Paris was enough in itself to overturn the ill-cemented edifice of the Austrian state. The Hungarians, inspired by the eloquence of Kossuth, clamoured for an independent diet and diminished taxes. Similar demands were made in Prague. The populace of Vienna, usually so contented and pleasure-loving, demanded the dismissal of Metternich. Without an effort at resistance the famous diplomatist fled to England, and the Austrian government was left to the direction of the mob. The feeble Ferdinand I. granted freedom to the press, allowed the formation of a citizen guard, and promised a liberal constitution.

In Prussia, Frederick William IV. offered a stubborn resistance to the demands for constitutional liberties which arrived from all parts of his kingdom, and especially from the Rhenish Provinces. But the report of the occurrences in Vienna led to formidable disturbances in Berlin and made concessions unavoidable. On March 17 the king promised freedom of the press, the summons of a *Landtag* on April 2, the "transformation of the German Confederation (*Statenbund*) into a Federal State (*Bundestat*)," and the incorporation of East and West Prussia and Posen in the *Bund*. Liberal as these assurances were they failed to satisfy the people, who now clamoured for the dismissal of the soldiers from the town and the formation of a citizen guard. On March 18 the mob came into collision with the troops, barricades were raised, and for fourteen hours a terrible battle was waged in the streets of Berlin. At last the king gave way, ordered the troops to withdraw, dismissed his ministry, and granted an unconditional amnesty to all political prisoners. His brother, William Prince of Prussia, who was regarded as a leader of the reactionary party, departed to England. From this moment Frederick William determined to put himself at the head of the liberal movement, and thus to satisfy the party which desired to see Prussia at the head of a united Germany. He assumed the German colours and issued a proclamation in which he undertook as a constitutional king to be the "leader of a free and new-born German nation" (21 March). Two days later he had to attend with bare head the funeral of the 183 victims of the 18th of March. But the memory of that day stood between him and the realisation of his new aims, and Prussia had for the moment lost all popularity and respect in Germany.

The revolutions in Vienna and Berlin decided the action of those states which had hitherto hesitated. On March 16, the king of Saxony appointed a liberal ministry. Lewis of Bavaria had to dismiss his hated mistress, Lola Montez (the Countess Landsfeldt), and on March 20 he abdicated in favour of his son Maximilian II., who at once conceded the popular demands. Ernest Augustus of Hanover was compelled to grant a constitution on the model of that of Baden. Thus, by the end of March the liberals had triumphed in every state of Germany.

The *Vorparlament,* composed mainly of deputies from the lesser states, met at Frankfort on March 31, and speedily completed its work. It decreed that the federal government should consist of a single head with two chambers, a senate and a house of popular representatives. The German people as a whole was to enjoy the same liberties which had been secured to the members of the individual states. The details of the constitution were to be settled by a national assembly to be elected without any regard to class divisions, wealth, or religion. The princes were to be excluded from all voice in the matter. Before separating, the assembly nominated a committee of fifty to superintend the carrying out of these decrees. But the proceedings at Frankfort altogether failed to satisfy the democratic party, which had conceived the extravagant plan of forming a German republic. Their leaders determined to give up constitutional action and resort to force. They stirred up the people to revolt, and organised bands of volunteers to terrify the established government. But in the brief struggle which followed the republicans were defeated, and their commander, Hecker, displayed neither ability nor courage.

§ 8. Beside domestic revolutions and reforms, Germany had a difficult question to deal with in the relations of the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein with Denmark. Both contained a large German population, and Holstein was a member of the *Bund.* Both were hostile to Danish rule, and were especially indignant at the attempts to destroy their independent nationality and to incorporate them with Denmark. The question was complicated by the prospect of a disputed succession. Females were entitled to succeed in Denmark, but were excluded from the duchies. In 1846 Christian VIII., whose only son was unlikely to have children, issued a decree, the *offene Briefe,* in which he declared the whole

Danish state to be indivisible and to be heritable by females as well as males. This excluded the duke of Augustenburg, the nearest male heir, and was a great blow to the inhabitants of Schleswig and Holstein, who had hoped, on the extinction of the Danish male line, to fall under the separate rule of a German prince. In January, 1848, Christian VIII. died, and was succeeded by his son, Frederick VII., who at once issued a liberal constitution in the hope of allaying discontent. But his German subjects refused to sell their independence at any price, and the revolutionary movement in Germany came just in time to give them new courage. The assemblies of the two duchies joined themselves together (18 March), and demanded that both should be admitted to the *Bund* and have a joint constitution, on the German model. On the 24th a provisional government was formed, with the duke of Augustenburg at its head. Frederick VII. treated these acts as rebellion, and sent an army into the duchies. But public opinion in Germany was warmly excited in their behalf, and the *Vorparlament* went out of its way to decree the admission of Schleswig to the *Bund*. The king of Prussia, eager to fall in with the current of opinion, sent an army to assist the duke of Augustenburg. On land the Prussians, under Wrangel, gained several successes, but the want of a fleet prevented any decisive result from being obtained, and the favour shown to Denmark by Russia and England induced Frederick William to recall his troops before any settlement had been made.

§ 9. No part of Europe was so quiet and at the same time so profoundly discontented as Italy in the first years of the fifth decade of the century. Austrian rule pressed like a leaden weight upon the provinces of Lombardy and Venetia. A powerful army, under Marshal Radetsky, stood ready to crush the slightest symptom of revolt. The press was subject to the most rigorous censorship, and so searching was the system of espionage that no one ventured to breathe a word of complaint. The upper classes were purposely encouraged to lead a licentious life, that they might lose all thought of political liberty. In the other provinces Austrian influence was supreme, and was employed to support the arbitrary government of the princes. In Naples and Sicily Ferdinand II. (1830–1859) crushed his subjects under a despotism of terror. In the Papal States Gregory XVI. (1831–1846) maintained the worst of all forms of government, the absolutism of the clergy. Leopold II. of Tuscany was personally benevolent and well-intentioned, but did not venture to depart from the system of rule prescribed from Vienna. The lesser rulers of Modena, Parma, and Lucca were the powerless vassals of Austria. In Piedmont Charles Albert had never ventured to return to the liberal principles of his youth.

Economic reforms were introduced, but no steps were taken towards constitutional reform. The King was a devout Roman Catholic, and the Austrian government began to regard him as one who had fully repented of his past follies. The only disturbance to public tranquillity arose from the isolated and hopeless revolts excited by Mazzini and his society of "Young Italy," which the people did not venture to support, and which only served to keep alive the idea of independence and the desire of revenge.

This lethargy was suddenly interrupted from a wholly unexpected quarter. In June, 1846, Gregory XVI. died, and the choice of the conclave fell upon one of the youngest cardinals, Mastai Ferretti, who took the name of Pius IX. The new pope was chosen mainly on account of his feeble health, but he was destined to the longest and one of the most eventful pontificates recorded in history. Eager to obtain popularity, Pius IX. signalised his accession by reforming measures which made a profound impression in Europe. He issued an amnesty for all political offenders, recalled the exiles, and appointed a council to aid him in the government. Italy resounded with cries of *Evviva Pio Nono!* and the pope became for a brief period the idol of his countrymen. Moderate liberals had long been accustomed to regard the papacy as the one genuinely Italian government in the peninsula, and they welcomed the prospect of reviving national unity and independence under papal guidance. Meanwhile the news from Rome was received in Vienna with mingled dismay and indignation. Metternich declared that a liberal pope was the one contingency that had never been anticipated. By the treaty of Vienna, Austria was allowed to keep a garrison in the fortress of Ferrara, and, as a counter-demonstration, the troops now occupied the city as well. Pius IX. bitterly protested against this act as an infraction of his sovereign rights, and went so far as to prepare for armed resistance, amidst the enthusiastic plaudits of his subjects.

The example of the pope naturally exercised great influence in the other Italian states. Leopold of Tuscany hastened to conciliate the people with administrative reforms. Charles Louis of Lucca was compelled to make similar concessions, but he showed his personal antipathy by selling his duchy to the grand-duke of Tuscany and retiring from public life. Intense popular indignation was aroused by the settlement of the succession in Parma on the death of Maria Louisa (December, 1847). The Congress of Vienna had arranged that if she died childless, Parma should be given to the duke of Lucca, whose duchy was to be transferred to Tuscany, while the latter was to cede certain districts to the duke of Modena. This elaborate arrangement, based altogether upon dynastic interests, without any regard to the wishes of the peoples concerned, was now carried out. Riots ensued, and Francis. V. of Modena invited the Austrians to occupy his duchy. In Southern Italy the movement was the more violent in proportion to the evils it had to combat. Sicily threw off the Neapolitan yoke, and a provisional government was established in Palermo, under Ruggiero Settimo (Jan. 24, 1848). A rising in Naples compelled Ferdinand II. to dismiss his ministers and to grant a liberal constitution (10th Feb.). The scruples of Charles Albert were removed when he found himself on the same side as the pope, and early in 1848 he drew up a constitution for Piedmont, the *Statuto Fondamentale*, which was issued on March 4. In Tuscany representative institutions were granted on February 17, and the revolution in Paris induced Pius IX. to take the final step, to which his previous measures had obviously tended. A ministry was formed under Cardinal Antonelli, in which for the first time the lay element preponderated, and a constitution was promulgated on March 14. This established two chambers—one composed of nominees of the pope, the other of popular representatives; but the final decision on all matters was still reserved to the college of cardinals.

§ 10. When the news arrived of the Viennese rising of March 13 and the flight of Metternich, the flame of revolt at once broke out in the northern provinces. The lead was taken by Milan, where the citizens erected barricades, and for four days carried on a desperate contest against the Austrian troops. Radetsky might have destroyed the city by a bombardment, but he was afraid lest a sudden advance of the Sardinian army might cut off his communications with Austria. On the evening of the 22nd he quitted Milan and retreated towards the famous Quadrilateral formed by the fortresses of Peschiera, Mantua, Legnago, and Verona. His retreat was the signal for a general rising. The duke of Parma fled without striking a blow. One after another Monza, Como, Bergamo, Brescia and Cremona threw off the rule of Austria. Venice was tamely resigned by Counts Palffy and Zichy, and the citizens restored the Republic under the presidency of Daniele Manin. Francis V. of Modena was driven from his duchy. Meanwhile Charles Albert had taken a decisive step. He declared war against Austria, crossed the Ticino with his army (March 25), and proceeded to pursue the retreating Austrians. Radetsky now took up his quarters at Verona and stood upon the defensive. Popular enthusiasm compelled the remaining Governments of the peninsula to espouse the national cause. The grand-duke of Tuscany ordered his troops to march to the frontier. Pius IX., torn by his conflicting interests as an Italian prince and as head of the Roman Catholic Church, found it impossible to resist the general impulse, and the Roman army was despatched to the Po. Even Ferdinand II. did not yet venture to obey his natural inclinations. The Neapolitan army set out under Pepé, the fleet was sent to Ancona, and Charles Albert was assured that Naples would co-operate actively in the war for Italian independence. But it was afterwards discovered that both the army and the fleet had received secret instructions to do nothing until the course of events had enabled the king to decide finally on his course of action. Ferdinand's insincerity was soon made manifest. In defiance of his solemn oath to observe the constitution, he dissolved the chamber of deputies before it had time to meet, formed a reactionary ministry, recalled his army, and decreed a complete change of the franchise. In consequence of these measures the Sicilians declared that the Bourbons had forfeited the crown, and prepared to offer the crown to the duke of Genoa, the second son of Charles Albert.

§ 11. The Sardinian king had continued for some time to retain his advantage in the Lombard war. Radetsky refused to be drawn from his position at Verona until the arrival of reinforcements should enable him to take the aggressive. The result was that the Sardinian troops were able to overrun the country as far as the Adige, and a momentary repulse at Santa Lucia (6th May) was more than compensated by a distinguished success at Goito (30th May) and by the capture of Peschiera. Popular votes decreed the annexation of Lombardy, Modena, and Parma to Sardinia. That these bright prospects were soon overclouded was probably due to the error of Charles Albert himself. If he had at once advanced against Radetsky at the end of March, he might have finished the war at one blow. But he was afraid of the nationalists, who might utilise his victories to his own disadvantage; he was not cordially supported by the other rulers of the peninsula; and he trusted that English mediation and the rising in Hungary would compel Austria to cede Lombardy to him without further warfare. His hesitation secured the success of Radetsky, whose retreat, instead of being a sign of weakness, was a masterly stroke of policy. Strengthened by reinforcements under Welden, he suddenly left Verona, captured Vicenza, Treviso and Padua, and thus secured a second and safer line of communication with Austria. Turning against the Piedmontese, he inflicted a crushing defeat upon them at Custozza (25th July). Charles Albert retreated to Milan, closely pursued and harassed by the victorious army. Milan capitulated without striking a blow, and the last chance of retaining any hold upon Lombardy was gone. On August 8 Charles Albert signed an armistice, by which he surrendered Peschiera and all positions outside Lombardy, and engaged to withdraw the ships and troops that had been sent to the assistance of Venice. Lombardy was once more an Austrian province, and Radetsky prepared to complete his work by laying siege to Venice.

§ 12. Pius IX. had already deserted the Italian cause when he discovered that it involved him in open war with Austria. From this time he began to think more of his duties as head of the church and less of temporal interests. The result was that he soon lost the popularity which his liberal measures had given him. His reforming ministry naturally resigned when the pope would no longer assent to their measures. Count Rossi, who became head of a new ministry, alienated both the liberal and the reactionary parties, and was assassinated on November 15. The pope was so horrified by this act that he quitted Rome in disguise (Nov. 24) and took up his residence at Gaeta, under the protection of the King of Naples. The greatest excitement prevailed when the news of his departure was made known. The Roman parliament, which had met on the day of Rossi's death, appointed an executive committee of three persons, and ordered the election of a constituent assembly. The pope contented himself with issuing one brief after another to declare the nullity of all that was done in his absence, but did nothing to strengthen the hands of the moderate party, who were still inclined to trust him. The constituent assembly, in which both Garibaldi and Mazzini had seats, decided that the pope had forfeited the temporal government of the State, that he should be guaranteed the independent exercise of his spiritual power, and that a pure democracy should be created under the name of the Roman Republic. In Tuscany Leopold II. followed the pope's example when he found that matters were going too far, and escaped first to San Stefano and then to Gaeta. As he refused to return, a Republic was proclaimed in Florence under the presidency of Guerrazzi.

§ 13. During the months which witnessed the overthrow and restoration of the Austrian power in Italy, the home government was undergoing a great crisis. Kolowrat, who took Metternich's place, was unequal to the task of maintaining order, and the government was carried on under the dictation of the students and the mob. The disturbances in the capital were stirred up by Kossuth, who aimed at freeing Hungary altogether from Hapsburg rule. The Emperor had already granted the Hungarians an independent ministry, in which Kossuth undertook the control of finance. But the revolutionary party demanded a constitution on the model of that of Baden, and the Diet was terrified by an insurrection into passing a decree for its establishment. In Bohemia the Slavonic party also agitated for the formation of an independent government and the exclusion of German elements. But the Slavs had no sympathy with the Magyars, and were willing to support the Hapsburgs if they would grant their demands. They were especially anxious to prevent the federal union of the German provinces of Austria with the rest of Germany. Kossuth determined to effect his own aims and to frustrate those of Bohemia by terrifying the imperial government. A new constitution had been issued, which established the ordinary two chambers. On May 15 the populace of Vienna rose in revolt and demanded the abolition of the aristocratic chamber and the summons of a national assembly to reform the constitution. Resistance was impossible, and Ferdinand, by the advice of the reactionary party, escaped with his family from Vienna to Innsprück. This was a very well-judged measure, because it freed the emperor from the influence of both the Hungarians and the Bohemians, while he could rely upon the support of the Tyrolese, always the most loyal subjects of the house of Hapsburg.

In Vienna the wildest excitement prevailed for a time. The mob raised barricades in the streets, and civil war was only avoided by ordering the troops to leave the city. In Bohemia the Emperor's departure to Innsprück was regarded as a serious blow, because it had been hoped that he would take up his residence in Prague and entrust the defence of the crown to his Slav subjects. His weakness and humiliation, however, still offered a favourable prospect of realising their designs. On June 2 a great Slavonic Congress was opened, under the presidency of Palacky, the historian. Three days later it was formally decreed that the Slavs would remain loyal subjects of the Hapsburgs on condition that the Austrian monarchy was organised as a federation. At the same time a provisional government was formed in Prague, and the Emperor was called upon to order Windischgrätz, the commander of the garrison, to withdraw his troops. But before this could be answered, hostilities broke out. After an indecisive conflict in the streets, in which the wife of Windischgrätz was killed, the garrison retired outside the walls, but only to bombard the city from the surrounding hills. This decided the struggle. The opposition leaders made their escape, and Prague surrendered unconditionally (June 18). This was only a small success in itself, but, coupled with Radetsky's victory in Italy, it had a great moral effect in restoring the courage and prestige of the Austrian Government. At the same time the movement in Hungary was seriously hampered by the action of the Slavonic portion of the population. The Slavs were always bitterly hostile to the Magyars, and the project of establishing an independent state of Hungary threatened them with political annihilation. Their only hope lay in the maintenance of German rule, and they rose in wild revolt against the dominant party of Kossuth. The Magyars had also to carry on war against the Croats under their Ban Jellachich, who was secretly instigated by the imperial court.

Meanwhile the constituent assembly, which Ferdinand had authorised before his departure, met on July 22. Race differences among its members made it difficult for them to come to any agreement, and they were soon absorbed in the thorny question of the relations of lords and serfs. But the presence of the assembly seemed to exercise a tranquillising effect upon Vienna, and the more favourable aspect of affairs emboldened the emperor to return to his capital (August 12). In the hope of ending the Hungarian war he nominated Count Lamberg commander of the troops in that kingdom, but the unfortunate general was murdered on the bridge of boats at Pesth. All hopes of reconciliation were now at an end, and open war was declared against the Hungarians. But this act also terminated the tranquillity at Vienna, which was in great measure due to the influence of Kossuth. On October 6 a third revolt commenced, and proved far more formidable than either of its predecessors. Its immediate object was to prevent the march of the troops who had been ordered to proceed to Hungary. The mob murdered Latour, the war minister, stormed the arsenals, and compelled the constituent assembly to demand from the Emperor the cessation of hostilities against the Hungarians. Ferdinand again fled, this time to Olmütz, in Moravia. The garrison under Auersperg occupied a defensive position in the Belvedere gardens, and the city was left in the hands of the insurgents. But their triumph was very short-lived. Jellachich with his Croats marched from the Raab against Vienna, and Windischgrätz, the victor of Prague, was appointed commander-in-chief of all Austrian troops outside Italy. By October 23 the city was closely invested on all sides. But the besieged, confident in the approaching aid from Hungary, refused to yield, and for several days carried on a desperate struggle against superior forces. On the 30th the Hungarian troops were seen in the distance, but they were repulsed after a short engagement on the Schwechat. This sealed the fate of Vienna, which surrendered on the next day. The rebels received the prompt punishment of military justice. The Austrian monarchy was saved. On November 24 a new ministry was formed, under Felix Schwarzenberg, the resolute head of the reactionary party. On December 2 the Emperor Ferdinand abdicated in favour of his nephew, Francis Joseph, on the ground that "younger powers were needed to carry out the reforms that had been commenced." The change of rulers was really the signal of approaching reaction.

The constituent assembly, which had been transferred from Vienna to Kremsier, was dissolved (March 7, 1849), and a new constitution was granted "by the grace of the emperor."

§ 14. The new emperor, Francis Joseph, recognised that his first task was the reduction of Hungary, and entrusted Windischgrätz with the completion of the work which had been so successfully commenced at Prague and Vienna. The Hungarians refused to accept the abdication of Ferdinand, and the government was still carried on in his name. Kossuth was compelled to adopt this course to conciliate the army and its leader, Görgey, who were determined not to act as rebels, and had no sympathy with the republican aspirations of the great orator. Windischgrätz began the campaign on December 15, and met with no real opposition to his early movements. Kossuth's plan was to give up western Hungary to the invaders, in order to entice them into the marshy districts of the interior during the winter season. The committee of national defence, of which Kossuth was president, abandoned Pesth, and the city was occupied by the Austrians (Jan. 5, 1849). From this moment the cause of the insurgents triumphed. Bem, a Polish exile, who had commanded in the recent defence of Vienna and had escaped from the conquerors, was sent to act against the Saxon population of Transylvania, which refused to accept the rule of the Magyars and maintained the cause of the imperial government. By the end of February he succeeded in reducing the whole province. Windischgrätz now advanced from Pesth into the interior. At Kapolna (Feb. 26–7) a two days' battle took place, in which neither side could claim a decisive victory, but the Hungarians retired to the river Theiss. There a number of battles were fought to defend the passage of the river, and everywhere the Austrians were repulsed. Görgey was now able to take the aggressive, and carried all before him. Windischgrätz was recalled, but his successor, Welden, found it necessary to evacuate Pesth. The Hungarians returned to the capital in triumph, and stormed Buda (Ofen), on the opposite bank of the Danube, after a heroic defence on the part of the garrison (21 May). The Austrian army retreated to Pressburg, in the extreme west of the kingdom. The triumph of the insurgents was celebrated by the declaration of Hungarian independence (14 April), and the creation of a provisional government, with Kossuth at its head. This bold step destroyed the last chance of a compromise, but at the same time it alienated Görgey, who henceforth acted in complete independence.

The Austrian government began to despair of reducing Hungary by its own efforts, and turned for assistance to Russia, the patron of all states contending against revolution. On May 21, the very day on which Buda surrendered, Francis Joseph met the Czar in a personal interview at Warsaw. Nicolas was afraid lest the success of the Hungarians might provoke a rising in Poland, which was the more likely as many Poles were serving in the Hungarian army, and willingly accorded the aid that was demanded. In June Paskiewitsch entered Hungary with 130,000 men, and the command of the Austrians was entrusted to Haynau, already notorious for the severity with which he had treated the defeated Italians of Lombardy. The eloquence of Kossuth induced the Hungarians to carry on a desperate guerilla warfare against the invaders. But the contest was too unequal, and the differences between the military and the civil leaders weakened the national cause. At Temesvar one division of the Hungarian army, under Dembinski, was crushed by Haynau (9 August). Kossuth now resigned his office and proceeded to Transylvania. Görgey was appointed dictator, but he had already opened negotiations with the Russians, and on August 13 he surrendered with his whole army to general Rüdiger at Vilagos. This practically ended the war. Kossuth and Bem fled to Turkey, where the Porte refused to give them up. Görgey was able to secure his personal safety, but the other leaders received scant mercy from Haynau and his military tribunals. Hungary had to pay dearly for its rebellion. It lost all independence and all constitutional freedom, and sank for a short time into a vassal province of Austria.

§ 15. Meanwhile the temporary success of the Hungarians in the early part of 1849 had involved Austria in a second Italian war. All the attempts of England and France to negotiate a final peace between Austria and Sardinia had failed. The government at Vienna refused to entertain any proposal except the complete restoration of Austrian rule and of the governments allied with Austria. For Charles Albert to accept these terms, except under the pressure of complete defeat, would deprive the Sardinian monarchy for ever of the respect and trust of Italy. On March 9 the king took the bold step of putting an end to the armistice, which had been prolonged since August, 1848. It was hoped that the Austrian arms would be sufficiently employed in the Hungarian war and in the siege of Venice. But Radetsky was confident of success, and hastened to engage in a contest which he hoped would finally settle affairs in Italy. Instead of waiting to be attacked he invaded Piedmont, and in the battle of Novara inflicted a crushing defeat upon the Sardinians, who were commanded by the Polish general Chrzanowski (23 March). So disastrous was the battle, and so exorbitant the terms proposed by Radetsky, that on the same evening Charles Albert abdicated in favour of his eldest son, Victor

Emmanuel II., and quitted Italy for Oporto, where he died on July 28. The new king was married to the daughter of an Austrian archduke, and had not inspired the same invincible distrust as his father. Radetsky now offered an immediate armistice, on condition that Victor Emmanuel should pledge himself to conclude a peace as soon as possible, to reduce his army to a peace footing, and to hand over the fortress of Alessandria to Austrian occupation as a hostage, for his good faith. These terms, though far milder than had been offered to Charles Albert, were resented as dishonourable in Turin, and the young king had to enter his capital by night to avoid the risk of being insulted by his new subjects. Few men could have anticipated that a ruler whose reign began under such gloomy auspices would become before its close the recognised king of a free and united Italy. A revolt in Lombardy, which had broken out directly hostilities commenced, was put down by the Austrians with prompt severity. Brescia, the only place which made a conspicuous resistance, was stormed by Haynau, whose conduct on this occasion earned him the name of the "Hyæna of Brescia," and a reputation for cruelty which was enhanced by his subsequent deeds in Hungary. The final treaty between Austria and Sardinia (August 6) restored matters to their condition before the war, the defeated country having to pay an idemnity of seventy-five million francs.

§ 16. After their success in the north the Austrians proceeded to complete their work by putting down the revolution in the other provinces of Italy. Entering Tuscany, they occupied Florence, put down the Republic, and restored the authority of the grand-duke. Leopold now returned from Gaeta, revoked the constitution which he had granted in the previous year, and restored the old system of absolute rule. Parma, Bologna, and Ancona were successively occupied by the Austrians, who would undoubtedly have advanced upon Rome if they had not been anticipated by the French. General Oudinot, with 8000 men, landed at Civita Vecchia on April 5, and at once marched against the city. The republican leaders determined on a desperate resistance, and after seven hours' fighting the assailants were driven back from the walls (30 April). But Oudinot received reinforcements, which enabled him to invest the city with 35,000 men, and, after resisting for a month, Rome was taken on July 3. Garibaldi, who had been the inspiring leader of the defence, escaped with his devoted followers to the mountains. Oudinot put an end to the Roman Republic by establishing a government in the pope's name, but Pius IX. refused to trust himself to his foreign allies, and continued to reside at Gaeta. Venice was now completely isolated, but continued to make a heroic resistance until August 26, when it was compelled, partly by the bombardment and partly by famine, to capitulate. Manin, the hero of the short-lived period of liberty, was allowed to retire into exile.

Meanwhile the reaction in Naples and Sicily had been completed without foreign assistance. Ferdinand II., after recalling his troops from the war in Lombardy, had employed them in reducing the Sicilians to obedience. Messina was taken by storm (7 Sept., 1848), and the cruelties practised by the victors were so atrocious that Ferdinand received the nickname of King Bomba. The Neapolitan Parliament was continually prorogued, and was finally dissolved without ever having been allowed to meet. The Austrian victory of Novara encouraged the king to renew his attack upon Sicily. In April, 1849, Palermo was captured, and by the end of May the authority of the Neapolitan king was completely restored.

§ 17. The suppression of disorder at Vienna after the capture of the city by Windischgrätz led to a similar reaction in Prussia. A constituent assembly had been sitting in Berlin ever since May 22, 1848, in which the democratic party sought to carry through its aims with the support of the mob. In June the arsenal was sacked, and the assembly, instead of condemning the disturbances, took advantage of them to abolish the constitution granted by the king and to issue a more democratic one of their own. In August and September the populace was guilty of fresh outrages, which the government was unable to check. But the news from Vienna emboldened the king, Frederick William IV., to take decisive measures. Count Brandenburg, a natural son of Frederick William II., was authorised to form a ministry, of which Manteuffel, minister of the interior, was the guiding spirit (4 Nov.). Four days later the constituent assembly was transferred from Berlin to the town of Brandenburg. When the democrats refused to obey, a considerable body of troops under Wrangel entered the capital and enforced compliance. Berlin was declared in a state of siege, all the inhabitants were disarmed, and the political clubs were dissolved. When the assembly resumed their meeting in Brandenburg (Nov. 27), the left protested against the recent action of the government, and quitted the hall in a body. On December 5 the king decreed the dissolution of the assembly, and issued a new constitution which had been drawn up by the ministers. This established two chambers, chosen by indirect election. The first election was ordered to take place in February, 1849.

§ 18. While the states of Europe were convulsed with the storm of revolution, a grand national assembly at Frankfort was endeavouring to devise a constitution which should form Germany into a great and united state. This assembly, which may be called the German Parliament, to distinguish it from the *Reichstag* or

Bundestag, had been summoned by the *Vorparlament*, and was opened in the church of St. Paul on May 18, 1848. It contained at first 300 members, but their number was afterwards increased to 500. The Parliament failed to carry out its resolutions, but nevertheless it was a notable experiment, and a worthy exponent of the hopes and aspirations of the noblest minds of Germany. The great obstacle to its success was that it had nothing but moral force to rely upon; that it trusted to the enthusiasm of the people to triumph over the jealous interests of the princes and the deeply-rooted tendencies to disunion. From the first the assembly was divided into three fairly distinct parties. On the right the conservatives, headed by von Radowitz and Vincke, wished to negotiate an agreement between the Parliament and the independent princes and governments of the separate states. On the left the democrats, led by Robert Blum of Leipzig, aimed at the establishment of a federal republic, and made up for their numerical weakness by stirring up the passions of the lower classes. The centre was the largest party, and comprised many of the most eminent men in Germany. Among its leaders were Gagern, Dahlmann, Gervinus, Arndt, Beseler, and Jacob Grimm. These men were the partisans of constitutional monarchy. They were imbued with the most ardent love of their country, but their want of practical experience in public business exposed them to the charge of being *doctrinaires*.

The choice of the president, Gagern, gave evidence that the centre was likely to have the decisive voice. The first business was to establish an executive government to take the place of the effete and useless *Bundestag*. After a long discussion it was decided to choose a provisional administrator from among the younger members of the ruling families. The choice fell upon the archduke John, who had shown popular sympathies, and who, as a Hapsburg, was likely to be acceptable to the princes. The election was intended to be a temporary compromise. The party of Gagern and Dahlmann was fully determined to entrust the headship of a new constitutional empire to the King of Prussia, and the weakness of Austria at this time made such a measure more than usually feasible. But at the moment Frederick William IV. was extremely unpopular in Germany, and it was necessary to gain time in order that this feeling might die away. On July 11 the administrator made his formal entry into Frankfort, and the *Bundestag* resigned its functions into his hands. He proceeded to nominate a ministry which should be responsible for all acts of the executive. From the first the weakness of the central government was obvious to all eyes. The Parliament ordered that all German troops should take an oath of fealty to the administrator. But the princes were by no means inclined to sacrifice one iota of their military independence, and in the larger states the order was simply disregarded. It was manifest that the central government existed only by the tolerance of the states, and that if they refused to obey there was no force which could compel their obedience.

Before proceeding to draw up the new constitution, the Parliament set itself to formulate "the fundamental rights of the German people." This was a grotesque error of tactics. The discussion of first principles naturally led to an endless discussion, and during the delay the princes were recovering strength. The first impulse of the revolutionary movement might have been strong enough to force a federal constitution upon Germany, but the Parliament foolishly allowed this impulse to spend itself and a reaction to set in before they entered upon their real task. And the discussion of the fundamental rights was not carried on without frequent interruptions. Every movement in Berlin or Vienna, every detail of foreign politics, the great question of the non-German nationalities in Poland, Bohemia, Hungary and Bohemia, all gave rise to lengthy debates in the Parliament, though it was unable to exercise a practical influence on any one of them. Among the matters that excited the keenest interest in Frankfort was the war in Schleswig-Holstein, from which the Prussian troops had been withdrawn. The Parliament warmly espoused the cause of the duchies and of "the honour of Germany." It decreed the formation of a federal army and fleet in order to carry on the war, even without the co-operation of Prussia. But meanwhile Frederick William IV. had opened negotiations with Denmark, which led to the conclusion of a truce at Malmö (26 August). By this it was agreed that Schleswig and Holstein should be subject to a common government of which half the members should be nominated by Prussia and half by Denmark; that all acts of the provisional government should be declared null, and that the Schleswig troops should be separated from those of Holstein. The Parliament denounced this truce as dishonourable, but was ultimately compelled to confirm it. This proof of weakness gave an opportunity for the democratic party to show its discontent with the action of the majority, and especially with the appointment of the administrator. Riots broke out at Frankfort, and two deputies, Lichnowsky and Auerswald, were brutally murdered (18 September). But the Government showed unexpected energy. The disorders were suppressed by the troops, and most of the democratic leaders quitted Frankfort.

§ 19. By the end of 1848 the Parliament had drawn up the "fundamental rights," and published them as a Christmas present to the nation. They were based on the prevailing liberal theories, and included legal equality for all men without regard to class privileges, the abolition of all feudal dues and burdens on the peasants, the freedom of the press, religious equality, trial by jury, the abolition of capital punishment, &c. The lesser states accepted them, the greater states took no notice, and they were soon forgotten. The assembly now turned to the great question of the constitution. By far the most important problem was the relation of Austria to a German federation. In the early part of the year Austria, then in the thick of her difficulties, had been disregarded, but matters had been completely altered in October by the reduction of Vienna to obedience. The restoration of the Holy Roman Empire with a Hapsburg head was impossible, because Prussia would never submit to it. Equally impossible in the eyes of the assembly was a return to the old organisation of the *Bund*, which had completely proved its inefficiency. In these circumstances the Parliament had three alternatives to choose between. (1) Austria might be split up, and its German provinces might be united with the German federation. (2) The Austrian empire might be left as it stood, and be excluded from Germany altogether. (3) Even though this latter plan were carried out, some bond might be found to unite the Austrian empire with the German federation. This last was the plan adopted by Gagern and his immediate followers, who proposed to form two federations—a smaller, which should exclude, and a larger, which should include, Austria. But this proposal alienated a number of sincere patriots, who could not endure the formation of a united Germany to which any Germans were refused admission. On this question parties were completely readjusted in the Parliament. On the one side stood the "Great Germans," who would not hear of the exclusion of Austria; on the other the "Little Germans," who saw no chance of forming a permanent union of Germany except under the headship of Prussia, and who realised that the admission of Austria would be fatal to their scheme. The "Great Germans" consisted not only of Austrian deputies, but of those from Bavaria and most of the South German states, which were hostile to Prussia on religious and political grounds. They had also the support of the democrats on the left, who did all in their power to frustrate the scheme of establishing a German monarchy. Gagern was at this time appointed minister by the Archduke John, and his place as president was taken by Simson, a deputy from Königsberg.

Parties being so evenly divided on a question of vital importance, the work of framing the constitution proceeded slowly. It was decided that the executive government should have the conduct of foreign relations, the supreme control of the army, and the right of deciding peace or war. The legislature was to consist of two houses: a federal chamber (*Statenhaus*), based on the independence of the states; and a popular chamber (*Volkshaus*), based upon the unity of the people. The most obstinate discussions naturally arose about the form which the executive government should take. The extreme right proposed a simple return to the old *Bundestag*, the extreme left proposed to establish an elective presidency to which any adult German might aspire. Between these two schemes every conceivable variety of government was brought forward for discussion. Some wanted a "directory" of princes, with Austria or Prussia as alternate presidents; others a triple executive, in which Bavaria should be associated with the two great powers. Austria demanded that there should be a directory of seven princes, with nine votes, Austria and Prussia having two votes each. Gradually the advantages of a single head were realised, but even then further difficulties arose. Should he be elective or hereditary? should he bear the imperial or some other title? should the office pass in rotation among the great families? The party of Gagern stood firm to their original programme, the appointment of a single hereditary emperor, and they carried the day. This pointed unmistakably to the election of the Prussian king, and the exclusion of Austria. The "Great German" party was so indignant at this that they allied themselves with the left to introduce democratic provisions into the constitution, in the hope of thus ensuring its failure. In consequence of this alliance manhood suffrage was fixed for the popular chamber, and the veto of the emperor was made suspensive instead of absolute. The constitutional party realised that these articles threatened their scheme with shipwreck, but they could obtain no other terms. The constitution was carried as a whole in the second reading, and on April 3, 1849, a deputation appeared in Berlin to offer the hereditary empire to the king of Prussia.

§ 20. The offer was sufficiently tempting, but Frederick William IV. made up his mind at the last moment to refuse it, and it must be confessed that he had ample reason for doing so. The democratic clauses which the left had tacked on to the constitution were distasteful to a prince who had had to contend with the populace in his own capital, and the crown could not be accepted without the constitution. The whole work of the Parliament had originated with the revolution, and the king would receive no gift from such a source. His acceptance would probably have involved him in a war with Austria, in which he would have to face the hostility of all the Roman Catholic states of southern Germany. The decree of the Parliament had only been carried by a very small majority, and the prospect of coercing unwilling subjects was not attractive. Moreover, flattering as the proposal was, there were many Prussians who were hostile to it, and who feared that the "rise of Prussia into Germany," as it was termed, would involve the sinking of Prussian nationality and independence. And, finally, it is more than probable that the influence of the Czar, who regarded himself as the special protector of the Confederation of 1815, had not a little to do with Frederick William's decision.

The refusal of Prussia gave a great advantage to the democratic party at Frankfort, and this was increased by the withdrawal of the Austrian deputies (14 April). The administrator had at first determined to resign his office on the election of an emperor, but advice from Vienna decided him to retain it until a federation had been established which included Austria. The assembly was resolute in its adherence to the constitution, and appointed a committee of thirty to superintend the measures for carrying it out. Twenty-eight of the lesser states had already announced their adhesion, but the kings of Bavaria, Saxony, Hanover and Wurtemberg held aloof. It was decided to force the hand of these princes by bringing pressure to bear upon them from their own subjects. But the kings met this by promptly dismissing their estates. In Prussia the lower chamber petitioned the king to accept the proposals from Frankfort, and was dissolved on April 27. But the Parliament refused to be daunted, and decreed on May 4 that all governments should be called upon to accept the constitution; that if the king of Prussia refused the headship of the empire it should be conferred provisionally upon the next most powerful prince; that the first diet, elected in the manner provided for, should meet on August 22.

To enforce these decrees the now dominant left determined to employ the revolutionary methods which had been so potent in the previous year. A riot in Dresden compelled the king to fly to Königstein, and a provisional government was erected. But the troops, with Prussian assistance, speedily got the better of the mob, and an attempted rising in Leipzig was also suppressed. More important were the revolutions in Baden and the Palatinate, but here also Prussia intervened with decisive effect. The Parliament was now completely discredited. The Prussian and Saxon deputies were withdrawn, and Gagern, finding himself in a hopeless minority, resigned office with his colleagues. The democrats, thus left to their own devices, passed futile protests against the action of Prussia, and took the revolutionary movement under their feeble protection. Thinking Frankfort insecure, they transferred their session to Stuttgart (6 June); but when they endeavoured to excite a movement among the mob, the government of Wurtemberg closed the hall against them, and the first German Parliament came to an end on June 18, 1849. It had failed lamentably to carry through the work it had undertaken; but it had played a conspicuous part in its earlier days, and it had given an impulse to German unity which was destined to take effect in later times.

§ 21. As Austria was at this time occupied with the wars in Hungary and Italy, the restoration of order in Germany fell to Prussia, which thus obtained a commanding position. Frederick William IV. had not refused the offer of the empire from any personal unwillingness or want of ambition; on the contrary, he was eager to become the head of Germany, if he could do so with the consent of the other governments, instead of being forced upon them by a revolutionary Assembly. On May 17, 1849, he opened a conference of princes at Berlin, before which he laid his plan of a confederation exclusive of Austria. Prussia was to be president of a college of princes with six votes, and a federal parliament was to be formed of two chambers. Bavaria withdrew from the meeting, but Hanover and Saxony remained, and thus was formed the "league of the three kings" (*Dreikönigsbund*). The party of Gagern and Dahlmann held a meeting at Gotha (the *Nachparlament*) to express their approval of the Prussian plan.

But Austria now succeeded in putting down the opposition in Italy and Hungary, and prepared to vindicate its position in Germany. Bavaria and Wurtemberg offered their mediation, and the Interim was arranged as a compromise between the two rival powers. This formed a commission, appointed by Austria and Prussia, into whose hands the administrator was to resign his functions, and which should act as a provisional government in Germany until May 1, 1850. The Prussian king met the emperor of Austria at Töplitz (7 Sept.), and accepted this agreement. But the rivalry of the two states continued until a permanent settlement could be arranged. The "league of the three kings" was broken up by the secession of Hanover and Saxony, but Prussia adhered to its plan of forming a "Union" apart from Austria. The issue of a new Prussian constitution (6 Feb. 1850) conciliated the liberal party in Germany, while Austria relied upon the arbitrary tendencies of the princes. On March 20 the second German Parliament met at Erfurt, but it had none of the prestige or independence of its predecessor at Frankfort. It was completely subservient to Prussian influence, and sat only to confirm the projected "Union," which was now joined by Hesse-Cassel, Oldenburg, Baden, Weimar, and other lesser states.

§ 22. But Austria refused to fall without a struggle from the leading position it had so long held in Germany, and could rely upon the unhesitating support of the four kingdoms and of Russia, which now began to exercise a great influence in German affairs. The ministry of Schwarzenberg took the bold step of summoning the old *Bundestag* to Frankfort, and the summons was obeyed by all the states which had not joined the "Union." Germany was thus divided into two hostile camps, and only a slight impulse was needed to bring about a civil war. This impulse was given by events in Hesse-Cassel, where the reactionary government of the minister Hassenpflug provoked a rebellion. The elector fled and appealed to the *Bundestag*, which promptly armed in his defence. But Hesse-Cassel was a member of the "Union," and Prussia prepared troops to resist any external intervention. For the moment a conflict seemed inevitable. But in Prussia a strong party had arisen under the leadership of Gerlach, Retzow, and Bismarck-Schönhausen, which disapproved of all the recent acts of the government, and wished to prevent the absorption of Prussia into Germany. Its organ, the *Kreuz Zeitung*, advocated a complete rupture with the Revolution, and an alliance of Prussia with the absolute powers of Austria and Russia. The influence of this party, and the intervention of Russia, prevented Frederick William IV. from embarking in a war, the issue of which was more than doubtful. A conference at Olmütz ended in the conclusion of a convention (29 Nov.), by which Prussia gave up the "Union," withdrew its protection from the movement in Hesse, and agreed to join a conference at Dresden for the settlement of German affairs. Count Brandenburg, who was ill, succumbed to the bitter humiliation, and Manteuffel, who became head of the ministry, allied himself closely with the *Kreuz* party. The rebellion in Hesse was put down by the troops of the *Bund*, the authority of the elector was restored, and Hassenpflug resumed the arbitrary rule which had provoked the outbreak.

The conference of Dresden was opened under the presidency of Schwarzenberg on December 23. From the first it was evident that the influence of Russia would be decisive. The motives of the Czar's policy were very simple. He wished to maintain the cavalry of Austria and Prussia, and, by supporting the lesser states, to prevent either of them from obtaining increased power. He demanded, therefore, the simple restoration of the old state of things before 1848. This was the net result of the conference, which was closed on May 15, 1850. On the same day a Prussian plenipotentiary joined the *Bundestag* at Frankfort. Thus the great movement ended in complete failure. Francis Joseph revoked the Austrian constitution (1 Jan., 1852). Frederick William IV., however, in spite of the influence of the *Kreuz* party, retained the constitution of 1850, and thus Prussia stood ready to assume the headship of Germany under more favourable circumstances.

§ 23. The intricate question of Schleswig-Holstein was still unsettled. In March, 1849, the Danish government declared the truce of Malmö (see p. 703) at an end and renewed the war. The German *Bund* sent 45,000 troops to the assistance of the duchies, and the Danes were defeated in several engagements. But a decisive Danish victory at Fredericia (6 July) compelled the acceptance of a truce by which Schleswig and Holstein were separated. The latter duchy, as a member of the *Bund*, was to remain under the rule of the administrator, but Schleswig was to receive a Danish government and the German troops were to be withdrawn. A year later this arrangement was confirmed by a definitive treaty between Denmark and Prussia (2 July, 1850). The duchies, however, refused to accept the treaty and continued the war on their own account. But they were defeated in one battle after another, and foreign intervention stepped in to put an end to the contest. At the conference of Olmütz Austria and Prussia agreed to take joint measures to restore peace in Schleswig and Holstein. Their troops marched into the duchies and compelled the cessation of hostilities. Ultimately the treaty of London (8 May, 1852), signed by England, Russia, Austria, France, Prussia, and Sweden, guaranteed the integrity of the Danish monarchy, the succession to which was promised to Christian of Glücksburg and his male issue. The rights of the German Confederation in Holstein were left undisturbed, and the duke of Augustenburg, whose legal claim to the duchies was arbitrarily disregarded, was obliged to content himself with a pecuniary compensation. Frederick of Denmark granted his subjects a new constitution (Oct. 1855) and allowed Schleswig and Holstein to retain separate provincial estates. But he failed to conciliate the affection of his German subjects, and their discontent survived to be the source of future complications.

III. The Second Republic and the Second Empire in France.

§ 24. After the suppression of the socialist rising of June, 1848 Cavaignac had carried on the government of France with almost perfect tranquillity. The assembly proceeded with its work of drawing up a constitution for the Republic. The legislative power was entrusted to a single chamber of 750 members chosen by manhood suffrage. All parties agreed to place the executive power in the hands of a President, the royalists because the office resembled a monarchy, the republicans in imitation of the constitution of America. The chief discussion arose on the question whether the

President should be chosen by the assembly or by the nation, but ultimately it was decided that he should be elected by universal suffrage for four years. The subordination of the President to the assembly was strongly asserted, but no means were suggested for enforcing it. It was a hazardous experiment to create two powers, both having an independent origin, without any provision to avert a dead-lock between them. But for the moment future dangers were forgotten and men's minds were absorbed in the approaching election, which was fixed for December 10. The republican candidate was Cavaignac, who had given conclusive proofs of his honesty and of his ability to rule. But he had alienated the socialists by his conduct in the June rising; he was regarded with jealousy by many of his fellow-officers; and his very devotion to the Republic told against him among those who cared less for democratic equality than for the protection of their property. His most formidable rival was Louis Napoleon, who had been elected in September by five departments. This time no opposition was made to his return to France, and he took his seat as deputy for the department of the Seine. Little was known of him but the futile conspiracies of Strasburg and Boulogne, but his name was a charm to conjure with. Thanks to Thiers and other writers, the memory of the first Napoleon had come to be almost worshipped in France. The peasants and soldiers believed that the rule of another Napoleon would secure their prosperity and their glory. The Orleanists also supported him, in the belief that they could use him as their instrument to effect the restoration of the July monarchy, but events proved that their confidence in his incapacity was ill-founded. Among the other candidates were Ledru-Rollin, Raspail, the champion of the advanced socialists, and Lamartine, whose popularity had declined as rapidly as it had arisen. From the first commencement of the voting, the result was a foregone conclusion. The recorded votes numbered nearly seven millions and a half. Of these Louis Napoleon received 5,434,226, and Cavaignac only 1,443,107. Ledru-Rollin came next with 370,119, and the other candidates received hardly any support. On December 20 the President took the prescribed oath to observe the constitution, and entered upon his official residence in the palace of the Elysée.

§ 25. From the first Louis Napoleon made it his aim to abolish the republic and to revive the empire. In complete contrast to Louis Philippe, who had relied upon the middle class, he sought support from the peasants, the army, and the priests. The expedition to Rome under Oudinot was intended as a bribe to the soldiers and the church. The constituent assembly, having completed its work, was dissolved, and a new legislative assembly met in Paris on May 26, 1849. The elections gave evidence that the republicans had lost the confidence of the people. Neither Lamartine, Dupont de l'Eure, Garnier Pagés, Flocon, nor Marie obtained seats. The opposition consisted of about 120 extreme democrats under the lead of Ledru-Rollin, and they revived the old revolutionary title of the "Mountain." The failure of Oudinot's first attack on Rome gave occasion for a rising in Paris in June. But the troops under Changarnier speedily put down disorder, and the movement of reaction was strengthened. Ledru-Rollin fled to London. Several of the republican journals were suppressed, and a new law was introduced to shackle the press. In October the President dismissed his ministers, who were too constitutional for his tastes, and filled their places with more obscure but more docile instruments.

To a certain extent the President and the majority of the assembly pursued common objects. Both were hostile to the republic, but while the latter wished to restore a constitutional monarchy, Louis Napoleon scarcely troubled to conceal his despotic inclinations. As long as they could work together, the progress of reaction was rapid. The *parti de l'ordre*, headed by Thiers, Broglie, Molé, and Montalembert, determined to avert the dangers threatened by universal suffrage. After a stormy debate, in which Thiers excited the fury of the "Mountain" by speaking of "*la vile multitude*," they carried their proposal restricting the suffrage to citizens domiciled for three consecutive years in the same commune (May 30, 1850). To simplify press prosecutions, it was decreed that all articles should be signed by the writers. A number of eminent professors were removed from the university on account of their republican opinions.

As the period of his presidency was running out, and the constitution prohibited his re-election, it became necessary for Louis Napoleon to take active measures to secure his power. He was always discussing schemes with his associates, but could never make up his mind as to the exact moment for executing them. As his designs became more and more apparent, the assembly began to show distrust and hostility. In January, 1851, General Changarnier was dismissed from the command of the Paris garrison and the national guard, apparently because his regiments had not raised the cry of *Vive l'Empereur!* at the recent reviews. The assembly declared its confidence in the general and its want of confidence in the ministry. This compelled the retirement of the ministers, but their successors were equally docile to the president, and equally unacceptable to the legislature. Petitions, got up by Napoleon's agents, poured in from the provinces to demand a revision of the constitution, but the requisite majority of votes in the assembly could not be obtained, and the project was dropped. Napoleon now determined to throw himself upon the support of the people. The assembly had made itself very unpopular by the law of May 30, 1850, which had reduced the number of electors by three millions. The ministers proposed the repeal of the law, but the majority refused to give up their measure. Thus the President posed as the champion of democratic liberties against an oligarchical and reactionary assembly. At last Louis Napoleon considered that his time had come, and fixed December 2, the anniversary of Austerlitz, as the date for the long-meditated *coup d'état.*

§ 26. The necessary preparations had been carefully made by Napoleon's agents, M. de Morny, Generals St. Arnaud and Magnan, and M. de Maupas, the prefect of police. On the night of the first, while suspicions were lulled by a grand party at the Elysée, the troops were distributed, and the necessary placards and proclamations were printed at the government press. The first blow was struck by the imprisonment of the most dangerous opponents. Generals Cavaignac, Changarnier, Lamoricière, Bedeau, together with Thiers, Victor Hugo, and Eugène Sue, were simultaneously seized in the middle of the night and dispersed to different prisons. In the morning proclamations appeared in all the streets announcing that the National Assembly was dissolved, that a new election was to take place on December 14, that universal suffrage was restored, and that Paris and the department of the Seine were in a state of siege. A new ministry was announced, in which Morny was minister of the interior; St. Arnaud, of war; M. Rouher, of justice, and M. Fould, of finance. In an "appeal to the people" Louis Napoleon proposed that the executive head of the government should be chosen for ten years, and that a Council of State, a Senate, and a Legislative Assembly should be created on the model of his uncle's constitution of the 18th Brumaire. Meanwhile, about 250 deputies met in the Palais Bourbon, and were preparing a protest against the action of the president, when the hall was surrounded by troops, and they found themselves prisoners. By this act the opposition was deprived of any common centre of union. Isolated revolts took place on the next two days, and the usual barricades were erected, but the troops gained an easy victory, though not without considerable bloodshed. By the evening of the 4th the success of the *coup d'état* was secured. The *plébiscite* was commenced on December 20, and resulted in an enormous majority in favour of the new constitution. The number of recorded votes was 7,439,216 to 646,757. The result of this vote was that Napoleon became President for ten years, and the chief constitutional checks upon his power were removed.

Like all restored princes, Louis Napoleon was an imitator. On December 2 he had closely copied the 18th Brumaire; his constitution, which was formally issued on January 15, returned to the system of the first Napoleon; the uncle had been Consul, the nephew was President. To complete the external parallel, it was only necessary to get rid of the republican title by reviving the empire, and it was certain that this would not long be delayed. The gilt eagles were restored to the standards; Napoleon's name was substituted for that of the Republic in the public prayers; the national guard was reconstituted; the President took up his residence in the Tuileries. In the autumn Louis Napoleon made a grand tour through the provinces and was everywhere received with shouts of *Vive l'Empereur!* The same cry was raised by the troops on his return to the capital. The senate was directed to discuss the matter, and it was decided once more to have recourse to a *plébiscite.* The proposal was that Louis Napoleon should be chosen hereditary emperor of the French, with the right of settling the succession among the members of his family. It was carried without discussion by 7,824,129, to 253,145. So far universal suffrage had shown itself sufficiently favourable to despotism. On December 2, 1852, the new Emperor was proclaimed as Napoleon III.

§ 27. The empire was accepted in Europe without hostility, but without enthusiasm. The governments which had just recovered from the shock of 1848 welcomed it as a defeat of the revolution. The Czar, the patron of legitimacy, was as usual the last to acknowledge the new government of France. In France itself the *coup d'état* had annihilated all opposition. The educated classes were hostile to despotism, but they were overawed by a system of espionage that made the utterance of heedless words a crime. A great revival of material prosperity followed the restoration of order, and the ardent pursuit of money-making proved an excellent salve for political discontent. The constitution of January, 1852, was renewed with a few modifications, which increased the power of the emperor, and further humiliated the *corps législatif.* To fuse the two branches of the house of Bourbon, the Comte de Chambord (Henry V.) adopted the Comte de Paris; but the royalists continued to be harmless, and the people resented the treatment of the French crown as the property of a family. The government adopted the economical fallacy that unproductive expenditure is beneficial to the labourers. Great part of Paris was pulled down to make room for more magnificent buildings. The Rue de Rivoli was extended almost to the Faubourg St. Antoine, and thus was demolished the labyrinth of lanes which formerly surrounded the Hôtel de Ville, and made it always liable to a surprise. The court was revived on the most magnificent scale, and the expenditure on pomp and festivities was enormously increased after the emperor's marriage. The first duty of the founder of a new dynasty was to marry. Napoleon began by looking round for a princess; but he found the established dynasties so cool in response to his overtures that he determined to conciliate democratic prejudices by an alliance with a subject. His choice fell upon Donna Eugenia di Montijo, the widow of a Spanish general who had fought under Napoleon I., and the marriage was solemnised in January, 1853. The empress Eugénie became the model for fashionable ladies, and her example did much to encourage that lavish extravagance which distinguished and at last discredited the second empire.

France was once more subject to the absolute rule of an individual, and the character of that individual was one of the riddles of the age. Napoleon's personal courage was indisputable, but it was combined with invincible procrastination. No advice could turn him from his purpose, but no one could predict the moment when he would carry it out. He could not endure opposition, and he surrounded himself with clerks rather than with ministers. Men like Guizot and Thiers refused to serve him, and he could never have tolerated their superiority. His early training had been that of a conspirator, and a conspirator he remained when he had attained the throne. There is little doubt that in his youth he had been mixed up in the plots of secret societies, and the associations then formed never ceased to hamper him. He was always afraid that any treachery to his old allies would lead to his assassination, and this fear had much to do with directing his policy towards Italy. He was a socialist in possession of absolute power, but he had to conciliate the established dynasties, which hated and dreaded socialism. Hence the apparent vacillation of his policy and the secrecy which always shrouded his designs. He was naturally indolent and averse to business; he would trust no one to do his work for him, and thus his administration was always defective. His ability was considerable, but it was the ability of an imitator. He had none of the original genius of his great uncle, and none of his power of choosing the best instruments. Nothing but the excessive dread of a new revolution could have kept him in power so long. The domestic history of France is almost a blank in his reign. To divert men's minds from the degradation and corruption of his rule, he adopted a vigorous foreign policy and became the firebrand of Europe. The French had been so accustomed to excitement for the last few years that they could not live without it. Napoleon fully comprehended this, and bribed his subjects with magnificent fêtes at home, and aggressive wars abroad.

It was generally expected at first that he would take the earliest opportunity to quarrel with England and to avenge the defeat of Waterloo. But an English war would have ruined the material prosperity of France, and a dispute about the Holy Places in Palestine offered the more congenial prospect of a contest with the northern despot who had been so contemptuously tardy in acknowledging the empire. When the Crimean war was over, the emperor turned his attention to Italy. It was this determination to distract the attention of the French that involved him in the war with Prussia which ultimately ruined his dynasty. The history of France under Napoleon III., as under Napoleon I., is the history of every country in Europe except France.

CHAPTER XXVII.

THE UNION OF ITALY AND GERMANY.

§ 1. The reaction in Italy; Victor Emmanuel maintains the constitution; reforms in Piedmont; ministry of Cavour; Sardinian troops in the Crimea; the Congress of Paris. § 2. Orsini's *attentat;* relations of France with England and Italy; the interview at Plombières; secret treaty with France. § 3. Austria provokes the war; campaign of 1859; battles of Magenta and Solferino; overthrow of the rulers of Tuscany, Parma, Modena, and Bologna; peace of Villafranca; Napoleon III.'s motives. § 4. Victor Emmanuel accepts Lombardy; the central provinces; their union with Sardinia; cession of Savoy and Nice. § 5. Garibaldi in Sicily and Naples; Victor Emmanuel at war with the papacy; campaign of Castel Fidardo; annexation of Umbria, the Marches, Naples and Sicily; the Italian Parliament; death of Cavour. § 6. Italy after Cavour's death; Aspromonte; the September convention with France; transference of the capital from Turin to Florence. § 7. Austria and Prussia from 1852 to 1863. § 8. The Schleswig-Holstein question; Denmark and the *Bund;* intervention of Austria and Prussia; conquest of Schleswig; the London conference; the treaty of Vienna; the convention of Gastein. § 9. Hostile preparations; the Seven Weeks' war; preliminaries of Nikolsburg; treaty of Prague; territorial acquisitions of Prussia. § 10. The North German Confederation; treaties between Prussia and the south German states; new constitution for Austro-Hungary. § 11. The war in Italy; battle of Custozza; annexation of Venetia; evacuation of Rome by the French; defeat of Garibaldi at Mentana; the French occupation of Rome is resumed. § 12. Attitude of Napoleon III.; the Mexican expedition; the affair of Luxemburg; hostility to Prussia. § 13. Revolution in Spain; expulsion of Isabella; the Hohenzollern candidature; French demands; France declares war against Prussia. § 14. The campaign from Saarbrück to Sedan; Napoleon a prisoner; revolution in Paris; the Third Republic. § 15. The siege of Paris; war in the provinces; armistice of Versailles; the national assembly at Bordeaux; the treaty of Frankfort; France after the war. § 16. The German Empire. § 17. Annexation of Rome to Italy; second transfer of the capital; death of Victor Emmanuel. § 18. Amadeus of Aosta elected king of Spain; his resignation; the Spanish Republic; accession of Alfonso XII.

§ 1. The triumph of the reaction had been more complete in Italy than in any other country. Even a moderate ruler like Leopold of Tuscany gave himself up to the current. Pius IX., who returned to Rome on April 14, 1850, abandoned all the reforms of his earlier years, and refused to listen to the advice of France, although French troops still garrisoned the city and maintained his power. The worst ruler of all was Ferdinand II. of Naples and Sicily, whose cruelties exasperated his subjects and disgusted every right-thinking man in Europe. In every court the influence of Austria was exerted to repress all aspirations towards freedom or union. The only country in which constitutional liberties were preserved was Piedmont. Victor Emmanuel had set himself from the first to achieve the object of his father and to free Italy from foreign rule. To do this he must inspire the Italians with confidence by making Piedmont the model of a constitutional monarchy. It was in vain that Radetsky offered him the assistance of "forty thousand bayonets" to establish despotism. His attachment to the *Statuto* was due to policy rather than to principle, but the honesty with which he held to his plighted word stood out in conspicuous contrast to the conduct of other princes, and earned for him the glorious title of "*il rè galantuomo.*"

While the other Italian states were groaning under the abuses of absolute rule, Piedmont entered upon the path of administrative reforms. The Siccardi laws, which were carried in 1850, abolished the *foro ecclesiastico*, i.e. the exclusive jurisdiction of the church in matters concerning the church and in cases of heresy, sacrilege and blasphemy. This measure provoked the violent hostility of the pope, but Victor Emmanuel, although the son of Charles Albert and himself endowed with a superstitious temperament, braved the storm with a courage which conclusively proved his devotion to the cause of civil liberty. It was at this juncture that a place in the ministry was given to count Camillo Cavour, who was destined to do more than any other man for the cause of Italy. The keystone of Cavour's policy was a conviction that the freedom of Italy could only be achieved with external assistance. He made it his object to obtain for Piedmont the respect and the friendship of the European powers, and he sternly repressed the revolutionary projects of Mazzini and his associates, which alienated all upholders of orderly government. In 1852, Cavour became prime minister, and before long an opportunity offered itself for carrying out his designs. When the Crimean war broke out, Sardinia offered its alliance to England and France. This step provoked the most active opposition. Its advantages were distant and doubtful, while it was easy to prove that Sardinia had no interests involved in the struggle, and no motive for incurring the hostility of Russia. But the support of the king enabled Cavour to carry his point, the treaty of Turin was signed (Jan. 10, 1855), and a Sardinian detachment of 18,000 men was sent to the Crimea. No promise of assistance was made by the allies, but a great step had been taken towards enlisting the sympathies of France and England in an eventual contest of Italy against Austria. The Sardinian troops, which were commanded by La Marmora, did not play any great part in the war. Their only success was gained in the comparatively unimportant battle of the Tschernaya. But there can be no doubt that Sardinia had risen greatly in the public opinion both of Italy and of Europe. At the Congress of Paris Cavour appeared on an equal footing with the plenipotentiaries of the great powers, and adroitly seized the opportunity to represent the evils which Italy suffered from foreign occupation.

§ 2. From this time Sardinia was practically recognised by all Italians as the representative and leader of the national cause. A subscription was raised in the chief towns of the peninsula to assist in the fortification of Alessandria. Austria was bitterly exasperated, and the Austrian minister was recalled from Turin. It was evident that the struggle could not be long delayed. Sardinia could not hope to contend single-handed with Austria, and relied for assistance upon the sympathies of Napoleon III. So far no tangible results had been obtained from the French alliance, and at this crisis an event occurred which almost broke it off altogether. On Jan. 14, 1858, Orsini, a member of the secret society of the *Carbonari*, attempted to assassinate the French emperor by throwing bombs under his carriage as he was going to the opera. The emperor himself escaped unhurt, but nearly 150 of the bystanders were either killed or wounded by the explosion. A very stringent "law of public safety" was adopted in France, which placed the persons and property of all suspected persons at the mercy of the government. But the most important result of the *attentat* was the sudden change of relations with England and Piedmont. Both countries were denounced as harbouring and protecting assassins. With England the quarrel became a serious one. The *Moniteur* published addresses from the French colonels to the emperor, which contained the most offensive references to England, and excited a storm of indignation in this country; the volunteer force was organised, Palmerston's ministry had to resign, and the government of Lord Derby showed a manifest inclination to support Austria against French designs in Italy.

The relations between France and Italy were naturally affected by the *attentat*. Orsini was an Italian and belonged to an Italian society. The reactionary and clerical parties in France tried to utilise the occasion to detach Napoleon III. from his connection with Italy. Walewski, the French foreign minister, called upon the government of Turin to introduce modifications into the laws, in order to protect foreign rulers against the plots of assassins, and to satisfy public opinion in France. But Victor Emmanuel refused to alter the constitution at the dictation of a foreign power. The only concession he would make was the passing of a law prohibiting the publication in Sardinia of articles which tended to provoke rebellion against friendly governments. In the end the act of Orsini rather helped than thwarted the aspirations of Italy. The motive for the plot was that Napoleon had broken his solemn pledges to the Italian patriots. He could not disarm the assassin more effectually than by giving some signal proof that he was still devoted to the cause which he had adopted in his youth. In July he had an interview at Plombières with Cavour at which it was secretly arranged that France would support Sardinia in case of a war with Austria. This was followed by the conclusion of a secret treaty, which confirmed the arrangement of Plombières, and agreed that Lombardy and Venetia should be annexed to Sardinia to form a Kingdom of Northern Italy. In return for these concessions, Victor Emmanuel pledged himself to cede Savoy and Nice to France.

§ 3. The neutral powers did all they could to avert the approaching war, and proposed that the grievances of Italy should be submitted to a Congress. Cavour had to exert all his diplomatic abilities to prevent a compromise, and at the same time to disguise any apparent desire for war. The assistance of France could not be looked for unless Austria could be represented as the aggressor. Fortunately, the government at Vienna stepped in to assist its enemies. Austria refused to allow that Sardinia should be represented at a Congress to settle the affairs of Italy, and finally sent an ultimatum to Turin demanding disarmament within three days under penalty of immediate war. This was exactly what Cavour was waiting for. He refused the demand, and the Austrian army, 200,000 strong, at once crossed the Ticino (May 27) and occupied Novara and Vercelli. Had they marched straight upon Turin, they could have seized the city long before the arrival of aid from France. But the Austrian commanders showed signal incompetence throughout the campaign, and the opportunity was lost. Napoleon III. lost no time in fulfilling his obligations to his ally, and assumed the command of the French army in person. On May 13 he landed at Genoa and was there joined by Victor Emmanuel. The Sardinian troops were to act as the auxiliaries of the French, and a body of volunteers, the famous "hunters of the Alps," was organised under the command of Garibaldi to harass the Austrians in the broken country at the foot of the Alps. The campaign was short and decisive. No conspicuous generalship was shown on either side, but the superior fighting power of the French gave them the victory.

The battle of Magenta (June 4), at which MacMahon won the marshal's baton, gave Milan to the allies, and forced the Austrians to retire upon the Quadrilateral. Francis Joseph now assumed the command at Verona, and at Solferino (June 24) the three sovereigns all appeared upon the field. It was a soldiers' battle, and after ten hours' obstinate fighting, in which both sides suffered enormous losses, the Austrians were again completely defeated.

The rapid success of the allies had roused the utmost enthusiasm in Italy. Leopold II. of Tuscany fled to the Austrian camp, and a provisional government was erected in Florence. Parma, Modena, and Bologna were deserted by their rulers. From all these states envoys appeared to offer the sovereignty to Victor Emmanuel. The question of annexation was deferred until after the conclusion of peace, but in the meanwhile the king sent commissioners to undertake a provisional regency in his name.

At this moment, when the freedom of northern and central Italy seemed assured, and the allies were preparing for the conquest of Venetia, the news fell like a thunderbolt upon the Italian patriots that Napoleon III. had granted an armistice to the Austrians and had concluded the preliminaries of a peace at Villafranca (July 12). By this arrangement Lombardy was to be ceded to Sardinia; Austria was to retain Venetia and the Quadrilateral; the old rulers were to be restored in Tuscany, Modena, Parma, and the Roman Legations, and Italy was to be organised as a federation under the honorary presidency of the pope. The final settlement was to be agreed upon in a conference at Zurich of plenipotentiaries from Austria, France, and Sardinia. Napoleon's motives for thus breaking his promises were eagerly debated at the time, but are now tolerably clear. He was carrying on the war not only for Italy but also for France. French public opinion, which he could not afford to disregard, was ready to welcome any weakening of Austria, but looked with fear and suspicion upon the erection of a strong and united state in Italy. It was obvious that the victories of the allies would give to Sardinia, not only Lombardy and Venetia, but the whole of central Italy, and this was more than Napoleon had contemplated at Plombières. Moreover, the annexation of the Legations would bring him into collision with the papacy, and the empire was not strong enough to dispense with the support of the priests. Personal motives had also great weight with him. He had done enough for fame, but he was conscious that his victories were not due to his own generalship, and that an attack on the Quadrilateral would be difficult and probably dangerous.

§ 4. Victor Emmanuel was bitterly disappointed by the sudden blow to his hopes. Cavour urged him to repudiate the treaty, to efuse the cession of Lombardy, and to throw the whole responsibility of the measure upon Napoleon III. But the king was too prudent to take this advice, and Cavour resigned, his place being taken by Rattazzi. Victor Emmanuel accepted the treaty of Villafranca "*pour ce qui me concerne*," and obtained a promise from the emperor that he would not tolerate any forcible restoration of the rulers of Tuscany, Parma, Modena, and the Legations. It was certain that the people would not do it of their own accord, especially while they were assured of the sympathy and moral support of Piedmont. The Sardinian commissioners were recalled, but their place was taken by provisional governments. Parma and Modena were united into a single state under the name of Emilia. In complete disregard of the treaty of Villafranca, which was confirmed by the conference of Zurich, representative assemblies were summoned, and voted for the annexation of their respective provinces to the Sardinian monarchy. Victor Emmanuel received their envoys graciously, and promised to do all in his power to obtain the approval of Europe for their wishes. It was suggested that a European congress should meet to discuss the question. The proposal came to nothing, but it served to reconcile Victor Emmanuel and Cavour. The latter was the only man who could be trusted to represent the Italian cause among the diplomatists of Europe. In January, 1860, Rattazzi resigned and Cavour was entrusted with the formation of a new ministry. Great exertions were made to induce the pope to listen to the demands of his subjects. But Pius IX. would not hear of any diminution of his temporal power, and it was evident that Victor Emmanuel must again risk a quarrel with the papacy. To conciliate the French emperor, Cavour determined that the wishes of the central provinces should be expressed by a *plébiscite*. The result was a foregone conclusion, and in March, 1860, Tuscany, Emilia, and Romagna were formally annexed to Sardinia. In the next month a parliament met in which the new provinces were represented, and the annexation was enthusiastically confirmed. The deposed princes issued futile protests, and the pope resorted to his last weapon of excommunication.

Napoleon III. discovered that it was easier to excite a storm than to allay it. In France the recent expedition was attacked as a quixotic enterprise in which French interests had been sacrificed to the aggrandisement of Sardinia. To satisfy his subjects, the emperor now demanded the cession of Savoy and Nice, which had hitherto been dropped because its condition, the annexation of Venetia with Lombardy, had not been fulfilled. It was hard for Victor Emmanuel to give up the country which had been the cradle of his race, but political interests were imperative. By Cavour's advice he consented to the sacrifice on condition that the approval should be obtained both of the Savoyards and of the Italian parliament. In the latter a violent debate took place: Garibaldi had been born in Nice, and expressed bitter resentment at its annexation by a foreign ruler. But the majority of Italians cared little for Savoy, which really stood outside the peninsula, and had no sympathy with the national cause. The annexation was approved by 229 votes to 233. Thus the last step was taken in the long process by which the house of Savoy was transformed into a purely Italian dynasty.

§ 2. The monarchy of Victor Emmanuel now included the whole of Italy with the exception of three provinces, Venetia, the remaining Papal States, and the Two Sicilies. In the latter kingdom the brutal Ferdinand II. (Bomba) had been succeeded in 1859 by his son, Francis II. Overtures had been made to the new king from Turin, proposing the formation of a constitutional monarchy in southern Italy which should co-operate with Sardinia in supporting the national cause against the foreigner. But Francis II. refused to alter the system of government bequeathed by his father, and clung obstinately to the Austrian alliance. Under these circumstances a contest between the north and south was inevitable. But Victor Emmanuel could not venture on another war for his own aggrandisement without alienating Europe and risking a quarrel with France. A solution of the difficulty was offered by an independent adventurer, whose zeal for the cause of Italy was not affected by any regard for the scruples of kings and princes. Garibaldi, indignant at the unpatriotic sacrifice of Nice, was eager to find a new field of action, and determined to offer himself as a champion to the oppressed subjects of the house of Bourbon. Collecting a "thousand" volunteers at Genoa, he sailed to Sicily and landed near Marsala (May 14, 1860). Within two months the whole island had been secured by the reduction of Palermo (June 6) and Messina (June 25). Garibaldi became an almost mythical hero, and his fame began to overshadow that of Victor Emmanuel and Cavour. Francis II. now hastened to announce his intention of granting a constitution and allying himself with Sardinia. But it was too late to win the confidence of a people that had so often suffered from the perfidy of their rulers. Garibaldi crossed over to the mainland, met with absolutely no resistance, and entered Naples in triumph (Sept. 7). Francis II. retired with 20,000 troops to Gaeta, while another part of his army occupied Capua.

Meanwhile Pius IX. had commenced a crusade for the recovery of the Legations, and entrusted the command of his army to the French general Lamoricière. The government of Turin demanded the disarmament of this force, and on the pope's refusal an army under Cialdini entered Umbria. At Castel Fidardo the papal army, a disorganised rabble of different nationalities, was utterly routed (Sept. 14). Lamoricière had to surrender in Ancona and was sent back to France. Austria, Russia, Prussia and France, expressed their disapproval of the invasion of papal territory by recalling their ambassadors from Turin. But Victor Emmanuel, having made up his mind to brave the perils of excommunication, was not much impressed with this diplomatic protest. He followed his army to Ancona and proceeded thence into Naples. An attack upon Rome or the surrounding Patrimony of St. Peter would have brought the Sardinians into collision with the French garrison, and would certainly have roused the hostility of Napoleon III.

The rapid success of Garibaldi involved an unexpected danger for Sardinia. He had not been in any formal connection with the court of Turin, and had in fact conquered Naples against its will. Instead of annexing his conquest to Victor Emmanuel's kingdom, he assumed the title of Dictator, and went so far as to demand the dismissal of Cavour. Mazzini urged him to form a Republic of Naples, and such an act must have retarded, if it did not prevent, the union of Italy. But Cavour acted with politic decision. Representing to the French Emperor that his action was necessary to thwart the revolutionary party, he assembled the parliament and obtained from it a decree authorising the annexation of the conquered papal provinces and the Two Sicilies. Garibaldi found it necessary to play a more humble part than had been suggested to him. He was still engaged in besieging Capua, when the arrival of the Sardinian army compelled the capitulation of the fortress. He laid down his temporary dictatorship, acknowledged the authority of Victor Emmanuel, and retired covered with glory to his island home at Caprera. The siege of Gaeta was now commenced in form by Cialdini. For some time the presence of the French fleet prevented any attack by sea, but at last, on February 16, 1861, Francis II. had to surrender, and sought refuge in Rome. A real Italian kingdom had now been formed by the addition of Umbria, the Marches and the Two Sicilies. Nearly 23,000,000 subjects acknowledged the rule of Victor Emmanuel. There were difficulties and dangers to be confronted in the future. National unity could not be created all at once. The population of the south had had no training to fit them for the enjoyment of constitutional liberties, and some time must elapse before Naples could stand on the same political level as Piedmont or Tuscany. The Austrians still held Venetia, and would seize the first opportunity to recover their lost supremacy. Rome, with its papal government and its French garrison, was not yet Italian, and provincial jealousies must continue as long as any but the Eternal City was regarded as the capital. But all these considerations were forgotten on February, 18, 1861, when the first Italian parliament, containing representatives from all the provinces except Venetia and the Patrimony, met in the Palazzo Carignano at Turin. Vociferous cheers greeted the arrival of "Victor Emmanuel II., by the grace of God and the will of the nation King of Italy." This ceremony was followed within a few weeks by the death of the man who had contributed more than any other to bring about this grand result. Cavour must always rank as one of the ablest diplomatists of the nineteenth century, but he was more than a diplomatist, he was a statesman. His keen perception that Italy could not be set free without foreign assistance; the adroit use which he made of Napoleon III.; the way in which he evaded the treaty of Villafranca; and, above all, the masterly manner in which he ousted Garibaldi from Naples, were all diplomatic triumphs of the highest order. But his internal reforms; his measures for the advancement of trade and education; his adherence to liberal principles in the face of a revolutionary party; his appreciation of the difficulties of uniting southern with northern Italy, are no less conclusive proofs of his constructive statesmanship. It was hard for him to die before his work was completed by the acquisition of Venice and Rome, but he may be credited with having anticipated the way in which this completion was to be brought about. He foresaw the rise of Prussia, and sought to enlist the sympathies of that power with the Italian cause. He was anxious to settle the Roman question peaceably so as to avoid offending the Roman Catholic powers. The temporal power had undoubted advantages, but at the same time it imposed serious checks upon the action of the Church. Cavour offered the removal of these checks in exchange for the sacrifice of temporal sovereignty. His favourite expression, "*Libera Chiesa in Libero Stato*" (a free Church in a free State), has been rightly chosen as the inscription on his tomb.

§ 6. Cavour left no minister to take his place, and the continuance of his policy fell to Victor Emmanuel himself. Carefully abstaining from opening the question either of Rome or Venice, he sought to utilise the interval of peace to break down the barriers between the different provinces of Italy, and to extend to all alike the benefits of material prosperity. But his subjects could not imitate the prudence and statesmanship of their ruler. Garibaldi believed that his volunteers could drive the French from Rome as easily as they had overthrown the Bourbons in Naples and Sicily, and that the government would again stand quietly by while it was done. He raised his standard at Reggio and announced his intention of marching upon Rome. But it was impossible for Victor Emmanuel to allow a war to be carried on from his own territories against a friendly power. At Aspromonte Garibaldi found himself confronted by the Italian army under Cialdini, and after a short struggle his troops were routed and himself a prisoner (August 29, 1862). The king could not have acted otherwise, but a storm of indignation greeted this apparent ingratitude towards the hero who had given him a crown. But Victor Emmanuel was undismayed, and continued negotiations with France for the evacuation of Rome. In September, 1864, a convention was at last concluded with Napoleon III., who agreed to a gradual withdrawal of the French garrison, on condition that the Italian government should undertake the defence of the Papal States against all external attack. The convention was bitterly attacked at the time as being a renunciation of Rome as the capital of Italy. In reality it was a virtual cession of Rome to Italy on condition that a sufficient interval should elapse to show that its annexation was not the result of the departure of the French. As a further guarantee of this, Napoleon demanded that the capital should be transferred from Turin to some other city. For this purpose Florence was chosen, and the court was removed to its new residence in 1865. The history of the further advance of Italian unity is bound up with affairs in Germany, to which attention must now be directed.

§ 7. A confused and depressing period of German history followed the failure of the movement towards union which had been inaugurated by the Frankfort Parliament. Austria had humiliated Prussia at Olmütz, and had gained a conspicuous victory in the restoration of the *Bundestag*. But the two great states continued their rivalry, and Germany was divided into parties adhering to one or the other. The *National Verein* adopted the views of the "Little German" party at Frankfort, advocated the exclusion of Austria from Germany, and demanded the establishment of the proposed constitution of 1849. On the other hand, the *Reform Verein* aimed at the creation of a united state in which both Austria and Prussia should find a place. If either state had made itself the champion of constitutional liberties, it might have played the part which Piedmont played in Italy. But the reaction in Berlin was quite as strong as in Vienna. Frederick William IV. lost his faculties in 1857, and the regency was entrusted to his brother, prince William, who in 1861 became king as William I. The *Kreuz* party continued to direct the policy of Prussia, and to repress every movement that savoured of revolutionary principles. The result of this attitude on the part of Prussia was that the rivalry with Austria was a purely selfish quarrel, and that there was no constitutional principle to contend for as in Italy. In fact the system of repression came to an end in Austria, where it had originated, while it was still in full vigour in the northern kingdom. The Austrian government was involved in such disastrous financial difficulties—difficulties which were immensely increased by its Italian wars—that reform became an imperative necessity. In 1861 the emperor Francis Joseph issued a new constitution establishing an Upper House of imperial nominees, and a Lower House of deputies from the provincial diets. The proposal was not cordially accepted by the chief non-German provinces, Hungary, Venetia, and Bohemia. They declined to acknowledge any single constitution for the whole empire, and demanded the recognition of their separate liberties. As they refused to send deputies to the Diet, the scheme broke down. But it served to conciliate for a moment the liberal party in Germany, and Austria took advantage of this to strike a blow at its rival. In 1863 the German princes were invited to a meeting at Frankfort, where it was proposed to reorganise the *Bund* by creating a directory of five princes with the Austrian emperor as hereditary president. But Prussia, whose position in the *Zollverein* was a source of great influence in Germany, refused to attend the meeting, and succeeded in defeating the proposed scheme. At this juncture the relations of the two great states were altogether modified by events in Schleswig-Holstein.

§ 8. The treaty of London (1852) had guaranteed the unity of the Danish monarchy, and promised the succession to Christian of Glücksburg, but it had failed to satisfy the national aspirations of the duchies. The *Bund*, which had never accepted the London treaty, was involved in constant disputes with Denmark about the details of the constitution which Frederick VII. issued in 1855. A strong Danish party in Copenhagen exerted its influence over the king to prevent any concessions being made to Germany, and at last in 1863 the *Bund* determined to send an "army of execution" into the duchies. But Denmark was encouraged to resist by the marriage of Christian of Glücksburg's daughter, Alexandra, with the Prince of Wales (March 10, 1863), which seemed likely to secure the support of England. At this critical moment Frederick VII. died, and Christian of Glücksburg ascended the throne as Christian IX. But Frederick of Augustenburg seized the opportunity to revive the claim to the duchies which his father had been compelled to renounce after the treaty of London. He could rely upon the sympathy of the *Bund*, and the enthusiastic support of the

Holsteiners. In December the army of the *Bund* entered Holstein and occupied the duchy without any opposition from the Danes. The duke of Augustenburg was proclaimed king as Frederick VIII., though he left the administration to the commissioners of the *Bund*. But matters were unexpectedly complicated by the intervention of Austria and Prussia. The two powers had been partners to the treaty of London, and could not therefore adopt the same attitude as the *Bund*, but they were determined to have a decisive voice in the settlement of a question which was so vitally important to Germany. The Prussian ministry had been headed since 1862 by Bismarck, who exercised a sort of fascination over the Austrian minister Rechberg. Germany was astounded to see the two rival states acting in apparently complete concord. Regardless of the protests of England, the combined armies marched through Holstein to Schleswig, which they determined to occupy as a hostage until Christian IX. should agree to a satisfactory settlement. The Danes had not defended Holstein, which was legally a member of the *Bund*, but they were resolved to hold out in Schleswig, which had no such connection with Germany, and which contained a large Danish population. But the superiority of the invading forces was too overwhelming. The Danes had to retire from their boasted fortification, the *Dannewirke* (Feb. 6), their obstinate defence of Düppel proved unavailing, and Fredericia surrendered (April 28). An armistice was now concluded while negotiations were carried on in a conference at London, presided over by Lord John Russell. The *Bund* demanded the complete severance of the duchies from Denmark under the duke of Augustenburg. Austria and Prussia, on the other hand, were willing to allow the "personal union" under the Danish crown to continue on condition that the duchies should receive a separate constitution. England, which had hitherto adhered firmly to the treaty of London, at last admitted that concessions must be made to Germany, and proposed a division of Schleswig into a Danish and a German half. This was accepted in principle, but no agreement could be come to about the dividing line, and the negotiations were broken off. The Austro-Prussian army renewed the war and occupied the whole peninsula of Jutland. Christian IX., unable to resist any longer, and bitterly disappointed at the failure of English support, concluded the treaty of Vienna (Oct. 30, 1864). No stipulation was made as to the future fate of the duchies, which were simply ceded to Austria and Prussia, and the king pledged himself to accept any arrangement that might commend itself to the two powers. The troops of the *Bund* evacuated Holstein in December, and the duke of Augustenburg discovered that his chances of the succession were as remote as ever.

It was evident that the relations of Olmütz had been reversed, and that in the recent transactions Prussia had led and Austria had followed. Bismarck was determined to maintain this position and to utilise the ceded duchies in the interests of Prussia. Ever since his accession to power he had set himself to increase the military resources of his country, and had not hesitated to avow his conviction that "blood and iron" would prove more effective instruments in the settlement of German difficulties than the speeches and votes which had failed so lamentably in 1849. He was encouraged in his aggressive attitude by the domestic troubles of Austria. Hungary and Venetia were on the verge of revolt, and all the non-German provinces were discontented. To conciliate them the government suspended the constitution of 1861 and restored the old system of provincial diets. But this measure alienated the German population of Austria proper, and failed to satisfy the Slavs, Magyars, and Italians. Under these circumstances it was difficult for Austria to oppose a resolute opposition to the designs of Prussia. The lesser German states tried in vain to obtain a voice in the final settlement of the duchies. Some supported the duke of Augustenburg, others proposed that the choice of a ruler should be submitted to the free choice of the inhabitants. Bismarck received all these suggestions with contemptuous silence, and continued to treat the matter as a private affair of the two great powers. At Gastein a convention was made (August 14, 1865), by which Austria undertook to administer Holstein, and Prussia Schleswig, while the small duchy of Lauenburg was sold to Prussia for 2,500,000 Danish thalers. The port of Kiel was occupied by Prussia, which at once commenced the erection of fortifications. The convention of Gastein was Bismarck's revenge for the humiliation of Prussia at Olmütz. But it was evident that the arrangement could be only temporary, and that the relations of the two powers in the duchies and in Germany could only be settled by war.

§ 9. The war was not long delayed. Austria was already convinced that its recent policy had been a great blunder, and sought to retrace its steps. Rechberg had been dismissed from the ministry, and his successors set themselves to conciliate the *Bund* and to support the claims of the duke of Augustenburg. While Manteuffel, the governor of Schleswig, rigorously forbade every expression of popular opinion, public meetings in favour of duke Frederick were openly held in Holstein under the very eyes of the Austrian representative, Gablenz. Bismarck wrote to Vienna in January, 1866, to complain of the encouragement of "demagogic anarchy" in Holstein. In April he concluded an offensive and defensive alliance with Victor Emmanuel. In a circular despatch he announced that Prussia was arming, not only for its immediate security, but also to obtain substantial guarantees for the future. As these guarantees were not afforded by the existing constitution of the *Bund*, he declared that that constitution must be amended, and demanded that its revision should be entrusted to a German parliament elected by universal suffrage. This was a startling proposal from a minister who prided himself upon being the champion of order against revolution, and who had shown resolute hostility to popular liberties at home. In Austria, the military party once more gained the upper hand, and was encouraged by the support of the middle German states, and the unpopularity of Bismarck's ministry in Berlin, to make energetic preparations for war. Napoleon III. negotiated with both parties, and sought to utilise the crisis to gain an increase of French territories in the direction of the Rhine. But events marched too fast for the procrastinating diplomacy of the French Emperor. On June 1, Austria announced that the question of Schleswig-Holstein should be submitted to the *Bundestag*, and that a meeting of the estates of Holstein should be summoned to declare the wishes of that province. Ten days latter a formal accusation was brought against Prussia of violating the convention of Gastein, and the mobilisation of the troops of the *Bund* was demanded. Bismarck responded by bringing forward his proposal for a new constitution of the *Bund*, which was to be divided into a northern federation under Prussia. and a southern under Bavaria, while Austria was to be excluded altogether. Manteuffel was ordered to occupy Holstein if the estates met, and he obeyed the order on June 8. The Austrian troops were too weak to resist, and the duchy was annexed to Schleswig under Prussian rule. On June 14 the *Bundestag*, by nine votes to six, accepted the Austrian demand for the mobilisation of the troops. The Prussian representative at once declared that this resolution was a breach of the constitution of 1815, pronounced the dissolution of the *Bund*, and quitted the assembly. War was declared against Saxony, Hanover and Hesse-Cassel, which had supported Austria.

The general expectation in Europe was that the war, which broke out on June 15, would be a long and desperate struggle, in which the superior resources of Austria would secure an ultimate victory. But these anticipations were completely falsified by the event. The Prussian troops were better organised than any others in Europe, and they were armed with the needle-gun, which enabled them to fire four or five times as fast as their opponents. On the other hand, Austria was in a hopeless financial position, its armies were composed of various nationalities, it had to send more than 150,000 men to defend Venetia against the Italians, and it had no general to be compared with the Prussian commander-in-chief, Von Moltke. In every engagement the Prussians gained conspicuous successes. Hesse-Cassel and Saxony were occupied without opposition. The Hanoverian army, after being defeated at Langensalza, was compelled to capitulate (June 29). It was in Bohemia that the main armies of Austria and Prussia came into collision. After a series of smaller engagements the great battle was fought on July 3 at Sadowa (or Königgrätz), where the Austrians were completely defeated. On July 26 an armistice was concluded at Nikolsburg, by which Austria agreed to withdraw from the *Bund*, to renounce all claims in Schleswig and Holstein, to recognise the new constitution which Prussia was to arrange for Germany, and to cede Venetia to Italy. On August 23 the preliminaries of Nikolsburg were confirmed by the peace of Prague, and Prussia undertook to restore the kingdom of Saxony, and to transfer northern Schleswig to Denmark if the inhabitants expressed a wish for such a transfer. The latter provision was wholly evaded, and though the former was fulfilled, it was on such hard conditions that Saxony became little more than a vassal state of Prussia. The two other provinces which had been occupied, Hanover and Hesse-Cassel, together with Schleswig-Holstein, Nassau, and Frankfort, were to remain in the possession of Prussia.

§ 10. Prussia now set to work to draw up the plan of a North German Confederation, to include all states to the north of the Main. Saxony, the only powerful state, was unable in existing circumstances to make any opposition. The scheme was first elaborated in a conference of plenipotentiaries of the various governments, and was then submitted to an assembly chosen by universal suffrage which sat in Berlin from Feb. 24 to April 17, 1867. The executive government was entrusted to the Prussian king as hereditary President and General of the Confederation. He was to be assisted by a Federal Council (*Bundesrath*), which was to be presided over by a chancellor appointed by Prussia. Legislation was to be in the hands of a *Reichstag*, the deputies to which were to be chosen by direct suffrage. Contributions to the common military expenditure were to be regulated by the number of soldiers which each state supplied for the federal army. Military service was organised on the Prussian system, and was made compulsory on every citizen over seventeen years of age. Bismarck was appointed to be the first Chancellor of the Confederation. With the chief states of southern Germany, Prussia was connected by the *Zollverein*, and special treaties were concluded with Bavaria, Wurtemberg and Baden, by which their territories were guaranteed, and their armies were placed at the disposal of Prussia in case of war. Thus the whole of Germany, with the exception of Austria, became practically subject to Prussian sovereignty.

Austria had been taught by the disasters of the war to realise how fatal to the empire was the discontent and disunion of the subject populations. Venetia was resigned almost with cheerfulness, and a serious effort was made to pacify Hungary. The work of conciliation was carried out by Count Beust, who had recently been minister in Saxony, but had been compelled to quit that kingdom by the enmity of Prussia. The government found it necessary to restore the old system of dualism. Hungary received a ministry and a diet of its own, while another diet and ministry were created for the provinces west of the Leitha. Joint delegations were to be appointed by the two diets for the consideration of imperial business, and there were to be three common ministers, for finance, war, and foreign affairs. This constitution, with improvements in detail, has been preserved to the present day.

§ 11. In Italy the Seven Weeks' War had produced important results. Before the outbreak of hostilities Austria had attempted to buy off Italian hostility by offering the cession of Venetia, but Victor Emmanuel had preferred to adhere to his treaty with Prussia. As soon as the war began in Germany, the Italian forces advanced towards the Quadrilateral. They were divided into two armies, one of which, under Cialdini, was to cross the Po at Ferrara, and to cut the line of communication between Venice and Verona, while the other, under the king and La Marmora, was to invest the fortresses. The plan of the campaign was based on the belief that the Austrians would stand on the defensive, and all calculations were upset when the archduke Albert quitted his position and attacked the Italians. At Custozza an obstinate battle was fought (June 24), and after twelve hours' fighting the Italian army was forced to retire to the Mincio. In July the Italian fleet was almost destroyed by the Austrians in the Adriatic near the island of Lissa. Before an opportunity was offered of retrieving these mortifying disasters, the news came that the German war had been terminated at Nikolsburg, and that Venetia was offered for the acceptance of Italy. It was a great blow to Italian pride to have to receive the coveted province at the hands of an ally instead of winning it by the prowess of the national arms. But Victor Emmanuel realised that it was not the time for excessive punctiliousness, and accepted the cession of Venetia by the treaty of Vienna (Oct. 3). The usual *plébiscite* was almost unanimous in favour of annexation, and in November the king was received with enthusiasm in Venice. Austria now possessed no territory that could be called Italian except

Trieste and the small district of the Trentino. It was just at this time that the evacuation of Rome by the French was completed in accordance with the terms of the September Convention. The great work of freeing Italy from the foreigners seemed for the moment to be accomplished. But one grievance still remained, the independent rule of the pope in Rome and the Patrimony, and this was protected by the agreement with France. The ministry of Rattazzi was foolish enough to think that Rome could be obtained in the same way as Cavour had obtained the Two Sicilies. Garibaldi was secretly encouraged to raise a new force of volunteers on the papal frontier. The result of this was that Napoleon III. at once despatched a new body of French troops to defend the city which had just been evacuated. At Mentana (Nov. 3, 1867) Garibaldi's raw levies were utterly routed by the French, and the occupation of Rome was resumed for an indefinite period. But the sympathies of Italy were for the misguided and defeated patriots, and the victory of the French *chassepôts* at Mentana destroyed all sentiments of gratitude for the services which France had previously rendered to the cause of Italian independence.

§ 12. In no country was the result of the Austro-Prussian war such an unwelcome surprise as in France. Napoleon III. was humiliated at this time by events in Mexico. In 1861, France, England and Spain had agreed to send a joint expedition to demand satisfaction for injuries inflicted on their subjects by Juarez, the head of the Mexican Republic. The two latter powers withdrew their forces when the object of the treaty had been attained. But the French emperor conceived the chimerical project of forming a grand empire of the Latin race in Mexico, which should counterbalance the power of the United States. He ordered his troops to conquer Mexico, which was achieved in 1863, and he offered the sovereignty to the Austrian archduke Maximilian, who accepted it in 1864. But Maximilian quarrelled with the French commander, Bazaine; the United States threatened to make war on the new empire; and Napoleon found the expense of the occupation a serious embarrassment. In 1866 the French troops were withdrawn, and the result was that the archduke was shot by Mexican rebels in the next year. While this mortification was still fresh, Napoleon discovered that his policy in Germany had been a complete failure. He had determined to utilise the quarrel of the two powers to obtain territorial acquisitions for France, and if the war had been a long one he might have succeeded. But the rapid success of Prussia foiled all his plans. Germany had received a strong organisation under the headship of a military state, and France had little prospect of obtaining any advantages to counterbalance the increased power of its formidable neighbour. The emperor opened negotiations with the king of Holland for the purchase of Luxemburg, which by the treaty of Vienna was a member of the German *Bund*, but which had become independent by the dissolution of that body. Prussia, however, stepped in to prevent the conclusion of the treaty, and a diplomatic conference at London arranged that Luxemburg should remain subject to the Dutch king, but that the fortifications should be demolished and its neutrality guaranteed. Napoleon III. now endeavoured to form a close alliance with Austria, and in August, 1867, he paid a formal visit to the emperor Francis Joseph at Salzburg. The visit was nominally one of condolence on the fate of the archduke Maximilian, but contemporary opinion persisted in attributing to it a political importance which it may not have possessed. At all events no important results followed the interview, but from this time it was certain that France would seize the first opportunity to measure its strength against the northern state which had made such a sudden stride towards the leadership in Europe. This opportunity soon presented itself in the affairs of Spain.

§ 13. It would be tedious to narrate in detail the domestic history of Spain under Isabella of Bourbon. The queen sought to cloak the dissoluteness of her private life by a superstitious devotion to religion and the church, and her personal sympathies were on the side of the clerical and reactionary party. But occasionally the *progresistas* and *moderados* forced themselves into office, though their jealous rivalry prevented them from maintaining the power to which their numbers entitled them. At last, in 1866, Isabella was induced to take energetic measures against the opposition. Narvaez was appointed chief minister, and the most prominent liberals, O'Donnell, Serrano, and Prim, sought safety in exile. The Cortes was dissolved, and many of the deputies, including the president, Rosas, were transported to the Canary Islands. A royalist reign of terror was established in Spain, and was continued after the death of Narvaez (April, 1868) by his successor, Gonzalez Bravo. But the Spaniards were completely alienated from Bourbon rule. They resented the scandals of the court and the despotism of the contemptible *camarilla* of priests and courtiers who surrounded the queen. The various sections of the liberal party were driven into union by their common danger. In September, 1868, Prim and Serrano returned to Spain, raised the standard of revolt, and offered the people the bribe of universal suffrage. The revolution was promptly effected, and Isabella fled to France. The leaders of the movement were not republicans, and they at once looked round for a prince to fill the vacant throne. There were three Bourbon candidates, Alfonso, Isabella's son; the duke of Montpensier husband of the queen's sister; and Don Carlos, the representative of the legal claims of the male line. But no one of them was acceptable to the people or to their leaders, and it was necessary to seek a foreign ruler. Serrano was appointed regent during the interregnum, and Prim undertook the office of minister of war. The Cortes drew up a new constitution, by which a hereditary king was to rule in conjunction with a senate and a popular chamber. The "Iberian" party wished to unite the whole peninsula by the election of the king of Portugal, but he refused to entertain the proposal. At last it was decided to offer the crown to Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, belonging to a distant branch of the royal family of Prussia. The prince expressed his personal willingness to accept the offer, but, as a Prussian subject, he demanded and obtained the approval of William I.

The prince of Hohenzollern was connected with the Bonaparte family, as his father had married Antoinette Murat, and it was hoped that his candidature would therefore be acceptable to the French emperor. But Napoleon III. represented the whole affair as an intrigue of Bismarck to extend the authority of Prussia in Europe. To satisfy him, the prince withdrew his acceptance of the Spanish crown (July 12). But Napoleon and the Ollivier ministry were convinced that a war was the only means of reviving the waning attachment of the people to the empire. A *plébiscite* in 1869 had approved a new constitution, but the increased number of negative votes had been very significant. They were encouraged by the belief that the states of southern Germany were jealous of Prussian ascendancy, and would welcome the prospect of recovering their independence. The French envoy, Benedetti, was instructed to demand a promise from the Prussian king that, if Spain again pressed the Hohenzollern candidature, he would interpose his authority to prohibit it. William I. courteously but firmly refused to give any such pledge. On July 19, France declared war against Prussia, and the streets of Paris resounded with cries of *à Berlin!* For the moment the empire seemed to be stronger and more popular than at any time since its establishment.

§ 14. All the hopes that had been based upon German disunion were speedily disappointed. The North German Confederation placed the whole of its forces at the disposal of Prussia, and voted 120 million thalers for the expenses of the war: the southern states hastened to fulfil the obligations imposed by the treaties of 1867. More than 440,000 men were placed in the field, under the nominal command of the king, but the real direction of Von Moltke. The Crown Prince, prince Frederick Charles, and Steinmetz were the chief leaders of divisions. The command of the French army was assumed by Napoleon in person, his chief marshals being Lebœuf, Bazaine, MacMahon, and Canrobert. The regency in Paris was entrusted to the Empress Eugénie. The first action was fought at Saarbrück (Aug. 3), where the young Prince Imperial underwent his "baptism of fire." From this moment events marched with a rapidity that astounded Europe. In every engagement the Germans showed an immense superiority in everything but personal bravery. The French fought with conspicuous courage, but they had to contend against superior arms and superior generalship. They were the first in the field, and ought to have taken the aggressive. Their delay allowed the Germans to enter Alsace, and to carry on the war on French soil. MacMahon was defeated at Weissemburg (Aug. 3), and again at Wörth (Aug. 6). General Frossard was driven from the heights of Spicheren by the army of Frederick Charles and Steinmetz (Aug. 6). The main force of the French was now concentrated near Metz under Bazaine, while MacMahon, who had been wounded at Wörth, retreated to Chalons. At Gravellotte a bloody and decisive victory was gained by the Germans (Aug. 18), and Bazaine shut himself up in Metz. Frederick Charles was entrusted with the blockade of the fortress, while the rest of the German army under the Crown Prince advanced upon Paris. MacMahon was now ordered by the emperor to march from Chalons to relieve Metz. At Sedan the French were completely defeated (Sept. 1), and on the next day the whole army capitulated. Napoleon himself became a prisoner and was sent to Wilhelmshöhe near Cassel.

The news of these crushing disasters overthrew the French Empire. The Empress Eugénie fled to England, a "government of national defence" was formed by the deputies of Paris, and the Republic was formally proclaimed (Sept. 4). A ministry was appointed, of which the leading spirits were Jules Favre, minister of foreign affairs, and Gambetta, minister of the interior. The Senate was abolished, and the *Corps Législatif* was dissolved. The defence of the capital was left in the hands of general Trochu, who had been appointed by the regent before her flight. M. Thiers, who had no republican sympathies, and who had refused a place in the provisional government, undertook an informal embassy to the European sovereigns to request their mediation on behalf of France.

§ 15. Meanwhile the advance of the Germans continued. On September 20 Paris was invested; on the 28th Strasburg surrendered; and, finally, on October 28 Bazaine capitulated at Metz, and 150,000 French troops, including 3 marshals, 50 generals, and nearly 6000 officers, became prisoners of war. Gambetta, who had escaped from Paris in a balloon, organised the "army of the Loire," which carried on a desperate but hopeless resistance to the invaders. Paris held out with obstinate courage, though the inhabitants were compelled to feed on vermin to escape starvation. To add to the general distress, the communists organised an *émeute* under Flourens, Blanqui, etc., which almost succeeded in overthrowing the government, but was ultimately put down by the national guard. In the provinces the Germans carried all before them in a number of local engagements. Garibaldi offered his services and came as far as Besançon, but it was too late to effect anything. Gambetta's army of the Loire was practically destroyed. The only place besides the capital which held out was the fortress of Belfort in Alsace. At last, the condition of Paris made it imperative to come to terms, and the preliminaries of a peace were arranged by Bismarck and Jules Favre at Versailles. An armistice was concluded for three weeks, and all military operations were to cease except those in the Jura and the siege of Belfort; a national assembly was to meet at Bordeaux to settle the terms of peace. The forts of Paris were to be placed in the hands of the Germans, but they were to be excluded from the city; the garrison was to surrender as prisoners of war, except 12,000 men who were left to maintain order; the blockade was to continue, but measures were arranged for supplying food to the citizens. The capitulation raised a feeling of bitter indignation in the provinces, and Gambetta announced his determination to continue the war in defiance of the armistice. But Jules Simon was despatched to Bordeaux to prohibit this useless quixotism, and Gambetta in disgust resigned his place in the ministry. The assembly met at Bordeaux on February 12, and elected M. Thiers as "head of the executive government of the French Republic." The veteran politician, whose services to his country in the moment of disaster have outweighed any errors of his previous career, at once undertook the difficult task of securing the best possible terms from Bismarck. The preliminaries were signed on February 26. France ceded the whole of Alsace except Belfort (which had surrendered on Feb. 16) and the greater part of Lorraine, including the fortresses of Metz and Thionville. The indemnity was fixed at five milliards of francs, to be paid within three years. The German army of occupation was to be withdrawn gradually as each instalment of the indemnity was paid, and while it remained was to be supported at the expense of France. The national assembly accepted the terms by 546 votes to 107, and the final treaty of Frankfort was signed on May 10, 1871.

The Third French Republic was established at a period of national humiliation unparalleled since the 15th century, but it has achieved greater permanence than either of its predecessors. Napoleon III. took up his residence at Chiselhurst, where he died in January, 1873. The death of his unfortunate son the Prince Imperial, in South Africa (June 1, 1879) seems to have rendered hopeless any project of another Bonapartist restoration. The royalist party has also suffered from the discord between the elder Bourbons and the house of Orleans. To these causes, and to the popular desire for rest, the Republic has undoubtedly owed much of its strength. The first President, M. Thiers, held office until May 24, 1873, when a hostile vote of the assembly led to his resignation, and he was replaced by Marshal MacMahon. In 1875 a new republican constitution was drawn up which created two chambers, an elective Senate and a Chamber of Deputies. As the President showed an inclination to a reactionary policy, the republicans formed a strong opposition. In 1878 MacMahon resigned, and M. Jules Grévy, who had won general respect in a long political career, was chosen as his successor.

§ 16. In Germany the result of the war was to give a great impulse towards the establishment of unity under Prussian headship. The work which the Parliament of Frankfort had failed to carry out in the revolutionary period was easily accomplished at a time when Germans were fighting side by side for a common Fatherland. Bismarck was enabled to sweep away the unnatural line of the Main, and to extend the Confederation of 1867 over the four states of southern Germany. The terms of union were settled in separate negotiations with the governments of Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Baden, and Grand-ducal Hesse. They were then submitted for formal approval to the estates of each province and to the diet of the North German Confederation. On January 18, 1871, the veteran King of Prussia was formally proclaimed German Emperor in the great Hall of Mirrors at Versailles. Bismarck, the Cavour of Germany, was appointed Imperial Chancellor. It is idle to prophecy as to the probable duration of this attempt to revive in Germany a national unity that had perished six centuries ago. The German Empire has been acknowledged since 1871 to be the first military power in Europe, and the national pride in this position has made the people overlook many domestic inconveniences and even humiliations. Bismarck has been able to maintain the ascendancy of Prussia in spite of serious quarrels with the Roman Catholic clergy, and in spite of the threatening attitude of social democracy.

§ 17. The first reverses at Weissemburg and Wörth had been followed by the hasty recall of the French troops from Rome, and the city was offered to the Italian government as the price of armed assistance to France. But Victor Emmanuel had already declared the neutrality of Italy; it would have been imprudent to join what was evidently a losing cause, and the link between Italy and France had been broken at Mentana. On September 11, ten days after the capitulation of Sedan, Italian troops crossed the frontier of the Papal States. Pius IX. had held an œcumenical council in the previous year to decree the dogma of papal infallibility, and had thus decided a dispute that had remained unsolved since the famous assemblies of Constance and Basel. Such a man was not likely to resign his temporal power of his own accord. All suggestions of a peaceful compromise were met with the invariable answer of *non possumus.* On September 18 the bombardment of Rome commenced, and two days later the city was occupied. A *plébiscite* declared for annexation to the Italian kingdom by an overwhelming majority, and in the next year the capital was transferred from Florence to the Eternal City. No protest was made against this natural completion of the Italian state. Victor Emmanuel carried out the policy of Cavour, left the Pope in undisturbed possession of the Vatican, and ostentatiously proclaimed the complete independence of his ecclesiastical authority. It was a great blow to the king to be involved in hostile relations to the head of his church, but he was consoled by the thought that he had obtained the object of his life. He had still much work to do in welding together the discordant parts of his kingdom, and increasing its material prosperity. His prosperous reign was ended by a sudden death on January 9, 1878, when the crown passed to his eldest son, Humbert I.

§ 18. It proved a very difficult task to fill up the vacancy in the Spanish throne, which had been productive of such vast results. After the collapse of the Hohenzollern candidature, the crown was offered to Victor Emmanuel's second son, Amadeus of Aosta (born in 1845). The offer was accepted, and the young prince did his best to perform the duties which he had undertaken. But Spain was wholly unfit for a constitutional monarchy. Wearied out and disgusted by the incessant factions and intrigues, Amadeus resigned his crown in 1873. A provisional republic was now formed, of which Castelar was the guiding spirit. But Don Carlos raised his standard once more in the Basque provinces, while the democrats of the south revolted against any central authority, and demanded the establishment of a republican federation. At last the restoration of order was undertaken by the army. The Cortes were dissolved by a *coup d'état*, Castelar indignantly threw up his office, and a military republic was established. This insured the unity of the state, and the anarchy of the federalists was suppressed. But it was obvious that peace could not be finally restored except by the restoration of the monarchy, and the only possible candidate was the young Alfonso, the son of the exiled Isabella. In December, 1874, he was proclaimed king as Alfonso XII. The first business of the new monarch was to terminate the Carlist war, and this was successfully accomplished in 1876. From this time the restored monarchy has maintained itself in Spain, and has satisfied the people, though without exciting any enthusiastic devotion.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

THE EASTERN QUESTION.

1830–1878.

§ 1. Russian influence in eastern Europe; conquest of Syria by Mehemet Ali; treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. § 2. Renewal of the war in Syria; death of Mahmoud II.; treaty of London; Mehemet Ali forced to accept the treaty; convention of the Straits; twelve years of peace. § 3. Quarrel about the Holy Places; Nicolas proposes a partition; Russian demands rejected by the Porte; occupation of the Principalities; outbreak of Russo-Turkish war. § 4. France and England join Turkey; the Russians evacuate the Principalities; war in the Crimea; siege of Sebastopol; § 5. Death of Nicolas; failure of negotiations; fall of Sebastopol; Treaty of Paris. § 6. Emancipation of the Russian serfs; Polish insurrection; its suppression. § 7. The kingdom of Greece under Otho I.; revolution of 1843; Greece during the Crimean war; revolution of 1862; expulsion of the Bavarian dynasty; accession of George I.; England cedes the Ionian Islands. § 8. Turkey from 1856-1875; Cretan insurrection. § 9. Rising in Herzegovina and Bosnia; the Andrassy Note; the Berlin Memorandum; deposition of Abdul Aziz and Amurath V.; Servia and Montenegro declare war; attitude of Russia; conference of Constantinople. § 10. Russo-Turkish war; siege of Plevna; passage of the Balkans; occupation of Adrianople; preliminaries of San Stefano. § 11. Opposition of England; risk of war; Congress of Berlin; cession of Cyprus to England; "peace with honour."

§ 1. The vigorous conduct of the Turkish war in 1829, the establishment of an independent kingdom of Greece under Otho I., and the suppression of the Polish insurrection of 1830, combined to give Russia a commanding position in eastern Europe. Nicolas had failed to have his own way in Belgium, but Belgium was a distant country, and Russian interests were not directly involved. In the East Russia had acted, while the other powers had debated. England, it is true, had struck a vigorous blow at Navarino, but had subsequently disowned the victory as "an untoward event." The growing ascendancy of Russia was accompanied by the rise of a wholly new policy in Europe with regard to the "Eastern Question." The old feeling that the Turk was the common enemy of Christendom, that every victory over the crescent, no matter what power it was gained by, was a subject for general triumph, completely disappeared. On the contrary, the Turkish power was to be maintained, because Russia was dreaded. To satisfy public opinion the Porte was to reform its administration, or at least to promise reform, but whether reformed or not, the power of the infidel in Europe was to be preserved from dissolution. The powers overlooked the fact that they really played into the hands of Russia, by making that state the champion of the Christian provinces of Turkey. The new policy was no sudden creation, but its genesis may be clearly traced in the twenty years which followed 1830.

The first disturbance in the east after the treaty of Adrianople was caused by the ambition of Mehemet Ali of Egypt. Mehemet had received the island of Candia as the reward for the assistance he had given to the Porte in Greece, but he endeavoured to take advantage of Turkish weakness to make further acquisitions. In 1831 he picked a quarrel with the Pasha of Acre, and seized the opportunity to conquer Syria. Mahmoud II. sent a large army against the Egyptian adventurer, but the Turks were completely defeated at Konieh, the ancient Iconium (Dec. 21, 1832). Constantinople itself was now threatened, and the Sultan applied for aid to the European powers. The Czar at once responded to this appeal, but England and France refused to sanction Russian intervention and threatened to support the Egyptians. Mahmoud was compelled to sign the treaty of Kutaieh, which confirmed Mehemet Ali in the possession of Candia and ceded Syria to him as a fief of the Porte. Disgusted with the attitude of the western powers, the Sultan concluded the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi with the Czar (July 8, 1833), and in a secret article agreed to close the Dardanelles to all but Russian vessels.

§ 2. In 1839 Mahmoud II. made an attempt to recover Syria, but his army was routed at Nisib, a village on the Euphrates, by Ibrahim, Mehemet's son (June 24). Four days later the aged Sultan died, leaving his empire to his son, Abdul Medjid, a feeble and dissolute youth of seventeen. Mehemet Ali now conceived the bold idea of supplanting the house of Othman on the throne. The Turkish fleet was carried to Alexandria and placed at his disposal by the admiral, Achmet Fevzy. But Russia was not prepared to see an able and vigorous ruler at the head of the Ottoman empire, and England had been alienated by Mehemet Ali's rule in Egypt. For once the two powers pursued a common policy in the east. France, on the other hand, remembering the part which it had once played under Napoleon, was eager to establish a protectorate over Egypt, and became the ardent champion of Mehemet. European diplomacy undertook to settle the question, and a conference met in

London. To the intense disgust of France, a treaty was arranged by England, Russia, Austria, and Prussia (July 15, 1840), by which the integrity of Turkey was guaranteed and Syria and Candia were to be restored. Mehemet Ali refused to accept these terms, and force had to be employed. English and Austrian troops defeated Ibrahim in Syria, while the English fleet bombarded Beyrout and Acre. Finding resistance to the European powers impossible, Mehemet Ali accepted the treaty of London (Nov. 27), on condition that the Pashalic of Egypt should be confirmed to himself and his direct descendants, the Porte receiving one fourth of the revenues as tribute. Russia had to sacrifice the secret article of Unkiar Skelessi as the price of English support. By a convention of July 13, 1841, the five great powers—France was this time included—recognised the absolute right of the Sultan to control the navigation of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, and the passage of foreign ships of war was prohibited. This was a defeat for Nicolas, but he was consoled by the humiliation inflicted on the government of Louis Philippe, which he cordially detested as the outgrowth of revolution.

For the next twelve years the east enjoyed a period of comparative tranquillity. Mehemet Ali abdicated in 1844, and the government of Egypt passed to his son Ibrahim. Abdul Medjid, under the influence of Redschid Pasha and Sir Stratford Canning (Lord Stratford de Redcliffe), attempted to reform the administration of Turkey on the European model. But all his schemes were frustrated by the weakness of the Sultan and the inveterate habits of his officials, and the old misrule continued. Russia was undisturbed by the revolution of 1848. While thrones and dynasties were falling on every side, Nicolas assumed the congenial *rôle* of the champion of order and legitimacy. He helped Austria to trample on the liberties of Hungary, and to defeat the scheme of a new union in Germany. He interfered to prevent the dismemberment of the Danish monarchy. When the revolutionary movement spread to Moldavia and Wallachia, 40,000 Russian soldiers occupied the Principalities, and were not withdrawn until 1850. The Czar seemed to have good grounds for believing that he could impose his will upon Europe, but the time approached when he was to be rudely undeceived.

§ 3. In 1852 an old dispute about the custody of the Holy Places in Jerusalem was revived. Napoleon, then President of the French Republic, put himself forward as the champion of the Latin Christians, and obtained for them from the Porte the right of free entry to the Sepulchre, which had been contested by the Greek monks. Nicolas, as the head of the Greek church, considered himself aggrieved by this decision. The weakness of Turkey seemed to offer a convenient opportunity for carrying out those aggressive designs which the Czar had never ceased to cherish even when he joined England in supporting the Porte against Mehemet Ali. The opposition of England might be bought off. In January 1853, Nicolas disclosed his plans in two important interviews with Sir Hamilton Seymour, the English ambassador. Without circumlocution, he suggested that the two powers should divide between them the territories of the "sick man." The Danubian Principalities, Servia, and Bulgaria were to be formed into independent states under Russian protection; England might annex Egypt, so important for the route to India, and also Candia. "If England and myself can come to an understanding about this affair, I shall care very little what the others (i.e. France, Austria, and Prussia) may think or do." England declined the proposal, and excited the Czar's indignation by publishing Seymour's despatches.

In March, Prince Menschikoff appeared in Constantinople, and arrogantly demanded from the Porte the recognition of a Russian protectorate over all Turkish subjects belonging to the Greek church. Abdul Medjid replied by offering to secure the rights of the Greek Christians by charter, but refused to do so by treaty. Menschikoff withdrew after presenting an *ultimatum*, and the Russian army under Gortschakoff crossed the Pruth (July 3, 1853), to occupy Moldavia and Wallachia as a guarantee for the fulfilment of Russian demands. The Porte treated this as an act of hostility, and declared war against Russia (Oct. 1). Omar Pasha, a Servian renegade in the Turkish service, won a conspicuous victory at Oltenitza (Nov. 4). Napoleon III. seized the opportunity to secure his recently established empire by embarking in a great war and by obtaining the countenance and support of England. The two western powers concluded a treaty with the Porte (Nov. 27), and promised their assistance if Russia would not accept peace on moderate terms. The destruction of the Turkish fleet at Sinope by Admiral Nakhimof destroyed the last chance of terminating the contest by diplomacy. The French and English fleets entered the Black Sea, and the Russian admiral had to retire to Sebastopol.

§ 4. In 1854 France and England declared war against Russia. Austria and Prussia remained neutral, but agreed to oppose the Russians if they attacked Austria or crossed the Balkans. The Czar found himself completely isolated in Europe, the result in great measure of the haughty attitude which he had assumed in recent years. By sea the allies had an overwhelming superiority, but it proved of little use to them. In the Black Sea they blockaded Odessa, but in the Baltic they found Cronstadt too strong to be attacked, and had to content themselves with the capture of

Bomarsund. It was obvious that Russia could only be seriously attacked by land. In April the Russians, under the veteran Paskiewitsch, had laid siege to Silistria, but all attempts to storm the fortress were foiled. In July the siege was raised, the Principalities were evacuated, and Austria undertook their occupation by a convention with the Porte. Meanwhile the French and English armies, under St. Arnaud and Lord Raglan, had landed at Gallipoli and proceeded to Varna. Finding the war in the Principalities settled without their intervention, the allies determined to transfer the scene of hostilities to the Crimea and to attack Sebastopol. They landed without opposition at Eupatoria (Sept. 14), and the battle of the Alma (Sept. 20) opened the way to the great fortress. A vigorous pursuit of the Russians might have taken Sebastopol at once, but the delay enabled Menschikoff to make elaborate preparations for defence. The siege lasted for more than twelve months and absorbed the interested attention of Europe. The allies suffered terribly from the severity of the climate and from the defective organisation of the commissariat. At the same time they had to resist the constant efforts of the Russian field army to interrupt the siege operations. At Balaclava (Oct. 25), and Inkermann (Nov. 5), the Russian attack was only repulsed after hard fighting and serious loss on both sides. In January, 1855, the allied forces were strengthened by the arrival of 18,000 Sardinian troops under La Marmora.

§ 5. The disasters of 1854 were a bitter humiliation to Nicolas. and probably hastened his death, which occurred on March 3, 1855. His successor, Alexander II., was more pacifically disposed, and it was hoped that his accession might lead to the conclusion of peace. But the military honour of the allies could only be satisfied by the capture of Sebastopol, and hostilities were soon renewed. The English fleet rendered conspicuous service by destroying the Russian base of supplies, but the garrison, which was now commanded by Gortschakoff, held out with unflinching courage. A grand assault, in which the English attacked the Redan and the French the Malakoff, was repulsed with great loss (June 18). The French were now commanded by Pélissier, who had superseded Canrobert, the successor of St. Arnaud. On the death of Lord Raglan (June 28), General Simpson undertook the command of the English army. Although the two armies supported each other with creditable loyalty, there can be no doubt that the dual command was a great obstacle to the success of the besiegers. On August 16, a Russian attack was repulsed with great loss on the Tschernaya, a battle in which the Sardinian contingent distinguished itself. The allies had at last succeeded in bringing a superior force of artillery to bear upon the fortress, and on the 17th the final bombardment was commenced. For twenty-three days the batteries kept up an almost incessant fire, which inflicted terrible damage. On Sept. 8 a general assault was ordered. The French stormed the Malakoff, but the English, after carrying the Redan, were compelled to retreat for want of support. The Russian position, however, was no longer tenable, and on the 10th Gortschakoff evacuated Sebastopol and retired to the north side of the harbour. The success of the allies was by no means complete, the Russians still occupied a very strong position, and the war might have been indefinitely prolonged if the people had not begun to murmur at the heavy burdens imposed upon them. The fall of the Asiatic fortress of Kars (Nov. 28, 1855) was a salve to the military vanity of Russia. Austria undertook to mediate, the bases of a pacification were agreed upon in January, 1856, and an armistice was concluded. A conference met at Paris, where the final treaty was signed on March 30. The Russian protectorate over the Danubian Principalities was abolished; the free navigation of the Danube was to be secured by the appointment of an international commission; the Black Sea was neutralised, and all ships of war, including those of Turkey and Russia, were to be excluded, except a small number of light vessels to protect the coasts; the Sultan undertook to confirm the privileges of his Christian subjects, but the powers agreed not to use this as a pretext for interfering with his domestic administration; the convention of 1841 about the Straits was confirmed; and the Porte was to be admitted to all the advantages of public law and the European concert. Russia agreed to restore Kars and to retire from the Danube by ceding a strip of Bessarabia to Roumania; while the allies were to evacuate Sebastopol and all other conquests in the Crimea. These terms were accepted by six powers, viz. France, Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, and Sardinia. A fortnight later France, Austria, and Great Britain concluded a separate agreement to guarantee the independence and integrity of the Turkish empire. In 1858 the signatories of the treaty of Paris arranged a convention to settle the relations of Moldavia and Wallachia. They were to be ruled by separate princes, who were to be chosen by the assembly of each principality, and they were to pay a tribute to the Porte. But the two principalities elected the same prince, Alexander Cusa, and in 1859 the convention was modified to allow them to become one state under the name of Roumania. In 1866 Prince Alexander was deposed, and Roumania fell under the rule of Prince Charles of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, a member of the royal family of Prussia.

§ 6. The Crimean war had exhausted the resources of Russia and had given rise to great discontent in that country. To satisfy his subjects Alexander II. adopted a liberal policy, and introduced a number of reforms, of which the greatest was the emancipation of the serfs. The peasants on the crown domains, some 20,000,000 in number, received personal freedom by a series of edicts in 1858. More difficulty was experienced in dealing with the serfs of private owners, but, after long negotiations with the territorial lords, the great edict was issued on March 3, 1861. All peasants attached to the soil became free cultivators, with the permanent occupation of part of their land, the rest being left to the lord. The permanent occupation might be exchanged for absolute ownership by a money payment, and the government organised a system of loans to enable the peasants to free themselves at once by becoming debtors to the state. There were political as well as humane motives for the measure, which extended the Czar's authority at the expense of the nobles. The change was by no means welcomed with unanimous approval. The upper classes resented the advance of despotism and demanded the concession of constitutional privileges, while the peasants thought less of the future gain than of the immediate loss of part of the land which they and their ancestors had cultivated for centuries. But, on the whole, the reform was both just and necessary, and involved more important social changes than any measure since the first French Revolution.

The liberal policy of the new Czar seems to have excited great hopes among the Poles, and their disappointment gave rise to a formidable insurrection in 1863. For two years a desperate guerilla warfare was carried on against the Russian troops, but in the end order and discipline carried the day against ill-organised heroism. Prussia, which had never sympathised with the Poles, made an alliance with the Czar. England, Austria, and France sought to mediate on behalf of the unfortunate nation, and to secure for Poland some of the liberties that had been promised in 1815. But they did not attempt to go beyond paper remonstrances, which Russia treated with contempt. The rebellion was put down with a hideous barbarity that was disgraceful to a state which had just professed such solicitude for its own peasants. It was determined to obliterate the last remnants of Polish nationality. The country was divided into ten provinces; the Russian language was introduced in the schools, and in all public acts; the university of Warsaw was Russianised; the Roman Catholic religion became a luxury which only the rich could afford; and to punish the nobles for their sympathy with the insurrection, their lands were arbitrarily handed over to the peasants. As the alliance between England and France was an effective barrier to aggression at the expense of

Turkey, Russia now devoted itself to the easier task of making conquests in Asia. Alexander II. did not attempt to play such a prominent part in European politics as his father had done. He offered no opposition to the establishment of the North German Confederation and the German Empire, but he took advantage of the Franco-German war to obtain the erasure of the article in the treaty of Paris which limited the maritime forces of Russia in the Black Sea.

§ 7. The kingdom of Greece had never thriven as its ardent admirers had expected. This was due partly to the defects of the Greeks themselves, partly to the errors of king Otho and his Bavarian advisers, but mainly to the attitude of the great powers. Neither Russia nor England really wished Greece to become a powerful state. Russia dreaded a possible rival in the headship of the Greek church, and England feared for her commercial supremacy in the Levant. Hence the defective frontier which was given to the new kingdom, and the constant snubs that it received from the European states. Otho, who was only seventeen years old when the crown was given to him, assumed the personal control of the government in 1837. Possessed of no ability, experience, or energy, but eager to exercise an absolute authority for which he was unfitted, he alienated his subjects before they had acquired the habits of loyalty. A revolution in 1843 compelled him to dismiss his Bavarian followers and to grant a constitution. When the Crimean war broke out, the Greeks eagerly seized the opportunity to attempt the annexation of Thessaly and Epirus. The king offered no opposition to the national movement, which was probably prompted by Russian influence. Regardless that by a breach of the treaties the support of England and France would be forfeited, the government openly took part in the war, which had already been commenced by an insurrection in the two provinces. The Turks had no difficulty in repulsing the invaders, whose rapacity and disorder did much to conciliate the inhabitants to Turkish rule. In May, 1854, English and French troops landed at the Piræus and compelled the king to abandon the Russian alliance. From this time the Bavarian monarchy forfeited all hold upon the respect or affection of Greece. The Italian war of 1859 evoked the warmest sympathy among the Greeks, while Otho and his court did not disguise their attachment to Austria. To put down the growing opposition, the king endeavoured to tamper with the constitution. Newspapers were suppressed, intimidation and corruption were employed to influence the elections, and the senate was packed with royal nominees. In 1862 a rebellion broke out while the king and queen were on a tour through the country. On returning to Athens, they found the city closed against them, and quitted Greece under the protection of the English flag. Otho, who never abandoned his pretensions to the throne, died at Bamberg in 1867. Meanwhile a provisional government was established, and a national assembly was summoned to elect a new king and to frame a new constitution. The assembly refused to take the responsibility of the election, and entrusted it to a national vote. By an overwhelming majority the crown was offered to the English prince Alfred (the duke of Edinburgh). But the great powers had agreed that no member of the ruling families of France, Russia, or Great Britain should ascend the throne of Greece, and the election was annulled. England now undertook to find a constitutional king, but discovered that the vacant throne was not an object of ambition to European princes. At last prince William George of Denmark, the second son of Christian IX. and the brother of the princess of Wales, was selected, and was acknowledged by the Greeks as George I. In order to conciliate the Greeks to their new sovereign, England resigned the Ionian Islands to Greece in 1864.

§ 8. In Turkey, Abdul Medjid died in 1861, and was succeeded by Abdul Aziz. The promises which the Sultan had made in the treaty of Paris shared the fate of most Turkish promises. The fact was that the despotism of the Sultan no longer existed except in name. Turkey was practically ruled by an official obligarchy, and the personal will of the nominal ruler counted for very little when it clashed with the interests of the dominant class. A series of revolts in the Christian provinces attested the continuance of Turkish oppression and of the discontent which it could hardly fail to provoke. The most important of these revolts before 1875 was that of Crete (1866–1868), which was almost openly countenanced by the Greek government. Diplomatic relations between Constantinople and Athens were broken off, and war would probably have ensued if the European powers had not stepped in to compel Greece to observe a strict neutrality. The insurrection was put down in 1868, mainly by the exertions of Hobart Pasha, an English naval officer who had entered the Turkish service, and Crete, with some nominal concessions, returned to its former servitude.

§ 9. In 1875 an insurrection in Herzegovina and Bosnia raised a storm in the whole of Turkey, and made the eastern question for three years the centre of European politics. Volunteers from Montenegro and Servia came to the assistance of the insurgents. Austria, with its large Slav population, was at first inclined to sympathise with the movement, and took the lead in procuring diplomatic intervention on its behalf. Count Andrassy, the foreign minister of Austro-Hungary, drew up a note in December in which he enumerated the concessions which the Porte ought to make to its Christian subjects. The "Andrassy Note" was accepted by Russia, Austria, France, Italy, and after some hesitation by England, and it was presented to the Porte by Count Zichy on January 31, 1876. The Turkish ministry undertook to make the proposed reforms, but the insurgents refused to accept them unless the European powers offered a practical guarantee for their execution. The note thus failed of its purpose, and the zeal of Austria perceptibly cooled as the Hungarians, who had never forgotten the conduct of Russia in 1849, showed unmistakeable hostility to the cause of the Slavs. A more energetic document, the "Berlin Memorandum," was now drawn up, and threatened active coercion unless the concessions were made within two months. But England, where Lord Beaconsfield's ministry was returning to the attitude of the Crimean war, refused to accept the Memorandum, which thus became futile. Meanwhile matters in the east were daily becoming more serious. Bulgaria joined the insurrection, but the Bulgarians were not a warlike race, and their rising was suppressed by Turkish irregular troops with a wanton barbarity that raised a storm of indignation in Europe and especially in England. In Constantinople Abdul Aziz was deposed on May 30, and was murdered a few days later. His successor, Amurath V., was a hopeless idiot, and was deposed on August 31, in favour of his brother Abdul Hamid II. Servia and Montenegro had already declared war against the Porte (July 1 and 2). Against the hardy mountaineers of Montenegro the Turks failed to gain any successes, but the Servians were completely defeated at Alexinatz (October 31). An armistice was now concluded to give a new opening for the efforts of diplomacy.

It was impossible for the son of Nicolas to look quietly on while the Slavs of Servia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina were crushed by Turkey. Alexander II. was compelled by the excited feeling of the Russian people to return to his father's policy which had been so long deserted. The alliance of the three emperors seemed to secure him against opposition from Germany and Austria, in spite of the Hungarian agitation in the latter country. France and Italy were eager for a Russian alliance, the one to get its revenge upon Germany, the other in the hope of annexing the Trentino. The English ministry was hostile to Russia, but the agitation about the "Bulgarian atrocities" during the parliamentary recess had made a great impression on public opinion, and a reaction in favour of the Liberals would secure the Czar in that quarter. In October Alexander threatened the Porte with immediate war unless a truce of two months were concluded. Hostilities now ceased, and a conference of ministers, at which England was represented by

Lord Salisbury, met at Constantinople (Dec. 23, 1876). Midhat Pasha, the leader of the reforming party, had been in power since the deposition of Abdul Aziz, and it was hoped that he would meet the wishes of the powers half-way. The conference drew up a number of reforms, and demanded that the powers should supervise their execution, and should have a voice in the appointment of provincial governors. The Porte refused to make such a sacrifice of its independence, and the conference broke up (Jan. 20, 1877). Midhat Pasha was driven from office and banished.

§ 10. In face of the obstinacy of the Turkish government, Russia had no difficulty in obtaining assurances of neutrality from the other powers, and at once prepared for war. In April, Alexander II. joined his army in person, and issued a manifesto announcing his intention to obtain "such securities for his fellow-Christians on Turkish soil as were absolutely necessary for their future welfare." A convention with Roumania secured the Russians free passage through that province. Prince Charles seized the opportunity to declare his independence of Turkish suzerainty (May 22), and joined the Czar at the head of a Roumanian army. Without meeting with serious opposition, the Russians crossed the Danube at two points, near Galacz and at Sistowa (June 21–28), and the general expectation prevailed that the campaign would be brought to a speedy conclusion. But the Turkish soldiers showed that they had not lost the military prowess which had once made them the terror of Europe. Osman Pasha repulsed two attacks of vastly superior forces upon the fortress of Plevna (July 30 and Sept. 11). The siege was now turned into a blockade, but it was not till November 10 that the heroic garrison was starved into surrender, after a desperate attempt to cut their way through the besieging forces. In Asia, the fortress of Kars was taken on Nov. 18. Servia and Montenegro had followed the example of Roumania in declaring their independence. The Russians were masters of Bulgaria, and prepared to follow up their success by crossing the Balkans. A force of 30,000 men blocked the Schipka Pass, but the Russians found another passage, took the Turks in the rear, and compelled them to capitulate (Jan. 10, 1878). A few days later General Gourko defeated Suleiman Pasha in Roumelia. The Russian vanguard, under the Czar's brother Nicolas, entered Adrianople without opposition on January 19.

The advance of the Russians to the neighbourhood of Constantinople alarmed the English ministers, and Admiral Hornby was ordered to take the English fleet to the Dardanelles. But it was too late to exert much influence on the course of events. A truce had been concluded at Adrianople on January 31, and the preliminary treaty of

San Stefano was accepted by Turkey on March 3. Roumania, Servia, and Montenegro were to be recognised as independent and to receive an increase of territory. Bulgaria, with boundaries reaching from the Black Sea to the Ægean, was to be formed into an autonomous but tributary state. Turkey was to pay an indemnity of 14 million roubles, but 10 millions were to be compounded for by cessions in Asia, which included Batoum, Erzeroum, and Kars. Russia was to recover the strip of Bessarabia that had been ceded by the treaty of Paris, and Roumania was to be compensated with the Dobrudscha.

§ 11. The treaty of San Stefano was regarded with grave misgivings by England, and the government demanded that it should be submitted to a European Congress. Russia consented to this as regards those articles which concerned the general interests of Europe, but refused to allow the discussion of the whole treaty. On this point negotiations came to a standstill, and both countries prepared seriously for war. But the exertions of Count Schouwaloff, the Russian ambassador in London, at last succeeded in effecting a compromise. A written agreement was drawn up as to the main points which were to be submitted to the Congress, which met at Berlin on June 13 under the presidency of Prince Bismarck.

Austria was represented by Andrassy, Russia by Gortschakoff and Schouwaloff, and England by Lords Beaconsfield and Salisbury. The preliminary agreement helped to smooth matters, and the treaty of Berlin was signed on July 13. Its chief result was to soften down those articles of the treaty of San Stefano which bore most hardly on the Porte. The independence of Roumania, Servia and Montenegro was confirmed, but the proposed increase of their territories was diminished. The exchange of the Dobrudscha for the strip of Bessarabia was confirmed, to the great disgust of Roumania, which had rendered loyal service to Russia in the war. The huge province of "Bulgaria" which the treaty of San Stefano proposed to create, was divided into two parts. Bulgaria proper was to form an autonomous but tributary state, under a prince to be elected by a national assembly and approved by the powers. Eastern Roumelia, on the other hand, was to remain subject to Turkey, with a certain amount of administrative autonomy, and was to be ruled by a Christian governor, nominated every five years by the Sultan and confirmed by the powers. Bosnia and Herzegovina, which had been left untouched by the treaty of San Stefano out of regard for Austria, were now handed over to Austrian occupation until they could receive a reformed administration under the guarantee of the powers. The free navigation of the Danube was confirmed, and the fortresses on its banks were to be razed, the existing arrangements about the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus were left unaltered. In Asia Russia resigned Erzeroum, but kept

Batoum and Kars. The Porte undertook to introduce reforms under the superintendence of the powers, and to grant complete political equality to all its subjects, without any regard to their religion, but no support was given to Russia's claim of a special protectorate over the Greek Christians. All other articles of the San Stefano treaty, including that of the indemnity, were left to be settled in a new agreement between Russia and Turkey. The question of Greece was brought before the congress, but no very definite conclusion was come to. The powers recommended the Porte to grant Greece a rectified frontier, and reserved their right of future mediation on the subject. A convention was now made public which had been concluded between England and Turkey on June 4, ten days before the meeting of the Congress. In order to reconcile the Porte to the cession of Batoum and Kars, England undertook to guarantee the remaining possessions of Turkey in Asia. The Sultan, on his part, undertook to introduce such reforms as should be agreed upon, and handed over the island of Cyprus to be occupied and administered by England. Lord Beaconsfield returned to England with the proud assertion that he had brought back "peace with honour." History has yet to show whether this boast was justified, and whether the treaty of Berlin provided more than a temporary settlement of the Eastern Question.[1]

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[1] Since this was written (Sept., 1885), events have occurred in Eastern Roumelia which seem likely to annul one very important article of the treaty, the subdivision of Bulgaria.

GENEALOGICAL TABLES.

TABLE I.

THE FRENCH CLAIMS UPON NAPLES AND MILAN.

(*See Chapter II.*)


John II. of France., died 1364.
Charles V., died 1380.
Louis of Anjou.*
Louis II.
Charles VI., died 1422
Louis of Orleans (died 1407) =Valentina, daughter of Gian Galeazzo Visconti, Duke of Milan.
Louis III., o.s.p. 1434.
Réné I. (died 1480) † =Isabel of Lorraine.
Charles, D. of Maine.
Charles VII., died 1461.
Louis XI., died 1483.
Charles VIII., died 1498.
=(1) Anne (2)=Louis XII. of Brittany.
Louis XII. died 1515.
Charles of Orleans, died 1467.
John of Angoulême, died 1467.
Charles of Angoulême, died 1496.
Claude = Francis I., died 1547.
John of Calabria, died 1469.
Nicholas of Calabria, o.s.p. 1473
Yolande =Frederick, C. of Vaudemont.
Réné II., D. of Lorraine.
The Dukes of Lorraine.
The Dukes of Guise.
Charles, D. of Maine,† o.s.p. 1481.

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* Louis of Anjou was adopted by Joanna I. of Naples, in order to exclude Charles of Durazzo. Louis failed to obtain the crown of Naples, but acquired Provence, which passed to his descendants.

† Réné I. disinherited his grandson, Réné of Lorraine, in favour of his nephew, Charles of Maine. On the latter's death in 1481, all his possessions and claims passed to Louis XI., the father of Charles VIII.

TABLE II.

THE INHERITANCE OF CHARLES V.


Aragon, etc.
Castile, etc.
The Netherlands.
Austria, etc.
Ferdinand, died 1516. = Isabella, died 1504.
Mary of Burgundy = Maximilian I., died 1519.
John, o.s.p. 1496.
Joanna = Philip, died 1506.
Margaret = Philibert of Savoy.
Charles V. = Isabella of Portugal.
Ferdinand I. = Anne, heiress of Hungary and Bohemia.
panish Hapsburgs.
Austrian Hapsburgs.

TABLE III.

THE HOUSE OF GUISE.


Réné II. of Lorraine (v. Table I.).
Antony of Lorraine.
Claude, D. of Guise.
Francis of Guise, ass. 1563.
Charles, Cardinal of Lorraine, died 1574.
Mary = James V. of Scotland
Mary Stuart. =(1) Francis II. (2) Henry Darnley.
Henry, D. of Guise, ass. 1588.
Louis, Cardinal of Guise.
Charles, D. of Mayenne

TABLE IV.

THE HOUSE OF ORANGE.

Anne of Saxony = William the Silent = Louisa, daughter of Admiral Colign
ass. 1584.

Maurice, o.s.p. 1625. (son of Anne of Saxony)

Frederick Henry, died 1647. (son of Louisa)

Charles I.

James II. (son of Charles I.)

Mary (daughter of Charles I.) = William II., died 1650. (son of Frederick Henry)

Emilia (daughter of Frederick Henry) = William Frederick of Nassau.

Mary (daughter of James II.) = William III. o.s.p. 1702. (son of William II.)

Henry Casimir. (son of Emilia)

John William Friso, died 1711.

Anne, daughter of George II. = William IV., died 1751.

William V. died 1806. = Wilhelmina of Prussia.

William I., K. of the Netherlands, died in 1815.

TABLE V.

THE SPANISH SUCCESSION.


Maria of Portugal = (1) PHILIP II. (3) = Elizabeth of Franc.
d. 1598.
Don Carlos.
PHILIP III. = Margaret, sister of Ferdinand II.
died 1621.
Louis XIII. = Anne of Austria
PHILIP IV., died 1655.
= Elizabeth of France.
Maria = Ferdinand III.
Louis XIV. = Maria Theresa.
CHARLES II., o.s.p. 1700.
Margaret = (1) Leopold I. (2) = Eleanor of Neuburg
Theresa.
Louis, dauphin.
Max. Emanuel = Maria
of Bavaria
Joseph I., died 1711.
Charles VI.
Louis, D. of Burgundy.
Philip of Anjou. (Philip V. of Spain.)
Joseph Ferdinand, o.s.p. 1699.

TABLE VI.

THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION.



TABLE VII.

THE HOUSE OF BONAPARTE.


Charles Bonaparte.
Joseph, K. of Spain, died 1844.
Maria Louisa of Austria.
=(2)
Napoleon I. died 1821.
(1)=Josephine=General Beauharnais.
Caroline =Joachim Murat.
Jerome, K. of Westphalia.
The D. of Reichstadt (Napoleon II.), o.s.p. 1832.
Eugène Beauharnais, died 1824.
Hortense=Louis, K. of Holland, died 1846.
Louis Napoleon III., died 1873.
The Prince Imperial, o.s.p. 1879.

TABLE VIII.

THE HOUSE OF SAVOY.

- CHARLES III., died 1553.
  - EMANUEL PHILIBERT, died 1580.
    - VICTOR AMADEUS I., died 1637.
      - FRANCIS HYACINTH, o.s p. 1638.
      - CHARLES EMANUEL II., died 1675.
        - VICTOR AMADEUS II., K. of Sicily, 1713: K. of Sardinia, 1720: died 1732.
          - CHARLES EMANUEL III., died 1773.
            - VICTOR AMADEUS III.
              - CHARLES EMANUEL IV., o.s.p. 1819.
              - VICTOR EMANUEL I., died 1824.
              - CHARLES FELIX, o.s.p. 1831.
    - Thomas Francis of Carignan.
      - Emanuel Philibert.
        - Victor Amadeus.
          - Louis Victor.
            - Victor Amadeus.
              - Charles Emanuel.
                - CHARLES ALBERT, died 1849.
                  - VICTOR EMANUEL II., K. of Italy, 1862: died 1878.
                    - HUMBERT I.
                    - Amadeus, K. of Spain, 1870–3.

TABLE IX.

THE HOUSE OF SAXE-COBURG.

- Francis, D. of Saxe-Coburg, died 1806.
  - Ernest I.
    - Ernest II.
    - Albert = Victoria, Queen of England.
  - Victoria = Edward, D. of Kent.
    - Victoria, Queen of England.
  - Ferdinand, died 1851.
    - Ferdinand = Maria da Gloria, Queen of Portugal, died 1853.
      - Pedro V., o.s.p. 1861.
      - Luis I.
  - Charlotte, daughter of Geo. IV., o.s.p. 1817. = Leopold I., K. of the Belgians, d. 1865. = Louise, daughter of Louis Philippe.
    - Leopold II., K. of the Belgians.
    - Philip, C. of Flanders.

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